Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 2 - Evidence - Meeting of December 10, 2007
OTTAWA, Monday, December 10, 2007
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 4:14 p.m. to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: I would like to call to order the meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. I am Senator Colin Kenny, the chair of this committee.
I will introduce the members of the committee. Senator Zimmer is from Winnipeg, Manitoba. He has had a long and distinguished career in business and philanthropy. He has been a member of the Senate since 2005, and he sits on the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications.
Senator Nancy Ruth is a feminist activist from Ontario. A senator since March of 2005, she is also to a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration as well as the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance. She is also a member of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
Senator Moore was called to the Senate in September of 1996 and represents the senatorial division of Stanhope St.- South Shore, Nova Scotia. He has been active at the city level in Halifax-Dartmouth and has served as a member of the board of governors at Saint Mary's University.
Senator Banks is from Alberta. He was called to the Senate in April of 2000. He is an accomplished and versatile musician and entertainer. He is the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources and a member of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
Senator Day is from New Brunswick, where he has had a career as a private practice attorney. He has served in the Senate since 2001, and he currently chairs the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance and is deputy chair of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
Members, we are fortunate today to have as our first witness Dr. Seth Jones. He is well known to the committee. He is from Washington, D.C., where we met him last June, and is an expert from the RAND Corporation, a large American think tank that conducts research focused on national security and many other things. Mr. Jones holds an MA and a PhD in political science from the University of Chicago. His main fields of expertise comprise Afghanistan, Europe, the Middle East, nation building, terrorism and counter-terrorism. He is here today to give us an update on the current situation in Afghanistan.
Seth Jones, Political Scientist, RAND Corporation: It is an honour for me to be here. As many of you know, my wife is a Canadian from Victoria and has followed the debate closely.
Much of this data has come from my successive trips to Afghanistan since 2003. Several weeks ago, I returned from Helmand, Kandahar, the east in general and central Afghanistan. My comments will be brief. We may get into more details during our question and answer discussion section.
I wanted to begin by saying that outside of the security sector, there are areas of progress, as noted in the handout that you have. The economy grew by an estimated 14 per cent in 2005 and by about 5.3 per cent in 2006. These are helpful steps in the area of democracy and democratic elections, and there will likely be an election again for president in 2009.
However, turning to the security sector, there is no question that there has been a deterioration in the security environment over the last several years across at least half of Afghanistan. I think the data is clear about this. It includes a number of organizations: the Taliban; the Haqqani network; foreign fighters based, for the most part, out of Pakistan; Hezb-i-Islami; criminal organizations and a number of different, mostly Pashtun, tribes, sub-tribes and clans. The overall number of insurgent-initiated attacks increased by 400 per cent from 2002 to 2006. The number of deaths also increased 800 per cent over this period of time. The increase in violence was particularly acute between 2005 and 2006. The number of suicide attacks quadrupled, remotely-detonated bombings more than doubled and armed attacks nearly tripled.
The 2007 data is not complete, but the trends look like the numbers will be greater in nearly all of these categories. For example, the number of suicide attacks in Afghanistan in 2007 will probably be the largest in the history of the country.
This brings us to the fundamental question of why this is the case. Why do we see growing levels of the insurgency in essentially an arc moving from the southern part of Herat Province down through Helmand and Kandahar, up through Paktika, Nangarhar and now into the centre of the country?
Ten months ago, I could drive two hours by ground convoy from Kabul west to Wardak Province. When I was back several weeks ago, that drive was too dangerous. There were Taliban and criminal organizations setting up checkpoints along the main road. The U.S. government, the Canadian government and multiple Afghan friends warned me, "Do not travel by road.'' That was only two hours west of Kabul. It was too dangerous due to Taliban checkpoints.
There are two factors causing this rise in activity and instability. One is what we often call governance. I think one can safely argue there has been a relative collapse of governance in Afghanistan. There are two or three components. One is corruption levels, which, as the polls indicate, are at an all-time high in the country. The police in particular are viewed by locals as corrupt, inefficient, and poorly trained and mentored. Some steps have been taken to address this problem, and Canadians have started to address this in Kandahar.
The key problem is what local Afghans at the village level think. You have to remember that, over the last 30 years of violence since the 1979 invasion, all politics in Afghanistan is local. It matters less what happens in Kabul and Kandahar City than it does what happens in the rural areas of the country. That is where you win or lose any counter- insurgency effort. Villages in these areas are not being sufficiently protected by Afghan national security forces.
In addition to governance problems in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, I want to raise issues of outside support. Historically, neighbours of Afghanistan — Iran, Russia, India and Pakistan — play in Afghanistan. Currently, the command and control structure of every major insurgent group is located on the Pakistani side of the border, whether it is the Taliban in Quetta or Peshawar or financial centres in Karachi or whether it is Hezb-i-Islami or al Qaeda based out of areas like North Waziristan in the federally administered tribal areas, or even some of the more senior high- value al Qaeda targets in the northern tribal areas.
There has been little systematic effort to do anything serious and sustained in Pakistan. This has a notable impact on Canadian forces in Kandahar and what comes across the border as well as for all of NATO.
On outside support for NATO, troop levels continue to be extraordinarily low, including in Kandahar. The problem on the ground is an inability to clear, hold and expand. In particular, there are very difficult problems in holding any territory on the ground, whether is it Panjwai, Zhari, or in Musa Qala in Helmand Province. Part of the reason is the lack of forces on the ground.
It is my view that Afghanistan has immense strategic importance. I would caution, as I have followed the Canadian debate, that this issue of downsizing or withdrawing forces from Afghanistan has to be taken extremely seriously. The costs have to be understood, because I would argue that September 11, 2001, happened in the United States because al Qaeda had a sanctuary and it had a relationship with the Taliban in Afghanistan. What would Afghanistan look like in areas of the country where the Taliban continued to make gains and establish territory? That would have extremely dangerous implications, not only on the region but also internationally. We have seen al Qaeda operating from Taliban-controlled areas in Pakistan.
In conclusion, I have four points to express. First, I would strongly suggest that Canadians, and NATO in general, take strong steps to deal with corruption in the government and overall. No major officials involved in corruption and drug trafficking have been prosecuted or removed from power. Why is that?
Second, there needs to be an increase of NATO and Afghan National Army resources in the south, which is the strategic heartland of the Taliban. NATO should act like Kandahar and Helmand provinces are the core focus, where we need major increases in force sizes.
Third, a regional approach to Afghanistan needs to be established, including dealing specifically with the sanctuary in Pakistan.
Finally, there needs to be institutional arrangements to improve cooperation. There are few integrated efforts across the international community in Afghanistan, although some useful steps have been taken along those lines.
I will conclude my remarks by saying that all is not hopeless. The costs of leaving are extraordinarily high, so the question in my mind is this: How do we improve a situation that is getting worse but is not yet out of control?
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Jones.
I would like to introduce Senator Tkachuk, Deputy Chair of the Committee.
Senator Moore: Mr. Jones, your comments have echoed much of the information that we have received over the past year, some of which we have experienced, so it is hard to know where to begin.
With regard to your comments on neighbours, what is Pakistan's attitude toward Afghanistan? Is Pakistan happy to have an unstable regime next door in Afghanistan? I know that over the years, Pakistan's secret service — Inter- Services Intelligence, ISI — has been very involved in Afghanistan in fighting and pursuing Pakistan's position of instability within Afghanistan.
Mr. Jones: That is an excellent question. I would argue that it is in Pakistan's interests and it wants to have a stable regime in Kabul that is according to its liking and strategic interest. It is difficult to generalize, but in my view, the concern in Islamabad is that the regime in Kabul is too closely allied with India, among other countries. The Afghan government has a close strategic alliance with India. The Indian government is involved in rebuilding the Afghan parliament building and in multiple road construction projects. The concern in Islamabad is that 80 per cent of Pakistan's borders are either with India, which has gone to war with Pakistan multiple times, or with an Afghan-Indian alliance, and its perception is that it is being encircled. The Taliban are a useful proxy force, then, because they can push into the south and east of Afghanistan, which means that there is support from Pakistan's ISI and from Pakistan's Frontier Corps — a paramilitary law and order service in the federally administered tribal areas. Part of this is ideological with the Frontier Corps and part of this is strategic as well. That is the strategic context, as I see it.
Senator Moore: Because of Pakistan's ongoing historical contest with India, Pakistan sees India's involvement within Afghanistan as a problem. Therefore, they are chipping away to keep their part of the Afghanistan position so that India does not have a free ride in there.
Mr. Jones: That is correct.
Senator Moore: Once or twice you mentioned the matter of the collapse of governance in Afghanistan, corruption being at an all-time high and the police being corrupt and poorly trained. I keep hearing the words "corruption'' and "corrupt.'' I do not have it with me, but the compact that was signed in London lists various benchmarks that are to be achieved in Afghanistan. One of them was the diminishing, if not the erasure, of corruption, yet it is getting worse.
You talk about officials being brought to trial. What is the state of the justice system? Is one being set up? Is it being modelled after what we see as a traditional system of justice within the North American definition? How is this evolving? If Canadians are working in government offices helping the ministers govern their country, I do not understand why this situation is not improving but is in fact worsening.
Mr. Jones: After Bonn in 2001 and 2002, the Italians took the lead in rebuilding the justice sector. That began as an Italian-led effort.
I would argue that the justice system can be divided into several fronts. At the local community there is an informal local justice system based on the jirga. It is alien to us in the West. It will take decades or centuries to change.
On the criminal front, there have been some efforts to improve the formal system dealing with criminal efforts. For example, a drug court has been built in Kabul to deal with high-level drug traffickers. The problem is less of an institutional issue and more of a political one. It is not that the institutions do not exist; rather, there has been little political will to prosecute high-level government officials or drug traffickers because of the possibility, in the midst of an insurgency, of making the situation worse. The issue has been that there is little political will among the Afghans and perhaps some of the international community to prosecute. The problem is less the institutions and more the will to actually do this. There are institutions.
Senator Moore: That has to come from the central government, but there seems to be a traditional system of justice within the tribal regions, and they are not adopting — and perhaps they do not think they need — a national system of justice such as we have in Canada.
Mr. Jones: Yes. In my personal view, that is okay to some degree. Especially in Pashtun areas, when someone steals someone else's animal, the issue may be addressed at a local jirga level. Local tribal elders will be called, have a meeting and will address it. More serious issues such as murder and killing are sometimes addressed by jirgas and sometimes above and beyond that. We have seen that in some provinces they are being addressed by a Taliban governance structure. At low levels we have an informal, jirga-based system and at high levels we have a somewhat formal system. It is just not particularly effective.
Senator Moore: The corruption centres around money — aid that is not getting down to the ground level where it is supposed to be helping. Is it being siphoned off by government officials?
Mr. Jones: The most significant area in which you see corruption is involvement in the narcotics trade. Individuals are involved in various ways in controlling areas or forces that are reaping profits through taxes or in other ways on the production, cultivation and trafficking of poppy. That is probably the single most significant area.
It has been well documented that the police in various ways have funds going to district police chiefs. I will give you two examples of corruption at the police level. One is money that is siphoned off to district police chiefs who take a cut of it. Second, there is an incentive to have what is called ghost police, where a local district police chief may say he has 1,000 or 2,000 police in his district or in several districts when he in fact does not have them; so he is being given money for police officers who do not actually exist. Those are examples where corruption comes into play, either taking a cut of it or taking money for people who do not exist.
Senator Nancy Ruth: I have an interest in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. What evidence have you seen of this being considered and implemented throughout the NATO forces in your time in Afghanistan?
Mr. Jones: In practice, on the ground, I have seen very little evidence that the resolution is actually taken seriously. Part of the argument you get on the ground level is that the resolution is probably several decades in advance of where Afghanistan is, and it is too early to push for women's reform. I think that is wrong, but that is the strongest pushback. I do not see any serious evidence of the resolution being implemented at any level.
Senator Nancy Ruth: Is it not part of the police training that you see happening?
Mr. Jones: There are 200 or so female police officers, but, in general, most of those officers are not involved in any serious positions, although there may be some exceptions. For the most part, reality is actually quite the opposite.
Senator Nancy Ruth: Is that the same as saying that women, as far as you see, are not much involved in the process of the reconstruction of Afghanistan?
Mr. Jones: On security, that is certainly true. I have not seen any systematic evidence that shows that women are being treated any better than they were five years ago. There are still multiple rapes. I heard recently that a woman was raped in southern Afghanistan and then punished for it. This is a stigma for the woman. I do not believe anything has seriously changed over the last several years.
Senator Nancy Ruth: In terms of development, which priorities should Canada and other members of the international community focus on to improve the situation in Afghanistan, particularly in Kandahar and in the south?
Mr. Jones: In my view, when involved in a counter-insurgency operation, what matters most is the local population, and what matters most in that sense is addressing concerns at the local level. Why do you have some level of support for the Taliban, say, in Kandahar? Why are some people supporting it? Development, in my view, has to be geared towards addressing very specific questions.
We see issues regarding electricity. If it were up and running, the Kajaki dam in Helmand would have a significant impact on getting electricity into Kandahar, and it would be one area of strategic importance. It addresses an issue that comes up regularly among Afghan grievances.
The issue is to assess the causes of grievances and then prepare a development strategy that deals with those specifics rather than development writ large; in other words, target development assistance to specific issues, such as electricity, that get at key concerns among the local population.
Senator Nancy Ruth: It is a tough spot. Thank you.
Senator Banks: I will go back to the issue that Senator Moore raised. You made the point that all of the conventional military operations and suppression of insurgency really does not make any difference to the Afghan on the ground if he loses his animals or cannot get his electricity and cannot get a job. His or her only question is, "Who can provide me with the best circumstance for my family and me?'' Sometimes that answer does not appear to be the new regime, under whatever aegis it is.
As Senator Moore mentioned, the agreement among the nations, including Afghanistan, in which they all gave their undertakings, included an undertaking from the Government of Afghanistan that it would address the problem of corruption. We can win all the battles, take back all the towns and maybe even occupy the land, but if the corruption is not dealt with in some way that they — not we, but Afghans — can see as making progress towards bettering their lives, then all of this is for naught.
This relates in a way to the Pakistan question. Is it not a reasonable argument to make — I am not making it — that if Afghanistan wants us, the good guys, to be there and says so but is not prepared to charge the brother-in-law of you- know-who with drug trafficking, why should we bother with this, aside from our own self-interest? We can build a fence around the place in our own self-interest.
You said there is hope. I am having a hard time seeing it.
Mr. Jones: I do not think these things are necessarily mutually exclusive. In other words, the Afghan government certainly does want the international community to stay. That is leverage that can be used against the Afghan government. There could be explicit, clear statements, such as, "There is a lot riding here, and we need you to take specific steps on corruption, for example, or you will lose support from the international community.''
Senator Banks: Has that case been put? Has someone gone to the president and his people and said, "We know you want us to be here, but part of the deal was that you would address these questions. If you do not, we are out of here''?
Mr. Jones: I hope it has been made. I cannot speak for discussions between President Karzai and others, especially ones I was not at, but I hope that has happened. I do not know, to be honest.
The history of insurgencies, at least since 1945, shows a litany of cases of failed counter-insurgency efforts because the local government is inadequate, corrupt and ultimately loses the support of the population. If you do not hold that population at the centre and you lose popular support for a number of reasons, especially if they lose faith in their government, then military operations over the long run will never win a counter-insurgency effort, because the day those forces leave, the government will collapse. This happened in Afghanistan during the Soviet era. History is littered with experiences like this.
Senator Banks: That is a bleak undertaking, because there is a lot of this kind of thing going on. We are making all kinds of efforts to help local tribal councils and give them the tools with which to do development and all that, but then the corruption comes into play.
This committee is comprised, of course, of well-known military strategists whose genius is beyond question. Everyone told us that the problem is the border; they hit and run, go back across, and there is the sovereignty of Pakistan, and we cannot do very much about that. We actually had the temerity to propose a no-go zone along that border, a "do not dare go here unless you are coming across at these check points'' place — but on the Afghan side so that it was away from the line that goes along the tops of mountains. It was a clear Berlin Wall kind of space, I guess. Is there any practicality to that, or were we completely out of line?
Mr. Jones: I do not believe that is a practical solution. To give you the U.S. experience on the Mexican border, the U.S. cannot stop Mexicans from coming across the border, and they built a wall. The idea of building in one of the most mountainous parts of the world is, I think, simply not practical, especially when there is a desire to get from one side to the other and there are governments that are willing to support that. In that sense, you just cannot stop it. If there is support on the other side, you will never be able to stop goods or people who want to come across the border. They provide explosive devices and suicide bombing vehicles. You will never be able to stop that.
Senator Banks: Given that point, and given that, as you pointed out, Pakistan is using the Taliban and others as proxies to promote Pakistan's interests in its neighbour, and as long as that border remains porous and what we think of as the bad guys can go back and forth across it at will, putting aside the idea of winning, because there is not a win, is there a way to success without a change on the part of the Government of Pakistan in this respect? Even if Pakistan's government did change, are they capable of enforcing anything in those federally administered but certainly not controlled tribal areas?
Mr. Jones: Yes, I believe they are capable of, if not enforcing it, having a significant impact. Their intelligence services, even their Frontier Corps, are fairly competent organizations, and we are not talking for the most part about ad hoc individuals operating or supporting the Taliban. These are mainstream ISI.
I think there are several developments worth noting. One is that the Talibanization of the tribal areas has, in a bizarre way, had a useful impact for those operating in Afghanistan. The Pakistan government faces a direct challenge from its own tribal areas to its authority with suicide attacks at ISI headquarters and army headquarters. Pakistan now finds itself also threatened by the same Taliban that it supported and still supports to some degree. This can be exploited, and there can be steps to work with the Government of Pakistan to deal with a threat that really has gone beyond its own control.
Much of this, to be honest, is on the shoulders and has to be on the shoulders of the U.S. government, because that government has by far the most leverage on Pakistan because of its over $1 billion of assistance per year. There will be a change in Washington in less than a year's time. There may also be room for change at that point. I would suggest that not all is necessarily bad, and I think there are some possibilities for change along the Pakistani side, as I have noted. I would not completely lose hope there. There are things that could be done.
Senator Zimmer: I want to cover the area of poppy cultivation. When it is used for good, it is called poppies. When it is used for evil, it is called drugs. Last June, you told the committee that Afghans believe that poppy growing is un- Islamic, but poppy cultivation became necessary in order for them to survive in the country. Do you still maintain this position?
Mr. Jones: The public opinion polls I have seen, including from late 2006 and possibly 2007, do show high levels of belief among Afghans that poppy cultivation is un-Islamic, yes, so there is a religious stigma. They do it for economic reasons.
Senator Zimmer: You still believe that.
Mr. Jones: Yes.
Senator Zimmer: Do you think the United States will reconsider its policy of poppy eradication in Afghanistan? Last week we heard from the ambassador from Afghanistan, and he told the committee that their government does not support poppy eradication at this time.
Mr. Jones: The U.S. government has gone on the record multiple times recently saying that they do support some eradication, but there have been several setbacks. There was support at one point recently for aerial spraying — eradicating fields by air — but that was pushed back by the Afghan government. Therefore, I do think, even on eradication, that there is a red line for the U.S. government: vehement opposition by the Afghan government can kill and has killed some of the eradication efforts. I think it has on the aerial spraying.
Senator Zimmer: Do you have an opinion on the alternatives to poppy cultivation if eradication is not a viable option? The ambassador told us last week that the Afghan government is considering subsidizing poppy farmers.
Mr. Jones: I am not a drug expert. I would suggest that the question on alternative crops is probably better asked to someone more knowledgeable about narcotics in Afghanistan. I know that wheat is sometimes grown, but I would have to do an analysis of alternative crops. I cannot give you a full and complete answer on which crops should be grown instead of poppy. I can say that, by far, poppy cultivation is actually much more economically profitable, at least compared to the alternatives I have seen. Something will have to be done to provide incentives for farmers to grow a less profitable crop.
Senator Zimmer: Last week I asked the ambassador, "When does incentive become subsidy? At what point would you cut the line?'' I have heard it before, but his answer was, "We will do a pilot project and see if it works.'' Perhaps that is part of the solution.
What do you think about The Senlis Council's position on the licensing of opium in Afghanistan for the production of morphine and other medicines? Ms. MacDonald from the council presented to us last week. Again, the ambassador told the committee that the Afghan government does not support The Senlis Council's proposal of using the production of opium for medicine.
Mr. Jones: I have seen the proposal. I think a small percentage of Afghan farmed land is used for poppy cultivation and then production. My concern would be about how farming in general would be affected if at least some opium were to be legalized. There is a lot of opportunity to grow more poppy throughout the country. This brings up major concerns about continuing to grow poppy in Afghanistan, legally now as well as illegally.
There have been major decreases in poppy cultivation in several countries, including Pakistan. An interesting point worth exploring is this: How were they successful in decreasing the levels of poppy that were cultivated? It was not through legalization, interestingly enough. It was through a variety of means. I would suggest taking a more serious look at those strategies rather than legalizing it. I would be concerned with the growth rather than the decrease in poppy with a legalization route.
Senator Tkachuk: We have spent quite a bit of time talking about the war and reconstruction. I would like to get your view about how the current situation compares to the historical evidence in situations with parallel objectives. After the Second World War, Japan and Germany sued for peace, there was the capitulation of the enemy, new forces took control of the country and then they began their process of reconstruction. Also, they began their process of democratization, especially in Japan. In Vietnam, we had a war going on while at the same time they were trying to do development and trying to make democrats out of them. That effort was not successful. Is there evidence to show that the kind of action plans we have with Afghanistan and with Iraq are going to work? Have there been historical instances of this actually working?
Mr. Jones: That is an excellent question. There has been a rich history of what is often termed "state building'' since the end of the cold war — for example UN, European, other NATO operations in the Balkans, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Namibia, Mozambique, the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, and a range of other countries. I would say that even this recent history of state building, even in some cases in the midst of quite violent situations or potentially violent ones as we saw in the Balkans, suggests one very clear lesson: You cannot do this cheaply.
The number of forces and the amounts of development and assistance in the Balkans were orders of magnitude higher than what is in Afghanistan. In fact, when you look at Afghanistan on a per capita level, the amount of assistance and troops on the ground have been among the lowest of any operation since World War II. I have the data if you would like to see it. Frankly, it is embarrassing that the amounts of resources provided have been as low as they are. There are two big lessons: This can be done, but it cannot be done on the cheap. Unfortunately, we have tried to do Afghanistan with a light footprint, on the cheap. I do not believe the history of that sort of strategy is particularly optimistic.
Senator Tkachuk: To me, Afghanistan is about security. There was not a lot of talk about Afghanistan before 9/11. I remember watching TV and being shocked and surprised at how women were treated in Afghanistan. Jay Leno's wife was involved in a movement in the United States to change the attitude of the government. I had faint memories of Afghanistan and the war the United States supported and of the Communists getting beaten, but I do not know of anyone who paid attention to Afghanistan until 9/11.
Few nations are involved in dealing with this security. Several nations do not treat the security issue seriously. They are not putting the troops or the resources into Afghanistan. They are expecting the United States and Britain, and a couple of other countries, to carry the can for them.
In reality, all we want is security. If they want to live in the 15th century or the Stone Age, it does not matter to me as long as they do not drop bombs, shoot airplanes and kill my family. After all, countries are supposed to defend themselves.
It seems to me that Canada and the U.S. have to send the message that we will just focus on keeping our nation safe; we will not focus on pouring money into reconstruction, especially if the rest of the countries do no care. If we are all in this together, we are all in this together.
It seems to me that we are having a debate here whether we should actually be there. They are having that debate in the United States and in Britain as well. If no one wants to be there, we are going to sacrifice security. That is a big problem — more of a problem than the failure of the reconstruction efforts.
Mr. Jones: Interestingly, the debate in the United States is not about leaving but about increasing. We are having this parallel debate in the United States over Iraq, but the Afghan debate is quite the opposite. The primary focus of the election campaign is to increase resources in Afghanistan. I think there are some trends in the U.K. along those lines.
I think you are right about security, although I would add one caveat, which is that it is also important to understand what motivates people at the local level to become involved in issues that contribute to the lack of security in Afghanistan.
Development is important if it can begin to address grievances. However, this is mostly a security issue, and so on the matter of withdrawal or downsizing, I would caution that it is worth considering what life would be like in territory controlled by the Taliban. Such camps are already in the tribal areas, as we saw from the attacks in July 2005 in Britain, where the training for both successful and unsuccessful attacks was done. We have also seen it when we learned of a German plot recently. I would caution that it is worth thinking about what Afghanistan would look like if we pulled out of areas controlled by the Taliban, because of the Taliban-al Qaeda alliance. It is seriously worth asking whether we are willing to live with that.
Senator Tkachuk: I would say, no, absolutely not. That is why I worry about the debate in this country. We talk about whether we are getting water to people. All of those things will continue as time marches on, and nothing will be quick to deal with. However, the key issue is that we cannot let Afghanistan be a training ground for the recruitment of terrorists, who are not poor people but middle class young men who are just nuts. That is who they are. That is the evidence we have of them. They are the ones who are in jail and the ones who are dead. They are middle-income people who are crazy, and there are lots of them. I would like to refocus on the security aspect and the fact that it would be dangerous for us to leave. I will ask the military guy whether he thinks we should be doing reconstruction.
Mr. Jones: There has been some discussion about Iraq being the central front of the war on terror. The evidence is quite clear, as we have seen recently. The U.S. intelligence community has come out with its national intelligence estimate putting the central front squarely in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Most intelligence agencies in the West are unified in their view that what operates on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border internationally, with the connection to multiple successful and unsuccessful plots, is serious. The Arabs, Libyans, Uzbeks, Chechens and others in this area — such as Abu Ubaidah al-Masri — are not run-of-the-mill militants; rather, they are quite competent, as we have seen in the cases of London, Madrid and Washington. I would not take this lightly.
Senator Banks: I think al-Masri was a man on whom the good guys used to rely. He is gone. Will his son be okay?
Mr. Jones: Perhaps we are speaking of different people. I am referring to Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, who is currently viewed as taking the position of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the chief al Qaeda operative involved in the 2005 London attacks and the 2006 transatlantic plot.
Senator Day: Dr. Jones, thank you for your frank assessment of the situation. This is helpful to us. In your introductory remarks, you mentioned three things in summary: first, we need more soldiers in the southern part of Afghanistan in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar; second, we have to deal with the Pakistan situation; and third, we need a more integrated approach. Can you expand on the last one?
Mr. Jones: Certainly. In Kosovo and Bosnia there was a relatively unified command and control structure for state- building efforts. We had a clear civilian and military chain of command. We do not have anything like that in Afghanistan. There has been talk about doing something along the lines of what Paddy Ashdown, former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, did in the Balkans. That would be a useful step. The argument is that on the military front, we have multiple chains of command going through NATO, through United States Special Operations Command and then through Central Command — at least three different chains of commands. On the civilian side, we have no chains of commands — we have the Canadians, the British and the Americans operating on multiple fronts on the civilian side. We also have non-governmental organizations and international organizations like the World Bank, the UN and the IMF. There is no clear body or individual that has so much as part of that under its authority. We have no clear command and control structure. We are involved in a counter-insurgency effort, which should be mostly non-military efforts with 10 per cent or so military kinetic operations. Not only can we not mesh the military and civilian sides, but also we cannot even mesh the civilian sides of operations. There has to be a serious rethinking about the efficiency and coordination among states, international organizations and non-governmental organizations, even on the development side, because we are entirely inefficient.
Senator Day: What role, if any, does the United Nations have to play in this?
Mr. Jones: Well, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, or UNAMA, has been involved in various selective issues, and they were involved in 2001 in Bonn in the whole settlement in the first place. They have been involved in efforts of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militia, as well as in some justice sector reform and other bits and pieces, but they have not had any coordinated role.
Senator Day: Should they have? NATO is primarily a military organization. We seem to be having difficulty, from the NATO point of view, getting involved in the development side. Who takes the lead when Karzai's government in Kabul is not able to coordinate that? Clearly it is not happening. Where does the lead come from for this approach that you talk about?
Mr. Jones: Multiple options are worth considering. One of them is to give the United Nations a broader role in helping to coordinate. As well, there is potentially the option, like the Balkans model, to appoint an individual to have at least major portfolios of money under his or her jurisdiction. That person would never be able to control the way in which non-governmental or international organizations like the World Bank operate, but he or she could coordinate them. It would mean that a major Canadian or American or European official would have under him or her the trust funds and some of the key aspects of reconstruction. It could be done through the United Nations or outside the UN. Actually, NATO and the European Union are both possibilities. There are costs and benefits to many of these options, but there are several options.
Senator Day: Canada is there as a member of NATO, and our commitment is to NATO. It is not Canada, it is NATO. Some time ago, Canada committed development to 2009 and aid to 2011. I am sure we will stick by that. NATO has the lead role in the southern part of Afghanistan in a military sense. The Brits are feeling the same way in the Helmand Province. This is a NATO problem that we have to deal with; and NATO is there as part of the United Nations. We are there for the United Nations, so we would not give the United Nations a greater role. The United Nations has to step forward and take a larger role.
Mr. Jones: To some degree, the UN also has to be given a larger role, because the UN can do very little other than what the major UN Security Council members agree to give it. Who sits on the Security Council? Are they permanent representatives? They are many of the key countries within NATO.
There is a bit of overlap, but I agree with your basic point. I would caution that part of this gets to be a public relations issue. Would a Canadian withdrawal or downsizing in Kandahar be viewed as a NATO downsizing or a Canadian downsizing or withdrawal? I do not know the answer, but it could be viewed as a Canadian downsizing or withdrawal. Again, the issue is one of perception.
Senator Day: There have been two operations ongoing in the last while, one in Helmand Province with the Afghan National Army and the British, and another just south of Kandahar with the Canadians and the Afghan National Army. We are being led to believe by the articles that the Afghan National Army is leading and that we are there as British and Canadian Forces supporting the Afghan National Army. Having been there and having studied this, are you convinced that the Afghan National Army is at the stage where they are leading the operation and we are just there in support? Will they be able to hold this land or these towns this time, when they have not been able to in the past?
Mr. Jones: I cannot comment on these current operations because I do not know the answer. The Afghan National Army has rarely, if ever, been the lead of major operations. Mostly, competent NATO forces are the lead in operations. The Afghan National Army is often integrated into the operations, including in the holding stage after areas are cleared. It would be a fairly new development if the Afghan National Army was in reality the lead organization in these military operations. I just do not know the answer.
The Afghan National Army is in relatively good shape. It has become more competent in conducting operations. Most of its army recruits are fearless. They will fight. There have been some retention problems, but the army is in decent shape, especially relative to the police. They cannot operate on their own for several reasons. One is that they have no air power, so they would need embeds anyway if there was need for air support. There are not enough personnel in the Afghan National Army to operate independently against insurgent groups.
Senator Day: How long will it be before the Afghan National Army is able to act independently and allow some of the NATO forces to withdraw?
Mr. Jones: The answer to your question depends on several variables. If insurgent groups have a sanctuary across the border from where they can bring weapons, improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers and commanders, then you are talking a long time, maybe forever — maybe 10, 15 or 20 years. If we can get a hold of the sanctuary to some degree, you may be talking about five to seven years. I would measure this in increments of five years or so. There are variables that will impact that.
Senator Day: How are we coming with the Afghan National Police? It is not as happy a story, I understand.
Mr. Jones: The Afghan National Police for the most part has been roundly and correctly criticized as being corrupt and not necessarily loyal to the Afghan government or the coalition. There have been many reports of Afghan National Police involved in operations, in some cases with the Taliban. Of course they have been involved in shaking people down at checkpoints. I have seen that with my own eyes.
The biggest concern I have is mentoring. From what I have seen in Kandahar, the Canadians have begun to address issues of mentoring, but for a long time the police were never mentored in the field. They were trained at the core regional training centres in Mazar-e Sharif, Kandahar or Gardez and then simply left to their own devices and sent back into the field. There have been increased efforts to mentor and to coach them. This is an important development that will help improve transparency of what they are doing. However, it will take a long time. Unfortunately, the Canadians faced a situation where first the Germans and then the Americans failed to build a competent police force. The Canadians have had to deal with failures from other locations.
Senator Mitchell: This has been very interesting. I have some eclectic questions in several different areas.
I do not know if this is true, but notes I have read ascribe to you the observation that there is a proxy war between Pakistan and India possibly being fought over India's support of the current Afghan government, and Pakistan is therefore resistant to that because of other issues. How significant is that? Do you still subscribe to that theory or that observation?
You mentioned earlier that the uncertainty or instability that groups along the border are causing Pakistan may be an offsetting influence. Where does all of this lie? In summary, does Pakistan have some interest in instability in Afghanistan or some deep reason not to be supportive of doing something about this border area?
Mr. Jones: Those are good questions. If I miss answers to some of them, please come back to me.
I firmly believe that an important, albeit not the only important, element is the Indian dimension. I have talked to and interviewed the senior leadership of the Pakistani army, and from their strategic perspective, their relationship with India is a zero-sum game. Afghanistan is important. It is on Pakistan's borders. Having an Afghan government with a close relationship with the Indians drives most of the Pakistani national security community wild.
This is the worst of all possible worlds. At the end of the 1990s, the Pakistanis had their ideal situation. They had a government in Kabul that they had helped build. ISI had supported the Taliban as it moved from Kandahar and Herat and then over to Kabul and up through the north. It could influence it. ISI stationed people throughout Afghanistan to help the Taliban win. Now the reverse is the case, and the Indians are the closest regional ally. This is viewed as a direct threat to the Pakistan government. It provides an incentive, although not the only incentive. At the local level there are political parties in Pakistan — the MMA, for example — in the vicinity of the tribal areas that have their own ideological support, so it is not strategic in that sense.
There are other reasons, but the Indian dimension is fundamentally important.
Senator Mitchell: Is the current problem — the groups along the border now causing instability and threat to Pakistan authority and the bombing of the ISI — enough to offset that, or did it just create more tension overall?
Mr. Jones: It creates an incentive for the Pakistanis to manage the situation better. In other words, an ideal situation would be to control enough or to influence enough the Taliban and other insurgent actors in Afghanistan so that their focus would be on Afghanistan and would be making progress on the Afghan front.
What has happened is that the Taliban have also turned on the Pakistanis. They have conquered tribal areas of Pakistan and have moved into major cities. We saw it with the Red Mosque incident in Islamabad. The Pakistan government has seen these organizations get out of their control. The militants operating from the tribal areas, including the Taliban, have gotten outside of their security services' control. In a sense, they were successful early on in roughly keeping control of these groups, but I think they have now clearly lost control, and they have been targeted as well.
Senator Mitchell: What are the impediments to Western forces going into these regions to take the fight to the Pakistan side of the border? I asked that question of an earlier witness, and the response was the concern that Pakistan has nuclear weapons and such action might destabilize the situation further. I do not really see that. It might be a threat to the Pakistan government if you inflamed militants even more, but is there more to it than that? It seems to me that that area is so lawless that for Pakistan to claim to control it in any event is hard to imagine. How big an affront would it be if forces went into that area? Think of Vietnam and Cambodia and the inability of forces to deal with the other side's being able to hide out, regroup and rest. Why do we not just go in there?
Mr. Jones: That is a fundamental question that gets at the root of the situation, at one of the root causes of the instability in Afghanistan. How do we deal with it? Several issues need to be looked at seriously regarding NATO operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan, and in my view these have nothing or very little to do with nuclear weapons.
First, there are very deep anti-Western, anti-American attitudes there and, in some cases, anti-Pakistan government as well. The question is whether you would inflame the local population by sending in forces. That is a serious question.
Second, the tribal areas are still viewed as Pakistani territory. Pakistan has a heavy influence with not only Frontier Corps but also intelligence services there, and if sending in international forces was not viewed in their interests, they would do everything to undermine those efforts. That is also worth understanding.
I also have questions about how well the international community, especially NATO, understands the tribal areas and the tribal dynamics and whether it could competently do this. These solutions require serious examination. In the tribal areas, there has been a shift over the last years. Five or six years ago, most of the power in the tribal areas was dominated by the tribal leaders. Today, most of the power is centred in the Taliban clerics. Sending in international forces would shift the power again, either back to tribal control or to tribal arrangements with the Pakistani government. You would need support, as the U.S. did in 2001, from locals on the ground who understand the situation and the tribal networks, and you would need better intelligence. You would have to work with the Pakistanis; it is their country, and they will undermine efforts that they do not consider to be in their interest.
You are talking about some combination of international assistance, especially on the intelligence end. The international community, especially NATO, has much better signals intelligence, airborne intelligence and satellite imagery than Pakistan will ever have, so it can provide resources and fire power, but that needs to be integrated with Pakistani and local tribal issues. Doing this alone, there are multiple reasons to be concerned about a predominantly NATO or U.S. operation in the tribal areas, which are an area that has among the highest levels of anti-Western sentiment in the world.
Senator Mitchell: I think the case can be made that Third World development is at least enhanced by and might not occur without the education of women. A recent report suggested that about 2 million girls are now attending school in Afghanistan. Is that real? Is it progress? What would happen if we withdrew?
Mr. Jones: I do not know the exact numbers of girls who go to school, but in areas of the country I have been to — Kabul, for example, although it is probably a bad example because it is the capital — I have seen girls going to school in the morning.
We have seen this before. We know who our enemy is here. If there were a major departure of NATO forces from the country and the government continually lost territory to the Taliban and other insurgent force, the Haqqani network, al Qaeda, or their ideology, we know what they will do. We saw it in Afghanistan in the 1990s. They banned music. They banned kite flying. They banned any conceivable definition of modernity. They will gut any progress that has been made on women and women's rights. That is what you get when the Taliban conquers territory.
Senator Moore: Dr. Jones, are you familiar with The Senlis Council?
Mr. Jones: Yes.
Senator Moore: Can you comment on the work they do and the quality of it?
Mr. Jones: I have seen some of The Senlis Council reports. I think some of their work is good. Some of their work on the ground is good. Questions have begun to surface in the diplomatic community about their motivations and who they are funded by. I think it is worth asking and finding who they are funded by. In the diplomatic community, in NATO, including in the United States, there are questions about the role of pharmaceutical companies' subsidizing The Senlis Council. As far as I am concerned, those are rumours, but I do think it is worth getting a better picture of where they get their funding. Some of their reports have been useful, some less useful, so I have a mixed view on their products.
Senator Moore: With regard to the development work that is being undertaken, you mentioned that you just returned from Afghanistan. What agencies did you observe, and what work is being done, particularly in the south of Kandahar Province?
Mr. Jones: The agencies I came into contact with on the development side were mostly the U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID, and a number of UN organizations and non-governmental organizations operating in the south, and a bit from CIDA, although I would not profess to be an expert on their operations on the ground. I will say two things.
The security environment in the south has a fundamental impact on the development that can be conducted throughout not just the province of Kandahar but the south in general. The lack of security makes it extraordinarily difficult just to get out.
Senator Moore: Do you mean that it makes it difficult for the NGO workers to get out?
Mr. Jones: It is difficult for the NGO workers or state agencies, whether CIDA or USAID, to get out and monitor what work is being done in the field. There are clear political push-backs to going outside the wire. It is a dangerous environment. Workers need military escorts when they go. The security environment has a fundamental impact on the ability to do reconstruction and development work in the south. Some UN organizations are slightly less restricted and have been able to monitor some bridge and road constructions.
Senator Moore: Who is doing that work?
Mr. Jones: I would characterize most of the development agencies as bankers, essentially. They are paying for locals to do the work. In some cases, I have seen local Afghans doing the work monitored by private companies in the field. In some cases, it is Pakistani companies in Afghanistan that are doing the work. The answer depends on which projects we are talking about. In general, you are talking about having to monitor from afar.
Senator Moore: Can you expand on what you mean by "bankers?''
Mr. Jones: Most of the development agencies today, for better or worse, give money to other people to build projects. They do not actually do the projects themselves. USAID, for example, does not build projects. It gives other organizations money to build. That is what I meant.
Senator Moore: A couple of months ago, there were reports in the Western media of President Karzai wanting to negotiate with the Taliban. Do you have any thoughts on that? Is that a good idea? Will it have to happen eventually, and what will it involve? What do you see happening?
Mr. Jones: That is a major source of discussion in Afghanistan. First, based on history, civil wars and insurgencies end in one of two ways: either one side wins on the battlefield, or there is a negotiated settlement. History also shows that in order to have a negotiated settlement, first a stalemate, among other things, is needed for both sides to agree to come to the table. I characterize a stalemate as a situation in which neither side views itself as winning or losing. Second, there has to be some matching or melding of objectives. A negotiated settlement would mean that you would not get everything, but you would get some of your objectives.
Unfortunately, in Afghanistan we have neither a stalemate at the moment nor any clear melding of objectives between the Taliban and Haqqani leadership and NATO or the Afghans.
Senator Moore: Philosophically, they are miles apart, and therefore you do not see them constructively trying to work this out.
Mr. Jones: I want to present a caveat. I do not believe you can cut a deal with these insurgent organizations. You will not be able to sit down at the table the way the Salvadoran government did.
Senator Moore: Is that due to lack of central command structure?
Mr. Jones: What Mullah Omar wants to see in Afghanistan is diametrically opposed to what the Afghan government wants to see and do. There may be ways of bringing in tier two and tier three Taliban who are less motivated by ideology and more motivated by governance issues. They are fighting and supporting efforts for a variety of grievances that have little to do with ideology.
To summarize, I do not think there is a stalemate. In fact, I think the Taliban clearly views itself as winning right now.
Second, I do not believe that the leadership will ever or could ever be able to sit down and negotiate. You would have to pick apart the organization.
Senator Moore: With regard to the U.S. and its armed forces, Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF, is continuing, is it not?
Mr. Jones: Yes, it is.
Senator Moore: What is the command relationship between Operation Enduring Freedom and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force? Are they working in the same areas?
Mr. Jones: I think the OEF and the NATO command and control arrangements are not ideal, because they are not operating under the same command and control structure. For the most part, they are operating in different regions. Most of the U.S. OEF forces are operating in the eastern provinces, not in the south.
I do not believe that significant benefits could be achieved by improving the command and control structure of the military. There would be some benefits, but that is not the answer to dealing with the counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan. It would be helpful, but I think this could be won with the OEF operating in some areas and NATO operating in others. It is not ideal, but I do not know if that is the reason we are in the situation we are in.
Senator Banks: I have three quick questions. First, you said that if the alliance does not spend more money on this, it will not work. Does RAND see any prospect of that? Is there anything afoot moving in that direction?
Second, we understand that among all of the NGOs that cannot move around, people from The Senlis Council seem to be able to move around with relative impunity. Have you heard that? Can you explain it?
Lastly, if, as in this case, most of the members involved in a military alliance have restraints and conditions put upon their participation, can NATO last? If we are part of an alliance in which everyone does not belly up to the bar and do their bit, is that the death knell of NATO?
Mr. Jones: Those are good questions. I will take them in order. The issue is less about spending more money and more about, at the very least, troop investment. Therefore, unless there is an increase in troop levels, it will be very difficult or perhaps impossible to clear and hold territory.
There are reasons for some hope. First, there are ongoing discussions in the U.S. about increasing the Marine Corps presence in Afghanistan, though not as much as the Marines would like. They are being kept in Iraq, but there are questions about a greater Marine Corps presence in Afghanistan.
There is the possibility of French forces in Afghanistan. I think that would be helpful; the French have seasoned expeditionary forces. On top of this, we also have an election in the United States in November of 2008, and virtually all major candidates are running on a platform of refocusing U.S. national security interests on the Afghan-Pakistan front. Therefore, I think there is reason for hope.
On The Senlis Council and moving around, I cannot comment on where Senlis Council people are getting access. In areas controlled by the Taliban or other areas of insurgency, I would be surprised if they are out in any serious way, because most Westerners are killed in these areas. Again, I do not know the answer, but I would doubt that they are having more luck with access in these areas. If they are talking about Kandahar City, that is one thing. If you are talking about operating in Northern Kandahar, where there is a major infiltration of Taliban, I would doubt it. If they are telling you otherwise, I would be skeptical.
On the third question regarding the military alliance, surprisingly, my response is that this is the way NATO has always operated. Whether it is planning to fight the Soviets during the Cold War or the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, there are always some allies that do much more than everyone else. There has never been a complete sharing of the burden within NATO in any of its operations or even in its planning.
Yes, the organization can operate with restraints if it can get sufficient numbers of resources from those countries that are willing to contribute forces. There were clear disparities in operations in Kosovo and Bosnia and the number of countries that were flying sorties, but there were enough of them that they could bomb Milosevic and agree to a settlement. The question is not whether enough Germans, Norwegians or Swedes are coming — they have caveats. Rather, the question is whether there are enough Americans, British, Canadians and Dutch to be doing what they are doing in the south. With the same restraints and sufficient forces, you would be effective. The restraints in and of themselves are not necessarily the cause of the problem.
If I may, I would add that we must also be honest when we talk about caveats. There are a number of NATO countries with no recent experience in conducting operations in a non-permissive environment like the provinces of Kandahar or Helmand. Do Canadians really want countries deployed there with no recent experience, countries that will have to start from scratch in conducting operations? Would you really want the Norwegians and Germans involved in fighting with no recent experience in combat operations, especially in a counter-insurgency environment? These questions are worth asking. Some countries are competent. I would argue that the Australians have proven to be competent and the French in Côte d'Ivoire have proven to be competent, but there are major questions about other countries. I would suggest that caveats might not necessarily be a bad thing because they might be protecting us from countries that are not used to operating in this kind of environment.
The Chair: Professor Jones, thank you for appearing before the committee. We have enjoyed hearing your views, which were as compelling and to the point as those of our last visit with you. We are grateful and wish you success in your new career. We hope that you will come back from time to time to talk to us.
Members of the public viewing this program may contact the committee with questions or comments by visiting our website at www.sen-sec.ca, where we post witness testimony as well as confirmed hearing schedules. Otherwise, they may contact the clerk of the committee by calling 1-800-267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting members of the committee.
Honourable senators, we are pleased to welcome as our next witness Brigadier-General P.J. Atkinson. He is Director General of Operations, Strategic Joint Staff at National Defence Headquarters.
Brigadier-General Atkinson joined the Canadian Armed Forces in 1977. He has commanded at the troop, squadron and regimental levels with the Royal Canadian Dragoons in Gagetown, Germany and Petawawa. He also commanded Canadian Forces Base Kingston, 2 Area Support Group in Ontario, and a task force in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the NATO Stabilization Force.
Brigadier-General Atkinson appears before us today to give us his viewpoint on the situation in Afghanistan.
Brigadier-General P.J. Atkinson, Director General of Operations, Strategic Joint Staff, National Defence: In my job on the Strategic Joint Staff, my primary responsibility is to provide timely and effective military analysis and decision support to the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Hillier, with regard to current operations and strategic coordination of his guidance.
My presentation this evening is based primarily on reportable security issues from July until November 2007 inclusive and leading into this first week of December. I am prepared, following my presentation, to provide clarification on any issues presented.
I would like to begin with a short explanation about operational security and its relation to our mission in Afghanistan. Our operations in Afghanistan have generated a growing public interest for information. This appetite for information about Government of Canada operations serves positive and lawful objectives required of a parliamentary democracy. Unfortunately, significant amounts of the information requested are operationally sensitive, and their release could prejudice the success of Canadian Forces operations and potentially endanger the lives of our soldiers, members of the whole-of-government team and the Afghans with whom we work every day.
Canadians expect the department and the Canadian Forces to protect the security of Canadian troops who are in harm's way and to mitigate the risks they face as much as possible. We recognize the importance of providing information to the public and we work hard to meet those obligations within the limits of the law. There must, however, be a balance between our responsibility to make information available to the public and our responsibility to protect the lives of our men and women in uniform. The safeguarding of some information specific to the mission in Afghanistan is fundamental to the safety of all Canadians working in Afghanistan and of the coalition personnel with whom we work side by side every day.
In August, we witnessed the relief-in-place between the 3 RCR Battle Group from Petawawa and the 3 R22eR Battle Group, the Van Doos, from Valcartier. Benefiting from the improving security environment created by preceding rotations, the current Joint Task Force Afghanistan under the leadership of Brigadier-General Guy Laroche and the commanding officer of the 3 Van Doos Battle Group, Lieutenant-Colonel Alain Gauthier, has maintained the pressure on insurgent leadership and activities improving the security in the Zhari, Panjwaii and Arghandab districts. Their contribution to the whole-of-government approach is measured by a number of Afghan national security forces capacity-building successes.
I would caution, however, that although we are achieving successes, Afghans still need our support and presence before they have achieved the required level of self-sustainment.
In the next 30 minutes, I hope to cover these five issues. They are on the slides I gave you. First off is the International Security Assistance Force.
The Chair: Did you say the next 30 minutes, Brigadier-General?
BGen. Atkinson: That is what I would hope to talk to.
The Chair: We would hope you would do it in about three minutes. We would like a very brief presentation. We asked for about five minutes. If you could keep it short, we have lots of questions.
BGen. Atkinson: Senator, I am not prepared to talk in three minutes. If I do, you will not get the benefit of a full update on what is on the ground in Afghanistan.
The Chair: We will be happy to hear you if you have more time, but we expect you to conform to the committee's request.
BGen. Atkinson: Sir, I was unaware that you wished me to speak for only three minutes.
The Chair: We actually asked for five.
BGen. Atkinson: I was also unaware of that. It was not transmitted to me, sir, that you wished me to speak for only five minutes. I will be happy to answer questions. I was offering a fulsome brief. I am prepared to answer questions.
The Chair: If you could give us a brief brief, we would be happy to hear from you.
BGen. Atkinson: It is unfortunate, because I spent a lot of time preparing myself to give you a full update on the situation on the ground.
The Chair: I am saying please go ahead, but if you could keep it short, we would be grateful.
BGen. Atkinson: The first section I want to talk about is the section I call the enemy has a vote. When I say the enemy has a vote, I am not talking in the literal sense. I am saying that they have a say in what is going on in Afghanistan.
The Taliban continue their efforts to expand their influence, and they have responded to local concerns by adopting more moderate approaches in areas that do not accept strict Taliban edicts. However, they have achieved only limited success to date. Recognizing that the central government of Afghanistan has made significant progress over the last six years, their lack of influence and authority outside major district centres continues to contribute to the ability of the Taliban as they attempt to expand their influence. As President Karzai so eloquently put it to our Prime Minister, "In Afghanistan we are trying to accomplish in five years what you in Canada have done in 100 years, so we are in a hurry and we need the kind of help you can give us.''
In Helmand, successive International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, operations from April until July have put the Taliban on the defensive, and their ability to coordinate operations has been affected. While their morale has suffered as a result of several defeats, the Taliban are fighting hard to maintain their influence and will attempt to increase their level of activity during the winter in an effort to prevent the loss of influence in contested areas of the country.
Last month, in Kandahar province, a Taliban attempt to establish a foothold to the northeast of the city was defeated by Afghan forces supported by ISAF. In response, the Taliban continued to target the Afghan police, like they did on November 23 when Taliban militants killed seven policemen after overrunning their checkpoints. Fewer direct engagements against ISAF and the Afghan National Army, ANA, will occur as the Taliban continue to suffer heavy losses when directly engaged. They will, however, employ IEDs, improvised explosive devices, and indirect fire in an increasing effort to achieve some success against pro-government forces.
Recognizing their own vulnerabilities, and as demonstrated in a video released by NATO last week, the Taliban have begun to use children and other innocent Afghans to discourage ISAF operations. They will attempt to exploit any opportunities to discredit the government of Afghanistan or security assistance forces and will continue to attempt to intimidate the local population through propaganda, execution of those they identify as traitors and attacking police stations and government district centres. The use of these tactics is a reaction to successful operations by pro- government forces in recent months.
The Afghan National Army recently completed a successful joint operation to increase security in the Zhari District of Kandahar Province. Operation TASHWISH MEKAWA, or No Worries, as it is translated, was executed by the 1st Brigade of the 205th Corps, ANA, working with Canada's Joint Task Force Afghanistan and other elements of the NATO-led ISAF. The operation had two aims: to drive insurgents out of the territory surrounding an important crossroads in the Sangsar area, about 40 kilometres west of Kandahar City, and to establish a strong point, a fortified compound, from which Afghanistan's national security forces will control the crossroads and maintain a presence in the area as we did in other locations last October.
The operation's first kinetic phase, a ground assault that began on the morning of November 17, took the insurgents completely by surprise. With no time to mount an organized response, the insurgents were compelled to withdraw after a short but intense firefight. The night before the assault, soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, the Van Doos, and elements of two Afghan National Army Kandaks or battalions infiltrated the area around the crossroads. It was during that staging phase that two Canadian soldiers and their Afghan interpreter were killed by the explosion of a roadside bomb.
This action was the second joint land operation conducted by the 1st Afghan Brigade from the initial planning stages all the way through to successful completion, and it was the first involving more than one Kandak. As soon that objective was secured, the engineers started to build the strong point, and that took seven days to complete.
While success in Afghanistan can be measured only over a long period, the success of last month's operations increased the stability and security throughout the Zhari-Panjwai area, resulting in good progression of the Government of Canada governance and developments objectives. Over the last month, Joint Task Force Afghanistan continued the overarching Operation GARRANDY ZMARRAY to extend the presence of the security forces in the Zhari-Panjwai regions. Building on the previous successes of the joint Afghan National Police, army and ISAF operations, the Joint Task Force conducted successive high-level joint operations, resulting in the disruption of the freedom of movement of the insurgents and a reduction of their command and control of the insurgent leadership, which forced them to revert to small group and IED tactics.
Through the P-OMLT initiative — the Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Team — the Afghan National Police have become more effective in policing; more important, they can survive under the constant pressure of the insurgents. Furthermore, we continually improve the safety of our personnel and the Afghanis through the operationalization of our new, expedient route-opening capability that we are using in all major road networks. The effects of that new equipment complement our continued and effective focused operations against IED leadership and obviously the placements of mines in the roads.
We currently have operational mentor and liaison teams working with three infantry Kandaks, which are the equivalent size of one of our battalions each, one with a combat service support unit and one with the brigade headquarters in Kandahar. In fact, Canada has had a direct impact on the training and development of the growth of a professional and credible Afghan National Army, which now numbers 41,500. At any one time, we are mentoring 2,000 soldiers through the operational mentoring liaison teams.
Operation INTIZAAR ZMARAY took place in Arghandab Province three weeks ago. In fact, it is still ongoing. At the request of the Afghan authorities, Joint Task Force Afghanistan and Afghan national security forces, ANSF, which is both the army and the police working together, conducted coordinated operations in the Arghandab district in order to maintain a safe and secure environment for the local population. The operation will continue until such time as the security is reinforced and insurgent activities in the district are contained and local Afghan authorities can manage the situation. While we need to maintain focus on ANSF capacity building, that operation represents the first operation in the Canadian area where an ANA Kandak battalion and Afghan National Police conducted operations that were fully independent of our Canadian-led operations. The Kandak commander led his troops into combat in remarkable manner and with great success. The ANP achieved their assigned objectives, and a major achievement was the level of responsiveness from the Afghan security forces who launched their attack with very limited time to plan and prepare.
I will turn to signs of progress in the area of governance. In general, progress has been made on all fronts and in areas where it counts, such as in Kandahar City and in the Zhari-Panjwai district. This view has been expressed by the population in surveys and in the Afghan national security force capacity building. We have set the conditions to deepen and broaden security, governance and development in areas where 90 per cent of the population of Kandahar lives, and I speak of the province. However, this is tempered by the give-and-take nature of the environment. For example, the ISAF presence in that district has disrupted insurgent influence in the area, but to counter this, they have conducted attacks in surrounding districts in an attempt to distract ISAF from their efforts in the Zhari-Panjwai. While progress has been made, violence may rise in other areas. The pace of progress is therefore susceptible to misinterpretation due to short-term focus. This cannot cloud an appreciation for significant strides that have been made since last year.
The Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team sponsored a trade fair earlier this fall that exhibited handmade products in Kandahar City, with 27 stalls, 3,800 different locally produced items and 3,000 visitors. They spent the equivalent of U.S.$10,000 during the course of that five-day exhibit, and it was a great promotion of local culture.
In September, the Minister of Rural Reconstruction and Development announced 69 new contracts worth $4.2 million for development projects in the southern provinces. These projects bring the total number of contracted projects in the south to 480.
[Translation]
From the development perspective, efforts are clearly measurable. In the Arghandab region, Joint Task Force Afghanistan is currently building a causeway over the Arghandab River to improve travel between two major cities for security and economic development reasons.
[English]
The causeway that is being built connects two towns and joins Highway 1 and Highway 4. It will be a huge enabler to the local economy and population when it is finished. We anticipate it's being finished before the end of this week.
RANA-FM's reach has been extended to the southeast of the province. The UNICEF Assistance to Vulnerable Families in the South program in Kandahar Province has resulted in 60,000 tetanus and 70,000 measles vaccinations.
Signs of normalcy are prevalent in Kandahar City. Children are playing in the street, women are uncovered in public and soccer is attended by thousands of people with no incidents in the big stadium.
On the next slide, you will see an image from April 2007, in the Sangin Bazaar. Below it, you will see an image from September 2007. In March 2007, Operation Achilles was launched. General Howard would have briefed you on that. The image at the top was at the time the operation was launched in March. You can see the impact inside the Sangin Bazaar. Over the summer, the security obviously increased to a point where a lively market and population have come back in, which is a sign of normalcy.
Regarding security, U.N. Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan has initiated mine clearing operations in Kandahar Province resulting in 400,000 square metres of land being cleared, benefiting over 10,000 people. The Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police have begun to plan and conduct their own operations. The establishment of six new police substations and the implementation of a pay system for qualified Afghan National Police members have created nascent progress in Afghan National Police capacity.
This progress is not without its challenges. Notwithstanding the efforts of improving the security situation in Zhari and Panjwai — two areas of our responsibility — non-government organization efforts towards development and reconstruction continue to be delayed due to the insurgent threat.
This security situation should improve as the newly built police substations increase their areas of operation. We have seen a significant increase in our security footprint in the months of October and November. As noted earlier, the Joint Task Force Afghanistan and the Afghanistan national security forces, ANSF, built and manned those six police substations and several checkpoints. The ANSF have allowed us to move into an unsecured area, set the conditions for success, leaving behind a capable Afghan force mentored by small police-mentoring teams. Every one of those police substations has Canadian soldiers embedded with them to work with them, mentor with them and ensure their survivability.
In order to continue the security area expansion, we still need more ANSF allocated to our area of operation. It is important to note that the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Auxiliary Police are growing in strength and capability every day. Three years ago, there was no ANA to speak of. In fact, six months ago, we had one full-up Kandak where today we have three, a brigade headquarters and a support unit. There has been huge progress since last spring.
The National Police, while their development has been slower, are now viewed as a force that is improving each and every day. They are an essential component of our security zone expansion.
We must be able to better communicate our successes to Canadians and to Afghans, particularly around reconstruction and development. This is challenging, as the media tends to focus on security stories at the expense of the other two areas, a situation which can bring disproportionate attention to and, consequently, the potential for incorrect perceptions of the actual security situation.
We are constantly working on how to improve our communications in Afghanistan. The Taliban always tries to misinform the local population and conduct information operations to discredit our successes. They are masters at it.
I will conclude with four points: We are improving the security by supporting democracy and the democratic values in Afghanistan; we are improving security by enhancing the legitimate government's capacity to rule effectively; we are defeating the Taliban by fostering economic and social development; and we are defeating the Taliban by building up the Afghan national security forces so that Afghans can defend their government and its citizens from violent extremists.
I am happy to take questions.
Senator Banks: It is nice and unusual, perhaps unique, for us to hear positive, if not sanguine, views of progress that is being made in the quality and effectiveness of the Afghan security forces. We often hear otherwise. I think you have given us some hope. I hope that you are right.
I want to talk about the 480 projects you mentioned in respect to development. I presume those are 480 projects being done by the Canadian Forces with money they have for development purposes. Is that correct, or are you including agencies such as the Canadian International Development Agency?
BGen. Atkinson: Canadian Forces do not do projects. CIDA does projects. We provide the security envelope to allow that to occur. The Provincial Reconstruction Team is a full-team effort. CIDA manages the projects and does all that coordination on the ground to allow that to occur. Those are the things happening in Kandahar Province.
Senator Banks: There are 480 CIDA projects in Kandahar Province being protected by the Canadian forces?
BGen. Atkinson: I did not say "protected.'' When they are put in place, we provide the security. Those 480 projects are not all CIDA projects. There are other governments that are supported by Canadian non-governmental efforts and the money that is pushed there by Canada. That area that is slightly out of my lane. CIDA has the lead there and is in a better position to provide the details. I can talk about the security envelope that we provide to support that sort of activity.
Senator Banks: The Canadian Forces do have money to spend on things other than buying bullets and the like. In fact, this committee recommended that the amount of money be doubled, and it was.
BGen. Atkinson: There is a commander's contingency fund. When things occur where our soldiers are, they can do what I refer to as "an immediate return on investment,'' whether that is digging a well, fixing culverts or repairing small bridges.
However, if you want to achieve lasting progress, it needs to be Afghans doing that work. We need to provide the structure. CIDA needs to provide the contracting and all those pieces, but the Afghans need to see their people doing the work and getting the credit for it. Otherwise, we are perceived as a bunch of foreigners in uniforms. In order to make a difference, we have to be the enabler to allow them to do the work. Canada doing it does not count. It counts when they do it themselves, facilitated through us with Canada providing the security.
Senator Banks: You were in the Armoured Corps and I am a civilian. Many of the concerns that Canadians have had about the risks faced by our forces there are engendered by stories of improvised explosive devices, roadside bombs and the like. According to what we understand, we are short on the right kind of equipment, vehicles in particular, to protect against those things. However, there have been reports lately of improvements in those areas. Do we have better vehicles now for dealing with IEDs and roadside bombs and suicide bombers?
BGen. Atkinson: Our Canadian battle group is the best equipped brigade bar none in the theatre, from the LAV3 to the Nyalas, to the tanks that we have deployed, to the route-opening system that we have just deployed, to the heavy armoured trucks we have just deployed over there. In sum, we have absolutely the best equipment.
The Chair: We are asking about the Cougars and Huskies and Buffaloes that were shipped over in the spring.
BGen. Atkinson: Those are the route opening equipment. I will expand on that. We deployed a system in September, and we are continuing to flow in more of them. This expedient route-opening system, which I spoke about briefly in my remarks, is that once we have established routes, we have them paved; that is how we ensure that they are maintained free of improvised explosive devices.
Senator Banks: How many Huskies, Buffaloes and Cougars are there now?
BGen. Atkinson: It is a system. All the different vehicles work in tandem with each other, and when you see them going down the road it looks like a train.
Senator Banks: How many of them are in Afghanistan now?
BGen. Atkinson: We have one system, and there are parts of a second system, and there will be parts of a third system. The system is all three vehicles working together.
Senator Banks: Is the system three vehicles?
BGen. Atkinson: It is a Husky, a Buffalo and a Cougar, yes.
Senator Banks: Do we have one each of those vehicles in Kandahar now?
BGen. Atkinson: I will confirm exactly to the vehicle what we have operating. I know we have a full up system operating. A second one has been flown in. I am not sure if they are all incomplete. It has been operating for over a month. We sent one system back here to train the troops that are coming over in the next rotation. I will confirm the exact numbers of what we have on the ground with that system.
Senator Banks: It will help us, and we can take it for future reference that when we are talking about a system, a system means one of each of those vehicles.
BGen. Atkinson: Yes. The E-ROC system, or Expedient Route Opening Capability, is the sum total of all the vehicles working in tandem with each other.
Senator Banks: One system would be three vehicles, two would be six, three would be nine, and so on?
BGen. Atkinson: Yes. They all complete a different function.
The Chair: Our understanding was that there were between five and seven of each of the vehicles coming. We are unclear of when. We knew that they started in September, but we do not know when the last of them will arrive.
BGen. Atkinson: I believe they will all be in theatre shortly after Christmas, the ones we will be delivering there. There is an operational spare. Any time you work in that kind of environment, it does not matter how good the vehicles are, there are breakdowns, and the Taliban tend to attack vehicles like that. The real bonus is that these vehicles are so well designed that when damage does occur the soldier operating the vehicle is well protected, and despite all the loud noise, and the reverberations, we do repairs and are able to carry on.
Senator Banks: We would be grateful if you let us know what the delivery schedule is and when it will be completed.
BGen. Atkinson: Absolutely, senator.
Senator Banks: Also, staying with armour for a moment, the borrowed, leased tanks — the new generation of Leopards — are either there or on their way there.
BGen. Atkinson: They are already there. There is a full squadron in theatre and operating.
Senator Banks: Are we bringing home the old Leopards, or are we leaving them there?
BGen. Atkinson: No, we are not going to bring them home yet. We brought the new Leopards over, with our mine rollers and our mine plows, but the Germans will be a little upset if we modify their tanks completely. Therefore, we actually have two squadrons in Afghanistan, and we will mix and match as appropriate for the next period of time until we overcome that and get our own tanks from the Dutch, which as you know we purchased with training in Canada, and then operational vehicles will come after. In the meantime, there are two squadrons in Afghanistan; we are using the gun tanks from the Leopard 2s, and the other tanks with the rollers and plows are a critical part of what we are doing.
Senator Banks: Do we have enough people to operate two squadrons of tanks?
BGen. Atkinson: Because we are not operating the two of them independently, we have enough people on the ground to do what needs to be done.
Senator Banks: Could we put two squadrons of tanks into the field today?
BGen. Atkinson: We would not be able to put two full squadrons into the field. The idea is to have one full-up squadron. It is up to the commander on the ground to assess what he needs from troop to task depending on what he is doing.
Senator Banks: Thank you. You spoke about enabling the democratic Government of Afghanistan to govern justly. However, everyone tells us that there is some question as to whether that government is moving in that direction, particularly with respect to their dealing with corruption.
This is more a matter of governance, but you raised the subject. Are you confident, are the Canadian Forces confident, that the Government of Afghanistan is dealing with questions of corruption within the government so that the hearts and minds battle will be won some day, somehow?
BGen. Atkinson: It is inappropriate for me to comment personally on policy on how another government is dealing with that.
In the whole-of-government approach, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, DFAIT, has the lead in the governance pillar; in the development pillar, CIDA has the lead; and in security, we do. However, we work in tandem with each other. The Canadian Forces have helped and continue to assist in the governance pillar through our Strategic Advisory Team, which works in the background providing planning and administration skills to the government in Kabul. We also work with DFAIT and with CIDA. We work closely with our ambassador, as a matter of fact. The Strategic Advisory Team takes the lead from the ambassador as we help in the background. The officers we send to that team are there for their ability to plan and think forward and do those things to assist those ministries as they move forward.
Senator Banks: We understand that, and we have heard a lot about the Strategic Advisory Team. It is comprised of officers of the Canadian military. Is it comfortable when it reports back to the command structure, of which you are a part, that its advice with respect to dealing with questions of corruption in the Government of Afghanistan is being followed, and if it is not, are we in danger of becoming tainted by that?
BGen. Atkinson: Our job is not to provide advice to the Government of Afghanistan.
Senator Banks: It is called the Strategic Advisory Team. That implies advice.
BGen. Atkinson: It is a planning team. That name was given to it early on, and I acknowledge that it is called the Strategic Advisory Team. Their job is as strategic planners and they work to help those ministries look forward. We would not comment back on how that government is working. DFAIT has the full lead in the work in the governance pillar and they are well positioned to comment on the progress that President Karzai's government is making, both at the federal and at the provincial level.
Senator Banks: I have a suspicion that if we asked people from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, they would say they could not comment on that Strategic Advisory Team because they are military officers. Who can comment on whether they are comfortable with the progress they are making?
BGen. Atkinson: Senator, I hope that when you go to Afghanistan you will have an opportunity to meet with the Strategic Advisory Team and talk first-hand with them to gain a fuller understanding of what they do every day as part of their mission. I can, if you like, provide a written brief about what they are doing and the breakdown of their tasks in advance, but the best way to get some better insight into what they do each day is to have an opportunity to interface with them directly.
Senator Banks: We would be grateful to have a brief from you, general. Our understanding is that they are providing direct advice to the president about a number of matters.
The Chair: If you can provide that to the clerk of the committee, we would be grateful.
BGen. Atkinson: Yes, no problem.
Senator Day: You have triggered a lot of interest and many questions, general. I will try to keep my time down so that my colleagues can pose theirs. It gives us a nice picture, especially after your briefing.
Can we take a step back? You command the Strategic Joint Staff at National Defence Headquarters for the Chief of the Defence Staff.
BGen. Atkinson: I work for Rear-Admiral Bruce Donaldson, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff. There are two principal parts: operations, which I run for him; and plans, which is under Brigadier-General John Collin. We have a Director General of Coordination, but my focus is on our current operations.
Senator Day: What is his current rank?
BGen. Atkinson: He is a rear-admiral.
Senator Day: He was a captain when he appeared before the committee. You deal with operations, and as the Strategic Joint Staff provide advice to the Chief of the Defence Staff, you work in conjunction with the Canadian Expeditionary Force Commander.
BGen. Atkinson: Yes, and Canada Command, Support Command and Special Operations Command.
Senator Day: Canadian Special Operations Forces Command and the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command are in Afghanistan and Canada Command gets the troops ready to go.
BGen. Atkinson: Canada Command is responsible for domestic operations at home.
Senator Day: From the point of view of this briefing on Joint Task Force Afghanistan, is your work duplicated by the Expeditionary Forces Command?
BGen. Atkinson: Absolutely not. Our job is at the strategic level — the interface with foreign affairs, with the Privy Council Office, with our allies and with NATO. The Expeditionary Forces Command is involved at the operational level and employment of our forces on the ground.
Senator Day: Is your focus strategic and theirs more tactical?
BGen. Atkinson: Yes, operational and tactical.
Senator Day: We are trying to get a feeling for role of the Strategic Joint Staff, which is a bit larger than we anticipated its being.
BGen. Atkinson: It is not very large. My team is nine officers on current operations, and my support side is another seven.
Senator Day: Do you see the Strategic Joint Staff continuing as the transformation continues?
BGen. Atkinson: Absolutely, yes.
Senator Day: It has an important role in the new scheme of things.
BGen. Atkinson: It is a critical component to providing situational awareness and decision support to the Chief of the Defence Staff.
Senator Day: Does the Strategic Advisory Team — those embedded in Kabul with the Karzai government — report back to you if they see something not functioning well?
BGen. Atkinson: Brigadier-General Guy Laroche is the commander in Afghanistan; all the troops in Afghanistan report to him. General Laroche then reports to Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier, Commander Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, CEFCOM. He not only commands our troops in Afghanistan but also our naval troops afloat, our troops in Africa and in the Middle East and all of our expeditionary forces outside the country. Obviously, our commitment in Afghanistan is the largest of our commitments and takes up the largest proportion of his time.
Senator Day: When these embedded strategic advisory individuals in Kabul see that the internal ministry controlling the police is not doing its job, that the police are not being properly directed from the top and that the Afghan National Police are just not up to the task and something has to be done, how are those messages relayed to Lieutenant-General Gauthier?
BGen. Atkinson: Canada is not in Afghanistan alone. We are there as a part of the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, and NATO. Our major focus is in Southern Afghanistan where the bulk of our troops are employed. I spoke about the Afghan National Police. When we started, the Afghan National Army was down there, and five years later they are about here at 41,000 troops in the military and probably about 35,000 hard effectives. The Afghanistan Compact, which goes to 2011, wants them to have an end stay of 70,000. They are halfway there, so the Afghan National Army is doing well. We are seeing the positive effects of that in our area.
The focus on the Afghan National Police did not begin until two years after the Afghan National Army, but they are on an uphill climb and are getting better. Two big focuses have been done with the Afghan National Police. The first was survival skills. The ANP were viewed by the Taliban as a soft target because they are in small, light Toyota trucks. They had uniforms but not much training or body armour. The first focus has been how to survive in this kind of environment.
The second focus has been mentoring. The police Operational Mentor Liaison Team, OMLT, is to mentor these guys and bring them along slowly. Afghan police are trained at a facility inside Kabul and then sent out into the regions and districts. The success we are having with the army is the reason that we have put our focus on police OMLTs, who are able to bring them along. We have military police and soldiers combined in each segment.
The officers in Kabul are providing administration and planning in each of the ministries. Their compound is adjacent to our embassy. Our ambassador has the lead in the government as head of mission. He is the interface, as he should be, between DFAIT and the Government of Afghanistan. If the Government of Canada thinks that we are not happy with something, then it will be up to the ambassador to take the lead, and the Strategic Advisory Team takes its lead from the ambassador, as it should.
Senator Day: You said "we,'' in terms of training the police. Who are "we?'' Are you talking about Canada in the province of Kandahar and Southern Command, or are you talking about a coordinated effort by NATO throughout all of Afghanistan?
BGen. Atkinson: The training in Kabul is at national level. It is led by the Germans and they go into the districts and into our area. We put our OMLTs with the police we work with every day. We build police sub-stations, and with each subsequent rotation we will put more OMLTs in place. It is only through our ability to help them build capacity that we will see success in the long run, as with the Afghan National Army.
Senator Day: They have been through central training with the Germans before they come down.
BGen. Atkinson: Yes, they have been.
Senator Day: You mentioned in your presentation that there is a change with respect to pay. Can you explain that?
BGen. Atkinson: Certainly it is one of the biggest complaints. There have been many comments about the Afghan National Police being susceptible to corruption, when for the longest period of time their pay was not making it through to the police working in the area. Over the last month, the pay system finally kicked in, and those officers are being paid.
Senator Day: What did you do to change that?
BGen. Atkinson: We did nothing to change that. The Afghan national government slowly started to show progress in a critical area. A policeman who does not get paid will, unfortunately, find some way to make ends meet. It was not the kind of behaviour that we like to see on the ground.
There has been progress, but they are not done yet. I mentioned President Karzai's remarks on being five years in. He said it will take them a while and they want to get there in a hurry, but they are seeing tangible signs on the ground.
Someone is wondering if I can answer a question on the EROC.
Senator Day: We are being televised, and someone is picking it up at your monitoring station.
BGen. Atkinson: We have authorized three Huskies, three Buffalos and three Cougars. There are four Huskies, two Buffalos and two Cougars available. Then we have an op stock of one of each in theatre, and a training piece that is back here in Canada.
Senator Banks: Are those two systems there now?
BGen. Atkinson: We have one fully operating system and parts of two others. I will confirm. When I put the note on the Strategic Advisory Team I will include the breakdown exactly for a full understanding. That gives you a snapshot of what I said earlier.
Senator Day: I have one other point to finish off on the longer-term planning versus the tactical day-to-day dealing with the situation in Kandahar. It relates to the map that you have given us. In the west of Afghanistan, next to Helmand Province, is one of the worst areas. That is where all the major narcotics activity takes place. That is right next to Kandahar, but going west you come to Nimruz. There is no nation in there now. That is right next to Iran. We hear lots of stories about the problems on the other side, in Kandahar and on the east side next to Pakistan, and of the insurgents going into Pakistan, getting rested up, re-arming and then coming back in. Why is there not a focus on the Iran side, and what makes the difference between the two sides of Afghanistan?
BGen. Atkinson: It is not just a question of focus. It is a question of capacity as well. Commander of ISAF and the North Atlantic Council have repeatedly said that the CJSOR, which is the name they apply to the manning level on the ground, is not completely filled up. We do not have all the troops we need. We are close to what the NATO commander asked for, but not all of it. Not until you have all of the CJSOR and an Afghan National Army can you hope to cover all parts of the country. It is a large piece of real estate.
Senator Day: I understand that. Should I conclude that the same problem is happening along the Iran-Afghanistan border as is happening on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border but that we do not know because we do not have anyone there?
BGen. Atkinson: That is not the area where the Canadian Forces are operating.
Senator Day: It is part of Command South.
BGen. Atkinson: It is part of Command South, but that is not where the Canadian Forces are operating. The Canadian Forces are operating in Kandahar, and that is the focus of where our troops are on the ground.
Senator Day: We commanded the south at one time.
BGen. Atkinson: We did, and we will command it again. There are operations that will be conducted in the Nimruz area.
Senator Day: Is Nimruz just not as active with the Taliban because of Iran's failure to cooperate with them, or might there be lots of things happening there but we do not have enough people to be down there?
BGen. Atkinson: Sir, you are asking me to speculate on something that I am not able to.
Senator Day: We do not know?
BGen. Atkinson: I do not know.
Senator Day: Could you find out if anyone in the Canadian command knows what is going on in Nimruz?
BGen. Atkinson: There are things happening in all parts of the country. When I started my remarks I talked about operational security and about events on the ground. There are some areas that are inappropriate for me to go into because of the impact of security on the ground, and that would be one of them.
Senator Day: The chair has been more than patient with me. Thank you. What I am trying to get to is whether we can learn from the situation in Iran to help deal with Pakistan.
The Chair: I have a point on Senator Day's comment about the Strategic Joint Staff and its dealing with CFCOM. You said there was no duplication. Does this mean that the report that the committee is familiar with of the three wise men that was commissioned by the Chief of the Defence Staff has caused a change in behaviour? It refers to duplication and triplication.
BGen. Atkinson: That was in the early days, sir. One thing that the three wise men's report said was that the Strategic Joint Staff was a critical part and one that needed to be reinforced. It is now 18 months old, and a lot of learning and adjustment have happened in those months. We have been evolving and getting better at what we do each day.
Sir, you are absolutely right. When we first started and the Strategic Joint Staff was feeling its oats, there was some duplication of effort. There has been a huge piece of work to ensure that that does not recur. We are too small to be duplicating efforts on both sides.
The Chair: I want to know if there is good news, and you have said there is.
BGen. Atkinson: It is good news, sir.
Senator Moore: You ran through numbers and you had a note about the equipment that is now in Afghanistan. You talked about Huskies, Buffaloes and Cougars. One system equals one of each of those three pieces of equipment. Is that correct?
BGen. Atkinson: Yes, sir.
Senator Moore: You said that you have one system in place and one spare on the ground there. Is that right?
BGen. Atkinson: I would like to go back. Yes, a note was handed to me, but I would like to go back, confirm the details and provide that information to the committee. I would rather give it to you exactly correct.
Senator Moore: Thank you. Someone was asking you about the Leopard 2 tanks. You said that they are all in the theatre and working. Two squadrons are there now, one full-up and one backup. How many tanks are in a squadron?
BGen. Atkinson: Twenty.
Senator Day: There is one squadron fully operational?
BGen. Atkinson: The first squadron that went over was with Canada's own Leopard 1s that we deployed. If you recall, those tanks are a little older. When I first joined 30 years ago, I served on the first ones we received. As I have greyed over time, so have they; and our ability to sustain and maintain them in the high and harsh environment in Afghanistan was an issue. The heat there, because of the types of systems we had inside, was tough on the crews. The Canadian military went to the government and a program was announced to lease some Leopard 2s from the Germans with better firepower, mobility and protection. They were the three big things, as well as newer technology.
The Chair: There was air conditioning.
BGen. Atkinson: In fact, air conditioning is a bit of a misnomer. Inside, the crews actually wear a cooling jacket. It plugs them in and it works fabulously, to the point that we have a hard job getting them out of the turret. When it is 65 degrees outside, it feels good inside. That is why we brought the second squadron over. It is with the longer view we would like to take.
Senator Moore: The two squadrons are there. One is of the original Leopards and the second squadron is Leopard 2s.
BGen. Atkinson: They have newer Leopard 2s.
Senator Moore: When you say one is full-up, that means fully operational?
BGen. Atkinson: The Leopard 1s we had in place were fully operational and in fact would be still if we were manning them all. The leopard 2s we brought in are. Our equipment includes attachments that go on. They are mine rollers and mine plows for clearing routes. We are unable to attach our equipment on the Leopard 2s, the ones we have borrowed from the Germans, so we have maintained the other Leopard 1s, the originals, to be able to keep that capability on the ground, because when it is needed, it is pretty critical.
We have one squadron's worth of personnel on the ground to man a squadron of tanks.
Senator Moore: When we were there last year, we heard, as we have heard from various witnesses recently and even earlier today, concerns about the amount of corruption that has not abated. Senator Day was asking you about the Strategic Advisory Team, the 15 people we have embedded with the Afghan government. Who is tracking our money? Canada gives $100 million to the World Bank. The World Bank must write a cheque to the Afghan national government. We have people working with the Afghan national government.
BGen. Atkinson: Sir, you are asking me to go down a track that I am not able to. My job is in operations.
Senator Moore: You do not know about this.
The Chair: We have a CIDA witness coming.
BGen. Atkinson: They will be able to provide you that level of detail. That is out of my lane, so to speak.
Senator Moore: All right. With regard to the police, we were told when we were there last year that some of the trainers were members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
BGen. Atkinson: Yes.
Senator Moore: We were told that the training period is seven weeks, that most of them stay for only five and that they are being paid $75 a week. Why would they not stay for the full seven weeks and get a paycheque? They said they are getting money elsewhere, through Taliban leaders, warlords in the particular tribes or from some corrupt official in Kabul who is buying their loyalty. You say a new pay system was put in effect just last month. Are these men now receiving this money, or are we still facing the corruption and the fact of others having influence over them?
BGen. Atkinson: I can talk about the police in Kandahar that we work with every day. The pay system has kicked in, and it is working. We have seen the results of that over the last month, as I commented. We have seen the benefit, and I have talked about how that police force has slowly been growing in both reputation and stature and getting better every day. They are not there yet, but that is why we have our mentoring teams working with them. The future of Afghanistan, the future of our work, depends on having a rule of law that is functioning, and the police are a critical part of that.
Senator Moore: There is no question about that.
BGen. Atkinson: It will take some time before they are a competent police force that is able to work on its own, but they are making progress and getting better all the time.
Senator Moore: What is Afghanistan costing Canada each month in dollars?
BGen. Atkinson: I can provide that number, but I do not have it here. I probably should, but I do not.
Senator Moore: I would like to know what it is, aside from salaries, and I would like to know that as well.
The Chair: You could add that to your list and give the information to the clerk, please.
BGen. Atkinson: Yes, I am writing it down, sir.
Senator Mitchell: Brigadier-General, my first question is for clarification of operational lessons. I remember a year ago last summer there was a major battle, one of the first, I think.
BGen. Atkinson: Operation Medusa.
Senator Mitchell: That is right. The Taliban congregated in significant numbers and thought they would attack in that way. We clearly overwhelmed them. In fact, if I am not mistaken, we lost no one in that battle, but very early after that, several were ambushed. In fact, even during that period, I think there were no IEDs, which led me to believe as a pure layman that maybe the Taliban were distracted by this fight. This year, however, there is the suggestion that now there are 2,000 amassed and the observations here are that that is a huge problem for us. In fact, we have tremendous success when the Taliban actually congregate and stop doing what they seem to have done with some greater success. Is that the case? If so, why do the Taliban continue to do this kind of battle? Is it for propaganda reasons to demonstrate that they have strength even if it does not work for them?
BGen. Atkinson: It is for them to try to demonstrate success. They would like to try to show the international community, the International Security Assistance Force and the people that they can operate with impunity. Unfortunately for them, and very positively for us, whenever they do mass and try that sort of coordinated operation, they fail. Because of ISAF and the coalition success in doing that, they then revert to the use of indirect fire and IEDs, which is about the only way that an insurgency like this can operate. In turn, we continue to adjust our tactics and techniques and what we do on the ground to combat that as well, through the use of the EROC system and by trying to take down the networks of the people. It is no secret that we use intelligence-led operations, and we try to combat those networks of people that put the improvised explosive devices in the ground.
Over last 24 hours, as I am sure you heard in the news, an operation took down an IED factory. Those are Canadian troops. That was a huge success. Obviously like to report on such events, because taking those people out of operation will have an immediate and positive effect on the ground.
Senator Mitchell: Is it therefore fair to say that relatively few of our soldiers are actually killed or wounded in direct confrontation, because they are so effective and well trained?
BGen. Atkinson: Our soldiers are well equipped and well trained, and they know what they are doing. The biggest threat to us has been and continues to be the IED threat.
Senator Mitchell: I have not heard it so much recently, but a number of months ago there was talk about whether the military could actually sustain this number of combatant soldiers for extended periods of time and that there are self-defining limits to how long we can go on. What is the status of that now?
BGen. Atkinson: It took us a while. There is force employment and force generation, and our primary force generator in Afghanistan is obviously the army. It took a while for the recruiting to kick in and for our training and everything to hit its stride. We are able to maintain the commitment that Canada has made. That is not to say that it is easy, because it is difficult. We do not have a shortage of infantry, for example. We do not have a shortage of armoured soldiers. Many of the specialist trades are areas where we have more difficulty force generating, and because of that some soldiers have had to go back for more than one tour in some specialist and support trades, but we have made the adjustments. Our recruiting did kick in in a big way and continues to do so, and we are able to maintain the commitment that Canada has asked of us.
Senator Mitchell: How serious an affront to our efforts in Afghanistan is it that we cannot pursue the Taliban back into Pakistan or that we cannot attack the Taliban there? It has not come out in your discussion, but is it a major operational concern? If we could do it, would it be far better?
BGen. Atkinson: Pakistan is a sovereign state. It would be like us doing military operations across the U.S. border next door. Obviously the commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan has regular meetings in coordination with the Pakistani troops on the other side of the border. It is a critical piece. You have heard the Chief of the Defence Staff and others say that the solution in Afghanistan lies in Pakistan. There is no secret there at all. We want to push our Afghan development zone right up to the border. That is why we have troops working on the borders in the Spin Boldak area. It is a critically important area.
Part of the Afghans' evolution and their getting better is to be able to control their own border. It will take time to get there, but that is obviously a state they want to get in so that they can demonstrate and protect their own sovereignty.
Senator Mitchell: Does morale amongst the troops remain good?
BGen. Atkinson: The morale in the troops is outstanding. Our best spokesmen are our soldiers. They know what they are doing and they know why they are there. They see the results on the faces of the Afghans — the women, children, and men that they assist every day. The soldiers come home, and they are anxious to get training and go back again.
It is kind of hard to describe, but the young soldiers from Petawawa or Edmonton or Valcartier, the young men and women who deliver each and every day, understand it; they get it. When you have the opportunity to ask them, they will tell you in spades what they are doing and the impact they are having. They understand what Canada's role is. We are a G8 nation, a nation that can help and that is helping, and the soldiers see it every day.
The Chair: General, twice you have commented on how well equipped our troops are. We get complaints about our unmanned aerial vehicles, the Sperwers, on a regular basis. We also know that the Canadian Forces wanted to acquire Predators. What progress is being made on that?
BGen. Atkinson: There is progress. As you know, sir, we have a project to replace them. If I was able to ask Santa Claus for a few things we would like to have in our stocking, one would be the delivery of a new unmanned aerial vehicle, a new UAV that is more capable. Our Sperwer is working. We are literally flying the wings off.
The Chair: We get reports that troops are engaged in the Sperwers and over them when they need them.
BGen. Atkinson: We use the Sperwer every day.
The Chair: I understand that, but they are limited.
BGen. Atkinson: Yes. That is why we have a program to replace it, although I do not know how far along the program is. We do get coverage from other NATO nations with whom we are working, but as you said, a Predator- type vehicle would be critical to our success.
The Chair: When can we expect some Predators in Afghanistan?
BGen. Atkinson: I cannot tell you that; I am not in the procurement side of the department. The ADM or the deputy minister of materiel would be in a better position to say where the project is at.
The Chair: Could you provide us with an answer for that, please?
BGen. Atkinson: I can ask, but it is not down my lane.
Senator Tkachuk: Last week we heard from Norine MacDonald of The Senlis Council, who told this committee that her group advocated the creation in Southern Afghanistan of what she called combat aid agencies so that aid would be delivered by our military, and by the British and Dutch militaries in the south, and for the military to be given control of the aid budget in Southern Afghanistan.
What do you think of this proposition, that in addition to fighting the Taliban, the military should be in charge of delivering aid as well?
BGen. Atkinson: We have taken a whole-of-government approach on Afghanistan. The Senlis Council has written a number of reports. I was asked about this two weeks ago when I appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence. That is a proposal that is on the ground, put forward by that one group. Our whole of government approach has not taken that approach on the ground. We feel that we are successful in what we are doing and it is getting better every day.
Senator Tkachuk: I asked the gentlemen from RAND Corporation earlier about our doing development there at all. The reason we went over to Afghanistan was security. Part of the reason we have a hard time communicating our story in Canada is that we talk about development and aid and not about security, but our main object in going to Afghanistan was security. All these things, we believe, will help our security, but the important thing is that the Taliban are destroyed and that al Qaeda does not train there.
You mentioned earlier that there was difficulty in talking about our story. Maybe that is not the story people want to hear. Maybe they want to hear that they are more secure and why they are more secure.
BGen. Atkinson: The three things work in tandem. You cannot have governance and development and all those projects without security. If you are just doing security instead of the other, then they will never see progress. Our frame of reference here in Canada and in the Western part of the world is skewed and different from what is there on the ground.
When ISAF, and the Canadian coalition forces, in particular, went to Afghanistan, there was no infrastructure. There were potted mud roads; the bridges were gone; there were no telephones and no electricity. Any infrastructure that we take for granted was not there. When the military first go in and are providing the first security envelope, they have to fix some of the critical infrastructure. Military engineers under a heavy protection envelope have to create the space and some basic infrastructure from which they can work.
As your security envelope grows, you create the conditions for the non-governmental organizations, aid agencies, civilian contractors and the Afghans. It is fine for us to have project management and all the organization and money pouring in, but in order for it to be effective, the Afghans need to see themselves in their future. They need to see Afghans building the roads and bridges, repairing the electrical infrastructure, the television and radio stations, all those things. By providing that security envelope and continuing to expand it, and by building up the capacity of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, working together to create proper conditions, that aid and development can go ahead. However, no one of them works on their own, and you cannot have development without security.
There is a full-court press and the story is not just about the security. The security is what we do, but the real story is what is happening to the people.
I showed you a picture of where we were last April to this November in Sangin, in the Zhari-Panjwai area. When I spent Christmas there a year ago, we looked out in a certain town area and there was not a light in place, not a soul. When I was back there in May of this year, there were 30,000 people back in the region. The lights are on, the roads are open, the vineyards are planted and they are digging wells. We can see it. By giving them hope and confidence in the Afghan National Security Forces — and I talked about them actually conducting operations for the first time, joint operations and then independent operations — it demonstrates to the Afghans that they have a hand and a stake in their future. They see their own army and their own police standing up and protecting them. That is the face we need to project so that we will get to a state where the Afghans are able to take responsibility for their own future.
Senator Tkachuk: Is that happening throughout the country and in areas governed by other parts of NATO, where the Americans, British and Dutch are?
BGen. Atkinson: The two major areas of conflict are the east and the south. The north and the west, by and large, have been very quiet. There have been small flare ups from time to time, but the major focus has been in the east and the south. We are in the south and the Americans are focused in the east. We are seeing progress in the south, and the Americans are seeing it there as well.
When we prod the Taliban and push them into a corner, they react. So far, we have had success in taking control of the major areas, the major highway routes. I talked about the Arghandab causeway we are putting in place. That is a tangible sign of progress for the people on the ground. They will see the economic flow, and the benefit to them will accrue immediately when we open that up, hopefully later this week.
Senator Tkachuk: How does the decision process work? If we accept a proposition that development occurs, then there must be several projects going on that the Afghanistan government, or the provincial government, or the city government, or the tribe itself, is thinking about. How is that coordinated with the military? For example, if they are to do a bridge, either they will provide protection while that is going on or they will not provide protection for it but will provide it somewhere else because there is a culvert. Who decides that and how?
BGen. Atkinson: Everything that is done inside the province of Kandahar starts with the provincial governor. We have joint district centres now in Kandahar, Zahri, Panjwai and Arghandab. That is where the Afghan National Army, the police and the mayor, if you will, meet and do that level of coordination. This is their 9/11 or operation centre for their areas. Everything that we do in the development screen is done under the leadership and the guidance of the Afghans. That is the space we are getting to. They set both the tone and the priorities and we support it with the Afghan national security forces, which allows those other pieces to do their work.
Senator Tkachuk: I cannot remember which senator asked for the budget and what it costs today, but could you provide information as to how that is broken down in the sense that we would be paying for the military whether they were there or here? What is the extra cost of having them there rather than here? Do you know what I am getting at?
BGen. Atkinson: There are salaries but there is also the cost of the operations and all the things over there.
Senator Tkachuk: That is good. You said earlier that the Taliban do not have success in particular military forays with NATO troops, including our Canadian troops, and they resort to other measures. I noticed that in Afghanistan and in Iraq, when something bad happens to the bad guys, all of a sudden, 43 people are killed in some explosion. Usually it is civilians or their own people; it is not even us. They do it to attract the media here, I think, because they are trying to get their story out — not only in the region but to world opinion — because they do not want us there. How do we combat that? I know we cannot censor stuff like that, but certainly the media provides an extra carrot for the Taliban when they do suicide bombing forays and cause civilian casualties. That is the way it is usually reported: 43 people died in an explosion in a hotel. No one cares that these are real human beings that have nothing to do with the military. They are cooks and chefs and people working in a hotel.
BGen. Atkinson: Earlier today I commented that at one time you need to have not only an Afghan face but also an Afghan body, legs and arms as you move this forward.
There is a point at which the Afghan people themselves start to gain confidence in their army and in their place. There is a point at which they say enough is enough from the Taliban, and that is when the Taliban use children and women as shields, as we have seen continually, and when Taliban suicide bombers kill many people in a marketplace. They are masters at information operations. I said this earlier: The Taliban is quick to point out any time we have any sort of collateral damage. Although we attempt in everything we do to ensure that we call in an air strike or an indirect fire, and we put a red card up on many occasions where there is a potential for civilian casualties, and we have stopped and pulled away from operations, any time there are any civilian casualties, the Taliban are in there with their cameras. We must do this better. We have to work with the Afghan government and people. When the Afghans do something and they use women and children as shields and something bad happens, we have to get better at making sure that messages get out. They are very good at it.
Senator Tkachuk: They love chaos.
BGen. Atkinson: They thrive on it. We need to show the people another side and other options. That is what they all want. They want to be able to leave the house, go to the market, go to school and have a normal life.
Senator Zimmer: Thank you, general, for your presentation this evening. I wish to talk about the allies and the team effort. In our committee's last report, we recommended that the Government of Canada continue to apply pressure on our allies to contribute soldiers and police officers as mentors. You already talked about that in your reference to engineers and construction to guide them. Have our allies made new commitments in the building of the Afghan national security forces, in your opinion? A number of nations made new announcements at the recent NATO ministers meeting. I believe the Poles and the Czechs and two other nations announced an increase. I believe the Germans and the French did also. We are seeing other NATO nations standing up. We are still not to the exact level we need to be, but more troops are being committed. Not all of them are from NATO nations; there are some non- NATO partners as well. Obviously, that is good news. Is it because they are starting to see some success there, so they want to get engaged? That is, might the successes we are seeing activate others' inspiration to get involved?
BGen. Atkinson: It would be difficult for me to speculate on what different countries' motivations are, but there has been a lot of international pressure and discussion among nations to get them to contribute.
For the NATO nations, the pressure has been on all the time. We see that each and every day. We are seeing more troops being committed, and that is a positive.
The Chair: Not in the South, though.
BGen. Atkinson: Not yet, but I am hopeful that over the coming weeks and months we will see potential for more troops coming into the South.
The Chair: So are we.
Senator Zimmer: It has been suggested that there is no strategic coherence among the NATO states that are participating in the International Security Assistance Force, and the difficulty in reaching consensus has led some to believe that there is no real battle plan. How are allies participating in ISAF and reaching strategic consensus, especially concerning the issue of caveats?
BGen. Atkinson: It would be inappropriate for me to comment on other countries' caveats. ISAF gets its direction from the North Atlantic Council. That discussion emanates from there. Our job as soldiers on the ground is to execute that policy and deliver it.
Senator Nancy Ruth: I want to ask about the OMLT, the Operational Mentor Liaison Teams.
BGen. Atkinson: I do not know why we put that term out there. Military guys have a tendency to do that. I apologize.
Senator Nancy Ruth: I do not know anything about them, so I would like to know how they work within the Afghan National Army. How do you recruit the people, how are they trained for cross-cultural activity, how do you measure success, and how do you redesign your program? How do you do it all?
BGen. Atkinson: The OMLTs are regular soldiers based on a unit. Basically, the commanding officer mentors the commanding officer of an Afghan battalion. We take majors and captains that will go and mentor the company commanders. We take NCOs and young officers. Obviously, it is a smaller group with anywhere from six to 20 inside a company. They are doing hands-on mentoring and training with them on the ground.
Our training before we leave Canada is almost a six-month cycle. They start slowly and they study the Afghan culture, the situation on the ground and they work hard on our ability to conduct operations. Our ability as soldiers and war fighters is what enables them to take that skill set and transfer it directly to those Afghan soldiers.
It is one thing to train a battalion and then push them off into operations, if you can take them off operations and they have an officer, an NCO and a soldier working side-by-side with them showing them how to apply what they learn in the schoolhouse on the ground. That is what the operational mentoring teams do. They take that schoolhouse stuff and turn it into practical things. They go on patrols with them, live with them, man the checkpoints with them, ride in the vehicles with them, show them how to maintain equipment and how to use communications and teach them how to plan and execute.
Senator Nancy Ruth: What language are they using?
BGen. Atkinson: We use interpreters, but you would be surprised at the number Afghan officers in those companies who speak English. Unfortunately, we do not have many Pashtu speakers in the Canadian military, although we have some. We make extensive use of interpreters, and that gets the message out. There are some things you do not need an interpreter for. When it comes down to soldiering on the ground, it is, "Follow me and my example,'' and the OMLTs do that face-to-face with the soldiers, and that is where we are seeing the effect. The success story is having these soldiers work hand-in-glove with the Afghans and the same with the police mentoring teams.
Senator Nancy Ruth: How long would they stay with that unit?
BGen. Atkinson: They stay six months.
Senator Nancy Ruth: Is there any measurement mechanism for how the Afghans are doing?
BGen. Atkinson: The proof is in the pudding in the operations they conduct on the ground. I talked about the independent and joint operations conducted this last month — that was the proof of progress right there. It is very successful.
Senator Nancy Ruth: You are very pleased.
BGen. Atkinson: We are very pleased, and we will do more of this.
The Chair: Thank you, Brigadier-General Atkinson, for coming and giving us a thorough explanation for our questions. We hope to see more of you over the course of the year, and we will get to know each other better. It is helpful to the committee to learn more about what is going on, particularly when we anticipate seeing it ourselves.
BGen. Atkinson: Senator, I would also like to thank you, because it is critically important that you get an understanding of what our soldiers are doing on the ground, with all the members of the whole-of-government team. I do not mind your questions. I find it very stimulating and it forces me to make sure that when I come here I am prepared and have thought through the issues. That is our business. It is important, and we are delivering for Canada.
The Chair: We certainly think you are delivering for Canada, and we are grateful to you and to the men and women serving in Afghanistan and those preparing here to go there. On behalf of the committee, thank you very much.
The committee adjourned.