Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Fisheries and Oceans
Issue No. 28 - Evidence - April 19, 2018
OTTAWA, Thursday, April 19, 2018
The Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans met this day at 8:36 a.m. to study Maritime Search and Rescue activities, including current challenges and opportunities.
Senator Fabian Manning (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Welcome to the committee. My name is Fabian Manning, a senator from Newfoundland and Labrador, and chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans.
Before I give the floor to our witness, I would ask that our senators introduce themselves.
[Translation]
Senator Ringuette: Pierrette Ringuette from New Brunswick.
[English]
Senator Coyle: Mary Coyle, Nova Scotia.
Senator Raine: Nancy Greene Raine from B.C.
Senator McInnis: Thomas McInnis, Nova Scotia.
Senator Deacon: Marty Deacon, Ontario.
Senator Hartling: Nancy Hartling, New Brunswick.
Senator Gold: Marc Gold, Quebec.
The Chair: And we may have other senators joining as the meeting progresses.
The committee is continuing its study on maritime search and rescue activities, including current challenges and opportunities. This morning, we are pleased to welcome Liane Benoit, Founder and President, Benoit and Associates. On behalf of the members of the committee, I thank you for being here this morning. I understand you have some opening remarks. Following the presentation, the members of the committee will have questions for you.
The floor is yours.
Liane Benoit, Founder and President, Benoit and Associates: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good morning, everyone. It’s a pleasure to be here, and I thank you for this opportunity to speak on this very important subject.
I recognize this committee has been focused on the marine search and rescue in the Arctic for some time, and all members are by now familiar with the challenges. There is a vast territory to be covered by limited assets and significantly increased traffic in Arctic waters due to climate change. We know much of this territory has yet to be adequately charted, and only the largest vessels must report to NORDREG, making much of marine activity difficult to track.
The question of whether the Northwest Passage constitutes domestic or international waters remains, and until this is resolved through diplomatic channels, Canada is constrained in the level of authority it can exert or the restrictions that can be placed on the increasing number of cruise ships and smaller vessels operating in these waters.
At the same time, we are obliged as signatories to the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, and the IMO, to provide SAR services to this vast territory. We lag well behind other countries, such as Russia and Norway, in the resources available to provide such assistance, although in fairness to Canada, we do face different political, geographic and geopolitical realities than these two countries.
In terms of SAR capabilities, the recommendations most commonly heard centre around the deployment of JRCC aircraft and SAR techs to one or more Arctic communities on a seasonal basis, as well as the provision of Coast Guard vessels with more advanced communications and radar technology.
While these would certainly have significant benefits, I’d like to focus my remarks today on some of the more policy-oriented deficiencies and actions that might bolster SAR capacity in other ways and improve our response to the many local SAR incidents that constitute the vast majority of rescues in the North.
Several years ago, in my capacity as co-chair of Emergency Management for the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, I undertook a study of Arctic marine SAR that looked at this subject through the prism of interoperability, jurisdiction and leadership.
The final series of reports from that study have been referenced in your notes and I would be happy to expand on any of these observations.
In the few minutes I have left, I would like to emphasize a few key points related to DFO and marine search and rescue.
The first has to do with the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary. The history of how CCGA funding for the Arctic has been allocated until very recently is somewhat a beggars belief.
For years, the 25 communities on the Arctic coast of Nunavut were unable to access sufficient funds to set up or maintain Coast Guard auxiliaries from the Arctic envelope administered out of Hay River, while at the same time, thirteen well-heeled units patrolled the inland waters of the Mackenzie River. There was no transparency or mechanism of accountability available to Nunavut officials to shed light on this unusual concentration of resources, yet the Canadian Coast Guard Auxilliary represents the main link in the chain of command between the JRCCs and coastal communities throughout the Arctic.
The recent allocation of new funds earmarked for the development of Canadian Coast Guard auxiliaries in Nunavut and Nunavik is a positive first step in redressing this situation, but the money alone is not enough. Of the 14 marine fast response teams that operate under KRG authority in Nunavik, only two have managed to convert to auxiliary status in the two years since the funding program began.
Nunavut is experiencing similar delays and challenges. Both Inuit territories are being asked to create Arctic units based on southern CCGA rules and standards that are proving unachievable and inappropriate to Northern realities. The most appropriate solution would be the establishment of a new Eastern Arctic region within CCGA supported by policies that would better respect and integrate Indigenous knowledge and expertise and be specifically adapted to Arctic conditions and culture.
In the broader search and rescue policy arena, the Inuit Nunangat Declaration on Inuit-Crown Partnership has opened the door to a whole-of-government approach to Arctic policies based on shared priorities. I would argue search and rescue should rank high on the agenda of these discussions. At the moment, Canada does not have a national SAR policy and responsibility for its delivery is fractured among myriad departments and agencies. The establishment of this secretariat could provide a mechanism for the review of Arctic SAR, writ large, with a new emphasis on Northern perspectives and priorities.
Arctic marine SAR policy has to date been somewhat blind to the opportunities and potential represented by Arctic residents. This is partly the result of southern institutional bias — most SAR policies do, after all, emanate from the South — but it is also influenced by long-standing stereotypes and prejudices that admittedly work in both directions. New perspectives are required and there are bridges to be mended.
To that end, I would suggest SAR funds and priorities in the Arctic should be more strongly focused on bolstering local SAR capacity above the stationing of southern personnel in these remote communities. Select northern Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary volunteers could be trained in Arctic-specialized SAR tech roles and, using locally chartered aircraft and cached supplies, provide those essential eyes on-scene and equipment drops much faster than any military aircraft departing Greenwood or Trenton.
Lastly, I’d like to reference the findings of another major tabletop exercise on cruise ship incidents that took place last May in advance of the Serenity’s transit of the passage. The average age on that ship was 73. Evacuation of the vessel was only possible by zip line or cargo net. The lifeboats have five-foot gunnels and no sanitary facilities or heat. There are no docks in communities along the passage to allow for the safe offloading of passengers and should they be safely landed, the strain of even 100 passengers and crew on a remote community’s water, sewage, fuel and food supplies would be enormous and unsustainable. Evacuation from any remote High Arctic location would take days due to runway size and flight crew regulations.
In short, any pretence of Canada having the capacity to effect a successful rescue of a floundering cruise ship in the waters of the High Arctic is pretty much a Potemkin Village in which we all currently reside.
I applaud the efforts of this committee to shed some light on all these important matters and welcome any questions you may have. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you. In a few short minutes, I think you’ve raised a few eyebrows. On your last comment, I am 53 years of age and I’m not sure if I am interested in zip lining or a cargo net myself, just as an example. I am sure there will be plenty of questions. Some of these are issues we haven’t delved into yet. It was certainly a wonderful presentation.
Senator Gold: Welcome and thank you for that presentation, which was interesting, chilling and sobering.
As you may know, the committee is scheduled to head North soon, so I will ask two questions. We have limited time, as you know, so what should we be looking for? What are the things we really should be keying in on when we are up North as to enhance the reliability, credibility and persuasive value of our report?
In some of the work you did in analyzing the hypothetical sinking of the MS Arctic Sun, you describe a real hodgepodge of governance structure where emergency response would become, dare I say, a logistical nightmare because so many different actors are involved.
Our report will have a series of recommendations. What would a simplified national strategy look like and how do you account for these differing variables involved in a situation such as the one you analyzed?
Ms. Benoit: I was delighted to learn yesterday, when I was on the phone with one of my friends and colleagues in Nunavut, that he discovered he was to appear before the committee in Iqaluit. I think it’s important for the members of this committee to travel North.
In terms of what to look for, I think you will probably have the opportunity to meet with the two heads of Emergency Management in Public Safety and both of these people — Ed Zebedee in Nunavut and Craig Lingard in Nunavik — have been in their jobs for many decades and they have been living in the North for decades. Neither of them are Inuit but Craig has an Inuit family and they’re very much integrated into the community. They will be able to tell you, chapter and verse, the challenges they face.
If you have the time, I think it would be very important to meet some of the people who actually man the fast response marine teams, particularly in Nunavik. They’ve been in place for many years. They are well trained and have taken all the required courses.
Those teams were, in fact, created out of a similar frustration to what was experienced with Nunavut in that the Canadian Coast Guard Auxilliary funding for Nunavik was part of the Quebec envelope. For years, they tried to get auxiliaries going in these remote communities but, of course, all the funding was being concentrated in the South on the St. Lawrence.
They had small budgets they didn’t want shared with remote communities up North so finally the Kativik Regional Government threw up its hands and said, “Fine, we’ll buy our own rescue boats and train our own people,” and they did. There is one fast response rescue boat in each community and the teams worked well. As I said, they’ve been very well trained.
But although they have informal contact with the JRCC, they are not in the formal chain of command. If you look at who JRCC should call for a marine incident, the first point of contact in a community is meant to be the auxiliary, if one exists.
It’s very important to meet with the people who are actually responding to these incidents. I think it will be a very eye-opening experience in that they are very remote and the context is completely different than a southern response. These people are extremely dedicated and even though they may not have the same credentials as responders in the South, they have a wealth of knowledge and expertise that is invaluable and I think has been largely overlooked by the Coast Guard in the past.
As to the hodgepodge of responsibilities, Canada doesn’t have a SAR policy. Years ago, they set up the National Search and Rescue Secretariat and its mandate was supposed to be to come up with a national search and rescue policy, but it has never been allowed to fulfil that mandate.
The problem, of course, is typical of any government. You have the military and Coast Guard for aeronautical and marine search and rescue, and if you move into ground search and rescue, that reverts to the territories. Then you have Transport Canada, Health Canada and Environment Canada. Depending on who’s drowning, you have the PMO, PCO and Global Affairs. You have other branches of the military. It’s literally a dog’s breakfast of responsibilities.
When it comes to accountability, because responsibility is so dispersed, accountability is equally dispersed.
The other challenge is you’re talking about incidents in remote areas, and the amount of funds available to bring all these different parties together are not large. Operation NANOOK, that has gone on for many years, has been useful in that sense and they do try to get together as often as possible. Small matters such as the national SAR round table — there was a northern SAR round table that operated twice a year for many years when , the National Search and Rescue Secretariat, was under DND. Two years ago NSS moved to Public Safety Canada, and since that time the northern SAR round table has not met. That is sorely missed by the practitioners in the North. It was an excellent opportunity for them to network with their colleagues and build relationships - even to know the name of the person when they called you - obviously they make the effort, but to know some of the people who will be responding to an incident through social contact at these larger meetings. SARscene has also been diminished, and that was another opportunity for people across the North.
I have been working to get an Arctic risk-management network together with a colleague from the U.S. who wants to set up a bilateral network as a means for knowledge, dissemination and education, exchanging experience between Alaska and Canada. Northern SAR falls solidly between the cracks of INAC and Public Safety Canada. It really is a challenge when you look at the complexities of rescues, the remoteness of the Arctic and the number of people who need to be involved, because by legislation they have to be involved. It becomes a complicated scene. The question I asked was who was in charge, and if you would like me to expand on the outcome of that later I will. Even the people working in SAR on a day-to-day basis don’t know where their jurisdiction ends at the margins.
Senator Gold: Is there a governance fix? If you could wave a magic wand, what should we recommend to at least significantly improve, if one could significantly improve, the governance hodgepodge that you have described?
Ms. Benoit: If there was a simple answer they would have found it. It would require possibly a single Arctic policy that brought together on a team basis all the different players. I think maybe an Arctic-specific SAR policy would be the only answer that really was appropriate to the conditions of the North and took into account all of the complexities up there.
Senator Gold: Thank you. Maybe we can feed that into the Arctic Committee.
The Chair: Certainly very interesting.
Senator Raine: Where would you locate the administration of a single Arctic-specific SAR policy?
Ms. Benoit: Well ideally in the North, but I think that’s a bit utopian at this point. I’m not sure that the funds are there, possibly not the capacity but ideally if you are administering an Arctic policy it should be based in the North.
Senator Raine: If you were going to set one up could you project a start up phase into a permanent administration phase where you could build the capacity? How long would that take? Is the talent there?
Ms. Benoit: I think we’re starting with the expansion of the Coast Guard Auxiliary. I think that’s one step. In terms of administration, you get into the whole federal-territorial conundrum, and I don’t know how familiar the committee is with the authorities for the various incidents. But let me tell you, if you have someone drown in the Arctic Ocean it raises all kinds of questions.
Take the tragic example of the two researchers who passed away, I think it was three years ago now, north of Resolute. They were on a research expedition, and one of them sadly went through the ice, it was crystal ice, it looked solid and he skied right into it and went down. His partner opened his sled and set off the EPIRB, and went to, the assumption is, help rescue his companion and fell in as well. Both perished. Technically, in the Arctic Ocean, this would be a marine rescue, but when water is frozen it becomes land. Now, the federal government JRCC is responsible for marine and aeronautical rescue. Ground rescue is the responsibility of the territories. Where that starts and ends when you have someone drown on the ocean is always a good question. However, practicality usually reigns and, of course, the local SAR people, they were using an outfitter in Resolute and the local SAR team did the first eyes-on assessment of the situation, and it was fairly obvious that the folks had perished.
I am going to tie myself up in trying to explain this.
The RCMP has overall jurisdiction for missing persons. If that missing person is within a community, then the RCMP searches. If that person is deemed to be outside of the municipal limits, then it’s actually the municipal volunteer SAR team that is mobilized to go look. The RCMP stays involved, but they normally don’t leave the community. If the capacity of that volunteer team is exceeded, then through a very complex line of authorities, they can ask for the Canadian Rangers to be activated. This, I remind you, is only in the context of a ground search and rescue, because neither the RCMP nor the Canadian Rangers have a mandate for marine search and rescue.
Now, if the search exceeds the resources and capacity of the Rangers, the JRCC can become involved and they would fly in from Trenton or Greenwood to assist with the rescue. One of the gaps is actually when you call a rescue off, and that’s always a conundrum, particularly when federal resources are involved because, of course, the families of the missing persons want the search to continue until they’re found. Whereas federal authorities are operating under different budget demands. It is endless time and resources to persist. This is a very tricky area that the JRCCs have to negotiate with the communities in the event.
That’s ground search and rescue. Now, when it comes to aeronautical and marine search and rescue, all the legislation supports the air force and the Coast Guard being responsible for marine search and rescue. When there is an incident on the water, technically, no one is supposed to go near until the JRCC arrives. In the study I did, and it was a very feasible scenario, it was a cruise ship that went down in Cumberland Sound, the horseshoe in the claw of Baffin Island, and it was 40 kilometres from Pangnirtung, which has a fishing fleet with 40 or 50 boats. Technically, according to legislation, they were not supposed to go near that sinking ship until the JRCC had taken command of the operation. The JRCC and the Coast Guard are responsible for all marine SAR. Now in reality, when a community has a missing person, the local people SAR teams take on that role. They will go out in their boats and search for local people. But again, if the search exceeds their capacity, then they do have to rely on the Coast Guard.
Unfortunately, with the limited number of vessels we have, they can’t be in all places at once. The odds of them actually being available when a marine search is on is limited.
However, JRCC will send planes to search the area and they’re usually very good at providing that kind of support.
You can see when water becomes ice and — whether somebody is lost inside it — it’s a missing person in a community or someone outside, it’s very convoluted. There is the chance of jurisdictions and authorities being confused. Again, the study was a perfect example.
So what happened? I should perhaps explain the methodology I used for this — technically a table top exercise — was different than what is normally done. Normally when there’s a table top exercise, there’s a scenario. The different responding agencies will come together, there’s a facilitator and they’ll work through the response. It’s very collegial, some of the time. Everybody decides who would do what and when. And who is in charge becomes obvious very quickly.
In this particular scenario, I was asking who was in charge and I wanted to find out whether all the agencies had the same perception. Instead of bringing everyone together, I took the scenario and a standard set of questions and went to each of the various agencies where they would be located if this were a real incident. I gave them the scenario and asked them the questions.
The best way I can explain how I did the analysis is that I’m sure most people around the table are old enough to remember the old punch cards from the early computers. If everything worked beautifully, in terms of jurisdiction and authority and interoperability, after I asked those questions I should have been able to line the cards up and see the light shine through. Needless to say, that didn’t happen.
The outcomes far exceeded any expectations or preconceived notions I might have had. Among other things, the JRCC had no idea, when I went to meet with them, that there were actually emergency management protocols that have been consecrated in territorial legislation that gives authority to senior administrative officials through the municipal council in each hamlet to take charge of a rescue. Granted, their authority does not extend to marine rescues. But if you have a ship full of people sinking 40 kilometres away from your community — and this is summertime so all the boats are off in Cumberland Sound — nothing happens in Cumberland Sound without Inuit knowing. They are there constantly. They fish, they have camps along the shore. A cruise ship coming into Cumberland Sound is still enough of an occasion that people would have eyes out for it. Obviously, if that ship is in trouble and people are having to abandon ship, as was the case in this particular scenario, they would immediately go in and help and ferry the people back to their community and look after them there.
Now, when I put that scenario to the folks at JRCC and asked them how they would react — I want to preface this by saying that this was one person on one occasion and that relations are often very good between local communities and JRCCs — on this particular occasion, the answer was, “I would arrest the SAO. I would have the RCMP arrest the SAO.”
Now, I was stunned into silence by this response because it was not the collegial “everybody tries to do what they can” attitude I would normally expect from military operations. They have their protocols, but they’re practical people. I called and talked to another fellow, a senior officer from the Coast Guard. I said, “I wanted to check back. I wasn’t sure I got the answer correct to that particular question about what would happen if the community took charge of the rescue in terms of the SAO.” He said yes, he would be impeding a military operation. Quite honestly, they were correct. According to legislation, they and they alone can run a marine rescue.
In fact, whenever the military gets involved in the North, the civilian volunteers are supposed to stand down because they should not be involved in a military operation.
Senator Raine: Wow.
The Chair: You’re bringing a level of silence among the table here, too. I welcome your answers, but we have a long list of questions.
Senator Raine: Going into detail is very important.
The Chair: Wonderful. I don’t want to shorten them in any way because the knowledge you have is very educational for us at the table. We have a long list of questions and we’re short on time.
Senator Coyle: Thank you very much, Ms. Benoit. It’s a staggering report. Plus, the materials we were provided from you in advance were excellent.
I’m also on the Arctic Committee, so this is very important and some of my questions will come from that. One of your main points today, in addition to what has already been discussed, is that you would recommend the creation of a new eastern Arctic region within the Canadian Coast Guard, CCGA. Yet that region would need to have its own character. It should not, by the very nature of its environment and human reality and climate change reality, be a cookie cutter replica of another region.
Okay; I got that. I think that’s a very important thing to say.
On top of that, I’m curious about international cooperation. You mentioned jurisdictional issues in the Arctic. Canada is a member state of a number of Arctic collaborative bodies, such as the Arctic Council, et cetera. Where do you see international cooperation being handled in these situations, Arctic search and rescue, and at which of those bodies, if any of those bodies, does this fit?
I am also curious about collaboration across Canadian assets and resources where we have huge investments in science infrastructure, human and physical infrastructure in the North and where, as you have highlighted, that possibly creates more demand for Arctic search and rescue, but also more resources that could be deployed in a variety of ways, human and others, in the North. I’m curious about your point on that.
Finally, with Labrador, which I haven’t heard a whole lot about, I understand from the Arctic Committee that with climate change, the ice changes and big shifts of great big chunks of ice called icebergs and other such things are going to be increasingly flowing down that direction. What’s your point of view on what needs to be done there?
Ms. Benoit: If I can answer that last question first, Labrador would like to join the eastern Arctic unit. They are aware that funding has been allocated. It would make perfect sense to include Labrador in that. That’s the short answer to your question.
In terms of international cooperation, I think the Arctic Council is the appropriate place. Of course, the agreement on Arctic SAR, on circumpolar SAR, was the first official agreement negotiated by the Artic Council, and that is the perfect place. I was in one of their meetings shortly after the agreement was signed. It was an infrastructure meeting in Iceland and all the countries came and all lied. Nobody wanted to admit that they didn’t have the infrastructure resources to actually provide adequate SAR to the vast territories all of us are being asked to respond to, with the exception of Russia, which actually had in place at that time plans for a total of nine search and rescue stations along the eastern passage.
I looked at the submission from Canada, and there were harbours and ports. I’ve been to and landed boats in some of those places, and unless they had been built in the last little while, they didn’t exist. I’m sure every other country was doing the same, because nobody wants to admit they don’t have the infrastructure or capable assets.
Canada would be challenged by a major incident in the North but so would Greenland. Russia is a little bit better. Some of the other countries have populations closer to the Arctic Ocean. We’re not alone in not being able to rescue people in a mass-casualty situation. What astounds me is that the people getting on those boats are never aware of that fact before they sign up, but that’s a different discussion.
In terms of your second question, there was a paragraph I cut out of my presentation in the interest of time. The military and Coast Guard have slight blinkers on when it comes to assets. They seem to only want to use their own assets. There is a great deal of infrastructure and equipment in the North. If you’re on the Arctic Committee, you’re probably familiar with this. There are lots of helicopters, planes and various other heavy equipment.
As I said in my remarks, if you have people trained up there as SAR techs who could get on a chartered plane and fly to an incident, that’s much more efficient than sending somebody from Greenwood or Trenton, but for some reason, it doesn’t seem to be considered.
It’s not unusual. I work in Indigenous SAR in other areas of Canada, and small First Nations communities often set up MOUs with mines, fisheries and other corporations, which are standing agreements. Whether it’s DND or DFO, they could have an inventory of equipment known to be up there they could update on an annual basis. If there’s an incident, they pick up the phone. It’s a bit like a ship of opportunity: If there’s an aircraft there and people are in trouble, we’ll send that aircraft while you wait for the Southern expertise and assets to be transported.
For some reason, the idea of utilizing infrastructure that’s there that doesn’t belong to them doesn’t seem to ever come up in any of the discussions I’ve been a part of on the subject. I think it’s a very good point.
Senator Coyle: Thank you very much. On that, there are human resources, as well. Many are being trained in these northern research stations and private companies, either in research methodologies or in their industrial area. Those people could be valuable members of the auxiliary.
Ms. Benoit: Absolutely.
Senator Coyle: Also, the physical infrastructure in which Canada is investing millions and millions of dollars across the Arctic could also be physical places. I was reading some of your issues with the scenario with the cruise ships, I thought where people could be housed, even. There is a whole variety of things — equipment, infrastructure and human resources — that we’re paying for already, they’re there — and increasingly so. There’s going to be a significant investment in the future, so why not?
Ms. Benoit: I agree entirely. It makes perfect common sense, but —
Senator Hartling: Thank you. Your presentation was riveting and adds value to where we are in our study, especially as we prepare to go to the North.
I’m interested in the sociological perspective. You talked about the long-standing prejudice and stereotyping. I’m wondering if you could expand on that and talk about how we can use Indigenous knowledge and expertise, given that there could be some prejudice and stereotypes blocking that. Can you talk a bit about that?
Ms. Benoit: I can. I will reference this study a little bit, maybe as an illustration of how these biases happen. Some time ago, DFO cached, I think, seven different sea cans of environmental response equipment in various communities around the Arctic. When you have an oil spill, depending on the grade of oil, you want to get onto that as quickly as possible. DFO in Sarnia put all these sea cans there. Some of the communities weren’t even aware they were being delivered; they simply got a call there was a sea can. They had to look at the label to find out what it was.
They were cached in the communities, but not one person in the communities was trained in the use of the equipment. When I met with Pangnirtung in the context of this scenario — and one aspect was a fuel tank puncture, and there was a spill in their fishing grounds — if there were to be an oil spill and they knew there was a sea can full of equipment, they’d knock off the lock, bring it out and use it. But he said that they would be doing it completely blind. “We have no idea how to set up booms. We have no idea what risk we’d be putting ourselves at in terms of health, but we would do it because it’s there and has to be done. We know that by the time the fellow flies in from Hay River or Iqaluit, it won’t be of much use.”
That’s one example.
Even more astounding in that case was that nobody knew where the key was for the sea can of equipment in Pangnirtung. It’s not that they wouldn’t have knocked the lock off in an emergency, but I wanted to find out. They said it was in Hay River, then Sarnia or maybe it’s in the community. Two years later, I found out it was in the bottom drawer of the local RCMP, but RCMP personnel had turned over in that period, and nobody knew what the key was for. It’s for environmental response equipment. There are those kinds of things.
Unfortunately in the past, because of the very set protocols the military and the Coast Guard follows — it’s a hierarchical organization, and they have set standards and procedures for all kinds of very good reasons. Inuit and Northern communities operate on a much different basis. Respect is earned through experience; it’s not because you necessarily have the credentials. But the military will only recognize credentials.
If the JRCC fly into Pangnirtung — and I’m not sure if this is an urban myth or it actually happened — because there’s a hiker injured in a crevasse in the park, the Inuit know exactly where that person is when it’s described, because they know that park. But the JRCC will fly in, and if those knowledgeable Inuit don’t have proper accreditation, they won’t take them in the plane on their first attempt to find that person. Having been unable to find them, they will take them on the second foray, but by that time, the person has been in distress for that much longer.
There’s a clash of cultures. Because Inuit people don’t have the same education, approach and training as they do — there isn’t that equivalency — and quite frankly, when I say it works in both directions, people in the North don’t have a whole lot of time on some occasions for the Southern people who come up. It’s a difficult dynamic to cross.
Maybe some of it is a little bit old-school thinking. I think it’s institutional cultures that clash often, just because things are done so differently in the North. It’s all-hands-on-deck. You look at the rule book later.
Over time, many search and rescue folks in the North are gaining these credentials. Even though they weren’t under auxiliary, the Nunavik boats were trained up in various courses and will be pursuing the necessary auxiliary courses. It’s a very difficult dynamic.
When you meet some of the first responders in the communities, they’re incredibly talented and dedicated. Quite frankly, if I were lost, I would be just as happy to have an Inuit hunter come find me as a JRCC SAR tech, but the Inuit hunter is not formally recognized.
Senator Poirier: Thank you very much. So many things are going through my mind I don’t even know where to start. My first question is: Presently, Canada’s Search and Rescue is divided into three regions. Would it help, or should we maybe divide it into four and allow the Arctic to have their own Joint Rescue Coordination Centre? Would that help?
Ms. Benoit: Yes, but the usual answer from the military is that there aren’t enough incidents to warrant that investment.
Senator Raine: For the time being.
Ms. Benoit: It will only take one mass-casualty event for things to change. One of the challenges in Arctic SAR, maybe not so much in the marine incidents that the Coast Guard responds to because I’m sure they keep fairly accurate data. In the bread-and-butter incidents that happen in the North, that data has not been adequately captured. It is certainly not communicated down to the decision makers in Ottawa. I don’t know how many times I’ve sat in DND briefings where some well-intentioned fellow will stand up and say, “Rescues in the North are 0.02 per cent of our callouts.” The data is there and hard to argue with. Resources tend to follow the metrics. There have been some efforts in the past. NSS has a knowledge-management system that they’ve instituted in Nunavut. Nunavut has tried to populate it with its figures because, between ground and marine searches, they have over 300 every year. Nunavik has slightly fewer. I’m actually just about to start a study. We’ve received, and are waiting for a decree from Quebec to access the funding for, a SARNIF grant to set up a data-management system in Nunavik so we can track the numbers. Until you have those statistics and can put them front of the people who are sorting out budgets, you really are not going to get those assets moving North.
In answer to your question, yes, it would be a huge advantage to have them there, although many of the incidents that happen are ground Search and Rescue incidents and do fall under territorial authority.
Senator Poirier: Because of the Arctic being unique, the size it is and the increase of travel happening, there is training that’s been there. I’m aware the federal government, I think, has announced the Canadian Coast Guard will expand in the Arctic with 8 new vessels. Will that be adequate? It’s definitely going to help. It’s not going to hurt. But will that be enough?
When an accident happens, like last May, the first priority of everybody would be to save lives, I would assume. I understand why the JRCC could say, “We need to be there first,” but, at the same time, if we’re losing lives because of the distance, we have the local people available to go there. I hope it has happened, and, if not, I hope it will. The municipal level of governance, the territorial level of governance, the federal level of governance responsible for the GRCC and the Coast Guard, maybe it’s time that we all sat together and said, “Why are we not accepting these people?” Is it a lack of training, and we fear that they are going to do more damage than save lives or that there’s a risk to somebody else? What do we need to do to encourage more people to get the training they need? How can we work together in a one-stop shop, if I can call it that, so that we have a place where, when a call comes in, we do everything we can with what we have on hand.
To your knowledge, has that ever happened, and is it because of the different cultures that this seems to be an issue, that we can’t have that moving?
Ms. Benoit: It’s certainly been discussed. As part of the Arctic Security Program and the management pillar of it, we held national round tables on SAR across the North, and we got lots of feedback on what the gaps were.
I think it boils down to, again, authorities. The military is responsible for these, and, therefore, they want to be using people who are trained and who are under their command in the response. When you have a group of untrained people — according to their credentials — out there effecting a rescue and the chance of the rescuers being injured, then where is the liability and accountability? It’s a very difficult situation.
In the Arctic, in terms of ground Search and Rescue, when the volunteers go out, they are covered, for their expenses and for insurance purposes, by the territory. When you’re out on a marine rescue, I’m not so sure that would cover because, technically, the territory doesn’t have jurisdiction for marine rescues. I think there are big liability issues that are of concern. Certainly the development, I think, of the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary is essential to really create that link between communities and the federal SAR structure that’s ultimately responsible.
In terms of your 8 vessels, it’s a start, but there are 25 communities. So, unfortunately it doesn’t help if you’re in Pangnirtung and the boat is in Iqaluit. But it is a start, and it’s a definite benefit. But I’m not sure — it’s not really my place — but perhaps, when you’re up North, either Craig or Ed will share some of the stories, some of the anomalies of the challenges they’re having in trying to shoehorn Arctic realities into the rules and standards they are being asked to have in the South. It just beggars imagination. Boats can’t be certified. There’s an auxiliary checklist. The equipment on your boat, you have to check off every box. If every box is not checked off, you can’t be certified as an auxiliary boat. In one case, the rope is an eighth of an inch too narrow, and you can’t just run to Rona and get a new rope. Worse than that, if you put the thicker rope on the wheel, the wheel’s not big enough. That means you have to retrofit your boat. Retrofitting a boat in the Arctic is not obvious either. There are these small things that could be so readily addressed by common sense. The same thing about batteries. One of the things on the checklist is that you have to have your EPIRB battery checked every year, but that’s considered a hazardous material. There’s no capacity to handle hazardous material in these remote communities. They can’t just ship it out on a regular airline. There’s all kinds of technical paperwork that has to be filled out, and there’s no capacity within the communities. There’s no administrative capacity to know how to fill out that paper appropriately, and the batteries have to be sent down to the South. They’re hoping to get the Coast Guard to pick them up along the communities and take them down. But, again, these are small things easily addressed when you’re in the South but create huge challenges when you’re in a remote community.
There are other requirements that particularly Quebec is imposing. For example, I don’t know if many of you have had the opportunity to read the Montreal Gazette article on Michael Cameron. Mike went down South, trained as an instructor for the Canadian Coast Guard and was all set to give the courses. Quebec has decided that he needs to be supervised for the next two years. There are only two people available to provide that supervision, and they’re not very available. Yet, he’s been invited to give the same course in Churchill, and there’s no requirement for supervision. What message does that telegraph to them? Perfectly competent individual, but, for some reason, the South believes he needs supervision for a two-year period.
Senator Raine: Is he Inuit?
Ms. Benoit: He’s an Inuit man, yes. He’s half Inuit. He’s the EMT and park warden in Salluit, a very competent individual. I have to say that Inuit are very generous in their perceptions of this. They’re very accepting, and they try as best they can to comply with these requirements. But the requirements are rigid, and, if you can’t meet them, you can’t become part of it. To my mind, it’s to use common sense in addressing these and to get these fast-response vessels into the Coast Guard Auxiliary as quickly as possible so that they can be part of that formal chain of response, rather than worrying about minor adjustments to the tow rope.
Senator Poirier: Following the incidents of last May, have we —
Ms. Benoit: That wasn’t an incident. That was a hypothetical incident. It was a tabletop exercise.
Senator Poirier: We are better prepared if something like that would happen again today.
Ms. Benoit: No, it was in anticipation of the Crystal cruise ship going through. They decided to get all the parties together and really work it out. Honestly, although everyone would do their very best, a ship like that probably has a Coast Guard vessel tailing them, but the outcome would not be pretty, I’m afraid.
Senator Poirier: Thank you very much.
The Chair: We need a few minutes of our meeting to discuss our trip to the North. It is a very interesting conversation. I hate to cut things off, but I have to move things on.
Senator McInnis: Thank you very much. Very interesting.
In your remarks you said for years the 25 communities on the Arctic coast in Nunavik were unable to access sufficient funds to set up or maintain Coast Guard Auxiliaries from the Arctic envelope administered out of Hay River while at the same time 13 well-heeled units patrolled the inland waters of the Mackenzie River.
One, has anything changed with respect to that? Two, we’ve seen, particularly in Newfoundland, the auxiliary that is there, and the wildest waters apparently in the world, and they do a wonderful job. They’re very effective. In the Arctic, it’s now all of a sudden fashionable to talk about the Arctic, cruise ships going up and so on. Is it because that it is a recent occurrence that auxiliaries are not up to par and not being given sufficient funds to operate and equipment? Do you think that is part of it?
Ms. Benoit: Your question is, is it because of the focus on the Arctic that the money is coming?
Senator McInnis: Now, yes.
Ms. Benoit: Yes, partly. Things have changed a little in terms of the administration, the leadership of the Coast Guard Auxiliary recently in the North. The Coast Guard Auxiliary is funded through a contribution agreement, and once the contribution goes into the zone and then is parcelled out again, it was sort of a sub envelope, if you will, for Central Arctic, and it was in the hands of one individual who happened to live in one geographic location. I would highly recommend that you ask Ed Zebedee about his challenges in trying to find out why they couldn’t access funds.
When I was doing this study and was at MCTS in Iqaluit, I was told they had a small unit in Iqaluit that was crawling along and they had to close it for lack of funding. They could not squeeze a penny out of N.W.T. and into Nunavut even though all the communities in Nunavut are on the coast.
I would strongly suggest you question Ed on some of the challenges. But, thankfully, we have moved past that, and they have recognized, within DFO, that there is a requirement for Coast Guard Auxiliaries in Nunavut and Nunavik. They are working towards it, but they really do have to respect the advice of the North, and they’re not doing it in terms of training, and people are failing at the training. They’re not failing because of any deficiencies in technique; they’re failing because of process because they won’t give the training in Nunavut. They insist on having it in N.W.T. and taking people out of their communities; so people end up not being able to complete the course and being flown home.
They’re small things that if they just listened to the advice of the people who are up there and have done it and dealt with the challenges around it and followed that advice, they would be so much further ahead. But, for their own reasons, they choose to do it differently, and the results have not been stellar.
Senator McInnis: Thank you for being so candid. Really, your whole approach has been very candid and interesting. We’ll have lots of questions for them when we get them there.
Is there a greater control over the vessels now that are in the Arctic? It was that they had to be over 300 gross tonnes.
Ms. Benoit: For NORDREG?
Senator McInnis: They would have to register there, and now the smaller ones, as we know, there are people who are venturesome that go up there. Has anything changed there?
Ms. Benoit: Perhaps to the first question of who you should speak to, there are Coast Guard members at MCTS in Iqaluit who have been there a long time, and they will tell you some very interesting rescues that have taken place with teams of people wanting to traverse the Northwest Passage in Sea-Doos, for example. Some people they have had to rescue three times.
To your question, no, nothing has changed. Only over 300 tonnes need to report to NORDREG. Because it is, for all intents and purposes, considered international waters, Canada does not have any authority to insist on ice-trained pilots being on ships or any of the other requirements we might be able to impose if it was considered internal waters.
An interesting point, if it were considered internal waters, it would be Inuit who would be deciding. It would be Nunavut who would be deciding who would go through the passage because those waters border their territory.
Until there is some diplomatic resolution to that issue, other than public relations type things, our hands are tied. I suppose if Canada wanted to organize and get some sort of a voluntary cruise ship association that would, for example, as in the Antarctic, where you have to have a buddy ship, if the visitors to the region wanted to get together and try to enhance their own safety, that’s something Canada could support. But in terms of actual authority over those waters, nothing has changed beyond the NORDREG requirements, for the moment.
Senator McInnis: You earlier alluded to private sector and utilization of the private sector, and this may not be in your expertise, but when we were in Newfoundland we met with Cougar Helicopters, and they do a lot of transporting back and forth to the offshore. How do you feel about the private sector coming in and doing these things? It seems when the government gets involved, they do a good job when they get on the job, but it all takes so long, whether they’re building an icebreaker or whatever, it’s always over time for whatever reason. Do you think there is a greater role for the private sector?
Ms. Benoit: It would provide the same service if JRCC were to put a SAR tech and a plane in one of these communities. It would mean it was being privatized, it was a contract to a private provider as opposed to someone else within government.
I’m sure they would do a very good job, and, yes, it would be an asset to the region. You’re back to the same government metrics that are deciding whether we have a budget to hire someone privately to be positioned in the North. The answer is likely no.
The more practical approach may be the one suggested earlier and is entering into MOUs with infrastructure-rich agencies up there, whether it be mines or someone else, and training people locally; so you have a local-trained person who can hop on a commandeered or chartered plane with cached equipment in the community.
It wouldn’t only have benefits in the event of a marine incident. If you have some major incident in the community and you have a cache of medical supplies, it’s a huge asset to have.
I think probably that’s the most economical way of going, but whether it’s JRCC, military SAR techs or Cougar, I know Cougar does an excellent job. I talked to the fellow who presented on a panel with me who was trying to encourage placement of some of his people in the North but again, it pretty much boils down to money.
Senator Ringuette: You’re a wealth of information, experience and, as you say, common sense.
With regard to your study of the cruise ship, have you met with the SAR Secretariat and discussed your results? It seems to me there is a major disconnect. Is there an effort, at least at the SAR Secretariat level, to make that connection? The issue of a glass house seems to be — in this case, we might say an ice house.
Ms. Benoit: Yes, at the time I did my study there was somebody within NSS who was designated for the North. His name was Ron Kroeker and he was a strong and vocal advocate for some sort of Arctic northern policy. He retired, he was not replaced and since that time, as I said, occasions like the National SAR Roundtable, which was managed by Ron and NSS, have seemed to have fallen by the wayside.
NSS moved to Public Safety Canada and seems to have diluted its focus a little bit, so in answer to your question, no, unless there is something going on I’m not aware of. As somebody who tries to get funding for Arctic SAR training, et cetera, I can tell you we fall solidly between departments. Everyone agrees entirely with what we’re proposing. It just doesn’t fit into the parameters of their funding policies. Public Safety Canada sends you to INAC, and INAC sends you back to Public Safety Canada.
Senator Ringuette: As a follow-up to Senator Poirier’s suggestion for having a unique region to dress up their own protocol and have their own budget, training and certification, on a multi-institution level, I think that would be your suggestion.
Ms. Benoit: That would be my very strong recommendation.
Senator Coyle: Where are the results of those round tables on SAR across the Arctic? How do we get a hold of those?
Ms. Benoit: You can get a hold of those through the Gordon Foundation. It was the Munk School of Global Affairs at U of T and the Gordon Foundation. If you go online and check under publications, I’m not sure the reports of those round tables are there, but they may be. Otherwise, you can access them there.
Senator Coyle: Do you believe those would be valuable to our work?
Ms. Benoit: They might well be valuable to your work. Certainly, they will give you a flavour for some of the challenges that Arctic search and rescue was facing at that time. Many of the issues are still very current.
Senator Coyle: Thank you very much.
The Chair: I just a have couple of observations. A couple of people that you mentioned earlier are on our list for our public hearings in Nunavut. We are also planning on visiting MCTS in Iqaluit. That’s on our list once we get all our ducks lined up properly.
I am intrigued by your presentation and your answers to our questions. As Senator Ringuette said, it’s a wealth of knowledge. In Newfoundland and Labrador, we have always heard if you had listened to the fishermen years ago and answered their concerns, we wouldn’t be in this mess today. It seems to be the same thing happening up in the North. It’s local knowledge, attitudes and expertise that seem to fall by the wayside with new government officials. We’ll find our way through somehow.
I want to thank you for your presentation this morning. I think your wealth of knowledge and information you have provided for us, along with your presentation, will add very much to our report. Certainly, that vast area of the North is something we are concerned about as a committee. You have helped us greatly this morning and I want to thank you.
Now, we’re going to come together to discuss our trip up North. Thank you.
(The committee adjourned.)