Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on the
Anti-terrorism Act
Issue 18 - Evidence - Morning meeting
OTTAWA, Monday, October 31, 2005
The Special Senate Committee on the Anti-terrorism Act met this day at 10:35 a.m. to undertake a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of the Anti-terrorism Act, (S.C. 2001, c.41).
Senator Joyce Fairbairn (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honour senators, I call this meeting to order. This is the thirty-ninth meeting with witnesses of the Special Senate Committee on the Anti-terrorism Act.
In October of 2001, as a direct response to the terrorist attacks in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, and at the request of the United Nations, the Canadian government introduced Bill C-36, the Anti- terrorism Act. Given the urgency of the situation then, Parliament was asked to expedite our study of the legislation, and we agreed. The deadline for passage of that bill was mid-December of 2001. However, concerns were expressed that it was difficult to thoroughly assess the potential impact of this legislation in such a short period of time. For that reason, it was agreed that three years later Parliament would be asked to examine the provisions of the act and its impact on Canadians with the benefit of hindsight and a less emotionally charged situation with the Canadian public. The work of this special committee represents the Senate's efforts to fulfil that obligation.
When we have completed the study, we will report to the Senate on any issue that we feel we should address. We will allow the results of our work to be available to the government and the Canadian people. The House of Commons is undertaking a similar process.
Thus far, the committee has met with government ministers and officials, international and domestic experts on the threat environment, legal experts, those involved in enforcement and intelligence gathering, and representatives of community groups. Committee members have travelled to Washington for meetings and, in one week, the committee will travel to London, England.
Over the course of our hearings, a number of questions have been raised with respect to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS. Consequently, we are very pleased to welcome back Mr. Jim Judd, the Director of CSIS. Mr. Judd has already appeared before us once and has been very generous with his time.
Thank you, Mr. Judd, for coming here again to help us at the end of our hearings, as you did at the beginning.
[Translation]
Mr. Jim Judd, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service: Madam Chairman, I am pleased to make another appearance before your committee. With your permission, I would like to make some opening remarks on three subjects in particular.
First, I would like to review development since my last appearance in March. Second, I would like to address some of the criticisms voiced by other witnesses about CSIS. Finally, I would like to address some of the issues that were discussed when I last appeared before you and that I wanted to follow up on today.
[English]
I would like to focus on the recent global developments in terrorism, and other issues that have affected CSIS since my appearance here in March of this year.
On the terrorism front, we have seen a series of significant global attacks, leaving aside the ongoing conflict in Iraq and in Israel. Most notable, certainly in terms of loss of life, have been the bombing attacks on the London public transit system in July; the bombing attacks on tourist facilities in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt in August; the suicide bombing attacks again directed at tourist sites in Bali, Indonesia, last month; and the events of this past weekend in New Delhi.
Excluding Iraq and Israel there have been more than a dozen significant terrorist attacks around the world in the last seven months. The motivations behind these attacks have been varied. Some were actions by separate movements, other reflect sectarian differences, while still others have been associated with the ideology of al Qaeda. Some, such as those this weekend in New Delhi, were inspired by undetermined causes. Still other high-profile fatalities, such as the murder of the foreign minister of Sri Lanka, have also been associated with terrorist movements.
Before discussing more specifically some of those attacks, I would like to refer you to two recent public reports dealing with these issues.
The first item is the 2005 Human Security Report just published by the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia. That report indicates that overall, all forms of political violence in the world have declined since the 1990s with the exception of the increase in the trend of international terrorism. The report notes that the increase in casualties due to international terrorist activities is due to the growing use of vehicle borne explosions and suicide bombers.
A second report was tabled with the United Nations Security Council last month. It is the third annual report to the Security Council concerning al Qaeda and the Taliban. It provides a succinct and interesting assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and affiliates noting that,
The threat from al Qaeda remains as pernicious and widespread as at any time since the attacks of September 11, 2001.
The report then goes on to describe in less than two pages the nature of that threat and the underlying ideology. Copies of both of these reports have been made available to the committee staff for distribution to senators.
I would like to discuss the attacks that took place in London this July, as there are a number of aspects you may find interesting, given your pending trip to the United Kingdom.
I want to focus on the attacks for two reasons: First, they took place in an industrialized democracy such as our own, and second, they were associated with the al Qaeda ideology, which still represents the most significant contemporary threat of terrorist violence in the Western world.
As mentioned at the outset of my remarks, there were two attacks on the London public transit system in July. The July 7 attack was successful, while the attack two weeks later was not.
The first attack resulted in 56 fatalities, including the four suicide bombers, and more than 700 injuries. The second attack did not produce any casualties. As you know police mistakenly and tragically shot and killed one other individual completely unconnected to terrorism or those attacks.
I would like to make some observations that may be of interest to the committee. The perpetrators of the two attacks were not on the ``radar screens'' of intelligence and police services in the United Kingdom. It appears that one individual involved in the first attack had come to the attention of those services in an investigation of an earlier terrorist plot in 2004 but escaped investigation. Moreover, the attacks occurred not long after British security services had actually lowered the threat level for terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom.
All of the individuals involved in the two attacks were young males between the ages of 18 and 30. The perpetrators in both attacks were British citizens. Three of those involved in the first attack were born in the United Kingdom, while the others acquired British citizenship after immigrating to that country.
The materials used to make the bombs in both attacks were commercially available products available at hardware or gardening stores. The instructions and recipes for the bombs and detonators are available on many of the more than 4,500 terrorist-related internet websites.
Finally, the attacks represented the first instance of suicide terrorist attacks within the United Kingdom; although it was not, however, the first time that British citizens were involved in suicide terrorist attacks. There have been incidents earlier in Israel and, as you may recall, on an international flight between the United Kingdom and the United States.
In the wake of these attacks in London, al Qaeda reissued its list of target countries for terrorist action. Canada remains one of those six countries listed by al Qaeda.
CSIS assisted British authorities in the investigation of these attacks, and we undertook investigations to determine whether there were any Canadian connections to the bombings. So far, we know of no connections between the attacks and any individuals or organizations in Canada, although one of the individuals involved in the second attack has relatives in Canada. None of those relatives, I should stress, were involved in these events.
There are a number of unknown aspects to the attacks in London. First, we do not yet have a clear understanding of how these young men, or others like them, became radicalized to the extent of being prepared to commit such crimes and take their own lives.
Second, we do not know with any certainty whether these attacks were directed from outside of the United Kingdom, notwithstanding subsequent claims by al Qaeda representatives. Finally, we do not know to what extent, if any, these individuals had been trained outside of the United Kingdom to carry out the attacks.
In regards to terrorism more generally, I have two other observations. Terrorism remains a major challenge for the Canadian Forces and other Canadian personnel deployed in Afghanistan today. Both our military and diplomatic personnel have been the subject of attacks there recently. The marked increase in suicide bombers against four of personnel is a most worrisome.
Earlier this year a British Columbia court dismissed charges against two individuals prosecuted in the Air India bombing. That incident, which occurred more than 20 years ago, represented the worst terrorist incident in the Western world until the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Since that decision, the Deputy Prime Minister has asked the Honourable Bob Rae to review the incident, the events that proceeded and followed it and the agencies principally involved in the related investigations or in the domain of transportation safety. Mr. Rae is expected to report back to the Deputy Prime Minister on his findings and recommendations in a matter of weeks.
My officials and I have been fully engaged in Mr. Rae's work and look forward with interest to seeing his conclusions and recommendations.
Since that decision, I have met with several of the victims' families to explain what CSIS did or did not do before and after that tragic event. The meetings were obviously wrenching events, despite the great courtesy extended by the families. In each visit, I was left with the clear message that we take the necessary steps to avoid another such tragedy.
In addition to Mr. Rae's review of the Air India bombing, CSIS has been engaged in initiatives that may be of interest to this committee. First, CSIS has met on a number of occasions with the newly established Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, whose chairman appeared before you last week.
From my own perspective, the interaction with the roundtable has been extremely useful. We look forward to working with its members in the future to develop a better mutual understanding on security issues and their various implications.
We have embarked on a new outreach effort designed to develop an ongoing dialogue with various constituencies in this country. Some things have been done in partnership with other federal agencies such as Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the RCMP, the Canada Border Service Agency and others. Some of it we have done independently. That has been accompanied by an effort to improve our public communications generally to allow Canadians to obtain a better understanding of who we are and what we do, or what we do not do.
Both of these initiatives are in the early stages, but they are my personal priorities. They represent significant departures for an organization such as ours in a business that is not used to this kind of interaction. Our motivation is clear, and it is our view that these initiatives serve the best interests of national security in this country.
Our organization is more in the news than ever before, not always for positive reasons. Some of the issues with which we deal, such as terrorism, are more in the public eye, which makes it important that we do a better job of explaining who we are and what we do.
Second, we understand the concerns that some communities in this country, particularly some new immigrants and visible minorities, have for organizations such as CSIS. A witness who appeared before you earlier this summer noted that the practices of security agencies have resulted in a chill that has alienated a significant proportion of the Canadian population.
This is not a healthy situation. It is critically important that we work to change this impression to avoid having such communities feel that they are marginalized or chilled as the witness said earlier this summer. To the extent that this occurs, there may be reluctance on the part of such communities to exercise both their rights and their responsibilities as citizens of this country.
In terms of their rights, this means taking advantage of established recourse mechanisms in the event that they feel they have experienced mistreatment by intelligence or security agencies. It also means discharging the responsibility as citizens to help those services in their work to protect all Canadians.
We need to explain our mandate to them. In turn, we need to listen and learn about their concerns and perspectives. Longer-term real dialogue is the key. In the final analysis, we need to be able to work effectively with all Canadians in discharging our national security mandate and protecting the security of our citizens.
The third point of our outreach activities relate to the importance that we attach to having a workforce that reflects the current demographic realities of Canada. CSIS is a more diverse employer than most people might imagine. Nearly 10 per cent of our employees today are self-identified visible minorities, a rate higher than the federal public service average.
CSIS has employees who speak more than 85 languages. Almost 48 per cent of our staff is women, and women make up nearly 40 per cent of our intelligence officers. Thirty-eight per cent of our workforce is francophone.
We need to become a truly reflective workplace and workforce, and one of the best ways to do that is to promote employment in the communities. In addition, we are soliciting the assistance of these groups to help us better understand their cultures and values in our own training and development programs for our staff.
We have participated in a number of outreach events across Canada. The events began this spring with many more planned for the future. For example, we have events in Vancouver, Ottawa and other Ontario cities planned in the near future.
I have met with a number of individuals and groups that have publicly criticized us. I intend to continue to do this, and members of my organization will do so as well. This will take some time. It will be a trial-and-error process as we learn how to do this well.
CSIS may well have made mistakes already in some of our encounters. We will persevere and get better at this. In the domain of criticisms of CSIS, I have been following the hearings of this committee with interest since they began despite the fact that the legislation you were reviewing had very little impact on either the mandate or the operations of CSIS.
I have noted that a number of witnesses have criticized CSIS and I would like to take this opportunity to respond to some of them.
First of all, there is the allegation that CSIS engages in racial profiling. We do not engage in racial profiling, which is neither an acceptable nor a useful practice. Moreover, any allegation of such profiling by CSIS employees should be brought to my attention for review.
A number of witnesses raised the need for CSIS to develop a dialogue on security issues within the different communities in this country. I agree with that and I think my earlier remarks outline the beginning of our approach to this issue.
A number of witnesses called for a greater transparency regarding CSIS. I, too, agree with that and we will do more to make ourselves better known to Canadians. I caution that there will always be limits as to what we can and cannot discuss publicly.
A number of witnesses made the point that we have to train our staff to deal with diverse communities. Our staff must learn to accommodate the different cultural differences. I should point out that CSIS is already doing that by utilizing expertise from both inside and outside CSIS, including our own employees, who are also members of such communities. We are, however, reviewing the adequacy of these arrangements and may modify them, if needed.
Several witnesses have argued for more review and oversight of CSIS. I am not sure that I agree with that point and I will explain why.
Today, CSIS is without a doubt the most externally reviewed intelligence agency in the world. Two-thirds of our legislation deals with ministerial control, the role of the federal court, the mandate and role of the Security Intelligence Review Committee and that of the Inspector General of CSIS who reports independently to the minister.
Any CSIS investigation involving so-called ``intrusive methods'' must have those methods approved by the minister and then by the Federal Court of Canada. They are also subject to independent review by both the Department of Justice Canada and the minister's department prior to the submission of any request from the service to the minister.
Both the Security Intelligence Review Committee and the inspector general report annually to the minister on our activities, including the use of our court warrants. All of this is in addition to reporting on other reviews and investigations undertaken by either of those bodies at the request of the minister, the agencies themselves or complaints from the public.
We are subject to external review by the Auditor General, the commissioners for the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act, the Commissioner of Official Languages, the Canadian Human Rights Commission and Parliament itself. Finally, the government has plans to establish a committee of parliamentarians to provide a new and permanent parliamentary review body on national security issues.
We are obviously involved in the commission and inquiry on Maher Arar as well as in Mr. Rae's review of the Air India tragedy. In some cases, we are extensively and intensively reviewed on an ongoing basis leaving aside special inquiries such as those mentioned above.
There have been a number of allegations made regarding our investigative methods. Witnesses have cited the use of intimidation, the lack of adequate identification, the use of inappropriate identification, the practice of visiting individuals at their workplace and discouraging people from having lawyers present for interviews.
Let me be clear about our mandate. CSIS is a national security agency, not a police force. We do not collect evidence. We cannot compel individuals to speak to us. We cannot detain people. We do not rely on intimidation in interviewing people; that is contrary to our own policies and is counterproductive to the development of an ongoing relationship with so-called ``human sources.''
In the course of doing our work, we may seek to interview people for any number of reasons that have nothing to do with terrorism investigations. Our personnel may be conducting security-screening interviews for immigration or refugee cases or for security clearances for individuals seeking employment requiring a security clearance in the federal government, some provincial governments, the Canadian Forces, the nuclear industry and some other parts of the economy.
We may interview individuals for investigations in other areas as well, from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems, to foreign espionage cases, or to instances of foreign interference in our country's affairs. We may also want to interview people for the purpose of enhancing our broader understanding of regions of the world, or specific issues in which that person may have some expertise or experience.
Normally, we try to conduct these interviews where we are most likely to find the people. For many people, that is during normal business hours and that is usually at their place of employment. However, in the event that they prefer the interview to take place in another location we will accommodate their preference.
Our personnel have photo identification. At times, an investigator will leave a non-identified business card if the individual wishes to stay in touch without overt evidence of any contact with CSIS.
I should note that we have had reports of individuals purporting to be CSIS officials seeking to interview people. I would only say here that such cases should be reported to us, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, or to the police.
It is common for our investigators to interview people accompanied by legal counsel. In any given year, we do hundreds of such interviews and it is up to the interviewee to decide whether to bring along legal counsel.
In cases involving the accusation of intimidation of an individual, we will investigate such an allegation. This summer, in Toronto, there was such an allegation and we conducted an investigation and found the allegation to be unfounded. However, we took it so seriously that we have referred the case to the Toronto police for investigation.
When I last appeared, you raised several matters, which I undertook to return to you with a more considered response. One issue related to whether, in my view, we should amend our legislation. As I mentioned earlier, the provisions within the legislation have had little impact on our mandate or our operations. An internal review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act concludes that there is no need to amend the legislation.
Another matter raised in my last appearance related to the implementation of the provisions of the Aeronautics Act. I understand that this has been addressed in a written submission to the committee from Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.
Finally, I committed to provide further comments on the provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, most commonly referred to as security certificates. Let me begin by reiterating that we have acted in complete accord with the law in seeking these certificates. Full rigour has been applied in substantiating the cases against those individuals, and the courts, which have made the decisions in those cases, have seen all relevant information, both public and secret, prior to taking the decision on any individual matter.
Having said that, we have obviously followed the debate, including the debate in this committee, on the use of these certificates. We have similarly followed with great interest the analogous debate in the United Kingdom that has been underway since last December.
As you know, there have been several recent developments regarding these cases. In the first instance, the Supreme Court of Canada has granted leave to hear appeals in two of those cases, and in the third case, a request for an appeal has yet to be heard. In addition, the government has announced its intention to seek the transfer of detainees from provincial to federal institutions, a decision that was made known to the court earlier this month.
I have yet to see a viable alternative to the current system, although I fully recognize that the quest continues. It is an issue where I, and perhaps many others, look forward to seeing your findings and recommendations.
I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might have of me.
The Chairman: Mr. Judd, we thank you for your detailed overview of the major issues and your efforts to respond to them.
Senator Fraser: Mr. Judd, I would like to ask a bit more about this practice of having CSIS interview people at their place of work. I can appreciate that for many people this would be convenient. It was convenient for me a few months ago when one of the CSIS people wanted to interview me as part of a security clearance for someone I knew who was going to work for the government. That was fine; they came to my office, no problem. However, I am a member of the Senate of Canada. I feel safe.
It seems to me that for many people, and not only for people belonging to certain minority communities but also for many people the mere arrival at their place of work of a CSIS agent would be a disruptive element. You have to stop doing your work, find a private place to talk and explain to your boss why you are finding a private place to talk. It would have a daunting effect on many, many people, and quite possibly affect the atmosphere of their workplace.
Why would it not be the last rather than the first line of attack for CSIS when you need to speak to people?
Mr. Judd: It has become a bit of a practice in the sense that most individuals are, more often than not, most available in normal hours at their workplace. As I said in my comments people are quite free to tell our investigators that they prefer to meet elsewhere, at home, a restaurant, a café, or in a park. That is a point we will make better known within the service. We will encourage our investigators to give people the option of picking a venue for investigations. There was nothing ill-intentioned about it. I noted that several witnesses have said that it has had a negative impact, which is not at all the kind of outcome we want.
Senator Fraser: In how many cases do you call ahead of time to make an appointment to see the person, perhaps not at their office? I understand that in some instances you plan to arrive unannounced.
Mr. Judd: I do not have useful percentages to give you but given the concerns, we will modify the practice to ensure that individuals are not left with that discomfort.
Obviously, there will be cases when we have no choice but to try to get someone urgently, depending on the particulars of the case. However, in the normal course of events, we will try and make that more amenable to the subject of the interviews.
Senator Andreychuk: Mr. Judd, you have given us many perspectives.
You indicate that CSIS does not collect evidence. It may be legally correct that your job is different from that of the RCMP and other forces but, in fact, you collect information against citizens, in some cases, or others that has a dramatic affect on their lives and can lead them to a court process.
Is it a little misleading to say that you do not collect evidence? Is it misleading to give the impression that you are not part of the surveillance system that leads people to find themselves in some court or before some tribunal where they will have to defend themselves?
Mr. Judd: I did not mean to mislead or to venture into the domain of lawyers. I made the point in terms of differentiating CSIS from the police service. In fact, very little of the information that we collect is actually used against individuals in any kind of legal or court proceeding. The most significant example would probably be in the case of security certificates. Material collected by CSIS was also available to the court, I believe, in the Air India court proceedings. Above and beyond those two examples, it is rare that information would actually appear in a legal or court proceeding against an individual.
As far as I know, any communications interception made by CSIS has never been used in a Canadian court proceeding. That was the general point I was trying to make.
Senator Andreychuk: You go to great length to say — and correct me if I am wrong — that the work you do is not intimidating and that you are very cooperative. You will see them at the workplace or at home or elsewhere, you identify yourself and you deny any intimidation. You have investigated the Toronto case.
Look at it from the point of view of someone in the community and, in particular, someone who may have recently come to Canada and who is still not certain that there are avenues of redress available to them. They may have come from a country where justice is not the issue, only the power and authority of the police.
Do you not believe that their feelings of intimidation are warranted when someone shows up at their office and says, ``I want to talk to you?'' Would that not strike fear in most Canadians? A visit like that did not intimidate Senator Fraser who expected CSIS to visit.
Suppose I got a call from a CSIS officer saying, ``I would like to talk to you. I cannot quite tell you on the phone what it is. I would like to see you in person.'' I would have that same dread. To someone from a particular group, under today's world of terrorism, would you not believe that is intimidating to the average Canadian?
Mr. Judd: I agree with you that many new Canadians would see this as a daunting prospect. That is why we are doing more in terms of outreach activities to communities across the country. A large part of our outreach program tries to explain what we do and how we do it while listening to their concerns.
The chairman of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security suggested that we produce a multilingual pamphlet describing CSIS, what it does, how it does it, what people can or should do if they have questions, and how to respond to questions.
On the issue of interaction with Canadians generally, I suspect that most of the interviews would probably relate to security clearances for employment in the federal government, the Canadian Forces, or on immigration and refugee cases, as opposed to investigations of potential wrongdoing or misdeeds.
Our hope is that through our outreach efforts we will establish better communications with some of the communities that feel most vulnerable.
Senator Andreychuk: The average citizen has an understanding of what happens when a police officer comes to the door to gain evidence. The average person knows where the information goes, how it is used, and what protection surrounds it. However, even I am not sure quite where information goes when CSIS obtains it. It can come into, for example, a security certificate, which you pointed out.
You make the statement that you are assuring us that the courts have seen all relevant information, but the government, I suppose in concert with you, can withhold information of a certain security nature from courts and, as you pointed out, can either have that information go to courts in public or in secret. One never knows where one's information will go and whether it will be used in the way it was intended.
This is not a very good parallel, but many years ago, working in family court, I worked with adoptions. Many people said, ``I am afraid to tell about what my neighbour is doing or my sister is doing for fear that it will be used in a way that will destroy my family and my community relations with that person.'' One was reticent to give out information because one did not know what a government official would do within their department with that information. Would it be used only for that purpose? Would it be confidential? It was all done under a veil of secrecy.
I have the same problem with information given to a CSIS officer. That information may end up in a court; it may not. It may be translated. It may be taken out of context.
Do you not believe that some sort of transparency or scrutiny is necessary to assure people that the information is used as you say it will be used?
It is not that I distrust your word, having worked with you for many years, but I do not think that is the way a democracy works. It does not work on self-statements; it works on double checks.
Mr. Judd: You do not have to rely on my word. On security certificates, bear in mind that in the history of the legislation, there have been less than 30 certificates issued over the space of more than 25 years. It is a very uncommon circumstance. All the relevant information pertaining to such a case against an individual is scrupulously put together and reviewed by lawyers in the federal justice department, by ministers, and by the court before a decision is taken.
Second, it is not possible for CSIS to use what I refer to as intrusive methods, mostly having to do with the interception of communications, without providing an affidavit to the court to seek approval for the issuance of a warrant.
The affidavits that go forward to the court can contain as many as 200 pages of information substantiating the casework. In my experience, the courts take their decisions on the granting of warrants very seriously. Our affiants appear before the court with legal counsel and there is often discussion among the court, the affiants and counsel.
Third, the Security Intelligence Review Committee and the Inspector General of CSIS review all of our activities annually. The review includes the acquisition and use of information and our practices with respect to the application for warrants before the federal court. As well, in any given year, the Security Intelligence Review Committee may undertake any number of individual reviews on specific operations.
I said that CSIS is the most externally reviewed intelligence service that I know of in the world, and that was not hyperbole. It truly is externally reviewed. The Security Intelligence Review Committee is composed of five Privy councillors with different political backgrounds chosen by the government. The Inspector General is appointed independently by the minister to act as her eyes and ears regarding the service.
In addition, other parliamentary officers such as the Information Commissioner and the Privacy Commissioner have access to our activities. You should be reassured by the fact that you need not rely only on my word but that we do try to do things in accordance with the law and our mandate.
Senator Andreychuk: I have also followed the Bhupinder Liddar case, which has been in the press recently. That case underscores my contention that once CSIS has evidence, it is very hard to get CSIS to change its mind, despite other information.
Mr. Judd: I would argue the reverse and say that the case is an example of the system working the way it is supposed to work. CSIS reached a particular conclusion and SIRC reviewed the case in accordance with the law. SIRC reached a different conclusion and the outcome turned out to be completely different from what the case had ostensibly been prior to the review by SIRC.
I argue that is a good illustration of the review system working, as it should.
Senator Andreychuk: It may be that the review worked, but I beg to differ as to whether the analysis of CSIS worked.
Senator Day: Mr. Judd, I will return to your comments about the London subway and bus bombings and deal with some lessons learned.
Is there any conclusion as to whether the second round of bombings were copycat bombings or of a similar nature to the first in terms of possible direction from outside?
Mr. Judd: We understand there to be no relationship between the two attacks.
As I said in my opening remarks, the motivation behind both attacks remains unclear despite the fact that al Qaeda has publicly claimed responsibility for them. I am not quite sure yet what we make of the attack of July 21.
Senator Day: I had not heard that al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the second attack. They usually wait until an attack is declared a success before claiming responsibility.
Mr. Judd: They certainly claimed responsibility for the first attack. You may well be correct in respect of the second attack. My British colleagues are obviously more au courant with the situation and you may wish to put that question to them.
Senator Day: I suppose one lesson that we can learn from that is that suicide bombings are more successful than planted bombs.
Mr. Judd: The incidence of suicide attacks has increased over the last several years. They are more difficult to deal with because they are extraordinary acts. As I mentioned earlier, there has been an increase in suicide attacks in Afghanistan against military and other services and lately they have become commonplace in Iraq.
There have been instances in the Western world of attacks associated with al Qaeda without the use of suicide bombers, such as the Madrid train bombings several years ago. However, the global trend seems to be increasingly toward the use of suicide bombers.
Senator Day: We have heard from where suicide bombers are likely to be recruited. It has often been said that in order to deal with terrorism we must deal with the fundamental problem of poverty in many nations.
This situation in the United Kingdom seems to contradict that analysis. Is there any thinking about where these suicide bombers are likely to be recruited?
Mr. Judd: Over the last year or two a number of books have been written on the phenomenon of suicide bombing. There have been a number of studies undertaken by academics in the United States and Europe. In fact, if you would like to get a survey of the literature on the subject, a very good piece appeared in the New York Review of Books within the last several months. It does an assessment of about seven or eight books on the issue of suicide bombers, their characteristics, their backgrounds, and so on.
Beside the fact that many of the suicide bombers seem to be preponderantly but not exclusively male and in a certain age group, there seems to be a difference of view as to the root causes, including whether or not poverty, for example, has an impact.
Some have argued in the past that conditions of poverty and a lack of education were prominent among suicide bombers. However, one American study points out that many suicide bombers have been well educated and from well- to-do families. This profile is especially true for many of the terrorists involved in the September 11 attacks in the United States.
Senator Day: I thought you were going to say including Osama bin Laden. To the best of our knowledge, he is not a suicide-oriented person.
Mr. Judd: I do recommend you refer to the New York Review of Books. I will provide you the precise date on that particular piece.
Senator Day: That would be helpful.
Mr. Judd: It is a useful overview of the issue.
Senator Day: On page 12 of your presentation, you say that you do not engage in profiling.
Could you help us with your understanding of the term ``profiling?''
Mr. Judd: That appears in an earlier version of my remarks. I have subsequently corrected it. I used the term ``racial profiling'' in my remarks today.
I am not speaking as a lawyer, but as I understand it, there is still some debate as to what does or does not constitute profiling.
We certainly do not utilize racial profiling in our activities, both because it is inappropriate and because it is not very practical as a guide for our investigation.
Senator Day: You do use profiling, do you not?
Mr. Judd: In our investigations, we tend to focus on individuals largely in relation to their activities and the particular backgrounds and associations they may have.
We focus on individuals who have a military background, individuals known to have undergone training in terrorist camps, and individuals known to have utilized terrorism while participating in conflicts in various parts of the world. We focus also on individuals who habitually use a dozen or more personalities and have extensive quantities of forged documents. Racial profiling per se is not very useful to us.
Senator Day: Would you use racial profiling if, as an example, a church leader preaches the annihilation of everybody who does not believe in that particular way of thinking? Would you profile the people who attend that church?
Surely, you would be irresponsible if you did not profile the people who adhere to that leadership and discussion.
Mr. Judd: In such an instance, we would certainly pay attention to the individual promulgating those views. However, extending surveillance to everyone that individual came into contact with would not be useful, unless we had some indication that one or more of them had other characteristics or traits that would be of concern to us.
Senator Day: The people attending that church would not go there unless they believe in the words of the preacher. You would have to profile those people, would you not? You would keep an eye on the group espousing that point of view, would you not?
Mr. Judd: As I said, we would certainly take an interest in the individual who is promoting that kind of attitude. Extending that focus to all of the individuals who happen to attend that particular institution would not be necessary. That focus would depend on the operation of other factors, in our view.
We would not take an up-front approach that would consign anyone and everyone associated with that institution to come under surveillance.
Senator Day: My concern is that security and policing organizations are becoming a little bit too defensive. Every time you hear the terms ``racial profiling'' or ``profiling,'' you assume that this is a bad comment.
Maybe we should define these terms a little more precisely before you start immediately saying you do not do it.
Mr. Judd: That is why I changed my remarks this morning, to bring greater clarity to what I was trying to say.
As to whether or not law enforcement or intelligence agencies are becoming more defensive in light of these situations, that is an interesting question. There may be something to your comment.
Further definition of the terminology would perhaps be useful. I know work is underway to try to accomplish that but with no conclusion to date.
Senator Day: We are going to the U.K. and I would like to address the situation involving the individual from South America who was regretfully shot. I think the negative aspect that resulted from that situation is the attempt by the police force to cover it up. Mistakes happen. It is regrettable.
The attempt to cover it up and say he was resisting and running away and doing a lot of things to make it appear that it was an acceptable thing seems to me to be more unfortunate and results in people having less confidence in police forces and security forces.
Mr. Judd: The incident itself and the subsequent reaction to it were unfortunate.
I was in the United Kingdom at the time of the July 21 bombings. I was in London just after the July 7 incidents. It is difficult to get a real sense of what the atmosphere was like at the time and the enormous pressure the police and security services were under to try to prevent a recurrence. It was thought that other attacks were forthcoming.
In the end, I agree that it was regrettable and it will have a long-term impact on confidence in the security and police forces.
Senator Day: I believe it is better to admit to a regrettable mistake rather than attempt to cover it up.
Mr. Judd: History has demonstrated that more often than not the cover-ups tend to be worse than the mistakes.
Senator Day: Precisely.
Senator Joyal: I would like to go back to page 5 of your presentation where you say that the perpetrators of last summer's London bombings were not on the ``radar screens'' of intelligence and police services.
Must we conclude from that part of your remarks that our greatest danger could be perpetrated by people that are not even on your list?
As I understand, your general activities and from your comments 10 days ago, the 10 or so Canadians that are training in Iraq, trying to enter Iraq to get trained, or do terrorist activity there are known to you. They are on your list. They are under surveillance. However, the most ``threatening terrorists'' are those who are not on your radar screen. These people are Canadian and not new immigrants. They may not be living in slum areas. They may be people with some education. They may be people who have had access to a form of ``brainwashing,'' because they have to be educated in terrorism or they have to be educated to share the concern that their convictions are so intense that they have to kill strangers.
How do you address that situation in the context that such a threat would happen in Canada?
How are you able to explain to Canadians that in spite of all your efforts, and the budget and all the legal imperatives that in fact the threat cannot really come under your surveillance, that the surveillance capacity of CSIS is really of no use to identify these people?
Mr. Judd: The comment I made was simply a factual comment. It is true in other instances where even in retrospect the police or the security services did not identify the individuals.
The second thing about the comment is that it reflects one of the traditional preoccupations of people in the intelligence business, which is that as far as I know they often spend more time worrying about what they do not know than what they do know.
In the case of the London attacks, the individuals do not appear to have had any prior associational background with known terrorists.
This is always a possibility in any jurisdiction, including Canada. It was a surprise for our colleagues in the United Kingdom.
Senator Joyal: Would it not in fact be a greater danger that what you are called to do, with all the security checks, might not in fact be the right way to determine where to invest your talents and your capacity?
Mr. Judd: To be fair, we are always in the process of rethinking what we do and how we do it when dealing with threats like this. One of the points that I also made in my opening comments was that we do not yet have a full understanding of this phenomenon of radicalization of individuals, and I believe that is true in most Western jurisdictions with intelligence and police services.
We do not yet have adequate clarity as to the motivational relationship that causes people to do this kind of thing. Hitherto, the assumption was that individuals who had training in terrorist camps and who had been engaged in conflicts involving international terrorism were the primary concerns for security services. The attacks in London demonstrate that there is a new kind of radicalized individual on the terrorist scene. These individuals have been radicalized by whatever phenomenon to commit these types of acts.
It is not something that we fully understand yet; the psychology, the sociology that is associated with that kind of activity.
Senator Joyal: Are you researching that phenomenon? Are you looking at areas of the country that might be more fertile or receptive to that type of contemporary phenomenon?
Mr. Judd: Yes, we are doing research in that domain. The research we are doing is probably analogous to similar research around the radicalization phenomenon. I know that there are also academic and other institutions looking at these kinds of issues as well. We do not have a foolproof formula for determining cause and effect in these kinds of cases. It is something in which we are still very much engaged.
Senator Joyal: Will you make it a priority to consider that potential terrorists are people who will submit to radicalization? Will you consider that these potential terrorists are receptive to radicalization through education? These people often feel marginalized in the democratic process and see terrorist activity as a way to destroy or challenge the system. People who have a certain degree of politicization and that are receptive to think politically, and of course are in possession of either written works or follow the teaching or the indoctrination of a certain philosophy fall into this category.
When you testified earlier, you mentioned that there are dormant al Qaeda cells in Canada and that you follow Canadians who might be in Iraq benefiting from the insurgencies there to train or to test and so on. Those people are on your radar screen.
I see the problem in the priorities of the intelligence community and wonder if Canada has the strategic reading that needs to be acted upon in terms of where the real threat or potential threat is for the years to come.
Mr. Judd: It is a work in progress. We know some things, and we do not know other things. We know that there appears to be very little relationship between one's economic or educational status and one's proclivity to being associated with terrorism. We know individuals both here and elsewhere in the Western world do not require face-to- face motivation to move in this direction. The internet is a very good source of dissemination, proselytizing, recruitment and transference of techniques and so on. To the extent that we followed this phenomenon in Western jurisdictions, we tend to be looking at young males, late teens to mid-30s, very often well-educated, not necessarily economically marginalized and not even politically marginalized. They have been stimulated by various and sundry motivations of any number of different kinds to take that kind of an action.
In some respects, I would say as well that some of the phenomena we are dealing with are not actually new. There may be several Canadians in Iraq working with the insurgent forces. You may have seen in The New York Times a few weeks ago a report that individuals from about 27 countries have been detained so far.
The other thing I would say is that historically, in the Canadian context, it has not been unusual for Canadians to join in on conflicts, going back to the MacKenzie-Papineau brigade, or Canadians who fought with the American forces in Vietnam, or Canadians who sided with more than one of the factions in the former Yugoslavia, for example. It is a difficult set of issues. At root, you are dealing with an individual's psychology, basically, which is usually difficult to get at.
Senator Joyal: On page 14 of your brief, you seem to say, by a way of exhaustion, that you do not need any other institution to review your activities.
One of the concerns we have relates to the fact that according to an American Senate report the September 11 catastrophe could have been prevented. In fact, the information existed, but it was discarded or not properly acted upon. One of the major conclusions of the report is that the various American agencies involved in the security of the country were acting in silos. Each one acted in respect of its mandate, and failed to strategize the information properly.
I am not sure that even with all of the reviews that there is an effective strategizing of information. I wonder if the Minister of Public Security's proposal made last May to involve a kind of parliamentary committee would not bring all the agencies together provided of course that certain conditions exist.
Do you not feel we would achieve a better result if we could bring all these agencies together under one umbrella whereby we would have the possibility of making sure that each plays its role in accordance with the other?
Mr. Judd: If I gave the impression of exhaustion, I seek to excuse myself. My purpose in detailing that was to do the contrary — to reassure people, as I tried to do with Senator Andreychuk, that CSIS is extensively reviewed in terms of what it does, how it does it, where it does it and with whom.
On the issue of silos, I agree with you that it was obviously a problem in the United States. One of the issues in the American context is that they have many more agencies involved in these sorts of activities than we do in Canada. By last count, I think they were somewhere in the order of 16 or 17 agencies of the federal government alone in the intelligence domain in the United States.
In regard to the committee of parliamentarians on national security, I do not know that creating a committee of parliamentarians would be reason to amalgamate or homogenize all the other review mechanisms we have in place, because they already have established mandates and methods of operation and so on. In some instances, they tend to focus on very specific things. I do think that having a committee of parliamentarians would be useful if only to ensure that parliamentarians have a better understanding of what we do and how we do it.
On the issue of silos, it is an issue in terms of trying to ensure that information is exchanged. We are also facing a countervailing issue as to ensuring that any information that is exchanged is appropriately exchanged and subject to appropriate caveats as to its end use. It is a on the one hand, on the other hand kind of circumstance.
I might also point out most of the agencies that review us are, at the end of the day, agents of Parliament. Even the Security Intelligence Review Committee can be called before Parliament and has appeared before your committee on issues relating to us.
Senator Joyal: In your opinion, what conditions should we be thinking about in establishing such parliamentary review in order to be effective?
On what basis do you see it operating to ensure that it achieves its objective?
Mr. Judd: I have spoken to the former chairperson of the British committee of parliamentarians, who is no longer in Parliament. I have met with staff directors of the Senate and House of Representatives committees in the United States on the intelligence issues. I gather there are different approaches in both jurisdictions but that one of the principal prerequisites to getting an effective operation going is trying to ensure that the parliamentarians have a good understanding of the agencies over which they exercise oversight. That would certainly be a pre-eminent precondition for such a body here in Canada. That will require a learning curve, given that we conduct our work without much public understanding. The same applies to sections of the RCMP. That would be one condition.
Second, a committee of parliamentarians should be prepared to spend the time to get a good understanding of these operations and activities so they are able to engage the agencies with a degree of literacy and conversancy about the issues.
In the case of the United Kingdom, the former chairwoman of the parliamentary committee said that the committee spent approximately 16 hours a week with the agencies. That gives some indication of the time commitment on their part.
Third, a measure of mutual confidence between the agencies and the parliamentarians would be required to ensure that the agencies were as forthcoming as they should be in their interactions with the committee.
Fourth, it might behoove members of the committee to go into the field, even on an operational basis, with either the RCMP or CSIS, just to see what our work is like. In the case of the Canadian Forces, many members of Parliament have taken advantage of the military's invitation to have them and senators board ships or planes or visit forces deployed overseas to get a better understanding of their work. That might be something that a committee of parliamentarians would want to think about as well.
There is another point made by an American Congressional staff member. One of the concerns that agencies sometimes have about parliamentary or congressional committees is the concern about the leaking of classified information.
In fact, I understand from my American colleagues that has happened maybe once or twice in the history of the congressional oversight committees but points out that it is important to ensure that confidentiality is, where required, respected.
[Translation]
Senator Chaput: Mr. Judd, there is no question that your work is important. You operate under very difficult and delicate circumstances. As some of my colleagues have pointed out, you work in an environment in which ideology is deeply entrenched. People hold to very strong beliefs which can lead them to commit suicide for a particular cause.
You note on page 5 of your presentation that in the case of last two terrorist attacks, all of those involved were young males between the ages of 18 and 30. I find it disconcerting that the attacks were so well orchestrated and the perpetrators were at a vulnerable age and willing to take up these causes.
Your Agency carries out the security screenings required by various federal departments. Let us consider one example in particular. What specifically does the screening of an individual for an airport job entail? What factors would cause you to screen a person more closely before issuing the proper security clearance?
Mr. Judd: Are you referring to the screening we do for the purposes of giving an employee a security clearance?
Senator Chaput: Yes.
Mr. Judd: We verify a number of facts when a person applies for a job, for example, an airport job. Most likely we will check with the RCMP to see of that individual has a criminal record. As far as CSIS is concerned, the agency reviews the individual's file to see whether he has been involved in activities that pose any kind of threat to national security, or whether he has links to a group or organization known for its terrorist leanings. Perhaps that individual has ties with a government that was engaged in questionable activities, or has been involved in espionage activities for a government. In other words, we screen people applying for an airport or federal government job, as well as immigrants and refugees.
Moreover, the annual report of the CSIS Review Committee provides data on the number of screenings conducted and the questions raised with respect to certain individuals.
In point of fact, very few issues arise each year when it comes to applications for jobs with the government, at an airport or elsewhere.
Senator Chaput: Therefore, few, if any, people are rejected?
Mr. Judd: Not many.
[English]
Senator Fraser: Mr. Judd, I would like to come back to the issue of racial profiling. As I gather, you are increasingly concerned about the cloudy nature of the phrase.
I would like to address behaviour. The behaviour that people are talking about runs along a whole continuum. You assure us that CSIS does not adhere to racial profiling. At one end of the continuum, I am sure that is absolutely true. CSIS does not say all Arabs are suspect and will be, for that reason alone, kept under surveillance. At the other end of the scale, if you had credible information that an Arab male, about five feet ten inches and about 30 years of age with serious al Qaeda involvement was arriving on a plane from Paris tomorrow afternoon, you would be checking the passengers coming off that plane for someone who matched that description.
It is in the cloudy middle that concerns arise. Without giving us confidential information about spy craft, for example, can you give us any training material or instructions that CSIS employees receive to help them as they navigate in that cloudy middle? That might help us to understand CSIS and how it conducts its business.
Mr. Judd: I do not know whether we can do that. I shall speak to my colleagues about it as soon as I return, and I am confident that we will find material that we can provide to the committee that will help explain this, although I do not know exactly what that would be.
Senator Fraser: It might be helpful.
Senator Andreychuk: Following up on Senator Fraser's point, before and after September 11, the criticism of security agencies was that although they had the dots, they had not connected them. In other words, there had been target work on where a security threat may come from, be it al Qaeda, internal or external.
As has been discussed, we do not know where the next terrorist threat will come from or why, and we may never know. In the same way as we do with regard to criminal activity, we can zero in on the person who might be likely to commit a crime but people defy categorization.
Since the British subway bombings and the appearance of new difficulties for security services there, what strategies and techniques are you using to address this issue?
Mr. Judd: We are doing several things. In response to Senator Joyal, I tried to outline what we are trying to do to understand the phenomenon of radicalization, an issue at which a number of other Western police and security agencies are looking. We compare and contrast notes with them on their findings. We also follow publicly available information and academic work on those sorts of things. That is very much a work in progress.
Second, our hope is to do a better job of outreach and dialogue with various constituencies in this country in order to explain ourselves and to solicit their assistance. I do not mean in terms of recruiting individuals for operations per se, but rather in terms of undertaking their general responsibility of citizenship. We hope that, as is the case in most things dealing with the law, the average citizen would be more willing to report instances where they have suspicions about the behaviour of individuals.
Third, we are trying to do much more than we have in the past in terms of managing our information holdings. One problem that most agencies such as ours have found in the last several years is that the volume of information we must deal with is becoming daunting.
We do get information that is considered legitimate intelligence. However, individuals, including terrorist groups trying to raise the level of anxiety and concern, are deliberately misleading us in this business in the West. In some instances, people try to play hoaxes or carry out scams. Getting a better handle on information and our analysis of it is yet another way we are trying to deal with that problem.
Senator Andreychuk: Do you believe that the LTTE should be listed? In light of circumstances in Sri Lanka and elsewhere, are they still of concern to you?
Mr. Judd: They are still of concern to us. They are already listed with the United Nations. They are not listed domestically under the Criminal Code.
Senator Andreychuk: Should they be listed in Canada?
Mr. Judd: To date the government has been of the view that the circumstances in Sri Lanka with respect to the peace negotiations and, in the post-tsunami period, the rehabilitation and reconstruction that is going on there are factors that would argue against a listing at this juncture. However, the LTTE is nonetheless still regarded as a terrorist entity.
Senator Joyal: On page 14 of your brief you say that you are involved in the Arar commission of inquiry. What lessons have you drawn from the Arar inquiry?
Mr. Judd: That is a very good question.
Senator Joyal: I did not say ``conclusion;'' I said ``lessons.''
Mr. Judd: Yes, I noticed. I do not know what I would say in terms of lessons, given that the inquiry is still ongoing and is not expected to conclude until some time next year. It has been a difficult undertaking for the service in terms of both the amount of material and the amount of time and energy we have had to devote to dealing with the inquiry with regard to the provision of documentation and witnesses, both in camera and public. That process is still ongoing.
I would have to think about lessons and get back to you. It has certainly had an impact on us just in terms of dealing with the queries of the inquiries. We have provided huge volumes of documentation and witnesses.
It is difficult to comment on an inquiry that is partly public and partly in camera. I suspect that a number of people face that difficulty in terms of coming to determinations about lessons or conclusions. We look forward to seeing the conclusions of the inquiry on both parts of their mandate.
Senator Joyal: Do you think the public has a sentiment of malaise especially now that it seems obvious that Mr. Arar was tortured. The release of that information seems to have undermined the very credibility that you described in your brief. I would like to commend you for that effort. I wonder if this disclosure is undoing your efforts and creating more suspicion about your operation. This makes it more difficult for you to achieve the valid objective described in your brief this morning.
We cannot ignore the bigger picture of the work that you do. In my opinion, this is a very important element. How will you address that?
Mr. Judd: I think it is fair to say that it seems to be an unfortunate consequence of the proceedings. The government has put the proceedings in place. The proceedings will run their course. My own sense is that it is in the natural course of events of inquiries for questions to be raised about individuals or organizations who are the subject of those inquiries.
I have every confidence that when the conclusions of the inquiry are made public, they will not substantiate many of the worst-case claims that have been made about government agencies. Again, I think it just raises the issue of the degree to which we need to be doing more than we have been doing in terms of outreach to communities. It illustrates that we must explain ourselves to ensure that people have a better understanding of who we are and what we do.
We will live with the inquiry and accusations that may be made around it until such time as they come to conclusions, which as I say, will not substantiate a number of the claims made about what we have done or have not done.
Senator Joyal: Do you think the committee that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness has announced as a parliamentary oversight committee could help the agencies to reach the Canadian public and create an impression of trusteeship?
Mr. Judd: The committee of parliamentarians could help that way to the extent that agencies such as ours appear before parliamentary groups such as this committee. I think the correct term is ``the other body.''
Senator Joyal: The other place.
Mr. Judd: Your role as public individuals and representatives of different constituencies in the country will hopefully help us in that task.
The Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security will help in that regard. I think the outreach activities that we have launched independently or in association with other members and other agencies of the public safety portfolio will help as well.
The more we can do to ensure that people get a better understanding of what we are and what we do, the better off we will be. This also includes parliamentarians.
The Chairman: Mr. Judd, thank you for sharing, as you have, with this committee since the very beginning when we started our hearings back in the early spring.
We are almost at the end of those hearings. We will be working on a report. The generosity of your time is much appreciated. Thank you very much.
Mr. Judd: Thank you very much.
The Chairman: Colleagues, we will adjourn for a lunch break and we will be back at 1:30 p.m.
The committee adjourned.