Proceedings of the Committee on
Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament
Issue 3 - Evidence - March 16, 2004
OTTAWA, Tuesday, March 16, 2004
The Standing Committee on Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament, to which was referred Bill C-4, to amend the Parliament of Canada Act (Ethics Commissioner and Senate Ethics Officer) and other acts in consequence, to which they desire the concurrence of the Senate, met this day at 9:34 a.m. to give consideration to the bill.
Senator Lorna Milne (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honourable senators, I see a quorum.
We have before us Professor Joseph Maingot, who has appeared before us and before the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs many times.
Professor Maingot, the floor is yours.
Mr. Joseph Maingot, as an individual: Honourable senators, I do not have anything put together, due to short notice. However, as a general statement, if I may, I read the very interesting proceedings of the last meeting. From that, I will just start off by saying that dealing with privilege as a whole, Blackstone's commentaries, and going back 300 or 400 years, he said: "The whole of the law and custom of Parliament has its origin from this one maxim: `that whatever matter arises concerning either House of Parliament ought to be examined, discussed, and abridged in that House to which it relates, and not elsewhere."'
Parliamentary privilege is concerned with the rights and immunities ascribed to members of Parliament individually and to the House of Parliament in which the members act collectively. It comprises those rights and immunities that are considered necessary for the members and the House in order to carry out their constitutional functions.
The history of this illusive subject shows that the principal issue throughout was this: Which institution has jurisdiction over parliamentary privilege, the courts or the Houses of Parliament? The Parliament that existed in the U.K. before the separation into the House of Commons and the House of Lords in about the mid-14th century was both a court and a legislature, the council of the king with varied functions, the High Court of Parliament.
While it is clear that Parliament, in all its constituent elements being at once the court of last result and the legislature, could make laws and thus set its privileges, it was not clear what privileges belonged to the House of Commons. The House of Commons started to assert powers by resolution, which hitherto it had only as a constituent element of the High Court of Parliament.
The courts in England began to call into question decisions of the House on the matter of privilege to consider that the law of Parliament, rather than being a separate law unknown to the courts, was part of the general and public law and was examinable in the courts.
The words of article 9 of the English Bill of Rights, 1689, are a good starting point in a discussion of the constitutional privilege of control over internal proceedings, for they confirm Parliament's long-standing claim for security from outside interference from the Crown, the government and the courts, and that reads:
...the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.
The prohibition on questioning proceedings in any court would appear broad enough to exclude all judicial dealings with the workings of Parliament. However, a line of cases narrowed the meaning of the words of article 9 and at least explored, if not clarified, the relationship between the courts and Parliament with regard to matters of privilege, rejecting Parliament's claim to exclusivity of jurisdiction and establishing a judicial right to come to an independent determination as to what is privilege.
The most famous of these cases is Stockdale v. Hansard, in 1839, in which the parliamentary printer was sued for libel because of a parliamentary report he had published. The House of Commons passed a resolution declaring that that publication was a necessity for the operation of Parliament and that Parliament had sole authority to determine the scope of the privileges of the House. The court rejected a defence based on the resolution, making it clear that there was a distinction between the courts inquiring whether a given subject was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House and the courts interfering with the House's judgment in the matter, which was within its exclusive jurisdiction.
The principle result of that case is to assert in the strongest way the right of the Court of Queen's Bench — in England or in Canada, the same thing — to ascertain in case of need the extent of the privileges of the House. Yet, the Senate is not subject to the control of the courts in its administration of that part of the statute law that has relation to its own internal proceedings.
Perhaps I will just finish with something the Chief Justice said in the New Brunswick case: "The courts have long maintained a hands-off approach to the exercise of parliamentary privilege, particularly when it is directed towards maintaining control of the internal proceedings of the House."
Constitutionally, the courts, the legislature, the government and the Crown are separate. The Supreme Court of Canada has frequently referred to that. Constitutionally, the courts, the government and the Houses of Parliament are independent of each other.
In effect, the present doctrine of parliamentary privilege rests on a set of presumed facts that have not been true in the U.K. since the reign of William III. It assumes that Parliament and the executive or the Crown has two opposed and largely separate bodies, whereas the degree of interaction and overlap is very considerable. A government with a majority in the House may and does impose its will on the House of Commons from time to time. Indeed, the well- known parliamentary privilege of freedom of speech, which protects both the individual member of Parliament and the House as a whole, is subject to party discipline, including that of the governing party, which is the sort of exercise of executive power that parliamentary privilege was originally meant to protect.
The Chairman: Thank you, Professor Maingot.
Senator Grafstein: I missed the first quote, the history that you referred to, that each House, in effect, is the master of its own internal workings and rules. Who is that quote from? It was your first quote, right at the beginning.
Mr. Maingot: Blackstone. We grew up on Blackstone, did we not?
Senator Grafstein: Mr. Maingot, Blackstone was one of the originators of the separation of powers, as well. He wrote extensively on the separation of powers between the Houses, between the court and in effect the executive, and between the courts themselves.
We are confronted with a proposal from the government that is a mélange.
Mr. Maingot: A what?
Senator Grafstein: A mélange. It is neither a separation of powers nor is it, in effect, shared powers.
I come to that analysis because I look at the appointment of the ethics officer. On one hand, it is based on consultation, in effect. I lay aside for the moment the argument made by the Leader of the Government in the Senate on convention, which we will come to in a moment.
I am curious about your conclusion, looking at the bill, as to whether or not it fits into Blackstone's principles. Practice and principles march best when they march together.
Mr. Maingot: On the other hand, privileges can be changed, but not by the House itself. Parliament may change its privileges, although privileges are few and far between right now. I think we all agree that the principle of privilege is freedom of speech.
Zeroing in on the bill itself, which I had occasion to look at, I cannot quite understand 20.5(1). The duties and functions are something that would be set up by the Senate itself, and then their administration would be by the ethics officer, it seems to me; however, it does not seem to say that in 20.5.
In 20.5(3), everybody who works for the Senate, the Senate officers, comes under the scrutiny the Senate generally. The employees are under the direction the Senate. However, the Senate ethics officer is supposed to be independent, yet he would come under the general direction of a committee of the Senate. Maybe I am reading into it what is not there.
Under 20.5(2), you provide that the ethics officer enjoys the privileges and immunities of the Senate. Anybody who works for the Senate, an officer or otherwise, comes under those privileges and immunities when involved in a parliamentary proceeding. This would apply presumably to those others, those few privileges that apply outside a parliamentary proceeding — that is, can you not compel them as a witness? Can you not compel them as a member of jury? You are free from civil contempt.
When Blackstone was speaking, their concern was speaking in the House, because at that time, the Speaker was sort of the mouthpiece the King. That is why they invented committee of the whole. In committee of the whole, the Speaker left the house so the members could speak without the Speaker being there and telling everything to the Crown or to the King. At that time, that was the principal concern. You had these other strange or interesting privileges where your servant was provided with safekeeping. There were abuses also by the members of Parliament of their privileges. This was the principal concern that the members of Parliament had at that time.
Eventually, there was the petition of right in the early 17th century, and then the Bill of Rights in the late 17th century. Apart from the fact there needed to be protection from the Crown, one of the particular facts leading up to the Bill of Rights was that the Speaker — I forget precisely the details — passed a resolution that was really not legal. The sergeant at arms, or an officer of the House, went to put that into effect. The courts found both the Speaker for the illegal resolution and the officer who put it into effect. It is clear that the courts were not correct because whatever is done in the House cannot be questioned elsewhere, but putting into effect an illegal order was subject to the ruling of the courts.
Senator Smith: I believe Senator Grafstein asked you whether the bill fits into Blackstone's principles. I suppose I could come at it from another angle, which is this: Is there anything in the bill that offends Blackstone's principles?
When I look at 20.1, which says that the appointment must be approved by "resolution of the Senate," and at 20.5. If you look at all four subclauses under 20.5, you will read under (1) that the duties and functions are "assigned" by the Senate; (2) that they are "carried out within the institution of the Senate" and that the ethics officer enjoys the "privileges and immunities of the Senate"; (3) that the duties and functions are carried out "under the general direction of any committee of the Senate"; and then (4) and (5) begin with "for greater certainty," which clarifies it more.
I cannot see where it offends any of Blackstone's principles. I wonder if you see any offence to Blackstone's principles.
Mr. Maingot: I do not see freedom of speech being affected by 20.5, in any way. One of the principal authorities of a legislature is to provide for its own rules and to provide for the conduct of its members. That is what this is attempting to do.
With respect to the independence, as you say — if the Senate ethics officer were appointed by the Senate alone and it is spelled out in the Senate rules to whom he or she was responsible, the ability to amend that would be rather simple. It is a question of how you want to appear transparent, how you want to appear truly independent.
An ethics officer for a legislature is something within. It is part of the important role of a legislature to set out what the conduct of its members should be. How that is set up independently is a matter to take into account the fact that they have the responsibility to provide for the conduct of members and also the responsibility to maintain independence from the Crown. That is the role of the draftsperson.
Senator Joyal: On the last point, Mr. Maingot, is it not right that the commissioner for public standards in the House of Lords and the House of Commons is appointed within the rules of the Lords and within the rules of the British House of Commons? I think it is rule 160. In other words, the principle of independence from the Crown is very well affirmed and stated in the British model as being a clear understanding of Blackstone's principles. Is that correct?
Mr. Maingot: Blackstone speaks of two things. First, you are independent if you cannot be examined elsewhere, and questioned elsewhere. Mind you, you are questioned elsewhere. The newspapers every day question what is happening in the House of Parliament, but that is a matter of history.
I realize that the House of Lords has that officer. They managed to have done that and it is in place. It seems to me the Rost case might have dealt with it. By the way, the reason we could not find that is because it is not Ross; it is Rost, R-O-S-T.
I do not know if I answered that question. I simply agree, yes, the House of Lords did that and they seem to be satisfied that they both have set up a code of conduct for their members, and also they are independent.
Senator Joyal: If we come back to section 20.5(2), especially where it says that the Senate ethics officer enjoys the "privileges and immunities of the Senate and its members."
As I understand the reading of this proposed section, the ethics officer would enjoy the institutional privileges of the Senate as a whole and the individual privileges of senators, the personal privileges or the privileges attached to the person of senators. Am I right?
Mr. Maingot: To me, that is what that means, yes.
Senator Joyal: If that is what it means, do you know of any other statute — and I will restrict my question — other officers of Parliament that exist who would have a similar status — that is, the Auditor General, who is a parliamentary officer, the Chief Electoral Officer, the Privacy Commissioner, the Access to Information Commissioner, or the Official Languages Commissioner? Do you know if any of those officers of Parliament enjoy the same privileges and immunities of the Senate and the House of Commons as institutions and the personal privileges of the members? Do you know of any other officers of Parliament, as stated in our statutes, that would enjoy exactly those two sets of privileges at the same time, in the same person?
Mr. Maingot: I looked at the Commissioner of Official Languages, in the Official Languages Act, the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. I did not spot that. I did spot that they were provided with the traditional protection as a government person in whatever they do in good faith.
In this case here, as I say, someone who works for the Senate, from the Clerk of the Senate right down, and is involved in a parliamentary proceedings enjoys the privileges of Parliament because the individual is part of the internal administration of the house.
The officers of the Senate, who have a role dealing with the proceedings in Parliament, enjoy the same individual privileges as a member — not say all of them. They enjoy the release from attending a jury; they enjoy the release from attending as a witness. However, I do not think they enjoy a release from civil contempt. I have not seen that, and I would be surprised.
That is what this suggests. It suggests that the Senate ethics officer, if he enjoys the same privileges of the members themselves, then if he is involved in a civil action and involved in a civil contempt he is equally protected as a member of the Senate.
Senator Joyal: According to your answer, you do not know of any similar statute provision that would extend the privileges of the institution and the personal privileges in that global and comprehensive manner.
Mr. Maingot: I do not. The thing is that the Senate and the House of Commons, because of their position in the constitutional life of Canada, are important. You should not impede members from taking part in their work. Mind you, these apply when the House or the Senate is not sitting yet is still in session.
Senator Joyal: In other words, to come back to your statement, the officers or personnel of the Senate or the House of Commons, like the clerk, the Sergeant-at-Arms, who enjoy some privileges in their duties related to internal proceedings, would not enjoy all the privileges of the institution and all the privileges of the individual senators or individual members of Parliament. Is that correct?
Mr. Maingot: I do not know. Those three privileges do not attach to a parliamentary proceeding — that is, freedom from jury duty, freedom from being compelled as a witness, and freedom from civil contempt. The purpose of that was to not impede the progress of a member of these institutions to come. As I say, that still applies when the House is not sitting, although when it is in session.
If it applies to one, I suppose it should apply to the three. An officer of the Senate or the Black Rod would equally fit into not only being compellable as a member of a jury or as a witness, but also if he was involved in a civil contempt proceedings. A court has not dealt with that, but if he is privileged in one, he should be privileged for the three.
The Chairman: I believe Senator Losier-Cool has a follow-up on that, and then, Senator Joyal, I will ask you to come back on a second round so we can give everyone a chance at this, if I may. I do not want to interrupt your flow of thought here though.
Before I go to Senator Losier-Cool, Professor Maingot, I would just point out that the other part of 20.5(2) indicates that the Senate ethics officer enjoys the privileges and immunities of the Senate and its members when carrying out those duties and functions. Those are the duties and functions that are carried out within the institution of the Senate.
Mr. Maingot: Yes. Thank you. That is interesting. It may well be that, with that addition, it would be subject to the interpretation of a court. The court may say, "In order for you to carry out those duties and functions, you have to get here." It is up to the court to interpret that.
Senator Losier-Cool: Your question was close to the one I wanted to ask. How can we compare the Commissioner of Official Languages, because that is one I know, to an ethics officer from the Senate?
[Translation]
The role of the Commissioner of Official Languages is spelled out in the Official Languages Act, a federal, or government statute. I do not understand the question put earlier by Senator Joyal. How can we compare these two individuals, whose roles are clearly defined in federal legislation, with a Senate Ethics Officer?
Mr. Maingot: The reason is that these persons are appointed to office. The government proposes someone and the two Houses of Parliament adopt a resolution to that effect. The work is more or less done outside this forum. To that extent, I agree somewhat with your statement that we are comparing apples and oranges. At times, people are confused. They are referred to as officers of Parliament because they are appointed by the two House of Parliament. However, their duties extend beyond the realm of Parliament. They report to Parliament. Consider the examples of the Chief Electoral Officer and the Privacy Commissioner who operate outside the parliamentary forum. They are referred to as officers because they are appointed further to a resolution by each house.
Senator Losier-Cool: They are officers of Parliament. The reference here is to Senate officers.
Mr. Maingot: They have responsibilities where Parliament is concerned.
[English]
Senator Bryden: My point is more a matter of clarification. In your last statement, when you were making your presentation, before we kept interrupting you, you were reading from your notes, and you said that Parliament and the executive have overlapped for some time, and, for example, are both subject to party discipline. Can you read that again, so that I get it right.
Mr. Maingot: I was pointing out the anomaly. I said first that, constitutionally, the courts, the government and the Houses of Parliament are independent of each other. In effect, the present doctrine of parliamentary privilege rests on a set of presumed facts that have not been true in the U.K. since the reign of William III. That goes back to the early 19th century. It assumes that Parliament and the executive or the Crown are two opposed and largely separate bodies, whereas of course the degree of interaction and overlap is really very considerable. A government with a majority in the House may and does impose its will on the House of Commons from time to time. Indeed, the well-known parliamentary privilege of freedom of speech, which protects both the individual member of Parliament and the House as a whole, is subject to party discipline, including that of the government party, which is the sort of exercise of executive power that parliamentary privilege was originally meant to protect.
Senator Bryden: I wanted to be sure that I remembered that correctly. I raise the issue that what you just referred to applies absolutely in the House of Commons — that is, the governing party is made up basically of members of the executive and, some wags would say, "those who want to be." The House of Commons is subject to party discipline, in the sense that it is a confidence chamber. There are the traditions of the whips. I understand we are just introducing one line and two line and three line whips in our House of Commons.
I should like to take that to what we have, which is a bicameral house. Most of what we have heard about in relation to Canada deals with legislatures in this area, and they are only unicameral. The Senate is not subject to party discipline. We have no whips in the Senate. There is only one government connection. Well, we have a nice whip, but she does not lay on one line or two lines or three lines.
The point I want to make is that, in the Senate, once we are appointed to the Senate, then it is incumbent upon us to exercise our judgment to the best of our possible ability in relation to the matters that come before us, without fear or favour. The only connection to government that we have is the Leader of the Government in the Senate, who is a member of the executive.
Does that same blurring occur? The reason it is so important in relation to a bill such as this is that if you look at both the clause of the bill that deals with the Senate and the clause of the bill that deals with the House of Commons it appears that the draftsmen, or women, or all, simply took what they determined to be an appropriate system for the overlapped and disciplined system that exists in the House of Commons and attempted to graft it on the front of a much more independent — and some of us believe the only independent — legislative chamber left in Canada. That is why we are having such trouble making all this stuff fit.
Do you have a comment on that?
Mr. Maingot: The independence with regard to the Senate, I understand that members of political parties of the Senate go to the caucus meetings of their parties. From a practical point of view, I have not had occasion to reflect on what you have said, Senator Bryden. Politically, there is a difference, because members of the House of Commons have to run for Parliament and members of the Senate do not have to run for Parliament. There are these aspects, which do not have much to do with procedure.
The Chairman: Which perhaps suggests that we should be harder on ourselves.
Mr. Maingot: However, there is no question about it — that statement applies in the House but it does not seem to apply in the Senate.
How does that relate to the drafting of the bill? It still comes down to what I said earlier. There are two aspects. As a legislature, the Senate has the right and duty to set out the conduct of its members, while, at the same time, constitutionally, you want to remain independent of the government. That is a task for Solomon or for a draftsperson.
Senator Smith: It could be one and the same.
The Chairman: Rarely are they the same.
Senator Stratton: I should like to go back to the issue respecting the evolution of the committee of the whole — that is, that it was created so that parliamentarians could speak to one another, because the Speaker was reporting constantly to the King — as well as the issue respecting the independence of the two Houses from each other and the importance of that and how that evolved.
Let me refer specifically to 20.1 in the bill, which states:
The Governor in Council shall, by commission under the Great Seal, appoint a Senate Ethics Officer after consultation with the leader of every recognized party in the Senate and after approval of the appointment by resolution of the Senate.
In other words, the appointment of the ethics officer is under the control of the other House through the Prime Minister. In your mind, is there a conflict there that should not be if we are going to have the two independents?
Before you answer that question, I should like to have a bit of a history lesson as to the evolution of the independence of the two chambers, if you have any to offer, and the importance of the independence of the two chambers and as such the importance of the independence of the ethics officer of this chamber.
Mr. Maingot: What started off as the council of the king with the lords, and then the House of Commons, together, the Parliament could do as it pleased, could pass laws and be judge. They acted really as judges, in petitions that came before the lords and the Commons together. Then, eventually the Commons wanted to act on their own, and in the 15th century the House of Lords actually was ruling on matters that affected the House of Commons. It was a court also. I tried to set it out more clearly in my book, and elsewhere many authors have dealt with that subject.
However, it was part of the need that the Commons felt to be able to adjudge their own matters, separate and distinct from the House of Lords, and also separate and distinct from the court, because in some of the earlier definitions of privilege is the right of the House of Commons to deal on their own, separate from the House of Lords and separate from the courts and separate from the executive.
As I say, eventually, the House of Commons attempted to assert far greater privileges than it had, and that came to a head in the 1830s or 1840s with Stockdale v. Hansard, when the courts said what you do in the House — for that matter in the House of Lord, too — with regard to procedure is examinable by the courts. That is why the position currently is that privilege is subject to the court saying the extent of that privilege. However, the court then said, "These are your privileges, and if what you do is part of the privilege, then we will not look into how it is exercised," which the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed in the last 10 to 15 years.
I am trying to think of the last part of your question, so I can get back on train.
Senator Stratton: That is all right, sir.
The question really boils down to the appointment. Clause 20.1 of the bill reads, in part: "The Governor in Council shall, by commission under the Great Seal, appoint a Senate Ethics Officer." The Governor in Council is, in fact, the Prime Minister of the House of Commons. He is then appointing the ethics officer of this chamber.
If you go by the Great Britain's history, the two chambers are supposed to be independent. I should like you to comment on the importance of the independence of the two chambers and whether or not you feel there is a conflict in the Prime Minister appointing an ethics officer to this chamber rather than this chamber itself selecting and appointing an ethics officer.
Mr. Maingot: Obviously, yes. I suppose you are looking at what happened in the past with the officers of Parliament, who are not involved in a parliamentary proceeding. At the same time, governments historically like to ensure that people will not run amok, have a certain overall responsibility. When you speak of the independence of members, we are all answerable to somebody. To whom should the members of Parliament, both sides, be answerable? They are answerable to the people. How is that done? How is that accomplished? It is accomplished by the fourth estate, reporting on what is being done and what is being said here.
Is that good enough? Perhaps the government will say it is not good enough and there has to be a steadier influence. I do not know the answer to that, but looking at this, it certainly appears to run counter to the idea of the members of each House providing their own rules, yet at the same time being independent from the Crown or the executive.
The courts have been very deferential to those privileges that are in the Constitution. They have been in the past, but they can step in and say, "What is the extent of the privilege that you are claiming?" They have the right to do that, because the Supreme Court of Canada, under the Constitution, is responsible for protecting the Constitution, which includes what happens here. It is a Solomon-like matter, if I may respectfully suggest.
It is a question of trying to blend the idea of the need and responsibility of each House of Parliament to provide for the conduct of its members and, at the same time, historically, constitutionally and necessarily, each House of Parliament being independent of the government. For those matters that take place outside a proceeding of Parliament, you have the civil law and the criminal law to which members of both Houses are subject.
Senator Austin: Professor Maingot, I wanted to draw your attention to clause 20.1. Please look at that clause. I would have you note that, while the Governor in Council appoints by commission under the great seal, in the case of the Senate, and it is also true in the case of the House, no action by the Governor in Council can be taken without the approval by resolution of the Senate. Therefore, the Senate is, I would suggest, acting under its own authority. It has still preserved, as the House does, its own authority in terms of the appointment.
Senator Stratton: But under the control of —
Senator Austin: The situation is that the executive is made up of ministers of the Crown, and they are acting under the Queen in Parliament, so the protection of the independence, if you like, of the Senate is that the Senate must approve the appointment by resolution. Is that consistent with your explanation?
Mr. Maingot: I suppose it is part of the safeguard, senator.
Senator Austin: It preserves the Senate's role as a chamber independent of the executive. This is the wording of clause 20.1 of the bill.
Mr. Maingot: The beginning of the bill, clause 20.1
Senator Austin: Yes — after approval by resolution of the Senate. No appointment can be made without the Senate's resolution.
Mr. Maingot: Yes.
The Chairman: I am assuming that is the answer, sir?
Mr. Maingot: Madam Chairman, I see that.
Senator Stratton: Professor, let us look at the practical reality that is occurring right now, as an example. We have a Senate with vastly disproportionate numbers on the government side. The current Prime Minister then decides to appoint an ethics officer of his choosing. Of course it would pass in this chamber, because of the disproportionate numbers on the government side. If you look at that issue, where is the independence? The government side controls this chamber, and the Prime Minister appoints the individual, so of course it would be approved by this chamber. That is not independence to me, or at least not by my definition. I should like a comment on that, if I could.
Mr. Maingot: In a sense, 20.1 suggests that that is the answer there. One appoints, and the other has to approve, so you are both in the picture.
Senator Smith: In response to Senator Stratton's sort of rhetorical question, I might ask another rhetorical question.
Senator Stratton: Rhetorical?
Senator Smith: Would not the passage of Senator Bryden's amendment last fall, which basically torpedoed this legislation from being dealt with last fall, in itself provide evidence that, notwithstanding the numbers, where something represents strong feelings, people might view, by their barometer and their weather vane, some issue of great principle, that parties are put aside, and that that does represent a real check, as Senator Austin spelled out, in 20.1?
Senator Stratton: Could you not explain what the amendment was? That would really define what it was all about.
Senator Smith: I am trying to ask a question. I do not know that the content matters so much as the result.
Senator Stratton: Oh, yes, it does.
Mr. Maingot: I do not think there is any need for me to reply.
The Chairman: We are through with rhetorical remarks.
Mr. Maingot: I did not bring my sword.
Senator Harb: Mr. Maingot, you mentioned the notion of independence of an appointee, or lack thereof, if that individual is appointed by the Crown. I thought I heard you make the statement that the mere fact that someone is appointed by the Crown means there is a perception of lack of independence. If that is the case, how do you reconcile that with the fact that our clerks, for example, at the House of Commons or the Senate are both appointed by the Crown? They both work within the institutions of Parliament, both on the Senate side as well as on the House of Commons side. How do you reconcile that statement with what we have now in terms of officers of Parliament on both sides?
Mr. Maingot: Some of the officers of both Houses are appointed by statute, but I know the five senior officers of the House of Commons are appointed by the Crown and no one suggests that they are other than independent.
I am still harking back to the notion that members of each House are constitutionally independent from the government, and yet they have a duty, responsibility and right to impose rules of conduct on the members. Their present rules of conduct are elsewhere. I think the House of Commons has a rule or two dealing with that.
I know that, in relation to one of the last clerks at Westminster, there was some question that the members were not happy with not having been asked in some form or other. Historically, the Crown has appointed the officers of each House, and there has not been any suggestion that they would other than fulfil their duty with authority and with responsibility.
The question asked with respect to officers of the House is somewhat different from the fact that the members of each House should be seen to be acting independently of the Crown. That is why in the past it was called the Independence of Parliament Act. That is now the Parliament of Canada Act. I notice that the bill provides for the removal of sections 14 and 15 of the Parliament of Canada Act, dealing with members being independent and no contracts. The members of the House of Commons or Senate, for that matter, cannot contract with the government. That will presumably be put into the rules of conduct of the members.
Senator Harb: The Crown appointed you. I presume you were independent, notwithstanding the fact that the Crown appointed you.
Mr. Maingot: I would say I was independent.
Senator Harb: In proposed new section 20.5(2), when we talk about the duties and functions of the Senate ethics officer are carried out within the institutions of the Senate, the Senate ethics officers enjoy the privileges and immunities of the Senate and its members when carrying out those duties and functions.
In this particular clause, are you worried that perhaps court intervention in this area might take place as a result of this particular clause when it comes to ethics counsellors carrying out their duties?
Mr. Maingot: Anyone who is involved in a parliamentary proceeding or the internal management of the House, whether an officer, member or witness, is protected by the Bill of Rights, as everything said or done cannot be questioned elsewhere. In that sense, I am not concerned, senator, that the courts would intervene with impunity. The courts are very chary of interfering. They are very deferential, and we will know later on this fall whether the House of Commons must make use of the Canadian Human Rights Act when it comes to dealing with an employee.
The Chairman: The Vaid case.
Mr. Maingot: That is correct.
[Translation]
Senator Gauthier: An officer is a senior official of Parliament. The English refers to an "Officer of Parliament," while the French uses the expression "haut fonctionnaire du Parlement." The distinction is fairly clear. The only difference between these five persons and all other commissioners or agency directors is that the former can report directly to Parliament, while the latter must go through the minister to table their report or make comments.
Officers of Parliament currently do not swear allegiance to the Queen. They do, however, represent the interests of Parliament. I have never understood the rationale for this decision. Are the Clerk of the House of Commons and the Clerk of the Senate required to swear an oath of allegiance when they are appointed? I am not sure about the Legislative Counsel, but I think he is required to swear an oath.
Mr. Maingot: I cannot recall.
Senator Gauthier: I know for a fact that the two clerks swear an oath of allegiance, but that officers of Parliament do not. I questioned why that was the case. They were asked if they were prepared to swear an oath and they responded in the affirmative. Why appoint someone who would enjoy parliamentary privileges and immunities, but not swear, as we do, an oath of allegiance?
Mr. Maingot: You want to know what the difference is between senior officials and officers of Parliament, for example, the Commissioner of Official Languages? As far as you are concerned, these persons are senior officials. Correct?
Senator Gauthier: Officially, there are five officers of Parliament: the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, the Auditor General of Canada, the Commissioner of Official Languages, the Information Commissioner and the Privacy Commissioner. These five persons may report directly to Parliament. In the bill before us for consideration, all of these individuals would enjoy parliamentary privileges and immunities. I fail to understand why they would enjoy such privileges when they do not swear an oath of allegiance. Moreover, they are not subject to the provisions of the Access to Information Act. Why is that? I have heard that Cabinet is currently holding discussions in an effort to subject these officers to the same rules as everyone else. Have you considered doing that?
Mr. Maingot: Are you saying that these five officers enjoy the same privileges as Members of Parliament?
Senator Gauthier: I am asking you that question.
Mr. Maingot: I do not believe they do. If involved in a parliamentary debate, then they enjoy the benefit of privilege. As a witness, I enjoy freedom of speech. Based on what I have read in the legislation governing these five officers, they do not enjoy the same individual privileges as Members of Parliament.
Senator Gauthier: The holder of the office of Ethics Commissioner, as proposed in the bill, would enjoy the same privileges and immunities as a parliamentarian. Therefore, the appointee cannot have the same status as the five other officers. Correct?
Mr. Maingot: Yes, his or her status would be different.
Senator Gauthier: Should the appointee be referred to as an officer of Parliament and if so, why should that person enjoy a special status, whereas the five other officers do not?
Mr. Maingot: In my estimation, the five officers do not enjoy the same privileges you enjoy as a senator, with the exception of the privileges you have when you participate in a parliamentary debate. They do not enjoy the privilege of not having to testify as a witness in judicial proceedings or of not having to serve on a jury.
Senator Gauthier: Perhaps I have not made myself clear enough.
[English]
Senator Di Nino: Mr. Maingot, the question of independence will be a main issue with this bill. We were talking about 20.1 and the consultation process, in effect, the final appointment process by the Governor in Council. The thought struck me that there may a deadlock and that the Senate may not approve. I question what happens then. When you look further in the bill, it says that, if there is a vacancy, the Governor in Council may appoint someone for an interim period. Also, the Governor in Council may remove the officer for cause, and the Governor in Council, under 20.3, will set the remuneration for the Senate ethics officer. It does not sound to me as if there is a great deal of independence there in the sense of the responsibility to the Senate.
Could you give me an opinion as to whether my interpretation is correct? I am really saying that, other than the consultation with the Senate prior to the appointment, the Governor in Council sets the salary, the Governor in Council has the authority to remove or otherwise and, if there is a vacancy, the Governor in Council, without consultation with the Senate, it seems to me, can appoint someone, although for an interim period of six months. I am not sure if that could continue if the deadlock is unresolved. Could you give me your opinion as to whether I am correct in interpreting these clauses that way?
Mr. Maingot: With respect to salary, the ethics officer is at the rank of a deputy minister, and there are ranges there. On the question of salary, I do not think there is a problem, although there are different ranges of salary for deputy ministers.
The Governor in Council appoints or names, and he must be approved. You have two bodies involved in that decision. Much of this involves independence. This is something that the members of the Senate would have to deal with. My views are not that important. It can be interpreted in more than one way.
What if the Senate appointed for up to a period of six months? I still say, with great respect, that that it is a question of how it is done. The Houses of Parliament each have a responsibility or a role to set out the conduct of each member, and yet they should remain independent of the Crown or the government. It is a question of how you accomplish that.
The Chairman: I would just point out that clause 20.2 says that the ethics officer may be removed by cause by the Governor in Council on address of the Senate. It would only be if the Senate asked for the person to be removed.
Senator Stratton: Where does it say that?
Senator Di Nino: I understand that, Madam Chair. I am saying that the authority still rests with the Governor in Council. The authority does not rest with the Senate. The Senate plays a role, in the sense of saying, "We think they should be removed." The Governor in Council could, in their wisdom, say, "We do not believe that." That is the point I am trying to make. The final authority rests with the Governor in Council, not with the Senate.
Senator Stratton: For removal as well.
Mr. Maingot: May I interject here for a moment? Judges are appointed by the Crown without any discussion with members of Parliament, and they are removed by joint address. You have that independence of who appoints and who removes.
Senator Di Nino: I do not disagree, Madam Chair. What we are talking about here is that the appointment process is by the Governor in Council, notwithstanding the process of consultation with the Senate. The removal process is still by the Governor in Council, notwithstanding the consultation with the Senate.
Senator Grafstein: Perhaps I can pose to Mr. Maingot, who is a great expert on the powers and privileges of senators and members of the House of Commons, a question that I asked to the Minister of Justice when he was last before us. I expect that we will get an answer shortly. I would be interested in Mr. Maingot's view as well.
Mr. Maingot, if you examine clause 1 of Bill C-4, it provides that sections 14 and 15 of the Parliament of Canada Act are repealed. Those provisions, just to remind you, are the provisions dealing with the question of a Member of Parliament having a direct or indirect interest willingly or knowingly in a government contract. They also provide that, in that event, there is a penalty. I believe the penalty is $200. This is an old section.
The provision I am equally interested in is the provision of forfeiture. If one examines the original history of that bill, Parliament came to the conclusion that one of the best ways to restore public confidence in public office-holders is that if, by happenstance or by intent, a member of Parliament had a direct or indirect benefit in a government contract then the government could forfeit that benefit. There is a provision there for forfeiture.
This is a current and lively topic in the public press. You can take this as notice, because this is an intricate question. I am interested in whether, having repealed those provisions, if the House of Commons in its wisdom or the Senate in its judgment decided to incorporate a similar provision in its rules — and I am more particularly interested, obviously, in the Senate; the House of Commons can worry about itself — we would have the power of forfeiture. Could we, in effect, demand that right to forfeit the benefit to the public interest?
You can take that as notice, because it is a difficult and interesting question. I tried to research it myself, but have not yet come to a firm conclusion. My impression is that I doubt we have that power, but I am more interested in seeing what you and then what the government has to say about that.
Mr. Maingot: May I suggest that this represents an extension of privilege, and you can only do that by legislation, not just by one House alone.
Senator Joyal: Mr. Maingot, you mentioned previously the case of Rost v. Edwards. You will remember that when you appeared earlier on at this committee last fall we referred to the report of the joint committee of the British House of Commons and the House of Lords on the states of privilege in the Westminster Parliament. You will remember the joint committee report of 1999.
Did you have an opportunity to review chapter 2 of that report that deals specifically with the case of Rost v. Edwards?
Mr. Maingot: I regret to say that I have not. I read Rost yesterday, and then subsequently I read the Privy Council decision. This was a Queen's Bench decision. I read subsequently where the judicial committee of the Privy Council suggested that Rost was not correct in dealing with members' interests — the register of members' interests not filed within the definition of a proceeding of Parliament.
Senator Joyal: To which case of the judicial committee of the Privy Council are you referring?
Mr. Maingot: I am referring to Prebble.
Senator Joyal: The New Zealand case.
Mr. Maingot: The Minister of Justice mentioned that.
Senator Joyal: Is it not right that the Privy Council did not mention the Rost case specifically? The presentation of the Minister of Justice dealt specifically with the proceedings of Parliament. Section 9 of the Bill of Rights, as much as I can read the decision myself, I think it is page 6 of the decision. When the court dealt with section 9 of the Bill of Rights specifically, the court stated that in addition to article 9 itself there is a long line of authority that supports a wider principle, of which article 9 is merely one manifestation.
Nowhere does the case refer specifically to the Rost case. In fact, they specifically set aside the Rost case, at least as far as I can see, in the case law to which the court referred in stating that principle. I am at page 6 of their decision.
Mr. Maingot: I will have to look at this more.
Senator Joyal: If you could, Mr. Maingot. As I understand, the Prebble case is 1995, and the joint report of the British House of Commons and the House of Lords is 1999. It is four years later.
I should like to refer you to chapter 2 of that joint committee report, and especially at paragraphs 119, 120, 121, 122 and 123 of chapter 2. The report of the British joint committee deals specifically with the case of Rost v. Edwards. I quote paragraph 122:
In this regard the court decision in Rost v Edwards is a cause for concern.
It goes on:
The trial judge rejected this submission, and held that the registration of members' interests is not a proceeding in Parliament.
Again, "is not a proceeding in Parliament."
Mr. Maingot: Yes.
Senator Joyal: Then the report goes on, the next following paragraph:
We recommend that legislation should make clear that keeping the registers —
Which is a conflict of interest, as you know.
— (and hence the registers themselves) are proceedings in Parliament.
In other words, in the opinion of the British House of Commons presently, they hold that since there is no legislation that has corrected the Rost v. Edwards then Rost v. Edwards still applies.
By stating, as we do in clause 20.5(2), that everything that the ethics counsellor would do would be protected by privileges does not insert a condition of section 18 of the Constitution and section 4(a) of the Parliament of Canada Act that states that we enjoy so much of the privileges that are at that time enjoyed by the British House of Commons. That is the problem we have with Rost v. Edwards, the way that the House of Commons itself has interpreted in 1999, which is four years after the Privy Council case that the Minister of Justice has alluded to and that you are quoting. It is not clear at all in 1995 that the decision of the Privy Council set aside the decision of Rost v. Edwards, since the House of Commons itself, four years later, considered that it was still a problem and that that problem had to be settled through legislation.
We recommend that legislation should make clear that keeping the registers and hence the registers themselves are proceedings in Parliament.
Mr. Maingot: That would settle it; otherwise, as you know, the courts have the authority in their role, especially in Canada with respect to the Constitution, to determine the extent of a parliamentary privilege.
Senator Joyal: The scope.
Mr. Maingot: The scope and the extent, yes. On the other hand, once they say — if the courts decided that that register was a part of the internal management of the House, then they would not deal with it. They would say it is privileged. In England, they do not want to rely on the courts. They feel that maybe they should put that in legislation to confirm it.
I read your very interesting remarks in your exchange with the Minister of Justice. I cannot disagree with the Minister of Justice with respect especially to the section. When I was last before the committee, we talked about that and I said that, under section 44 of the Constitution, that is that part of the Constitution that may be amended by the House and the Senate. They can amend their privileges. You can do that just by law, and they do not have to amend the Constitution itself. They can do that by law.
Senator Joyal: I agree. However, as long as we have not amended section 18 and section 4(a) of the Parliament of Canada Act, this is the law. I totally agree with you. We can amend section 18 and delete all of the references or any references to the privileges enjoyed at that time by the British House of Commons. I have no problem with that at all. However, we did not do it in 1982, and so far we have not done it. This bill does not contain any provisions that would amend, as a collateral amendment, any of the section 4(a) of the Parliament of Canada Act that states, as you know, very clearly, such and the like privileges, immunities and powers as of the time of the passing of the Constitution Act, 1867, were held, enjoyed and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom and by the members thereof.
In other words, we are still bound by that provision of the Constitution, sections 18 and section 4(a).
Mr. Maingot: May I suggest, and I think we talked about that when I was last here, it is clear in law that section 18 does not have to be amended for the House of Commons and the Senate to amend their privileges because the Constitution Act itself provides a method whereby you can make these amendments dealing with privilege — and that can be done simply by an act of Parliament.
Senator Joyal: I agree with you.
Mr. Maingot: Otherwise, you rely on the courts and what they will come up with.
Senator Joyal: I am not quarrelling with you or disputing with you the fact that Parliament can amend the privileges, but there are limits on how Parliament can do it as long as we maintain section 4(a) and section 18. We have limits to the capacity of Parliament to amend it as long as we have not amended it.
The puzzling thing about this is the fact that we have a clear decision of the British court, recognized by the British House of Commons as still valid. It has not been set aside formally. They recommend, in fact, that they should legislate on this, and we should legislate appropriately, as we did in 1868. You remember the famous case of administering the oath and the bill that was repealed. There is already a precedent whereby this Parliament was faced with that decision and Parliament acted at that time. Now we are faced with a similar decision.
As I say, nothing in this bill provides for an amendment that would remove the level or the threshold of what existed at the time we are legislating in the British House of Commons. How do we address this in this bill, as you stated quite clearly in your previous answers, that the court would to adjudicate? In other words, we will find ourselves back in the courts. This bill will bring us right back to the court's hands to review 20.5(2), because we are in a realm of privileges that is absolutely not that clear on the basis of the decision of the court in Britain and the Rost v. Edwards and on the basis of the report of the British House of Commons which is the level of the appreciation of our privileges.
Mr. Maingot: In trying to answer your question, I have talked about the aspect of what Parliament can do without the need to amend the Constitution. With respect to the Senate ethics officer, or the House's, for that matter, you are concerned about whether the courts might get involved. There is no question that the Senate ethics officer — the House of Commons is probably the same thing — will be dealing with matters of senators. They will be dealing with their functions and whether they fulfil them correctly or not. You are dealing with a matter of the internal management of the House of Commons. You are not affecting the rights of third parties outside. If you affect the rights of third parties outside, then the courts will step in, as they should, but when you are talking about and dealing with the members of the House of Commons and the Senate, unless you breach the Charter of Rights while dealing with them, the courts will not step in. It may require a decision, but as far as I can see, it is unlikely.
With respect to 20.5(2), dealing with the privileges and immunities of the Senate and the Senate ethics officer, it will be like anyone else who is involved in a proceeding of Parliament. You are involved with the internal management of the House, and that is hands off to the courts. The court will not step in. Mind you, they can talk about the scope of that privilege, and they will have to say that is not part of the scope of the privilege. You cannot cross every "T" and dot every "I." This is not a perfect bill, like many other bills are not perfect.
Senator Joyal: You say that it is not affecting third-party rights, but we were discussing having as an appendix to this bill that the spouse would have to report his or her assets, so does that not in fact affect third-party rights?
Senator Christensen: That would be our rules.
Senator Joyal: But they would be under investigation of the ethics officer or counsellor.
Senator Losier-Cool: You can put it in the rules.
Senator Joyal: We cannot ignore the fact that the draft rules we have already contain that provision. We cannot ignore on the left what we are doing on the right.
The Chairman: I would point out that this will probably be addressed in the future by our rules, and the only people the Senate rules apply to are senators. It will be up to the senators themselves as to how they report or if they want their spouses to or if their spouses allow them to.
Senator Joyal: Madam Chair, with all respect, if there is an allegation by a member of the Senate that a spouse of a senator has not filed the proper declaration or is in a conflict of interest in a bill, as much as we have a draft code and a bill at the same time, we are exactly in the field of investigation or concern, to put it in a neutral term, of the ethics officer. That is part of the overall discussion we have had. We have certainly heard members of the Senate and members of our committee discussing the draft code proposing that. I am not inventing something that does not already exist.
The Chairman: No, you are not, Senator Joyal, but I would reiterate that the only person who will be compellable whatsoever by this person will be the senators — not their spouses, not their children or anyone else. It is up to the Senate and their own sense of honour what they do.
Senator Austin: I wanted, colleagues, to touch on something for the purposes of the record, the British case of Prebble v. Television New Zealand Ltd., [1994] 3 All ER, page 418 — and I quote:
In particular, it is questionable whether Rost v. Edwards, [1990] 2 All ER 641, [1990] 2 Q.B. 460, was rightly decided.
Senator Grafstein: What quote is that?
Senator Austin: This is the judicial committee of the Privy Council. Thank you for the question.
In R v. Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, ex parte Al Fayed, the Master of the Rolls, Lord Woolf, says on page 95 of the 1998, 1 All England Reports:
In Prebble v. Television New Zealand...
He then gives the citation.
...Lord Browne-Wilkinson dealt with the same matter. Lord Browne- Wilkinson indicated that a generous approach had to be adopted to art 9.
That is article 9 of the Bill of Rights, 1688, which Professor Maingot has quoted in his evidence today.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson went on to say:
"In addition to art 9 itself, there is a long line of authority which supports a wider principle, of which art 9 is merely one manifestation, viz that the courts and Parliament are both astute to recognise their respective constitutional roles. So far as the courts are concerned they will not allow any challenge to be made to what is said or done within the walls of Parliament in performance of its legislative functions and protection of established privileges.
I wanted to point out that the Rost v. Edwards case has had two very senior courts commenting about it as a questionable privilege. I am not familiar with the joint committee to which Senator Joyal refers, but I will certainly look at what it says. Thank you.
Senator Joyal: I want to come back to the issue of privileges that we discussed earlier. I asked before if you know of any similar provisions extending the privileges of the Senate and its members to one single person in any federal statute per se. Since you have written a book on this, you certainly have looked into all the federal statutes dealing with privileges, especially the devolution of privileges. This is what it is all about, that is, Parliament would devolve or delegate not only the privileges of the individual members but the privileges of the institution to one single person. In your opinion, does that exist in any other statute?
Mr. Maingot: I did not look at all the statutes to see whether they dealt with it.
Senator Joyal: You wrote a book on this. Therefore, you certainly know about the issue.
Mr. Maingot: Parliamentary privilege deals with Parliament, the House of Commons and the Senate, and when you have some connection with the Senate or the House of Commons. You would not provide parliamentary privilege to any particular person if he or she were not involved in a parliamentary proceeding.
As I said before, if someone works here or is a witness before you, you do not have to fix them with a parliamentary proceeding. It is by the very act of participating in the parliamentary proceeding that this descends upon, this provides you with that cloak of protection and immunity. You are subject only to the House or the Senate itself as to what you say and do, while you are participating.
The idea of a person who, out of the blue, is provided with parliamentary privilege without any nexus to the House or the Senate is anathema. There no need for it. It does not seem rational in my view, except with respect to those privileges that exist outside the House, such as being summoned as a witness or as a member of a jury or providing for your civil protection from civil contempt of court.
Senator, we would not find it anywhere. I looked briefly at legislation concerning officers of Parliament who deal with access to information, official languages, privacy, elections, and there may be another. In my cursory examination, I did not see anything that said that that person is protected by parliamentary privilege. Anyone, whether he is present at elections, someone such as myself, any other witness, or somebody bringing a petition to the House is protected by that parliamentary privilege which reflects what your activity is at that particular time.
Senator Joyal: Thus, you do not know of any particular provision vesting an officer with both the privileges and immunities of the Senate and the individual privileges of members thereof, do you?
Mr. Maingot: As I say, I did not look at all those bills in detail. I would be very surprised to see that.
I know that, in British Columbia, when Mr. Hughes was the conflict of interest commissioner, the legislation provided simply that no action of any kind lies against the commissioner for anything he or she does under the act.
Senator Joyal: That is the good faith provision.
Mr. Maingot: In the British Columbia act, I did not see anything about protecting him from parliamentary privilege. Parliamentary privilege applies when you are involved in a parliamentary proceeding.
Senator Joyal: I totally agree with you. A witness who comes here like you, for instance, is protected when you take part in the deliberations of Parliament. The same is true when you are part of the deliberative function of Parliament or when you are directly part of the legislative function of Parliament, such as the clerk, for instance, or the Sergeant-at- Arms, who are part of the legislative process within the institution of Parliament. We are faced here with a different kind of proposal. What I am trying to understand is what we are doing here with this.
Mr. Maingot: I did not see the need for that because he or she is already covered. For that matter, if what they call the whistle-blower appears before your committee, he or she is protected.
Senator Joyal: As are you and as is any witness.
Mr. Maingot: Yes, that is right. Some action taken against that person represents contempt of the House before he or she spoke.
Senator Joyal: That is what I think. Furthermore, he is protected with the usual good faith clause. When somebody is acting in good faith within his or her duties, he or she is protected from legal proceedings.
Mr. Maingot: You do not need that when speaking in the House, the Senate or in committee.
Senator Joyal: Because you are already protected.
Senator Smith: For the record, Senator Joyal was asking you, Mr. Maingot, about clause 20.5, and whether or not any other officer had that same situation. Could we turn over to clause 72.05 on page 6? That part of the bill is headed "Functions in Relation to Members of the House of Commons." There are five provisions that are the same vis-à-vis the House of Commons. Might it be reasonable to conclude that given the fact that the House of Commons adopted this, with the support of four of the five parties, including of course the Conservative Party —
Senator Di Nino: In the House of Commons.
Senator Smith: Yes. As far as we are aware, they did not seem to have any trouble with any precedent being established by the provisions set out in 72.05.
Senator Di Nino: It has nothing to do with the Senate.
Senator Smith: I am not saying it does. However, I think it is useful information.
Senator Di Nino: Anything coming from Senator Smith is always useful.
The Chairman: I am not sure that requires an answer.
Senator Smith: It does appear the same, does it not?
Mr. Maingot: I see that.
Senator Joyal: What does it prove?
Senator Smith: I will save that for my speech.
Mr. Maingot: It is an elusive subject.
Senator Bryden: I will save my reaction to the last interjection for my speech.
If we go back to clause 20.5(2), the last sentence states that the Senate ethics officer enjoys the privileges and immunities of the Senate and its members when carrying out those duties and functions. At the very most, that is redundant. It is not adding anything. If he were carrying out his duties within the Senate, then he would have the privileges that you have as a witness. Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Maingot: In effect, that is what I am saying, yes.
Senator Bryden: So we should take that out. We do not need gratuitous verbiage in there.
Senator Smith: Then we would delete all of the "for greater certainty" clauses, too?
The Chairman: Senator Joyal, at this point, I believe we have finished our questioning.
I thank you very much, Mr. Maingot, for appearing before us once again and attempting to set us straight.
The committee adjourned.