Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 5 - Evidence
OTTAWA, Monday, October 2, 2006
The Standing Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 11:37 a.m. to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: I call the meeting to order. This is a meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. My name is Colin Kenny, and I will chair the meeting.
I would like to introduce the members of the committee before we begin.
On my right is Senator Michael Meighen, deputy chair of the committee. He is a lawyer and a member of the bars of Quebec and Ontario. He is the Chancellor of the University of King's College and Past Chair of the Stratford Festival. Currently, he is Chair of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs and also a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce and Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans.
At the far end, on my right, is Senator Wilfred Moore from Halifax. He is a lawyer with an extensive record of community involvement. He has served 10 years on the board of governors of St. Mary's University and sits on the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce and on the Standing Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons for the Scrutiny of Regulations.
Beside him, also on my right, is Senator Norman Atkins from Ontario. He came to the Senate with 27 years of experience in the field of communications. He has served as senior adviser to former federal Conservative leader Robert Stanfield, to Premier William Davis of Ontario and to former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.
On my left is Senator Joseph Day from New Brunswick. He is Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance. He is a member of the bar of New Brunswick, Ontario and Quebec. He is a Fellow of the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada. He is also a former President and CEO of the New Brunswick Forest Products Association.
Our committee has been mandated to examine security and defence and the need for a national security policy. We have produced the following reports since the year 2002: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness; Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility; Update on Canada's Military Crisis, A View from the Bottom Up; The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports; Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World; National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines; Canadian Security Guide Book 2005 Edition; Borderline Insecure; and, most recently, Wounded — Canada's Military and The Legacy of Neglect.
We are in the midst of a detailed review of Canadian defence policy and are also holding hearings on a number of other topics, including airport and port security and border security.
Today, we have before us Mr. Marc Grégoire, Assistant Deputy Minister of Safety and Security at Transport Canada. The subject of the hearing is transportation security clearance process, Restricted Area Identification Card Program.
Mr. Grégoire is an airline pilot by trade. He has been with Transport Canada since 1983 in a variety of different positions. In September of 2003, he was appointed Assistant Deputy Minister of Safety and Security.
Mr. Grégoire last testified before the committee on June 19, 2006 and we welcome him back here today.
Mr. Grégoire is accompanied by Mr. Jean Barrette, Director of Security Operations with Transport Canada. You, too, are welcome.
Mr. Grégoire, I understand you have a brief statement for the committee, and the floor is yours.
Marc Grégoire, Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security, Transport Canada: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As you mentioned, I am joined here by my colleague Mr. Barrette, director of security operations, in case your questions are too pointed.
We are here today to explain the process that is used to conduct background checks that leads to the issuance of a transportation security clearance.
The transportation security clearance is a prerequisite to obtain the card that permits access to restricted areas at airports in Canada.
I will also speak to future changes to the access card itself.
[Translation]
The process of carrying out a background check, or security clearance, is performed by Transport Canada's Intelligence Branch under the authority of the Aeronautics Act, an act which confers broad powers on our minister. The security clearance function, or program, in Transport Canada, which was instituted in 1986 after of the Air India 182 disaster, was referred to in the past as the Airport Restricted Area Access Clearance Program. Now, as the security clearance is also being introduced in the marine mode, we have begun referring to it simply as Transport Canada's Transportation Security Clearance.
On the last page of my speaking notes, you will find a chart. Please follow along as I walk you through this flowchart and please feel free to ask questions as we move along.
[English]
The following are the steps followed to complete the transportation security clearance.
The applicant goes to the Pass Control Office at the airport and fills out an application form. The airport Pass Control Office staff check the documentation and take the fingerprints and a photograph of the individual and send it to Transport Canada electronically. The original documentation then follows by mail.
The Pass Control Office staff also check the identity of the applicant using official photo ID documents such as a passport or a driver's licence. Copies of these documents are attached to the file.
Transport Canada security screening does the following: First, we forward the fingerprints to the RCMP electronically. Then we check to ensure that all information is on the application. There must be five years of reliable, verifiable information in order to proceed with the application. We then start an automated CSIS indices check and a check for criminal records and outstanding warrants from the Canadian Police Information Centre, also called CPIC. We also contact Citizenship and Immigration Canada to confirm immigration status where applicable.
[Translation]
Let me give you a bit more detail on how information is verified.
The RCMP performs a fingerprint-based criminal record check; checks with the Canadian Police Information Centre for outstanding warrants and confirms criminal records; and checks the Criminal Intelligence Database for links to organized crime or other criminal investigations.
Transport Canada checks files of law enforcement records.
CSIS assesses whether the applicant constitutes a threat to Canada's security as defined by section 2 of the CSIS Act. CSIS makes further inquiries where the indices check produces adverse information and, where appropriate, prepares an information brief which is forwarded to Transport Canada.
Citizenship and Immigration Canada verifies information submitted on the application, notably date of arrival in Canada and citizenship and immigration reference numbers. Citizenship and Immigration Canada uses two databases: the Field Operation Support System and the Global Case Management System.
Transport Canada does a final review of all of the documentation and if all of the above ``checks out,'' Transport Canada grants the security clearance and advises the Pass Control Office. If there are concerns, Transport Canada continues to work to see if these concerns can be addressed.
Should a security clearance not be granted, there are mechanisms for recourse, as you can see at the bottom of the chart.
At this point, the transportation security clearance is completed and we are about to involve other parties. Please note that at this stage, no card has yet been issued. Obviously, in the case of a renewal, the person already has an access card.
[English]
I will speak first about the steps to issue the access card, which is in use today, and afterward I will speak about the new higher tech card that we are developing to further enhance security.
A Restricted Area Pass is a photo identification card including a variety of anti-counterfeiting features which entitles individuals to access restricted areas of airports to perform their work. Pass holders in the restricted area must wear and display a Restricted Area Pass at all times, and in order to be issued a Restricted Area Pass, the pass holder must have a valid Transport Canada transportation security clearance.
When the transportation security clearance has been completed, this information is conveyed by Transport Canada personnel, usually by email, to the Pass Control Office of the airport in question. The airport's Pass Control Office then issues the Restricted Area Pass Card to the employee. The airport authority is the issuing body. Airport authorities are accountable for controlling access to restricted areas, and they decide who can enter restricted areas on the basis of need and right to enter these areas.
Restricted Area Pass Cards are issued under the authority of the Aeronautics Act.
Restricted Area Pass Cards allow access to restricted areas, but sub-areas can be created by the airport, restricting some card holders to specific areas of the airport, again on the basis of a need and right to enter those areas.
Restricted Area Pass Cards are required for all who work within the restricted area, including employees of retail operations. This results in a significant number of clearances due to employee turnover. While the transportation security clearance has a maximum validity period of five years, the Restricted Area Pass may be valid for less than five years at the discretion and the wishes of the airport in question. Any violation of the terms and conditions may cause the card to be revoked during that time.
[Translation]
To conclude on the current Restricted Area Pass card, I would note that the Canadian Aviation Security Regulations require Restricted Area Pass holders to do the following: to visibly display their Restricted Area Pass on their outer clothing; to report the loss or theft of their Restricted Area Pass; to return the pass when they are no longer employed at the aerodrome, when their security clearance is no longer valid or when they no longer require access to the restricted area; to surrender their Restricted Area Pass on demand by the minister, the aerodrome operator or the person who issued it; to present their pass, on demand, to a screening officer when the pass holder is undergoing screening; and to surrender their pass to a screening officer on demand when they refuse to undergo screening.
[English]
Some years ago, we noted deficiencies with the Restricted Area Pass card. Transport Canada security inspectors conduct routine audits of Pass Control Offices to ensure unissued blank Restricted Area Passes are being properly stored and that Restricted Area Passes are being properly controlled and documented. However, it is not always possible for the airport authorities to recover all Restricted Area Pass Cards when employees leave. This is why the government asked the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, or CATSA, to develop a higher tech card.
The future Restricted Area Identification Card, or RAIC, is a smart card that contains biometric information, either fingerprint and/or iris scan. In conjunction with CATSA, each airport will decide which technology it wishes to use, either electronic reading of the pass holder's fingerprint or the iris scan or both.
The Restricted Area Identification Card will verify that the person who was issued the card is the same person presenting the card, that the card is valid and that the individual has a current transportation security clearance. The Restricted Area Identification Card will be implemented initially at all Class I and Class II airports.
[Translation]
The Restricted Area Identification Card will be electronically verified or ``read'' at each access point. This will eliminate the risk of forged cards or lost/stolen cards being altered and used by others.
Some of the benefits of the Restricted Area Identification Card over the Restricted Area Pass are as follows: — authentication and validation of the holder on the basis of current positive approval; prevents the fraudulent use of cards; decreases the possibility of identity theft; provides the ability to cancel a card electronically across the system; and facilitates oversight.
In effect, each time pass holders present themselves at an access point, there is a comparison of the individual's biometric data to a template on the card, as well as an electronic transaction, essentially confirming in real time that the Restricted Area Identification Card of the pass holder is valid and that the latter has a current Transportation Security Clearance.
[English]
Because of this feature, if a card is lost or the holder loses his or her security clearance, the card can be invalidated in real time and will no longer work.
The process for issuing a Restricted Area Identification Card will be different from the current restricted area pass card. When the transportation security clearance has been completed, Transport Canada advises the airport that the clearance has been granted and also provides CATSA with the corresponding document control number. CATSA then, working with the airports, uses the database of active document control numbers to provide the validation function for the Restricted Area Identification Card.
[Translation]
The airport can only issue the Restricted Area Identification Card to an applicant when both have been advised by Transport Canada that the Transportation Security Clearance has been granted and also advised by CATSA that they can add the necessary information to a blank card and print the picture and other data on it and present it to the pass holder.
The Restricted Area Identification Card program will be operational across twenty-nine airports, both Class I and II, as of December 31, 2006.
[English]
Honourable senators, it will be a pleasure for me and my colleague to now answer your questions.
The Chairman: Before we go to questioning, would you clarify, please, Class I and Class II airports?
Mr. Grégoire: Class I airports are the major airports in Canada; Class II are the second tier airports. Class I would include Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, et cetera.
The Chairman: What is the ``et cetera?'' In other words, what is the definition of a Class I and a Class II airport?
Mr. Grégoire: I can give you the exact list.
The Chairman: Perhaps you could make it available to the committee and let us know how many Class I airports there are and how many Class II.
Mr. Grégoire: We will give the committee the full list. There are 29 in total.
Senator Meighen: Are there any Class III?
Mr. Grégoire: We call that class ``others.'' These would be the others. We have eight in Class I and 21 in Class II.
The Chairman: You have eight Class I, 21 Class II and you do not provide security at the others; is that right?
Mr. Grégoire: We provide security at 89 airports, but this pass will be first introduced at Class I and Class II airports by December 31. Implementation will follow later at those other airports, but it is not yet in the program.
The Chairman: What about the airports that you do not provide security for?
Mr. Grégoire: There are other measures in place.
The Chairman: How many airports are there of those?
Mr. Grégoire: Sixty.
The Chairman: Do you have a breakdown of where security is provided and where security is not provided in terms of the Class I, Class II and other airports?
Mr. Grégoire: Security is provided but not using this new card. There are other mechanisms and regulations in place. The airports must control the access of people, but it is not as sophisticated as those 29 Class I and Class II airports.
The Chairman: Do you have a document that lists the different airports in Canada and the different levels of security that you provide for them? The discussion seems to revolve around the high-volume airports, which is reasonable, but we seldom talk about the smaller airports that do not have security systems of the same sophistication.
Mr. Grégoire: Passengers are screened at 89 airports. Baggage is screened at those airports.
The Chairman: How many airports are there in Canada?
Mr. Grégoire: Hundreds of airports, but those 89 include about 99 per cent of the travelling public by scheduled airlines.
The Chairman: What we would like to see is the list of how the first 89 break out and the list of the remaining hundreds.
Mr. Grégoire: We only have a list of those airports for which Stats Canada compiles statistics.
The Chairman: Give us the list that you have.
Mr. Grégoire: All right. The latest list we have is for 2005. We have the number of passengers and the number of aircraft movements at all the airports. The top eight airports are the most important, of course, along with the next 21. Those 29 airports carry the largest share of all the travelling public in Canada.
The Chairman: We understand that, but we would like to have the full picture.
Senator Day: Thank you very much for the detail in which you have outlined the process for your transportation security clearance. I would like to go through it again. I do not know whether I will follow the chart that you have given me or the narrative, but I would like to get a better feeling for the process of obtaining a transportation security clearance.
You said the applicant goes to the Pass Control Office. Is there a Pass Control Office at every airport and every marine site or just at certain ones?
Mr. Grégoire: Just certain ones. For now, there is a Pass Control Office at all of the Class I airports. Each of these airports is equipped with a sophisticated electronic system, where the fingerprints and the photos of each applicant are taken electronically and digitized on the spot.
Senator Day: I will get to what they do. First, I want to understand what the Pass Control Office is. They are employees of Transport Canada; is that correct?
Mr. Grégoire: No, they are employees of the airport. According to the legislation, the airports are responsible for the access to their premises. It is the same with the ports. The airport Pass Control Office is located at the airports and is staffed by airport staff.
In Montreal, for instance, this is under the responsibility of the director of security of the airport, which reports to the VP of operations of the airport. The Pass Control Office is located in the terminal at a place where all the employees who go to the airport can have easy access.
Senator Day: With respect to marine facilities, you indicate that you will be introducing the same process at ports that you now have at airports. In the smaller ones, presumably the individual will have to go to a Pass Control Office of another airport or another marine facility?
Mr. Grégoire: We also have those machines at our regional offices in Transport Canada. However, we are in the process of installing such machines at the major ports in Canada — Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver. As we have indicated before, this is where the program will first start, but the regulation is not completed yet.
We prepublished in Canada Gazette, Part I, on July 1. We hope to come up with the final regulation in Part II in the near future. The enrolment of the port workers will occur approximately one year following the Canada Gazette Part II promulgation.
Senator Day: We are talking about small airports that are not classified as Class I or Class II.
Mr. Grégoire: Yes. In the small airports, someone from airport staff is in charge of that job, but we have not provided the larger, more sophisticated machine to digitize fingerprints and photos. A photo is taken and the fingerprints are put on paper. Sometimes we can use RCMP offices in small localities to take those fingerprints. All of that information is sent to our office in Ottawa, where all of the paper is digitized and processed electronically with the RCMP and CSIS.
Senator Day: Obviously, more work is to be done in this regard. In the interim you have some alternate ways of handling things. I would assume that you would tell us in due course when you have that fully implemented.
Mr. Grégoire: There is no immediate plan over the short term to install the sophisticated machines at small airports because the volume does not justify it. You may have only 20 to 90 people working at such airports and requiring passes while at larger airports in Montreal, Vancouver and Toronto, for example, tens of thousands of people require the passes.
Senator Day: I understand it will be a little less convenient in the smaller locations, but our concern is that the same level of security be provided. Are you satisfied with the alternate means of using the Transport Canada office?
Mr. Grégoire: We have no fixed date for the implementation of biometrics at small airports. It is all a matter of risk management and assessment, but we are looking at it to determine exactly where we should have the program.
Senator Moore: The airport Pass Control Offices and the necessary equipment are in the eight major airports.
Mr. Grégoire: As well, they are in the 21 Class II airports, but they do not have the sophisticated machinery to take the photos and fingerprints. There is an office at each of the 21 Class II airports, but they cannot collect the data electronically.
Senator Moore: How, then, does it work?
Mr. Grégoire: The photos and fingerprints are taken manually on paper at those airports. That information is digitized and processed afterwards.
The Chairman: You mentioned ``sophisticated equipment.'' Each American customs post set up at the seven or so Canadian airports has a camera that is similar to the one you might have on top of your computer. You just put the finger on it and it will take a digitized fingerprint. The cost of that is $200.
Mr. Grégoire: We do not charge for the processing.
The Chairman: The processing is zero, but the equipment is $200.
Mr. Grégoire: No, the equipment has cost us hundreds of thousands of dollars, with the communication equipment. It is compatible with the RCMP equipment and all of the data is transmitted electronically.
The Chairman: I understand that, but the machine that the American's use to take the person's picture is identical to the one that I have on top of my computer. The fingerprint reader is identical to the one I have to turn on my computer. The Americans read fingerprints digitally and can transmit them for about a $200.
Mr. Grégoire: Maybe so, but not likely for the volume that we are talking about at major airports.
The Chairman: We were talking about the smaller airports where only 20 to 90 people require Restricted Area Passes.
Mr. Grégoire: This is not a security issue but it is a processing issue. Currently, the information is collected on paper and processed later. If you are interested in improving the processing time, that is not a security issue.
Senator Day: It is a security issue if the level of verification is less at certain airports or seaports than it is at others. That is what we are trying to establish. I have heard your answer and I do not think we need to pursue that line now. However, the committee would be interested in being kept up to date on your risk assessment and the implementation of the processes in the smaller areas.
The transportation security clearance happens before any card is issued, so it is important for us to understand what you have done before CATSA issues any cards. Is a new employee at an airport subject to obtaining a transportation security clearance?
Mr. Grégoire: Are you talking about any applicant in general? Anyone who needs access to the restricted area will need a pass, and if they need a pass, then they need the clearance first.
Senator Day: Are people offered jobs and then screened or are they screened at the application stage?
Mr. Grégoire: They have to be offered a job at an airport before any screening is done. However, the position is conditional on the applicant obtaining the transportation security clearance. We do refuse security clearances. If an applicant is promised a permanent job but he or she cannot obtain the security clearance, then the person cannot work in a restricted area.
Senator Day: An airport will offer a person a job and then send them to the airport Pass Control Office.
Mr. Grégoire: To clarify, this applies not only to airport staff but also to airline employees and employees of other companies whose work requires them to be in restricted areas. All of those potential employees are sent to the Pass Control Office, which is managed by the airport.
Senator Day: Have you been doing this since 1982?
Mr. Grégoire: Since 1986.
Senator Day: Is there any history of individuals being hired subject to the transportation security clearance who have been able to work in the interim? Has anyone ever begun work in a restricted area before the transportation security clearance has been completed?
Mr. Grégoire: Yes. I would say that over the years the system has become more rigid. There was a time when people were given a temporary pass immediately upon acceptance of their application for employment. Today, we have another process whereby we verify the initial information quickly and if that shows no risk then we can issue a temporary pass. If any risk is indicated, then a temporary pass is not to be issued.
Senator Day: What kind of check can be performed quickly to determine the risk factor?
Mr. Grégoire: We perform electronic checks with the RCMP and CSIS.
Senator Day: Perhaps we could explore that. The person has filled out an application form, provided you with five years of history, a fingerprint and a photograph, after which you send the fingerprint to the RCMP.
Mr. Grégoire: Yes.
Senator Day: What does the RCMP do with that information? What does the RCMP do for the airport?
Mr. Grégoire: The RCMP does this not for the airport but as part of a joint program with CSIS and Transport Canada, the funding for which comes from the centre. The RCMP enter the fingerprints and names into their databases to determine whether the person has a criminal record. Names can change but fingerprints cannot change, and that is why they are checked in the criminal records fingerprint database.
Senator Day: The RCMP does not have a database of fingerprints of everyone living in Canada. They have only a database of fingerprints of people who have been charged in the past with an offence and thus fingerprinted.
Mr. Grégoire: Exactly, but that is only a first check of many.
Senator Day: This is an electronic check of the applicant's fingerprints against the RCMP's database.
Mr. Grégoire: Yes.
Senator Day: What other test does the RCMP perform?
Mr. Grégoire: CSIS also performs a security assessment check.
Senator Day: I would like to finish with the RCMP first. What else does the RCMP do?
Mr. Grégoire: The RCMP performs a CPIC level 1 check.
Transport Canada goes through a CPIC level 2 check, which gives us only the criminal record that a person may have. The RCMP goes further. In spring of 2004, we signed a memorandum of understanding with the RCMP for the sharing of criminal linkages information. The RCMP check will determine whether the person has a criminal record, but they will also determine whether the person is under operational investigation. The RCMP will determine whether the person is linked to organized crime, which we do not have access to at Transport Canada.
Senator Day: The Canadian Police Information Centre check, which the RCMP conducts, is called CPIC level 1 or level 2?
Mr. Grégoire: Transport Canada conducts a level 2 check and the RCMP conducts a level 1 check. We are not a police force.
Senator Day: I understand, but this database of the Canadian Police Information Centre is an electronic check of a name?
Mr. Grégoire: Yes.
Senator Day: They will check a name and then come back to Transport Canada and say they have no record of this name or that this person had an offence in the past.
Mr. Grégoire: Exactly.
Senator Day: Who makes the determination as to whether an offence or conviction is relevant?
Mr. Grégoire: If there is a criminal record or a conviction of any kind, then we have a committee within Transport Canada determine if that person represents a risk to transportation security. We cannot refuse a person just because the person has a criminal record, which explains why a number of applicants obtain security clearances even though they have a criminal record. The legislation is very precise. The person has to be a threat to transportation security.
Senator Day: Transport Canada conducts the CPIC level 2 test and information comes back on the fingerprint database and criminal record.
Mr. Grégoire: The fingerprint database will give the numbers of criminal files. Then we can go in and see the offences.
Senator Day: What does CSIS do for Transport Canada?
Mr. Grégoire: CSIS does an indices check.
Senator Day: I saw that you put it in quotation marks. Could you explain to me what an indices check is?
Mr. Grégoire: I would suggest that for those details you ask representatives of the RCMP or CSIS. Fundamentally, CSIS will tell us if they think a person is linked to terrorism or if a person represents a threat to national security, using the definition in their legislation. If that is the case, CSIS will send us that information and then we will tell the applicant that we are refusing to deliver a security clearance based on CSIS information.
Senator Day: The Pass Control Office sends an application form with a fingerprint, a photograph and a name with a five-year history. What does CSIS use to check their index?
Mr. Grégoire: To begin with, there is a computer check, which is done within 48 to 72 hours.
Senator Day: Against the name of the applicant?
Mr. Grégoire: Yes, and date of birth. If there is a red flag, then CSIS will investigate.
Senator Day: However, if there is no red flag for an applicant from some place in Canada, CSIS merely conducts the computer check?
Mr. Grégoire: To my knowledge, yes. If there is a red flag, CSIS does much more.
Senator Day: The red flag could be a name that pops up that causes CSIS some concern.
Mr. Grégoire: Yes.
Senator Day: What does Transport Canada do with respect to this five-year history, if anything?
Mr. Grégoire: We introduced the five-year history in 2004 as part of improving our background check process. We request that the person has five years of verifiable information. If someone has been in Canada all his life but for the last three years has been travelling abroad, we will want to know where the person was and what the person was doing. If he or she is a newcomer to Canada, it is the same situation. If we do not have access to five years of information, we will ask the applicant to provide additional information. For example, if someone said that he has been teaching at the London School of Economics, we will call the school and speak to the human resources people to verify this information ourselves.
Senator Day: Do you verify that information with respect to every applicant?
Mr. Grégoire: We only verify information for applicants who do not have five years of continuous stay in Canada.
Senator Day: For everyone who has been outside of Canada during part or all of the five years, do you specifically have a Transport Canada team verify that information?
Mr. Grégoire: Yes, if the absence was more than 90 days.
Senator Day: In the event that an applicant was not out of Canada in the five-year period, is anything done?
Mr. Grégoire: These are the checks with the other documents that I mentioned before.
Senator Day: Transport Canada does not do anything for those individuals, and you do not feel you need to?
Mr. Grégoire: Exactly.
Senator Day: You mentioned ``if applicable'' in relation to immigration. That would only be in the event that in giving their history a person indicates that he or she was not a Canadian citizen throughout the five-year period or that he or she has recently become a Canadian citizen?
Mr. Grégoire: Any immigrants.
Senator Day: What do you do with Immigration Canada?
Mr. Grégoire: We send the file to Immigration Canada. We also have an MOU with Immigration Canada for the sharing of information. In cases where an applicant is a permanent resident, a naturalized citizen or a foreign national, we will transmit to CIC the applicant's name, date of birth, date of arrival in Canada and/or immigration or citizenship reference numbers. CIC will then conduct checks against its field operation support system and global case management system to confirm that the information provided by an applicant matches the information contained in the CIC database. CIC then confirms the individual's status by secure electronic communication through the Transport Canada intelligence group.
Senator Day: We have gone through the list of all the checks that you do. How long does this take? How long does it take for someone to go to the Pass Control Office, submit to the fingerprinting and photograph, et cetera, until they are told that they have clearance?
Mr. Grégoire: It can take two weeks if everything is fine, and it can take up to three months if there are a number of red flags.
Senator Day: If there are no red flags, is the average about two weeks?
Mr. Grégoire: It is two to three weeks if there are no red flags. I emphasize that.
Senator Day: I can understand that if there are red flags you must find out what they are.
For those uncomplicated cases, have you calculated roughly what the process costs are per applicant? Who pays for that?
Mr. Grégoire: This is part of our A base. Yes, we have calculated this, but I do not have the numbers with me now. I can provide this to the committee if senators are interested. When we wanted to introduce the program in the marine environment, we sought funds for the centre and we were allocated money — Transport Canada, the RCMP and CSIS — to fund this program. We have costs for each applicant, multiplied by the number of people we deal with. We process about 40,000 clearances per year at this point in time.
The Chairman: Just for clarification, Mr. Grégoire, explain to the audience what ``A base'' is.
Mr. Grégoire: The reference level of our budget.
The Chairman: The government pays for it, is what you are saying.
Mr. Grégoire: Yes.
Senator Day: Until now, we have been talking about transportation security clearance, not about a card being issued, but prerequisite to that.
Mr. Grégoire: Yes, but the process finishes there. If I tell you that you do not have a security clearance, you will not have a pass either.
Senator Day: Do you have any review of your clearance process, or is the five-year review built into the card holder?
Mr. Grégoire: No, it is independent. We have our own triggers in our databases for our own five-year internal review. As well, other triggers can be activated. For instance, if the RCMP — and they can do that any time during the course of the life of a person — provides us information that would trigger us to suspend or revoke a pass, then that file is looked at. However, if nothing happens, the file is reviewed after five years. Some airports have elected to change the pass every three years. They would call us to check if the security clearance is still valid. If we say it is valid but there are only two years left, they would not make the pass valid beyond the security clearance validity.
Senator Day: With respect to airports that have chosen to issue a card for three years, why would you not do a security clearance again at that time rather than wait for five years? Why the arbitrary choice of five years that does not fit in with someone else's need to conduct a security clearance every three years?
Mr. Grégoire: It is a risk management decision to do that every five years. The frequency is done in consultation with CSIS, the RCMP and other colleagues of other departments here in town. We questioned ourselves as to the frequency in the last two years because we wanted to improve the system. For the vast majority of people, five years is good enough.
The Chairman: In terms of the issuance of passes, I believe I heard you say that Transport Canada issues the passes.
Mr. Grégoire: No. We issue no pass. We issue our own pass for our own employees, but that is all the passes we issue.
The Chairman: You are saying you are responsible for what?
Mr. Grégoire: Security clearance.
The Chairman: Once you decide that there is a security clearance, then the airport authority issues the pass.
Mr. Grégoire: That is correct.
The Chairman: What discretion do they have to issue the passes once you have given the security clearance?
Mr. Grégoire: You mean if we do not issue a clearance, can they issue a card?
The Chairman: No. If you do issue a clearance, what discretion do they have, if any, to issue a pass?
Jean Barrette, Director, Security Operations, Transport Canada: As a matter of principle, any employee who applies for either a clearance or a Restricted Area Pass at an airport must substantiate the need and the purpose for them to be in a restricted area. That is supported by a pass application, duly supported by the employer. They must be subjected to the access clearance program, the transportation security program with Transport Canada, and the discretion that the airport exercises. The airport must ensure the employee only has access to those areas where they have a need and a right to be.
To give an example, if I am a cargo employee and work in the cargo warehouse at Toronto, I do not have a need nor can I substantiate being on the main air terminal apron of Pearson airport. Consequently, the responsibility and the discretion of the airport is to ensure that the zone is clearly indicated on the pass. The pass clearly provides the visible information that the individual is only entitled to be in that area.
In addition, when an employee is issued a Restricted Area Pass, they must sign terms and conditions upon issuance of that pass. For example, first, the pass is only to be used for the purpose of carrying out their work; second, that the pass is not to be issued to help someone else enter into the restricted area; and, third, that the pass must not be loaned to anyone. Those are the conditions of issuance.
I want to emphasize one point. A pass is not a right to an employee. A Restricted Area Pass is a privilege. For those employees who abuse the privileges of their pass, the airport manager, the airport authority, does have the discretion to pull that pass.
The Chairman: Keep in mind those points that you have just given us because we will come back to you later and ask you to explain how those are enforced.
Senator Meighen: I must be confused but I thought I heard you say, Mr. Grégoire, that you were dealing with Transport Canada employees only, not people who work at airports?
Mr. Grégoire: He asked me if we issue the passes, the cards themselves. We issue Transport Canada employee passes.
Senator Meighen: If I work for an airline, those passes come from the airport authority; is that correct?
Mr. Grégoire: Yes.
Senator Meighen: After you have given the security clearance?
Mr. Grégoire: Yes, sir.
The Chairman: Yet, the passes that are issued by Pearson airport may be used by a pilot in Trudeau airport.
Mr. Grégoire: For identification purposes, yes; to open doors, no.
Senator Atkins: Would it not make more sense to have a centralized system rather than Transport Canada having its system and the airlines, even though you provide the security clearance, having their system? Would it not make more sense to have it all under one central control?
Mr. Grégoire: Yes. This is why we are introducing the Restricted Area Identification Card. A central database will be linked to our security clearance database and all of the airports. It is a triangle. If we cancel the security clearance, this will be known by the central database held by CATSA and then will be transmitted to the airport to cancel the pass immediately and vice versa. If the airport cancels an employee or wants an employee to stop having access to some areas, this information will be relayed to CATSA and to us. This concept of one place will be there as soon as our new system is in place at the end of December.
The Chairman: Would I be correct in saying that after you have dealt with RCMP, CSIS and Immigration Canada, all you know for sure is that so far the authorities do not have any reason to be concerned about this individual?
Mr. Grégoire: Or that the individual does not represent a threat to transportation security.
The Chairman: How do you get to that conclusion on the basis of the information you have? No one certifies back that they are not a threat. The RCMP does not tell you this person is not a threat; they simply say that so far they have no reason to believe this is a bad person. How do you make that jump?
Mr. Grégoire: What is your real question?
The Chairman: Which word did you not understand?
Mr. Grégoire: Are you saying that we should interview the individual or we should make a further assessment?
The Chairman: I am not saying anything. You are telling us that they have told you that this person is not a threat.
Mr. Grégoire: Yes.
The Chairman: I have not heard any of them say that yet. The RCMP did not say the person was not a threat; CSIS did not say the person was not a threat; Immigration Canada did not say the person was not a threat. They only told you that they had no information.
Mr. Grégoire: Yes, but they will tell us if there is threat. If they tell us nothing, it means they have nothing. If they think a person is a threat to transportation security, they will tell us.
The Chairman: No, you said they would tell you if they did not know anything about the person. That did not say anything about whether or not the person had plans that they were not aware of.
Mr. Grégoire: That is the whole purpose of the program. If CSIS or the RCMP have information on an individual who represents a threat, they will tell us and on that basis we will not issue a clearance or, if the person has one, we will suspend it.
The Chairman: Yes, but if no information is provided, it does not mean a person is not a threat.
Mr. Grégoire: That is right. People change and could become a threat in later years.
The Chairman: They could also be a threat right now and the RCMP does not realize it.
Mr. Grégoire: If the RCMP, CSIS and CIC do not realize it, it is pretty hard for us to make that determination.
The Chairman: Correct. All you know is that so far no one is aware of whether a person is a threat or not?
Mr. Grégoire: That is correct.
Senator Moore: For the record, what do you mean by the restricted area in an airport?
Mr. Barrette: There is a terminal building with a periphery, which include tenants, cargo buildings, et cetera. Ground side is any area to which the public has access, and the restricted area is that area to which only authorized individuals can enter.
The apron of air terminal buildings or the tarmac — a term being used in the press today — of cargo areas are areas to which only authorized individuals have access for the purpose of doing their jobs. In order for someone to gain the authority to access those areas, they must have a document of entitlement.
If we go further into the category of employees at an airport, they must be in possession of that document of entitlement, the Restricted Area Pass. As a passenger proceeding through the screening point, one must have a document of entitlement; for example, an electronic ticket or a boarding pass, something entitling that person to be allowed in that restricted area, provided they are subjected to security controls.
As another example, there may be someone travelling on business. For example, if you are in transit between Halifax and Vancouver and you have to do business with Senator Meighen, he could obtain from the air carrier something called a VIP pass. That document of entitlement allows you entry into the area provided you are subjected to screening. That special pass is approved by the airport authority, which is ultimately accountable for control of access into a restricted area.
That is a brief example of what we mean by ground side, the public area, and the type of situation where someone would want access into a restricted area.
Senator Meighen: As I understand it, the new Restricted Area Identification Card will not have any geo-fencing component. Provided my card is up to date and I am who I claim to be, is there anything stopping me from moving between restricted area A and restricted area B?
Mr. Grégoire: There is the possibility of access being denied by the airports, and this is something we took further than the original announcement.
When we announced the RAIC program back in 2002, control of the door was not part of the program. Now, all airports have adopted the same technology of controlling access to doors as well as the ID portion. That means the airport actually decides which doors you can and cannot access with your card. It is a bit like our passes for buildings: Some people are allowed access to every floor of the building while others are only allowed access to some floors at certain hours.
Senator Meighen: It is left to the discretion of the airport.
Senator Moore: Are airport Pass Control Offices only present at Class I airports, or are they also present at Class II airports?
Mr. Grégoire: There is something set up in all 29 airports across the country.
Senator Moore: Are there staff in that Pass Control Office looking at monitors that show information triggered by use of the restricted pass? For example, can they see that Mr. X is a food handler? If so, what is he doing in the baggage handling section? He should not be there? Will the new system you are putting in place in the control offices be able to ensure that — maybe this is what was referred to as the geo-fencing — a person is entitled to be in the area he or she is supposed to be in?
Mr. Barrette: That is the beauty of an electronic access control system. It allows the airport authority, who is responsible for access control, to determine which doors one can have access to. I will refer back to my example.
Senator Moore: For example, I am in transit and someone wants to see —
Mr. Barrette: No, we are talking about an employee. A passenger situation is quite different.
If I am an employee in the cargo area, I am supposed to be working at the other end of the field and I am not supposed to be on the terminal apron. In answer to your first question, if Jean Barrette has access control through the cargo building, the airport authority will know which doors I have access to or not.
Let us assume that Jean Barrette decides one day that he will test the system and abuse his privilege by trying to gain access through a pedestrian door in the air terminal building. First, if the card has not been programmed, I will not be able to go through that door. Second, the airport authority will in fact have an electronic record demonstrating that Card 002, owned by Jean Barrette, attempted to penetrate that pedestrian door at the air terminal building.
Senator Moore: If someone is at that cargo end on the ground, they could still travel on foot without going through a doorway to the tarmac side of the building; correct?
Mr. Barrette: There is always the possibility of someone moving within the restricted area between one zone and another. You are absolutely right. That is why additional mechanisms and requirements are in place for airport operators to exercise patrol. They must do patrols on their side, and there are visual checks. That is why we have provided, as requested by Senator Kenny, discretion for the airport authority to lift that pass, to lift that privilege if the individual may have abused them.
You can resolve a lot of issues using electronics and automated access control systems. That is the reason we have built those layers, to ensure that guidelines are supplemented by proper supervision and proper patrol. That is the reason we have provided the airport authority and their protective security people, who patrol our side, with the discretion of lifting that pass if the privileges have been abused by the employee.
The Chairman: That is one of the concerns we have as a committee, the technology you are going to and the reason you did not jump the ``pass'' generation through to true geo-fencing where someone, as Senator Moore was describing, is moving from one area to another. Passes currently exist that will alert a central authority when someone is moving from one area to another. You are familiar with those passes. They have the ability to communicate that information back to a control center. Why have you chosen not to go with that technology?
I ask you that question because we have received testimony from people who work on the air side, the apron or tarmac, as you have referred to it, and they say the airports do not check them regularly. They have the ability, right and maybe even the obligation to check, but in reality they do not. The ability to observe or the concept that other workers would report them does not, in fact, happen. They are able to move around a great deal.
Therefore, what you have been describing seems to be something that will be effective only if someone is actually going through a door that requires a card for it to open. However, it does not show up if someone happens to walk through when the door is already open or if the person moves air side from one location to another when they are not entitled to go from one location to another.
Why have you not chosen to take that extra step in order to provide that level of security at our airports?
Mr. Grégoire: CATSA is managing this program. CATSA is the organization that chose the technology and is implementing it now. As any technology, it is evolving quickly, and your recommendation can be taken for a future enhancement of the program.
However, as you know and we know, we cannot depend on a single system. That is why we use a multi-layered approach. In this case, that is why we are screening non-passengers on a random basis.
The Chairman: I understand the need for multiple layers, but it is not right for you to offload this on CATSA. CATSA is your creature; they follow your policies and cannot deviate from them. Transport Canada is responsible for everything CATSA does. Do not come to this committee and say that is a CATSA problem because when we call CATSA in, they say, ``We do what Transport Canada tells us to do.''
Mr. Grégoire: As I said at the beginning, the concept of operations, which was provided to CATSA some years ago, was to have a central database controlling the person, the validity of the pass, validity of the clearance and put it all together. We have already gone further with the control of doors, and maybe we will go further in the future, but we do not have the geo-surveillance at this point in time.
The Chairman: We know you do not, but it has been around for a long period of time. It is old technology. It is available to you, and it appears that you have made the wrong choice.
Mr. Barrette: On your point about geo-technology, you are right. It is technology that has been around for a little while. I would challenge many of us to go around the world right now to find this kind of technology which has been used in an environment as complex as an airport. We have not ignored it. As a matter of fact, we tested a lot of biometric technology after 9/11, as you are well aware, ranging from hand scanners to facial geometry. I will not get into the long list of bells and whistles because that is what they are — bells and whistles. There is good reliable technology out there.
I am not a technology person, but what I know about this technology, senators, is that to apply it to an airport environment requires further analysis and further maturity of that technology to be able to put it in place. We have not ignored it. However, we will felt at the time, based on the maturity of the technology and the challenges we deal with, using technology in an airport environment is not as easy as using technology in an office building where the peripheral interference and issues are much less than that of an airport environment.
Mr. Grégoire is absolutely right that this is a first step. Let me reassure you that Canada will be the first country to have an integrated system of Restricted Area Identification Cards at airports.
The Chairman: The technology you described to us is appropriate for an office building and not an airport. Your very example is one that works fine in an office building, but not in an airport. Could you provide the committee with the evaluation that you used to arrive at this judgment?
Mr. Barrette: Perhaps we can ask our colleagues from CATSA who are responsible for the operational implementation to provide you with these details. I do not have the analysis with me today.
The Chairman: We are really fixed with you folks going like this. CATSA works for you; it follows your policies and your direction. They are the implementers. You are the policymakers and they do what you say.
Senator Moore: With respect to the applicants for a security clearance, does that include pilots and flight attendants as well as conventional ground crew at airports?
Mr. Barrette: Yes, it does.
The Chairman: When you say it includes pilots, are you telling us that all pilots are included?
Mr. Grégoire: No, not all pilots. It includes all pilots who need to go through a secured door in the main terminal of the 29 airports.
The Chairman: When you say ``need to go through a secured door,'' how many do not have to go through the secured door?
Mr. Grégoire: The Canadian airline pilots who fly out of the 29 airports all have the security clearance and the card.
The Chairman: How many pilots go through an inspection process?
Mr. Grégoire: Today, it depends on the airport. Some airports force the pilot to go through the passenger screening point and others do not force them. Our regulations treat the pilots as non-passengers, and they can go through the access door of the airports. We allow that to happen because they have a security clearance and an ID card. However, some airports go further and want to provide for more security and force the pilots to go through the passenger screening points.
The Chairman: When you say ``force,'' it sounds as though that is pejorative. Is it something you do not agree with?
Mr. Grégoire: Not at all. We cannot disagree with more security, but our basic requirement is the background check and the random screening of non-passengers. That is the basic requirement. Some airports go further, and we will not prevent them from going further, of course.
The Chairman: When you say some pilots are screened and some are not, aside from Pearson airport, where else are pilots checked?
Mr. Barrette: I do not have a specific list, but it would be several smaller airports like Class II airports. Many do not have a bypass door; consequently, a lot of these pilots have to go through the screening points anyway.
The Chairman: Do you think that is a good idea?
Mr. Barrette: Do you mean going through a screening point?
The Chairman: Yes.
Mr. Grégoire: We do not discuss policy.
The Chairman: You do not discuss policy.
Mr. Grégoire: I can explain to you the actual policy. I just did. We do not impose screening of pilots if they have a security pass, which they obtain through a background check.
The Chairman: You are telling us the practice at some airports. I said Pearson and I asked if there were others. I simply asked if you thought this was good.
Mr. Grégoire: We have no opinion on what is good and what is not good.
The Chairman: Really? You set the policy, but you have no opinion.
Mr. Grégoire: The minister sets the policy.
The Chairman: Should we ask the minister whether he thinks it is good that Pearson screens pilots?
Mr. Grégoire: If you want to discuss policy, sir. The pilots have control of the aircraft. Once they are in the cockpit, they control the aircraft.
The Chairman: You have control over who gets screened and who does not.
Mr. Grégoire: Yes.
Senator Moore: I find that interesting. This summer, I was in the United States a few times on Banking Committee business. The pilots and flight attendants went through the same security check I did. That was in Philadelphia, Nashville and Boston. I am surprised at that.
Senator Atkins: Perceptions are important. When the public hears that there are criminals employed at airports, who determines whether a criminal is or is not a threat to national security? Is it a psychologist? Who makes that determination? Social behaviour can determine a lot of threats, including those that might be important to national security at an airport.
Mr. Grégoire: If the person has a criminal record, that person will be assessed systematically by a committee. As a minimum, that committee is composed of our director of intelligence and screening, one original director of security, one lawyer from Justice Canada and the chief of security screening programs. Those people will look at the person's file with a view to determine whether or not the person represents a threat to transportation security.
There are large numbers of people with criminal records, as was pointed out by the Auditor General of Canada back in 2004. However, I would say that most of those involve criminal offences that do not represent a threat. For instance, the vast majority are drunk driving charges or charges that occurred 20 or 25 years ago for which people have not requested a pardon. The airports are the same as elsewhere in our society: People have a right to work, even though they have a criminal record. According to the last Statistics Canada census, close to 10 per cent of the population has a criminal record. While that figure is much lower at our airports because of the data background check that is done, 3 per cent to 5 per cent of people who work at airports have criminal records. This should not surprise you. It is not a threat to transportation security. We have to follow the law, and that is what the law says. The law does not say that people with a criminal record cannot work at airports. The law tells us that people who represent a threat to transportation security or national security cannot work at airports.
Senator Atkins: I am curious as to the guidelines. Are there guidelines for making that judgment?
Mr. Grégoire: Yes, there are guidelines. As I mentioned, it depends on the offence. It depends on when the offence occurred. We do not have a set of rigid guidelines under which people would be rejected systematically. If there is criminal record information, the committee that I mentioned before will make an assessment. This assessment is then sent to the minister or his delegate, the deputy minister, who then accepts or refuses the recommendation of the committee.
Senator Atkins: You can understand that when the public hears that there are criminals working at airports, without any definition, they could be quite shocked by that information.
Mr. Grégoire: Yes. They are small criminal offences. Often the people will have paid their dues to society but have not requested a pardon, so a criminal record pops up. In the vast majority of cases, the offence is driving while under the influence of alcohol.
The Chairman: We understand the point you make, that not all criminals should be precluded from working. However, when the Royal Canadian Mounted Police tell us that they know that there are a number of criminal gangs active airside, active on the tarmac, how can you justify not searching everybody who will work airside? The police are telling you that there are organized criminal groups currently working at those very airports.
Mr. Grégoire: As I mentioned in June, we did not say we would never screen all the non-passengers. We said that we were not doing that now. We are doing this on a random basis now. That being said, this is why we signed a memorandum of understanding with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police back in April 2004. If the RCMP has information on anyone they think should not work at the airport, they can give us the name and we will revoke or suspend the clearance. If the RCMP tells us — as they have in the past two years — that so-and-so is a member of a criminal gang and should not have a clearance, then we act; or if so-and-so is applying for a clearance, you should not give him one.
Senator Meighen: In the last two years, approximately how many passes would have been revoked?
Mr. Grégoire: I have the exact number: in 2004, 58 passes; in 2005, 107 passes; in 2006, to date, as of Friday, 34 passes have either been cancelled or refused. These numbers are based on criminal information or other types of information.
We also have the five years of information that resulted in a number of security clearances being refused. That is a different set of numbers. I believe that we refused or cancelled or did not give a security clearance to 434 applicants since March 2005.
The Chairman: If later this afternoon we ask the RCMP whether any criminal gangs or organized criminal gangs are active in Canadian airports, will their answer be no?
Mr. Grégoire: I do not know what their answer will be, sir. If they give us names with specific information, we will act upon that information. Of course, once you tell this to the applicant, he or she can use the existing appeal mechanism. A person can go to the Federal Court and challenge the fact that you have suspended or revoked his or her clearance.
Senator Moore: Mr. Grégoire, did you say that 434 applications were refused?
Mr. Grégoire: They were refused. That is based on five years of information. That is since March 2005.
Senator Moore: Does that include the 107 and the 34?
Mr. Grégoire: No, it does not. It is a separate number. In fact, I can give you the number since the beginning of the program. Back in 1986, we have either cancelled or refused 574 security clearances. Since we introduced the five years of information criteria, we have refused a further 434 clearances, for a total of 1,008.
Senator Moore: What is the difference between those ones and the 107 from 2005 and the 34 to date in 2006? Is this a function of the process?
Mr. Grégoire: No. There is not enough information to assess the individuals. If the individual has been outside the country for four years, as an example, we will have only one year of information. CSIS and the RCMP cannot assess this individual with only one year of information. They need five years. CSIS does not have agreements with other countries to search for those kinds of security clearances. We need reliable information from the individual. In those cases, we could not obtain it.
Senator Moore: You could not get enough information to process the full application.
Mr. Grégoire: We process it, but if we check the additional information they give us on their whereabouts and it does not add up, we do not give them the clearance.
Senator Moore: I would like to follow up on one thing the chairman asked. You do random screening of non- passengers on the tarmac side now. I do not understand why everyone is not screened. It looks to me to be an opportunity for somebody driving a food delivery truck to be up to no good. It is an open book. Why are we not doing that?
Mr.. Grégoire: It is a matter of risk management and management of public funds. Today, we believe that our security clearance program, the background check on which we spent so much time today, is good. It reduces the risk, but it is not perfect. That is why we have the non-passenger screening on a random basis. I understand that you favour 100 per cent, but it is a matter of cost. If you had a dollar where would you invest it?
Senator Moore: The fees we all pay when we travel back and forth to Ottawa, how much is collected under that program and is there a deficit or surplus situation?
Mr. Grégoire: This money goes to the central fund and CATSA and Transport Canada get their appropriations from the central fund. There are no direct linkages between those revenues and the expenditures incurred to deliver the program.
Senator Moore: Are those monies not set aside in one account to cover the costs of these things you are trying to do?
Mr. Grégoire: There are no direct linkages.
Senator Moore: Is that a yes or a no?
Mr. Grégoire: The government has said that over five years, on the revolving five years, that the revenues from the Air Travellers Security Charge and the expenditures of CATSA and Transport Canada, the portion that was allocated, would match. I understand from their last report that there is a surplus. If you look at five years there is a surplus, although I forget the exact number.
Senator Moore: Is this in the hundreds, the thousands, the millions? Do you have any idea what that is? Maybe you could find out and let us know.
The Chairman: The question seems to be that you have not asked for the funding to do it.
Mr. Grégoire: We have asked for lots of funding for different things.
The Chairman: Have you been turned down?
Mr. Grégoire: We get the funding that we get.
The Chairman: Have you asked for funding to screen all airside workers?
Mr. Grégoire: Not yet, sir.
The Chairman: Why not?
Mr. Grégoire: We did not think it was necessary yet because we have just implemented the non-passenger screening. We are following up on what other countries are doing. We are having discussions at the ICAO level on that subject and no one was moving when we made the decision. Now I understand some countries, such as the U.K., are moving to screen non-passengers at 100 per cent.
The Chairman: Why do you give us examples like ICAO? That is the lowest common denominator. That is where the standards sink down to the bottom level so that everyone agrees. Why would you want Canada to be there? Why would you not want us to be a leading country with the safest airports?
Mr. Grégoire: Is that a question?
The Chairman: Is that an answer?
That is clearly a question. Why do you go to the lowest common denominator instead of having us be a leading country with the safest airports?
Mr. Grégoire: We are now developing a transportation security action plan into which we will prioritize by risk the various things we should do in all of the modes. If we add $100 million, where would we put it? Would it be in marine, in aviation or in surface transportation? We want to rank the actions that way.
The Chairman: Where does this rank?
Mr. Grégoire: This work is not completed yet, but it is underway.
The Chairman: It has been a long time since 9/11. This issue came up back in 2002 and we drew it to your attention then. It is now 2006. Four years is a long time for you to get through your ranking.
Mr. Grégoire: The first priority was to finish the deployment of the explosives detection system. That was completed last year. The next priority for airport security is to complete the deployment of the Restricted Area Identification Card. We are getting there.
The Chairman: You have an opportunity and you have the funds. You have a surplus in the funds. Canadian taxpayers have paid more into the funds than have been spent, and you are telling this committee that you have not yet asked for funding to inspect everyone going to work at airports, even though you inspect all of the passengers who go through the airport. Why is that?
Mr. Grégoire: We have not done that, sir.
The Chairman: The question is: Why have not you done that?
Mr. Grégoire: Because we are not there yet, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Why not?
Mr. Grégoire: Because we have a good background check, a good security card to be put in place, so that is the basis of the security in layers. If you were to screen 100 per cent of the workers, would you continue with the security card and the background check, or would you see duplication between the two?
The Chairman: I thought you just finished giving us testimony that you would like to do things in layers, that you did not want to rely on one thing, that you had redundancies so one protected another. Is that not so?
Mr. Grégoire: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Would you not consider that to be doing things in layers?
Mr. Grégoire: I said at the beginning, as I said in June, that we were not doing it today, but that we were not saying that we would never do it. We are not doing it today and we are not funded to do it yet.
The Chairman: You have not asked for the funds to do it.
Mr. Grégoire: That is correct.
Senator Atkins: We talk about all this technology, such as the biometrics. Do you have a critical path that indicates any completion dates for everything that is taking place?
Mr. Grégoire: Yes. The airports are now enrolling their employees — not only employees but all the people working at the airports, from the airlines to the other people working there. Some airports have finished the enrolment and have finished the deployment of the system. For some other airports, it will go until the end of December. We are hopeful that by the end of December 2006 this system will be operational in all of the terminal doors.
Senator Atkins: Does that mean the technology, too?
Mr. Grégoire: The technology is working now. It has been tested. This is why we have seen such a delay. There were complications with the technology, but now the technical glitches have been fixed and the technology is working.
Senator Meighen: If I am an employee of a cleaning company that cleans the aircraft, or any of the other people who have regular access to the tarmac, airside, right now I am presumably in possession of a Restricted Area Pass or, soon, a Restricted Area Identification Card; correct?
Mr. Grégoire: Yes.
Senator Meighen: As I heard you, you asked why you would do anything more if you have this. My question to you would be that if I were a member of the cleaning staff and I arrive airside with a great big gym bag, is anyone going to look in it, or if I have the right card, no problem, come on in?
Mr. Barrette: Random passenger screening has been in place for several months. What that employee does not know is that as he or she is going rough the access controls, he or she may be subjected one day or another to a random screening. They do not know this, and that is why we call it random.
Senator Meighen: Is that an electronic screening of the contents?
Mr. Barrette: That would include a screening of the person and the contents of what they are bringing airside. That includes personal items. If the person is a cleaner, they may go through with a cart and a certain amount of goods for them do their work, and that would be subjected to screening as well.
Senator Meighen: It seems astonishing to me that there are a great many more passengers than members of the cleaning staff, yet it seems to be heresy or an extraordinary idea to suggest they go through what I have to go through every time I board a plane.
Mr. Grégoire: Actually there are other issues. Non-passengers or workers will need a variety of tools to do their work that are not allowed on the aircraft for passengers. If you have them using the same screening points as the passengers, that would create a problem between the workers and the passengers. The workers have their own doors elsewhere.
Senator Meighen: Fine. Why not stick an electronic screening unit there for everyone who goes airside to go through?
Senator Moore: Is that not what they do?
Senator Meighen: No. They do random checks.
Mr. Grégoire: They do random checks.
The Chairman: What if they do not take their tools back out? If someone is bringing a knife in, do you not want to know that they bring a knife out?
Mr. Grégoire: The law, as it is written now, only enables us to check when you are coming in, not when you are coming out.
Senator Meighen: But we only do it on a random basis; right?
Mr. Grégoire: That is correct.
Senator Meighen: Take Toronto Island Airport as an example, where there is the possibility of greatly increased traffic. Can airports move from Class I to Class II or vice versa?
Mr. Grégoire: No, the airports were classified back in 1996 through the National Airports Policy. Only one airport has changed classification since then; it is Hamilton, I believe.
Senator Meighen: What is the answer? You can change or you cannot change?
Mr. Grégoire: Well, one airport did change.
Senator Meighen: So it is possible.
Mr. Grégoire: Yes.
Senator Meighen: Is Toronto Island Airport Class I or Class II?
Mr. Barrette: When Toronto Island Airport had commercial operations, it was a Class II airport.
Senator Meighen: Is the class based essentially on volume?
Mr. Barrette: No, it is a number of items. It is based on volume and the nature of the operation. What I mean by ``nature of operation'' is destination, whether it is going to the United States or a number of international flights. Not only that, but the classification of airports requires an annual ongoing evaluation of threat and risk. That is done by Transport Canada on a year-to-year basis, looking not only at statistics and destination, but also at environmental factors around that airport, to help determine in what category this airport should be classified. There are a number of factors.
Senator Meighen: You are providing us with that list, as I understand.
Can you tell us what Transport Canada has done in relation to the recent allegations of ongoing security breaches at Trudeau airport?
Mr. Grégoire: We conducted a full investigation, which means that we sent inspectors to the airport to run a full investigation on all the allegations reported by the journalists. The investigation portion is finished, I believe, and now it is in the analysis stage. Mr. Barrette and colleagues from our legal affairs department are discussing the next steps.
Senator Meighen: Does the next step incorporate any type of public communiqué?
Mr. Grégoire: We do not know yet. We do issue a number of monetary fines in the security environment at all of the airports, either to airports, to airlines or to people who rent lands, but we never publish those for obvious security reasons. On the safety side, we publish all of the aviation safety enforcement actions that we take, but we have never published the security fines that we issue. However, the Aeronautics Act the security regulations provide us with a number of monetary penalties and other regulatory tools to enforce the law.
Senator Meighen: Do you indicate whether there have been fines levied or do you say nothing?
Mr. Grégoire: That would be the decision of the minister because it was never done before.
The Chairman: What are the ``obvious security reasons'' that you would not indicate that fines had been levied?
Senator Moore: It would show the weak spots in the airport.
The Chairman: Please let the witness answer the question.
Mr. Grégoire: We have yet to have a discussion with the minister on the results of that because it is not completed yet. All I am saying is that we have never published the list of security fines.
The Chairman: What are the ``obvious security reasons?''
Mr. Grégoire: If you were to publish a security fine to an airline, it would indicate a security gap at that place.
The Chairman: Correct. What is the problem with you making it public a period of time after that happens? In other words, the problem took place; then, six months later when they have had a chance to fix the problem, let the public know that there was a problem, that you imposed a fine and the problem was fixed. Why would there be a security problem with that?
Mr. Grégoire: There may or may not be a security problem, but our policy now is not to publish those at all.
The Chairman: Do you not believe that the public would have greater confidence in the system if they knew you were catching problems and correcting them? Then, after time has gone by and the problem has been corrected, the public knows you are on the job and the problems are being fixed.
Mr. Grégoire: It is possible. We have 137 or 140 inspectors across the country doing that kind of work throughout the various airports. We check if the airports, the airlines and others are following the regulations. We do enforce, give fines or suspensions on a regular basis, but we do not publish them.
Senator Meighen: Why do not you start by publishing the fact that you do levy fines with X number of fines having been levied against Y number of offenders? For example, I am sure that sort of information about eating establishments is available from city hall in most cities in Canada.
Mr. Grégoire: It is possible, yes.
Senator Meighen: Otherwise, how does the public know you are doing anything? That is the problem. I am trying to help you.
Mr. Grégoire: You are trying to help us?
Senator Meighen: Yes, it is important to let the public know that Transport Canada is on the job.
Mr. Grégoire: We are on the job and it is part of our communications. Whenever our communication people talk about what we do, they mention that, but never go into specifics.
Senator Meighen: I did not say that; that is just what I did not say. I suggested that you give generalities; that X number of fines were levied against Y number of offenders. That is not specific.
Mr. Grégoire: We can certainly consider that suggestion for the future.
Senator Meighen: I cannot ask for anything more today, I guess.
The Chairman: Would you advise us when you have completed that consideration? Would you put that on your list of information to bring back to us?
Mr. Grégoire: Yes.
Senator Meighen: Has Transport Canada conducted a cost benefit analysis or other kind of analysis to determine whether your present policy of CATSA employees being employees of private contractors rather than public servants is the right one?
Mr. Grégoire: No, sir, we have not.
Senator Meighen: Am I not correct that in other jurisdictions, the United States for one, I think, that those people are public servants?
Mr. Grégoire: You are correct. The TSA in the U.S. employs, I believe, 43,000 screeners. The CATSA legislation provided for CATSA to hire their own screeners, contract to airports or use service providers. CATSA has chosen to use service providers and the CATSA legislation is presently under review. We will see if the panel makes any recommendations to the minister in that regard, but we, in Transport Canada, have not done that analysis.
Senator Meighen: It will require a decision by the minister to carry it out, as I understand.
Mr. Grégoire: CATSA is a Crown corporation and can choose the mechanism it wants under the act as it is today. It would require something to force them, if I get your question right.
Senator Meighen: If we decided that was the right way to go.
Mr. Grégoire: If you decided that was the right way to go, that would either have to be a decision of CATSA or a change in legislation imposed by Parliament.
Senator Moore: How many CATSA screeners are there?
Mr. Grégoire: I believe there are 4,200, approximately, while there were about 2,800 before September 2001.
Senator Meighen: Mr. Grégoire, did I hear you correctly to say that it takes generally two to three weeks to get the Restricted Area Pass card, assuming there are no problems?
Mr. Grégoire: If everything is clean, yes.
Senator Meighen: I am very encouraged to hear that because the anecdotal evidence I have received is not to that effect. If fact, the human resources director of an airline in Canada has had an application in, I am told, since February, and nothing has happened. Either there is a problem or in some instances it takes longer.
Mr. Grégoire: I will not discuss specific cases in public for sure.
Senator Meighen: I did not give you a specific case, so it would be hard for you to discuss it, right?
Mr. Grégoire: Yes.
Senator Meighen: Why do you say that? I did not give you any specifics?
Mr. Grégoire: If there is a red flag it will take much longer.
Senator Meighen: I understand that.
If I were to apply for a pass today, would I be under the Restricted Area Pass card system or under the new Restricted Area Identification Card which comes into effect December 31?
Mr. Grégoire: It depends on the airport. Some already have the new system in place and functioning; others have not completed the installation of the electronic door access. With respect to the background check of Transport Canada, it does not change anything, whether you apply now or in the future, but at some airports you may be given the old pass and asked to renew your old pass immediately. If you go to Pearson airport, for instance, it is doing the enrolment now with a number of enrolment stations.
Can the new pass be used? As soon as the new pass is issued, the old pass is cancelled?
Mr. Barrette: That is correct.
[Translation]
Senator Meighen: The old card will automatically be cancelled then. There is no timed delay. Correct?
[English]
Mr. Barrette: It is in with the new one and out with the old one, and that is recuperated by the airport authority.
Mr. Grégoire: The new one may not activate the doors yet at some airports.
Senator Meighen: ``Yet'' meaning today or ``yet'' meaning December 31.
Mr. Grégoire: ``Yet'' meaning today.
Senator Meighen: But it will activate the doors December 31.
Mr. Grégoire: That is the plan.
The Chairman: On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank both of you very much for appearing before us. We look forward to having you back again. I anticipate we will be asking you to come back in the coming months. This is an ongoing matter of interest to the committee and it is a subject that we intend to pursue further.
Senators, our next panel of witnesses are representatives of the RCMP. We have before us today Assistant Commissioner Raf Souccar, who is responsible for Federal and International Operations of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The subject of our hearings today relates principally to Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, commonly known as IBETs.
Assistant Commissioner Souccar joined the RCMP in 1977 and began his career in drug enforcement. He was promoted to his current rank in 2005 and was given responsibility for the RCMP's Federal and International Operations. In this capacity, he is responsible for financial crime, border integrity, drugs and organized crime and international policing programs, as well as federal strategic services.
Mr. Souccar is accompanied by Superintendent Joe Oliver, Director of Customs and Excise with the RCMP.
Welcome to you both.
Raf Souccar, Assistant Commissioner, Federal and International Operations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Mr. Chairman and senators, I am pleased to be here before you today, along with my colleague Joe Oliver.
The strategic priorities for the RCMP's Federal and International Operations Directorate, or FIO, include effective support of international operations, reducing the threat and impact of organized crime, and effectively delivering our federal programs.
Border integrity falls under federal international operations and encompasses branches with expertise in investigating cross-border criminality and identifying threats to Canada's national security along the shared land border and at major air and marine points.
The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams — or IBETs, as I will refer to them — are an important component of the border integrity strategy and, in my view, are a best practice in border security management for the 21st century.
Following September 11, and as a result of the Smart Border Declaration and action plans, 15 IBET regions were created with teams in 23 different locations along the shared border of Canada and the United States. There are five participating IBET core agencies: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada Border Services Agency, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement, and the U.S. Coast Guard.
The IBET concept is based on intelligence-led policing, coordinated information sharing, and identifying, investigating and interdicting persons and organizations that pose a threat to national security or that are engaged in other organized crime activity. This model also emphasizes a harmonized approach to targeting cross-border criminal activity, not only east to west but also north to south.
I would like to spend a few minutes explaining why the IBET model is crucial to border security, and I would also like to talk about its benefits.
Law enforcement today is faced with a multitude of complex challenges: globalization, innovative criminal organizations, rapidly advancing technology and a threat of terrorism, to name a few. We have seen on a number of occasions the innovation and flexibility of criminal organizations rapidly responding to enhanced enforcement by displacement, building tunnels or even smuggling.
In my opinion, the Canada-U.S. border is quite unique. Among the challenges we face is how best to increase security without impeding the legitimate movement of people and commerce. The border is much more than a line in the sand; it is a continuum.
Several years ago, the RCMP patrolled specific parts the country but, over time, our experience showed that criminal organizations knew exactly how to get around those patrols and their effectiveness became questionable. The situation remains today, as evidenced by the increase in home-grown terrorism. A border patrol would not have prevented their crossing and would not have made the links that intelligence-led policing was able to accomplish, which led to their arrest.
I am not suggesting that we do not need tight border controls, but I do believe the best way to protect our citizens and target the real threat is through a balanced approach. By a balanced or multi-faceted approach, I mean that in addition to border enforcers, we need law enforcements agencies on both sides of the border, partnering and working closely together on the same goals — disrupting criminal activity and working smarter instead of harder.
IBET brings to bear the resources and authorities of a bi-national multi-disciplinary team with a full range of police, customs, immigration and regulatory powers to support public safety and national security. It does this through an intelligence-led method of operation. The IBET initiative goes beyond physical barriers by sharing information with law enforcement partners who have an interest in border security, by leveraging domestic resources and assets with other domestic and international partners to accomplish the overall objective, by using economies of scale to divide the costs and multiply the benefits, and by developing shared priorities and long-term plans so that our resources can be committed to achieving common goals.
Although front line law enforcement officers have worked together on joint operations and cooperated for decades, there was no formal ongoing structure as exists in the IBET and is endorsed by both Canada and the United States. The core IBET agencies are dedicated to building strong relationships, sharing information and best practices, as well as conducting joint threat assessments. In my view, they have opened up the lines of communication between the law enforcement agencies of our two countries. This close cooperation has come about as a result of monthly meetings held with local IBET representatives, from the five core agencies, to resolve issues, share information and best practices and prioritize investigations that have come to light through intelligence analysis.
At the national level, senior representatives meet quarterly as a steering committee known as the International Joint Management Team. Given that organized crime is not static at the border, conspiracies occur inland and between major Canadian and U.S. cities. Effective border enforcement requires dialogue and coordination with inland enforcement teams, which takes place through the IBET Joint Management Teams, or JMTs.
Another very important component of the IBET model involves the co-location of intelligence resources in the field to facilitate the exchange of law enforcement information on criminal activities observed or interdicted at the shared border. These co-located intelligence teams jointly develop intelligence that sets the stage for a focused enforcement effort on the criminal organizations, taking advantage of the gaps in security of the border between the points of entry.
The IBET program has also created a National Coordination Team composed of representatives from the five core agencies, co-located in Ottawa. These dedicated resources work in the same office to expedite processes, develop joint directions and ensure policy development is not done in a vacuum.
Since their inception, IBET units have identified national security cases, disrupted smuggling rings, confiscated drugs, weapons, tobacco, and intercepted criminal networks attempting to smuggle illegal migrants. A number of long- term investigations have come to fruition in 2006. For example, Project Frozen Timber was a major, two-year project between British Columbia and Washington State where IBET targeted a network of smuggling organizations that were using aircraft to ferry tons of drugs across the border, including marijuana to the U.S. and cocaine to Canada. That investigation involved every Canadian and American agency operating in that area, working together under the umbrella of IBET. It should be made clear that IBETs do not work alone but work closely with local and provincial law enforcement agencies, as required in any given investigation.
In closing, I would like to make the following points. The IBET initiative has been internationally recognized as a best practice because it is consistent with government-wide and RCMP departmental priorities, while continuing to serve the public interest. In fact, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, under the Department of Homeland Security, is leading a new southern border initiative called Border Enforcement Security Team, or BEST, which is modelled after the IBET initiative.
Over the past several years, the Government of Canada has iterated its commitment to ensuring the safety and security of Canadians and to working with the United States to protect the safety and integrity of our shared border. This commitment has been declared in successive Speeches from the Throne and in international policy statements.
The IBET initiative has made remarkable progress in strengthening our bi-national relationships and partnerships. We have seen significant improvements in our ability to share information, coordinate investigations and enforce the law in support of our shared mandate to enhance border security.
The IBET partners are all keenly aware that we must improve on this foundation to ensure the sustainability of this important bilateral initiative. We continue to examine opportunities, such as advancing and investing in interoperable border technology; increasing the number of IBET partners and resources on both sides of the line to improve border integrity; and increasing law enforcement resources in Canada's North to exert Canadian sovereignty and respond to increasing international travel.
I thank the committee for allowing me to make these opening comments. My colleague and I will be pleased to answer questions.
Senator Atkins: Mr. Souccar, you have a major responsibility in your work and the description of what you do is most impressive. What is the difference between an IBET group and a SWAT team?
Mr. Souccar: A SWAT team is referred to as an emergency response team in the RCMP. They are called into action in high risk situations that require a tactical unit that has the proper skill sets to deal with that risk level, using specific weaponry and training, et cetera. An IBET is an integrated unit whose focus is the border. It is critical that an IBET maintain that focus on the border and not chase rabbits, if you will. Although they interact with inland teams, their focus remains the border. They work jointly at all times with the five core agencies, which I referred to in my opening comments, to identify threats and to react accordingly by getting ahead of the curve as opposed to behind it. To that extent go my comments about working smarter instead of harder.
Senator Atkins: An IBET unit performs an investigative role primarily.
Mr. Souccar: Yes, that is correct.
Senator Atkins: Where are the IBETs physically located?
Mr. Souccar: We have 23 IBETs in 15 regions across the country with a total of approximately 147 full-time employees.
Senator Atkins: How does an IBET unit differ from local RCMP detachments?
Mr. Souccar: Again, the difference between an IBET team and an inland team at a local detachment is this: For example, a criminal organization exploits the border, either through importing or exporting drugs, smuggling human beings or weapons, whatever it may be. The criminal organization does not operate at the border as such; it operates inland. They utilize facilitators at the border as a means to an end. An IBET team would then focus on the border, while the inland team would focus on the organization itself, through either Part IV, wiretap investigation, the undercover technique, use of human sources, to try to disrupt the criminal organization inland. IBET would focus on the border as a way of interdicting shipments or people being smuggled, as well as working jointly with our U.S. partners who are part of that same team in order to be as effective as possible in dismantling the criminal organization and its facilitating network.
Superintendent Joe Oliver, Director, Customs & Excise, RCMP: Recently, we conducted a joint operation with 26 agencies in British Columbia called Operation Outlook. IBET is the hub through which communication and dialogue takes place. In that operation, the IBET team was under the umbrella of IBET. The local detachment was involved in this joint cross-border operation by strategically deploying roadblocks to help with the displacement and movement of criminal activity. It was a comprehensive IBET operation bringing together all of the partners, including other RCMP entities such as highway patrol, and leveraging those. IBET is the entity through which dialogue takes place, priorities are set and joint action is taken.
Senator Atkins: How many people are involved in IBET at the moment?
Mr. Souccar: Currently, with the 23 teams that we have, there are a total of 147 full-time employees, which includes analysts, civilian members, as well as police officers.
Senator Atkins: Let us take a hypothetical consideration. If you had another 1,000 members of IBET, how would you deploy them?
Mr. Souccar: If we had another 1,000 members, I take it you are asking how would we deploy them to secure our borders? Are you referring simply to land or are you referring to all of our borders: land, marine and air?
Senator Atkins: I am referring to all of the borders.
Mr. Souccar: Another 1,000 members would be a good start. We would enhance the number of IBET teams. One hundred and forty-seven is very thin, as you can imagine, given the length of our border. IBET teams would be strategically located across the country to fill in the gaps that we have. The numbers per team would increase to allow for a greater period of coverage, so we would go from an 8- or 12-hour shift to perhaps 20- to 24-hour coverage. We would possibly also include a uniform presence on land.
When I speak about a uniform presence, I am not a big supporter of the border patrol concept of having marked cars and uniformed people burning gas back and forth across the border for perhaps little purpose. I am referring more to a uniform presence to show the police presence there, but an intelligence-led presence to the extent that officers would be patrolling where required to perhaps squeeze criminality to where we want it to go, where IBETs are located. Border patrol would be one purpose of the uniform presence.
Second, there would be an outreach component, where officers would educate and create awareness among our citizens along the border to recognize criminality as it travels back and forth across the border. We would perhaps have a uniform police presence attend the border points of entry on a rotational basis. Again, I am not in favour of static guard duty because that only leads to trouble in the long run. We would have members of IBET or members of the uniformed unit present at the border on a rotational basis to deal with people who crash through the border, to be able to pursue them. That, in and of itself, probably requires infrastructure changes to deal with these border crashers, such as the maze barriers that are put in place.
The Chairman: Commissioner, when you refer to something like a maze barrier, there are many people watching us on television who have never heard of that. Could you describe it, please?
Mr. Souccar: They are concrete blocks that would be put past the border, just as one goes through the gate. It is like an obstacle course, if you will, which changes all the time. If someone wants to practise in order to get through the maze or be ready for it, tomorrow it may not be the same maze.
Senator Atkins: Why are maze barriers not used at Fort Erie or St. Stephen?
Senator Meighen: More importantly, why do they not use what companies who rent cars use? I am referring to the spikes that come up if you are going the wrong way. If spikes were in the road, they could be raised up when required.
Mr. Souccar: Those are all infrastructure options that are available, as well as added police presence on a rotational basis.
In addition to people, of course, technological support is required, including increased sensors and air support for interdiction. We are not strong enough in that area on this side of the border. We do not have available the air assets.
The Chairman: Could you be more specific? How many aircraft do you have available to you?
Mr. Souccar: Three helicopters are dedicated to the IBETs.
The Chairman: Over how many kilometres?
Mr. Souccar: Over the length of our border.
The Chairman: Could each team utilize a helicopter profitably?
Mr. Souccar: Depending on the distance between IBETs, potentially, yes.
The Chairman: When you say ``potentially,'' it sounds like it is not something you are studying or actively pursuing.
Senator Moore: In a perfect world?
Mr. Souccar: In a perfect world, yes, we would have the air assets and the technology available right now. We would have people monitoring the sensors, with the ability to deploy someone immediately once a sensor goes off.
The Chairman: What are we missing without those assets?
Mr. Souccar: Without those assets, regardless of how intelligence-led we are, gaps are created. With those gaps, we do not know what we do not know, in that we do not know what is getting through. We know that most interdictions are done at the ports of entry, but perhaps more is coming through between the ports of entry than we are aware of.
The Chairman: Is it hard for people to figure out where those gaps are?
Mr. Souccar: No, I do not think it is difficult to figure out where the gaps are. We move our teams around as much as we possibly can to anticipate the movement of criminality.
For example, if you secure the land and they dig underneath, now you have awe tunnel. As you know, we have one between British Columbia and Washington State. If you secure the ground, they may come by air. Criminality is always adapting and going to where we are not. Those are the gaps I am talking about that we need to seal in order to be able to be more effective.
Another important thing is resources. You talked about an addition of 1,000 members. It is important to ensure that we have a seamless integration with our marine units, our airports and our marine ports so that if we beef up an area with security and it squeezes criminality elsewhere, we better be ready to deal with the displacement that occurs. Hence, if we tighten up land and they go marine or come through the ports or the airports, we need to be there in order to deal with the displacement we have created.
The Chairman: Describe ``seamless'' to us. Is it a question of interoperability of radios? Is it a question of them not being aware of plans you have going forward? What causes you not to be seamless?
Mr. Souccar: There are a couple of things. For example, if you were to create a new agency to deal with the border patrol, that may cause a bit of fragmentation or duplication. It may create the desire to have quick successes. It may create territorialism, something that I see on the U.S. side with duplicated mandates between border patrol, immigration and customs enforcement, the DEA. These agencies often step on each other because they have separate mandates but they overlap. Some times they do not talk to each other.
The Chairman: No one is suggesting a new agency here, except for the customs.
Mr. Souccar: Those are things that have cropped up in the past. I am simply providing you one way where seamlessness would not happen. You asked me how seamlessness would occur. It would occur if you had one agency able to set priorities and go with that priority as one, as opposed to having two or three different organizations setting different priorities.
The Chairman: I am sorry; perhaps I was not clear. You seem to be describing to the committee how the principal function of IBET was coordinating a number of difference organizations so they were all reading from the same page, generally speaking. You then talked about how, in a perfect world, you would try to have a more seamless operation with the different aspects of the RCMP. I was asking you to describe where it was not seamless or how you would improve that to ensure better coordination and interoperability.
Mr. Souccar: One of the ways that we can certainly increase that seamlessness within the current IBETs and the five core agencies that exist would be something you mentioned earlier, which is radio interoperability. That is essential in order to have communication between all the agencies — Canada and U.S. especially.
We also have the cross-border carriage of firearms.
The Chairman: Let us stick with one issue at a time. Tell the committee about the problem with radios. Are you talking on the telephone or giving hands signals or what?
Mr. Souccar: Communication via radio; that is, to be able to communicate back and forth, working on different radio systems.
Senator Moore: You are talking about IBET teams.
The Chairman: Members of the team can not talk one to another.
Mr. Souccar: We have a pilot project in Windsor. A working group called the Cross-Border Crime Forum is working on being able to put in place a radio interoperability system that can work across the country.
The Chairman: What will it take? Do you have to clear out frequencies? What problems do you have to work out so that you can simply talk to each other?
Mr. Oliver: To clarify, the IBET concept leverages existing resources. It may not be someone who is necessarily part of the IBET team, but it may be that we are leveraging the 150 border patrol agents in one sector. Although they have only one to two people dedicated to IBET, we are leveraging all of their resources. To be as comprehensive and responsive as possible would mean that everyone would be able to communicate with each other, whether core members of IBET or affiliated members. In day-to-day operations, we have recognized that public safety and officer safety is put at risk when we cannot talk to each other.
Currently, there are about four or five different ``work-abouts.'' In some cases, when there are surplus portable radios, we pass those over to our partners on the U.S. side during a joint operation so that we can talk on one radio. However, that creates a problem where they are sometimes carrying two radios.
In other situations, we have employed an interim solution, namely, the AC-1000. We plug in radios from each of the agencies. If we have five secure radios and one open radio, it all goes to lowest common denominator so that we lose our encrypted status. That is one of the challenges.
Ultimately, we are trying to get to a ``trunked'' radio system with talk channels using digital technology so we are able to talk securely and rapidly to each other. A number of projects are under way. We had a project in Windsor- Detroit that was being led by the RCMP with the support of our U.S. partners. We ran into a number of technical issues with that project. Although a number of lessons were learned, we had to prematurely terminate that project due to officer safety concerns.
Under the Cross-Border Crime Forum, we are working with PSEPC on a number of strategies to enhance that radio interoperability across the border. In some cases, we are dealing with technology that is decades old and with new digital technology. We are dealing in situations where on the Canadian side there is one level of frequencies for law enforcement, and on the U.S. side there is a separate level of frequencies. It is a complex, regulated area that will require significant dialogue, not only internally in Canada but Canada-U.S. as well.
The Chairman: When do you get to the end of the tunnel?
Mr. Oliver: I think it will require a huge investment because it will require significant infrastructure changes. Hopefully, we will be able to work through it piece by piece.
The Chairman: When we go to Washington, which we do on a regular basis, our friends raise this as issue number one. Every time we go to Washington, the issue that is occupies most of the committee's time is border security — how safe the border is and all of the dire consequences that will occur if the border is not safe. What type of investment are we talking about? We are looking at the Americans building a virtual fence and contracting it out to Boeing. What kind of investment, just on the communications side, is required so that we can talk back and forth? It would be very useful for this committee to have an understanding of the investments both countries will have to make if we are to have a cooperative system that leverages the resources that exist on both sides of the border.
Mr. Oliver: We are attempting to leverage the infrastructure that does exist. With respect to radio communications, that infrastructure can also be used for sensing technology. It is piggybacking on the existing infrastructure. Whether it is a sensor, a hit that is communicated, or voice communications or data, we can build on the same infrastructure.
How much will it cost? I am not sure that a comprehensive study has been done because it also includes the needs for interoperability not only north and south but also east and west. It could be a very complex project. We are trying to engage our U.S. partners in the Department of Homeland Security through the Secure Border Initiative.
The Chairman: For more than a year now we have been asking the RCMP for manpower estimates just for the Great Lakes, and they have not been coming forward. When you say you that have a problem with communications and with radios, is no one doing a study that outlines how much it is likely to cost and what it will take so that you can, in fact, communicate?
This committee spoke to your predecessors two and three years ago about the problems of interoperability. People indicated that the way they were communicating was by telephone. It sounds as though you are still communicating by telephone.
How do we as a committee find out how much the different components of a process to secure the borders will cost? Not only could we be helpful, but we would like to have a constructive dialogue with our colleagues in Congress and say, ``Look, here is your share.'' Maybe it is 10 times ours, I do not know, but it may be a 50/50 split. However, we find it difficult to have this type of conversation when we are not getting information back with respect to your needs.
You have described a problem to us, and I think everyone on the committee understands the problem. You do not have to give us a number today.
Perhaps I should direct this question to the assistant commissioner: We would like a commitment to get that number. We would like to know what it takes so you can have these communications. We will not wait a year to invite you back. We will invite you back sooner, and at that time we will be asking you about helicopters, boats, ships, trains and so on. However, if we cannot get our minds around the cost of radio interoperability and the benefits derived from it so that we can have an understanding of where the gaps and vulnerabilities are, it is very hard to make a case for it. Intuitively, I think the committee feels there is a case for it, but we are not getting the ammunition and the arguments to put the case.
Mr. Souccar: Your question is timely. First, I do not have the figures you are requesting. I am not sure if they exist, but the working group responsible for radio interoperability is meeting at the Cross-Border Crime Forum in November, I believe.
I will undertake after this meeting to ensure this is a question that is put to them. If the numbers exist, I will report them to you. If they do not, then I will task them to ensure that is done.
The Chairman: Thank you.
Senator Moore: You mentioned the Department of Homeland Security and the tender to Boeing Corporation with regard to a virtual fence. Is that something you would discuss with your counterparts in the U.S. with regard to our participation?
The percentage of sharing is something that can be worked out. If they will do it, there is no sense in us doing it. It is a common border. Why do we not participate together? It would make good business sense and show the coordination and cooperation between both countries. The information is needed by the authorities on each side of the border. Do you intend to have that discussion?
Mr. Oliver: There are benefits to having the national coordination team in Ottawa. We have two representatives from the Office of Border Patrol co-located with us. I had a conversation with them today after the announcement. They are looking at bringing someone to Ottawa to brief senior government officials on where they are planning to go and to create a dialogue with Canada on SBI-Net.
Obviously, that is something in consideration. We have been and are currently doing that today. We already have interoperable sensor technology in Eastern Canada and in Quebec. We have tapped in with RCMP sensors and U.S. Border Patrol sensors. The sensors are tapped into their system as well as ours, so we get a common picture.
Senator Moore: You are sharing information and producing a common picture?
Mr. Oliver: Yes, from sensing technology. Therefore, we are already leveraging existing technology to the extent possible.
Senator Moore: The culture of cooperating and sharing in this type of technology for the common good of law enforcement is there. I hope you bring it up at your meeting and push for it.
Maybe you should let the chairman know in your letter to him about what the estimates of the cost of this would be. Again, if we do not have this data to use in discussions and offer recommendations, we are flying on our own here. You have to give us hard numbers and the benefits.
Senator Atkins: How many ports of entry do you estimate are unmanned in this country?
Mr. Oliver: The methods of crossing between ports of entry are virtually limitless. We have seen displacement from smuggling through ports of entry to between ports of entry, to tunnelling, to air smuggling.
The Chairman: It depends on how you define it. I think Senator Atkins was talking about airports, for example, that do not have customs people there; yet, people will land, use a phone and report into customs remotely.
Mr. Souccar: There are ports of entry that close after a certain time of day.
Senator Atkins: Second, in what areas of the country are there more apt to be violations that challenge IBET?
Mr. Oliver: Most of the criminality we are experiencing occurs in areas with a large population base. There is a significant amount of traffic in Central Canada. We are also seeing that in the Lower Mainland of British Columbia.
As soon as we enhance our enforcement capacity there, we have recently seen displacement such that the criminality has moved into the Prairies. We enhanced our enforcement posture as a result of the recent air smuggling case, and we have received intelligence of displacement.
Senator Atkins: If you had a priority list, what would be the key components you require to manage your job in IBET? You have mentioned three components. That hardly seems enough for a border as long as ours. What other instruments are required that you do not have now?
Mr. Souccar: In terms of the land component, again, we need increased IBET units strategically located, increased technology and air support, a uniformed presence for outreach and visibility and having that presence also at the ports of entry themselves.
Of course, our Marine Security Enforcement Teams would require enhancement. Our marine ports would require what we refer to as National Port Enforcement Teams. These are covert units that work within the ports to detect criminality. Airports require the same thing. These units would work on identifying the facilitators who work within these areas, be it marine ports or airports, and who facilitate the smuggling for those criminal organizations residing in the larger centres.
Senator Atkins: Does IBET have a training centre? What is your program for training people who serve in your division?
Mr. Souccar: There is a multi-level training component for the IBETs, and I will let Mr. Oliver expand on them. We have level 1 and level 2 training of the IBETs for people just entering into them. The training is meant to ensure that they understand cross-border criminality and what is involved in it, the various laws they will be enforcing, their interaction with the core agencies, the need to leverage their resources by hooking into the inland teams and to know their focus is the border and not inland.
Senator Atkins: If I were a recruit who had graduated from Regina, could I be assigned to IBET?
Mr. Souccar: No, you could not. As you come out of Regina, you would be posted to one of our contract provinces, which would not include Ontario or Quebec, where you would begin by working general duty to learn how to become a police officer first. Three to five years after learning how to become a police officer, then you get the opportunity to move to a team like an IBET or drug squad or national security enforcement team and so on.
Mr. Oliver: The IBET training we are offering is in addition to what the core agencies offer in their training programs. Phase 1 was essentially an orientation package for people coming to IBETs from all the agencies. They would be supposed to the orientation package. Phase 2 involved scenario-based problem solving. Partners from all the agencies would sit around the table and would undergo scenario-based training on how to manage certain operations.
We are currently undertaking a needs analysis for additional training requirements for the IBETS. We are going out to all partners — not just the RCMP, but also CBSA, U.S. Customs, U.S. Border Patrol and U.S. Coast Guard — asking what they view as the needs for our IBET partners and what they need. Do they need surveillance training or other types of training? We have also had IBET personnel sit on the RCMP's national security enforcement course. In some areas, such as the West Coast, IBET developed a law enforcement mountain operations course given the terrain in which they operate. We do not want officers to be put at risk by being abandoned or left out in harsh conditions, so there is that training as well.
Senator Moore: If there is an incident at a border crossing with a manned border station, who responds? Is it the regular RCMP or is it IBET? How does that work? What is the protocol with respect to the chain of communicating between the border personnel, the nearest detachment of the RCMP or the nearest IBET team?
Mr. Souccar: Typically the first response to a call from the point of entry would be the police force of jurisdiction.
Senator Moore: Could it be a municipal? Could it be yourselves if you are contracted to look after that area?
Mr. Souccar: That is correct, that is what it would be. In some instances IBET would respond, but typically it would be the police force of jurisdiction. They have their marked cars and are usually the closest to be able to respond.
Senator Moore: Is there an ongoing communication? For example, in a regular workday, does the IBET team talk to the nearest RCMP or the border personnel, or is it only in the event of an incident that you talk to each other?
Mr. Souccar: Communications with the points of entry are very much encouraged.
Senator Moore: ``Encouraged'' is nice, but does it happen?
Mr. Souccar: Absolutely, it does happen, and it is encouraged to happen as often as possible. As you know, CBSA is part of the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams and the personnel at the points of entry are CBSA personnel, so to that extent there is that interagency coordination.
Senator Moore: They are familiar with it and they know the back up, the support and the need for communicating.
Mr. Souccar: Absolutely. It is important for the personnel at the point of entry to understand what the IBETs do and the benefit that the IBETs can extend to them.
Senator Moore: When you hold the different problem-solving workshops, do you go across the border and ask how quickly you can respond to a situation at that border crossing? Do you analyze it and break it down in terms of how quickly you can get to a place, or decide that you cannot get there quickly enough and have to call upon the municipal force or the RCMP? Obviously, response time to a situation is critical. Is that examined, or do you wait until an event happens and then pick the force that is closest? Do you look at it in advance, figure it out and make it part of your overall operational strategy?
Mr. Souccar: We are conscious more than ever of the need to be able to respond quickly as a result of events over the last year. In fact, we have examined the average response time to attend a call at a point of entry in British Columbia.
Typically the police force of the jurisdiction in question nearest the point of entry will be called, be it the OPP or the Niagara Regional Police. It could be the RCMP. It also depends on other calls for service as they occur and what cars are free to attend.
When I was asked about the addition of 1,000 resources, one of the options is to have an armed police presence from the jurisdiction to immediately be on site at the point of entry.
Senator Meighen: Permanently?
Mr. Souccar: Yes, permanently, with a rotation so as not to have one person whose full-time job is to do that. If that person is a member of the IBET team, which is potentially the case, of course, because of their relationship, that could be solidified. If that person were to be on site, they would not have to stand at attention, watching every car that goes through, because that is the role of the Canada Border Services Agency. However, they could be there catching up on their IBET duties at the point of entry, present in uniform, with a marked car.
The Chairman: Are you saying that this would be for every port of entry? If so, by what date would that be?
Mr. Souccar: No, this is not something that we are putting into place. I was allowed to ``pipe dream'' a little bit.
The Chairman: We are back in the perfect world. I am sorry. I like the perfect world part. Stay there.
Senator Moore: Is that 24 hours a day?
Mr. Souccar: Absolutely.
Senator Moore: I think earlier you mentioned eight hours or something.
Mr. Souccar: We were not in the perfect world then.
Senator Moore: I forget what it was.
The Chairman: In the real world right now, do IBETs function eight hours a day?
Mr. Souccar: Again, it depends on their location and the size of their team; typically, there is one shift.
Senator Moore: The criminal element can squeeze you on that.
Mr. Souccar: Again, we do not set our shifts to our members. We set our shifts to the criminality.
Mr. Oliver: And the intelligence.
Mr. Souccar: Where we go and the shifts we work is based on our intelligence. We go to the hot spots at the times we feel are most critical for us to be there.
Mr. Oliver: That is so we can maintain our tactical advantage. We may not have enough personnel to cover the entire border, but we can assure you that they are out there and you may not know where they are, which keeps you on edge.
Senator Moore: Earlier, we were discussing things that we would really like to have, such as radio operability. Right now, is the CBSA staff able to communicate securely with IBET personnel, or is that something you would like to see as well?
Mr. Oliver: Full, secure communications is a challenge even within the RCMP, so to have secure communications will require investments, not only internally but also to be interoperable. One of the objectives is to ensure that we are interoperable with the CBSA.
Senator Moore: The timeliness of obtaining the best and most current information is critical in your line of work.
Mr. Oliver: One objective of the Windsor pilot project included interoperability with the CBSA. It was a $5.3 million project, but we ran into officer safety issues. The objective was that once we completed the pilot, it would set the stage for developing a long-term strategy. We would see what worked, what did not, what kind of investment we needed and what kind of interfaces we needed with the U.S. agencies.
A number of recommendations resulted from that project, but now we have to bring it to the next stage to see where we go from here.
The Chairman: Are those recommendations confidential for some reason?
Mr. Oliver: The report is being finalized and will be presented at the Cross-Border Crime Forum. It has not been approved yet. We are still drafting the report.
The Chairman: Once it is approved, can you make a copy available to the committee, please?
Mr. Oliver: I believe that will not be a problem, sir.
Senator Meighen: You referred to officer safety. What is new? I mean, you people are engaged in a dangerous occupation. You said that you ran into officer safety issues with respect to this $5.3 billion project with the CBSA. Can you be more specific, not necessarily about the type of danger, but why did that put an end to the project?
Mr. Oliver: New technology was being introduced and we had system failures. It was a small area being tested, plus the legacy system was also in use.
Senator Meighen: Was it a small area geographically?
Mr. Oliver: Yes, it was in the Windsor area. We were not yet interoperable with CBSA, but the project plan was to do that. However, we were in the process of conducting operations and there were critical failures of the system on a couple of occasions.
Senator Meighen: Did that endanger officers?
Mr. Oliver: Yes. We were doing surveillance and so forth. There were situations where our members on the ground had lost confidence in the system and wanted to go back to what they trusted and relied upon.
Senator Meighen: Without putting too fine a point on it, did $5.3 million go down the drain?
Mr. Oliver: Not necessarily, as we still have the infrastructure in place, and there is the possibility of adapting a new standard, which is P-25. The service provider has that capability as well. These are things we are working on currently. This was terminated during the summer, so we are still working through those kinks.
Senator Meighen: As you know, this committee has recommended — and whether there was any connection or not is up for anybody to guess — and the government, as I understand it, has indicated that it will proceed with the arming of the border guards in Canada. They have also indicated this will take place over a considerable period of time; I think 10 years was the time frame.
How do you see the RCMP's role in the meantime? As I am sure you are aware, if you read our report, one of the reasons we reluctantly came to the conclusion that border guards should be armed was because, no doubt due to your lack of resources, it was frequently impossible for the RCMP to respond in what was considered to be a timely manner to alerts at the border.
Since we will be dealing with a 10-year time frame, what policies will you be following between now and the point when border guards are armed?
Mr. Souccar: Arming the border guards will clearly enhance their own safety and security — not necessarily border security, but personal security.
In terms of how we manage our resources, until such time as the border guards are fully armed, and even when fully armed, unless their mandate changes, they will not be able to pursue border crashers inland.
Senator Meighen: If we had those cement blocks one of you talked about earlier, or if we had the spikes of the rent- a-car agencies that I talked about, would something like that not significantly cut down on the need to pursue? Perhaps there would be individuals on foot, but you would not have to pursue automobiles.
Mr. Souccar: It should, absolutely.
In terms of our role, we will continue to be called upon. The police of jurisdiction will continue to be called upon for any pursuits that have to be undertaken inland. The presence of a uniformed person full time at the point of entry with a marked car would, in the perfect world scenario, give you the instantaneous response, if you will.
Senator Meighen: We do not have the perfect world. I cannot see it. I doubt it will be upon us in our lifetime. We have to make do with the current situation and try to improvise.
I am wondering about the Great Lakes. You have limited resources there, do you not?
Mr. Souccar: They are limited, yes, but we have a presence in the Great Lakes.
The Chairman: It would be non-existent almost. If I took off my shoes, I could count the number, could I not?
Mr. Oliver: Our current capacity consists of two MSET patrols, the Marine Security Enforcement Team. As well, and this is where we talked about leveraging, when you have Integrated Border Enforcement Teams that can bring partners together and resources to bear, we try to leverage what we can by using the Coast Guard.
The Chairman: This committee calls the Great Lakes ``the great black hole.'' We do not see any resources on the St. Lawrence River, the St. Lawrence Seaway or the Great Lakes that are anywhere near commensurate to the problems that exist there. The count we had was something in the area of 28 or 30, was it not?
Senator Moore: Three vessels, 26 staff.
The Chairman: Are we correct in saying three vessels and 26 staff?
Mr. Oliver: Yes.
The Chairman: How many Great Lakes are there? ``Thin'' is not even the right word for it, is it?
Mr. Souccar: That is correct.
We are looking at emergency response teams as well to come on line. That is not enough, but it is a start. We are hoping that there is a will. The current government seems to be pro-enforcement in terms of reducing criminality. We have seen positive responses over the last while, and I am hopeful there will be responses in that area as well.
The Chairman: The responses we have seen over the last little while are 600 uniforms and 400 civilians.
Mr. Souccar: There are about 1,000 full-time employees for the federal program. We have seen some peacekeeping resources. We have seen some potential resources to combat human trafficking.
The Chairman: The 600 uniformed resources were backfilling existing vacancies; they fell under ``authority to hire'' as opposed to creating new positions.
Mr. Souccar: That is correct; it was to restore the integrity of policing as a result of added costs.
The Chairman: I do not want to take words out of Senator Meighen's mouth. He said it better than I can.
Senator Meighen: We are running hard to stay in exactly the same place.
Mr. Souccar: As with everything else, there has been an added cost in policing as a result of legal costs such as disclosure, cost of wiretaps, et cetera. Some costs are imposed as result of court decisions. Some are simply inflationary costs, if you will. The cost of putting a police officer on the street today is much higher than it was 10 years ago. Over the years, our resources have eroded. As the chairman said, it is a replenishing of the erosion that has taken place.
Senator Meighen: We are asked questions when we go to Washington, and we, as you do, I am sure, detect impressions they have about the strictness of our border enforcement or lack thereof. What do you come across mostly in cross-border exchanges with your counterparts that seem to impress our American friends with our diligence in patrolling the border? Do you find that they are quite convinced that the degree of diligence we have is minimal?
Senator Moore: That is aside from the political rhetoric.
Mr. Souccar: We have had some very successful operations with our U.S. colleagues.
Senator Meighen: Is that since 9/11?
Mr. Souccar: Yes. The number of extremely successful operations that we have had with them is endless. The work is being done and is being done very effectively. The question is, do we have enough to do more and if we had enough would we have more successes? The answer is, absolutely yes.
I have never been met with criticism personally. Clearly, when you see the numbers and the assets they have on their side versus ours, I am not sure what happens behind closed doors.
Senator Meighen: Let me ask you one final question in that general vein. Since I notice the U.S. Coast Guard is one of the IBET core agencies, were you aware of live firing exercises about to take place in the Great Lakes before I was when I read it in the paper?
Mr. Oliver: Just what I read in the paper as well.
Senator Meighen: Well, so much for the Rush-Bagot Treaty and the international exchange of information.
The Chairman: The Rush-Bagot Treaty refers to the number of pounds of cannonball you can fire at any given time.
Senator Meighen: It is still lead, Mr. Chair, and lead is bad for the environment.
Senator Banks: I want to revert to the radio question. You will have sensed a certain frustration on the part of members of this committee about how quickly things move, which is a great surprise to anyone who is a student of government. If this question of interoperability and secure, quick and reliable communications was one that affected General Motors or Inco, it would be solved in a trice. I suspect that the impediment is not entirely money. Where is the bottleneck?
We think that the fault is not sitting in this room; it is with a lack of will or determination. Is this file sitting on somebody's in-box on their desk and not getting out because of intransigence? What is the holdup? If there were a clear and present danger, to use that old phrase, this problem would be solved in an afternoon.
Mr. Oliver: I can tell you from the front line officers on the ground involved in cross-border operations this is one of the most pressing issues that they would like to see resolved.
Senator Banks: Why is it not being resolved?
Mr. Oliver: I think it is because of the dialogue that is required. For instance, in the Windsor-Detroit area, not only are you dealing with the need to talk with federal U.S. law enforcement agencies, but there are also the state and local police. We want an integrated, holistic comprehensive border response to instant management, or some sort of issue. We want to be able to talk to all our of partners who sit around the IBET table. It is the difference in the radio systems that each of those agencies use, the infrastructure itself, as well as the regulators on both sides of the borders and the need for a comprehensive Canada-U.S. agreement to say that we are committed to overcoming those barriers.
The Chairman: When we raised this question with you, you gave us the impression there was not even a study in place that described the magnitude of the problem and the potential cost of the problem. Remember when I was asking you what are the bucks involved in doing this? The impression we have right now — and I would be happy if you were to correct it — is that everyone has identified the problem, but no one is doing anything about it. If someone is doing something about it, Senator Banks and the committee are asking: What is the plan?
Mr. Oliver: In terms of knowing what infrastructure we require, how much it will cost, no, we do not have that plan. I am not aware of it anyway and I can certainly check.
The Chairman: Who is charged with it? This is your bailiwick, commissioner. Who is your guy or gal working on the plan?
Mr. Souccar: Again, Mr. Chairman, this matter was left with the Cross-Border Crime Forum working group that is reporting to the Cross-Border Crime Forum, and I will know the latest and greatest next month when they report. That is why I undertook to get back to you in terms of the latest developments. Also, I will inquire as to whether there has been a cost attached to it.
The Chairman: The reason we are nervous is that we asked over a year ago about how many police it would take to properly police the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence Seaway and the St. Lawrence River, and we are still waiting.
Mr. Souccar: You have asked me once and that is all you will have to ask me. I will undertake to get back to you with that answer.
Senator Moore: With regard to Senator Banks' question and Mr. Oliver's response concerning the frustration that you are expressing and experiencing with the inability to communicate via radio, when you have your meetings with your cross-border teams, is the same frustration expressed from the U.S. side?
Mr. Oliver: Yes.
Senator Moore: They want this fixed too, I would think, for their own good as well as your good.
Mr. Oliver: This issue is identified continuously by the local joint management teams of IBETs. It has also been identified as a common recurring problem by Project Northstar, which is feeding cross-border security.
Two groups are looking at radio interoperability. One is the interoperability subgroup of the Cross-Border Crime Forum, which is dealing with the Department of Homeland Security. The other is a border enforcement group composed of representatives of the international joint management team. I sit on that group as well. We are trying to find not only interim solutions but longer-term solutions.
Our focus had been on the Windsor-Detroit project, to evaluate it and take it forward. Now that it has terminated prematurely, we are now looking for a way to advance it to the next stage. I dialogue with my counterparts in the U.S. every day. This is an issue we want resolved, and we are looking for the best way to get it resolved.
Senator Moore: Like the virtual fence project, is the radio operability issue something we can sit down and say that the two teams on each side of the border should be working this out together and not each doing a separate project? Let's cooperate and move forward in economic and intelligence gathering ways. Is that the spirit of how your meetings go?
Mr. Oliver: Yes.
Senator Moore: Even though they did not tell you about the live firing on the Great Lakes? I know it was in their waters, but still, poison moves.
Mr. Oliver: We must also be mindful of the role state governments play. For instance, Michigan has implemented a public safety network. They are looking for others to be interoperable with them. We are trying to work with those agencies as well. This issue is very complex and requires a huge amount of coordination through all levels of government.
Senator Moore: The goal is common.
Mr. Oliver: The goal is common.
Senator Moore: They want to fix it as much as we do.
Supt. Oliver: We all want to talk to each other, yes.
Senator Banks: Here is the problem that I think we have: There are two places in which there can be a bottleneck to solving this problem. One is at the operational level where the agencies that are on the ground and dealing with this issue have to agree among themselves what they need to do. The second place would be when those people have to go back to their superiors who hold the purse strings and say here is what we need to do and how much it will cost, and those people say, ``We cannot do that.'' There are two places this could be messed up.
Do I understand that there is no impediment among the agencies involved and that plans are moving forward apace and as quickly as they could without impediment? Does someone need to come from some place up above on both sides of the border, bring down the hammer and say, ``Get this done, cut this spaghetti bowl of red tape and take care of this problem?''
The issue of border security is at the top of the minds on both sides of the border for very good reason. There is simply no logical reason that a solution cannot be moved forward quickly. I am trying to find out exactly where it is so we can apply some pressure where it is, and I do not think that it is with you.
Mr. Oliver: There is still a need for the law enforcement community to define user requirements.
I am referring to standard operating procedures. In some circumstances, we will want to have interoperable communications with all agencies in the U.S. Other times, they do not want to hear our local chat. We still have to work out those requirements in terms of when do we switch to a common talk group and when do we not; who is encrypted and who is not?
Radio interoperability as well as cross-border carriage of firearms will be two of the key issues highlighted at the upcoming Cross-Border Crime Forum for the Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, the Minister of Public Safety and the Minister of Justice. A couple of presentations will be highlighting and showing, operationally, the challenges that we need to collectively resolve. We do have it flagged in the security and prosperity partnership as one of the deliverables.
Mr. Souccar: There are a number of issues when you talk about impediments for border security. We have talked about radio interoperability. There is also the land pre-clearance issue. There is the cross-border carriage of firearms. There are geographical inhibiters. A few issues are sometimes stymied, if you will, by either legal impediments or sovereignty issues. The discussions to resolve them become difficult and slow. It is sometimes like going through mud. We all know it needs to be done, but just how much is each country willing to give and how do we deal with sovereignty issues? Sometimes we get stuck in a way such that we are not able to go forward to address something we know needs to be addressed quickly.
Senator Banks: I presume members of IBET train together and work together as a team. What happens to the side arms, for example, of American border patrol officers when it requires that that team move across the border to our side? Do they carry their guns, or do they put them in a box in a swamp someplace?
Mr. Oliver: The border is like a barrier to law enforcement and the carriage of firearms.
Senator Banks: Except for the bad guys.
Mr. Oliver: Exactly.
Mr. Souccar: We have had some joint projects, like in Windsor for this past Super Bowl where we participated in armed joint patrols. Exemptions are given for a specific period of time. We have dealt with police officers who have to attend their post but, in order to get from point A in the United States to their post, the shortest route is through Canada. We call those geographical inhibiters. We have put systems in place where they have to lock their side arm in the trunk of their vehicle in a lock box until they get to their post on the U.S. side, but to get there they have to go through Canada. We have dealt with some of these issues.
Some of the ones you have mentioned, Senator Banks, are issues that are still not resolved.
Senator Banks: Officers of the Canada Border Services Agency will become armed, and there will be 150 by 2007. It is not like all of a sudden, boom, they will all be armed; it will be an incremental process. I presume that some of the CBSA people on IBETs will be armed. Does that present problems under the nature of their contract, or do you know about that yet?
Let me come at that question differently.
The Chairman: We can put that to CBSA.
Senator Banks: We will.
When Senator Atkins asked you about the list of things that you would like to have in the perfect world, you mentioned an RCMP presence at every border crossing, enforcement by sight and the mere fact that your officers are there.
Our committee's view is that in respect of providing armed security at border crossings, it should first be done by the RCMP, but if the government could or would not do it, then we endorse the necessity of CBSA officers being armed. You are now saying that you have a plan in mind. Is there a blue-sky plan that there will be armed RCMP officers at every border crossing?
Mr. Souccar: When the issue of arming the border guards was on the table for discussion, we were asked to present options. If the border guards were not to be armed, what are the options on the table to deal with this issue of safety at the border?
One of the options within the RCMP, in addition to enhanced IBET teams and patrols, was a uniformed presence at points of entry. Static guard duties within the RCMP is not something we endorse. For this purpose, it was something we were willing to do as long as it was rotational and we did not have one police officer stuck at a point of entry on a regular basis, not able to enhance their development.
Senator Banks: A few weeks ago CBSA officers, having been informed that a suspected armed person was on their way to a border crossing in British Columbia, left their posts and shut the border down for several hours. They are entitled to do that, and I would do it too if I did not have a gun and had to face a potential treat.
Do IBETs have anything to do with security at border crossings? In that case, do you know whether CBSA or someone else called the RCMP and said, ``We have a guy with a gun heading toward the border from the United States?'' The reason I ask the question is because the border was closed for hours and there was a line-up for a long time. Was there a response? Was there a request for a response? If not, can you imagine why not?
Mr. Souccar: There usually is a request for response. I am not aware, in this instance, whether one was made, how quickly it was made or whether it was prior to them walking off. Our responsibility, senator, is between the points of entry and not at the point of entry. The point of entry is CBSA's responsibility.
Senator Banks: That is a very nice rule.
When you talk about shifts, most of us imagine that when police officers are in pursuit of someone, they probably do not pay too much attention to taking coffee breaks or going home because their shift is over. Are IBETs impeded in that respect at all by existing labour agreements either within the RCMP or the other agencies? Is there a literal concept that my eight hours are up and I am going home now; does that happen within IBET?
Mr. Souccar: It is no different than any other unit in the RCMP. They have a shift and work their shift. However, like all other units, if they are in the middle of an operation they continue working. They have shown a lot of flexibility, as I explained earlier, in working to their target as opposed to working their shift. They modify their shift and the hours they work based on the intelligence they have been provided.
Senator Moore: With regard to CBSA, someone mentioned they could not travel inland in pursuit. How far can they go? Is there a rule regarding a staked-out area 100 feet or 100 yards around the post? What is their jurisdiction?
Mr. Oliver: The CBSA has jurisdiction for enforcement of the Customs Act. The division of responsibility between the ports of entry is by ministerial directive. We are talking about the international boundary.
CBSA also has a mandate to investigate Customs Act infractions inland as well. A commercial entity could be involved in committing fraud under the Customs Act. They have a mandate to investigate those instances as well.
Senator Moore: I meant a pursuit situation at the border. I think Mr. Souccar said that you could not go inland. Can you go at all? How far can you go? Is it just the building he works in and that is it?
Mr. Souccar: It is based on what they enforce. Typically, it would be a Criminal Code offence of some sort, and that is where they lose jurisdiction in terms of their mandate.
Senator Moore: Then it goes to the local police unit or to IBET or to the RCMP.
Mr. Souccar: It would go to the police force that has the jurisdiction.
Senator Banks: Crashing a car through a border without stopping is a Criminal Code offence and therefore the police force of jurisdiction has to look after it. It is not a CBSA offence, not a customs offence?
Mr. Oliver: It is a customs violation. There is a failure to report inward, so CBSA would have jurisdiction. However, it becomes an issue such that the CBSA currently does not have pursuit-type patrol vehicles.
People who do run through the ports of entry and fail to report could still be issued penalties. CBSA investigates those types of infractions. It is an issue of capacity and the ability to interdict someone.
The Chairman: They are not trained or equipped; it is not part of their job. It is their offence.
Mr. Oliver: It is an offence under the Customs Act.
The Chairman: Correct, but they are not equipped or trained to prosecute an offender who has fled the site.
Mr. Oliver: That question is probably best directed to CBSA, but it becomes an issue of having the capacity to pursue vehicles. If someone is running, they may be running dangerously, which then could turn into a Criminal Code violation of dangerous driving. If someone crashes through a port of entry, and we know how busy they can be, there is a risk to public safety in terms of dangerous driving, which does become a criminal offence.
Senator Banks: Right now, absent the blue-sky plan of having RCMP officers at every border crossing, the fact is that when cars crash through the border without stopping, no one is after them. We heard recently that there were 350 in half a year; 350 people just drove cars through the border, whether out of ignorance or confusion. No one goes after them. I am not asking for a response. I am merely stating the nature of our concern.
The Chairman: Assistant Commissioner, it is clear by now that this is an issue of concern to the committee. Among the other things you have undertaken to do, could you provide us with a listing, in order of priority, of the tasks that you see in relation to enhancing border security with the programs that are currently in place and with the areas that need further enhancement? It is fair to say the committee would like to revisit this issue and focus our subsequent hearings a little more specifically. The logical way to do that would be to start with your priority list rather than with ours so we can get some sense of how each of the priorities is moving forward. We see this as a continuing concern that needs attention. We would very much like to get some sense of the agenda you are pursuing and to work through it over time. The committee will then form its conclusions about how to move forward.
Mr. Souccar: Done.
The Chairman: On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank you both very much for appearing today. We are grateful for the information you have provided. We value getting this sort of information. We look forward to both receiving the information and having you come back before us again to discuss these matters further.
Honourable senators, our next witness is Lieutenant-General Marc Dumais, who is a transport pilot by trade. He has had a long and distinguished career in various operational and staff positions within the air transport community. He is here today to help us gain a better understanding of Canada Command.
Most recently, Lieutenant-General Dumais was Commander of the Air Division in Winnipeg from 2002 until 2004. He was the Assistant Chief of Air Staff from 2004 to 2005, and Deputy Chief of Defence Staff from 2005 to 2006. He assumed the position of Commander of Canada Command in May 2006. General Dumais last appeared before the committee in June 2005 in his then role of Deputy Chief of Defence Staff.
Welcome back, general.
Lieutenant-General Marc J. Dumais, Commander, Canada Command, National Defence: Mr. Chairman, senators, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me this afternoon.
[Translation]
This is my first opportunity to appear before you since becoming the Commander of Canada Command on May 19, although I know that you met with my predecessor, Vice Admiral Forcier, shortly before his retirement, and that you have already visited my Headquarters and Command Centre.
I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the contribution of Vice-Admiral Forcier and the transition team responsible for standing up Canada Command. Many members of that team remain on the Canada Command staff. Under Vice Admiral Forcier's leadership, they did an excellent job establishing an organization that is at the heart of the CF transformation vision and the Canada First approach to defence and security.
[English]
As Commander of Canada Command, I am responsible for an integrated chain of command that views Canada as a single theatre of operations. We are mandated to defend Canada, to work bilaterally with the United States in the defence of the continent and to provide military support to civilian authorities in areas such as consequence management and humanitarian assistance. In other words, we are responsible for all domestic and continental military operations that fall outside of NORAD's binational mission.
As many of you are aware, prior to this job, I was Deputy Chief of Defence Staff in the previous Canadian Forces organizational structure, where I was responsible for all domestic and international contingency operations. Therefore, in my view, I have a unique perspective from having seen operations from within the strategic National Defence Headquarters and now as an operational commander in a transformed structure.
Given that the Canadian Forces have always responded well to all domestic contingencies — I would point to the Ice Storm and the Red River Floods as two of the most prominent of many examples — I would not wish to leave the impression that the previous structure was, in any way, broken. Instead, I would highlight that we have been enhanced with the creation of the new operational commands.
First and foremost, Canada Command is at the centre of a clear command and control chain for domestic and continental operations, flowing from the Chief of Defence Staff to myself and then to my regional joint task force commanders. Second, Canada Command has brought operational focus to military, domestic and continental issues, moving away from the corporate focus that sometimes dominated the domestic scene.
In my view, this approach ensures that the Canadian Forces are well positioned and ready to respond to events or issues that require military support. Indeed, our aim is to ensure that the Canadian Forces are effective, relevant and responsive in a domestic environment.
Critical to our mission are relationships with our civilian partners at the federal, provincial, territorial and municipal levels. These relationships exist both formally and informally and cut across areas of such as planning, exercising, operational coordination and information exchange. The enhanced daily situation awareness that comes from these relationships clearly proves the value-added of Canada Command.
In that regard, many of you have seen firsthand the issues tracked by my Joint Command Centre 24/7 and the information that is briefed to me every day by my staff. This information is gathered from our full network of contacts. It is passed to us from the regions by my joint task forces, at the national level by entities such as the Government of Canada Operations Centre and, continentally, through our connectivity to NORAD and U.S. Northern Command.
This connectivity has paid dividends already as we have tracked forest fire data, hurricane information and other important issues, looking for early indications of potential requests for military assistance. This situational awareness, in turn, contributes to timely decision-making and effective interdepartmental coordination.
[Translation]
However, I must stress here that for much of our work domestically we are in support of the lead civilian authorities, particularly Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada and the RCMP. It is my job to ensure that the Canadian Forces are well positioned to discuss issues with our counterparts and that we are ready to provide the appropriate military contribution to requests for assistance or to any coordinated Government of Canada response.
[English]
Canada Command's ability to deliver its mission is centered on four lines of operation or major thrusts: readiness, planning, operational execution and transformation. These lines form my operational vision for Canada Command, and I would like to describe each briefly.
[Translation]
In terms of readiness, I expect to continue to evolve and enhance Command and Control mechanisms, particularly through technology and the use of communications systems. We will also continue to work with our civilian partners and US Northern Command in training and exercising — critical components of readiness.
For planning, my staff is working with governments departments, but also bilaterally with U.S. Northern Command, to update the many domestic and bilateral plans.
We are also involved in planning for the military contribution to many significant national events in the coming years.
[English]
In the area of operational execution, Canada Command is responsible for the full spectrum of domestic operations, with the exception of those under NORAD. On a daily and ongoing basis, the Canadian Forces conduct operations such as search and rescue, sovereignty patrols, fisheries patrols, assistance to law enforcement and others operations. Specifically, I would highlight two significant operations that took place in the North this past summer.
In August, the Canadian Forces conducted two major sovereignty operations in Canada's Western and Eastern Arctic respectively: Operation Beaufort and Operation Lancaster. These operations were part of a broader initiative to increase the presence of the Canadian Forces and to expand military operations in the Arctic. While the main purpose was to assert Canadian sovereignty, they also served to enhance military capabilities in the North and to develop additional partnerships with other relevant government departments that participated in the operation. These were two of the largest operations conducted in the Arctic in recent history, with the navy, the army and the air force participating. We expect to build on their success in the coming years.
[Translation]
Finally, I will continue to focus on the transformation or evolution of Canada Command to ensure that we are in the best position to achieve our objectives and mission. In this regard, we will support force development work that is under way at the strategic level to look at future capability requirements.
[English]
In closing, the government has emphasized in its Canada-first defence approach the importance of both the home game and the away game to the defence and security of Canada. While the mission in Afghanistan is quite rightly the main operational focus of the Canadian Forces, the message that I would like to leave you with today is that Canada Command is focused 24/7 on issues related to the defence of Canada. Thus, while it is not always evident to the general public, I can assure you there is the equivalent of a significant line of operation underway on a 24/7 basis in Canada, including a dedicated command and control structure and through the execution of missions such as search and rescue and maritime air surveillance. Our mission encompasses thousands of Canadian Forces personnel across the country committed to its success.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak before the committee today. I will be pleased to respond to your questions.
Senator Meighen: You have answered one of my questions to a degree but I would like you to elaborate. Given your previous experience and without wishing you to say anything that would be contrary to the comments of the Chief of Defence Staff, why is this new structure so much better? You mentioned in your testimony that it is at the centre of a clear command and control chain.
The Chairman: The words were ``new and improved.''
Senator Meighen: Have you had enough experience to judge whether it is much better or more nimble? Where are you on the continuum to transform or evolve Canada Command to ensure that we are in the best position to achieve our objectives? Are you at 50 per cent, 80 per cent, 90 per cent?
LGen. Dumais: Thank you for the questions, which are very appropriate. I will begin with the middle question.
Ultimately, the value-added of Canada Command will be in the test of actual crises that we will face downstream. I always tell my staff that we will succeed because we must succeed in any operation that we undertake in the future in terms of dealing with a crisis that might arise.
Changes have occurred in the structure. The essence is that now we have formal command and control structures where there were none before. Before, the domestic structures were primarily focused on force generation. There were some residual routine operations done by the army, the air force and the navy through the environmental chiefs, but domestic operations were handled in that way. The Deputy Chief of Defence Staff waded in when we were talking about a crisis situation. Now, we have established a formal command and control chain from the Chief of Defence Staff through my position to the regional joint task forces. It is completely operationally focused. On a 24/7 basis, we have a direct downward chain of command and control, and we have a 24/7 feed of information from the bottom up about what is happening across the country. With that, we have enhanced our operational focus on domestic issues, and we have in place a clear chain for executing all domestic operations, including the routine ones that were previously done by the environmental chiefs. We have enhanced our situational awareness by having a better collective assessment of the domestic picture, more so than we had before by a long shot.
We had relationships with other government departments before, but now we can bring renewed vigour, energy and focus to those relationships. Concurrently with the stand-up of Northern Command, we are in a position to deal with them on an equitable basis command to command. I dare say that with significant operations outside the country, notably in Afghanistan, it is good to have a separate entity to look after the domestic situation — the home front, as I say. There are many reasons why this structure has operationally enhanced the focus on domestic situations. The proof will be in any major events that happen in the future.
[Translation]
Senator Meighen: What are Canada Command's current staff levels?
LGen. Dumais: We currently have a staff of 123 out of a possible 126 employees, which is not too bad.
The other part of your question concerned the status of the transformation process. That is a difficult question to answer. As Commander of Canada Command, now that this entity has been established, I see an opportunity for the Command to get involved in a wide range of areas and issues. However, additional resources would be needed in order for that to happen.
One area that comes to mind is maritime situational awareness. This is an entirely new area for Canada Command in that in the past, it fell under the full responsibility of the Commander, Maritime Command. This is a highly complex field, one in which Canada Command will have to become more heavily involved. Greater involvement will require additional human resources, for the North as well. Some of our resources are focused on the Artic and Canada's North, in particular the JTFC. However, I am convinced that Canada Command's profile must be further enhanced to include a northern focus.
In terms of transformation, several examples can be cited as to why Canada Command must evolve in such a way that it is better positioned to help us expand our knowledge of files and ultimately, carry out command operations in various contexts.
Senator Meighen: One of my colleagues asked for your views on protecting Canada's Arctic sovereignty. However, my question concerns local communities and the kind of liaison system you have in place.
You have appointed liaison officers to deal with first responders. How does this system work? Are these officers currently on duty? Are you satisfied with the system in place?
LGen. Dumais: These initiatives were launched in association with the Army prior to the Canada Command's establishment. We believe it is extremely important to establish a rapport of this nature, not only at the provincial and regional levels, but also, as the Minister pointed out, at the community and municipal levels.
This ongoing initiative will evolve over time. A significant proportion of the Reserve Force is working on this project and has the skills for the job. Again, these numbers are set to increase. In my view, more liaison officers are needed mainly at the provincial and regional levels.
The Army has already created domestic liaison officer positions at the provincial levels because in some regions — British Columbia, Quebec and Ontario, for example — Command is responsible for one province. Elsewhere, Commands are responsible for several provinces. For instance, in Western Canada, JTF West is responsible for the three Prairie provinces; in the East, JTF Atlantic is responsible for the four Atlantic provinces.
Structures are already in place, but we need to invest more resources to ensure vigorous liaison at the provincial level so that as soon as an incident occurs, we are informed and ready to respond, together with other federal agencies, and to provide an assessment at the federal level.
You have to understand that at the local, community and municipal levels, we are not the first responders. Agencies are in place to respond at the municipal level, whereas our role is to lend support and augment staff at the provincial and federal levels, where necessary.
[English]
Senator Meighen: I am not quite clear yet on the role of these liaison officers. Are they your men and women?
LGen. Dumais: They were established by the Chief of the Land Staff, so the handover has not yet occurred. I do not have control over all the land forces in Canada. I have control over the regional joint task force commanders and the domestic ops detachments that they have set up. As I said, we need to invest in those further because they are in various states of construction. The same holds true for the liaison teams at the community level. I have not had much exposure to them.
Senator Meighen: Do they exist?
LGen. Dumais: To be honest, I could not answer that question.
Senator Meighen: Do they exist just on paper?
LGen. Dumais: It is being done at the reserve level.
I know that there is liaison between various regiments and reserve units and their counterparts in towns and cities. To the extent that it has been formalized as part of the process, I have not had any visibility in that regard.
Senator Meighen: What if you or I wanted to know who is the liaison officer with Ontario?
LGen. Dumais: I can answer that quickly. With respect to Ontario, it is the Regional Joint Task Force Commander (Central), General Guy Thibault. He is the liaison officer for Canada Command in the province of Ontario.
The Chairman: I do not expect you to know the name, but is there someone who deals with Brockville?
LGen. Dumais: I could not answer that question with certainty.
The Chairman: It is not fair to expect you to respond, but could General Thibault answer with certainty?
LGen. Dumais: He would be able to find out if there is a reserve unit in that area and whether they have established a liaison.
The Chairman: Do the Brockville Rifles work for General Leslie or for you?
LGen. Dumais: They work for General Leslie, and that is what I was going to say. They are primarily part of the force generation piece right now. We are evolving the role of the reserves in a domestic response context, and that, as I said, is a work in progress. From my perspective, I am interested in having liaison officers — who report to me through the Canada Command chain of command — who are trained and who understand the issues of concern, how to resolve things locally and when it is time to raise the issues at the regional or national level.
The Chairman: Part of our remit, general, is as first responders. As we wander around the country, one of the questions we inevitably ask is: When was the last time you saw someone in uniform, and were they helpful?
Given the state of flux, is there a chart? Is there something that would lay out for us what the state of play is now and a timeline that would indicate how things will evolve? If we take the army as an example, I understand that at some point General Leslie will be responsible for force generation and equipment development, and you will be responsible for this theatre, as it were. Where is the situation at now?
LGen. Dumais: It is primarily still within Chief of the Land Staff in terms of evolving the roles for the reserves, and we are not directly involved. To date, I have not been engaged in discussions about establishing liaison officers at the community level from a Canada Command perspective.
The Chairman: That is part of the plan, is it not?
LGen. Dumais: Yes. However, as I said, I have not yet been engaged in such discussions. I am focused on the provincial level and ensuring that our regional joint task forces, which report to me, are resourced to be able to do their job and their liaison function.
The Chairman: Could you provide the committee with a schematic describing the state of play and the ultimate objective?
LGen. Dumais: If I were to produce a schematic, I would have to obtain it from the Chief of the Land Staff.
The Chairman: Will he also give you the ultimate objective?
LGen. Dumais: We seem to be focused on the community level right now. From Canada Command's perspective, we are all about providing the right resources, at the right place, at the right time. That does not necessarily mean having a chain of command where we respond to community-level issues in Canada Command. In most cases, we are supporting command to assist the federal government in responding to situations, and through the provincial government as well.
If a community has an issue, obviously we would want to be aware of it as soon as possible. We have enhanced situation awareness. Generally speaking, when something happens locally, we get wind of it quickly and monitor it. However, many processes occur between the time when a community has an issue or an event and us getting involved in serious planning.
First, the provincial EMO needs to become involved to assess whether the issue can be resolved provincially. If the issue cannot be resolved provincially, then normally they would engage Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada to get a national assessment.
We are monitoring these things on an ongoing basis. If an event occurs at a community level involving tripwires or some of the criteria we have established for engagement of Canada Command, then we get right on it and start discussing it at the federal level.
The Chairman: What I am having difficulty with, general, is that not too many years ago we conducted a review of each community in Canada with a population over 20,000, some 92 communities. The committee concluded that these communities had different needs, concerns, assets and problems.
In order to plan to be a third-level responder, if you will, you must understand the needs of first-level responders. If you do not contemplate that in anticipation of being of assistance, problems happen in a community at the end of the day.
While PSEPC and the provinces obviously have roles that are triggered before yours, if your command does not have a good feel for what the local problem will be, you may not be a third responder.
LGen. Dumais: One of our important responsibilities is to develop capabilities useful, from a military perspective, toward contributing to any security event, crisis or natural disaster in Canada. We are evolving capabilities such as an NBC company we have in Trenton. That could be brought to bear. Similar capabilities exist in the immediate response units in the land forces.
These kinds of capabilities need to be evolved to respond to domestic crises. However, I do not see it as my responsibility to identify every community shortfall and consequently advance a military requirement to address that shortfall at the local level. Many responsibilities between the community and Canada Command fall to other levels.
The Chairman: The differences between the problems that Sarnia and London will encounter are huge, even if they are only a few hundred miles apart. If your staff is not aware of the difference in the needs of the two communities —
LGen. Dumais: I would suggest that Emergency Measures Ontario needs to be aware of the differences between those communities.
The Chairman: Absolutely; they certainly do. However, if at some point you have not taken that into account in your planning, you will be doing a lot of catch-up.
LGen. Dumais: We have significant capabilities that we can bring to bear, as we have seen in past events domestically. They can be brought to bear fairly quickly. Saying we need to be in a position to address all the gaps of all the communities across Canada is a stretch that I have difficulty understanding.
The Chairman: I picked Sarnia as an example because it is a chemical city that has unique characteristics, and it might be similar to Edmonton. I chose London because it is essentially a commercial and university town with truly unusual characteristics.
Even if you indicated you have broken it down and are prepared to deal with and have the capability to respond to X number of classes of communities in different ways, I can see the logic. I am exaggerating a bit, but the message I am hearing is that the provinces will tell us what they need, when they need it and you will be there.
LGen. Dumais: We are working hand-in-glove with PSEPC to identify, over time, various gaps that need to be addressed at the federal level. This is a work in progress, as I have said. I imagine that PSEPC works with their EMO counterparts and with the communities. That is the kind of layered process it must be.
As the Chief of Defence Staff has said, the time between the first responder and our response can be measured in a very short timeline if it is a serious crisis. Rest assured that if something happens we will bring out all available resources to bear on the situation, as we have done in the past.
I see part of my job as helping define the requirements that Canada Command needs to propose within the Canadian Forces to invest and enhance our ability to respond to domestic situations. You can appreciate that this is a process whereby we should not intervene directly with the community and cut through all of the emergency agencies that have those responsibilities and mandates.
The Chairman: No one was suggesting that. We are suggesting that you should be aware of it.
LGen. Dumais: We are aware of it in a general sense, but you can appreciate that to be aware community by community would require a Canada Command that is more the size of NORTHCOM in terms of numbers of personnel.
Senator Meighen: What is your biggest challenge? If you could wave a magic wand, what problem would you like to solve?
LGen. Dumais: My biggest challenge is capacity. As Canada Command stands up, matures and becomes involved in more and more issues, we have come to realize that there are many areas in which we need to be involved.
As I said, the development of capabilities in the North and Maritime Domain Awareness are very complex areas in which we are becoming involved, and there are others that need personnel to complete those jobs.
Senator Meighen: Is that related to the size of your command and the size of the Canadian Forces generally?
LGen. Dumais: The size of our area of responsibility, which is Canada and the continent, is very large. The size of our headquarters is relatively modest. People are working very hard in dealing with multiple issues.
If we are to continue down this road of transformation and have Canada Command increasingly involved in these kinds of issues, then we will need to invest additional resources.
Senator Meighen: Either we must increase the size of the Canadian Forces or you have to steal from other commands.
LGen. Dumais: That is the challenge. It is a question of priorities, efforts and challenges that we face.
Senator Atkins: With respect to the line and staff organization, you have the Chief of Defence Staff, and down the line there is you. What other generals are at your level in the overall military structure?
LGen. Dumais: Do you mean at the operational level?
Senator Atkins: Yes.
LGen. Dumais: There have been several commands created, and one was stood up in February.
Senator Atkins: There is Canada Command. Is there a European Command?
LGen. Dumais: Exactly. There is the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, CEFCOM, headed by Lieutenant- General Gauthier. There is the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command.
Senator Atkins: Is that one domestic as well as overseas?
LGen. Dumais: That is correct.
There is Canadian Operational Support Command, CANOSCOM, which provides a headquarters structured to manage support and logistics, writ large, for domestic and international operations.
Senator Atkins: If we follow the line down, reporting to you are the regional joint task force commanders?
LGen. Dumais: That is correct.
Senator Atkins: Under your command, you have a limited number of human resources and you have to count on them.
LGen. Dumais: That is correct.
Senator Atkins: Do they head significant units?
LGen. Dumais: Yes. The regional joint task force commanders are what were the former area commanders and the two coastal commanders for the East and West Coast navies, double-hatted to do an operational function. We have invested additional personnel in their headquarters to beef them up and give them more capacity to assist us in the operational dimension of the job, in addition to their force generation responsibilities. It is our collective assessment that we need to invest in more so they can be involved in the operational piece more fully.
Senator Atkins: Where does the air force and the navy fit under those commanders?
LGen. Dumais: They are a parallel structure, if you will. We have two main pillars in the Canadian Forces: One is force generation and the other is force employment. I believe that both are critically important to the health and operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces.
The environmental chiefs — army, air force and navy — are responsible for generating the three environments. The commander of CEFCOM for the expeditionary forces and myself, on behalf of the domestic and continental side, are responsible for the employment of those forces on the various operations.
Senator Atkins: How does the chief of the land forces fit into that equation?
LGen. Dumais: He is one of the environmental chiefs responsible for generating land-based capabilities to support either domestic operations or operations outside the country.
Senator Atkins: Take me through how this new structure would work if you had a situation such as the flood in Manitoba.
LGen. Dumais: With flooding we can get some advance warning that the water is cresting upriver so that we can prepare, but the regional joint task force commander for that region would identify that a problem was developing and we would obviously be aware of that as well.
There are two scenarios. One is that the regional joint task force commander can likely provide the necessary assistance to the province with the resources within his region. With the other scenario, if more than that is required, then Canada Command would get involved, declare it a larger operation and bring resources to bear from anywhere across the country. They could be army, navy or air force and would likely be all three. I would go to the Chief of Defence Staff and request additional resources to carry out that operation.
Senator Atkins: Would the request come from the province?
LGen. Dumais: A formal request must be made, and usually it would go from the province to PSEPC. Once it has been assessed that the operation requires the assistance of the Canadian Forces, it would then come over to our minister.
Obviously, in the intervening time informal discussions and assessments are going on so that we are prepared. By the time the minister receives his request we have prepared options for consideration by the government.
If this is a very sudden crisis and time is short, the regional task force commander has command of all the resources in his region that he can use immediately if required.
Senator Atkins: Are you dependent on those units in the region?
LGen. Dumais: Yes, we are dependent on any units that are not involved in the deployment to Afghanistan or other operations outside the country.
Senator Atkins: You mentioned that you are in the advanced planning stage of significant national events in the coming years. Could you give us some examples? I think I know one — the Olympics.
LGen. Dumais: That is correct. Obviously, this is an effort that has engaged the Vancouver Olympic Committee at the local level, the Province of British Columbia, and many federal departments. We have been involved from the beginning, working primarily the security portion. That is our main contribution. We have been working with the RCMP, who have the lead for security for those Olympics, and we have been working with them defining the Canadian Forces' role in that important activity. That effort has been ongoing.
Senator Atkins: Are you satisfied you have the resources and the instruments to deal with a major event?
LGen. Dumais: I would say so. We have not fleshed out the full contribution of the Canadian Forces. However, we have been involved in previous Olympic efforts and they have gone well. We have unique capabilities we can bring to bear to assist with security, as well as some key logistical dimensions. We will be prepared to do that. There is no question about that.
Senator Atkins: Can you tell me of other significant events you are planning?
LGen. Dumais: There are several events in 2007. The NATO Military Committee, chaired by General Henault, is coming to Canada. This is an important event that we will be coordinating.
Senator Atkins: Where will that take place?
LGen. Dumais: It is supposed to take place in Victoria.
There are the Winter Games in Whitehorse in 2007 to which we will be contributing. The year 2008 it is a big year for Quebec, with the four hundredth anniversary, the papal visit and the Francophonie Summit.
As well, we are contributing to government departments that have the lead for these other events coming up on the horizon.
Senator Atkins: Recently, a Russian airplane flew over the Arctic. Did your organization have any involvement in that event?
LGen. Dumais: Are you referring to the NORAD event?
Senator Atkins: Yes.
LGen. Dumais: NORAD is outside the chain of Canada Command because it is a unique binational command and control structure. We are aware of what is going on but those resources do not come under our command.
The Chairman: That is an interesting comment, General Dumais, inasmuch as your counterpart in the United States is double-hatted; he deals with both of those. Is that correct?
LGen. Dumais: That is correct.
The Chairman: Is there a logic in there that I am missing?
LGen. Dumais: No. NORAD is a binational entity. It has its own structure. It is a unique command that is neither Canadian nor American but both, as I am sure you appreciate. The commander of NORAD reports to both the Secretary of Defence and the Chief of Defence Staff.
The Chairman: I understand that.
LGen. Dumais: NORTHCOM and Canada Command are uniquely national entities, so there is some value in separating the two.
The Chairman: I understand that as well. If an individual on the other side of the border has a similar command to yours and also has NORAD, yet you are on this side of the border and have just Canada Command, he connects with you and with Winnipeg; is that right?
LGen. Dumais: That is correct. Wearing his Canadian NORAD region hat, General Bouchard reports to Admiral Keating as commander of NORAD. In my position as Commander of Canada Command, I am the counterpart to Admiral Keating wearing his NORTHCOM hat.
Senator Moore: There is a story reported in today's Ottawa Citizen with regard to two high-tech radar installations in Newfoundland working for 10 years. I understand that Canada spent $39 million building those systems. They can monitor ships 370 kilometres off our coast. We set aside another $43 million to develop five other sites on the East and West Coasts, but because of a recent complaint the whole system was shut down.
The installations have been working for 10 years. Everything was fine. One single complaint shuts it down and stops the investment. Was that a complaint from a civilian source or another nation? I guess there are international rules that govern frequencies and their use. What can you tell us about that situation?
LGen. Dumais: I cannot tell you very much because I am not involved in that program, and neither is my command. This is a program sponsored by the Chief of the Maritime Staff, the navy side. Increasingly, as Canada Command stands up and becomes involved in Maritime Domain Awareness, we will have an interest in the sensors that will contribute to that awareness, of which high frequency surface radar is one.
We were not involved in managing that program or the decision process. Basically, all I know is what I have read in the paper.
Senator Moore: Canada Command is new, just having stood up this February officially.
LGen. Dumais: I would hate to venture into a discussion of that area because it is not my area of expertise. Others at National Defence Headquarters would be in a better position to answer the specific legalities of that program.
Senator Moore: You referred to your areas of readiness and planning. It would seem to me that when you are talking about our country, the continent and surveillance of the coasts, that would be an important asset for you.
LGen. Dumais: An awareness of what is happening off the coast is very important. The value of each sensor contributes to that awareness. However, I cannot comment on whether the HF surface wave radar was making a contribution or the extent of that contribution because that is handled at the coal face over at the Marine Security Operations Centres, or MSOCs, in this case on the East Coast.
Senator Moore: Is that not something you would look into or want to pursue in view of your overall command?
LGen. Dumais: As of February, yes, that is correct.
Senator Moore: Does the navy feed into your needs? Intelligence is primary.
LGen. Dumais: Absolutely.
Senator Moore: Would you be pursuing that?
LGen. Dumais: I did not say I would be pursuing HF.
Senator Moore: What did you say you would do?
LGen. Dumais: I said that we intend to become increasingly involved in Maritime Domain Awareness. We need to ensure that we are involved in the force development of capabilities downstream, whether it be manned aircraft, UAVs or aerostat balloons or the follow-on technology from HF surface wave radar. Whatever sensors we feel we need to tribute to Maritime Domain Awareness, we need to have an increasing say in that whole process.
Senator Moore: Given that these two radar stations were working, proven assets, why would they be shut down following one complaint over the course of 10 years?
LGen. Dumais: I suspect there is more to it than that.
Senator Moore: There may be, but if I were sitting in your shoes, I would want to know what happened and how we move the ball forward to ensure that such a complaint does not happen again.
LGen. Dumais: I am aware there were circumstances that led to that decision, but that is totally outside of my sphere of control the way this has been structured. There are legacy issues here.
Senator Moore: From the pre-CANCOM days.
LGen. Dumais: That is correct. The whole way of managing these programs was done in another context. As Canada Command evolves and matures, we get a sense that we must increasingly be involved in force development and in the evolution of these kinds of capabilities, which will require structural changes in how things are managed at National Defence Headquarters.
Senator Moore: In this case, when Commander Stephen Peters of the navy on the East Coast found out about this, would he have let you know?
LGen. Dumais: No, he did not at the time.
Senator Moore: You would not have known any more quickly than any of us having read about it?
LGen. Dumais: As I say, most of what I know comes from reading the papers.
Senator Moore: I think that is something we should overcome. It is important for you and for him in your coordinated efforts on behalf of all of us.
LGen. Dumais: I concur. That is the whole point of the transformation thrust in terms of our lines of operation.
Senator Moore: Good luck with it, and I mean that.
Senator Campbell: We would have to call another witness to find out why these installations were shut down. Is it incorrect that it was one complaint that shut down these two radar installations?
LGen. Dumais: I cannot say with certainty. That seems to be the case, but I do not know.
Senator Campbell: Will this fall under your bailiwick eventually?
LGen. Dumais: Maritime Domain Awareness is essentially meant to provide situational awareness of the coasts, and that is going to be our business. We are the ones who will need to know what is happening off the coasts and to assess the kind of response we will need to make.
Senator Campbell: Is it correct to say that somewhere down the road you will take over these installations?
LGen. Dumais: We will not necessarily take control of the installations.
Senator Campbell: Will you be responsible for them?
LGen. Dumais: Perhaps not even that because that is in the realm of force generation. The technicians who work on those installation and the expertise to maintain them would not be a Canada Command responsibility any more than I will not be involved in the maintenance of aircraft or the training of soldiers in Canada.
The Chairman: The rear-admiral who owns them also reports to you in a different capacity.
LGen. Dumais: I am not even sure of that. I do not believe so.
Senator Campbell: I am not suggesting that you are going out and training the airmen or training the technicians. I am suggesting that these are critical installations for the country; correct?
LGen. Dumais: A risk assessment was done, and the sense was that there was not value in continuing to invest in them. That is the sense I get.
Senator Campbell: Is that because of one complaint?
LGen. Dumais: I assume there is more to it than that, and I do not want to venture into any of that.
Senator Campbell: With all due respect, Mr. Chairman, this is an area we should look at. If we shut down these operations and in the process toss $38 million out the door over 10 years, we should get in touch with whomever is in charge of that so we can figure out what is going on.
Senator Banks: The person riding on the subway to work in Edmonton, where I live, would have a terrible time understanding how this all works. We ask questions for a living. Maybe I am just being dense, but I am having a terrible time understanding how this all really works.
One of our concerns regarding national security and defence is to remove the existence of silos. It is a terrible analogy, but we all know how frustrating it is to be in a restaurant when you request something and the guy says this is not his station.
We have a tiny armed force in Canada by comparison with any other country; by any comparison it is small. We have two maritime commands, the head of the land services, the head of the army, the head of the air force, the head of the navy. We have five separate commands, as you have just described and named them, of which yours is one. You have said that you do not command all of the land forces. CANCOM treats Canada as a theatre of operation and is headed by you, but you said that you do not command all the land forces in CANCOM. If that guy riding to work on the subway in Edmonton was an MBA, he would be in a panic about this because it sounds on the face of it to be a Rube Goldberg model of how not to manage anything because, with respect, no one is in charge except maybe General Hillier. I am not even sure about that.
If you were the King and could set things up differently, would you not have a different organizational tree? Would some branches reach across the whole board? I do not know what Carl von Clausewitz would say about a border that is 7,000 kilometres as long being one theatre of operations. However, if you were commanding something called Canada Command, would you not want to be able to command all of the forces in Canada when an event such as you describe occurs, for which you are ultimately response, including the air force? I guess it is almost a rhetorical question.
LGen. Dumais: I am prepared to answer it.
Senator Banks: Please.
LGen. Dumais: First, I have to apologize. Obviously, if you do not understand the structures, then I have not explained them properly.
Senator Banks: No, I am sorry. I am not suggesting that you have not described them properly, but so have others in other commands. Sometimes they do not bump into each other effectively or seem to be synergistic. I was not criticizing your explanation at all.
LGen. Dumais: I will add to that and maybe bring a little clarity. It might appear like a bit of a Rube Goldberg puzzle, but it is not. It is just acknowledging, as I say, the two pillars of running the Canadian Forces, a complex organization. There is the force generation piece and the force employment piece.
Make no mistake: If there is an operation in Canada, the Chief of Defence Staff is obviously accountable and responsible, but so am I as Commander of Canada Command. All the army, air force and navy assets that are assigned to that operation will come under my command. That is very clear.
I do not have access to nor do I command all those forces on a daily basis, because many of those forces are busy training and getting ready either for potential deployment to Afghanistan or another international mission, or perhaps they are just training to be at high readiness for a domestic situation, such as search and rescue or NORAD forces. I do not need to command them while they do that kind of force generation activity. In fact, I do not want to command them while they are doing that. Those are very complex undertakings, and I would have to assume the personnel and the mandates of the army, air force and navy — some elements of them — if I were to get into that business.
Senator Banks: I understand your point perfectly. However, if there is an earthquake in Vancouver tomorrow afternoon and you need the services and people of the 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, can you send them there?
LGen. Dumais: If there is a serious crises of that nature, the regional joint task force commander for the Pacific has the authority to command all the available military resources to respond to that event without asking anyone.
Senator Banks: Without asking you?
LGen. Dumais: That is right. You have painted a worst-case scenario with the example of an earthquake. For most scenarios — even, for example, a serious flood like the one in Winnipeg — we have several days of warning. We can see this coming toward our country, so we have time to staff it, to assess it, to provide options, to preposition forces in the way we do best. In case of a Winnipeg flood, the joint task force western area would likely be the joint task force commander, and all the army, air force and navy assets that would be put at his disposal would come under his command and then ultimately under my command. The responsibilities are very clear for specific scenarios.
Senator Banks: The spaghetti bowl would be solved in any event.
LGen. Dumais: All the spaghetti noodles would be lined up nice and straight.
Senator Banks: I sure hope so.
I will revert to a question the chair referred to about the double-hatting with NORTHCOM counterparts and Canada Command. Would you please describe the relationship between NORTHCOM, which is the United States military command that looks after North America, and your command? Is there a working relationship? Is it an ongoing daily relationship with liaisons in your respective headquarters? Do you conduct exercises together? Do you work together in the event of a crisis where we need to go across the border to help the Americans or they need to come here to help us?
LGen. Dumais: Very much so. In fact, we have liaison officers in their headquarters and they have one in ours. I have met Admiral Keating on several occasions and we know each other fairly well. Our staffs are in contact daily, if not several times a day. We are working together on bilateral plans; a combined defence plan in a civil assistance plan, where we are working out the particulars of how one nation's military could assist another nation's military in responding to a domestic situation.
We exercise together on a regular basis. We had a major exercise called Ardent Sentry, and it was sponsored by NORTHCOM. There was one earlier this year, and we are doing one again in April of next year.
Senator Banks: Are these table-top exercises, or do they involve real people?
LGen. Dumais: No, they are more than just table-top exercises. Some units deploy, and the intent is to exercise the whole chain of command and hopefully bring in the other government departments as well.
The Chairman: How much have you budgeted a year for actual exercises? Last year OCIPEP budgeted $4 million, which struck us as being a remarkably low amount for a country to be spending on exercises.
LGen. Dumais: I could not give you a figure. We can get that for you without a problem. We provide limited funding inside Canada Command. The regions have a certain amount of funding, and the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff has a pot of funding for joint exercises, and that contributes to those activities.
The Chairman: The committee has expressed the view a number of times that if we do not see exercises happening with real people running around simulating actual events, the bottom line is that we do not think people will be ready. We do not see very much of that happening.
LGen. Dumais: For example, earlier I cited two exercises we have done up North. One is the Lancaster exercise. We call it an operation, but there is an exercise element to it. That involved deploying over 450 people up North, which was a massive undertaking. The exercise was very successful in achieving its overall strategic objectives. There are always lessons learned.
The Chairman: Are you satisfied with the level of exercises?
LGen. Dumais: No, I did not say that. We need to do more. As the Chief of Defence Staff said, planning and exercising until something happens is our bread and butter here in Canada Command, so we are putting a lot of emphasis on exercises. In 2007, we will be doing the Ardent Sentry series with NORTHCOM, but we also need to conduct exercises internally. We have a very robust exercise program; a building-block approach, if you will, because we get new people every season.
The Chairman: Could you provide the committee with a list of them, together with the budgeting for Senator Banks?
LGen. Dumais: It would be my pleasure to do so.
Senator Banks: Would you tell us how many people are actively engaged outside of a table-top operation?
LGen. Dumais: We can do that.
Senator Banks: The nature of the deployment and the ways in which they work together.
LGen. Dumais: Yes, sir.
Senator Banks: General, everyone bumps up against resource problems, but can you do the job you need to do with the resources that you have to do them within your command?
LGen. Dumais: Absolutely.
Senator Banks: Are you sufficiently resourced to do everything you need to do now?
LGen. Dumais: In terms of planning and preparing, absolutely.
Senator Banks: What about directing in the event of an operation?
LGen. Dumais: Absolutely. Our organization is more robust than what the DCDS had at the time for the domestic side. There is less ad hocery now because we have established the headquarters and command control chain. We have a better awareness of what is happening on an ongoing basis across the country. If anything starts to develop, we will have early warning of that and we have procedures in place to generate the staff and to plan.
With respect to challenges over a period of time, when we talk about these intense operations domestically, we are talking about operating 24 hours a day. That will take a toll on our staff because we do not have multiple shifts for all the positions. That is a luxury we cannot afford. Clearly the staff would work and do what needs to be done to ensure success.
Senator Banks: In the event of whatever is happening, we cannot say that we will finish this exercise today at noon, come back tomorrow afternoon and start it again when everyone has had a nice night's sleep. That is the nature of my question as regards the resources. In the event of a crisis, do you have the resources to do what you need to do?
LGen. Dumais: We would have to augment from National Defence Headquarters, which is a process that most of our headquarters we have stood up in the past have had to rely on; augmentation of some kind for those worst-case scenarios.
Senator Banks: In the desks that sit around in the control centre which we have seen, would you be able to put a qualified, experienced person, one who was gone through exercises at that desk, on the third shift?
LGen. Dumais: Yes, senator. We have full shifts in the command centre.
Senator Banks: All right.
LGen. Dumais: They would not be running the operation; that would be myself and the deputy commander.
Senator Banks: That is a very satisfying and gratifying answer.
I want to remind you, although I am sure it is not necessary, of the undertaking you made to the chair with respect to providing us with an organizational model. That will be extremely helpful to us.
LGen. Dumais: In terms of headquarters structure?
Senator Banks: Yes.
LGen. Dumais: We can certainly do that as well. Also, I will be providing information on our training and exercise program.
The Chairman: To follow on from Senator Banks' comment, your ability to sustain is, what, 48 hours, and then you need to replace people?
LGen. Dumais: It would be a bit of a challenge, but we would be able to carry on for several days, perhaps even a week.
The Chairman: How do you relate to the Government Operations Centre?
LGen. Dumais: We are doing very well.
The Chairman: Everyone is doing well compared to them, but that was not my question.
LGen. Dumais: I probably should not have answered it that way. We have a very good relationship with the Government Operations Centre. We have some liaison officers there.
The Chairman: I was sure you have good relations with them. I was more concerned with how you did your job and they did their job in the event of a flood, or earthquake or crisis. What is the difference between the two and why are there two?
LGen. Dumais: The Government Operations Centre works for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. They coordinate the federal level response to any situation. My ops centre provides the Canada Command response and dimension to that federal response. There are very unique requirements. The Government Operations Centre would coordinate all the various federal departments and their contribution and effort in terms of that activity.
The Chairman: In terms of your redundancy, is that back to the Pearkes Building?
LGen. Dumais: With respect to our redundancy, that is one option. If we are talking about business continuity and there is, let's say, a massive power failure, our second default option is to go to the JTF east in Quebec, give them control temporarily and then drive down the road.
Senator Meighen: General, you touched on the Arctic, and I want to explore what you see as being the relevance of the Arctic in terms of training your forces. I can see the need to conduct exercises in the Arctic for the purpose of enhancing your winter warfare capabilities. I can see that stationing Canadian Forces personnel in the Arctic from time to time contributes to our sovereignty of that area. However, the fact is that no threat to us as a nation comes through the Arctic. The Canadian Coast Guard is up there with its ice breakers. We also have the Arctic Rangers. In addition, hopefully we are increasing our ability for surveillance by means of unmanned vehicles. Are these not all ways to demonstrate, protect and enhance our sovereignty in the Arctic rather than — I am not suggesting you said this — to push for military exercises every year in the Arctic?
LGen. Dumais: Dealing with the Arctic is the same as dealing with any other part of the country, but with additional challenges brought on by the unique climate and environment. Sovereignty is exercised by both an awareness and either a persistent presence or a presence when and if required anywhere in our country or in our maritime approaches. I think it is all of the above.
Clearly we need to enhance our awareness of what is happening in the North. You mentioned some the capabilities that either do or will contribute to that, but our Canadian Forces need to be able to operate there as much as anywhere else.
The definition of ``threat'' is evolving; it is not strictly a classic threat in the old Cold War context. I assume what the government is doing is using ``threat'' in a broader context: the environment, pollution, various commercial activities up there, the possibility of organized crime, climate change. All these things contribute to having an impact on the North. I am not suggesting they are all military.
Senator Meighen: Should the Armed Forces be up there combating pollution?
LGen. Dumais: It is the same as anywhere else in Canada. In most situations we are in support of another government department, and other government departments likely are challenged to operate up there or have the awareness of what is going on up there. By themselves, I think it is a whole of government approach to dealing with the North because of the unique challenges, although I would argue it is the same in the rest of the country. We have our part to play and need to be prepared.
Senator Meighen: I certainly hope you maintain a capacity and capability of operating, but I would make I plea to you, with thinly spread resources anyway, not to become enamoured of a huge presence of Armed Forces up there at the expense of the East and West Coasts, for example.
LGen. Dumais: It is a challenge. We do have a big country and relatively small Canadian Forces. It is a balancing of risks versus capabilities.
Senator Meighen: Perhaps our sovereignty is best safeguarded by rangers, UAVs, occupied aerial vehicles, by the Coast Guard and exercises from time to time.
LGen. Dumais: I would agree. I would only add that operating up there is very challenging, and so there is a need to do some training and develop some expertise.
Senator Meighen: I agree.
Senator Day: General Dumais, I want you to understand why we were quite disappointed to learn about the high frequency surface wave radar cancellation. We had recommended an expansion of that program thinking it was a high- tech solution to a very important part of your work, which is situational awareness. We were expecting that there would be an expansion of this technology. I understand it was developed by a Canadian military research establishment and then licensed to the private sector, so it seemed like a perfect combination of how things should happen. We understand, as well, that the United States and Mexico, in particular, were very interested in this technology. That is why I think you are seeing a little frustration from this committee on that particular point.
Rather than requiring us to bring someone else back who can answer the questions that we are asking you — and a year from now you will probably be able to answer questions like this one very directly as you get your command stood up — if there is anything you can do informally to provide us with an answer in writing on that issue, I know that the clerk would be pleased to receive that information and distribute it to us.
LGen. Dumais: I appreciate that comment. I was going to suggest that I could do that for you. The information may not come through me, but we will endeavour to ensure that the appropriate information on this issue is brought forward to you.
Senator Day: That would be very much appreciated.
LGen. Dumais: That might save the need to call another witness.
Senator Day: There are four commands, and in my own mind I still do not have it all sorted out. I guess it will take us a while to get a clear understanding. With regard to the various regimental schools where people go to fine-tune their skills, are they part of force generation or part of Canada Command?
LGen. Dumais: Anything to do with skills training in the various occupations has more to do with force generation.
Senator Day: They could be out on operations, come back and then go off to training for a period of time, which is usually the type of activity you like. It gives the soldiers a chance to recover a bit and go off and practice some of the things they have learned in the last operation.
Earlier you mentioned the reserves and the militia. They are doing both. They are doing some operations and some training, and they are called up in times of an emergency. Do they jump over under your command when they are called up, but they are normally in the realm of force generation on the support side?
LGen. Dumais: That is correct. Technically, they are not called up; they have to volunteer to serve as reservists. We have seen that in the past. For example, during the Ice Storm, upwards of 18,000 military personnel, many of whom were reservists, contributed to that effort. They are an important dimension of our ability to respond domestically.
Shaping the reserve contribution from a domestic perspective is a work in progress. Clearly, Canada Command has something to do with that. Up until now, reserve issues have been addressed primarily by the Chief of Land Staff because it is viewed as a force generation element. As we identify capabilities that we need from a Canadian Forces perspective, then some of those might well be the purview of the reserves to deliver.
Senator Day: Which command do the Chief of Land Staff and the Chief of Air Staff fit into?
LGen. Dumais: They are commands unto themselves. They command the force generation elements of their environments.
Senator Day: They would be in addition to Canada Command and the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command?
LGen. Dumais: That is correct. We are the two commands involved in operations.
Senator Day: Outside of Canada; Canada Command for the —
LGen. Dumais: Domestic and continental. They are responsible for training and developing the capabilities.
The Chairman: This is an area that the committee is concerned about because it is not entirely clear to us what the role of the environmental commanders are and how it is evolving as transformation takes place. Clearly, there is an interaction between you and them, but could you describe it from your perspective as Commander of Canada Command, how you relate to the different environmental commanders — army, navy and air force?
LGen. Dumais: At our level, it is primarily through the commanders' council, which is chaired by the Chief of Defence Staff, where we meet to discuss force development issues and these kinds of circumstances and issues.
Other than that, it is at the staff level where we, to the best of our ability, participate in the force development process and try to influence the process that way.
You have to appreciate that CEFCOM and Canada Command are fairly recent occurrences. Structures and governance frameworks are evolving, so there is a transition period. For example, initially there was a thought that the operational level would not be too involved in force development work because it was a strategic activity. Clearly, that does not work — certainly from my perspective. We need to be involved in that process and assert ourselves, and the structures are evolving to accommodate that.
The Chairman: We thought the purpose of moving you and the other commands out to Star Top was to get you out of the rat race going on over in the Pearkes Building.
LGen. Dumais: This is the conundrum. You are absolutely right; in fact, some thought we should be further away than just Star Top. It seems it me we have something important to say in force development and identifying requirements and lessons learned, as Senator Day alluded to earlier. We need to be participating in those processes.
The Chairman: That begs the following question: What do the commanders of the army, navy and air force have to say about what you have to do?
LGen. Dumais: It is a team effort. Clearly, we identify the requirements. They are the experts in their various fields in terms of generating air power, sea power and land capability. They know the doctrine and how to generate those capabilities. We tell them what effect we want and what requirement we have, but they are in the best position to deliver the actual elements that contribute to that capability.
As I say, it is a team effort. It is not like we have all the solutions. We do not give them solutions. We say that we need to enhance, let us say, NBC military capability domestically, to use a hypothetical example. There are different ways to do that — regular force units, reserve units or a combination of both. Specifically, what kind of capabilities do we need? We have some ideas in that regard, but some of that might reside with the units that have those capabilities.
It is between us and the force generation. All I am saying is that we need to be involved in the process because we are the force employers. We are the ones who will be using the capabilities in an operational context. We have some ideas. We also learn from past experiences, and we need to pass that on in the system.
The Chairman: All of the folks one level below you are double-hatted. They are working for them and for you, which really clarifies things for us.
LGen. Dumais: In some ways, it makes it easier; but in other ways, it brings unique challenges. People have to remember which hat they are wearing when undertaking different activities.
The Chairman: Even their business cards have both jobs on them; it is confusing as hell.
LGen. Dumais: To a person looking at it from the outside, perhaps. I must admit that we are working our way through this issue. The devil is in the details with this kind of stuff. That is why we had a useful conference last week, which brought together all of our regional joint task force commanders for a couple days. We sat down and talked about these very issues, how to resolve them and work within the structure.
The Chairman: Were the environmental commanders at this meeting?
LGen. Dumais: No, this was strictly my chain of command.
The Chairman: They only brought one hat.
LGen. Dumais: Well, that is impossible.
The Chairman: We are being a little facetious here.
This issue is a conundrum and the committee is having difficulty coming to grips with it. This is one of the reasons we were keen to have the Commander of Canada Command back a second time to help work us through it. We were hoping to see some evolution in terms of how the command is moving and where the likely end point will be. This may be a question for the CDS.
LGen. Dumais: We have explored different models in these command control constructs. That is why I made the point that from my perspective, both the force generation pillar and the force employment pillar are critical. I think that to reduce the influence of one or to weaken the structure of one to build up the other would be detrimental.
Clearly, setting up two complete parallel structures, with me having my own independent regional structures, might be ideal. However, it would be very expensive and definitely not sustainable.
Again, it comes back to the conundrum that we have a large country and a relatively small military, so we have to make it work. I think this structure, while not perfect, will evolve over time. There might be a rebalancing between force generation and force employment. I can certainly see that happening, but it works.
Like every other structure, it has its pluses and minuses. However, the regional joint task force commanders understand their operational role in the Canada Command context and are fully engaged in ensuring that it succeeds.
Senator Day: What are the responsibilities of the Chief of Military Personnel?
LGen. Dumais: They are responsible for HR policies, writ large — recruiting, some of the individual, non- environment specific training that occurs, some of the generic training we receive and the academic dimension to our education. As well, they are responsible for all policies in respect of medical and retirement benefits — from the cradle to the grave. They take care of all the aspects of taking care and nurturing our personnel.
Senator Day: At CFB Borden, there are quite a few generic schools as well as specific schools. Are the generics under one hat and the specifics under another?
LGen. Dumais: That is correct. For example, an air school and an aircraft technician school both come under the air force.
Senator Day: Is the base commander and his structure under support command?
LGen. Dumais: No, I do not believe that it is. The base is under the Chief of Military Personnel. One of the reasons for setting it up as a command was to have command of those organizations as opposed to the assistant deputy minister construct that we had before.
Senator Day: Am I to understand that all base commanders are under the Chief of Military Personnel?
LGen. Dumais: No, sir. Some of the bases are force generators for the army, air force and navy. Some provide a unique training environment, and those would come under the Chief of Military Personnel.
Senator Day: The committee visited CFB Kingston — not RMC — where there is a training school with many various training facilities. Does that come under the Chief of Military Personnel?
LGen. Dumais: I believe so, but I might be wrong.
Senator Day: I would like you to let me know, please.
LGen. Dumais: It might belong to the Chief of the Land Staff.
Senator Day: We visited CFB Gagetown where there are various schools.
LGen. Dumais: That falls under the Chief of the Land Staff.
Senator Day: It has a major training aspect as well.
What about the Canada Defence Academy and the Royal Military College?
LGen. Dumais: They would be under the Chief of Military Personnel because of education aspect.
The Chairman: We need to know ``who is on first,'' so to speak. Is it reasonable to ask you to provide us with some descriptor of this?
LGen. Dumais: I would be pleased to do so, but it is outside my lane. I will try.
The Chairman: I am sure there is someone at DND who will figure it out.
Senator Day: We always find that the military is so keen on the chain of command. You are not the first person that has a not been able to help us understand this clearly. It might be that because we are not in the military, we take a little longer to understand. It is difficult to understand that traditional chain of command. Everyone knows who is above them and who is below them, but it does not seem to be as clearly defined now as it has been in the past.
LGen. Dumais: It is very clear. It is just that my memory is not perfect in that area. Certainly, there is a clear chain. Every base commander reports to either one of the Environmental Chiefs of Staff, ECSs, or the Chief of Military Personnel.
The Chairman: If Senator Forrestall were here, God bless him, he would ask, ``Who drives the bus?''
LGen. Dumais: The thing is, we have several buses.
Senator Day: And several steering wheels, it seems.
LGen. Dumais: Each bus has only one steering wheel and one driver.
Senator Day: We appreciate the light that you have been able to shed.
LGen. Dumais: To a certain extent.
Senator Moore: In this operational chart, who is the Commander of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command?
LGen. Dumais: Colonel David Barr.
Senator Moore: Who is the Commander of Canadian Operational Support Command?
LGen. Dumais: Brigadier-General Daniel Benjamin. We can provide you with an organizational chart of National Defence Headquarters and the operational commands.
Senator Banks: Lieutenant-General Dumais, twice today you have used the phrase ``like other government departments.'' It has been the view of the committee that the physical separation by moving some folks to Star Top is a good idea given the way people relate to each other. Some committee members are of the view that it would be a good idea if the Department of National Defence, on the one hand, and National Defence Headquarters, on the other, did not have all that much to do with each other. Is the cultural idea of being just ``like other government departments'' one that you subscribe to? Is that how you think, that this is just another government department?
LGen. Dumais: Absolutely not. I believe that you misunderstood what I was saying in terms of dealing with other government departments.
Senator Banks: When you say ``dealing with other government departments,'' that implies you think that you are a government department.
LGen. Dumais: I work in the Department of National Defence as well as the Canadian Forces.
The Chairman: Lieutenant-General Dumais, thank you for appearing today. Perhaps you understand better why we wanted you back, given that we heard from Vice-Admiral Forcier not too long ago. The committee is having difficulty gaining a sense of how transformation is shaping up and falling out. We need to keep asking more questions and, over time, we will develop a picture of it. When we do that, we will pass it on.
LGen. Dumais: All I can say is that I have tried to answer your questions as straightforwardly as possible.
The Chairman: You did that and we appreciate it. Your testimony has been helpful.
Members of the public with questions or comments can visit the committee's website by going to www.sen-sec.ca. We post witness testimony and confirm hearing schedules. Otherwise, you may contact the clerk of the committee by calling 1-800-267-7362.
The committee adjourned.