Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on the
Anti-terrorism Act
Issue 3 - Evidence - Morning meeting
OTTAWA, Monday, March 7, 2005
The Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism Act met this day at 10:30~a.m. to undertake a comprehensive review of the provisions and operations of the Anti-terrorism Act, (S.C. 2001, c.41).
Senator Joyce Fairbairn (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honourable senators, I call this meeting to order. I will explain briefly the purpose of this committee. In October 2001, as a direct response to the terrorist attacks in New York City, in Washington DC, and in a field in Pennsylvania, and at the request of the United Nations, the Canadian government introduced Bill C-36, the Anti- terrorism Act.
Given the urgency of the situation then, Parliament was asked to expedite our study of the legislation and we agreed to do that. The deadline for the bill to pass was mid-December of 2001, and we met that deadline. However, concerns were expressed that it was difficult to thoroughly assess the potential impact of this legislation in such a short period of time. For that reason it was agreed that, three years later, Parliament would be asked to examine the provisions of the act and its impact on Canadians with the benefit of hindsight and in a less emotionally charged situation than existed at that time.
The work of this special committee represents the Senate's efforts to fulfill that obligation. When we have completed the study, we will report to the Senate, outlining any issue that we believe should be addressed. Our work will be available to the government and to the Canadian people. The House of Commons is undergoing a similar process.
To this point, the committee has met with the Honourable Anne McLellan, our Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, as well as the Honourable Irwin Cotler, Minister of Justice, Attorney General for Canada.
We are pleased to be joined today by Mr. Jim Judd the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service as well Mr. Dale Neufeld, the Deputy Director of Operations.
Even though Mr. Judd has been generous to say that he can be with us until two o'clock this afternoon, I am certain we will all have a great number of questions for him. I would, therefore, request that questions and answers be as concise as possible. Mr. Judd, the floor is yours.
Mr. Jim Judd, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service: Good morning senators. I am here with Mr. Neufeld, the Deputy Director of Operations for the service. We will give you an overview of the terrorist threats facing Canada today, in the context of your review of the legislation that was passed several years ago in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
I will focus on three things today: what has happened with the threat of terrorism since the legislation was enacted; how we see the current environment both in Canada and globally; and what the prospects may be for the future.
Terrorism has become a global phenomenon that has taken root. If terrorism ever was, it is no longer a passing trend. It is in Canada and it is a very real threat to our national security.
Adherents of the movement span country, cultures, political systems and socio-economic backgrounds. They include both highly educated elites and more humble foot soldiers. Followers are recruited around the world, including our own country. Since 9/11, numerous terrorist actions have taken place across the globe with a concomitant loss of life and injury. As you will see in the next slide, both the number and frequency of terrorist attacks have grown significantly. While none of the attacks has been on the scale of September 11, 2001, they have nonetheless been horrifying, whether we talk of the bombings of the Bali night club, of the trains in Madrid last year, or the attack in the school in Beslan. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Canada or to Canadians, even prior to the attacks of 9/11 and the passage of this legislation.
All that said, there have been a number of positive developments over the last three and a half years in the effort to counterterrorism. In Afghanistan, the actions by coalition forces have dispersed the leadership and handicapped the infrastructure that previously supported much of the terrorist movement. The response by the United Nations and individual national governments to enact legislation, change organizations and improve collaboration amongst institutions and commit resources to the counterterrorism effort, have all had a salutary effect. Despite the continuing terrorist action around the world, new attacks have been thwarted in a number of countries. At the same time, there have been a number of significant negative developments, some of which have made and will make the work of security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies difficult.
First, evidence of planning for other attacks around the world and in our country continues to be uncovered. While we have a good sense of what our current targets are doing, it is the ones that we do not know about that remain of greatest concern to us.
Second, the terrorist networks responsible for or associated with the 9/11 attacks have become more physically dispersed and more technologically sophisticated in many respects. We assess that their longstanding quest to obtain more horrific weaponry, be it chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear, continues unabated. Last month the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency set out his own concerns about the ease of access to radiological and nuclear weaponry in the world today.
The organizational structure of al Qaeda and its affiliates has changed from more of a centralized command-and- control model to a much more decentralized and loosely-tied system. In many respects, it has been transformed into more of a global movement formed often of autonomous and far-flung elements.
The terrorist networks' use of the Internet, for example, as a communications, recruitment and propaganda tool, has been impressive in bolstering their capacity around the world and in our own country. Their utilization of encryption and sophisticated steganography techniques has been impressive. It is being increasingly used as a fundraising mechanism through the use of credit card fraud schemes.
Third, the number of adherents to terrorism has continued to grow in the years since 9/11. Last month, the Director of the CIA in his threat overview to Congress cited Iraq as a possible new operating base for international terrorism. The ranks of trained terrorist fighters in Iraq are bolstered by individuals from around the world, including from Europe and Canada. For example, a Canadian citizen is believed to be a member of a group affiliated with al Qaeda; and Abdul Jabbar, a landed immigrant, is believed to be a key commander and ideologue with that same organization in Iraq.
Fourth, the type of persons attracted to terrorist networks is changing in worrisome ways. More are being found in the second generation of immigrant families in Europe, Canada, the United States and elsewhere, while still others have had no discernible previous link of any kind with terrorist networks, a phenomenon we have found in our own country as well.
Some things have not changed regarding the contemporary terrorist threat in Canada or in other countries. The extremists remain committed adversaries, ready to die for their cause or causes. They continue to be indiscriminate in their targets, not differentiating between military and security forces or civilians, and preferring to attack soft targets and to inflict maximum casualties, thereby increasing the public impact of their action. They continue to demonstrate outstanding operational security and highly effective planning skills, often taking years to put into effect an operation. They also maintain the capacity to operate effectively in much the same way as a multinational corporation, with operations involving personnel in several countries simultaneously. Geography has not proven to be an impediment to them. Finally, many tools of the terrorist trade are readily accessible, including recipes for chemical agents or commercially available components for explosives and other weaponry.
Canada is extremely fortunate not to have had terrorist attacks take place on our soil in the last three and a half years, but we have not been immune from the effects of terrorism, leaving aside the 24 Canadians who died in the attacks in New York City. Two other Canadians died in the bombings of the Bali nightclubs, Canadian Forces personnel have been killed and wounded by terrorist attacks while serving in Afghanistan, and the threat to our deployed forces in Afghanistan remains high. For this reason, the service makes it a priority to support the Canadian Forces deployed there.
Given the international mobility of Canadian citizens and the continued deployment of Canadian Forces personnel in Afghanistan and potentially to other troubled regions of the world, our citizens can be at risk whenever they are outside the country.
We have not been immune from terrorism in other ways. Several graduates of terrorist training camps, many of whom are battle-hardened veterans of campaigns in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and elsewhere, reside here, while others continue to seek access to our country. Often these individuals remain in contact with one another while in Canada or with colleagues outside of the country, and continue to show signs of ongoing clandestine-type activities, including the use of counter-surveillance techniques, secretive meetings and encrypted communications.
Canadians have been involved in the planning and execution of terrorist operations in other countries, either while residing within or outside of Canada. These include Abdul Rahman Jabarah, who was sought for his involvement in the bombing of residential compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 2003. He died later that summer in a gun battle with Saudi security forces. His brother, Mohammed Jabarah, was involved in a foiled terrorist plot to attack foreign embassies in Singapore. Since 2002, he has been detained by the United States.
There has been considerable publicity around the family of the late Ahmed Said Khadr, a close associate of bin Laden, who was a central figure in Canada's Islamic extremist network. Some of his children underwent weapons and explosives training in camps in Afghanistan.
Kassem Daher, a Canadian citizen, was imprisoned in Lebanon for his role in a gun battle with Lebanese security forces.
In addition, Abderraouf Jdey and Faker Boussora, Canadian citizens of Tunisian origin, are listed on the U.S. State Department's Reward for Justice Program. Both attended al Qaeda camps and Jdey made a suicide video for al Qaeda in which he pledged his life for the movement.
Canada has also been an attractive refuge for extremists. Hani Al Sayegh, a refugee claimant, was involved in the bombings in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and Ahmed Ressam, a failed refugee claimant from Montreal, planned an attack at the Los Angeles airport in the late 1990s and was tried and convicted in a U.S. court.
We believe that a number of these extremists came to Canada to continue their activities and are being held under national security certificates. These include Mohammed Mahjoub, a member of the Vanguards of Conquest, a radical wing of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad; Mahmoud Jaballah, a senior operative of the Egyptian terrorist organization al- Jihad and al Qaeda; Hassan Al Merei and Mohammed Harket, both suspected members of the Osama bin Laden network; and Adil Charkaoui, a suspected member of the al Qaeda network.
We also know that pre-operational planning reconnaissance has been undertaken in Canada on a variety of possible targets in some of our largest metropolitan centres.
The publicized case of Samir Ait Mohamed, a failed refugee claimant currently incarcerated in Vancouver, who is believed to have been targeting a Jewish neighbourhood in Montreal, is but one publicly known example.
Finally, it is worth remembering that Canada was specifically mentioned by Osama bin Laden as amongst the six designated targets for terrorist action because of our role in Afghanistan. Canada has been twice cited by al Qaeda, most recently last year as a designated target of choice.
In conclusion, while circumstances have changed since 9/11 in terms of both the nature of the terrorist threat and the measures taken against it, the threat remains real, both in Canada and other countries. The bottom line is that global terrorism and specifically al Qaeda and its affiliated networks have become more difficult for security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies to track and apprehend. In particular, greater autonomy and decentralization of these groups have provided more opportunities for local initiatives, as opposed to centrally directed attacks.
There is little about the terrorist threat that distinguishes Canada from other nations, including those that have been or are likely to be directly targeted. In other words, nothing exempts us from the threat of violence.
While our pre-eminent concern remains with security threats to Canada and Canadians, we also have critical obligations to our international partners to ensure that Canada is not used as a base of attack on other countries or that Canadians are in any way participants in such attacks or their planning. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that there have been a number of instances where Canadians or individuals based here have been implicated in terrorist attacks or plans in other countries, at least a half dozen or more in the last several years.
Fighting the terrorist threat and reducing the vulnerability to attack here and elsewhere in the world will require us to creatively engage the complete range of techniques and legislative devices available to us. In many ways, we have made our own luck by not only relentlessly pursuing our targets using the legal means provided to us under our own legislation, but also, in concert with our partners, using new measures provided by the government to enhance its ability to fight terrorism at home and abroad.
That concludes my presentation. Mr. Neufeld or I would be happy to take any questions that honourable senators may have for us.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: Thank you, Mr. Neufeld for being here, and for your presentation, Mr. Judd.
You said that the last five people you mentioned were are held under the national security certificate provisions of the Immigration Act. I wish to discuss with you how that procedure works. The Minister of Justice and the Deputy Prime Minister spoke to us about security certificates, and some of us were anxious about the fact that detainees have limited, if any, rights in attempting to fight detention and eventual deportation to their country of origin.
I understand that CSIS initiates the process by providing two ministers with information that they believe is strong enough to warrant the issuance of a security certificate on the basis that the individual is a threat to our society. Am I correct that CSIS initiates the process?
Mr. Judd: That is correct. In the history of certificates, there may be one case in which the police initiated a certificate based on criminal activities.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: However, in the five cases before us it was based on CSIS information; is that correct?
Mr. Judd: That is correct.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: How is the information gathered that is provided to ministers and, once a certificate is confirmed, to the court? What elements go into that information brief? Is it, as we have been told, a collection of newspaper articles? Is it rumour? Is it interviews with neighbours and others who know the individual? Is the individual himself or herself interviewed?
Mr. Judd: The information presented to ministers and subsequently made available to the Federal Court is comprised of a range of information and documentation, some of it public, some of it obtained through covert means, if you will, some of it obtained through interviews with the individual or others and some of it obtained from foreign intelligence services.
Normally, the material put forward to the ministers is comprised of a mix of overt and covert information that is multiple sourced, that is, not based on a single source. It is scrupulously facted, as we say, so that every conclusion in the report is supported by substantiating documentation. I understand that the process of putting together a file such as this is enormously work intensive. It sometimes takes more than a year and requires a considerable investment of resources to compile.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: I am surprised you say the report is conclusive. I would have thought that, if the information were as conclusive as you are suggesting, there would be grounds in it to lay charges rather going through a process by which a person is not charged but rather detained while awaiting hearings and so forth. Is ``conclusive'' an optimistic word, or is my interpretation of that word different from yours?
Mr. Judd: I use ``conclusive'' in the sense that it is conclusive for the purposes of this portion of the legislation. The question of whether the information could be used for a law enforcement proceeding, the laying of charges under the Criminal Code, for example, is a good one. At the genesis of this provision, it was intended to deal with people who came into the country without citizenship and who retrospectively might have been thought inadmissible. The principal focus of the security certificate is on the removal of the individual from the country as opposed to the pursuit of a proceeding under the Criminal Code.
In acting on these situations, CSIS is motivated very much by risk avoidance, that is, we would like to ensure that the individual is not in a position to undertake anything that could subsequently produce a Criminal Code charge.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: I think the Immigration Act specifies that all you require are reasonable grounds whereas, under the Criminal Code, you need something more substantial.
Mr. Judd: Yes.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: The individual has to be called before a Federal Court judge within a week of a certificate being issued. Is it correct that the judge is given all the information that the ministers have signed off on?
Mr. Judd: Yes.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: The judge decides what part, if not all, of that information can be released to the detainee?
Mr. Judd: The detainee and his or her counsel.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: Is it correct that CSIS can intervene and protest the release of certain information by withdrawing that information?
Mr. Judd: I do not know that we can withdraw information once it is put forward, has been signed off by the minister and is put to the judge. There are certain kinds of information that we would not want made public because of the potential jeopardy it would pose to either sources or operations of the service. However, it is my understanding that, once the information is conveyed to the ministers and the judge, it is not withdrawn.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: The judge has the obligation to read the information and the discretion to release some or all of it to the detainee or his or her counsel, but if some of the information that the judge wants released is objected to by CSIS, can CSIS disallow that release?
Mr. Judd: My understanding is that there may be instances in which the judge will meet with officers of CSIS to discuss elements of the material and to hear argument on why it should not be released. In the final analysis, I believe the determination is made by the judge.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: After consultation with CSIS.
Am I correct that not every judge on the Federal Court is qualified to sit on these cases?
Mr. Judd: I understand that certain judges of the Federal Court are designated to hear such cases.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: Who makes the designation and on what basis?
Mr. Judd: That is a matter decided upon by the court for the purposes of such proceedings.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: Because of the high security nature of the case, do the judges need CSIS clearance to hear such a case?
Mr. Judd: I do not think so.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: I ask that in all seriousness because you are taking them to a high level of confidentiality to which very few people are entitled.
Mr. Judd: It is a legitimate point. That has never occurred to me.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: If a detainee's lawyer, after looking at the evidence he is allowed to see, finds flaws in it, can he submit counter evidence?
Mr. Judd: I understand that he can.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: I am glad that you are clarifying this. My understanding is that no appeal is allowed, that you can challenge but not introduce evidence for that purpose.
Mr. Judd: My understanding is that it is possible to bring in evidence and that, in certain instances, particularly where the individual in question has permanent residence status, there is an obligation for a review of the case every six months and that the individual and his or her counsel would have the opportunity to introduce evidence in those instances.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: The decision may be that the detainee is to be deported. Then the fear of course is that, as it is in most cases, the country of origin is one that practices torture. Canada is a signatory to the UN Convention against Torture under which, before deportation takes place, there shall be assurances received from the country of origin that the individual in question will not be subjected to torture. Is that correct?
Mr. Judd: My understanding is that there is a process involving a designated official or a designated representative of the minister who makes a determination on the balance of danger versus risk — danger of the individual remaining in Canada; risk to the individual if the individual were to be removed to his or her country of origin.
Part of the process that is undergone is an assessment of the risk that the individual might face in his or her home country, including from treatment by national authorities, were that individual repatriated. That then is considered subsequently by the federal court judge in making a determination.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: The Americans have sent many people back to Syria and Egypt. They sent Arar to Syria. That is the most notorious case in this country. I suppose we cannot get into that in detail as it is before a commission, but Syria is also a signatory to the convention, and Arar and others claim that they were tortured. The Americans claim they get assurances just beforehand. Obviously they cannot be followed through.
What guarantee, if any, do we have that these assurances are valid? I can think of three cases, Arar and two others, where individuals were sent back to their country of origin, and they claim they were tortured before the countries released them without charges being laid. It makes me wonder why we are a part of a process where, in the long run, the individual may suffer treatment which is completely abhorrent to our society. Perhaps you are not the person to answer that question. The point is: How valid are these assurances, and who can ensure that they are complied with, if at all?
Mr. Judd: The issue of assurances is obviously a legitimate one. I gather that, in some cases, assurances that were sought and received were judged not to be adequate by the federal court judge. In other cases, I know of individuals who have been returned to their countries of origin, including some of the countries that people are now concerned about regarding the treatment of persons returned to them.
In my brief tenure as director of CSIS, I have experience with only one returnee, and that is Mr. Zundel who, of course, returned last week. The issue surrounding assurances and what happens if assurances are not considered adequate by a federal court judge is a very real issue, both from our vantage point and from the vantage point of how governments deal with individuals such as these.
As you know, and I think you have discussed it here, it is not only an issue in our own country, it is one that is quite alive in other foreign jurisdictions at the moment.
The Chairman: Mr. Judd has generously agreed to stay with us for a length of time today, so I am being relatively generous in the first round of questioning. However, I may tighten up as the day goes on.
Senator Jaffer: I would congratulate you on your appointment. I worked with you when you were in Defence, and I hope you bring the same values as you did in Defence in encouraging women and minorities to be a part of your organization. I am sure you will.
On the CSIS website, you have identified a number of specific roles in counterterrorism, and one is community interviewing. As part of your counterterrorism program, you identify community interviews as one of the main roles. In your website, you state:
The Service conducts interviews within communities to assess the likelihood of violence taking place in response to international political developments. The interviews provide community members with a forum to make their concerns and opinions known, to assist CSIS in determining whether there are threats to particular communities, and to sensitize them to the role and mandate of CSIS.
Please advise the committee what prompts you to do this kind of interview and how you choose the individuals or communities that are targeted and the types of questions an intelligence officer might ask over the course of an interview. What have you done specifically to sensitize the community to the role of CSIS?
Mr. Judd: A variety of issues may arise in respect to different communities in Canada, including those that may relate to counterterrorism investigations that are under way. In instances, members of an immigrant community may be subject to harassment or pressure from persons to engage in or to support fund-raising, for example, or to do other activities which are not consistent with their own preferences and desires as members of Canadian society.
Many interviews are done in support of specific investigations, and they are normally associated with a particular investigation that may be under way of any given individual or individuals. Generally speaking, we try to develop an understanding of the individual, of the person, and to do that by speaking to people to whom the individual may be known.
On the issue of community relations more generally, I personally have an interest in doing more than has been done in the past. The service has taken a number of steps in terms of meeting with representatives of various communities across the country. We will be meeting with the newly established cross-cultural roundtable this week for that purpose. In my travels around the country, I hope to meet with a variety of community leaders and individuals to better explain the operations of the service, particularly what it does or what it does not do and why we do what we do, so that there is a better understanding of our modus operandi and raison d'être.
Senator Jaffer: Could you provide to our committee information on the outreach programs you have been doing, and also on the training of CSIS officers in understanding the diverse community of Canada? I would appreciate it if you would provide that to us in writing. Would that be possible?
Mr. Judd: Certainly. On your first question about outreach programs, we would be happy to respond to you in writing. On the issue of training, I can respond to that now.
CSIS officers, once recruited to the service, undergo a fairly extensive professional development and training program that lasts months, usually divided into two periods of course learning. Part and parcel of the training and development they undergo has to do with Canadian society, the make-up of Canadian society, its particular features and its constituent groups. People are brought in from outside of CSIS for the purpose of speaking to recruits and subsequently in more advanced training on cultural and social issues that may be particular to a given community in the country. I might add that we also have a number of employees of the service who come from those communities and they too participate from time to time in these training and development exercises so as to better sensitize their colleagues to some of these issues.
On the outreach issue, I will be happy to respond with a written response.
Senator Jaffer: Mr. Judd, I know I asked you a number of questions and you may not be able to answer them, but one of the questions I asked you is: How do you target a community, and what types of questions do you ask?
To follow up on what you have said, when does a community stop being an immigrant community and become part of the Canadian community? That is of interest to people like me. When do you stop being an immigrant community, according to your definition?
Mr. Judd: If I could back this up a moment, senator, the service does not deal in a sense with communities or groups; it deals with individuals, basically. The focus on an individual who is considered to be a possible interest is dealt with on a kind of an associational basis, which is to say that we try to develop an understanding of the individual and what that individual's intentions and background may be. We do that by reference in part to the people with whom that individual associates, and in some instances, not all, the individual in question may associate only with members of a smaller community.
I will ask Mr. Neufeld to add to that, if he would.
Mr. Dale Neufeld, Deputy Director of Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service: To try to reassure the senator, we do not look at immigrant communities quite in that light, if I understood the question correctly. If I were to give you an example, perhaps, it would be wherever there is a homeland issue, somewhere in the world where there is a situation with ongoing violence, probably tied to something political or successional. If there were, say, an Irish extremist group recruiting or collecting money in Canada to back up a terrorist threat in the United Kingdom, we would be in the Irish community carrying on our investigation. I do not know how long they have been here, but they have been here a very long time. Therefore, I do not consider, necessarily, how long a particular group of immigrants has been in Canada. It ties into what we call homeland issues, where it is sometimes difficult for an immigrant community in Canada to divorce itself from the violence that is taking place in the part of the world from which they came. If that element is there, then how long they have been here is not the issue.
In addition to the sensitivity training that we give to all of our recruits, we have had, for example, an imam from a local mosque come into one of our senior training courses not that long ago. We have a theatre in our building at national headquarters and we have regularly had Muslim spokesmen come in to make sure that they get their points across. They also field questions from our employees.
At the regional level — we have six regional offices — we are quite active in talking to community leaders. Certainly, that is where you can get an indication if that community is being threatened, because in many cases they are intimidated by people who exert coercion or threats, and perhaps they are reluctant to approach the police or the service on those issues. By us being out there looking for a sounding board, if there is a problem in the community, we are able to help them with it.
Community dialogue in every threat area is truly important to us.
Senator Jaffer: May I please ask again how you choose the individuals of communities that are targeted, and what types of questions an intelligence officer might ask?
Mr. Neufeld: It would go, I suggest, to main themes. The first one the director also stressed. If we suspect that an individual is a threat to Canada's security, we would be looking for people in the community that could, perhaps, provide corroboration or dispel the suspicions we might have. It depends on who is in that circle where the individual may be. The other one is more general in nature, where we examine the nature of the community and whether there might be intimidation or coercion going on there. In some cases it would be community leaders, in some cases it might be a much narrower circle of people that surrounds an individual about whom we have a concern.
Senator Jaffer: I appreciate you sharing that with us.
Over the years that I have been in this country, I have appreciated the kind of training that the RCMP has done. I know this is a new field for you, but if you were to proceed on a more structured basis I think communities would feel more at ease.
For the last three years that this act has been in place, I have travelled extensively in our country, and I know that it is not the immigrants who are feeling the chill, it is the professors who were born in this country who are feeling it. I will give you details privately, since this hearing is being televised. I have been told that they receive calls from CSIS, whose agent has left a message with a secretary to the effect that CSIS wants to talk to them. I can assure you that that causes a great chill. If I received a call from CSIS I, too, would be worried. Intimidation goes along with that. One professor publicly said that he had four calls from CSIS, and then when CSIS came to speak with him, all they wanted to know was the history of Afghanistan. You need not leave a message that CSIS called if you only want to know the history of Afghanistan.
I have many examples of the intimidation of CSIS. I am sure that you have seen the pamphlet from the reputable group, the Canadian Council for Refugees, where they talk about feeling the chill and discrimination against Muslims and Arabs in Canada. They say that Muslims and Arabs have been subjected to intrusive interviewing by CSIS in public contexts such as their work places. Although interviews may be necessary to gather information, the methods used have intimidated and unfairly exposed certain persons to suspicion of being involved in terrorism.
How do you respond to such criticism?
Mr. Judd: First, I believe it is fair to say that we can understand the concerns on the part of some individuals, groups or communities in Canada about this. However, I would remind you that, under the terms of the CSIS legislation, anything that CSIS does is subject to review externally. Any individual who feels that he or she has been treated inappropriately has the wherewithal to register concerns with the Security Intelligence Review Committee. We would not condone intimidation in interviews. If you want to bring any particular instances or cases to my personal attention, I will be happy to receive those.
Another thing to bear in mind is that CSIS does a number of things other than deal with counterterrorism. It provides security clearances for individuals seeking employment for jobs which require a security clearance in the federal government, in at least two provincial governments, and anywhere in the nuclear industry in Canada. In the process of going through the steps required to provide a security clearance for an individual, CSIS will interview people who have been provided as references by the job seeker. There may be many instances where individuals are called not because of a connection with anything insidious, but simply because they are seeking a job in a particular organization for which a security clearance is a requirement.
Senator Jaffer: I understand that. However, when I have asked people why they did not report a particular incident SIRC, they have told me that, if they go to them, other issues will arise.
It concerns me that the people who are feared are all from a certain part of the world. Mr. Neufeld said that you also look at other terrorist groups, but the only names that have come out have been names of Muslim people. Surely you are looking at other groups as well.
When I spoke this morning to journalists from South Asia, I said that the greatest thing about this country is that we all feel part of it. Background does not matter. When you come to this country, you feel very much part of the community. Bill C-36 has made people like me not part of the community because we are singled out.
You raised the issue of second generation. I am concerned that we not look at second generation as homeland people or as being from immigrant communities because we are not. My children are not immigrants; they were born in this country. Bill C-36 has already started creating an ``us'' and ``them,'' and that is a concern to me.
Senator Andreychuk: Welcome, Mr. Judd. I am trying to keep up with all of your title changes. I hope that the government does not move you out of CSIS because continuity is important in the organization.
You made a comment on second generation families which I thought I understood until Senator Jaffer commented. Could you elaborate on what you said and what you meant by your look at second generation family members?
Mr. Judd: One of the surprises that intelligence agencies in the Western world have encountered recently has to do with individuals who are becoming adherent to the terrorism phenomenon. Traditionally, in the sense of the last number of years, much of the focus of attention has been on individuals who emanated from another jurisdiction. However, in certain instances, we are encountering individuals, here and elsewhere, who are native born in the country to which their parents have moved who have, without any particular past connection or any apparent discernible motivation, shown up as associates or members of terrorist groups.
Senator Andreychuk: Is that an area of concern for security forces?
Mr. Judd: A surprising one, yes.
Senator Andreychuk: Previously you have answered questions about security certificates under the Immigration Act. You have now identified second generation family members who were born here and are Canadians with full citizenship. If we are concerned about our safety and security, we should be concerned about those who will commit terrorist acts and not what title they fall under: immigrant, resident, alien, citizen, and so on.
Should a Canadian citizen become a suspect and there is not sufficient evidence to lay a charge, how is that person held? Is he or she held under a security certificate? Can you describe the process?
Mr. Judd: As far as I know, there is no analogous process for someone who has Canadian citizenship, other than the provisions that were put in place in Bill C-36 for ``preventive arrest,'' I believe is the term, which is not being used. In the case of Canadian citizens associated with terrorism, a number of individuals are currently of concern, and in one instance criminal charges have been laid.
Senator Andreychuk: If we have facts on which to lay charges, we do make the distinction of attempting to move those who might be a risk through the immigration process.
With Canadians, am I led to believe that, if we cannot lay charges, all you do is keep them under surveillance, one would hope?
Mr. Judd: Very much so. As I tried to explain earlier, the security certificate process for people who do not have Canadian citizenship could, in some respects, be regarded as a default mechanism which is only brought into play where, retrospectively, an individual would have been or should have been denied entry to the country in the first place.
However, that process is only applicable to those who do not have citizenship. For Canadian citizens, as I said, there has been one instance in the last year where criminal charges have been brought. Unfortunately, there is a publication ban on the case in question. In other instances, the surveillance by the service or other agencies would continue for as long as there was some consideration that there was some potential threat.
Senator Andreychuk: Minister after minister has told us that we belong to a global world and that we have to do our part to ensure that terrorists are deported quickly. Why do you, then, move people to a third country, such as Syria or Egypt, where we know that they might be interrogated and tortured? That issue has been flagged.
The second issue that has received less attention is that, if they are not charged in that country and held, they are released back into a void. Are we not concerned about losing terrorists into this amorphous mass so that they can return to terrorist activity? Are we really performing a security service by deporting them?
Mr. Judd: It goes back to the original intention of the certificates, which is to remove an individual to the country of his or her origin, where they have entered the country and are subsequently deemed to be a potential terrorist threat. In ideal circumstances, the system would have known that upon the individual's original application for entry and the application would have been denied.
In instance, where people have been removed to their country of origin and subsequently released by the authorities of that country, if they were in fact detained post deportation, it is probably fair to say that they would continue to be the subject of monitoring, even if they were not in detention. Were they to move elsewhere, that would be drawn to the attention of the national authorities of the country to which they moved.
Senator Andreychuk: It seems curious to me that, in Canada, if you are a Canadian citizen, a charge must be laid. There must be sufficient grounds upon which to lay a charge. If you are an immigrant or an alien in this country, you can be deported, and we rely on the capacities of countries that may not be like-minded in how they view terrorist activity. How are we then making the world safer? That is the question I would ask you to ponder.
Mr. Judd: It is a legitimate question. Our first concern as a service relates principally and foremost to the security of Canada. We would assume that, were an individual to be removed to another country and there were still suspicions, doubts or allegations about that individual's propensity for activity of a certain kind, the individual would remain under surveillance or monitoring by the authorities there, even if that individual were not detained or prosecuted in some criminal proceeding.
Senator Andreychuk: We have no levers, except influence on these countries.
On another point, the commission studying 9/11 pointed out that terrorist activities were known, and even if we want to talk about the Iraq war, and the conclusions are not that the tools failed but that the assessments failed. In other words, the people who were assessing the situation did not connect the dots because of valid reasons of not enough resources, not enough time, not enough coordination and not enough consistency in intelligence work.
I am hearing you say today in Canada that, for security, we very much rely on how you perform your task, how you identify a suspect, and how you uncover evidence. Since 9/11, how have you changed the operations in CSIS? I appreciate you will be talking about how others in the service have changed.
The day after the attacks, we all realized that we had surveillance, we knew there was terrorist activity, but we did not connect the dots, or we did not have the resources to do so. Everyone seems to have readjusted after 9/11, after we passed Bill C-36. How have you readjusted your services? It seems to me the essence of whether we are safe or not is if you do your job properly. If you do not do your job properly, either we are into a security problem or we are improperly targeting innocent people. How have you changed since 9/11?
Mr. Judd: Some of the problems you have laid out, senator, have been common issues in a number of Western jurisdictions, and certainly the 9/11 commission highlighted a number of those.
In our own case, Mr. Neufeld has been in the service much longer than I have, and I will ask him for a supplementary response.
My sense would be that what has changed is, first, more of the resources of CSIS are devoted to counterterrorism activity than ever before in history, and that is probably true of most related agencies in the Western world.
Second, the government has seen fit to increase the budget of the service to allow it to hire more staff and to take on more operational activity.
Third, there has been a conscious effort to ensure greater collaboration, coordination and coherence amongst the various entities of the government who may have some role to play in international security areas. The reorganization 15 or 16 months ago that this government undertook of departments and agencies, particularly with the creation of the Canada Border Services Agency, brought together many constituent parts that had hitherto been in disparate organizations, hopefully with the goal of making for greater coherence amongst those.
The government also, as a consequence of the national security policy last year, undertook to establish something called the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, which is composed of individuals from a number of departments and agencies in the federal and some provincial governments whose purpose is to share and make known information on threats to security, whether here in Canada or abroad, to Canadians. That is a step that at least two or three other foreign governments have undertaken in the last several years. The United Kingdom and the United States have done something analogous. A number of measures have been undertaken, and our hope would be that they will prove sufficient.
Senator Andreychuk: You do security clearances on anyone who is an Order-in-Council appointment to a sensitive position in a department. You also do investigative work respecting all sorts of threats, not just security threats. Do you now provide security clearances before Order-in-Council appointments are made, or are you still in the position of doing some of those after someone is appointed?
Mr. Judd: I stand to be corrected on this, given my relative newness in the job, but I believe security clearances are done before the Order-in-Council is issued.
A brief clarification is that the program of security clearances is broader than you described it. We now do security clearances for certain jobs in the province of Alberta and the province of New Brunswick as well as for individuals seeking employment in nuclear-related industries, which is relatively new, that is, over the last several years.
Senator Andreychuk: No appointments are made that require security clearances until CSIS provides the security clearance; is that correct? Since you are new I want to be sure of that. You may want to reply later.
Mr. Judd: I will get back to you on that.
Senator Fraser: I understand that CSIS maintains terrorist watch lists. Indeed, that would seem to be a core function for CSIS, at least to a lay person. Could you give us any idea of the criteria used to put somebody on such a list?
Mr. Judd: We have an internal inventory of individuals about whom we have reason to believe that they have been, are, or could be members of a terrorist organization. Externally to the service, we only provide names of foreign nationals who meet those criteria. That information is provided to Citizenship and Immigration for the Enforcement Information Index
The criteria for putting individuals on such a list would include, largely, past activities, known training in terrorist camps in various jurisdictions, known participation in terrorist activities elsewhere around the world, recognized and known affiliations with individuals and groups who are known terrorists. There may be other criteria. I will ask Mr. Neufeld to expand.
Mr. Neufeld: The watch list would likely include others who are considered a threat to Canada's security. We might have someone who is not a terrorist but whom we suspect of wanting to conduct espionage in Canada, for example. The watch list would consist of more than just terrorist entities.
Senator Fraser: How do you assess whether someone has been or could be engaged in the kind of activities that we do not want going on in this country?
Mr. Judd: It is based on the individual's behaviour, associations, travel and conduct. There are a series of factors that I tried to briefly outline. We do not treat individuals en masse. They are treated as individuals and there are certain gradations amongst them as to the seriousness with which we regard them. Some people might be of interest to us just to determine whether or not they would be of interest to us in the longer term. If they are not, then we no longer pay attention to them.
If they do exhibit behaviours in the course of the investigation that lead us to think otherwise, we will continue to investigate and to maintain the individual on an internal watch list. There are instances where individuals come to our attention and subsequent investigation proves or demonstrates to us that there is no basis for the investigation. We pursue that investigation no further.
Senator Fraser: Would you drop their names from the list, or is it once in, always in? Do you purge names from your lists?
Mr. Judd: Yes.
Senator Fraser: Could you give us any idea of how many names, at any given time, like today, might be on such a list? I am not asking you to betray national security.
Mr. Judd: I will give you an appropriately vague answer; it is in the triple digits.
Senator Fraser: Not the quadruple?
Mr. Judd: No, not in Canada.
Senator Fraser: You do exchange information with other intelligence agencies about people who may or may not be threats but who might well be threats; is that correct?
Mr. Judd: We do, but under fairly closely monitored circumstances. In order for us to work with another agency, we must have the approval of at least two cabinet ministers. To the extent any information is shared with a foreign government agency, any information that comes in or goes out is subject to review annually by the Security Intelligence Review Committee and in some cases by the Inspector General to determine that it has been done appropriately.
Senator Day: Could you help me with the meaning of the acronym ITAC?
Mr. Judd: Integrated Threat Assessment Centre.
Senator Day: Is that located here in Ottawa?
Mr. Judd: Yes. More precisely, it is physically located in our building, but it is not a CSIS organization per se. It is located in our building simply because of the availability of space at the time it was established. It is constituted of individuals drawn from a number of federal and provincial organizations, and it is currently headed by an RCMP officer.
Senator Day: One of your primary responsibilities is to perform a threat assessment with respect to national security. Do you use the information that is generated by the ITAC group as the source of a threat assessment for national security?
Mr. Judd: It would be a part of the basis on which we would prepare a national security assessment. The national security assessment normally would be done annually for consideration by cabinet, and then cabinet would provide direction as to where we should be focusing our efforts, based on the information we have put forward. However, the information in question would have a number of different sources and would cover a number of different areas, not just terrorism.
Senator Day: Does the information that goes to the Prime Minister with respect to threat assessment continue to go to the National Security Advisor through the Privy Council Office, or is ITAC taking over some of that responsibility? How is this happening? Explain to me the role of the national security secretariat that has been established in the Privy Council Office?
Mr. Judd: The work of ITAC is shared within the security and intelligence community and law enforcement community broadly. As a matter of course, anything that would be produced by them would be shared with the National Security Advisor in the Privy Council Office.
In addition, the National Security Advisor might receive separate reports that are otherwise generated by CSIS or other departments and agencies of the federal government relating to security threats or particular issues that may come up, not necessarily a security threat, but an issue that may be related to it, or may be related to a longer-term study of a particular phenomenon internationally or domestically that might be of interest from a security vantage point.
The National Security Advisor would receive both ITAC material, and material from us and other departments and agencies in the government, and it would be his role to ensure that the Prime Minister is subsequently briefed.
Senator Day: I appreciate that information.
Can you distinguish foreign intelligence and national security intelligence? I am trying to create definitions so we understand where we are going.
Mr. Judd: That is an interesting and legitimate question. There is some semantic dispute as to what those terms mean.
From my vantage point, national security intelligence relates to intelligence that directly affects the national security of the country.
Foreign intelligence is intelligence about the activities of particularly other governments or individuals outside the country that may not directly relate to national security issues in Canada. Foreign intelligence might be about trying to determine the intentions of country A versus country B, where the issue in question would be not necessarily at all germane to Canada's national security interests.
Senator Day: The Deputy Prime Minister gave an indication that perhaps we should become more involved and there should be more funds available to gather national security intelligence; is that your understanding?
Mr. Judd: My understanding is that there would an interest in acquiring more national security intelligence information outside of Canada, which does not help the semantic debate.
Senator Day: Could that possibly involve foreign intelligence gathering?
Mr. Judd: It could.
Senator Day: I am beginning to recognize the difference and the overlap.
During your presentation, you seemed to indicate that the potential terrorist activities and organizations all seemed to have an Islamic connection. Are there other international organizations on your watch list and areas of particular concern to you that are not Islam-based?
Mr. Judd: I do not like using the term ``Islamic-based organizations.'' The reality is that that the terrorist threat, including the terrorist threat that has been publicly associated with ``Islamic terrorism'' is a perversion of that religion. The motivations of people who may wrap themselves in that flag can be political, socio-economic or whatever. Many of the individuals associated with these organizations have nothing much to do with the Islamic religion.
That said, there are a number of other terrorist organizations around the world, many of which operate in Canada in some fashion or another, that have nothing whatsoever to do with Islam or the Middle East. They represent or are associated with different geographic regions, causes, ideologies, political motivations and so on. The world is probably more complicated than some people would like to think it is.
Senator Day: It is unfortunate that virtually all of the terrorist groups or potential groups who have a potential for terrorist activity seem to have a Muslim or an Islamic name attached and therefore we create a false impression. White and Black supremacy groups are never talked about. Irish and Tamil Tigers are never talked about. There are a number of other potential problems in Canada, that I assume are part of your watch list and that you are keeping an eye on from the national security point of view in addition to that one particular religious group.
Mr. Judd: The reality is that, as a consequence of 9/11, and some of the other terrorist activities that have taken place, there tends to be more of a focus at present on individuals and groups who have been associated in some fashion or another with al Qaeda, which, over the last five yars, has developed into the world's most notorious terrorist organization.
My own sense is that many of these individuals and groups who would say that they are associated with or are a part of al Qaeda have really nothing to do with Islam or not even necessarily the Middle East or North Africa for that matter.
Many people seem to be rallying to the particular flag — almost a flag convenience, if you will — where the associations are very difficult to determine with any degree of precision. They communicate and sometimes act in accordance with direction from them but, again, many of the more ostensible characteristics are somewhat dubious.
The Chairman: We will adjourn for lunch and return at 12:30.
The committee adjourned.