Proceedings of the Committee on
Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament
Issue 8 - Evidence of March 18, 2003
OTTAWA, Tuesday, March 18, 2003
The Standing Committee on Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament met this day at 9:34 a.m. to examine proposals to amend the Parliament of Canada Act (Ethics Commissioner) and other acts as a consequence and proposals to amend the Rules of the Senate and the Standing Orders of the House of Commons to implement the 1997 Milliken-Oliver report, tabled in the Senate on October 23, 2002.
Senator Lorna Milne (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: This is our fifth meeting on the ethics package tabled by the government last fall. The package is based on work done by our colleague Senator Donald Oliver who co-chaired with Mr. Peter Milliken a joint committee on a code of conduct. Their report tabled in 1997 forms the basis of the package that we are studying today.
Today, we have before us Mr. Hughes, the Conflict of Interest Commissioner for the Northwest Territories and previously for the province of British Columbia, and Mr. Clark, Ethics Commissioner for the Province of Alberta.
Welcome to Ottawa, gentlemen. The floor is yours.
Mr. Robert Clark, Ethics Commissioner, Province of Alberta: Honourable senators, thank you for the opportunity to make a brief presentation to you. I would like to take five minutes to tell you what is going on in Alberta at this time because it deals with reappointment. I want to make it clear that I am not here seeking any responsibilities. I am stepping down as the commissioner in Alberta at the end of this month. At this time, the committee of members of the legislature from all three parties are in the final stages of selecting a new commissioner.
The expectation is that the new commissioner's name will come forward to the house with the unanimous support of the committee, a motion will be passed in the house, and then an Order in Council will be made.
The tradition in Alberta has been that those appointments are for five years. I am in my third term and I have decided to move on and do some other things.
In April of each year, a package goes out to each of the members of the Alberta legislature asking them to indicate to the commissioner any significant changes in their financial status, the financial status of their spouse and minor children, and of any companies over which they have control. During the months of June, July and August the commissioner meets individually with each member, goes over the disclosure document and explores any areas that other parties feel are appropriate.
In the early part of November of each year, a public disclosure document is filed with the clerk of the assembly and that is available to all members of the public.
This has brought a significant amount of accountability and transparency. As a matter of practice, I file my own declaration, so that I am not asking people to do anything that I am not doing myself.
The most important work I do as commissioner involves dealing with members of the assembly and senior officials who make inquiries of the office in order to get advice on steps they are considering taking or on changes that they may be considering, as opposed to dealing with issues after significant changes have taken place. From the reaction I have received from all three parties, that appears to be the most important work I do as commissioner. Members can get that kind of advice ahead of time as opposed dealing with incidents later on.
When a complaint is registered with my office, my practice is to meet with the member and the individual lodging the complaint to get as much information as I deem necessary. If the matter goes forward for an investigation, I then pose questions to the affected parties and have them respond to me in the form of a written statutory declaration. Once the statutory declarations are in, as commissioner, I come to a conclusion and then put together a package which goes to the house with my recommendations — that there be sanctions or no sanctions, or my finding that there was no breach. I include in that package all the statutory declarations, so that everyone, including the public, can see that the commissioner has or has not done his job. Every party involved gets all the information. The conclusion is that, within 60 days, if the commissioner recommends sanctions, then the house has to accept, alter or reject the recommendations.
Briefly, that is the job of the commissioner in the Province of Alberta, as far as the elected members of the assembly are concerned.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Clark.
Mr. Ted Hughes, Q.C., Conflict of Interest Commissioner, Northwest Territories: Thank you for the opportunity to be here, honourable senators. My colleague and I have been on this show for some years now. We first appeared before a parliamentary committee in 1995 on this issue and we both agreed this morning that this may be the end of the road. We are optimistic about that being so.
I want to do two things. First, I will confirm that the procedure that I follow now in the Northwest Territories, and that I followed in the Yukon and British Columbia, is similar to the process that Bob Clark has outlined with respect to the Province of Alberta.
The commissioners at the provincial and territorial level wear three hats. The first hat is that of an adviser to members, which is probably the most important role. As Mr. Clark says, he has frequent requests for advice. Sometimes it is asked for and given on an informal basis. However, the statute provides for a formal delivery of advice and, if the member has given all of the facts to the commissioner and the commissioner then responds as he must or she must in writing, then it is an opinion on which the member can rely for all purposes.
The second hat relates to disclosure, and the process followed in most jurisdictions is similar to that outlined by Mr. Clark.
The third hat relates to the complaint process where either a member or, in some jurisdictions, a member of the public can lay a complaint with respect to a member of the legislature being in violation of the statutory provisions of the Conflict of Interest Act. It is then up to the commissioner to decide whether there is a basis to proceed with an investigation and deal with the matter through an internal hearing and responding to the legislature.
Let me say that in the three jurisdictions that I have served, the selection of the commissioner was always one by the legislature in public session. The statute in British Columbia requires a two-thirds majority vote of the members to favour the nominee. I can tell you that I think any commissioner coming into office who had two-thirds with him and one-third not with him or her would not have an easy time. I think that, when the time comes for you to select a conflict or integrity or ethics commissioner or counsellor, or more than one, if that is what you decide, you will find that you will work to come up with an eminent nominee who will enjoy the confidence of the whole house. I certainly think that is very desirable.
The other area I would comment on briefly relates to the legislation, the amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act, and the code that was laid before you and before parliamentarians last summer, I believe, based primarily on the Oliver-Milliken report. It was when that process was underway those years ago that Bob Clark and I first appeared. In the main, I think that report was a very sound document and one that lays out a most acceptable blueprint for implementation in some form. There are, perhaps, a few points on which I would comment.
First, in the code that has come forward, there is no provision for family or spousal disclosure along with that of the member. While there never is an individual disclosure by a spouse, in the provinces and territories it is the responsibility of the member to, in his or her disclosure statement, make provision with respect to ownership interests and the like of the spouse. I think you should give your attention to that matter, because I am not sure that leaving that provision out will afford the kind of disclosure that there should be.
Second, I would comment on the documents that you have before you providing for the appointment of the ethics counsellor or commissioner by the Governor in Council rather than on the basis of the recommendation provided for in the Oliver-Milliken report, which was to come about as a result of, as I understand it, the Speakers of the two Houses consulting with the leaders of the various parties and then tabling a nomination for passage in both Houses. It seems to me that that is a very sensible, procedural way of going about it. However, the important point is, I think, that there must be an appointment by Parliament, with responsibility resting in the nominee to report to Parliament if, indeed, you are to have overall transparency.
With respect to that, it is my view that, insofar as the complaint process is concerned, the hearing of complaints must fall under the jurisdiction of the ethics commissioner who has been appointed by Parliament. I say that with respect to not only the responsibility of parliamentarians under the code of conduct, but also with respect to the Prime Minister's guidelines for ministers.
We take no issue with the basic proposition that the cabinet is the prerogative of the Prime Minister, but I know that the documents before you provide for the Ethics Counsellor to investigate a complaint that has been made with respect to a violation of the Prime Minister's guidelines and then report to the Prime Minister, the complainor and the minister about whom the complaint was made, and that it then be made public. The important point is that the decision has to be made by a party or person who has been appointed by Parliament, and the results of the investigation are a matter of public record.
One consideration, of course, is the mammoth size of the responsibility that presently rests with Mr. Wilson who, under the Prime Minister's code of conduct, not only deals with ministers and parliamentary secretaries and secretaries of state, but also 1,300 full-time government appointees and 2,000 part-time Governor in Council appointees. If you add to that the 300 members of the House and the 105 or whatever it is of your assembly, then you have a very large and onerous responsibility. It may be that there is a place for some division of responsibility. I know that the Prime Minister's office has found the advice given to them by Mr. Wilson to be helpful and important. It may be that one person could assume that role and also look after the Governor in Council appointees and the full-time Order in Council appointees, while leaving to a parliamentary appointee the affairs of the 301 and the 105, if my numbers are correct, members of the houses.
Having looked at transcripts of the evidence that has been given before this committee in the last month, it is clear that there is a view that there should be a separate commissioner for the Senate. That is a matter for you to decide. That might bring about a further lessening of the responsibilities of the person at the top. It is certainly a proposal that is worthy of consideration.
Those are the introductory remarks I have to make, honourable senators. Mr. Clark and I would be pleased to answer any questions you have.
Senator Joyal: Welcome, Messrs. Clark and Hughes. I appreciated the general comments you made about the operation of the system in your province and territory.
My first question concerns the appointment on which you commented. The Alberta Conflicts of Interest Act states in section 33(1):
There is to be appointed, as an officer of the Legislature, by the Lieutenant Governor in Council on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly, an Ethics Commissioner to carry out those duties and functions set out in this Act...
You made the important point that there has to be an agreement by the assembly itself on the selection of the candidate and that that does not exist in the government's proposal. The Alberta Ethics Commissioner is an officer of the legislature and is qualified as such in the act. In the schedule to the act the officers of the legislature are listed specifically, and they are: the Auditor General; the Ombudsman; the Chief Electoral Officer; the Ethics Commissioner; and the Information and Privacy Commissioner.
The proposal we have before us from the government does not specify clearly that the proposed ethics commissioner will be an officer of Parliament. At the federal level, Parliament includes three elements: the Crown, the House of Commons and the Senate. We cannot say how an officer of Parliament could be an officer of the Crown, and have a responsibility in relation to the Crown. The proposed section 72.1 — and I am sure that Mr. Hughes read this before he commented — reads that:
The Governor in Council shall, by commission, under the Great Seal, appoint an Ethics Commissioner.
In the government's proposal there is no requirement to consult anyone from either the House of Commons or the Senate. In fact, the ethics commissioner, in the government's proposal will not be an officer of Parliament. As I mentioned, our Constitution is clear as to what is the Parliament in the federal context.
We are dealing with the recommendation from the government. On the basis of the Charter, the overall philosophy of Canadian institutions is to protect minorities. In a legislature, the first and foremost objective is to protect opposition minority rights. The opposition is in the minority and a legislature — a House of Commons or a Senate — dominated by a majority can always impose its selection. It is contrary to the objective of the proposal, which is to give to the public trust in the institutions that the proper rights of the minority parties or party in the legislature or in the House or the Senate have to be considered when we appoint the very person who must create that trust in the institution. If we apply majority rule to the selection of the ethics commissioner, we deny the protection that the minority parties and the representative of the minority parties should have in Parliament. Our system works on the adversarial principle. There is a government and there is an opposition that is the alternative government. Those are the fundamental principles of our system.
In defining an officer who has, first and foremost, the responsibility to maintain the trust of the public in those who act in that legislature, it is essential that the point of views of the minority parties be taken into account when we select the person who has that ultimate responsibility. The government proposal does not deal with that.
You mention that Alberta operates on the recommendation of the legislative assembly. Again, the recommendation of the legislative assembly gives rise to the imposition of majority rule. The Oliver-Milliken report opens an element of consultation that at least involves the other parties. The Milliken-Oliver report, at recommendation number 2, states:
After consultations with the leaders of the recognized parties in the Senate and the House of Commons and such other person as the Speakers consider advisable...
It is in the hands of the Speakers who are more neutral. The Speaker is selected by secret ballot in the House of Commons. The Speaker has some kind of neutral arbiter position. In the Senate, the Speaker is a Governor-in-Council appointee, but maintains a level of arbitration capacity that gives him some kind of objectivity in the performance of his duty.
This fundamental point is linked to the credibility and the maintenance of the principles that are at the root of our system. Based on your own experience, would you be of the opinion that this aspect of the proposed legislation should be amended or qualified, as far as the Senate is concerned? We have a bicameral Parliament. We do not have a monocameral Parliament. Perhaps we could hear your comments, with the provisos that I have made.
Mr. Clark: Honourable senators, I was a member of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta for 21 years. I was a minister in the former government and a Leader of the Opposition for a period of time later. I look at the matter in light of that history.
The practice is Alberta is that the five legislative officers that you listed work with what is referred to as the ``legislative officers committee'' which is made up of members of all three parties. For all practicality, a recommendation would not get out of that committee unless there was unanimous or close to unanimous support.
When I took the job on, I went to the two opposition parties and told them that I had put my name forward and that if they were prepared to support me, great; and, if not, then I would withdraw my name. Any person who would take the job on and not have that kind of initial support at the outset would be extremely foolish. I do not see that happening.
I see the protection in the fact that there is now a committee of six Tories, two Liberals and one NDP member who are sorting through the candidates in Alberta. That is why I made a comment about the recommendation.
I promised myself when I flew down yesterday at your expense that I would not say, ``This is the way you should do it.'' With that caveat, it is important that the Senate make whatever changes are needed so that the appointment has the broad support of virtually the entire Senate. It would be a serious mistake and would adversely affect the credibility of the office if there were not that broad support from the outset.
Let me assure honourable senators that, on occasion, this is a pretty lonely job. You are only as good as your last decision. I am sure both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hughes would agree. It is important to have a strong relationship with the various groups in the assembly, which I worked hard to maintain over 11 years. I do not think you can do that if there is not that kind of appointment process at the outset.
Mr. Hughes: I concur with that entirely. I would only add that, unless someone has a better mechanism in mind, the proposal of making use of the services of the Speakers of the two Houses laid out in the Oliver-Milliken report seems to be a good suggestion.
Mr. Clark: Coming from the part of the country I do, I have had occasion to talk to people on what I would say is the other side of the house, if I might put it that way. Great care should be taken to avoid a process that could be construed as the result of a casual conversation, such as, ``We would like to appoint this person.'' I am not saying that is what happened, but the perception may be that that has happened on some occasions. A formal process, such as I have outlined to you, with advertising and so on, is a far stronger approach.
Senator Andreychuk: Gentlemen, I want to explore the idea that members of the public should have the right or at least the ability to make a complaint against a member, whether it is in the Senate or in the House of Commons. If such a right were not in place, would that jeopardize the confidence that the public may have in the process?
We have heard the opinion expressed that, if the public could make complaints against us, that might be a way of furthering political agendas. We heard that could be used in a way that has nothing to do with ethics but, rather, it would politicize the process.
The other school of thought is that, if the public cannot lay complaints, it would be like an exclusive club, that is, it would be viewed as an internal process where members could lodge complaints against each other, but no one else could. I hearken back to the law process that was opened up so that the public would have a greater ability to lay complaints. Would either of you comment on the desirability of having the public involved in this complaint process?
Mr. Hughes: I would be pleased to mention my experience and I am sure Mr. Clark will add his to that. When all of the provincial and territorial statutes were first put into place, the provision was that only members of the House could lay a complaint. Gradually there has been a move in some jurisdictions to widen that to allow the public to lodge complaints.
I have never been out in front advocating that change, although it presents no problem for me. My experience is that, if any member of the public has a legitimate complaint against a member for having violated the law such as it is, whether a guideline or part of the statute, if indeed it is a bona fide complaint, there is no shortage of opposition members who are prepared to take on the task of laying the complaint. That has been my experience throughout the 10 or 12 years I have been involved in this. While it may be a step that one might want to take to democratize the system and allow the public in, I personally do not feel it is a critical step that must be taken in order to give credibility to the system.
Mr. Clark: In Alberta, the public does have the opportunity to lodge a complaint against a member. However, of the serious complaints I have investigated over 11 years, I do not believe that any of those have come from the public. However, it does allow the public to converse with the commissioner's office. I have often had to say, ``You may not think this is right, but this action does not come under the Conflicts of Interest Act.'' It does afford an opportunity for dialogue, however, and it is an important part of the educational process of what the Conflicts of Interest Act is all about.
It is in our legislation. Initially there was a fear that we would be swamped, but that has not been the case.
Mr. Hughes: If it is to be there and, as I say, I have no problem with it being there, the commissioner would want to have the authority to deal with frivolous and vexatious matters so that, if they were in that category, they could be summarily dealt with. Coming from the public, they are more likely to be in that category, than they would be if they came from members of the House.
Mr. Clark: Mr. Hughes is absolutely correct. It is important that the commissioner have the ability to deal with frivolous and vexatious matters in that way.
I have also found a reasonable approach in regards to allegations made about a member. On three or four occasions a member has come to me and said that allegations had been made against him and that he wanted me to investigate them. I have done the investigations and reported to the House that, in fact, I have investigated and found out there was no substance to the allegations and that the member had not breached the act. Then there is a report to the assembly. The member can take the position that he or she was open, upfront, and had the matter investigated by the commissioner, an independent officer, and offer the report.
Senator Smith: On this latter point, have either of you had a situation with either a member of the public or a member of the legislature — and I suppose this gets into the question of privilege inside the House or outside the House — where a defamation issue of libel or slander erupted because of allegations that had been made that proved to be baseless? Have any of these proceedings in your experience ever slid down a defamatory slope?
Mr. Clark: Sadly, yes. In one report I prepared on a member of the assembly I was most critical of the member. The member ended up no longer serving in cabinet and launched a $2 million lawsuit against me. However, I was covered legally and the matter died after five years. It was never raised off the floor, senator.
Senator Smith: Did it go to court?
Mr. Clark: No, it was dropped. On one other occasion I had a member attempt to get the court to stop a report of the commissioner going to the Speaker to be released publicly, and the court summarily dismissed the application.
Mr. Hughes: I have had no experience along that line. I will say that, once you get this regime in place, my experience has been that members are diligent in their efforts to comply and to avoid allegations of violation. When you look at the whole scheme of things, the numbers of complaints that are investigated across the country in the provinces and territories in a year are very few. Members do not want to be seen to be in violation. I have never in my all my years had occasion to recommend a sanction against a member. The preventive medicine role is the major issue.
Specifically in answer to the senator's question, no, I have not had that experience with defamation.
Senator Joyal: Mr. Clark, the act that governs your position, at section 45(1), states:
No action lies against the Ethics Commissioner or any former Ethics Commissioner or any other person who is or was employed or engaged by the Office of the Ethics Commissioner for anything done in good faith under this Act.
Therefore, were you not protected against any legal action by this very section of your own act?
Mr. Clark: The allegation was that I had not acted in good faith.
Senator Joyal: They must prove the lack of good faith, and that is quite difficult to do in court.
Mr. Clark: It never went anywhere. I will not go down that road.
Senator Joyal: In other words, you and your staff are protected by the act.
Mr. Clark: The person most concerned about that whole matter was my wife.
Senator Andreychuk: That leads into my next question very nicely. Both witnesses have made the point clearly that, if there is a code, members endeavour to meet the standards, and it is a preventive tool, whereas, if we do not have a code, we may all have different ways of looking at what is appropriate or inappropriate because there is a range of difference across the country and among different people as to what behaviour is acceptable or not.
That leads into spousal disclosure. You both said that spousal disclosure is advantageous, that it should be done, if I understand, within the disclosure of the member. I happen to agree with that. Where I have trouble, and what this committee has wrestled with, is the definition of ``spousal.'' In the old days, ``spousal'' meant husband and wife but now, as society has developed so many different relationships and they have some of the strengths and weaknesses of a spousal relationship of the traditional type, some are caught within our laws but some are only conventions within our social stream.
How can we be fair to members and deal with the expectations of the public in terms of these relationships? In other words, how would we or should we define ``spousal''?
Mr. Hughes: Many statutes have undergone revision in the era in which we live, as you pointed out, because there is a change in the environment of living and cohabitation relationships. I believe most of those statutes, whether they relate to the division of matrimonial property or whatever, have a modernized definition of ``spouse.'' It seems me that in most instances where there has not been a marriage, the definition is based upon a period of time of cohabitation. I think that you will have to adopt something along those lines. I am not an expert and I cannot say what that period of time should be, or perhaps even the extent of the relationship. However, in 2003, unquestionably the definition of ``spouse'' as a married partner, will not cover what should be covered in the legislation. I am sure your legal advisors will quickly gather together for you the various definitions that have been used in sundry statutes across the country. As I say, it is based mostly on the length of time the union has been in existence.
Mr. Clark: I would agree with that. In Alberta, there are members who are in what one might call non-traditional relationships, and those members report. In one case, the member and the significant other come in as a pair to see me every year.
Senator Di Nino: I would like to pursue the disclosure provisions in the proposed package and your experiences in that area. One of the concerns we are grappling with is the fact that a disclosure of personal effects and personal information of members may be required. We may also be talking about spouses and even others. The opportunity we have here is to try to balance public interest versus the privacy requirements of the individual.
I would like to get an opinion from the two of you on how far public disclosure of personal effects and personal assets and liabilities should go, as opposed to a confidential disclosure to the commissioner, which would only be made public when the commissioner believed it to be necessary.
Mr. Clark: The disclosure that members initially give me covers a great deal of information. It covers how many shares they have in a corporation, what mutual funds they have and their value, along with a similar listing of liabilities. I meet with the member to go over that. The public disclosure documents would simply disclose that the member has an interest in XYZ Corporation or certain mutual funds and, on the other side, that the member may have a loan with the Bank of Montreal or a credit union. The number of shares and the amount of liability, it seems to me, is not important for the public to know. The public needs to know where members' interests, assets and liabilities are, so that they can monitor the actions of the member to see that he or she is conforming to the legislation, not using insider information for his or her advantage, and not attempting to be involved in decisions where it is inappropriate to do so.
The commissioner's office does have a significant amount of personal information and, in Alberta, the legislative officers are exempt from the information and privacy legislation. One year after a member leaves, the member has a choice of either getting all his or her documents back or having them destroyed under the eye of the commissioner.
In the 11 years I have been in office, we have never disclosed personal financial information about any member. I cannot, senator, imagine a situation where that would ever be required.
One of the more significant things I have done as commissioner, especially with regard to younger members of the house, is that I have said, on occasion, ``You have been here four years, you have a young family and how are you doing?'' It is important to let members know you are concerned about how they are doing in this new arena. On a rare occasion I have said to a member, ``You are sliding back a great deal,'' but that is never made public. That is between a member and the commissioner. I have never allowed personal information to become public.
Mr. Hughes: I concur with what Mr. Clark has said. In British Columbia, where I was conflict commissioner for five or six years, in the disclosure statement, the members were not required to give a dollar figure with respect to their ownership interests, their liabilities, or their sources of income. They would have to declare what those sources of income, assets and liabilities were, subject to a long list of exceptions, but they never had to put a dollar value on it. As a result, I always felt I had a little more cooperation from the members.
An annual meeting between the commissioner and the member who has filed the disclosure statement is mandated in all jurisdictions, and it is open to the commissioner to inquire about quantum if it is deemed appropriate. I have always been of the view that, in the main, it is the asset that might trigger a possible conflict, not the amount or value of it. That has made the job a little easier in terms of getting the cooperation of members.
In the Northwest Territories, where I currently preside, members do have to disclose dollar amounts. However, as Mr. Clark said, that is not passed on to any public disclosure statement. That remains totally confidential. In the current Northwest Territories statute, there is a long list of assets that you do not have to disclose, such as bonds backed by government guarantees, GICs and that kind of thing, Life insurance policies, pension rights, and those things have come to be exempt as we have all learned more about this new field.
You must remember that, until 15 years ago, there was no conflict of interest legislation in the country. This legislation has evolved. I believe that all commissioners go out of their way to let the public know what the holdings are, but as to value and size of an estate and worth of a person, that is just not for public consumption and never occurs in any jurisdiction.
I should confess that my spouse is a municipal politician and she has to declare her ownership interests twice a year, which are then published in the paper. Spousal disclosure has not been included, but if and when they decide to ask for that, the public will quickly find that my wife has all the assets in our family.
Senator Di Nino: That is usually the case in life.
If I understood correctly, there is a difference in various jurisdictions regarding the details that should be included in the declaration. You told us that British Columbia does not require the detail that is required by the Northwest Territories.
Mr. Hughes: Insofar as dollar amounts are concerned, that is the case.
Senator Di Nino: Do you think that would be an important component of disclosure? If you have 100 shares of BCE, versus 100,000 shares, it may result in the commissioner taking a different view as to whether a potential conflict could exist.
Mr. Clark: There is a provision in our act that, if an asset is less than $1,000, you need not disclose it. That covers a lot of shares these days.
Senator Di Nino: Not in Alberta, surely.
Mr. Clark: Very much so in Alberta.
Senator Smith: There is one issue about which I want to get a response. I cannot say it is one that is really troubled me so far, but I know that other senators have expressed some concern about it. Assuming we will have a code of conduct, how will we get there? If we do it by legislation, theoretically we can make it judiciable. However, if we were to do it by a resolution of the house as something we enforce ourselves within the bounds of privilege, then the courts would have no jurisdiction.
What has been your experience with regard to judicial excursions into this area? Is this an area that might cause concern?
Mr. Hughes: I have had some experience with judicial excursions. All provinces operate with statutes, and that is the way the system operates in the provinces and territories of the country. One of the judicial matters I was involved in — and I noticed in the materials that your law clerk made available to you he made reference to this — was the case of Tafler v. Hughes, which ultimately in 1998 went to the British Columbia Court of Appeal.
Senator, this really is the point you are making. Right at the outset, Mr. Justice Lambert of the Court of Appeal of British Columbia posed this question.
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the Conflict of Interest Commissioner, acting under the Members' Conflict of Interest Act, on the complaint of a member of the public or a member of the Legislative Assembly, is acting under legislative privilege such that the courts have no power of review in relation to the way the Commissioner carries out his tasks.
On page 10 of that judgment, Justice Lambert answers the question by saying this:
In my opinion, the privileges of the Legislative Assembly extend to the Commissioner who is expressly made an officer of the Assembly by sub-section 10(1) of the Members' Conflict of Interest Act. In my opinion, decisions made by the Commissioner in the carrying out of the Commissioner's powers under the Act are decisions made within, and with respect to, the privileges of the Legislative Assembly and are not reviewable in the courts.
That is the British Columbia Court of Appeal speaking. There have been other trial division rulings, but I do not think there has been any ruling beyond the Court of Appeal of British Columbia. I do not think the issue has ever come to the Supreme Court of Canada. I think that is of some significance.
I know as well that in the materials that were made available to you, and the law clerk discussed this issue with you, was the Roberts case in the Northwest Territories, Roberts being my predecessor in the office there. There were two judgments. There was the Morin case, which in effect said the same thing as the Tafler case. As well, the Roberts case 2002 came along, where there was a decision of Mr. Justice Vertes that allowed or directed that the legislature look at the severance package, if you like, of the departed commissioner.
I think the law clerk hit this on the head as to the explanation and why that was peculiar to its own facts in the hearing that you held on February 18. Mr. Audcent is reported as saying this:
My understanding of the Roberts case was that the person was dismissed, went to the court, and the court said, ``Yes, we can consider this, because there is a statute giving you a term.'' They would not have looked at this had the issue been internal to the house.
That last statement is in accordance with what the Court of Appeal said in the Tafler case, so I hope that is of some assistance to you, senator.
Senator Smith: Yes, thank you. Do you have anything to add, Mr. Clark?
Mr. Clark: I rely on my learned friend.
Senator Fraser: I will first ask about the matter of terms. This proposal calls for a five-year, non-renewable term, and there have been some concerns expressed, at least in this end of Parliament, that five years may be too short, particularly for a non-renewable term, and in particular because it is explicitly designed to be linked to the electoral cycle, yet you have the vision of a new commissioner arriving at the same time as a whole lot of new MPs. Could you comment on that?
Mr. Clark: My experience has been that the busiest time for the commissioner is right after a provincial election. Traditionally, in Alberta, about one-third of the house turns over, even though the government does not generally, so that becomes a very busy time for the commissioner. I am in my third term now, and I am leaving in the early part of that third term, so I am obviously biased; however, if the commissioner has the support of the three sides of the house it is a mistake. I said I would not come down and tell you what to do, but I think this is an area you should reconsider and make reappointment possible.
Senator Fraser: If one stayed with a non-renewable term, should it then perhaps be a longer term? I have not heard yet from you, Mr. Hughes.
Mr. Hughes: My view is that if you are going to stay with a non-renewable term, five years is too short; a non- renewable term maximum would be 10 years, I would think. Perhaps the ideal, if it were non-renewable, would be halfway between the two, seven or eight years. I agree with Mr. Clark. If you have someone who is doing a job that is most satisfactory to everyone, then I would think a second term would not be unreasonable if the initial term is five or six years.
Senator Fraser: Another matter that I would like to raise, if I have the chair's indulgence, follows a bit on the discussion around Senator Di Nino's question. That involves the matter of the importance or significance of the assets that are being disclosed. The proposed code would say, for example, that in the public disclosure, in the summary, the ethics commissioner could qualify an interest in a partnership or corporation by the words ``nominal, significant or controlling.'' My difficulty there is who determines what is significant, and is it something that is significant to the parliamentarian or significant to the corporation?
If, to use the example cited previously, I own 10,000 shares of BCE, which I do not, incidentally, that would not be significant at all to BCE — I would just be one more statistic — but to me it might be everything I had in the world. Would that be considered significant?
Mr. Hughes: Which section of the code were you looking at?
Senator Fraser: This is section 25(2), and it is on page 10 of the code.
Mr. Hughes: That, of course, follows 25(1), which calls for the reporting of or the disclosing of the source and nature but not value of income, assets and liabilities referred to in the parliamentary statement. You are to list affiliated corporations. You ask a good question. I honestly have not considered that section. An interest in a partnership or corporation may be qualified in the summary by the word ``nominal, significant or controlling.'' I can understand that if it is a partnership; it should be indicated if the member has the controlling interest in the partnership. Your question was in whose view is it significant. Is that the question?
Senator Fraser: Basically, I am trying to get at how to determine what is significant in the sense that it might give rise to a conflict of interest and who is the judge of that. How is the public to understand what is being disclosed here, particularly if there are no dollar values attached, which I think we are all agreed there should not be in the public summary?
Mr. Hughes: I notice that is to be designated if, in the opinion of the ethics commissioner, it is in the public interest to do so. That designation will be only put on the asset if the commissioner thinks it is in the public interest to do so. I have never had an experience with a section like that.
Mr. Clark: Nor have I.
Mr. Hughes: I do not know what kinds of thinking would go into that. I do not know what would tell the commissioner that it would be in the public interest to make that designation. If it is the case of those 100,000 shares in a huge corporate body, like you say a public company, I doubt the commissioner would find it in the public interest to say anything about it. If he were to say something, I would think he would use the word ``nominal,'' but that is a subjective kind of thing or his or her part, I would think.
Mr. Clark: There is a provision in the Alberta act for the commissioner to make an exemption from a disclosure if there is a unique circumstance. To be honest, I do not recall ever being asked to do that over the 11 years I have been in the job. There is that flexibility for the commissioner, though that is the kind of thing I suspect you would want to use sparingly.
The Chairman: I am looking at this same section. It seems that an interest may be qualified, an interest that is in the partnership or the corporation, not to the individual. It applies to the corporation or the partnership, as you have said.
Senator Joyal: Mr. Hughes, the questions you raise in your presentation are of significant importance for us as a legislative, autonomous house of Parliament. You echo the brief of your federal counterpart, Mr. Wilson, who testified here on February 18. I should like to quote from Mr. Wilson's brief, where he wrote, at page 5, the following:
The last question that has come up is that in the proposal before you, the ethics commissioner should be responsible for the Parliamentary Code of Conduct as well as the Prime Minister's Code. You may recall that the proposal in June 2002 was that these would be two separate individuals. The question raised has been whether is it possible to combine responsibility in one person? Perhaps so, but I don't think the difficulties that will be caused should be underestimated. There should be no confusion on this point. This is an enormous task.
Later on, on the same page he stated:
The number of public office holders is very large. There are about 1,300 full-time public office holders and about 2,000 part-time governor in council appointees for whom we have responsibility. It will be a major task, both in terms of volume and the split accountability — to the legislature, on the one hand, and to the Prime Minister on the other hand.
My question is: Based on your own experience, and considering that we are a bicameral Parliament, would it not be better to have two ethics commissioners, one responsible to the House of Commons for all the Governor in Council appointees and for the Prime Ministerial code of conduct? That person would report to the House and the members of the House.
The Senate has longer terms of office; therefore, the term of office for a commissioner could be longer because we do not have the turnover on an electoral cycle. We are the element of stability within Parliament and have a capacity to have a commissioner who would be able to operate outside the electoral cycle and all the other administrative tasks that are invested with the commissioner. There is no question in my mind that if we are to investigate declarations of 2,000 part-time workers, 1,300 full-time workers, which totals 3,300 people, plus the 301 MPs who are elected on a regular cycle, the task is an enormous one. This is a department.
Mr. Clark, in your legislation, you are considered a department. It seems that we are establishing something quite new in our system. With proper respect of the constitutional principles that separate the two Houses, should we not have a commissioner established within each House considering the importance of the task, if we are to be effective? That is the point. The point is not to put everything on the shoulders of one person, a kind of ethics czar who, after each five years, is packed away. What we want is an element of stability and coherence in the system and trust in the position.
Mr. Hughes has mentioned that that could satisfy the objective without jeopardizing the efficiency of the system; is that correct?
Mr. Clark: With the greatest of respect for Mr. Wilson, I do not believe a commissioner can serve two masters. I believe it is difficult for a commissioner to do the kind of work Mr. Wilson does now for all of the people involved and at the same time be able to do that for the members of the House of Commons and for senators. It is extremely difficult. However one handles that job, someone will always accuse the commissioner of being partisan, for this or that reason.
Even with the members of the Legislative Assembly in Alberta, that happens from time to time. My colleague and I may not agree completely, but my sense is that it would be very difficult for the commissioner to do all the work that the Prime Minister is expecting to have done, and to look after the interests of the members of the House of Commons and the Senate, too. There needs to be a separation of the lawmakers, if I can put it that way, from the bureaucracy.
Most provinces include in their conflict of interest legislation standards for ministers. I believe, and I could be wrong — and Mr. Hughes can correct me if I am wrong — Ontario at one time and Premier Rae had an additional code for ministers. My memory is that that was not administered by Mr. Evans, who was the integrity commissioner, but by someone in the senior bureaucracy.
In the Province of Alberta, there are no additional standards for ministers other than what is set out in the Conflict of Interest Act. For example, it says that ministers cannot own shares, that they must put them into meaningful blind trusts. It also says that ministers cannot have other employment. Those kinds of things are in the act.
Getting back to your specific point, senator, it is extremely difficult for a person to do the two jobs as you lay them out. Having said that, I have great respect for the work that Mr. Wilson has done over the period of time that he has held his position.
Mr. Hughes: I understand, senator, what you said about the Senate and the continuity that it brings to the system and perhaps wanting to have a commissioner of its own.
If there were more than one commissioner, whether it would be one, two or three, I do not know whether they would share offices, et cetera, but there would have to be some kind of understanding between them as to definitions and that kind of thing — you would not want to have the commissioners going off in entirely different directions. However, I do not think that would be a formidable problem.
I understand what Mr. Clark is saying. It is a tremendous job; Mr. Wilson has been of tremendous help to the Prime Minister. It may be that there would be someone appointed by the Prime Minister to advise him and to deal with the public office holders who were not elected personnel. In addition, there would be the appointed commissioner or commissioners — the number would depend, one, or two, if you think the need is there for two, and you may have a valid point. These commissioners would deal with the elected people, the commissioners' appointments being made then by the respective houses.
The point is, however, that insofar as the guidelines that the Prime Minister lays out for ministers are concerned — who, after all, are still members of the House — I would think that any adjudication with respect to any violation of those guidelines should be by the commissioner who has been named by the House, by unanimous vote, one would hope, as Mr. Clark said earlier. In order to have the transparency that is required, those kind of decisions should be made by that person who has been appointed by the House and the results of any investigation should be public.
Mr. Clark: The commissioners in the provinces make recommendations to the House. The House is the highest authority.
Mr. Hughes: The proposal before you now has one commissioner, all embracing, When Mr. Clark said that one person cannot serve two masters, by saying that he is talking about two commissioners, and the point you have made, senator, one for the Senate maybe takes us into the realm of three, which is perhaps the way it should be.
Senator Smith: On that point, Mr. Clark, you were paraphrasing a verse from the Bible, which, if I recall the King James version, goes something like this: No man can serve two masters; choose ye this day whom you will serve.
I particularly understand, without getting into the bicameral legislative angle — and I am totally open-minded on that. Do you see a fundamental conflict between the legislative branch and the administrative branch, quite apart from whether or not you are too busy? Forget about how busy you are. These are two different spheres. Is that the point you are making?
Mr. Clark: Yes, it is. My caveat is that in Alberta some place down the road this could be an issue in our province. In addition to the 83 members, I am also responsible for conflict of interest advice respecting the 75 senior officials of the province. At some time down the road, that will have to be separated. It will be long after I am gone, however. There is a bit of a challenge with serving two masters there.
Senator Joyal: The other point I want to canvass with you is the confidentiality of your advice. When a member seeks advice from you, and you give it, it could become a very political hot potato.
Mr. Clark: I am not anticipating your question, but I have found that the best way to handle that is to give the member written advice. If it does become that political hot potato you referred to, the member can declare that he went to the commissioner, laid out the facts, and then present the advice he was given. Members on both sides of the House quite often have found that to be a very powerful defence, that, in fact, they have acted appropriately, properly, and have been on what I call the right side of the wave as opposed to being dragged along later.
Senator Joyal: It is a touchy point, in fact, in terms of political implications. If we have a commissioner who is appointed by a legislature, or the House of Commons or the Senate, on the basis of unanimous agreement, that person is the officer of that legislature. If we have an officer who is appointed by the Governor in Council, that officer is a political appointee. The question that relates to the confidentiality of the records of the discussion, of the exchange of views on the advice and the consultation, has to be kept in the most airtight context. In that way, no one from the executive could come into your system and know what advice has been given to a minister who might become a challenger of someone else in the government. You never know what can happen. Politics is made of that. Therefore, there must be a very airtight system of control, and autonomy and independence from the executive branch of government must be maintained. This is paramount to the credibility and objectivity of your system.
On the basis of your experience, and, again, to refer to your constituting statute, section 48 provides that by February 17, 2005, and every five years after that a special committee established by legislature must begin a comprehensive review of this act. You have been 11 years in that position. What kind of recommendation would you be in a position to make to us in order to maintain that confidentiality of the information that is given to you in all trust, franchise and truth by the members so that the member does not put himself at risk for further political intervention in the future?
Mr. Clark: I have never had a request from the premier's office for anything dealing with any member of the House. If I had, I believe my reaction would be, ``With great respect, sir, this is none of your business.'' It is between the commissioner and the member who sought the advice.
It is true that the commissioner is appointed by an Order in Council, but that Order in Council is initiated by a motion of the House. In my view, there is just no question that my loyalty is to the Speaker of the legislative assembly of the province, not to the executive branch.
Senator Joyal: Would you concur that if there is a separation of responsibility between the monitoring of the administrative branch of government, or the bureaucracy, as you use the term, and the role of the commissioner in relation to the members only, that would maintain the trust and greater security within the overall system?
Mr. Clark: Yes, I believe that to be accurate. I have never had a question like this posed to me, primarily because there has never been a request to me. I have had ministers and members on both sides of the House ask for all sorts of advice, including some very political advice like whether I think they should run again, which is none of my business really but I have given advice anyway, to other sorts of things dealing with investments, holdings, et cetera. The advice has always been to the member and to no one else.
Mr. Hughes: Referring to the statute I deal with in the Northwest Territories, which is similar to other jurisdictions, section 98 states that a member may request the conflict of interest commissioner to give written advice and recommendations on any matter respecting obligations of the member under this act. Information provided by a member under this subsection and any advice and recommendations of the conflict of interest commissioner are confidential but may be disclosed by the member or with the written consent of the member.
I know of no instance where any commissioner in the country has ever breached that confidentiality provision.
Senator Joyal: Are your records part of the Privy Council Office or are you separated from the Privy Council?
Mr. Hughes: We are independent officers and those records are within the conflict of interest commissioner's office. I am not an expert in this field, but there are provisions in the privacy statutes and the freedom of information statutes in the provinces and legislatures that puts that material, as I understand it, beyond those officers.
Mr. Clark: I was the information and privacy commissioner for five years, while also ethics commissioner. It is clearly in the information and privacy legislation that the operative expenses of the commissioner are open to the public; however, the files dealing with the individual members and any advice they receive are totally excluded from any review at all by the information and privacy commissioner. I believe that is consistent across the country.
Senator Andreychuk: You are saying that you have not had a problem. However, if there were a situation where the House, the Senate and the ministerial role of Mr. Wilson's office were all housed in the Privy Council Office, or similar, even if we had appropriate protocols, I see a dilemma. Not only would those three commissioners be there, but there will be other staff. In that case, there would be erosion, a tendency to start working collegially together and disseminating information.
I have had provincial experience, where ministries grow and subject matters are added to them. For example, in social services where I worked welfare files should be kept confidential; as well, child protection cases should be kept separate. Inevitably, when they were in the ministry together, there was a tendency, with the best intentions, among staff members to share information. It took some doing to put in place protocols and checks, to ensure that those records of a confidential nature were only shared appropriately. My concern is that in the scenario I presented there would not be the kind of integrity found in the provincial systems; in other words, there would be a massive bureaucracy.
Do you see what is being proposed federally as different, and therefore subject to some concern by us, as opposed to a smaller, tight, unicameral legislature?
Mr. Clark: As commissioner, I have been responsible for 150 people, between MLAs and senior officials. There are two full-time staff and one part-time person, and that is the office. I do go outside and get legal advice on occasions. I have sought advice from the corporate community, as far as legal advice in financial matters on occasion. I would be upset if the Executive Council Office had any control or any contact with the office. They do not have such contact.
That is half the size of the House of Commons or about the size of a significant portion of the Senate. I do not understand the concern, as long as you are separate and distinct, have your own operation and are a small group of people. There is only one person, other than myself, who sees this information. Some think she is trustworthier than I.
Mr. Hughes: I do not equate any commissioner who has been appointed by the Parliament, by either House of Parliament, as being the commissioner with respect to the affairs of the members of that House, as having any attachment to the Privy Council Office at all. Rather, those offices, it seems to me, would be more akin with offices that exist in Ottawa like the Auditor General and the Privacy Commissioner. It seems to me that that is where the parallel would be drawn. I agree with Mr. Clark that the confidentiality within the office has not been a problem. If it is structured in that way, I think it could be maintained as such.
The Chairman: I believe that, under the federal Privacy Act right now, any person's information is protected until 20 years after their death. At that point, it can go to archives. Should this be amended to put in the type of provision that you have, that a person's private file goes back to them or is shredded when they leave public life?
Mr. Clark: That is a recommendation that our office made of the last review of the legislation in Alberta. In our limited experience, it has served us well.
Mr. Hughes: Unless I am wrong, I think there is a provision in the Ontario statute that calls for destruction of those files x-number of years after the member ceases to belong to the house. That is a very valid way of dealing with it.
Senator Andreychuk: In summation, if I understand, you are saying that the system does not matter as long as the system is seen to be independent and the commissioners have the exclusive control of the documents and information.
Mr. Clark: Total control.
Senator Andreychuk: Therefore, for a public perception to carry that through, should there be some physical separation and some understanding of the role of the commissioner as the key to the confidentiality, the privacy and disclosure and the maintenance of the documents?
Mr. Clark: Yes. When the office was opened in Alberta initially, there was a move to have the office in the legislative annex, which is the same building where members are housed. We strenuously objected. Our building is a block or two away from the legislature, so the public can see there is a separation from the government.
Senator Di Nino: If I understood correctly, Senator Andreychuk was saying, Mr. Clark, that you have a small team of 2.5 people looking after 150 individuals, 83 members and 75 senior officials of government. The proposed office for the federal government could conceivably have thousands of people to look after, not just hundreds. In addition to members of the House and members of the Senate, there would also be hundreds of other senior individuals in the bureaucracy. The office would then be much larger.
Would you not agree that the potential increases for some information to unintentionally be mislaid or released, which could have a detrimental effect on the party being investigated or discussed? It is a great deal easier to control an office with two to five people than one with 30 to 50 people. Would that not be cause for having separate commissioners or separate offices to look after separate components of the government and bureaucracy?
Mr. Clark: You answer your own question, senator. Privy Council could have some sense they should have some information about what I would lovingly call the members of the bureaucracy, et cetera. I do not understand how they would feel in any way they have any interest in the members of the Senate or the House.
Senator Di Nino: My concern was more the unintentional or the accidental release of information. I, too, feel that it would probably not be the case that you would have the executive branch or an opposition member wanting to take advantage of information for political purposes. We can argue that point until the end of the day, but I do not believe that would be the problem. The problem would be that, if you have such a large office, the incidence of unintended release of information would be much greater, which would in turn give cause for concern for those of us who have to deal with the subject.
Mr. Hughes: The unintended release or accidental occurrence, as you speak, senator, I guess is real in a sense, but it would not tell me that you should not proceed with putting commissioners in place. Your point may well be a valid point for why you might need another commissioner, which I follow, but it would not be a reason for not doing it because you would put in place all of the safeguards you can to prevent that kind of thing happening. To me, the alternative of turning your back and not having a regime in place would not be the answer.
Senator Di Nino: For the purpose of the record, I specifically was suggesting that it is, in my opinion, a reason to consider more than one commissioner, particularly after the discussions that we have had this morning, even to the degree where perhaps three would be necessary as opposed to two: one for the House of Commons, one for the Senate, and maybe one for the bureaucracy.
Mr. Hughes: I agree with you, senator.
Senator Fraser: Back on the question of confidentiality of the commissioner's opinions, I think we are all in agreement that it is important that this material be confidential. Let me play the devil's advocate a little bit. Suppose the commissioner is asked for an opinion by a parliamentarian, gives that opinion, and then the parliamentarian does not take the advice. If that parliamentarian finds himself or herself the subject of a complaint and it gets to the committee stage, is there not a point at which it might be important for the integrity of the process that people know that an opinion had been given?
For example, if a parliamentarian is alleging, ``I made a honest mistake because I did not know,'' but in fact the commissioner had said, ``You should not be doing this,'' then that parliamentarian is lying, so should it not be possible at some point to override that condition of confidentiality? I repeat that I am being a little bit of the devil's advocate, but I want to understand how things should operate on the margins. Do you understand what I am driving at here?
Mr. Hughes: It is a good question. I do not think a commissioner will stand idly by and see a member pronouncing lies in a public forum. I would quickly have that member into my office and would say to him or her: ``I do not know how I will handle this, but you have just been untruthful to the House or your constituents or whoever. I know that you have been untruthful. Shape up and do something about it.''
Maybe I would be in for a surprise, but I would be surprised if elected people in that situation did not measure up and do the right thing. I have a lot of faith in people, and I can see them wiggling to get to where you have put them, but I think if the commissioner had a member in, a reasonable person would realize that he or she better make amends in some acceptable way. That is probably not a very good answer, but it may be a practical one.
Mr. Clark: I would agree with Mr. Hughes about having the member in. Members generally do not look forward to getting a call saying the commissioner would like to see them this afternoon or tomorrow morning. I never found myself looking forward to making it either. It is a very rare thing.
Mr. Hughes: The commissioner must make an annual report to the house, and he can make special reports. I am not so sure that, in the situation you put forward, a special report could not be made, without revealing the nature of the advice but simply that advice had been given that was not in accordance with the member's statement. I think I would be prepared to put my neck out that far and say that much, if that were to occur.
Senator Sparrow: Mr. Clark, you mentioned earlier that you notify the member who has asked for advice by letter, so that advice, whether it was positive or negative, would have a paper trail indicating what the advice was?
Mr. Clark: Yes.
Senator Sparrow: So neither one of the parties, you or the member, could refute that particular advice. Is that what you told us before?
Mr. Clark: Yes. If the member asks for written advice, then I try to restate the issues the member has laid out to me. My advice goes to the member and remains confidential to the member.
The Chairman: Mr. Clark, do you give both oral advice and written advice, or do you always follow up in writing?
Mr. Clark: No. For example, a member could phone and say, ``I have an opportunity to fly to such and such a place to see such and such.'' I quite often say, ``Did that person, or persons, take you on those trips before you became a member?'' The answer is generally no, so I say, ``Get the government to pay your way.'' I put that on the file to protect the member, so that he or she can say that the advice of the commissioner was sought, if it became necessary to say so. Alternatively, the member could tell the company that he or she sought the advice of the commissioner but the commissioner said they could not go.
Mr. Hughes: When I get a telephone call, I always ask: ``Are you seeking advice on which you propose to rely?'' If the member answers yes to that, I say: ``Please give me a letter setting out the question you are asking, and you will get an immediate response in writing.'' They know that if they do not follow up with a letter, they have not received any advice on which they can rely.
Senator Joyal: In other words, and I do not want to make fun of this, you are like lawyers. Any phone call is registered and billed to the customer who is phoning.
Mr. Clark: Our total bill for the year in my office is about $300,000 a year.
Senator Joyal: You understand what I mean. In other words, any contact that is established between a member and your office or you personally or someone from your office is part of the record of that person with you.
Mr. Clark: Yes.
Mr. Hughes: That is only the prudent thing to do.
Senator Fraser: I think the House of Commons in Westminster has made it a rule that a parliamentarian must be able to have legal counsel during investigative proceedings appearing before a commissioner. Is that unusual? I think it is the only reference I have seen written, but that does not mean it is the only place it is done. Would that kind of thing build in a degree of formality that would end up being counterproductive?
Mr. Hughes: I have had legal counsel appear with members when I am holding a hearing in private to get to the bottom of a situation, so certainly my experience has been to let them through the door. I have also had requests for my office to pay for the counsel, but I have never concurred in that. Whether they have gone other places to submit it in as an expense, I do not know, but I have certainly always allowed a member to have legal counsel if the member wanted it when I was looking at a complaint.
Mr. Clark: My experience is exactly the same, but I have never had a member turn up at the door for their annual meeting with anyone other than their spouse, on some occasions.
The Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you very much for travelling so far to shed some light on our debate.
The committee adjourned.