Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 6 - Evidence, October 16, 2006
OTTAWA, Monday, October 16, 2006
The Standing Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 11:05 a.m. to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Before we begin I would like to introduce the members of the committee. I will start with Senator Moore, from Halifax. He is a lawyer with an extensive record of community involvement. He served 10 years on the board of governors at St. Mary's University. He also sits on the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, and on the Standing Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons for the Scrutiny of Regulations.
To my right is Senator St. Germain from British Columbia. He has served in Parliament from 1983, first as a member of the House of Commons and then as a senator. He is the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples and he also sits on the Standing Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons for the Scrutiny of Regulations.
On my left is Senator Tommy Banks from Alberta. He was called to the Senate following a 50-year career in the entertainment industry. He is the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources.
Our committee has been mandated to examine security and defence and the need for a national security policy. We have produced 15 reports since 2001. Our most recent report, Managing Turmoil, The Need to Upgrade Canadian Foreign Aid and Military Strength to Deal with Massive Change, was released in the first week of October.
We have before us today Alan S. Williams. He joined the public service in 1972 and held a number of different positions throughout his 33-year career. In August of 1999 he was appointed Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) for the Department of National Defence. He was also the Canadian representative for the NATO conference on national armaments directors. In April 2005, Mr. Williams retired from the public service and is now president of the Williams Group providing expertise in areas of policy, programs and procurement.
He has written a book entitled Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement: A View from the Inside. He is also a senior research fellow at Queen's University where he lectures on defence procurement.
Mr. Williams, welcome to the committee.
Alan S. Williams, as an individual: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me here this morning. Defence procurement is a subject I am passionate about. I have devoted over 10 years to learning about and overseeing both Public Works and Government Services Canada and the Department of National Defence. Having seen first-hand and up close the tremendous dedication and commitment of our men and women in the military, I do not view this subject merely as an administrative exercise but rather one that, above all, must see to their security interests.
In spite of the recent proliferation of reports and recommendations, the process is still too lengthy and too costly. Why is this the case? I believe the answer lies in the fact that there has not been a clear understanding of the overall defence procurement process. As a result, isolated recommendations have been advanced rather than a comprehensive package of recommendations that addresses the complete system, and worse, these recommendations frequently tackle the perceived rather than the real weaknesses. For example, at a recent lecture on topics in defence management at Queen's University, I asked the students if they thought the following five statements were true or false: First, the bureaucratic defence procurement process is unresponsive; second, there is too much political interference in the defence procurement process; third, the major funding pressures in national defence are to pay salaries and benefits for military personnel and to acquire capital; fourth, it costs less to maintain new equipment than the equipment being replaced; and fifth, Canada is dependent upon others, especially the United States, for strategic lift capability. Perhaps not surprisingly, most of the students agreed with each statement. In fact, each of these statements is more false than true.
In my book, Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement: A View from the Inside, I dispel these myths and provide a comprehensive description of the entire defence procurement process, including the legal and industrial frameworks as well as the core procurement process. For the sceptics or naysayers, I also provide a road map that shows how all 25 recommendations can be implemented within one year. In my brief comments this morning I will focus on the core procurement process. Of course, I look forward to discussing all areas following these comments.
If one overarching observation can be made, it is the lack of clear accountability at all levels in the process. By all levels I mean the parliamentary level, the ministerial level and the bureaucratic level. In the book, I quote an article from the Ottawa Citizen in which Anne McLellan, in addressing a specific defence procurement, refers to then Minister of National Defence, Bill Graham, and then Minister of Public Works and Government Services, Scott Brison, as the two ministers in charge of the procurement. She was right. With respect to defence procurement, ministers from these two departments are in charge. The problem is that whenever two ministers are in charge, neither is in charge. It is time to address this reality. Perhaps the most significant of my 25 recommendations is the creation of defence procurement Canada, DPC, which would combine the procurement resources from the Department of National Defence and the contracting resources from Public Works and Government Services Canada to become the sole organization accountable for defence procurement. While I present five different governance models, I favour the one whereby DPC would report to the Minister of National Defence. Under this model, the Minister of National Defence is accountable for all elements of the procurement cycle from the preparation of the statements of requirements to the request for proposals, evaluation, contract signing and administration.
The benefits generated from such a model go well beyond clarifying accountability. Significant resource savings will result with the elimination of the overlap and duplication of the duties and responsibilities. My conservative estimate is in the range of 48 and 125 person-years, or annual savings of between $4.8 million and $12.5 million. Equally important, this model will alleviate a large skill-shortage problem that is becoming even more serious as the population ages. The process will be streamlined. When two departments are involved, the process moves only as fast as the slower of the two. In the book I cite one example where it took nine months for the Department of National Defence to negotiate a deal, and more than 21 months for Public Works and Government Services Canada to agree to it. While this may be an extreme case, the reality is that getting approvals through two channels rather than one channel takes extra time and, therefore, slows down the process.
This being true, two obvious questions arise. First, why was the process structured this way in the first place? Second, if it is so dysfunctional, why has it not been changed? To answer the first question, while PWGSC's oversight is designed to ensure integrity in the process, currently other mechanisms serve the same purpose: the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, the court system, the Auditor General of Canada, the media, and the general openness of our society, which helps to guard against any wilful manipulation of the defence procurement system. DND personnel are well aware of the dangers in operating with anything less than full openness, transparency and fairness. Another argument for the involvement of Public Works and Government Services Canada is its role as a common services agency, achieving government-wide savings. However, it is clear that in this case we are limiting ourselves to defence-specific goods and services with little or no potential saving benefits to other government departments.
Turning now to the second question, if the resulting benefits are a more streamlined process — cost savings, clarified accountability and simplified communications — and if there are no downside risks, why has this streamlining not been done before? It is not because the suggestion has not been made. The House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs, SCONDVA, and a report from John McCallum's advisory committee both suggested that this idea be examined. Unfortunately, at times there can be a great deal of turf protection in the public service and without the support of all players, the concept could not be advanced. That is why I make the point in the book that if DPC and other recommendations are to be implemented, a clear and unequivocal direction must be given to that effect.
Strengthened accountability demands not only clearly defined roles but also appropriate performance reporting. It is not surprising today that one continually hears about a procurement process that takes 5.8 years because this data is the only data being made public. Yet this data comes from a study based upon data from the late 1990s. More up-to- date information is necessary on the current procurement cycle times and the causes of any delays, whether the causes are the politicians in providing approvals, the military in defining their statement of requirement, the bureaucrats in working the system or the contractors in delivering on their obligations. I am convinced that implementing the recommendations to establish DPC, instituting performance reporting and continuing to introduce the wide range of best practices that has already begun will shorten the acquisition cycle by at least 40 per cent from over 15 years to nine years or less. In essence, that cycle translates as follows: up to two years for the military to define their requirements, up to two years to enter into a contract and up to five years to complete delivery of the equipment.
With respect to accountability, I would be remiss if I did not comment on the virtual absence of accountability by Parliament. Annual DND expenditures for capital acquisition and capital support receive little or no review by any standing committee. There is no rigor to the questions posed by committee members. I would typically prepare more than 50 hours for a three-hour appearance before a committee, yet the questions were often off topic or, if on topic, they were superficial. Witnesses should be interviewed prior to their appearances so that committee members can gain a better understanding of the positions of witnesses and can focus their questions better.
While a senior public servant, I always rationalized that the only reason governments did not act was because they were not provided with the necessary information. This committee has the information and now has the opportunity to wield its influence to help ensure that we act upon the recommendations and do the right thing by the men and women in the military.
Mr. Chairman, senators, thank you very much for this opportunity to share my thoughts. I will be pleased to take your questions.
The Chairman: Thank you. I want the record to show that I interviewed you over breakfast not long ago to gain some sense of your views. On that one topic, not only are there real costs involved but also the availability of many senior officials simply is not there. Frequently, parliamentarians are unable to hear from senior officials when they make their requests. It is a double burden when they ask that staffers spend time with senior officials. Certainly, in a perfect world we would like to depose everyone first. Nobody likes to ask a question when they do not know the answer.
Having said that, it is wishful thinking to suggest that senior government officials will be available twice, once in private and in camera for an examination, and second, with the lights on and media coverage in the committee room. That is a challenging order.
Mr. Williams: May I comment on that?
The Chairman: Yes, please.
Mr. Williams: If that is the case, then something is dramatically wrong with the public service. When I was Assistant Deputy Minister I took it as a requirement of democracy when people asked me to appear and to explain what we were doing. I am not aware that any of my colleagues might feel differently about that. I would be truly disappointed to learn that when you asked ADMs from any government department to appear they would shy away. I know that most of my colleagues feel the same way that I do: it is our duty and obligation to come before parliamentary committees to explain things as often as we need to do so. That is a big part of being a senior public servant. I never heard a deputy minister or a minister tell me not to appear before such a committee. To the contrary, they knew that by my going everyone could have a better understanding and, therefore, make better decisions. It would be disappointing and, frankly, I would not tolerate public servants shying away when asked to appear before a parliamentary committee. There cannot be any reason for them to dismiss such an obligation.
The Chairman: Frequently, committees can only meet on certain days. Public servants have commitments so the combination of the two moves the schedule back to a time where it does not work for the committee's work plan. With respect to trying to organize, what you suggest would be the ideal. In many cases, we discuss questions ahead of time with ministers or senior officials. To expect it to happen on a regular basis is challenging, not necessarily because people are being obstinate or trying to hide the truth but simply because they tend to have schedules that are not always compatible with parliamentary schedules.
Mr. Williams: I would make two points. One which I mentioned in the book is that committees should spend more time developing strategic plans. Plans always change, but if, for instance, when you talk about defence procurement, a committee such as SCONDVA could set out its agenda in the beginning of the year to say it will look at the $4 billion that is spent, plus or minus on materiel, and look at these two or three major projects. That will be the agenda for this year; the committee cannot look at all the projects. Let the committee look at strategic issues as to how these requirements marry with the defence policy objective, and schedule these things over the next couple of months to better allow the appropriate senior people to appear.
Schedules are crammed at times, but if public servants know in a month or two that they will be required to appear, then it is fair to ask those public servants to safeguard that time, even if things change.
The Chairman: Committees do precisely that. This committee does exactly that before it receives a budget. A work plan is prepared, and the committee adopts the budget and the work plan at the same time. The committee would not look at a budget if it did not have a work plan. That is laid out.
Having said that, the committee also leaves time in the work plan in case someone writes a good book. It wants to be able to seize that opportunity.
We also find, however, that extraordinary delays come from government. We waited over eight months for answers to questions in our next report. We say ``wow,'' but a government changed, and a new set of officials wanted to run the answers by the new government. It was not entirely unreasonable, but from the perspective of the committee, it is not a straightforward matter. Committees also do not stand up immediately when a Parliament comes back. On average, it takes Parliament about 60 days before a committee has an order of preference, is funded and is ready to go.
Mr. Williams: That is a reality.
The Chairman: There are realities.
Senator St. Germain: Mr. Williams, you make the recommendation that one minister be responsible as opposed to two ministries or one, and you say defence procurement Canada should be established.
I gather you have done extensive study on this particular file. What are other countries doing in the G8 or the G7, or whatever number it is at the moment? It would be interesting to know. Have you researched this and could you inform the committee what your research has provided?
Mr. Williams: The easier question to answer is which, if any, countries do it the way we do, and the answer is none. The U.K. has its Defence Procurement Agency. Australia has its Defence Materiel Organization. The U.S. is a whole different size, where the army, navy and air force each do their own procurement. However, in none of these cases do you find that the group responsible for developing the specifications and doing the process is separate from the group that is doing the contracting. You do not find that in any case. Whoever is accountable is accountable. Whatever organizational structure they have in the organizations I looked at, we are the only one that has this separation of duties. That means you have resources that overlap as well as duplication because all have their own mandate. If you visit a company, people from both organizations go, and the overhead is more. It obfuscates accountability, and the savings I have talked about are the tip of the iceberg. I am sure you can do more than that, but to be conservative I am saying about 50 to 100 people.
It is not just the savings. You should not minimize $10 million savings a year—that is taxpayers' money—but both organizations suffer a significant skills shortage right now. Each hires from the other. Each has huge gaps it cannot fill. If you look at the demographics, one third of the requisite skilled people are over 55, and two thirds are over 45. It will get worse.
The other benefit is that with one organization requiring fewer people, you can address the skills shortage problem as well.
Senator St. Germain: If you set up one defence procurement Canada department, how do you deal with conflicting interests? I am a former air force pilot. You said, if I heard you clearly, that in the U.S. each organization has its own procurement department. How would you deal with this and deal with the priorities of each department in Canada: air force, army and navy?
Mr. Williams: You would do it no differently than you do it today. If we look at the bureaucratic responsibilities and accountabilities within the Department of National Defence today, the military alone is accountable for setting priorities and determining its needs. We have the strategic capability investment plan, SCIP, and we are hoping to have their defence procurement plan soon. Therefore, the military alone will determine its needs as it does today. Then, instead of having two departments take those requirements and usher them through the system, that agency would be accountable to do it. Therefore, there is no difference in terms of the military role before and after.
Senator St. Germain: Having been a minister of the Crown, one thing has always intrigued me, which was the devolution of airports, when I was Minister of Transport. It was something that was passed over by the department. When the Prime Minister asked me to take over the ministry, he said, ``What areas will you work in? What would you like to work in?'' I said air, because of my background, and I also picked coast guard because of the helicopters and so forth. At the time, three ministers had gone through that present administration, and no devolution had taken place. Control had to be taken, and I had to ask for a point person to deal with it, but this was a directive from the Prime Minister.
What role do you see the government playing in establishing the strategic needs of the military from a cabinet and a prime ministerial level?
Mr. Williams: That is an interesting question. That is not directly in my domain. Let me make that clear.
There is a big section about the military-civilian balance and roles for each. When I was in the Department of National Defence, I made it clear that I would take the priorities that they developed. It was not up to me to challenge the military's priority. Within the process, as I see it unfolding when you talk about the minister, ministers have had and do have a role to play.
This government has certainly put the strategic air lift among its top priorities, whether or not it happens to be in the top priorities of the military. Previous governments, too, have had their pet projects.
What happens pragmatically is that the military develops its own priorities, works on getting the minister comfortable with them, the minister asks legitimate questions about them, and together they come up with a consensus that meets the military needs while also addressing the political requirements. That is how the process unfolds typically. There is give and take on both sides.
I wish to make another point that is not directly related. You talked about political direction. I cannot overstate the fact that one of two things will happen with this book, as far as I am concerned. Either the government will give it to the bureaucrats to study again, in which case nothing happens for the reasons I have talked about; or the government says it is time to put our men and women first: The answers are in front of us, and let us act; this is not an option bureaucracy; we will do this; here is the road map; and the timetable is laid out.
We have talked about the governance models. The plan lays out a time to discuss which model you want. There should be no debate about whether we do it. If we do, the same thing will happen over the next year that has happened for the last 10 years. We will continue to study and study. I do not think that is fair to our men and women.
Senator St. Germain: Have you thought of giving this to the Prime Minister?
Mr. Williams: Yes.
Senator St. Germain: In the case of devolution of the airports, the Prime Minister said, ``Gerry, get it done.'' That was the instruction, and it was done. If something like this is of absolute necessity in our system, this is where it must go, with the support of committees like this.
Mr. Williams: I have no doubt about it. That is what I state in the book, namely, that the Prime Minister, in his mandate letters to the ministers, must direct them to do this and not ask them how to streamline the process. I found five typos in the book. Once they are corrected, we will send a copy to the Prime Minister.
The Chairman: When does the clock start? Does it start after the defence capabilities plan is announced or when the staff group first starts working on a project? We have had it described to us that the clock starts with a glint in someone's eye somewhere.
Mr. Williams: With regard to procurement?
The Chairman: Yes.
Mr. Williams: The clock starts once the government gives approval.
The Chairman: In terms of how long it takes for a project to go ahead, you suggest that even if the department has been working on it for a couple of years, that does not count?
Mr. Williams: It counts in terms of making people aware of what has gone on. The helicopter is the best example of that. Year after year people talked about when this thing will go. As I pointed out in the book, when I appeared before the Senate Committee of the Whole, I think Senator Forrestall asked me when this started and I said I did not know. He said it was 1978.
Senator Meighen: Senator Stratton said that.
Mr. Williams: Both of them were asking questions for a good part of the day.
If we take a major procurement like helicopters or joint support ships, there should be an annual report that looks at the acquisition time frame: where we are in the process and clearly denoting delays or things that are stagnant. I have listed four different areas that we should colour code. If the government has given approval but the military is still finalizing the statement of requirements, and that is continuing, we know that is where to focus. If the government has not yet given approval and the timeline is dragging on, do not blame the bureaucrats, because, frankly, until the government says they can go, they cannot go.
As I mentioned in the book, I think it was December 17, 2003 when Minister David Pratt gave the go-ahead on the helicopters finally, and within two years we had a contract. Work was done before that in parallel, in any case. The public must know the causes for the delay and the status. I would reflect all of that in a public document.
The Chairman: Can we really be that simple about it? We can think of major projects where there was clearly an interest in the department, but the government of the day did not want to move on the issue and then we bought the equipment second-hand too late. I cannot tell in my mind when that project really started. We all know now that I am talking about submarines. At some point, someone decided that we needed a replacement for the existing submarines. Is that the true starting point? By your definition, the true starting point would be many months or, in this case, years later.
Mr. Williams: I think that question is worthy of examination. There is a specific process whereby once there is a needs identification approval, the process officially starts within the bureaucracy. One could use that approval as a touch point, but one must understand what is happening. If we use that point, which is legitimate from the bureaucratic standpoint, the work on maritime helicopters started at this particular point but was delayed and delayed because there was no approval.
My point is that you can spend some time deciding what the beginning point is, but whatever you decide will be a lot better than what you have today. As long as you try to be consistent and explain things, you will be better off, especially if delays are annotated.
I am convinced that if you have a benchmark of nine years or less to do something, nine years being the outer limit — two years for the requirements, two years to sign the contract and five years to deliver — you can identify the right starting point. If you know that you have not yet received approval, you can colour-code something, ``waiting for approval.'' Right now, we have the worst of all worlds. For example, the United States and the U.K. can tell us what percentage of delay there is in their cases. One is 14 per cent and one is 6 per cent. The point is that we cannot even say that. I think we do a better job than many colleague countries, but we cannot prove it. Performance reporting is a requisite part of accountability. You can debate the issue of when we start and people can come up with different options, but whatever decision you make will be a lot better because right now you have nothing.
Senator Moore: That beginning point seems to be an elusive target. Are you suggesting that they should begin when the minister says ``go''? What if it is something that takes place in the course of an election campaign? Is that deemed to be the beginning date or is it to be when the minister is officially in office and says, ``I want that asset acquired for this particular armed force''?
Mr. Williams: The responsibility of the bureaucrats to deliver begins once the budget and approval has been given and the identification phase is under way. That process should never take more than nine years, as far as I am concerned, and probably a lot less.
However, in the political domain, a lot of things are debated and discussed that people think have been approved that have not been approved. I simply suggest that while the bureaucratic process should be nine years, the front end, getting approval of the government to proceed, should not be lost. People should understand that the process has not started yet because we are still waiting for approval.
Senator Moore: Do you consider that preliminary work to be part of the time when you said it is now 15 years and we should aim for nine?
Mr. Williams: No.
Senator Moore: Are you saying from the approval date forward?
Mr. Williams: It should be nine.
Senator Moore: That is your benchmark.
Mr. Williams: That is my benchmark. Two years for the military, two years for the bureaucrats and five years for the contractors.
Senator Banks: I do not want to attribute my naiveté to my colleagues, so I will say that I am naive enough to think that the two years, two years and five years seem, on the face of it, to be too long. Can you assure me that propriety, efficacy, efficiency and oversight really require nine years for the military to acquire something they need?
Mr. Williams: Let us discuss each component. The first is for the military to decide what they want. Two years is the outside limit. I make a big point in my book about how industry has consolidated over the last decades. There are five or so major companies in the U.S. while there were 50 a couple of decades ago. When you want to buy something, there are only one or two out there in any case, so it makes no sense to do something that is way out there to which you cannot adhere.
Last month, the second-in-charge in the Pentagon said that they think they have to revert to the way they did the F- 16 model 30 years ago.
Senator Banks: Grumman no longer exists?
Mr. Williams: That is true, but the point is that James Finley, the deputy secretary of acquisition, said that people were developing requirements totally inconsistent with the capability of industry to develop. Even in the U.S. they are much more focussed on R&D than we are. We, appropriately, look at commercial and military off-the-shelf products.
I think that two years is the outside limit. If the military focussed on what is available and what their needs are, and married the two, you probably could do it in less time.
Also, there are times when you do not need to spend any time on it, and I cited one example of that. If we are quick and sharp and see that someone else is doing exactly what we are doing, we can cut out all the waste of time. We have the example of air-to-air refuelling capability. We found out that the Germans were doing exactly what we were doing. Rather than taking the time to do a statement of requirements, we simply entered into a memorandum of understanding with them, put our two Airbuses in their production line, and saved three years and $50 million.
If we are knowledgeable about what the marketplace and our allies are doing, we can save time. While being cognizant of what is out there, we must ensure that we do not tailor or bias requirements to one company, because in that way we get into a lot of problems.
Up to two years, and maybe less, is not unreasonable. Two years for the bureaucrats is also probably close to reality, particularly because we are, as you are aware, committed to compete on things under the Agreement on Internal Trade. Usually, we want to give industry three months to look at complex procurements. We want to take the time to discuss them with industry and to put out drafts.
With those time frames, up to two years is the outside limit. We did the maritime helicopter procurement in slightly less than that, but we had done a lot of homework before. I do not think that is unreasonable, but perhaps four years can become three years.
I am then talking about five years to deliver. The more you move toward military off-the-shelf and commercial off- the-shelf, the more you can streamline that time line. Keep in mind that more than half the nine years is waiting for the products to arrive. The more you ask for, the longer it will take. If you ask for 40 of something, it will take much longer than if you ask for 20 of them.
If we monitor those time frames and adhere to them, we will do well.
Senator Banks: Nine years is the best we can expect?
Mr. Williams: No, nine years is the outside limit. I think that for the process we could move to three instead of four, saving one year. If delivery is two years rather than five, that saves four years out of the nine years.
Senator Banks: However, nine years would be acceptable in normal circumstances?
Mr. Williams: Yes, I think so.
Senator Banks: When we were at one of our defence bases, we looked at equipment that was more or less obsolescent. It functioned, but it was obsolescent. It was not up-to-snuff due to the absence of one part of that piece of equipment. The operators told us that they could go to Radio Shack and buy that piece, but they were not permitted to do so, and therefore the equipment was inoperable.
However, that is merely anecdotal.
Mr. Williams: Would you like me to comment on that?
Senator Banks: Certainly.
Mr. Williams: I do not know what piece you are talking about, but when we buy equipment for our military it must be robust enough to withstand what happens in theatre. People talk about ashtrays that cost hundreds of dollars. However, if an improvised explosive device, IED, explodes, you do not want the glass of your vehicle shattering. Therefore, you buy products that can withstand a certain kind of operational environment, so I am not so sure that the example you gave happens all that often.
Also, whatever product you buy, you must maintain. You must buy a good that has a supply stream that ensures that you can continue to get it on a regular basis. I am not sure I would want to stake the lives of our men and women on something you can get from Canadian Tire or Radio Shack, notwithstanding that they are very good for the lay person.
Senator Banks: I was talking about a piece of field communication equipment. We were placing the lives of our men and women at risk because the equipment did not work properly due to the absence of a widget.
Mr. Williams: I need more detail on your example, but in my experience, whenever people came up with anecdotes I said, ``Give me the evidence; give me specifics.'' It was rare that it held water. If our men and women were at risk, I know that everyone would do everything possible to get the required part out there as soon as possible. There may be the odd exception.
Senator Banks: I hope that is true, and I am sure you are right.
You suggested in your book that transformation in the process is required, but I think you told us that most people in the defence procurement process in the government do not understand the problem. I assume that if they did, you would have been able to deal with it while you had your hand on the tiller. I believe you said that it requires unequivocal direction from no less than the Prime Minister and that, absent that, this recommendation will not happen.
Mr. Williams: That is correct.
Senator Banks: That is an indictment of the bureaucracy, is it not?
Mr. Williams: Yes: I was fortunate to spend five or so years at Public Works and Government Services Canada looking after contracting and procurement, and a certain amount of time at the Department of National Defence. I do not think anyone else has been fortunate enough to have that broad spectrum to understand all the dimensions of procurement from within the Department of National Defence and globally. I bring to the table complete understanding of the legal and industrial framework as well as the specifics of the Department of National Defence.
There is no question in my mind that the changes I am talking about should be made. I am not the first to recommend them. As I said, SCONDVA and John McCallum recommended them. However, unfortunately, some people view this change as a win-lose situation. My perspective was always to put the men and women of the military first. That is not always the case.Whenever people want to protect turf within the bureaucracy, unless they are told otherwise, that is what will happen. Status quo is great. People in PWGSC like to deal with defence business. It is fun to go to shipyards and airspace air shows. This equipment is neat stuff, and a lot more exciting than buying computers or furniture. Therefore, not surprisingly, there is reluctance to get out of this business. Yet the fact is, this business is not a common service business to start with. That department has made commitments to save $2.5 billion in common service. I am convinced that if this responsibility was taken away from them they would be better able to focus on their real mandate and to deliver those savings rather than expending the tremendous amount of time, energy and resources necessary to do this part of the business which, frankly, is not part of that mandate.
Second, the notion of them providing a sober, independent oversight to ensure openness, fairness and integrity is a valid role to play, but it was valid before the Agreement on Internal Trade and with the establishment of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, CITT. Today everyone is aware of all the redress mechanisms. If someone oversteps or does something wrong, they are at the CITT in no time at all.
Therefore, we do not need them in addition, not at the expense of time, costs or accountability. We are giving up too much for that kind of a role.
Senator Banks: Do you agree with the contention with respect to acquisition and capital expenses that, among all the departments of government, DND is unique, needs to be treated differently and needs to operate differently from all the other departments?
Mr. Williams: Yes: More than half the business of Public Works and Government Services Canada is national defence. The department has the size but, most important, there is nothing to be gained. A common service agency does its best when it can make savings across the board.
Senator Banks: Everybody needs paper clips.
Mr. Williams: Everybody needs paper clips, but not everybody needs submarines, helicopters, mobile gun systems or light armoured vehicles, LAV3s. One organization does, and their size and complexity mandates us to do it this way. I said you would save money and time, with clear focus and clear accountability. I have no doubt about it.
Senator Meighen: May I ask a supplementary question?
Senator Banks: You may because I am done.
The Chairman: On a point of clarification you have the floor.
Senator Meighen: Senator Banks asked you a question about treating the Department of National Defence as a department unlike any others. I heard your answer and I certainly agree with the answer. In fact, this committee has made that recommendation that it be treated unlike the others because it is unlike the others.
The Chairman: And we do not mean worse.
Senator Meighen: However, now that you can speak freely and frankly, in your opinion would this idea receive support from the bureaucracy? Also, if you would like to venture an opinion about the political side I would like to hear that, too.
Mr. Williams: I can say only what I saw directly. Certainly within the Department of National Defence there was full support. The deputy minister and the ministers were all in favour. At Public Works and Government Services Canada at times we thought there was support but whenever we did it would evaporate. I talk about that in the book so I am not telling you anything I have not said before.
I am not convinced, in fairness to the ministers, that ministers ever received the true story. That is why I make the point that I could rationalize that the reason we did not make the decision was because ministers did not understand.
Senator Banks: Sorry to leap in, but why is that? Should we not be able to expect that ministers understand the question?
The Chairman: Come on, Senator Banks, surely you know.
Mr. Williams: My point is that I know that information does not always reach ministers. Bureaucrats control the information that comes to ministers.
Senator Meighen: Therefore it is an incomplete rather than an incorrect story.
Mr. Williams: Yes: For instance, I could never be sure whether former minister Scott Brison was supportive because I was never sure whether he had the right information, as I have just expressed it. I would have been surprised if he had said no. It boggles the mind, given what I have said — unless you prove me wrong and I do not think I am — given all the advantages of doing this, why we would not put our men and women before bureaucracy. However, I was never sure that he received all the information and so we were left with a conundrum. Unless both organizations are willing to work together, it will not happen. We would be frustrated and we would say that enough is enough: let us do what we can do. Maybe another time, maybe another era, both organizations will look more cooperatively at undertaking this.
Senator Moore: Mr. Williams, on page 2 of your remarks you state, ``Equally important it alleviates a large skill shortage problem that is becoming even more serious as the population ages.'' Also, you mention that one third of personnel are now of the age of 55 or more; and two-thirds are 45 or more.
Mr. Williams: Two-thirds; 65 per cent.
Senator Moore: How do we address that? Where do people receive the proper training? Is it on the job? Does some university have a course in procurement systems or procedures? How do we train the necessary staff to fill the gaps?
Mr. Williams: First, you eliminate a big part of the problem at the get-go by creating one organization. Instead of two organizations that borrow from each other, each one unable to meet all its needs, you have one needing less, hence it is able to fill all it jobs.
The second question has a positive answer, because both within the Department of Public Works and Government Services Canada and within the Department of National Defence there is a plethora of training courses. Thousands of man hours and man days are spent by all the purchasing agents, PGs, as they are called, learning the process and the requisite skill sets. A great deal is done often in conjunction with the private sector, the Material Management Institute, and a wide range of course work is available to educate and provide the knowledge to the men and women.
There is also a good hierarchy or advancement criteria as you move upward: PG2, PG3, PG4, PG5, and PG6. A lot has been done within the public service in terms of advancement and to provide the requisite training. The problem is not so much lack of training, but lack of people in both organizations to undertake the process.
Senator Moore: Lack of people to undertake what process?
Mr. Williams: The projects that we are talking about to buy X, Y or Z. That is a constraint, too. If you do not have enough people you cannot undertake projects the way you would like. You do not have enough people to field this project team or that project team.
Senator Moore: You are talking about compressing and now you say we need more people.
Mr. Williams: No, I am saying that by combining you eliminate or address the immediate skill shortage problem. If both organizations are short of people and you combine the two you have enough to serve one organization. The key then becomes what you are saying. As you look ahead to retirements, bring in the requisite number of people at the lower levels and train them, and be rather buoyant about the course work and training available to people to advance and to be able to take on these challenges.
Senator Moore: If this separate entity, a defence procurement Canada, was put into place as you suggest in your book and in your remarks, what would that do internally with regard to the whole esprit de corps for the public servants who work in that section? Will they think, if only they had this they would be keener and they would attract more and better people, and they could do the job with more enthusiasm?
Mr. Williams: Throughout the public service if we thought that we would have it already and we do not have it, therefore by definition not everyone thinks that way.
Certainly, within the Department of National Defence people would support this. Within a lot of the bureaucracy within the public works department, people would also feel closer to the client because obviously they would be part of one organization and they would be supportive. The challenge is in the mid-to-higher echelons of the bureaucracy, where people might feel that they are losing something that is an awful lot of fun. That is why I make the point that as long as it is a question of ``should we'' the answer from the bureaucrats will be ``no.''
Senator Moore: Is that strictly a preservation of turf?
Mr. Williams: Yes: I am convinced that is all it is, and not by everyone.
Senator Moore: Then it will take a political decision on top of all that.
Mr. Williams: That is exactly my point.
Senator Moore: Given your time at the public works department, once you are at DND, with your five or six years of background knowledge and experience, were you able to eliminate costs or shorten the time to deliver equipment?
Mr. Williams: Together we were, absolutely. The book talks about moving toward total package procurement. There is a whole list of best practices, such as the air-to-air refuelling example. In other words, it is about leveraging what others are doing.
If you look today at the number of best practices that have been put in place by officials in both departments, I am convinced you would see that the time frames are much less than 15.8 years. As long as you measure and publicize those things, what else is anyone to think?
Senator Moore: My last question is with regard to your concern about whether the Minister of Public Works and Government Services receives all the good information the minister should have to make a decision concerning acquisition of defence equipment. With your knowledge of the file as deputy minister, is it appropriate or inappropriate for the Minister of Public Works and Government Services to say, ``Mr. Williams, can you come over to my office and brief me on this?'' You are from the Department of National Defence. Is that ever done? Is it appropriate?
If you are concerned that a minister of the Crown does not have the best information, how does the minister get it? I would say it comes from the deputy minister of defence.
Mr. Williams: I cannot be unequivocal. I would be surprised if I had not met with and talked to ministers in briefings from the Department of National Defence to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services. That often goes on.
Senator Moore: In your time at DND, were you ever asked by the Minister of Public Works and Government Services to drop over and give a briefing on a particular file?
Mr. Williams: Yes, I have a number of times. Sometimes my directors general would, too. Often I would do it on a particular file.
Senator Moore: If you were concerned that a minister did not have the best information because, perhaps, the decision did not come in a timely way or maybe you had indications that it would be negative, would you initiate such a course of action?
Mr. Williams: Only if I was invited to speak, or I may ask my deputy to check with their deputy.
Senator Moore: You are a lead public servant here. You know what is in the file. You know, or at least you think you know, that the Minister of Public Works and Government Services probably does not have all the good information because someone is doing some bureaucratic stickhandling. Would you feel a responsibility to show the minister more complete information? Is there no process to do that?
Mr. Williams: Let me make two points. The way you state it suggests that it is a common occurrence.
Senator Moore: I do not mean that.
Mr. Williams: I do not suggest that at all.
Senator Moore: Even one occurrence: If you were sitting there with this knowledge and you can help the welfare of the country, why should you not be able to? How can you?
Mr. Williams: Let me distinguish between a file-by-file examination and the kind of things I am talking about here that are basic machinery of government.
My view is that on a file-by-file basis we typically were on the same page. We work collectively together. When we went and briefed together, things worked smoothly. It was not an uncommon occurrence for both bureaucracies to reach both ministers.
What I am talking about here is not that, though. I am talking about a significant machinery-of-government question. I am talking specifically about where I am convinced that the whole story, as I have articulated it, was not robustly explained to both ministers. I have to rationalize that because, if I do not, then people put the bureaucracy over the best welfare of our men and women, and I would hate to think that was the case.
Senator Meighen: Before the chairman called on me I looked through your recommendations again. I seem to recall there was one you made about the necessity of redrawing regulations governing force deployment. Is that correct?
Mr. Williams: I do not think so.
Senator Meighen: I mean force development, not deployment.
Mr. Williams: I try to shy away from that.
The only regulations I talk about are regulations around the Canadian International Trade Tribunal and the regulations surrounding the different acts to create defence procurement Canada. I comment on the new defence procurement plan that they want to put in place, and enhancements to it. However, I do not talk about force development regulations, as least I should not have. I do not think I did.
Senator Meighen: I will see if I can come across the exact words in your book. Let me move to something else.
Do you see sole source contracts as something that we should employ more frequently; or do you see pitfalls and minefields there?
Mr. Williams: If it was up to me, we would never do it. It is a lose-lose-lose situation. The taxpayer loses, the military loses and industry loses.
Senator Meighen: Have you not already said that industry has consolidated dramatically and, perhaps, there is only one industry.
Mr. Williams: I said two or three. Two or three is good; one is not. We had the three biggest consortiums in the world participating in the maritime helicopter program. Only one won. Not everyone was happy. However, three thought it was good enough for them to put millions of dollars into their bids.
Any time you pre-select you are trying to play God. You are trying to say that, for some reason, we know this is the best one for the military. Frankly, we do not know that until we go through a competition.
At best, we are dealing with a fixed budget. If we can save $50 million or $100 million by forcing the company to whom we will sole-source it to compete and, by so doing, lower the price, we allow that money to be reallocated for other defence priorities.
Senator Meighen: I understand that. Are there not exceptions to the rule, for example, the Nyala jeep in Afghanistan? Clearly, the Iltis was not up to the job. We had to do something quickly.
Mr. Williams: In fact, we do that regularly. Section 506.11(a) of the Agreement on Internal Trade talks about having the option to do things quickly if something unforeseen happens. Absolutely, without question, we do what we have to do to protect the lives of the men and women.
When we bought the unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, we did it quickly because we knew we needed them. When we got the counter bombardment radar systems from the Swedes, we did it quickly because we knew we needed them to protect our men and women on the bases. One can always do that.
To do that for those reasons is no problem at all. Those are short-term needs. You will do it and fix it. We are not talking about that. We are talking about whether we buy tactical airlift or buy other kinds of military equipment. People have talked about this for a long time. In those cases, you lose more time by trying to trick the system than by going through the door. The fixed-wing search and rescue is a perfect example.
In 2004, the Department of Finance said to us, ``We will give you extra money. Where can you best use it?'' I met with the vice-chief at that time and said, ``All right, fixed-wing search and rescue is a critical need. Everyone understands it. The average Canadian understands we need things to save our people. Let us get the money and do it.'' We will be three years on and we have not done a thing. The primary reason for not doing a thing was that rather than go through the door straightforwardly, and develop a requirement package that we could then complete, there were continuous efforts to develop specifications that would allow one company to compete.
We have lost three years. I always said to the military, ``Trust us to meet your needs.''
The Chairman: Mr. Williams, this situation was of a company that had good political connections, exercised them and threw a monkey wrench into the system. It was not a question of someone trying to develop a faster route; it was a question of a company saying, wait for us until we modify a piece of equipment and play with it a bit.
Mr. Williams: With due respect, I do not think that was the reason. I was there from the get-go. I know all the companies that wanted to play. We visited all the companies in the marketplace. We should have, and could have, put out a requirement to allow more than one competitor to play. That would have allowed Canadian industry to be part of the different consortiums and to allow the minister to get up and say, I am not predetermining: If they can meet our needs, so be it and if they cannot, so be it. They are the ones that contended they could adapt what they have to meet the needs. My advice to the military is, do not downgrade your requirements. The minister must say that the capability will be equal to or greater than what we have today. You can say it a number of ways and let industry then deliver.
The Chairman: Let me put the question to you slightly differently and, believe it or not, this is a supplementary question. What happens when the capability drops and is degraded to such a level that you are faced with an emergency? We have been talking about tactical lift for such a long time. If you use that as an example, at what point do we consider the C-130 Hercules degraded to the point where we have a totally dysfunctional Canadian Forces? At that point, can you break the rules and say we need these because we cannot function without them?
Mr. Williams: I cannot give you an answer to that. I know we spent a lot of time worrying about the Hercules and developing a short-term and a long-term plan. That argument can be used to avoid competition all the time.
My point is, it is not unforeseen. You have one of two choices. Either you invoke national security to say, we will bypass all that and go ahead and buy it, or you say, we will invest the three or four months extra and do it right. My answer has always been, do the latter thing. If you do it from the get-go, chances are you will be further ahead than trying to convince people there is only one company that can do it. If you invoke national security, you have handed someone billions of dollars worth of Canadian taxpayers' money on a plate. I do not like that. I would much rather see suppliers sharpen their pencil. They may still win it, but at millions of dollars less and that gets poured back into the defence budget to be used elsewhere.
Senator Meighen: Mr. Williams, let me turn to something else. I would like your opinion as to whether it would help speed up the process. This committee has recommended on more than one occasion that the approval level of the Minister of National Defence for major capital projects be increased to $500 million. I think now if it is over $30 million, the minister must bring it to cabinet and if it were increased to $500 million, cabinet could still ask for details. I think there are 49 projects on the drawing board right now and the number requiring presentation to cabinet and cabinet approval would be reduced to ten.
Is there any reason we should not do that?
Mr. Williams: No: Let me make some contextual comments. Right now, with two organizations you have a higher authority, going up a contractual level to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services. Both will be combined into one organization. I make the point that if you have an appropriately developed defence capability plan that has all the projects listed and prioritized, and the plan receives cabinet approval, there is no question that at the front end you ought to be able to get appropriate Treasury Board approval so you do not need to go back, project by project. You are exactly right. I think it could be even more streamlined than you say. The key is obtaining approval at the front end for this list of projects with ministers understanding what it means, how the projects will be procured, and then allowing one minister to maintain accountability as opposed to accountability being diffused between two ministers. Whenever you have accountability diffused between two ministers, it is hard to know where things go wrong. If you have one minister, you can project higher contract authority and higher project authority but you do that only when people have looked at the whole plan, they understand the whole plan, and they understand why this project is on the plan. Only if you deviate by X per cent or do something dramatic do you have to come back to cabinet again — full speed ahead. That would streamline the process. There are recommendations to that effect in the book.
Senator Meighen: Can I ask you one final question about the old, famous story of the purchase of the submarines. It seems to me, as a former lawyer, that it is a case of caveat emptor. While I personally supported the purchase of those submarines, it seems where we went wrong is that they were lying unused in dry dock or tied up alongside for a number of years and inevitably, anything that goes through that process degrades. It is pretty basic. How did we miss it? Is it the process or the people?
Mr. Williams: I am not sure how often one has gone through this kind of a process where we reactivate used submarines. I know from reviewing the files about submarines in preparation for my coming to this committee, and the House of Commons as well, a lot of people did due diligence in trying to anticipate. There was review with engineers from both countries. I think they did the best they could in terms of trying to understand the extent of the reactivation work.
The fact is that the U.K. has had to pay the bill for the vast majority of the cost upgrades, not the Canadian taxpayer.
Senator Meighen: I did not realize that and I do not know whether most Canadian taxpayers realized that.
Mr. Williams: Absolutely: My counterpart there probably got more heat than I did here. We had to fix dents and those kinds of things, but by and large the contractual arrangements were such that all the problems were basically absorbed by the U.K. We suffered too by not having these in place when we wanted to provide sufficient training and all those kinds of navy issues that relate to getting them properly staffed. If you talk to the heads of the navy, they will talk to you more capably about those delays.
Everyone thought they were doing the best they could, and did a lot of rigorous work. Everyone was surprised at the amount of problems that occurred and the delays caused by them. At the end of the day, 25 cents on the dollar is still good value, if only we could get them up and running.
Senator Moore: I understand that a big part of the cost that Canada had to cover, in that submarine acquisition program was that we did not take and use the British weapons systems that were in place on these ships. We went about retooling and outfitting them with Canadian systems when the British system worked as well for us. They are an ally and you mentioned earlier about working with allies and saving time and money.
Is that so?
Mr. Williams: Without question, a big part of the program is the Canadianization of the system. Where I would probably differ from you — you would have to talk more to the navy people than to me — is that while the systems may be proven, we are working in a different environment. We have different communication responsibilities and different radar requirements, and I think the Canadianization process was not done simply at time and cost but because it was necessary to the functioning of our systems within our environment.
You would have to discuss that more in detail. I do not think that was a surprise, frankly. That is not where the problems arise in the Canadianization aspect. They were budgeted for and planned for.
Senator Moore: Including the weapons system?
Mr. Williams: Yes.
Senator Moore: It was all thought about with due diligence efforts? It was thought about and budgeted for, so there were no surprises there? How much would we have saved if we had just adopted the British missile systems that were on those ships?
Mr. Williams: I cannot give you a figure offhand. I would not even want to hazard a guess.
Senator Moore: Why did we not take those systems?
Mr. Williams: People more expert than I would make those decisions because you are talking about a military operational environment.
Clearly, the view of the Navy was that to operate those submarines within our environment required uniquely Canadian systems. That does not surprise me. You need to talk to the navy about why these systems are preferable.
Senator Moore: When we build a destroyer, we install weapons systems on board from different countries and then learn the technicalities of them.
Mr. Williams: No.
Senator Moore: Everything on a frigate built in Canada is made in Canada?
Mr. Williams: I use the maritime helicopter example again. While both the frame and the systems are there, the real risk is in integrating all the different systems uniquely packaged into our own helicopter. We did not take a helicopter with a weapons system from this country or that country. We took a frame and put in place those weapons systems that make the asset applicable to our environment.
Senator Moore: Where do we get those weapons systems?
Mr. Williams: We have a range of systems.
Senator Moore: From across the world, which is exactly my point.
Mr. Williams: We do not take someone else's helicopter and system and then remove it.
Senator Moore: I know that. My point is, we have a proven military weapon in place on these submarines that we did not take, and we could have. It would have saved millions.
Mr. Williams: I am not so sure those weapons could operate within the Canadian environment.
Senator Moore: I am not sure if missiles or torpedoes were on board.
The Chairman: Mr. Williams, even with the money we have spent on the submarines, they are still significantly less than the alternative; is that correct?
Mr. Williams: Yes: At the time I left the cost was about 25 cents on the dollar. That cost may have gone up. The costs are less than the alternative of buying new ones, absolutely.
The Chairman: Those numbers still apply even though we are close to the mid-life of the submarines, the Chicoutimi is out of play, and they will not be fully operational for another year or two?
Mr. Williams: Correct: The plan still is to ensure they are serviceable for 20-plus years, and that is still the intent. You recall that we underestimated the cost of maintaining each one, and that was included to ensure we were open, fair and transparent with the costs. Absolutely there is a cost saving, providing they can be made operational.
The Chairman: How do you account for the public perception that the taxpayer has been ripped off with these boats?
Mr. Williams: While it is nice to mention 25 cents on the dollar, we still do not have anything.
All people have heard about is problems and delay, so they are saying will we ever get these boats? If they are never operational, then 25 cents on the dollar is 25 cents wasted. I can understand why people would think that way. If they do become operational in the near future and we can maintain them for the next 20 to 30 years, given our limited budget, it is a good deal for Canada.
The Chairman: I am not sure whether you are telling us a story about the price of your bananas.
Senator Day: I would like to start by discussing an announcement a couple of weeks ago for the high-frequency surface wave radar that is being developed. The plan is for three in the West Coast and two in the East Coast, as I recall. This was an important part of DND's plan. The program was cancelled by the current government because, as I understand it, the department of communications was not prepared to allow the frequencies to be used for that equipment after many millions of dollars were spent. This program incorporated into the plan for knowing what was happening on the seas at our two approaches. Is that a procurement problem, or is that DND not knowing that this was a potential problem? How does this situation happen?
Mr. Williams: It did not just crop up. It was an issue when I was there. To be fair, at the time, working with Industry Canada and communications, I thought that they were trying to address where on the spectrum it would fit.
Obviously they could not address the problem, notwithstanding best efforts by everyone. Whether something else could have been done to expedite it or to address the problem, I cannot say. I was somewhat surprised, but obviously both organizations could not find a way to address each other's concerns, and obviously the senior people did not feel anything needed to be imposed to make it happen.
The Chairman: On the subject, Senator Day, Lieutenant-General Marc Dumais did not have the answer when he appeared before us, but he did undertake, on the part of the department, to provide us with a complete explanation on this matter. Mr. Williams may have a different perspective.
Senator Day: In procurement and during the procurement phase, do you leave that kind of issue to someone else to do: DND says this is what we want, we have defined this, and you assume that all those checks have been made?
Mr. Williams: No: It is fair to say that whether it is the military, as part of their statement of requirements, or the procurement arm trying to move this projectforward, both would be heavily involved in addressing any kind of hiccup in the process.
Senator Day: Would any licences required be part of the procurement process as well?
Mr. Williams: Absolutely: We work together on this, and if one of the requirements of our men and women is not met we try to find the solution together. A lot of people in the procurement organization are military, so everyone is committed to finding the solution because we are doing it for colleagues.
Senator Day: We will see what answer we get from other sources, but I raised the issue because we have you here and you were involved as deputy minister at the time.
Mr. Williams: Assistant deputy minister.
Senator Banks: For clarification, did you say that the people involved in the procurement process would be the ones involved in obtaining a licence from the CRTC, as an example? Is that a part of procurement?
Mr. Williams: If there was an issue with Industry Canada and the communication people in the process of the military defining their requirements for this surface wave radar, and depending on where it was on the spectrum in relation to this issue, we would not sit back idly and tell them to fix the problem. As I discussed in the book, civilians ought to be able to work the system perhaps even better than the military. We would try to convene a meeting and bring organizations together to figure out how we solve the problem together. That is what I was trying to refer to.
Senator Day: It is important to clarify that.
You raised accountability in your comments earlier, and I think it is an interesting area that we might want to explore a little bit.
Bill C-2, the federal accountability act, is before Parliament at the present time. In that bill there is a provision for a procurement officer. Have you had an opportunity to study that recommendation? Can you talk about the impact of that position, assuming the bill gets passed?
Mr. Williams: I have looked at it. I am all in favour of stronger accountability, but whether this particular position achieves much is questionable. For one thing, how will it fit within the spectrum of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal and existing rules? If someone has a problem today they know where to go. My second point is that the position is advisory, not adjudicatory. In other words, that person can give advice but cannot rule. How much substance will that person have and how challengeable will that person's decisions be? If that person makes a recommendation, can it be challenged? We do not know the answer to that question. However, it does allow people that have missed the CITT deadline to go to that person, and it does look at contract administration. There are opportunities for that person to add value, perhaps, but I am skeptical. We have many checks and balances, more than any other country, with the Agreement on Internal Trade and the Canadian International Trade Tribunal. We need to determine how that person fits within the accountability of an organization. I have many questions in mind in this respect.
Senator Day: Mr. Justice Gomery's report recommended strongly that parliamentary committees be given sufficient resources to do the job to hold ministers accountable. You point out in your comments that to date you have not seen committees being rigorous in that respect. Obviously, you agree with Mr. Justice Gomery that the committees need resources to do their job properly.
Mr. Williams: Probably, yes: I say ``probably'' because although more resources can help, witnesses who appear before committees should be interviewed prior to their appearance, either in their office or somewhere else, and questioned about what they will say. That information should be brought back to committee members for the collective good of all. Whether that requires more resources or better use of existing resources I am not sure. Maybe it is a bit of both. Efforts can be made collectively if you are determined to explore things as opposed to taking a partisan position, which most of the House of Commons committees do, more often than not. I would argue that you can do your job better with what you have but if you have more, it makes the job easier. I would love to see people have more resources but I know that is not always the case. My plea is: If you do not have more resources, at least use what you have to the betterment of all committee members. One way to do that is to take the time to interview witnesses once before their appearance and to share those notes so that everyone has a higher level of understanding before the witnesses appear before the committee.
Senator Day: That recommendation is in your comments and explains the importance of interviewing witnesses beforehand.
Mr. Williams: As a bureaucrat, I made a comment that I would prepare at length, like studying for a dissertation. It was great for me to do that because I asked many questions in anticipation of being asked many hard questions. It forces witnesses to do their homework much better than, perhaps, they would do otherwise.
Senator Day: My final question is about industrial benefits and the use of the purchasing power of the Department of National Defence for regional development. In your book you talk about understanding the process and you give three different ways that industrial and regional benefits can accrue. You seem to endorse the concept but you put an interesting recommendation at the end: that DND should be compensated if DND purchasing power creates a regional or industrial benefit when the item would cost less to purchase elsewhere. Do you see that as a legitimate role for government, to use the DND budget to industrial benefit and regional development?
Mr. Williams: Yes I do see it as legitimate, without question. The main purpose of defence procurement is to meet the military's needs. However, when you spend billions of dollars of taxpayers' money, to not create benefits for Canadians in jobs would be unconscionable. The current system allows for that. Typically, on procurements over a certain amount we demand benefits equal to those that are in the contract. If one wins a contract of $570 million, the supplier will be asked to contribute a benefit to that extent at least in Canada.
With the AIT, we cannot say where those benefits will occur. Only industry can determine that. Industry is not stupid — they understand politics and that you should distribute things from coast to coast so they will go where industry is so they do not incur additional costs needlessly.
Putting on our defence hat, the best way to buy is competitively because competition will maximize your budget. The government has the right to say, as other countries have done, that in terms of the industrial framework the government wants to provide additional benefit to Canadian industries. Currently that holds for only two industries — ship building and munitions. Obviously, we would comply with that. My point is that restriction typically means increased costs. To that effect, you might say to the ministers of the Crown and to cabinet that if government policy includes such restrictions, then it will cost more and that extra cost should not be borne by the Department of National Defence. In asking for that, the odds likely will be small of getting it — so be it. At least the government has spoken to a new industrial policy to encourage and enhance these industries, just as in other major countries. DND, in understanding the new rules, will ask for the extra money and government will say yea or nay. For DND not to ask would not be smart. Whether the money is forthcoming, at minimum it is useful for the decision makers to know what it will cost. We do not know the cost of industrial and regional benefits or the cost of demanding that our ships be built in Canada. We ought to know that because we might understand that it is worthwhile to do that for many different reasons. I strongly advise finding the answers to those questions.
Senator Day: My supplementary question is whether that is readily calculable.
Mr. Williams: Certainly someone, inside or outside the bureaucracy, could do a good job of identifying those costs within a range. I am not convinced that it would cost more for industrial regional benefits. That would be useful to note, too, because all the naysayers might be surprised to know that a competitive marketplace with the strength of our industry does not cost us much, if anything, for companies outside of Canada to use our industry to build or to supply. In my view, any incremental cost is minimal. We can work to determine that or at least to have a rough approximation.
Senator Day: Did you do that as a matter of course when you were assistant deputy minister?
Mr. Williams: No because the accountability lies with Industry Canada, where the industrial and regional benefits policy is in place. We talked about it a great deal but it is not up to me to do that.
The Chairman: If I understood correctly, Mr. Williams, you said that you did not think there was any additional cost for having 100 per cent regional benefits coming back?
Mr. Williams: I am not sure whether there is any cost, or even much cost. I too would like to know that answer.
The Chairman: You have not studied it.
Mr. Williams: That is correct. My suggestion is, that is the way in which business is done around the world today.
The Chairman: We hear your theory but where is the best place to find the answer to that?
Mr. Williams: The people accountable for Canadian industrial policy are found at Industry Canada.
The Chairman: Do you believe that they can demonstrate that we are not paying X per cent extra for a widget?
Mr. Williams: No, I am not sure they can do that. I am uncertain whether they would know, when asked, if there is a cost and how much it is for industrial and regional benefits, IRBs.
The Chairman: Is there an additional cost calculated for ammunition or shipbuilding?
Mr. Williams: No: Currently, we comply with cabinet direction.
The Chairman: Cabinet is never told of how much extra it will cost if you direct that vessel to that yard?
Mr. Williams: That is correct, as opposed to allowing it to be built in Korea, for example.
Senator St. Germain: Mr. Williams, the clarity that you have brought to this hearing indicates your level of knowledge. You are dead on with regard to turf. I recall that in 1988 government was prepared to devolve the airports and the ADM said, ``We will look after it.'' I said, ``No, we need a point person.'' The deputy minister said, ``Minister, you do not need this.'' We are facing the same situation today. If we were to set up defence procurement Canada, we would need to dismantle certain positions within the system. Ministers do not know everything. You are absolutely right. They rely on information from bureaucrats and their political staff, what little information they may have on these complex files.
We are talking about changing the process here. We can go into the various acquisitions in the past, and we should learn from history. How would you recommend, short of going to the Prime Minister — maybe that is the only route to go — that we effect your recommendations in this book as far as devolving the process and establishing the process that works? The process you recommend would also deal with the question of men and women in the theatre of action in harm's way and urgency. It would most likely expedite that process of being able to react quicker.
Those of us that have been elected, political people that come in from British Columbia, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia or wherever it is, we arrive here and, all of a sudden, we are a ``minister of this.'' I am sure you people are saying, ``How long will this minister be here?'' If we were to make a recommendation as a committee that your ideas are sound, what is the best way to get the process underway in Ottawa?
Mr. Williams: Frankly, if this committee said something like ``Upon review, these recommendations should be implemented forthwith,'' and pass it to the Prime Minister, that would not hurt.
We are trying to appear before SCONDVA as well to make that same point. We will try to provide this information directly to the Prime Minister. People like you must make the point that the time for study is over if we are to try to fix this thing. Frankly, nothing else under the sun will be uncovered about this process. It is all right there. You either decide to fix it or not. If you do not fix it, I am not so sure the government can then say to its ministers in their mandate each time, ``Please look at procurement and see how you can make it faster and cheaper.'' That is what it says in every mandate letter. They have the answer, and not only do they have the recommendations but they also have the roadmap to do it within a year. Establishing the agency and the legislative changes that must be made are not particularly onerous. They can be done quickly by changing the particular acts I have indicated. If people want to put the men and women first, from the top of the government they simply must say, ``Do it. Give me monthly progress reports, but we are not asking you whether you like this. We are simply telling you do it.''
The process will stand best if we look at it as I have done, namely, holistically. We have focussed a bit of time on industrial issues here. We have not talked much about the Canadian International Trade Tribunal. To have people heading up that tribunal that have no procurement experience is unconscionable. They make decisions worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and none of them has procurement experience. It does not make any sense to me.
Senator Moore: Is that the situation today?
Mr. Williams: Yes, it is. To have a mandate that allows suppliers who did not even bid to complain afterwards about something and to win lost profits is bananas.
Therefore, we have many things to look at, and my plea is not to focus on only one thing. If we want to improve the process, let us do it all. How the CITT acts influences the culture of the organizations. You can become risk averse because you receive inane decisions. I am not saying all decisions are inane, but when decisions boggle the mind, what do you do? That leads to stagnation because you are so afraid of making mistakes.
We can take all 25 recommendations and implement them. We should not pick and choose because we are trying to improve the whole process. If we try to tackle just one part of it, the sum of the each of the parts is much greater than each of the things individually. My plea is to look at it holistically, put a plan in place to fix it all and make it the best it can be.
Senator St. Germain: That sort of wraps it up.
The Chairman: We will not hold the vote right now, but we will consider your proposition carefully. We have noted your comment that your approach is holistic, and there is no point in putting a Chev in the front end and a Ford in the back end. I believe we understand that concept.
We appreciate your coming before us. As usual, you have interesting and provocative ideas. The committee likes that because we think there needs to be a fundamental change in this area.
Senator Meighen: That is so particularly when your ideas accord with our own, yes.
The Chairman: We do notice an occasional congruence. In fairness, you have a far more comprehensive approach than we have taken, and we note that as well.
Thank you for appearing before us.
For members of the public who are viewing the program, if you have questions or comments, visit our website at www.sen-sec.ca. We post witness testimony as well as confirmed hearing schedules. Otherwise, you can contact the Clerk of the Committee by calling 1-800-267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting members of the committee.
The committee continued in camera.
The committee continued in public.
We have before us today Brigadier-General A.J. Howard, Director General Operations, Strategic Joint Staff, National Defence Headquarters. The subject matter is to receive a briefing on the present operational situation in Kandahar, with a look to future operations in the area, and to discuss the initiatives of the Canadian Forces in Kandahar.
BGen. Howard joined the Canadian Forces in 1978. He was commissioned into the army as an artillery officer and has commanded from the troop to Brigade Group level. He spent over 15 years either serving on operations, in field units or in formations. He has served internationally in Lahr, Germany, Cyprus, the former Yugoslavia and Washington, D.C.
More recently, he was appointed Commanding Officer, 1st Regiment Royal Canadian Horse Artillery from 1991 to 2001, and Commander 2nd Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, 2004 to 2006. BGen. Howard was appointed Director General Operations, Strategic Joint Staff at National Defence Headquarters in the summer of 2006.
He is accompanied by Colonel J.G.E. Tremblay, Director, Current Operations, Strategic Joint Staff, National Defence Headquarters. Col. Tremblay joined the Canadian Forces in 1980. He is an artillery officer by trade and has served with the 5th Regiment Light Artillery of Canada in all ranks, including commanding officer. During his first year as commanding officer, he deployed to Afghanistan with Operation Athena and, for six months, served as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Kabul Multinational Brigade and Commanding Officer of Brigade Groups. He was promoted Colonel in January 2006.
Welcome. General, I understand you have a statement for the committee. If you do, you have the floor, sir.
Brigadier-General A.J. Howard, Director General Operations, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence: Thank you for that kind introduction. Honourable senators, good afternoon, and thank you for the invitation to provide a short update on CF operations in Afghanistan and to address questions to the best of my ability, respecting security constraints and knowing that strategic policy is the purview of the Government of Canada and elected officials.
As you know, my name is Brigadier-General Al Howard. I last met the committee in Petawawa during the late spring, when I was commander of the brigade there. In Petawawa and brigade, I was a large fish in a very small pond. I was the boss and that worked well for me. Having swum down the Ottawa River in this direction, I now find myself a much smaller fish in a bigger pond. I am sure you know what that means.
I will try my best to help you this afternoon as we work through the issues. You will well understand that while I have good and recent experience as field commander, I am still learning here in Ottawa.
I am joined this afternoon by my compatriot, the Director of Current Operations, Col. Eric Tremblay, an officer of impeccable credentials and one of our outstanding senior leaders for the future. He has also deployed in Kabul as part of an earlier rotation, and so has great perspective on the depth of the mission we conduct in Afghanistan.
Let me begin my remarks this afternoon by saluting the men and women of Task Force Afghanistan, TFA. They deserve a huge vote of thanks for the work they are doing in Afghanistan. I do not want to put too fine a point on it, but they would be interested to know that we are here talking about this issue. What matters most to them is the knowledge that their fellow Canadians and the Government of Canada are interested in what they are doing. It is essential for them to know that, and that has certainly been communicated, not so much the specifics of this particular discussion today but the work that this committee does. For example, the Red Friday that we had a couple of weeks back means a lot to the troops.
They are literally putting their lives on the line, trying to make Afghanistan a better place. We all know that, and this is no easy task. It is far from it. It is also no easy task being a family member of these outstanding soldiers, and I am always mindful of that.
The soldiers of TFA serving in Afghanistan today are at the forefront of Canadian foreign policy. In the largest sense, our strategy is, in partnership with over 30 other nations, to assist the Afghan government to bring about peace and stability, to my way of thinking.
[Translation]
Our integrated ``Whole of Government Approach'' is focussed on three strategic objectives: assist in stabilising Afghanistan to prevent a relapse as a safe haven for terrorists; strengthen Afghan governance; and improve the lives of Afghans and reduce Afghan poverty.
[English]
I do not think those three objectives are any different from what you have already been briefed on and would know.
Our commitment to Afghanistan, as part of a wider Government of Canada and international community commitments, aims to achieve effects at three levels. At the national level, we try to provide mentoring and advisory capabilities. We work with the government of President Karzai right in Kabul. Many government departments do, not only the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, DFAIT, but DND with a strategic assistance team, so there is an effort at the national level.
At the regional level, we have taken the lead for the multinational brigade, which is set to change in November. We have been leading for the past nine months and will hand off to our Dutch colleagues in November. Also, we have provided a robust battle group and capable provincial reconstruction team, which we see weekly if not daily on the television. We provide that work and those teams to Afghanistan at the lowest level, at the coal face.
As you are well aware, the international community, and indeed Canada, is trying to help Afghanistan in three distinctive ways: three lines of operation, if you will. First is governance. We support the capability of the Government of Afghanistan to address the needs of its peoples and enforce the rule of law throughout its territory whilst reducing illicit trade.
Second is developments. We hope to support the capability of the Government of Afghanistan to reduce poverty, create a viable economy, and address the infrastructure and social priorities of government authorities at all levels.
Third is security. We are busy trying to eliminate or significantly reduce the operational capability of opposing military forces and their support by the local population. We want to support the capability of the security forces of the Government of Afghanistan to maintain a secure environment. It is hard to advance these first two lines of operation without security in hand. Nowhere is this more true than in Kandahar province.
At this point, I want to drill down a little further within each of these three lines to describe, in more detail, where I think we are at.
Governance: From a CF perspective, the goal is to strengthen and enhance the architecture of governance in cooperation with Canadian governmental departments as well as international organizations. This goal is accomplished through integration with the Canadian embassy in Kabul. The strategic advisory team, 14 Canadian Forces officers in Kabul, assists the Afghan government and advises President Karzai through the presidential advisory group.
In August 2005, the Government of Canada decided to contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan by helping to establish enduring institutions through the deployment of a strategic assessment team, SAT, consisting of the 14 personnel I just mentioned. This initiative is uniquely Canadian, and this SAT remains a national asset that we have not given to NATO or the allied chain of command. It works for the ambassador of Canada. This team was created to work mainly with the presidential office on strategic planning and inter-agency coordination predominantly related to national defence and security issues. The SAT's responsibilities are to assist the office of the President of Afghanistan, in particular his Chief of Staff, in developing a strategic planning capability, and to assist and support security reform through the provision of strategic military advice.
The second line is development. From a CF perspective, we facilitate the delivery of programs and projects in support of the economic recovery and rehabilitation of Afghanistan focusing on supporting Canadian government organizations and non-governmental organizations, NGOs, whose efforts meet our national objectives. The Government of Canada has committed $700 million to this endeavour. The Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA, DFAIT and the RCMP have integrated into the PRT in Kandahar, providing the whole of a government team.
At the provincial level, the provincial reconstruction team seeks to support the governor through a multi-faceted approach. Lieutenant-Colonel Simon Hetherington and the PRT are working to help the governor establish a rudimentary bureaucracy, establish reconstruction in aid priorities and hire local firms to reconstruct key facilities such as schools, roads and hospitals. They are also helping the governor to create a police force from scratch. That is no minor task.
While the PRT is involved in many other areas let me simply state that the military component of the PRT, coupled with the foreign affairs officer there, the three CIDA development officers, the four RCMP officers, and one city police officer from Prince Edward Island, to keep everything sane, are doing the best job they can. Their focus is on creating Afghan capacity within the governor's framework and not simply rushing out to complete all this on their own.
No doubt it would be quicker and simpler but it would defeat our long-term goals. The PRT tries to focus longer term, so we work at the Afghan pace. This work involves shuras, where every decision is based on consensus. At the local village level and all the way up, as you are well aware, no one person can ride shotgun over decisions that are made by this young bureaucracy we are trying to build, if you can even call it a bureaucracy.
Why do things take so long in Afghanistan? It is because we are trying to do it the Afghan way. We are trying to build the capacity of the Afghans to govern and facilitate their own reconstruction, their own aid; that is what the PRT is trying to do. I spoke at length with LCol. Hetherington on this particular subject over the weekend. It frustrates him and everyone there but there is a component and I think, in the long-term, it is the correct way to go.
Finally, on security, the CF conducts full-spectrum operations in support of the Afghan national security forces to create an environment that is secure and conducive to the improvement of Afghan life. As lead nation in Regional Command South, which includes several thousand troops including 2400 Canadian troops, Canada shaped and executed NATO transition in this regional command. That transition was from Operation Enduring Freedom to International Stabilization Assistance Force, ISAF. That is no minor accomplishment to have made a change in organizations and mindset.
The Canadian national training team in Kabul conducts training for Afghan troops and we have participated in training over 4800 Afghan troops. That work does not get a lot of notice nationally, but it is certainly a worthy achievement of progress.
On October 5, we achieved NATO Stage Four expansion. This gives the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, the responsibility for all of Afghanistan. The transfer of the sector that we are into, International Stabilization Assistance Force, occurred earlier in the summer, in July. The transfer of Regional Command East, RC East, has just occurred, so ISAF now is responsible for all of Afghanistan.
Operation Enduring Freedom still exists as an operation but it is a counterterrorism mission and is predominantly led by the Americans.
I want to spend a couple of minutes on the International Security Assistance Force concept of operations. The commander of ISAF, Lieutenant-General David Richards, has invoked what he has called the Afghan development zone, ADZ concept. This concept offers an excellent opportunity to bring together security, governance and development in a timely and fully coordinated manner. The three thrusts that we seek as Canadians across those three lines of operations are also accepted internationally, and are being pursued by ISAF headquarters.
The ADZ concept will establish regions that are sufficiently safe to allow a focus on reconstruction. Perhaps I could quickly run through the theoretical sequence of these zones.
The idea is to annotate large population areas within Afghanistan where we can make the most difference. If we can go to those population zones and first have security forces clear that particular area of insurgents, the idea is then to maintain a presence to ensure the security of the development projects by embedding security with the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, as well as providing an ISAF and PRT presence.
The third step is that the PRT and other development agencies roll out concentrated spending on projects with a key economic and social multiplier value such as bridges, roads, wells and clinics. ISAF would maintain a quick reaction capability to protect against renewed insurgent activity. Lastly, ISAF would continue to assist in the coordination of overall government donor synchronization with long-term government development strategy.
This is what we are trying to do and what we are working toward, in the area west of Kandahar city, where the one regional command battle group has operated over the last several weeks. They have been trying to implement this concept: to secure an area, allow the aid to flow in, keep the area secure, and try to build it up as opposed to taking a wide, totally across-all-of-Afghanistan approach. We target areas where the bulk of the population is.
I will annotate briefly enhancements that you have heard about to bring you up to speed on one or two of those issues. Canadian Forces were authorized recently to deploy the following force protection capabilities for a minimum of one year beginning this fall. Under the reconstruction capability, an infantry company has been dispatched. Its task will be to protect the provincial reconstruction team better so it will conduct escorts and help guard members of the provincial reconstruction team, PRT. The company will be dispatched out of CFB Valcartier. In terms of stabilization capabilities, tank squadron, armoured recovery and engineering vehicles have been dispatched to provide greater mobility, protection, fire power and survivability. To counter changes in Taliban tactics, a counter-mortar capability has also been dispatched to locate enemy weapons, principally mortars that have been shelling our camps and rockets. We know where they are coming from and we can pinpoint better how to deal with them. The bulk of that capability is dispatched out of Edmonton.
We have augmented our mentoring and liaison teams working directly with the Afghan National Army. Approximately 40 soldiers from Valcartier, members of the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team, affectionately known to the troops as the OMLT, are supporting the training of the Afghan army. Recently, this new initiative has begun to operate in the Kandahar region. The goal of the OMLT is simple: to help the Afghan army battalions that we trained in Kabul. The job of those trainers in Kandahar province is to work with the army battalions to help them to maintain security within Kandahar province. Getting the Afghan army battalions to join us has been slow but this team will make a difference in helping them to operate as fighting units in Kandahar province. I am happy to expand on that later.
Some 200 soldiers under Brigadier General David A. Fraser have been at brigade headquarters for nine months. There is no doubt that they have experienced a highly charged nine-month deployment but they will come home this November. Brigadier General Timothy Grant, head of Task Force Afghanistan, and his command-and-control team, which will be smaller, will replace BGen Fraser and his team. The Dutch will run Multi-National Brigade Headquarters for Regional Command South.This change will occur in early November.
The Canadian Forces commitment to Afghanistan is all about helping Afghans move toward self-sufficiency and security, stabilize their country, develop their government and build a better future for their children. I am well over time and I apologize for that, Mr. Chairman, but I am happy to take your questions.
The Chairman: It was worth it, so we were happy to have you take the time.
You commented on the operational mentor-liaison team and that we have been training troops in Kabul. When committee members were in Kabul, we encountered Canadian soldiers but they were not training troops. Rather, they were evaluating training and they were ticked off that they were not training troops. Did that change? Did they start to train or are they still evaluators?
BGen. Howard: You have it exactly right. At the beginning of the mandate when we arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan, we had great difficulty incorporating the people we had provided to the training centre into any meaningful training.
One year ago, we took on the responsibility of running the training facility for the Afghan army battalions in cooperation with other NATO partners. To date, we have not accompanied the battalions on operational missions.
The Chairman: We had a caveat that prohibited Canadians from accompanying the Afghan battalions. Is that correct?
BGen. Howard: Yes: It was a national decision not to accompany them.
The Chairman: We prevented our trainers from going?
BGen. Howard: Yes.
The Chairman: Are our troops working under other caveats? We have been hearing a great deal about caveats.
BGen. Howard: No: National decisions on the employment of our forces in Afghanistan are controlled on a day-to- day basis by the commander of Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, CEFCOM, Lieutenant-General J.C.M. Gauthier. Certainly, he has been given a great deal of flexibility in terms of the on-ground commanders when it comes to rules of engagement and the areas in which we will operate. I will give you an example. If the commander of ISAF were to ask us to leave the southern region and move to the northern region, BGen. Fraser would have to contact LGen. Gauthier. I think they have a good framework with which to operate. Outside of that framework, they need to check back nationally.
The Chairman: General Hillier has been on the record talking about some of our allies to the effect that they have caveats such that they cannot operate at night, they cannot go outside the wire, et cetera. The list of restrictions covers everything down to tying shoe laces.
BGen. Howard: I do not want to disparage our allies.
The Chairman: I was not disparaging them. I was simply saying that they face restrictions such that the commander cannot utilize the troops with any flexibility.
BGen. Howard: That is correct. Certainly, one of the challenges of coalition operations is understanding what each force is permitted to do or to not do. Canadians have operated with caveats in the past in Bosnia, for example, which would frustrate coalition commanders as well.
The Chairman: I understand that we had a caveat in Afghanistan that said we could not participate in riot suppression because the troops had not been trained for it and, therefore, could not do it until they were trained.
BGen. Howard: It is safe to say that every nation has a certain number and level of caveats on their force. They will not pass them over to another nation under full command. There will always be, for example, rules of engagement, ROE. Every nation issues their soldiers ROE, which are caveats in the grand scheme. The commanders on the ground must deal with this reality.
Senator Meighen: Brig.-Gen. Howard, I begin by asking for some definitions. We are not as well versed in acronyms and military titles as you are. You are the Director General Operations of the Strategic Joint Staff. Can you tell us what the Strategic Joint Staff is? When did it see the light of day? What is it responsible for?
BGen. Howard: I am happy to do that. I will describe it in general terms and then ask Col. Tremblay to say a few words on his specific tasks.
The Strategic Joint Staff is designed to provide military analysis and decision support to the Chief of Defence Staff, CDS, in his role as the principal military adviser to the Government of Canada. We translate government direction into effective and responsive CF operations. The key word is ``operations.'' The role of the Strategic Joint Staff has been created to assist the CDS and higher authorities with the operational matters of the Canadian Forces.
Senator Meighen: Does it exist whether we are deployed?
BGen. Howard: Yes, sir: On any organization chart for the Department of National Defence you will not see the staffs listed. For example, the Chief of the Land Staff has his own staff, the Vice-Chief has a large staff, the Chief of Force Development, who programs for the Defence Capabilities Plan, et cetera. Our primary focus is operations, based on two specific areas. One area is current operations: providing support to the CDS and to the government on the here and now, on the day-to-day factors. If we do not have enough ammunition in theatre, for example, my team would look at that and deal with it right away.
Senator Meighen: Your team would look at it before or after the fact?
BGen. Howard: Hopefully before.
The Chairman: Why is that not a General Gauthier problem?
BGen. Howard: This depends on the level that we are talking about. General Gauthier's mandate is prosecuting international operations. He will do that, but there are certain issues on which he will get stuck.
I will use a hypothetical situation. Let us say we have run out of ammunition and further ammunition needs to be procured. General Gauthier can turn to CDS and say, ``I have taken this as far as I can. I have sent as much ammunition as I can, but I need more.'' The strategic staff works with the other level 1s within the headquarters to coordinate larger-level issues.
It is really a question of what level we are talking about. We try to interface with, and assist, the CDS at the highest level, the governmental strategic level, while General Gauthier prosecutes at a slightly lower level. One headquarters cannot do it all. The span of control would be too large.
The Chairman: The example of ammunition struck me as being a routine thing that General Gauthier would be concerned about on a daily or weekly basis.
BGen. Howard: However, if he runs out of ammunition, for example, and we need to buy some but there is none to be bought in Canada, we, the strategic staff, would facilitate the purchase.
The Chairman: Is that in fact the case?
BGen. Howard: There are certain natures that are reduced, but this is only one hypothetical issue. The strategic staff deals with issues that the CDS and the government direct us to take a look at. For example, in our operations to go to Lebanon, the initiating directives are worked on by the strategic joint staff, SJS, working with the CDS, which in turn works with the government, to define the strategic and national objectives. My staff work on these issues, provide the documentation, and there is a hand-off to the commander of the expeditionary force command, General Gauthier, to then prosecute the mission.
Senator Meighen: You are reactive, then; you are asked to do something.
BGen. Howard: No: There is a planning function. It is not totally reactive. We look at a number of areas across the world. It depends on the issue of the day.
Korea, for example, is an issue that the government will take a look at. What will Canada's response be? This issue is not only military; it is at the prime ministerial level, with all the other departments, DND included. The staff that supports that discussion is the strategic joint staff.
Senator Meighen: Given what we have all read in the paper, there is nothing to stop you from thinking about what happens if the government says we must do something about Korea.
BGen. Howard: That is right. If they want military advice and planning, they turn to the CDS.
Senator Meighen: You might be thinking about that now.
BGen. Howard: Right.
Senator Meighen: It is your decision to think about it.
BGen. Howard: It is the decision of the CDS as to what priorities to look at. We are not a stand-alone entity. We work for the CDS. The CDS sets our mandate and workloads. We have a planning capability and an ability to deal with issues of the day that are of a strategic nature. We also provide situational awareness. I would like Colonel Tremblay to describe some of his activities. That will give you more depth on what the strategic staff does.
Colonel J.G.E. Tremblay, Director, Current Operations, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence: Thank you for the opportunity to address the committee.
As mentioned by General Howard, we are the strategic joint staff, the military planners who translate Government of Canada objectives into military strategy at the strategic level versus the operational level. The Government of Canada sets the objectives and we translate those objectives into military objectives. We provide strategic guidance and clarity for the operational commanders to execute their mission.
As Director, Current Operations, I do not necessarily engage in long-term planning for the Canadian Forces in terms of force generation or force development. Other organizations do that. I am involved with the current operations, the ongoing operations for the Canadian Forces. To provide strategic clarity to Canadian Forces senior leadership and also to Government of Canada political leaders, including senators, as members of different committees, it is critical for us to understand what goes on at the technical level, the operational level and also at the strategic level with our allies. We follow, as part of a strategic battle rhythm, the day-to-day, week-to-week, minute-to- minute tempo throughout Canadian Forces missions so that we can provide advice through the CDS on what is happening on the ground. That is the situational awareness part.
The second function is command support, to ensure strategic clarity. We accomplish that by ensuring that when policy is developed or various subjects are discussed, we also have strategic military value added to the debate so that the proper decision can be taken. From a current operations perspective, that is exactly what my directorate would do.
Senator Meighen: Thank you, Colonel Tremblay. That is helpful. I am sure there will be other questions from my colleagues. Time is flying, chair, but I have a couple of other areas to explore.
General Howard, can you help us with some numbers? We have been operating on the 2300 number of troops for a long time. Recently, we came to understand that we have 2500 troops, if not more, in Afghanistan. With the changes brought about by relinquishing the ISAF command and by the arrival of the company of the Vandoos, what is the level of troop involvement at this point in Afghanistan from Canada, to the best of your knowledge?
BGen. Howard: We will hold steady at about 2500 troops. We will not go much higher than that. We simply do not have the forces to sustain a higher level. By the time we have brought the brigade headquarters back and put the enhancements back into Afghanistan, we will have about 2500 troops. The numbers today, for example, ran at about 2390 for number of personnel in theatre. We always drop down a bit because we have a couple hundred soldiers away on leave, taking a well-deserved break, throughout the mission. On any given day, we probably hover around 2500 troops.
Senator Meighen: However, they are committed to the theatre, in effect, are they not?
BGen. Howard: Yes.
Senator Meighen: They are going back to the theatre?
BGen. Howard: Yes, they certainly will.
Senator Meighen: If you count those on leave, it will bring the number up to 2500. In addition to the company of Vandoos, are tanks not going over?
BGen. Howard: The total will hover around 2500.
Senator Meighen: Maybe some of my colleagues will want to explore the numbers on each of your stabilization capabilities you have listed.
Col. Tremblay: Because there is no requirement to have a brigade headquarters beyond November 1, there will be a net gain in terms of personnel. Troops are coming home, so we will drop below 2200. When you then add the enhancement figures, we can maintain up to 2500 troops.
Senator Meighen: I want to ask you both about the delivery and deliverability of aid in Afghanistan. I think I can speak for every member of the committee when I say that we are convinced — and I assume you are, although I would like to hear your views on it — that success in Afghanistan will be through a combination, as BGen. Howard has outlined in this paper, of military stabilization of an area and aid coming in to win the hearts and minds of the people who live in the stabilized area. I do not think many people believe we can win hearts and minds through military action alone.
The problem seems to be that even the military, when trying to deliver aid, are shot at. Obviously civilians, or even PRT teams, have difficulty bringing any significant aid at this juncture. To what extent is aid getting through now under these trying circumstances.
Is there light at the end of this tunnel? Will the PRT teams be effective in the short run, in your view? Will we be able to stabilize and to liberate in the short term, or are we just hanging on by our fingernails?
BGen. Howard: That is a great question, and it comes to the nub of the endeavour in Afghanistan.
Looking back at the entire country, the NATO community has had great success in three quarters of Afghanistan. Three quarters of it is stable due to excellent work. There are dozens of PRTs throughout the country. The work that we have done in Kabul since we first arrived has resulted in almost a completely different city. Those are great successes, and Canada played a key role in them.
I had a chance to patrol personally various sectors on foot with the soldiers when we were in Kabul. I could see the results of the provision of aid. New wells had been built. Schools had Canadian furniture in them. It is a model that has worked well.
I do not suggest for a minute that Kabul is in any way done, but it has progressed and the challenge now is to bring that same success to the south. The southern region is a tough nut to crack, and that is where the challenge is. Along with our colleagues, the Dutch and the British, we have been stuck for a couple of months trying to stabilize the security situation so that we can get on with the excellent reconstructive effort that we made in Kabul.
There is not much sense in getting carried away with reconstruction or aid delivery until we can stabilize and secure the area. That does not mean that we will not proceed. Simon Hetherington is trying to talk to the governor on a daily basis. We have established a provincial development coordination centre that is not only a Canadian effort. It includes all the international NGOs trying to operate in that area.
I would be lying to you if I said that the situation was secure and that all of this could roll in on a dime. We definitely need help there. We are asking other partners to give us a hand. If we can turn the situation around down south — and there is no reason we cannot, but it will take time and hard work — then we are well on our way. It is difficult at this point.
The PRT, as it sits in Kandahar now, has a ``whole-of-government'' approach. It has a foreign affairs officer and three CIDA development officers. They have programmed a number of developmental projects that are on the books and ready to go. We are trying to square away funding to ensure that we can progress with those projects. The RCMP are doing their best to work with the Afghan National Police. For example, the ANP are about two years behind the Afghan National Army right now.
The situation is indeed challenging. Canadian soldiers are at the forefront of trying to bring stability there. We have asked our NATO partners for some assistance, but that does not mean that the reconstruction and aid package is just languishing. All sorts of endeavours are under way to try to deliver it. Could we do it better and faster?
Senator Meighen: Excuse me, General. Did you say ``under way to try to deliver''? I am not being critical, but are they not waiting until the situation is more stable?
BGen. Howard: Not at all. For example, during Operation Medusa aid was brought into the local region to help people who were displaced. International NGOs were delivering food aid.
Senator Meighen: It was not only military delivery; there were NGOs?
BGen. Howard: The NGOs provided the bulk of reconstruction assistance in Kandahar province. We helped to facilitate and coordinate their efforts.
The Chairman: I was concerned about your earlier remark that you were waiting for glitches to be resolved in terms of the funding. This concerns us. The minister was here in the spring. She could not tell us what sort of aid was being delivered in Kandahar. We received a letter from her subsequently that we published in our last report. We are having difficulty learning what is going on in Kandahar. We wonder why it is not available. If you say it is happening, why do we not have a list that shows it? It looks like you have a terrific chart there. Is that something you will share with us?
Senator Meighen: Could you also touch on where the money comes from? It is my understanding that the military has a $1.9-million budget for aid, which comes out of your budget in effect. It is DND money, not CIDA money.
It is my understanding that CIDA also has money. It is my understanding that your budget might be increased because you are the ones currently most able to deliver, given the situation.
Whose money is being spent where?
BGen. Howard: The provision of aid and reconstruction in Afghanistan is not solely a Canadian issue. At the highest levels, there are a host of national and international NGOs. The UN itself is operating in Afghanistan. It brings in all sorts of aid, be it money, food or the like. I have no idea how much that is, but the UN is operating in Kandahar province.
It is important to dwell on this because the PRT helps coordinate with the governor of Kandahar the provision of this type of aid. That is happening. I would be happy to try to get more figures on that, but the PRT is not operating only on a Canadian level but also on an international level.
The Chairman: We understand that.
BGen. Howard: If I could continue my answer.
The Chairman: Of course you can, but I wanted to clarify this point: We hear people say aid does not operate only on a Canadian level, but we have no sense that there is any accountability for the Canadian contribution. It seems to be hiding under the bushel of overall aid but we are curious to know where the Canadian component comes out. We think it is important for there to be a direct connection between seeing folks with the Maple Leaf on their shoulders and the aid coming in at the same time. We would like you to talk about that.
BGen. Howard: Minister Josée Verner has been here. She spoke about the $100 million a year that goes into Afghanistan and 10 per cent of it is aimed at the Kandahar province. That is as per her transcripts when she was here last time. Based on that 10 per cent then, a number of projects are ready to go created by the PRT with the three development officers. They are simply waiting for this funding to arrive. Once they have the funding they can prosecute these projects.
The Chairman: The troops have been there for how long, and we are waiting for funding from CIDA still?
BGen. Howard: Yes, sir.
The Chairman: This is what we do not understand. Perhaps it is not fair to ask you because are you not in CIDA, but it seems a mite strange to us that we have troops there. This is not the first rotation, we do not have funding, and yet funding is key to success there.
BGen. Howard: I cannot address why the funding is not there.
The Chairman: Okay, can you address the question of whether the CIDA folk or the DFAIT people ever leave the wire? We are told that they stay in the camp all the time.
BGen. Howard: I really do not want to get into who is allowed to move where for security reasons.
Senator Meighen: Is the decision about who can go where a military decision?
BGen. Howard: If people are allowed to move outside of the wire, when they do is a military decision.
The Chairman: Why do you not want to get into it? If you are making a military decision that they should stay behind the wire, why are you not saying, ``Look, we do not think it is safe to go outside the wire''? Surely you are not putting people at risk by telling us that you are keeping them behind the wire.
BGen. Howard: It is not my purview to discuss the movements of the CIDA officers.
Senator St. Germain: With all due respect, having been a military person myself, I do not think it is fair to ask that question. I realize you have the prerogative as a member of the committee, but I can understand what the brigadier- general is saying. If you are behind the wire, or whatever side of the wire you are on, if it is a security issue I think that any disclosure would be detrimental to whoever is impacted.
Senator Meighen: Suppose the general were to say, we do not mind if CIDA people go outside but they say they do not want to. I do not suggest that is the case. Does that compromise someone's security?
Senator St. Germain: I think we should have CIDA here to answer that.
Senator Meighen: I am prepared to leave it.
One more question, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman: In fairness, I think we cut off the general: at least I cut him off when he was about 20 per cent through. Perhaps we can give him a shot and then you can go ahead after that, Senator Meighen.
BGen. Howard: We have the final pot of money, which comes through DND. The local commanders there have certain thresholds.
The Chairman: This is the $1.9 million that Senator Meighen talked about?
BGen. Howard: Right, they can use that money towards projects and we have been using it: for example, improvement to various road networks. Right now in the latest area of operations just west of Kandahar, we are trying to help build and strengthen the roads.
We have been involved with other types of projects such as providing fire equipment to fire houses, and we have been dealing with other types of access and security issues. We can provide a list of those types of projects that we have been working on there.
The Chairman: Can you provide that to the clerk, please?
BGen. Howard: Most certainly.
The Chairman: If we can have a full list of the work that has been completed, it would be helpful.
Senator Meighen: By the military, out of the military budget?
The Chairman: Out of the military budget, and if you can also provide us with information of other work that has gone on, if you have knowledge of other NGOs there, that would be helpful.
Senator St. Germain: In regard to CIDA, has it ever been discussed that we invite them to appear before the committee?
The Chairman: We have had them here, and we also asked them to write us.
Col. Tremblay: As far as the role of the strategic joint staff goes, I mentioned that we interacted with our colleagues of other departments, and CIDA is working on an integrated list of their projects and Canadian Forces projects. It is ongoing work, so I cannot comment if it is completed but I know it is ongoing. One thing I would like to mention here is the PRT for Regional Command South, even though it has been there since August 2005, needs to follow the reality on the ground. The reality is that the British contingent arrived only in May, and the Dutch contingent arrived only in August. There is a lot of shaping taking place, and shaping is also taking place in Kandahar. We are occupying ground that the Taliban have occupied for many years, and we are only starting to shape those grounds to enable security, and to enable development in governance.
We need to look at a project through the lens of long-term projects and short-term projects that are making a difference in terms of quick impact on the ground: shelter and food where we are making a strong difference for the locals versus projects such as road construction, which will shape what Afghanistan will look like in the mid- to long- term.
I will give you an example of where money from CIDA could be invested. A major supply road is currently under assessment and evaluation. There is construction to a certain point, but it is not yet a hard topped road that would enable traffic and lots of flow so that goods can travel left and right.
A lot of coordination has taken place between the two departments to shape the situation on the ground, but from that perspective it all depends on the reality on the ground. The reality on the ground right now is that we are still trying to develop the Afghanistan Development Zone, Kandahar. Once we have established that, because we have project forces on the ground and we have pushed the Taliban away, we have created a buffer zone. As we did this, we conducted assessment of the requirements and needs. Then, after that we can really deliver the mid- and long-term project versus the short-term project to make a difference with the ones who have been displaced. We have this in mind to ensure that the ones who have been displaced are taken care of.
The Chairman: Thank you, colonel. This of course is a briefing to the committee on what is going on in Kandahar, so we are happy to learn whatever information you can give us. It is in the context of our visit to Kabul where, when General Hillier asked what we saw in Kabul when we were there last and we said not much, he said, ``Well, wait until you get to Kandahar because then we will show you how 3D really works.'' This committee has bought into the concept of 3D, defence, diplomacy and development, to a man. We think it makes a whole lot of good sense, but do not be surprised if we probe now as to how the other Ds function because we were told by the Chief of the Defence Staff that Kandahar would be significantly different from what we had seen in Kabul. He said we would see Canadians actually interrelating, and we would see Canadian aid projects going ahead shoulder to shoulder with what our troops were doing.
Obviously things do not unfold like a script. You have a dynamic situation, and we understand that. The purpose of this hearing is to bring us up to speed so we have a better understanding of the situation, and I appreciate your comments.
Senator St. Germain: You have painted a word picture of what is there. I think Canadians want to know. It is important that we know, but it is more important that Canadians know, as well as those watching this. When you initially went into Kandahar were you alone, Colonel? Were our troops alone and are the British and the Dutch coming in only now? When you were trying to destabilize the enemy, to build a road and what have you, were Canadian troops doing this alone or were Dutch, American, British or others there? Were we there alone initially and we are now being reinforced by others? Can you give us a word picture so that Canadians can understand what is happening there?
Col. Tremblay: I was not in Kandahar personally, but Canadian soldiers were there shaping the mission to a certain extent. As part of NATO taking over, it was clear that NATO partners needed to be deployed on the ground. As part of that deployment, Canadians were critical in ensuring that our allied nations were able to project themselves in theatre, gain ground, conduct a patrol framework and organize themselves in their area of operation.
From that perspective, Canadians and BGen. Fraser, as part of the command of international brigade south, have done outstanding work.
Senator St. Germain: Canadian soldiers have been alone in that area and are now being reinforced by other NATO forces; is that correct?
BGen. Howard: In the beginning, Regional Command South did not have a lot of combat troops. Originally, the entire Afghanistan mission was led by the Americans under Operation Enduring Freedom, and through NATO we began up north in different sectors. The third stage of NATO expansion in ISAF was to come to Kandahar province where the Americans were operating in some force. For example, there were no troops in Helmand province; there were no troops in Oruzgan province.
The Americans were operating in Kandahar, so Canadian Forces that arrived in March actually took over from an American task force. We then began our mission in the Kandahar province. Others were operating, but in thin numbers. The Brits have since moved into Helmand province and the Dutch have moved into Oruzgan. That has brought extra troops into this region, and that is a bit of a new face for local inhabitants.
Senator St. Germain: Canadians look at the casualties we are suffering, and it seems we are bearing the brunt of casualties. Many Canadians ask me what is going on there. Is it just us?
BGen. Howard: Across all the ISAF mission over the last few years, all nations have suffered casualties across Afghanistan. For example, when we first arrived in Kabul the Germans suffered dozens of injuries from the same sort of challenges that we face now; improvised explosive devices, IEDs, and suicide bombers. The Americans have suffered greater casualties than we have across the breadth of the mission.
In Regional Command South, our soldiers have been challenged over these last two six-month rotations, one of which we are at the three-month point. We are operating in a difficult situation. It is equally as difficult in Helmand province, with the British suffering casualties as well. On the weekend in Kandahar not only did we suffer causalities, but an American soldier was also killed by an IED.
The entire coalition is under stress in Afghanistan. There is no denying it to anyone. The southern region that we are operating in appears to be, and is, the most dangerous right now.
Senator St. Germain: There are certain comparisons of this theatre of action to one in Vietnam. Surrounding areas seem to be a training ground or a breeding ground for the Taliban or whoever is challenging the stabilization of Afghanistan. Does this fall under your department of responsibility as far as planning how to deal with this in the future, and is this a concern?
BGen. Howard: It is most definitely a concern. The minister recently visited Pakistan and I know that BGen. Fraser works closely with his military counterpart across the border near Spin Boldak. He has been across the border a couple of times to chat about the security situation. It is a complex frontier to deal with because there is a lot of movement of normal civilian traffic that crosses that border on any given day. This is one of the challenging areas of concern, and is something that the minister has been trying to address with his colleagues in Pakistan.
Senator St. Germain: Is securing the border between Afghanistan and its neighbours also part of the strategy to secure the country for future development?
BGen. Howard: The most I can say on this issue is we certainly need to watch the border closely to understand the movement of the insurgents and what their operating methods are so that we can bring some stability and security. It is not something that we can do independently; we have to do it in partnership with the other nations that border on Afghanistan.
The Chairman: General, the impression the committee gets is that Pakistan serves as the R and R spot for the Taliban. When they want time out they go to Pakistan and come and go pretty much as they choose. Is that a fair statement?
BGen. Howard: It is a difficult region to operate in. Unfortunately there are tribes that do not know international boundaries that were created after World War I. When arbitrary boundaries like that are drawn, tribes feel cut off on both sides. The threats in Afghanistan are obviously the insurgents and their tribal affiliations. We need to look at that issue.
There is also the threat to our soldiers of mines in the ground from previous wars. There are quite a few mines on the ground. The internal Afghan narcotics trade is also a huge threat to the peace and stability of that nation, as well as the lawlessness and criminal activity that can flourish within the boundaries. It is not fair to heap all of this necessarily on one particular cause, but certainly when it comes to insurgents one has to look at the tribal structure that transcends international boundaries.
The Chairman: Does the Government of Pakistan see any obligation in enforcing its borders so that there is not the number of people crossing it from either direction?
BGen. Howard: That is a good question to ask the minister after his recent visit to Pakistan. I can say that General David Fraser has spoken with his Pakistani military counterpart to see if we can contain and understand that insurgent movement a little better.
Senator Banks: I want to continue along the line of Senator St. Germain because we need a snapshot today of the place in which Canadian Forces are operating. We do not have one that is clear and Canadians do not have one that is clear. Canadians are operating, for the most part, in Kandahar province now. Is that correct?
BGen. Howard: Yes, sir, with the exception of some strategic assets in Kabul.
Senator Banks: In Kandahar province, where Canadians are actively engaged, today — I know it can change tomorrow afternoon — how many Americans, British and Dutch are there? I think there are no British in Kandahar. I think they are in Helmand. Am I right?
BGen. Howard: That is correct. The British are in Helmand. They have a large task force in larger numbers than us, and the Dutch are to our north. We share a common airfield, the Kandahar airfield. All nations are represented there with their international airheads and the like, but for the most part, the country that is leading in Kandahar province is Canada. Our partners are the Afghan National Army battalions that are operating with us. At least two or three are currently deployed with us.
Senator Banks: When the Dutch assume the overall command of the southern region, will Canadians still be the main, principal operating military force in Kandahar province?
BGen. Howard: Yes, senator, they will. In the new Dutch brigade headquarters, it is a Dutch lead, but a Canadian colonel will be the Chief of Staff. Colonel Mike Kampman will become the Chief of Staff.
Senator Banks: Will General Grant be the overall commander of Canadians?
BGen. Howard: Yes, he will.
Senator Banks: He is from Edmonton, which is where I am from.
BGen. Howard: He was the area commander and is currently on his leave before he deploys.
Senator Banks: The problem you talked about before is the caveats that other senators mentioned too, namely, the differences in the terms of engagement in Afghanistan, which are clearly broad and allow for aggressiveness in the pursuit of the first job, which is security. However, we understand other NATO partners are there who have terms of engagement that are less robust. Is that correct?
BGen. Howard: Yes, it is.
Senator Banks: Does that not make it extremely difficult? I know we always fight the last war, but in World War II, for example, or even in Korea, we did not have to operate, as I recall, with partners and allies who had different terms of engagement than we did. Everyone had the same object and was prepared to go to the same lengths to obtain it.
I know this is largely a political question, but do you see and hear about movement in that respect so that our partners will be able to act in the same way and in support of what we have undertaken to do?
BGen. Howard: The Chief of the Defence Staff and the minister have both been active the last couple of weeks talking to partners in Afghanistan, to their heads of armed forces and heads of ministries of defence, seeking their assistance in coming south. It is premature to say that none of them will come. Some useful dialogue is continuing.
Senator Banks: With respect to those forces, will governments make those decisions?
BGen. Howard: Yes, they will.
Senator Banks: I will go to a different subject, if I may.
Senator St. Germain: Were we told that the French were removing troops from that area?
The Chairman: I was advised today by the news media that the French are withdrawing 700 troops. I think that is the question.
Senator St. Germain: It is a supplementary question.
The Chairman: They were working with American special forces.
BGen. Howard: I am not sure. The French are in several locations. They are in Kabul as well, and I believe they are operating special forces, so I would need to take a closer look. I am not familiar with that specific initiative.
I do not want to stand on my soap box here. The only caution I throw out is that nations have always had caveats. The Canadian army had caveats when it went to World War I. It refused to allow its brigades to be put under British divisions. We demanded that we fight as Canadians, and so every nation, depending on the situation, has to assess where it is and what it is willing to put its troops under, in terms of other national command.
We are asking for help down south. This is the tipping point in Afghanistan now. We need help down south with more forces, and some reasonable discussion is going on. It is too premature to say that endeavour will not result in anything, but NATO as an entity with 26 member nations must step forward to give us a hand.
Senator Banks: I hope they have success in that respect. We talked earlier about the 3D approach and the necessity in the long run, if not in the medium run, after some level of security has been established, of development happening, so that life for the citizens of Afghanistan is demonstrably different in ways they can see.
We were told by LGen. Gauthier when he was here that the PRT had between 55 and 60 people in it. Do we have one provincial reconstruction team in Kandahar province?
BGen. Howard: Yes, it is based in Kandahar city. It is based there to work with the governor to try to take a provincial approach towards his efforts. He obviously has to reach out to the local communities and the elders because everything is done by committee — shuras — at lower levels.
However, it is not only the security situation that slows down aid and reconstruction, as I described in my opening remarks. It is also building capacity within the Afghan governance system itself to be able to do this. You are taking a nation that has not had strong central control as a part of its history and trying to build the capacity for bureaucracy. Everyone needs a little bureaucracy to get things done. It is a different culture. It is not the Canadian way of doing things, so that poses its own challenges as well.
If you ask LCol. Hetherington, it is not only about money. That is not his challenge. It is also about trying to build the capacity locally to do this. We could race out the front gate and build a school without any difficulty tomorrow, but do that through the local governance system and there are some ways to go there.
Senator Banks: When you talked about the three CIDA, one DFAIT, four RCMP and one Prince Edward Island police officer, are they part of the PRT?
BGen. Howard: Yes, they are. The PRT is led by DND simply because of the security aspects of the work, but it is a partnership, and as much as military guys would like to command the group, it is a consensus whole-of-government approach. It is a unique approach for us to take, but certainly the expertise that the foreign affairs officer has brought is well beyond what any military officer would have, and he is used to great effect.
The three CIDA development officers are doing fantastic work to put a framework together.
Altogether, Simon Hetherington is sitting over the top. If we need to organize a group to visit the PRT or to have an exchange, he will get the transport laid on. I could give you 100 other examples of this routine support that the PRT provides these important members.
Senator Banks: The mechanics are in place but the money is not; is that right?
BGen. Howard: There are a number of projects waiting for additional money to be brought in. I am confident and optimistic the money will there. Certainly around town there is an understanding that there is a requirement.
Senator Banks: Around this town?
BGen. Howard: Yes, around Ottawa: We are working hard at the national level among the various departments to bring this about. I do not want to give you an impression that I am throwing rocks at CIDA. They have their methods and protocol. They are experts in long-term development. We need to defer to them.
Senator Banks: To find out, though, where the choke point is for the funds to allow that PRT to realize its full potential, where would we look?
BGen. Howard: You would need to ask CIDA.
The Chairman: With regard to the $2.9 million that Gen. Fraser has, are those the funds you are now spending on projects?
BGen. Howard: Yes.
The Chairman: Is it DND funds that are being spent right now on the project?
BGen. Howard: A certain amount of funding was allotted to Col. Hetherington, not to do the medium- and long- term projects as my colleague has enunciated, but more to help with the here and now. For example, an ED went off in Kandahar and blew up a shop. The shop burned down. On short notice, Col. Hetherington was able to bring the money to bear and rebuild that shop.
The Chairman: This money is important for the safety of the troops, so that you have intelligence and so that people associate soldiers with making the place a better place to live. Is that what we are talking about?
BGen. Howard: That is right.
The Chairman: Does Gen. Fraser have all the money he needs?
BGen. Howard: That is a specific question I would need to ask him. I have not asked him that question.
The Chairman: This committee recommended a doubling to $4 million because we do not see much else happening. If a hold-up causes the troops not to be as secure as they could be, and you are not receiving the sort of intelligence and cooperation you would get if the development was going ahead with funding elsewhere, this committee is on record as saying, let us take the money and give it to Gen. Fraser until the situation changes and you can have other folks there.
BGen. Howard: Certainly, money is an issue. I cannot talk for the CIDA money. It is not my responsibility and I do not have good visibility into it.
The thought I would like to leave you with is that it is not only about money. It is about trying to work through the Afghan governance portion that is there. That can be slow.
The Chairman: We have noted that and will keep it in mind.
Senator Atkins: Do you think Canadians receive the credit they deserve for the efforts they are making over there, both in the major population areas and outside?
BGen. Howard: As I walked around Kabul I could tell from my interaction with young Afghans that they were friendly toward Canadians. I will ask Col. Tremblay to comment on this issue since he spent six months there. We taught them phrases like, ``Hey, Joe, do you have a pen?'' I do not know how many times I have been asked that as I walked down the road.
We have been favourably received. A unique piece that Canadians bring is their willingness to get down on the ground. That is why our soldiers are sometimes in risky scenarios. They will get out of their vehicles and try to talk to the locals.
We definitely want to bring that down south. The locals are scared of the situation that is occurring. When you have combat around you, then you do not have many kind words to say to anyone. I think that Canadians have a good reputation in that regard.
Perhaps Col. Tremblay could reply also.
Col. Tremblay: I think the human touch delivered by our soldiers on the ground is real. It is profound, in fact. Our men and women are really thinking about what they are doing there. They are focussed on the mission. However, they also understand a humanitarian aspect needs to be considered to make a difference so that the Afghans can enjoy freedoms that, perhaps, they have never experienced before.
It is hard to convince some people of that when they have a whole lot to lose in terms of influence and power. It is a struggle to create the relationships and to ensure that they understand where we are coming from. We must get across that we are not there to be the government but we are supporting the Afghan government to establish the development strategy that has been put in place by the Afghans, not only in the capital but also on the periphery.
Senator Atkins: In your judgment, what is the level of trust of Canadians, not with the government so much but with the people in the economy, the locals?
BGen. Howard: It is still early days. One complicating factor has been the surge in insurgent activity. It has resulted in difficult circumstances. The soldiers have spent considerable time involved in combat and dealing with the insurgents themselves. Where we can, we have conducted a number of outreach programs. The medical program, for example, garnished great support, as it would. However, it is a work-in-progress when it comes to reaching out to the locals within the Kandahar region to bring hope for a better life: the reconstruction and the aid that we require. If we can maintain a stable situation, if some of the partners can give us a hand and if we can get a bit more surging with some of the activities that, as I have described, are money and governance-based, that support will increase dramatically.
One thing we have done — and we have all seen it on the television — is our care for the Afghans. People will present themselves at the gates, some of them children, who might have a serious illness. We take the time, where we can and where we have the capacity, to help. That goes a long way to spreading the message. It is one of those things that we need to continue.
This will probably be easier to analyze in the months ahead, assuming that we have success.
Senator Atkins: It has to be a great challenge.
BGen. Howard: It is, yes.
Senator Atkins: I want to move to the area of security and the recruitment of members to the Afghan National Police. Do we provide any assistance in their recruitment process or even assistance to the army?
BGen. Howard: The Afghan National Army, if I could start at that level, its creation and capacity-building is a multinational approach but it is American-led. It is on a good path. It has been in progress from the beginning.
You are well aware, I think, of some of the bits that we have tried to do in that regard with our team in Kabul and our OMLT in Kandahar province. We want to build on that. The more capacity we can build and the more ANA military forces there are, the more we are on a road to condition-based success where security can be provided by Afghans.
The Afghan National Police endeavour was started later than the Afghan National Army endeavour, so it is a little bit further behind. In southern province, I do not want to say it is nonexistent but it is fragile. Being able to train and develop policemen, as you and I would understand it, is a huge undertaking. We could measure in the number of years the time this will take to fix.
We do not have the numbers in Kandahar province that we would like to have. There are few professional policemen that are able to conduct their activities. One initiative by the Afghan government is to create an Afghan national auxiliary police. That force will be a lower grade of ANP, with much less training and it will be more regionally based; but the idea of a central payment system —
The Chairman: Excuse me, can you tell me what ANP is?
BGen. Howard: That is the Afghan National Police. The Afghan national auxiliary police, ANAP, is a new endeavour that has caused some concern — that we are not just arming local militias but they will be centrally controlled. The whole aim there is to provide more Afghans doing the security task.
That is a good initiative. Canadians are involved. BGen. Gary O'Brien is working in ISAF headquarters on this endeavour with an international team.
Senator Atkins: How do they screen them to ensure that they do not recruit insurgents?
BGen. Howard: We have to work with what is there. I do not have the full details, but this will be an auxiliary police with rudimentary training and screening. It is to fill a gap. A full-up, professional Afghan National Police force is some time away. The idea is to use folks from local provinces to fill that gap.
It has some risk but if it is centrally controlled in the sense that the weapons, the pay and those sorts of things are essentially controlled, the hope is that there would be some levers over the top.
Senator Atkins: For the SAT, you mentioned there were 14 members on that committee. Is Gen. Fraser one of them?
BGen. Howard: No, the strategic advisory team is led by a full colonel, Mike Capstick. I highly recommend that he come in and talk about it. He knows Afghanistan and has done some great work there; he would love to come and address these issues.
He was replaced recently by someone whose name escapes me at the moment. However, the colonel has two teams, each headed by a lieutenant-colonel, and there are a few majors who work for him. They are at the beck and call of the Afghan government to help with strategic planning based on trying to bring a framework to some of their decision making.
This was an initiative between General Hillier and President Karzai. Mike Capstick could come and describe to you in detail the work they do. This great Canadian initiative is worthy of better understanding.
Senator Atkins: We keep hearing about economic recovery and rehabilitation. Can you give me some examples of that success?
BGen. Howard: The foreign minister commented on some of the success that has been achieved from President Karzai's perspective. From a governance perspective — and I will get to economic in a bit — Afghanistan has a constitution. It has an elected president and Parliament. That might seem like pretty small potatoes to those of us who live in a democracy, but to Afghanistan it is big stuff.
As I understand it, the real GDP growth in Afghanistan hovers around 85 per cent and the rate of inflation is around 10 per cent. That is certainly not a full set of economic stats and I would not want to give you the impression that I am an economist. However, I can see the differences with my own eyes when I walk around Kabul from what we started with at the beginning. People were laying in the dirt on the streets; at least they are living in sea containers now and you can see construction in the town. As I walk through Kabul, there are shops that are open and markets all over the place.
We need to fan that across the country, and we need to fan it down south. I have seen that in Kandahar city myself; it does exist. By Afghan standards, a prospering economy is under way.
The biggest challenge is the illicit drug trade. This is not something that Canadian Forces is involved with at all. It is at the level of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and CIDA, in working with the Afghan government on the way forward. We are not involved in eradication, but eventually this issue will need to be dealt with.
Senator Atkins: We hear that the drug trade is flourishing.
BGen. Howard: Right: Our soldiers west of Kandahar fight through marijuana patches. The CDS briefed the press that it is hard to operate the night vision equipment; the marijuana masks the vehicles because it deflects the signature that our night vision gear is looking for. However, drugs are a way of life there and I do not think you will change that overnight.
I do not profess to be an expert, but if you try to shut all that down without having other mechanisms in place, you could fan even more misery than is there right now. It is a difficult situation.
Senator Moore: I have a number of little questions at the outset. Someone asked a question about the other troops in Kandahar province. You mentioned that Canada will have 2,500 troops and the British will have around that number. You also mentioned the U.S. and the Dutch but you did not mention the numbers. May I have those?
BGen. Howard: The U.S. does not operate in Regional Command South. They are up in Regional Command East and in Bagram. I think the American contribution is in the neighbourhood of 13,000 troops. Does that make sense or do I have that number wrong?
Col. Tremblay: It is probably a bit more than that, sir. I would like to mention one thing. During Operation Medusa, it was not just the Canadians who were operating in the area of operations; the Americans, the Dutch and the Brits also were there. It is not because it was specifically our area of operation that we were the only soldiers in that area.
BGen. Howard: Permanently based, it is Canadians.
Senator Moore: What about the Dutch?
BGen. Howard: They are about 2,000.
Senator Banks: They are in a different province.
BGen. Howard: They are in Oruzgan province. They are in Regional Command South, but in the northern province north of Kandahar.
Senator Moore: The Afghan National Army, such as it is, has how many soldiers?
Col. Tremblay: I think it is around 27,000 soldiers.
Senator Moore: These are the ones who have gone through the full training exercise by the Americans?
Col. Tremblay: Yes, but as part of the Afghanistan concept, I think the final number by the end of 2010 will be roughly 70,000.
Senator Moore: That is the goal?
Col. Tremblay: Yes.
Senator Moore: Who prepares your briefing when you come here? Is it personnel in the Strategic Joint Staff office?
BGen. Howard: I am given assistance by parliamentary personnel in ADM policy.
Senator Moore: What does that mean?
BGen. Howard: Policy group within NDHQ.
Senator Moore: Within National Defence Headquarters?
BGen. Howard: Yes.
Senator Moore: I saw new words here. When General Hillier was here it was the three Ds: defence, diplomacy and development. I was wondering if we have a new writer here. That is just a small thing.
You said that you have to work at a slower pace, at the Afghan pace, which involves shuras. That is what, a tribe?
BGen. Howard: Those are the elders.
Senator Moore: Is it tribes or tribe?
BGen. Howard: Tribe.
Senator Moore: One tribe comes together and they agree with a consensus to the proposal you put forward, then they implement it; is that how it works?
BGen. Howard: Yes.
Senator Moore: Someone asked about the Canadian flag being attached to the aid. Is there any corruption here? Do we have a problem getting that money into the right hands? Are we physically ensuring that those Canadian dollars get into the hands of the people doing the work and the reconstruction, or are we passing it over to shuras, tribal leaders, and hoping they will do the right thing with it? Do we know the money gets to where it should go?
BGen. Howard: I would say, yes we are. We are engaging the Afghan governance and the shuras to decide what to do and where to do it. For example, we will build a well. That is the most important thing; deciding within a region where the most important sites are for the well. Rather than us picking the contractors, the locals must pick them.
Senator Moore: That is fine. We will award the contract to Joe over there and it will cost $100 Canadian dollars. We give the $100 to one of those tribal leaders, he pays Joe and the well is finished. Are we doing this in the traditional North American commercial manner or does he say, ``I need $200 to get that well done?''
BGen. Howard: The actual mechanics of how the contracts are awarded, I am not aware of. My sense is that they are awarded through the governor. We work closely with him and our folks deliver and a local company is contracted and provided. The exact details of that, however, I am not aware of. I would have to research that for you.
Senator Moore: I would like to know. I think the people of Canada would like to know. Are we in a corrupt situation or are we getting good value for the dollar, as can be expected, given the whole milieu within which you are working?
Col. Tremblay: It was the view of a senior CIDA official that corruption was not an issue.
Senator Moore: All right. I did not get the numbers but you said that so many are CIDA, DFAIT and RCMP. What are those numbers again?
BGen. Howard: With the PRT, there is one Foreign Affairs officer; three CIDA development officers; four RCMP constables — maybe of higher rank; and one city police officer from P.E.I., so I assume Charlottetown Police Force.
Senator Moore: Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. led, continues to function. Where is it? Is it throughout Afghanistan or is it working in the south trying to help us in its own way? If so, are the efforts coordinated?
BGen. Howard: Operation Enduring Freedom, the American continuing effort with counter-terrorism, operates throughout Afghanistan. The Americans maintain a base in Bagram, which is outside of Kabul. That figures greatly in their planning and force basing.
The Americans are helping us out considerably in Kandahar with the provision of helicopter support and other enablers. We would not be able to conduct the mission without them. The requirement for, as General Leslie calls them, big honkin' helicopters, is provided by another country because we are not there yet. We certainly will be there, given recent government announcements but without that American effort we would be lost.
The Chairman: We were concerned about whether Operation Enduring Freedom would overlap with the NATO effort. Has there been an overlap? Have there been problems in coordinating activities between the two organizations?
BGen. Howard: It is a bit early. Now that ISAF has responsibility for all the sectors — you are talking about Operation Enduring Freedom layering on top of that — I think coordination will actually be easier now. Protocol will be put in place to help facilitate that level of coordination.
It can be difficult if, for example, you have special forces that are trying to operate in certain areas where that is not coordinated; it can pose problems. My understanding from this latest change and architecture that we have now is that this should be easier.
Senator Moore: Watching the news report, reading and hearing from witnesses such as yourselves and hearing what you have said today, who is the enemy? ``Taliban'' is the name and the label we hear attached, but is the Taliban force made up of members of various tribes or is it one tribe? Do we know how many people we are fighting? We hear the bad news. I am sure there are good stories because you are making advances in your efforts to secure territory and in reconstruction efforts, but the enemy seems to be effective in disrupting our efforts. Do they have a few ''good guys'' or are there a lot of them? Who is the enemy and how many are there?
BGen. Howard: We are there to support the Government of Afghanistan.
Senator Moore: I know that, I understand that framework.
BGen. Howard: Their enemy is a multi-faceted threat. We have hit on the first one, which is the Taliban. It is an entity which obviously the Americans —
Senator Moore: That is the structure; they were there before.
BGen. Howard: The Americans showed them the door, so to speak, and they fled. They fled to places in Pakistan, and so on. The Taliban are not some foreign army. They can be young Afghans as well. It is an ideological group of fanatics. That would be the best way to describe them. That is one of the threats or enemies that we face, but not the only one.
Senator Moore: Are they of one tribe or do they cross many tribal lines? Are we dealing with members of various tribes here? Are we dealing with old territories? I understand they do not see or recognize that line on the map. That was their traditional territory for hundreds or thousands of years and they will not listen to what we say. Are there tribes on each side of the Pakistani border from this group?
BGen. Howard: I will ask Col. Tremblay to describe that and see if he knows the breakdown of the Taliban.
We could come back with that information rather than wing the answer.
Senator Moore: I find it frustrating. Traditionally in battle both sides wore uniforms and, having done your intelligence work, you know who and where they are. This situation is not the same.
BGen. Howard: The enemy that we are dealing with takes an asymmetrical approach without a good structural network. Different groups can claim to belong to the overall arching cause, if you will, but there are different grades of expertise within the Taliban. Some are extremely well-skilled fighters while others are less well-trained — local farmers perhaps that will grab weapons, if required, and fight in sympathy. ``What is the Taliban?'' is a particularly good question.
Col. Tremblay: I will try to answer the question. There are hard-core former Taliban fighters or officials of the former Taliban government. Some of these people are still around in the area or elsewhere. From their perspective, their agenda is still valid. They have an end state and would rather be in charge of Afghanistan than have Hamid Karzai in charge. People who have been deeply rooted among the various tribes in the area for many years were provided governance and were able to create many relationships with local officials and the local population. For individuals to survive in that kind of environment, they change their allegiance from one group to another group, depending on need. As well, there is the intimidation factor whereby people try to convince others that it would be in their best interest to join the Taliban movement and to take action if they want to survive to the next day. In addition, there are part-time Taliban who might need the work and, feeling slightly positive toward their cause, will fight the Afghan partners.
Taking those factors into account plus the fact that we have increased our footprint to occupy some sanctuaries, we can be sure to get it back from the individuals who are planning a bit ahead to provide directions, either from a higher perspective or a lower perspective.
Senator Moore: Who is funding the Taliban effort?
BGen. Howard: That I am not sure of but I can say that the Taliban are happy to go down for minimal amounts of money. They can get young, impressionable people to join them. It does not take much money to engage them in activities. As Col. Tremblay laid out, sympathizers rest within Afghanistan.
Senator Moore: I am interested in how many Taliban are in Afghanistan. We would have to rely on ground intelligence to determine that. Would it be reliable, given what you have said?
BGen. Howard: Open source reporting is that the Taliban number in the thousands. They do not concentrate like a conventional army would do and instead are splintered all over the place.
Senator Moore: BGen. Howard, you mentioned that Canada is asking for help from other NATO countries to come to southern Afghanistan. These other NATO countries must know what we are attempting to do, what we are facing and why we need their help. What if we do not get any help? Will we go it alone? That would be the worst scenario. Do we have a plan for that? I do not know how you can do your Strategic Joint Staff planning for the CF in that particular theatre without knowing whether our friends will help out.
BGen. Howard: We do want to —
Senator Moore: Without being hard on our allies, does someone not have to make a move and begin to contribute?
BGen. Howard: We must be mindful of time and space. The Canadian Forces did some great work west of Kandahar. It showed the Taliban that it cannot occupy ground and threaten the locals in the area of Kandahar. We would not allow that to stand. Operation Medusa proved to the Taliban that we will not entertain that, and we were successful in making them leave.
The difficulty comes in exploiting that success, which requires us to move a little bit more outside Kandahar and expand east, west, north and south in further directions. To do that over such a large distance requires help.
We have been talking to the allies for several weeks about helping us. It is not as if we have been asking for months and years and have not received any offers of help.
Senator Moore: I understand that.
BGen. Howard: We need to give a little more time for the requisite discussion.
Senator Moore: Are we talking about early November when we will have a change in command or are we talking about the end of the calendar year? All this must be straining our resources. You would know what you could do if you knew you had support.
BGen. Howard: We will need help in the months ahead; there is no doubt about it.
Senator Moore: Before the calendar year is out, you need to know whether that help will be forthcoming.
BGen. Howard: I do not want to tie it to a date but that is not a bad way to look at it. We are not in a crisis situation.
Senator Moore: However, you do not want to lose the initiative.
BGen. Howard: We do not want to leave the area that Canadians have given their lives for. NATO is only one angle that we are pursuing. The second angle was when President Karzai was in Ottawa because it proved to be an excellent opportunity for Canada to ask for more assistance from the Afghan National Army in the southern provinces. There are larger concentrations of Afghan National Army units in the northern provinces and we asked that some of them be transferred to the south. This request has resulted in battalions arriving in the south. That is another way that we will build the capacity to allow us to branch out.
Both those angles should bear some fruit.
Senator Moore: How many troops did they send to the south?
BGen. Howard: Currently, there are about 1,000 troops and we hope to see a few more thousand arriving in the south.
Senator Day: I thank our witnesses for their comments today. They are helping us to gain a better understanding of the CF and, in particular, what is happening in Kandahar and Afghanistan.
It seems clear that the situation is evolving. You spoke about the Afghan auxiliary force, which we had not heard about before, and about a number of other initiatives.
We are hoping that with the extra troops, we will be able to move into what this whole concept was about when NATO agreed to take it on, and that is provincial reconstruction as opposed to an almost exclusively military operation. You have told us that in some areas if Afghanistan there are real signs of provincial reconstruction, and we are pleased to hear that as well.
For us to stay on top of this, I think we will need a briefing on a regular basis. Is your group the best place for us to make an arrangement to have a periodic, regular briefing on the evolving situation in Afghanistan?
BGen. Howard: The short answer is yes. One of our responsibilities is to provide situation awareness, a daily update of what occurs in Afghanistan, so we do that on a daily basis within the department. We have that function. We stay abreast of the current situation and new initiatives.
Senator Day: Your hesitation was, Oh, no, not another load on our already busy department?
BGen. Howard: We need the support of all Canadians, and this committee as well, and so if that aids by providing information in that regard and if the minister agrees — I had better say that — then we would certainly be happy to do that.
Senator Day: We like to think this is one area where you can get public support by explaining the situation and making it clear what is actually happening, rather than having a lot of rumours floating around. This matter is of serious concern to the Canadian public.
The north-south highway near Kandahar that is being constructed, where several Canadian soldiers have lost their lives, is that provincial reconstruction or is that a strategic military project?
BGen. Howard: It is based on the provincial reconstruction team, but the area that we have been operating in, the Pashmul region, where we have engaged the Taliban, proved extremely difficult to get in and out of with ground vehicles.
I do not know how best to describe the road. There are huge potholes. You would not even recognize it as a road. It would probably be better to describe it as a riverbed, very hard to transit. Obviously, there was some displacement of local inhabitants. One way that we can help them in the future is to build a road that would allow a bit of commerce and transit for them.
You will have read in the newspapers Dave Fraser's comments that the Taliban does not like roads because roads are progress. This is exactly what we are trying to accomplish. The initial attempt was to improve our military mobility through the region. We lost the two soldiers over the weekend in working on this road and getting it squared away, but we will continue to improve it to facilitate the aid, reconstruction and development efforts we will need to bring into this area. Our hope is to be able to get the Afghan national security forces — ANA and ANP — to help take control of this area, to get the local inhabitants back. They will then have this route that will give them easier access to the main east-west route, which is Highway 1, a well-paved road that runs through Afghanistan.
Senator Day: So it is both military infrastructure and good reconstruction for the economy of the area?
BGen. Howard: Yes, senator.
Senator Day: My recollection is that when General Gauthier was here, he told us that the provincial reconstruction team — and I thought he was talking about Kandahar — was around 50 to 60 people, and now you are telling us that it is a much smaller group. Are the others military personnel, then? Is that what the difference in the numbers is?
BGen. Howard: The PRT is about 50 to 60, all military ranks. That is the military component, which I had the pleasure to train when we were in Petawawa, and you would have met some of them. I mentioned individuals from other government departments. Now, with the security company, the infantry company that will be assigned to them, that will be another 150. We will have over 200 personnel working on provincial reconstruction issues, the bulk of that number being the security element, not only the guard camp, Camp Nathan Smith, but also to help escort those who need to go outside the wire to conduct their business. The size of the PRT will be just over 200.
Senator Day: The security group will not do the project but will provide security to those who perform the work on reconstruction?
BGen. Howard: They will escort the officials, whether they are from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Development, CIDA, or military officials. For example, if they drive from Camp Nathan Smith to the governor's palace, or if meetings are required, they can provide the security for that. For the actual conduct of the projects, there is always a hope to use locals, and we do not provide any security for that. They go ahead and conduct the task. There are other tasks where we will be involved, for example, construction of the north-south road.
Senator Day: When our committee visited Petawawa, we were told that these soldiers who went over are the best trained, that they understood the challenges they had to meet, and that there were lessons learned from earlier rotations. I suppose there are still lessons to be learned each time, but are we doing everything we can before we send these soldiers over there to meet the challenges that they are about to face?
BGen. Howard: We try our best to train the soldiers before they go. The establishment of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre in Wainwright has allowed us to provide a replicated environment in which they can practice for a few weeks the sorts of tasks and challenges that they will face in theatre.
We also try not to apply old lessons to new problems. For example, what we achieved and learned in Kabul has some applicability, but that is a different environment to what we face in Kandahar. If I can be frank, I told the soldiers before they left Petawawa that I will do my best to give them about 60 per cent of what they need. The other 40 per cent they will get only when they can survey the scene themselves and commence with the actual operation. They have to learn each and every day. They need to adapt to the challenges they face. We do not want to have a dogmatic approach that says we will always do it this way. We have made good strides. There is more work to do, for example, trading good secrets between sergeant X, who was on patrol and saw something happen, with the rest of his buddies. We can bring technology to improve that. Bringing the lessons back from Afghanistan and spreading them through the army back here so that we do not make some of the same mistakes is certainly something that we need and that we continue to work at.
What we did to train soldiers to go to Bosnia, for example, is different from what we trained them to do in Afghanistan; there is no doubt about it. I have nothing but respect for the soldiers who are operating in what is essentially a combat environment, a tough situation, and they deserve all the credit.
Senator Day: Are there any specific lessons that you are implementing into the training that you can share with us?
BGen. Howard: The first thing I would mention is an emphasis on having a quick discussion about what has occurred as soon as it happens to try to adapt and change. That might seem intuitive, but it has not necessarily always been the case.
For some protocols we follow on patrols, something might happen to us and we change those protocols based on what we observed and saw. We have done that.
We are always changing and adapting, ensuring that we have the right weapons systems located in backing up the right guys. We have ongoing dilemmas with identification of friendly foe between us and aircraft to ensure that we do not hit our own guys. We continue to work on these things on a daily basis.
Senator Day: Are these the new helmets we learned about recently in the media?
BGen. Howard: We always want to improve markings so that everyone understands who is who on the battlefield. This has been a dilemma for years and continues to be of concern.
We are also learning, as an institution, that we need to listen to those in the field. I am trying to remember the last time a forward-deployed commander said that this is a shopping list of what I need: I need a squadron of tanks, another entry company and some counter-mortar radars. This was BGen. Fraser communicating back to the CDS who communicated with government, and these things are actually being provided. I see this as very positive to give the soldiers in the field the tools they need.
We have learned that we need to be careful with the light utility vehicle wheeled, LUVW,and we are trying to reduce its usage rate. It cannot be eliminated completely. It is a vehicle that has its uses, but we would be crazy to keep using it in the quantities we have. We have had good success in converting over to the Nyala and pumping new vehicles into theatre replacements because some have been damaged. We are looking at that as well.
Senator Day: You are telling us then that as a nation we are reacting quickly to a perceived need for change in training and equipment for our troops in Afghanistan?
BGen. Howard: It is hard to concede that we could do it any faster or any better. There is always room for improvement, but that action in itself showed a commitment by the government to support the troops in the field.
Senator Moore: I asked about NATO and I do not think I received an answer. What happens if NATO declines?
BGen. Howard: That is a great question, and one that the CDS is seized with right now. Obviously, we are trying to get more Afghan support, and we have been working on that, but what are our options if our NATO partners will not join us down there? That is a good question and we are working our way through that right now. I do not have a good answer for you. You can only do what you have the capacity to do. We will have to think that particular piece through.
We have had some positive response. I am not at liberty to talk about the particular nations that have said they will come to assist. I hope that in the next few weeks the minister and the CDS will have some success.
Senator Moore: I hope you get that success, and that the terms of engagement will be similar to what our Canadian men and women are operating under.
BGen. Howard: That good thing as a coalition commander is that you can work to everyone's strengths. Even if someone comes with a bit of a caveat, there is lots of work to do down there. They will not be ridiculous caveats, but it is something that BGen. Fraser has to deal with on a daily basis.
Senator Atkins: Now that we are sending tanks to Afghanistan, does that reinforce the argument for armoured tanks in the future in the military?
BGen. Howard: The tank deployment shows that if you have something in your inventory and it can be of use to the troops forward, put the tanks in their hands and we can save the philosophical debates about the future for later on. We are all a bit taken aback by the tactics of the enemy who have a wide repertoire and essentially they have decided that they want to defend a piece of ground; they concentrated. When they do that, if we have a weapon system that will protect our soldiers, allow us to have precise direct fire to defeat enemy concentrations more safely for our guys and reduce collateral damage — after we weighed all those factors — we could see the value there.
It is one of those things in the inventory. The future of tanks is not for me to comment on, but I am glad to see us using a capability we have in the inventory.
Senator Atkins: That is the point: having it in the inventory.
Senator Banks: General, finish the following sentence: ``We will achieve Canadian success in Afghanistan if...''
BGen. Howard: ...if the following conditions are met. First, from a governance perspective, President Karzai says, ``I do not need you anymore; I have a security apparatus here with the ability to handle our country, to sustain us and keep us safe.'' The second condition is, in terms of economic reconstruction aid, the lot of Afghans is on the right road. This undertaking will take years, obviously.
The Afghanistan Compact talks about achieving an Afghan National Army that is credible by 2010. It has to be condition-based on what success will be. It may not have a shape that is readily apparent to us in Canada, because they need to find solutions that fit their paradigm, which are not necessarily the same as ours, but is their life better than what they had? My sense is, and President Karzai says, yes, life is better. We are having this problem down south and we need to deal with that.
When will the work of the Canadian Forces be completed in Afghanistan? When the government tells us to come home; and the government is ultimately the boss in this regard. They have said that we will remain deployed until early 2009, but it would be speculative for me to reach beyond that.
I think it is condition-based, and I do not think anyone can fully predict the timeline for that, senator.
The Chairman: General, at the beginning of your testimony you made a point for which we are very conscious, that is, that the troops in Afghanistan want to know that Canadians support them and that members of the government and the Parliament of Canada support them.
What is the best way for us to get the message to them and their families that we support them and are proud of what they are doing? Can you convey that message for us or is there a better way to convey it?
BGen. Howard: I know that the last time the CDS was here you asked him to convey that message on your behalf. Every time he goes to theatre he conveys those thoughts and they are well acknowledged by the troops. The troops are certainly aware of what is happening in Canada with regard to ``Red Friday'' and so on.
We tried to have this committee visit Afghanistan, and I do not want to open that can of worms, but for reasons of security —
The Chairman: I will receive a call tomorrow at 11.
BGen. Howard: Things are all rosy again and it is just a matter of getting this squared away.
One way of getting the message to the troops is your tangible presence there, and I know that you want to do that.
I personally can convey the message to others. The commander of the PRT knows where I sit right now and is eagerly awaiting to hear how it went. There is interest over there.
The Chairman: We spent time in Petawawa with a representative group of the families. I know they are going through a difficult period as well. What is the best way to send them a message?
BGen. Howard: There are many mailings from central agencies, including the military family resource centre, MFRC, network and the support centre there. They would be happy to send out a message of support. You might want to consider that to convey a message to them. They certainly could mail that out to each individual family, and I am sure that would be well appreciated by them.
The Chairman: On behalf of the committee, we have appreciated your testimony today. It has been of assistance to us. Senator Day is correct; we will look for more regular briefings on what is happening in Afghanistan. We appreciate the effort you made today to explain things to us and to those who are watching on television. We think that these sorts of exchanges are useful and we thank you.
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The committee continued in camera.