Proceedings of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs
Issue 5 - Evidence - May 9, 2007
OTTAWA, Wednesday, May 9, 2007
The Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 12:03 p.m. to study the services and benefits provided to members of the Canadian Forces, veterans of war and peacekeeping missions and members of their families in recognition of their services to Canada.
Senator Joseph A. Day (Chairman) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chairman: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
[English]
Today we will continue our examination of the issues surrounding the enduring controversy display at the Canadian War Museum.
Appearing before us this afternoon is General, Retired, Paul Manson, Randall Hansen, and Serge Bernier.
I am Senator Day, from New Brunswick and I am chair of this subcommittee.
I also wish to recognize Senator Atkins, Progressive Conservative senator. We have to describe him now as independent. Senator Atkins is deputy chair of the committee. Joining us shortly will be Senator Kenny from Ontario and he chairs the parent committee, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence.
Last but not least, we are particularly privileged to have attending Senator Dallaire who represents Quebec. He and Senator Downe from Prince Edward Island may well join us shortly. We have had Senate caucuses so some of our colleagues are late in arriving.
I will not introduce those senators when they arrive. I do not want to interrupt your presentations. I understand you each have brief opening remarks and typically, we would go into question and answer. With your agreement we will start with General Paul Manson, then Dr. Hansen and conclude with Dr. Bernier.
General (Ret'd) Paul D. Manson, President, Conference of Defence Associations Institute: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Atkins. I am truly grateful for this opportunity to address your subcommittee on the subject of the Canadian War Museum's controversial portrayal of the Allied bombing campaign in World War II.
First, let me state my credentials. From October 2000 to December 2006 I was a member of the Board of Trustees of the Canadian Museum of Civilization Corporation. Throughout this period, I chaired the board's Canadian War Museum Committee. I was also chairman of the Canadian War Museum Building Committee through the entire process of specification, design and construction of the new Canadian War Museum.
Apart from my duties as a trustee, from early 1988 through to the official opening of the new museum, two years ago, I also chaired the Passing the Torch campaign, sponsored by the Friends of the Canadian War Museum. This campaign raised more than $16.5 million in support of the new facility. In that capacity alone, I served for seven long years as a full-time volunteer.
I wish to state, emphatically, at the outset, that I am extremely proud of the new Canadian War Museum. It is unmatched in the world as a national museum of military history.
It is all the more painful, therefore, to express my profound disappointment at the museum's failure to correct what I believe to be a serious error in the presentation of its concluding panel on the Bomber Campaign entitled ``An Enduring Controversy.''
Ironically, the greater part of the museum's coverage of the campaign and Canada's contribution to it, is comprehensive, accurate and balanced. However, for reasons that I cannot understand, the authors of the final panel unaccountably came down heavily on one side of the controversy with ill chosen words that belittle the strategic value of the Allied bomber offensive. Furthermore, by focusing instead on civilian deaths and the destruction of German homes, this focus darkly implies that the campaign and those who took part in it were involved in an unjustified and immoral activity. The museum visitor is therefore left with a false and damaging impression of this part of Canada's military history. I fully understand why Canadian veterans and especially veterans of Bomber Command are so incensed by the museum's approach.
It is not my intent to reiterate the numerous arguments that have been made in this matter by members of the veterans' community, historians and others having an interest in our military history and who, like myself, object to the museum's treatment of the subject. You have already received much information and opinion in defence of one side or the other, and there will be more, I am sure, before you have concluded your deliberations, including some misguided and poorly researched personal views. Those views are inevitable in a controversy of this kind.
Here is an important point. No one who has studied the situation denies that there is an abiding controversy over the ``value and morality'' of the Allied bomber campaign. As we have seen recently, the four eminent historians who were brought in by the museum to examine the matter were divided down the middle in their conclusions. That there is a divergence of opinion on the difficult question of strategic effectiveness versus morality is not what brings us here today, although the museum officials in their public announcements and recent testimony before your committee last week would like you to think so. The real controversy facing us is in the Canadian War Museum's stubborn refusal to budge from its severely unbalanced position as expressed in the display's concluding panel and the huge inflammatory photo of German corpses that accompanies it. It is heavy handed, biased, it ignores the historical reality of the bomber campaign and it sends the museum visitor away with a severely distorted understanding of an immensely important element of the strategic war against Nazi Germany and the vital role that Canadians played in it.
I wish to acknowledge that, having worked closely over the years with Dr. Rabinovitch, Mr. Geurts, Dr. Oliver and Dr. Granatstein, I admire and respect their contributions to the creation and operation of the new Canadian War Museum. We part company however, with the arguments they presented in the defence of the enduring controversy panel and the refusal to change it.
You will draw your own conclusions about the validity of their claims but I strongly disagree with the main points of their defence, of which there are four in my estimation. Allow me to refute each of these in turn. The museum's first line of defence is to stand firmly by the fact that there is a controversy and that it is enduring. Frankly, this is obfuscation. There is no real disagreement on this point, as I mentioned a moment ago. Virtually all proponents acknowledge that the controversy over value and morality has been going on for 60 years and likely will continue indefinitely. Museum officials, by claiming that the battle is over the panel, is an attempt to divert attention from the real issue, which is the panel's biased wording. I can see why they resorted to this diversionary tactic. The wording of the ``Enduring Controversy'' panel is utterly indefensible with its few summarizing words. The panel blithely belittles the value of the Allied bombing campaign, while not very subtly focusing the visitors' attention on the moral side of the debate. It tells the observer that the strategic value is doubtful, whereas 600,000 Germans were killed and millions made homeless.
Add to this the panel's subheading, in a font twice the size of a main text, which says: ``Mass bomber raids against Germany resulted in vast destruction and heavy loss of life.'' What conclusions can visitors walk away with, having read the museum's inference that the effectiveness of the bombing was doubtful, other than that the bombing was immoral?
It is in this second line of defence that the museum's position is weakest. The panel denigrates the campaign's strategic value with a cavalier and misleading reference to: ``only small reductions in German war production until late in the war'' while omitting any reference to the enormous impact of Allied bombardment on transportation, communications, anti-submarine operations, interdiction of the Nazi armies on both the Eastern Front and the Western Front, mitigation of the V-1 and V-2 rocket attacks against Western Europe and Great Britain, the undeniably heavy impact on civilian and military morale in Germany as well as the enormous resources that Nazi Germany was forced to divert to air defence and damage repair, that otherwise would be used to oppose the Normandy landings.
This glaring omission sends the museum visitor away with a severely distorted understanding of the value and effectiveness of the allied bombing campaign.
This leads me to a third serious weakness in the museum's defence. Dr. Oliver and Dr. Granatstein have said that every word on that panel is true.
That may be so, but it is misleading because vital historical facts are left out. Historically accurate content is necessary, but it must cover the whole story. The history must be complete and it must be pertinent. The panel fails to meet the test.
This museum also declares they must never give in to lobby groups. Dr. Granatstein expressed it this way: ``A terrible precedent can be established if the facts are adjusted for one group. How then, can the war museum resist the others?''
This view is troubling because it implies that the museum's historians are always right and their interpretations, as displayed in the Canadian War Museum, are unassailable. This, of course, is wrong. Each case must be judged on its own merits.
Mr. Chairman, you will note that in refuting the arguments presented by museum officials, I have deliberately avoided the emotional side of the debate. This is because of my considered belief that the museum's position is untenable on logical grounds alone.
However, emotional perceptions cannot be waived off. They matter, especially when they come from those who are part of the history we are discussing here today.
All who respect the veterans of Bomber Command and what they went through ought to heed their emotional call for correction of what they consider, with good reason, to be an unfair representation of their contribution to victory over Nazi Germany.
They are deeply offended and sad about what they see as a cold-hearted modern historical interpretation of their campaign, written and defended by those who cannot possibly understand what it was like.
They are bewildered by the Canadian War Museum's obstinacy in this matter. Can they be wrong with their reading of the ``Enduring Controversy'' panel? I do not think so.
I want to make another point which I believe to be critical. It has to do with how this dispute might be resolved. Failure to correct the imbalance that currently resides in the words of the ``Enduring Controversy'' panel would have the most serious consequences for reasons I think must be obvious, although the surviving veterans of Bomber Command, now in their 80s and 90s, are fading from the scene. The controversy we face here will not disappear with them because it is a matter of fact, substance and reality.
Younger people like myself will continue to seek resolution and reconciliation, but not at any price.
The question remains, what can be done? The simple answer is that, in my considered view, a modest change to the wording of the final panel, thoughtfully constructed, would satisfy both parties to this unfortunate dispute. I have seen several alternative wordings that might resolve the issue. All that is needed is to restore the balance by acknowledging the huge contribution that Allied bombing and the occupied territories made to ultimate victory. If I were doing the writing, I would also include mention of the great courage, the moral courage, displayed by Canadian bomber crews in the face of appalling odds.
These two facts, the strategic impact of the bombing and the courageous service of those who took part, deserve to be passed on by the Canadian War Museum to future generations. Rewriting the offending panel in this way need not involve any loss of face by the museum or any sacrifice of academic integrity. Canadians would surely understand.
As I said at the outset, it pains me to speak out against an institution that has been an important part of my life for the past decade. I do so only with the intention of restoring to the Canadian War Museum its richly deserved reputation as a superb instrument for the preserving and telling of Canadian history. It is now up to the museum to set things right.
Randall Hansen, Associate Professor and Canada Research Chair, University of Toronto: Thank you for the opportunity to speak before this committee. It is a great honour.
I begin by saying that my interest in this matter is academic. I am writing a book on the Anglo-American bombing war. I have no institutional connection to the war museum itself.
With the greatest respect to General Manson and his distinguished record of service to the country, I wish to disagree with the points he put forward. I want to emphasize three points.
First, the claims advanced by the Canadian War Museum's exhibit are more than plausible. They are accepted fact and beyond historical debate and there is little that, in fact, is.
Second, the argument that the exhibit implies or suggests that Royal Canadian Air Force, RCAF, and Royal Air Force, RAF, pilots were war criminals is false.
Third, in my view, the exhibit cannot be revised in a way that both retains historical accuracy and pleases those veterans who are unhappy with it. Much more can be said about the morality of the bombing war and the strategic effects, but doing so would raise issues and conclusions with which the veterans are even less likely to be happy.
Claim one: I agree with the claim that the ''value and morality of the strategic bombing offensive remains bitterly contested'' is a matter of undisputed fact. No serious historian holds that the bombing had a decisive effect, that it won the war. There is a lively debate about the strategic effects, but that debate is limited to its secondary effects, specifically, the transfer of resources from the Eastern Front and what became the Western Front.
Claim two is that ``Bomber Command's aim was to crush civilian morale and force Germany to surrender by destroying its cities and industrial installations.'' This statement again is absolute fact. From the time Arthur Harris took over in 1942, although he did not make the original decision, he was a consistent advocate of city bombing and he thought precision bombing of industrial or communication targets was pointless. He stated that the aim of Bomber Command:
. . . is the destruction of German cities; the killing of German workers; and the disruption of civilized life throughout Germany. It should be emphasized that the destruction of houses, public utilities, transport and lives; the creation of a refugee problem on an unprecedented scale; and the breakdown of morale both at home and at the battle fronts by fear of extended and intensified bombing, are accepted and intended aims of our bombing policy. They are not by-products of attempts to hit factories.
A basic element of this was the deliberate killing of civilians. He further stated:
What we want to do in addition to the horrors of fire is to bring the masonry crashing down on top of the Boche, to kill Boche, and to terrify Boche: hence the proportion of high explosives. It was a technical debate. The ``Boche,'' of course, referred to the Germans.
Claim three is that ``Mass bomber raids against Germany resulted in vast destruction and heavy loss of life.'' Again, there can be no debate: 500,000 tons of bombs were dropped on German cities. Some 70 German cities were destroyed. In its execution and intention, the bombing of Dresden was not exceptional. It was a normal raid like many others.
Claim four is that ``Although Bomber Command and American attacks left 600,000 Germans dead, and more than five million homeless, the raids resulted in only small reductions in German war production until late in the war.''
The figure for the numbers of German dead is not a matter of dispute so I will not address that. On the issue of German industrial production, the only clear facts are that German industrial production increased year after year, until late September 1944, and from then fell rapidly. Anything else is counterfactual speculation.
What it might have been in the absence of bombing, we cannot know. If we enter into the game of counterfactual speculation, it cannot be one-sided. We cannot ask how the war would have developed had Germany not had to defend its cities. We must ask how the war would have developed if the massive resources that went into bombing German cities had been used elsewhere in the war, in Normandy and on the Eastern Front. I submit that such speculation is endless and pointless.
I want to say something about what the exhibit implies. It has been suggested that the exhibit's implications are the problem, that it leaves the impression that people who served this country well were, in fact, war criminals. I suggest it does nothing of the sort.
The exhibit states widely known facts; and by emphasizing the accepted controversy surrounding the campaign, it encourages visitors to make up their own mind. That is exactly what one would hope a museum would do — inform, educate and provoke thought and debate.
How could the exhibit be changed? The exhibit could be changed. For example, much more could be said. The most effective bombing targets were precision targets, such as ball bearings, oil and communications — here I agree with General Manson — but these targets are precisely the ones that Arthur Harris opposed. When he did bomb them, he did so against his own wishes.
Second, throughout the war, the Americans argued for the precision bombing of industrial targets, and against city bombing. Some 46 per cent of all Bomber Command bombs were dropped directly on the centre of German cities. The figure for the Americans is 6 per cent. I note, in passing, the exception to their policy in February 1945, over Berlin.
To conclude, the museum's exhibit is historically accurate and balanced in its presentation. Its conclusions are supported by British, American and Canadian official histories, by decades of scholarship and by Canada's most distinguished historians, such as Margaret MacMillan and Desmond Morton. If the museum were to change the exhibition text to please veterans — and I do not doubt or call into question the sincerity of their feelings — it would need to ignore, suppress and deny undisputed historical evidence. In my view, it would be better to have no exhibit at all than one that substitutes fiction for fact.
[Translation]
Serge Bernier, Historian, as an individual: Mr. Chairman, given all the facts that have already been presented to you, including the brief I presented to the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, on the subject that brings us together today, I propose to go directly to the point of what we are here to talk about.
The controversy before us here does not exist as such in the French-language world of Canada in which I generally operate. It was not until I received a phone call from the Director and CEO of the Canadian War Museum last fall that I became aware of the whole issue. At that point, however, I very quickly realized that there is in effect an important debate underway concerning a part of the Canadian War Museum's permanent exhibition that deals with strategic bombing in the Second World War.
In December, the President and CEO of the Canadian Museum of Civilization asked if I would give my opinion as a historian and I agreed to do so. I will summarize my responses to the two questions that were put to me and that you have seen, and I quote myself; it is always good to have a footnote in a historian's text:
The section of the Canadian War Museum on the strategic bombing campaign generally gives the visitor a good idea of what the strategic bombing was attempting to accomplish, the real results that it achieved with respect to its objectives, and the human and moral costs to both the attackers and the recipients of those attacks.
The second question asked whether the panel ``An Enduring Controversy'' presented certain consequences of the bombing campaign in an appropriate manner. Based on the Canadian War Museum's Interpretive Development Guidelines, dated January 11, 2003, the Visitor Bill of Rights, and also the impact of the photographs that appear alongside the text panel, I concluded that, since the subject of the strategic bombing campaign was well covered elsewhere in the area where the panel was located, the panel itself was not necessary.
I would like to take this opportunity to add one point, and to go into more detail concerning another point that I mentioned in my report in January. The museum made a choice to highlight this controversial issue relating to the morality of certain acts of war. And why not? It would have chosen to debate the morality of war itself, the morality of the very existence of a Canadian War Museum, the name of which, in French at any rate, could easily be interpreted as encouraging war. Simply put, among all the moral debates that are possible around war and warfare, the museum chose one in particular. Personally I have no problem with this choice, but it appears that others do.
The point that I want to go into in a little more detail concerns the photographs that appear on the panel at the centre of this controversy, because I believe that without them, the outcry would have been far less vociferous. As is often the case with historians — and I am as guilty in this regard as the vast majority of my colleagues — the photos were chosen simply to illustrate a statement. In fact, however, they have their own story. In the case at hand, did the photos come from the victims, the Germans, or those carrying out the bombings, the Allies? Who were the photographers? Civilians, or soldiers? Who were they working for? Were they known to doctor photographs as part of their regular duties? What were the captions that accompanied the original photos? Who paid for them? Were they subject to censorship approval?
Any time a photograph is to be used in support of an analysis, it is essential to do the research necessary to understand the photo and to undertake a critical analysis of the original photographic document.
In the case with which we are concerned, the accusatory photographs accompanying the text panel presenting the debate on the morality of strategic bombing offer only one reading of the situation. There does not appear to have been an analysis of what these images are, of what they actually represent. They are historical sources that must be critically analyzed just like any other sources used by historians. If not, there is a risk that they will create a story of their own.
In closing, allow me to add that from my point of view as a historian, any change made to this part of the exhibition from this point forward could only be interpreted as caving in to political pressure. And that is something that neither the Canadian War Museum nor any other Canadian historian could accept.
A historian, who also happens to be the CEO of the Canadian Museum of Civilization Corporation, asked me for my opinion and I gave it. Personally, I would have been happy if it could have been left at that.
[English]
Senator Atkins: First, we are talking about a Canadian museum that is now a national treasure. Anybody who has been involved in it deserves a great deal of credit for what they have done.
I think it is remarkable that there has not been more controversy than we have heard. Maybe there have been minor ones but, if so, they have not been public. I do not know that anybody is quarrelling about the historical accuracy, from anything I have heard. I do not think that has been a serious point of argument.
However, having been there and seen the panel, it seems to me that the headline and the photos do support the veterans' complaint about what has happened. A photo is worth 1,000 words. Is there not an opportunity for perhaps examining that part of the presentation, so that it softens any impression people might have when they attend the museum? I would be interested in any comments from the witnesses with regard to my remarks.
Gen. Manson: If I may, Senator Atkins makes some interesting points. There have been previous controversies, one of which was bitter. It was during the opening days of the National War Museum over the portrayal of three paintings related to this dreadful episode in Somalia, in which Canadian soldiers killed a young Somalian. In particular, members of the regiment involved, the army and veterans in general were opposed to the war museum showing these highly inflammatory photographs depicting this sad episode in Canada's military history. The War Museum, and I was part of that process, rightly refused to take down those paintings for a good reason. Those paintings portrayed an episode that was real and historically accurate. It happened and as distasteful as it was, it was part of the story. The war museum held the line and refused to change.
There was a second case where arguments were presented that the war museum was presenting incorrect statistics involving Canadian soldiers in the Korean War. The war museum changed the exhibition because it was determined that those statistics were incorrect. They had the courage and correctness to change an exhibition that was demonstrably incorrect.
There is a precedent for making change in the war museum when displays are incorrect. Of the 10,000 elements of exhibitions, only one or two are wrong, and when something is wrong, the War Museum should make the necessary changes. In this particular case, as you know, so many people think that the display, in particular the final panel, needs to be changed that the war museum should have no compunction whatsoever about changing it to restore the balance that does not exist. That imbalance is an incorrect presentation of Canada's military history.
Mr. Hansen: Thank you for those most interesting and thoughtful comments. I have two remarks in response. Briefly, I am not sure that we can bracket the issue of historical fact from the legitimacy of the veterans' complaints, which is distinct from saying that they are genuinely and sincerely held beliefs. We must keep all that information together. On your more substantive comment on the photo of civilian bombing victims in Hamburg, it is a standard photo of the kind shown in almost all books on the bombing war, in particular on Bomber Command, books that are both critical and supportive of the campaign. It is by no means the most inflammatory of the photos because, as many of us have seen, there are photos of children with their heads sheared off or of women shrunken to the size of accordions, and other photos that are much more gory. However, that is what happened as the result of a bombing campaign that deliberately targeted the centres of cities where people lived in the thousands. It was inevitable.
It would be a great mistake to remove that. One possible way forward would be to add a photo of some of the industrial destruction wrought by the campaign, such as the V-2 launching pads that were destroyed, the Krupp Works or where the railroads were destroyed, to emphasize that both were the product of the bombing campaign.
[Translation]
Mr. Bernier: One photo has often been used in books, the caption to which was: ``Jews being led into a gas chamber at Treblinka.'' This scene was shown in a book time after time. Someone began to conduct research and to ask questions. Ultimately, that did not change the fate of the Jews; they had been killed, but these were people who were being led down a gully in Ukraine, who were killed and buried on the spot. The outcome of the story remains the same: the Jews were eliminated, but the photo has borne a false message for years.
Two of the three photos of destruction — no doubt caused in large part by bombing or artillery — were taken by National Defence after the war and the other more probably by Germans. I doubt that Canadians went to take photos immediately after the bombing. You also have to take into account the propaganda conducted in time of war with this kind of photograph.
[English]
Senator Atkins: Professor Hansen, we make the assumption that the War Museum is a national treasure — it represents a great deal of Canadian history. However, a problem has been raised by the Air Force Association of Canada and the Royal Canadian Legion, which represent a significant number of people. Is it not in the interest of the museum to reach out in some way to find a compromise to this issue, without in any way doing anything that could be interpreted as the historical revisionism?
Mr. Hansen: I agree, although I cannot speak for the museum and I speak as an uninformed outside observer only. There is no question that the museum has a great interest in consulting veterans and others involved in this campaign to bring them on board to ensure that their views are heard. If the museum feels that their objections on this particular point lack historical validity, then it is in the interests of the museum and, indeed, in the interests of the veterans, although they would never see it that way, for the museum to stand its ground. The overwhelming message received through the rest of the section on the air war, and from the museum overall, is of the profound and powerful contribution that Canadian forces made during the war in defence of the liberty of this country. They expended an effort that was hugely disproportionate to its size for what was a faraway country. It was in defence of liberty and there is something impressive and moving about that.
It would be dangerous for the museum to capitulate on this point because it would create the impression that there is something tainted about the broader and overwhelmingly powerful conclusion. To cite by example, in the Enola Gay controversy, although I do not know enough details to take one side, a museum in the United States created the impression among historians that that museum is not to be taken seriously because it is not motivated by the pursuit of historical fact but by a certain form of political correctness. In Canada, we and the veterans have a strong interest in avoiding that kind of outcome.
Senator Atkins: Is that even if it means burying the headlines somewhere and having a new headline?
Mr. Hansen: Again, that would be wrong. The overall Allied bombing war was an important element of the Allied strategy. I agree entirely with General Manson that the precision element of the attacks, in particular late in the war, that were led by the Americans had an important effect in the outcome of the war. However, the fact remains that Arthur Harris and the British and, by extension, the Canadians, although they made none of the decisions that drove it forward and were wrapped up in it because of the structures of the day, staked their reputation and expended huge numbers of Allied lives on the bombing of cities. That policy was of doubtful moral validity and did not work in practice. Therefore, for the war museum to bury that fact would do credit to neither history nor the veterans.
Gen. Manson: This whole question of whether the intent of the Allies was to bomb cities or to bomb, primarily, industry and war production in Germany is one that will be debated forever. Professor Hansen threw out some statistics about the U.S. having about 60 per cent accuracy in hitting industries, whereas the Bomber Command including the Royal Canadian Air Force and other Allied air forces was about 6 per cent.
What Professor Hansen did not mention — and this is typical of the arguments that are made against the veterans' position — is that British, Canadian and Commonwealth air forces within Bomber Command were bombing at night, in the dark, whereas the Americans were bombing in daylight. This strategy to have one air force bombing German cities and industry in daytime and the other at night was deliberate, to keep 24-hour pressure on the Nazi regime. The impact that pressure had, for example, on workers going to work to build armaments, was enormous. It was a constant 24-hour-a-day pressure that had a great impact on the outcome of this Allied bombing campaign in the Second World War.
Another factor that is starkly evident — or should be, but which seems to be forgotten in many arguments being made today — is that bombing was dreadfully inaccurate in those days. The techniques simply did not have the ability, other than in the most ideal circumstances, to drop bombs accurately on targets. I think today's generation tends to look at images from the Gulf War, where they see incredibly accurately delivered missiles going through windows of the target. You cannot judge World War II bombing by those standards. It was an inaccurate period.
One phenomenon that was discovered in bombing, particularly in nighttime bombing in World War II, was that the initial bombers would drop their weapons close, if not right on the target, but succeeding waves attacking that same target would drop their bombs earlier and earlier. There was a creep away from the target area because of the smoke and the cloud of dust that had been brought up by the initial bombs, in darkness particularly, and the tremendously inaccurate bomb sites that were used by the bombers. It was a different world. Judging accuracy of bombing and claiming that the intent was to bomb the centres of cities and kill as many civilians as possible simply does not ring true.
Mr. Hansen: I entirely agree on the point about accuracy. Bombing was terribly inaccurate because of the factors mentioned, and also because of the conditions the pilots were under. Searchlights and flaks were blasting the hell out of them. Bombing precisely under those conditions was extremely difficult.
I do not want to present the Americans as the white knights of this campaign. They killed many civilians. However, there is a basic and important distinction between the incidental and unintentional killing of civilians and the deliberate killing of civilians. The Americans deliberately killed civilians for four weeks in the February 1945 raids, above all in Berlin. Bomber Command deliberately killed civilians for three years. Those are undisputed historical facts.
On the point of the 24-hour campaign, that was not a principled decision. It was a compromise. Both sides were passionately committed to their view of bombing. The British thought daylight bombing would not work: It cost too many pilots, so they had to bomb at night and they had to area bomb. The Americans were convinced they had to bomb during the day and to bomb precisely. Since they could not agree, at Casablanca, in January 1943, they said: We will agree to disagree. You bomb by day and we will bomb by night.
It was not a principled decision. It was simply a way of getting around the fundamental disagreement between the two allies.
Senator Kenny: Thank you. To Professor Hansen: Does history every change?
Mr. Hansen: I was waiting for the rest of the question.
Senator Kenny: That is all.
Mr. Hansen: Does history ever change? Of course, our interpretation of history changes hugely. I read in one of the briefs — I think it was by Desmond Morton, but I do not mean to misquote him — that the Louis Riel rebellion was once treason and is now glorious resistance. Clearly, historical interpretation does change.
Do certain historical facts change? No, they do not. The Germans started the war and the Germans lost the war. Those facts will never change.
I think there is a fact-interpretation distinction, although I would admit that the boundaries blur at certain times.
Senator Kenny: I heard you say that historians change their views over parts of history when they have a chance to reflect on it further.
Mr. Hansen: Context plays a role.
Senator Kenny: Is there only one way to describe the truth?
Mr. Hansen: It depends on what we are talking about. No, there is not one way to describe the truth. I assume we are talking about this issue in the context of the museum, and that is why there is an enduring controversy. The point made upfront was that one can have differing interpretations of the same facts.
Senator Kenny: I have some difficulty with your conclusion, and also yours, Professor Bernier.
Your conclusion, Professor Hansen, is that the museum's exhibit is historically accurate and balanced in its presentation. I do not have any difficulty with that so far.
You said its conclusions are supported by British, American and Canadian official histories, by decades of scholarship and by Canada's most distinguished historians. I do not have problems there.
If the museum were to change the exhibit text to please victims, it would need to ignore, suppress and deny historical evidence. That is a straw man. You have set up a straw man before the committee and suggested that any change in the exhibit text that pleased veterans would ignore, suppress and deny undisputed historical evidence.
You are telling the committee that there are not 10 ways that historians could describe what happened, still be accurate, still maintain their integrity and still have something that was historically sound. You suggest all sorts of terrible things would happen. Do you not believe that if we had 10 historians sitting around this table and asked them all to describe this event, all men and women of integrity, that we would receive 10 different descriptions? Could they not all be right?
Mr. Hansen: I appreciate the burden of your point and I will be glad to admit that, at a logical level, my statement does not ring true in the sense that one could certainly, by counter-example, come up with a minor change in the text that does not violate the claims of historical accuracy. At a logical level, I will accept what you said.
However, the point I do not want to retreat from is that the four claims put forward by the committee on vast destruction, on the deliberate targeting on morale, on the number of people killed and on industrial production, those are not facts about which 10 historians who knew this debate would disagree.
If the panel said, for example, the bombing campaign had no effect or a decisive effect — imagine either of those two statements — on the development of the war, that sort of interpretive exercise would be subject to a massive degree of interpretation. All it says is that it targeted morale. If the conclusion was that it destroyed or had no effect on morale, again, I think 10 historians would disagree profoundly on those conclusions.
Senator Kenny: You miss my point, Professor. My point is this — and I think you have conceded it — that you can have a number of historians with great integrity write about an event and come up with a number of different descriptions. Is that true or not true?
Mr. Hansen: It depends on the event. At the risk of being controversial, one historian, David Irving, tried an interpretation of the number of Jews killed in WW II, which was not subject to that interpretation. If I were to put forward to this committee that Germany did not unilaterally start the war but it was forced on them by the aggressive intention of its enemies, which is the claim of Nazi propaganda, that debate would not be reasonable. That statement is inaccurate.
Senator Kenny: I need to go back to square one again. Square one is simply this: I do not want you giving me extremes at one end and extremes at another to demonstrate that historians can proceed without integrity. I am saying that if historians proceed in a sound, academic way and work with integrity, is it not possible for them to come up with different ways of describing the same thing?
Mr. Hansen: With the greatest respect, I understand perfectly what you are saying but we cannot —
Senator Kenny: Stop dodging around the answer, then.
Mr. Hansen: I am not dodging the answer. That question cannot be answered at a general, abstract level because, unfortunately, it depends on what we are talking about. Certain historical developments are subject to more interpretation than others. Again, the conclusions reached by the Canadian War Museum are not revisionist. They are not radical, nor are they out of keeping with historical opinion. They square clearly with what the majority of the historians who work on this campaign argue.
Senator Kenny: No doubt, but are you telling me that the words on that plaque are perfect?
Mr. Hansen: The conclusions are perfect. If one wanted to debate the word ``although,'' I would be happy to debate that word. For example, one could remove the word ``although'' and retain the rest of the statement and the substantive meaning of the statement would remain — my criterion. However, the word would have been changed — your criterion.
Senator Kenny: Professor Bernier, if I may go to your closing paragraph, you make the statement there that, from your point of view as a historian, any change made to this part of the exhibit from this point forward could be interpreted only as caving in to political pressure. From now until the end of time, if any change was made, you would see that as ``caving in to political pressure.'' Is that correct?
[Translation]
Mr. Bernier: I was referring to the current controversy. Obviously, I am not telling you that, in 50 years, we still will not have the same arrangement of artefacts and the same story to tell. There will probably be a new permanent exhibition. That was simply in relation to what we are debating today. I was asked to make a personal evaluation of what was taking place. I thought we would leave it at that. And yet, today, I find myself before politicians. If a change is made, someone could definitely interpret that fact as being the result of political pressure.
[English]
Senator Kenny: Did you have the opportunity to read the transcript or see the telecast of the officials from the museum appear before us, together with Mr. Granatstein?
Mr. Bernier: Yes.
Senator Kenny: Did you feel they were under political pressure?
[Translation]
Mr. Bernier: No, each one presented his point of view in his own way.
[English]
Senator Kenny: Were they harassed or harangued or abused?
[Translation]
Mr. Bernier: No. The eventual interpretation, which you will certainly read in a newspaper, will be that we will have someone — that may be false, but that will be the interpretation given.
[English]
Senator Kenny: We are here to correct the record, then, and ensure that no one jumps to inappropriate conclusions. I felt they were treated with courtesy and respect. We heard them out, even to the extent that we did not have much time for questions. Surely it is possible, one, not to say only this is perfect and therefore I cannot change it; and, two, not to say, should a change happen by any chance, it is as a result of the political pressure being placed on us. Surely it is possible for reasonable people to say, ``Goodness. We can probably describe that half a dozen ways.'' I wonder if one of those six different ways would not be so offensive to people who we care about a great deal, who have performed enormous service to the country and who deserve a bit of extra effort when it comes to describing what they did and what happened when they did it. Is that not possible?
[Translation]
Mr. Bernier: From my point of view, yes. That is what I presented before and again somewhat today.
[English]
Senator Kenny: I was concerned only about your last point where you said that any change from this point forward is not happening.
[Translation]
Mr. Bernier: I understand. Thank you.
Senator Dallaire: I want to welcome you, gentlemen. General Manson, we have not emphasized often enough the work you have had to do to have a major war museum built. I congratulate you and your colleagues. We are very proud of it.
[English]
In this particular presentation, I will indicate to you upfront that, having looked at it, the interpretation that is given by the vast majority of the people who have any link to anything that might be military or an interpretation of military skills leads them to believe the pejorative perspective that has been articulated by many people thus far.
Whether one argues it is accurate or not, what is left to the people is something that, in my opinion, has an overtly negative tone in regard to not only the campaign but also to those who participated in that campaign and to Canada participating in that campaign. That leaves me with a perspective that I am wondering if balance exists throughout the process. For example, is the blitz projected in a similar sort of fashion? Are the nuclear bombings of the Japanese, a correction of the Americans on the Japanese, projected in the same sort of fashion? Is the fact that 27 million civilians were killed during World War II, of which a portion was part of that campaign, within the strategic focus? Yes, killing civilians is not necessarily within either the conventions of human rights that were evolving or the law of armed conflict. However, it was within the norm, if I can abuse that term, of the use of force in campaigns of total war of that time. I did not get that feeling in the display. That was not projected. To me, there is a dimension that is not necessarily balanced, right off the bat.
However, I want to make a few specific points. First, I now realize, Professor Hansen, that the years I spent at staff colleges and on war gaming, and so on, studying wars and options that commanders had over those campaigns, was something called counter-factual speculation. I am not sure that is exactly what we were doing, but it is absolutely analytical work on what happened, what could have happened, why the commander decided to do that versus doing this, and what was the commander's option analysis at the time. I contend that the debate of how and why some decision was taken and whether it was effective is absolutely overt and can be credible and rigorous under peer review, as with any other sort of work of research or analysis of things that happened.
Second, we are not in this exercise to please veterans. We are not in this exercise to create fiction but to bring what we hope are the voices of a variety of players into the forum of democracy, permitting them to be expressed. In so doing, there is nothing in there that is sacred, apart from facts. I ask the question to Professor Hansen, and to you, General Manson, and Mr. Bernier, because I found your comments in regard to the essentiality of that board to start with, let alone the arguments on the pictures, interesting. Is it the role of a museum to interpret and to project an interpretation, or is it the role of the museum to articulate facts with the balanced methodologies of any pedagogical tools that might be available to ensure that facts come to the fore rather than interpretations, which, no matter how academically it could be argued, can also lead sometimes to certain speculation?
Professor Hansen, I would love to be in your classes.
Mr. Hansen: Thank you. That is high praise. I will respond to your general comment about additions to other displays in the museum. I do not feel competent to comment on any particular exhibit. As a general principle, they seem to me perfectly fine.
The side issue of total war, which you mentioned, is often brought up. I appreciate your points about the awful number of civilians killed in this war, but there was never total war. There was war between the Russians and the Germans, and between the Japanese and the Allies, but the Germans and the Western Allies respected, in the main — and there were some important exceptions to that statement — Geneva conventions on the treatment of prisoners. I am lecturing: You know this as well as I do. Had it been total war, when the Allied armies went into Germany, they would have had no compunction about going door-to-door and spraying bullets madly, killing every civilian in their wake. We know they did not do that. They made ever effort to reduce civilian casualties. I do not think that saying it was total war gives us that much theoretical purchase.
On counter-factual speculation, first, historians tend to be suspicious of it. I am not opposed to counter-factual speculation. The point I was trying to emphasize is that it would need to be two-sided. We need to consider the possibility of there having been no bombing in the war at all, or no area bombing and only precision bombing. It is a vast but intellectually engaging enterprise. The time is well spent on it. It is difficult to know whether a museum could ever do that, but as a general intellectual exercise, it is important.
On the question of pleasing the veterans, if I gave the impression that I thought this committee was out to please veterans, I apologize. I did not mean to give that impression. This committee is an important part of the public debate and it is evidence for one of the claims of the museum that there is an ``Enduring Controversy,'' and I welcome the presence of this committee and the opportunity to speak before it. I apologize if I gave the other impression.
On your last question, I would go with the latter suggestion, the role of the museum to present facts rather than interpretation, insofar as one can ever make a clear distinction between the two.
Gen. Manson: Perhaps I can add a word about these interesting subjects. In the last two questions posed by senators, we are getting to the heart of the issue facing us here today.
Let me agree totally with Professor Hansen that the museum's purpose is not to please veterans. Veterans have a personal interest in this, about which they are vocal, and understandably so.
However, the purpose of the museum and of this exhibition is to tell the true and full story about one important element of a major war in which Canada participated. That story must be told factually and completely. Senator Kenny brought out that there can be a broad array of fact-based interpretations of history.
My concern here is that in its interpretation, and only in its final panel called ``An Enduring Controversy,'' the interpretation is flawed because it comes down heavily with a bias on one side of the argument. That is not the purpose of the war museum.
The war museum is addressing its story to the visitors, the people who come and look at these displays and learn from them. Beyond that, it is the entire people of Canada whose interest is to be preserved in the Canadian War Museum.
The museum is the major repository of historical fact and interpretation in this country today of our military history. As I said before so many times, it does its job extremely well. It is an anomaly, therefore, that in this one particular case they have come down with a misinterpretation of an important part of our history. All that we, the veterans and Canadians themselves, should seek as a successful outcome to this dispute is that the balance be restored in that one final panel. It could be done so easily.
[Translation]
Mr. Bernier: In the museum and in all its, let us say, academic activities, the facts are always reported. A certain difficulty arises because we rely on artefacts, and certain facts are sometimes forgotten for lack of artefacts.
Everything is subject to interpretation. We can accept or not accept what is presented through the permanent exhibit. I am persuaded that, if historians toured the permanent exhibit, each one would say that he would have done things his own way. A compromise has to be reached in order to present something that everyone can rally around.
Reference was made to what is called the North West Rebellion. Today we realize that there were virtually no enemies in that incident; everyone was a friend, even though they shot at each other for a few days. We can not start a debate on all aspects of the event, but there is one on that part in particular.
For example, I found myself caught up in a debate, at a French university, on the bombing of Caen, which took place in the summer of 1944. Some French historians were of the view that the bombing had been completely pointless, having caused the deaths of 3,000 persons. The Canadians and British, for their part, who had been at the gates of Caen for a month and who wanted to break that deadlock, thought at the time that that tactic was the right one. However, there was a price to pay and they later realized that the effort had been pointless. It is always easier to make decisions 60 years later than at the moment itself.
In these museums, we will always be caught between academic and ludic aspects, and that is subject to interpretation and debate.
Senator Dallaire: We are touching on a component which I do not think is emphasized enough.
[English]
We have been debating the historic dimensions of this issue. General Manson, you used the terms ``interpretation'' and ``misinterpretation.'' I am fearful of that sort of terminology for the museum. You used as an example Somalia and paintings that went up with regard to Somalia. If they had been front and centre when people first walked in, people would have objected to that. Whether it is too big or too small, it is an event within the history of the Canadian Forces. It is a scar wound so it should have been presented, but the question is, was it presented in a reasonable, balanced way?
That brings me to the question of museology. This area is essentially what we are into, the instrument by which this material is projected to the population. I speak not of the pure, scientific side of the historic analysis of artifacts but the museology that has the dimension of pedagogy to it. It is my opinion that although facts are there, the weakness of this particular presentation might be in the instruments that are used to project it, and that these instruments have not necessarily reflected the true factual nature of the campaign, both from the museology perspective and from a pedagogical perspective.
Would you say that those two sciences, if I can use the term, that are complementary to the facts can sometimes project a dimension that is not necessarily fully responsive to the content that may be historically correct, and this might be one of those cases?
Mr. Hansen: In terms of the overall burden of what you are saying, abstractly or perhaps theoretically, I agree. The way to answer your question in this context is to pose those questions. Placed in the context, is this plaque the equivalent of the Somalian example, front and centre, that hits you in the face as you walk in? I believe it is not.
There has been discussion, and I read the coverage about the exhibit in the press before I went to the museum. It pretends that it stands there all by itself and that is all that is said about Bomber Command, and of course that is not the case. The overall exhibit on the air war raises precisely the points that need to be there, giving some impression of what it was like to be a pilot up there although I do not think we could ever fully have that impression without being up there, and about the tragic loss — the letters to the family who lost a son in the bombing war.
The exhibit also makes the points that there was a diversionary effect of equipment and arms from the fronts that come back to defend the German cities and this diversion may have had an effect on the outcome of the war. Taking it in its broader museum context, there is that balance. If the plaque were literally the only thing that was said about the bombing war, while I would say yes, it is historically accurate; I would then say the objection against the display is stronger. Since we have all this other detail, I believe the critique is much weaker.
Gen. Manson: Perhaps I can add a point. A major problem that museums face, that museologists face and that the Canadian War Museum certainly faces is trying to portray thousands of years of military history in a limited-sized museum. To be sure, the entire exhibition is approximately 2.4 kilometres walking distance for the main displays alone. Even then, there is simply not enough capacity in the museum to tell the whole story. In fact, it can only tell a relatively small part of the story. Having spent years serving with the air force, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO, and North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD, in Europe, as well as in Canada, I feel that part of Canada's story could have been told in considerably more detail. However, that could be said about almost any aspect of our military history.
The air war story, as I said, is told extremely well and accurately given these limitations, except for that final panel. I cannot understand why having told the story accurately, they can move to that final panel and completely ignore an extremely important element of the effectiveness of the whole campaign, and therefore present a distorted view.
While talking about historical accuracy, I wish to make one small point. Professor Hansen, three times now, has talked about pilots who flew the bombers. It is not just him. I have even heard the main historian in the war museum use the term ``pilot'' when what is meant is the air crew. Beyond the pilots, in each of these bombers, there were navigators, bomb aimers, communicators and air gunners as well. Please do not forget those people, because every time they hear someone talk about the pilots, their hair stands on end. That is a small point but an important one because it reflects the need for historical accuracy.
Mr. Hansen: Well taken.
The Chairman: On that point, representatives of the Aircrew Association Canadian Region are pleased with your comment, I am sure.
[Translation]
Mr. Bernier: That refers back somewhat to what I already said earlier, that is to say that, when you enter that room on the strategic bombing in particular, the first panel summarizes the whole story very well. The number of persons who were killed, the fact that there was collateral damage, and so on. Then you move around and you indeed get other explanations with the artefacts and everything. Then suddenly you arrive at this panel.
As I said earlier, we have chosen to conduct this debate rather than another one. A host of other debates could have arisen, but we decided to have this one, and it seems that there is a price to pay for that. In addition, I find that the photos virtually tell us more than the text, which leads us in only one direction.
I also explained something else earlier, that I had followed their guide and answered some of the questions in my presentation in January, but, on some occasions, you may realize that the instructions of the guide offered to the museologists were not completely followed.
[English]
Senator Dallaire: In 2005, there was a publication about the history, called No Prouder Place: Canadians and the Bomber Command Experience, 1939-1945, by David Bashow. I would like to read the following quote into the record. The author quotes another historian named Franklin D'Olier, who wrote The United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
If the bombing of Germany had little effect on production prior to July '44, it is not only because she had idle resources on which to draw but because the major weight of the air offensive against her had not been brought to bear. After the air war against Germany was launched in its full scale, the effect was immediate.
Amongst historians, there is a debate that should be reflected as a debate and not as an opinion. I contend, in looking at the information, and I raise this with you and with the others, that the last panel projects opinion. It does not even go as far as being interpretation. Interpretation, one could still argue, has a certain peer review to it of course, but to me it reflects opinion. That to me is not within the realm of intellectual discipline that we see with so much of the museum.
My last question is to General Manson. There was a debate about the name of the museum, and Dr. Bernier raised it here. Was a tone projected by the leadership throughout the museum structure of a moral reference to war that might have influenced that panel?
Gen. Manson: Whether it influenced the panel, I frankly do not think so but you are absolutely right. When we were planning the war museum, we received letters from various groups saying, ``How dare your call it a war museum? It should be called a Canadian peace museum,'' which of course was absolutely ludicrous. It is a museum about war and it is the right name.
In the United Kingdom, there is the Imperial War Museum and it is historically accurate to call it a war museum. That debate was rather silly but it is one we considered at great length and seriously. However, the conclusion we reached was that it must be called a war museum.
Whether that had any impact on the way in which the history in Canada was presented, I think not. I believe it had no influence whatsoever because it was not the kind of complaint that could be taken too seriously.
The Chairman: Gentlemen, you have each been to the display. At the display, did you see any of the references to bombings of London and Coventry?
Mr. Hansen: I am not sure that I did.
The Chairman: Assuming for a moment that there are references to those bombings at the display, and I assume that you would think if we are talking about strategic bombing that you would expect some comment there, and if this display is exclusively about Bomber Command and not about strategic bombing, then maybe there should not be any reference.
Gen. Manson: I cannot answer that. I have a feeling there is some coverage of the German bombing, the Blitzkrieg. I recall having seen a video of V-1 buzz bombs flying towards England and in one case, being shot down but no, certainly not in the context of the issue we are talking about today is there any substantial presentation on the German bombing of cities such as London, Coventry and Rotterdam.
The Chairman: That is the point I want to lead to. There is reference in this display to strategic bombing of London and Coventry although I do not recall Rotterdam. The final words on the panel we are talking about say the value and morality of the strategic bomber offensive against Germany remains bitterly contested. Does that mean the bombing of London and Coventry does not remain bitterly contested?
Mr. Hansen: Of course, it is hugely contested. One debate in the discussion of city bombing in Germany is, why did this occur, given that it did not work, from a purely strategic and not moral point of view. Given the case of the bombing of London, what made us think it would work over Germany? One should add that the bombing of Germany was hugely disproportionate to the bombing of England. That is also true. I agree with you.
The Chairman: We are looking for some balance, and why certain individuals would interpret this in a way that I do not think the museum intended. Is that not one of the points? If we want to talk about the debate of strategic bombing, should we not talk about strategic bombing both ways?
Mr. Hansen: In a sense, there is not a strategic debate about the bombing of London because everyone accepts it was indiscriminate, immoral and ineffective. We would be hard-pressed to find a mainstream German or English-speaking author who in any way defended the blitz. If the question is about which campaign is more controversial, there is no question that it is the German campaign. We would be hard-pressed to find a defender of the blitz.
The Chairman: This is ``An Enduring Controversy,'' and we are talking about the value and morality of strategic bombing.
Let me ask my next question and that is, this is an ``Enduring Controversy'' and an ongoing debate. During the war and when this was happening, were the aircrew into an enduring controversy, as to the value and the morality of what they were about to do?
Gen. Manson: The answer is, absolutely not. I have read countless books, personal accounts of aircrew who took part in the bombing campaign on the Allied side, and I have never seen a single reference to any of them feeling they were taking part in anything that was immoral. There was a certain fatalism, as they faced horrible odds for survival. Dr. Granatstein made the point last week that not a single Allied airman withdrew from service on moral grounds.
Mr. Hansen: Overall, I agree there was not a huge amount of debate among the aircrew themselves. I have read of individual cases where, in particular, pilots wondered what was happening on the ground, what it was like to be down there, and were they dropping bombs on children. One pilot who did not want to area bomb Munster was told, this is war, accept it. Moral qualms were raised, but overall, very little, and as the general rightly pointed out, no one refused to fly, as they could have.
The Chairman: This entire display is about individuals and as you pointed out earlier, only aircrew could know the feelings of this experience. That is what the entire debate is about, and the displays are about, as one walks through this exhibit. At the end, it talks about the enduring controversy. That enduring controversy was not amongst all these individuals we have seen in the display, but at another level. It was at a political level, at the commanders' level, as opposed to the individuals who are honoured in this display.
Mr. Hansen: I think that is right. There was a debate amongst the Allied air staff, disagreement among themselves. Some of them referred to the bombing as baby killing. There was a debate among them. The broader debate occurred subsequently, after the last bomb dropped.
I am not sure what we conclude from this debate. It partly reflects the nature of bombing, and pilots say this. They were up thousands of feet with flak in their face and could not see what was below them. It created a huge moral space between what was occurring in the airplane and on the ground. If those same pilots could have had a camera showing what was happening, when mothers were grabbing their children, running from cellars and a child had its head sheared off by a collapsing building, then they would have expressed those qualms. It was the nature of the bombing. The pilots could not see what was going on below.
The Chairman: I have one other quick question but I will allow my colleague, Senator Atkins, who has one second round question to ask his question. We have about four minutes left.
Senator Atkins: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been on this subcommittee for a number of years now. I never thought I would face this kind of a debate. The thing that occurs to me in this whole discussion and argument is that neither side will move. They are dug in. I asked the general, how do you break that impasse?
Gen. Manson: It is the fundamental question facing us here today and the one that has faced all parties to this dispute for the last two years. We need to resolve it. The museum is suffering more perhaps than they realize in the eyes of not only the veterans but those who serve Canada in uniform and by Canadian citizens at large. The museum looks bad in this episode because of what is called its obstinacy and refusal to acknowledge the contribution made by brave people 60 years ago. The resolution is simple. Somebody with good intent must sit down with the museum and rewrite that final panel. I would have done it myself. Others would have done it. There are ways in which the wording can be placed that will satisfy both parties without any loss of face to either side.
If that does not happen, this dispute will go on for years and that would be most unfortunate for the Canadian War Museum, for the veterans and for Canadian military history.
Senator Atkins: We have a responsibility to put out a report but it is not our responsibility to write history.
How do we do it?
Gen. Manson: One way would be to sit the key people down together, lock them up in a room and say you have two hours to come to an agreement to a rewrite of the panel. I would be willing to do that. I am convinced it could be done.
The Chairman: We are convinced as well. We are not here to rewrite history. We are not revisionists. We support the Canadian War Museum and the efforts there and we are sensitive to the fact that maybe there has been an interpretation that was not intended by one panel, which seems to be a panel debating the morality of strategic bombing, whereas the display is a Bomber Command display. They are two different things in my mind. The debate with respect to strategic bombing is at a different level than the Bomber Command display.
This panel is the last one, as one goes out the door. This is the memory that one leaves with. If you want to comment on this please do. It is an important point, as after all one sees, what message does the museum leave the viewer with? Currently, it is a large photograph of a bombed-out area plus this comment as to the morality and the effectiveness of everything the viewer has seen.
Unfortunately, I cannot ask you to comment on that on the air, but if you would like to write to us as to the final message issue, it is one that is deserving of some time and I will try to ask it earlier with our next panel next week. The professor who wrote the book referred to by General Dallaire will be here next week along with others, to continue this enduring controversy.
General Manson, Dr. Hansen and Dr. Bernier thank you.
The committee adjourned.