THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, May 12, 2022
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 11:30 a.m. [ET], in public, to study the subject matter of those elements contained in Divisions 9, 18 and 31 of Part 5 of Bill C-19, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on April 7, 2022 and other measures, and in camera, to study the subject matter of those elements contained in Part 9 of Bill S-6, An Act respecting regulatory modernization.
Senator Peter Harder (Deputy Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Deputy Chair: Honourable senators, I call the meeting to order.
My name is Peter Harder. I am a senator from Ontario and deputy chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. In the absence and at the request of the chair, Senator Peter Boehm, I will chair our meeting today. Before I begin, I would like to introduce the members of the committee participating in the meeting. We have Senator Gwen Boniface from Ontario, Senator Mary Coyle from Nova Scotia, Senator Marty Deacon from Ontario, Senator Amina Gerba from Quebec, Senator Stephen Greene from Nova Scotia, Senator Michael MacDonald from Nova Scotia, Senator Marie-Françoise Mégie from Quebec, and Senator Victor Oh from Ontario.
Welcome everyone.
[English]
Today, we are conducting a hybrid meeting. I would like to remind senators and witnesses alike who are taking part via video conference to please keep your microphones muted at all times unless recognized by the chair. I will ask senators to use the “raise hand” function in order to be recognized if you are on Zoom. Those present here in the committee room can signal to the clerk their desire to ask questions or to comment.
Should any technical challenges arise, particularly in relation to interpretation, please signal this to the chair or the clerk, and we will work to resolve the issue as quickly as possible.
Today, we are beginning the study that was referred to us on May 4. We are to consider the subject matter of those elements contained in Divisions 9, 18 and 31 of Part 5 of Bill C-19, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on April 7, 2022 and other measures.
Specifically, today we are looking at Division 31, which contains amendments to the Special Economic Measures Act, the Sergei Magnitsky Act and the Seized Property Management Act to create regimes allowing for the forfeiture of property that has been seized or restrained under those acts.
To discuss this matter, we have before us a number of government officials who are all with us virtually. From Global Affairs Canada, we welcome back to the committee Alexandre Lévêque, Assistant Deputy Minister, Strategic Policy; and Lynn McDonald, Director General, International Economic Policy. From the Department of Justice Canada, we have Matina Karvellas, Deputy Executive Director and General Counsel, GAC Legal Services; and Carlos De Vera, Counsel, Global Affairs Canada Legal Services. From Department of Finance Canada, we welcome Jeremy Weil, Acting Senior Director, Financial Crimes and Security Division. Finally, from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, we have Chief Superintendent Kelly Bradshaw, Director General, Financial Crime, Federal Policing Criminal Operations; and Superintendent Denis Beaudoin, Director, Financial Crime.
Welcome, everyone, and thank you for being with us. I understand that Mr. Lévêque is giving us his usual opening remarks. I believe those have been circulated. It will be followed by questions from the senators.
Senators, while we have reserved an hour for this conversation, should questions end before that, we’ll move on to the second half of our meeting. I don’t say that to diminish the conversation but simply to ensure that we manage our time effectively.
Before begin, I will also mention that Senator Moncion has joined us. Senator Moncion is from Ontario.
Mr. Lévêque, the floor is yours.
Alexandre Lévêque, Assistant Deputy Minister, Strategic Policy, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you very much, senators. It’s a pleasure to be back before your committee.
I would like to begin by thanking you and your committee for inviting us to speak to you about the proposed legislative amendments to Canada’s sanctions in Part 5, Division 31, of the Budget Implementation Act. My colleagues and I are pleased to be here today to provide an overview of the changes being proposed to the Special Economic Measures Act, known as SEMA; and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, JVCFOA, also known as the Magnitsky Act. We are also here to answer any questions you may have.
[Translation]
I would like to begin by underscoring that Russia’s unjustifiable and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has compelled Canada and its allies to identify and implement measures that aim to isolate Russia from the international financial system and impose consequences for its actions. To this end, G7 and other countries have formed the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs Taskforce, or REPO Taskforce. As part of this group, we have jointly committed to taking all available legal steps to find, restrain, freeze, seize, and, where appropriate, confiscate or forfeit the assets of individuals and entities that have been sanctioned in connection with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To that end, Canada has committed federal resources to work with our partners, both foreign and domestic, to target the assets and ill-gotten gains of Russia’s elites and those who act on their behalf.
[English]
Canada already has the legal ability to apply autonomous sanctions against individuals and entities under both SEMA and JVCFOA. Among a wide range of measures, Canada has already imposed new sanctions on more than 1,000 Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian individuals and entities under SEMA since February 24. It is now currently prohibited for persons in Canada and Canadians abroad to engage in any activity related to any property of these listed persons, or to provide financial or related services to them, subject to very few exceptions. As a result, the assets of sanctioned persons are effectively frozen in Canada.
While SEMA and JVCFOA also currently provide for assets to be seized or frozen through orders issued by the Governor-in-Council, they do not presently enable the government to durther deal with such assets as envisioned in the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs Task Force, or REPO, commitment. In light of this, Division 31 of Part 5 proposes to amend SEMA and JVCFOA to allow for the forfeiture, disposal and redistribution of assets in Canada held by sanctioned persons. More specifically, the proposed amendments would, on application by the relevant minister, allow the courts to order that certain property that has already been seized or restrained be forfeited to the Crown.
The amendments also provide for procedural fairness, including for the courts to give notice to third parties who may have a valid interest in the property so that they can bring their claims forward and seek relief.
The proposed amendments would further allow for the disposal of forfeited property and for the proceeds to be used for specified purposes, including reconstruction of affected states, restoration of international peace and security, and for compensation to victims. New information-sharing authorities would also be created between implicated departments to assist with making, administering or enforcing an order made under these two acts.
In summary, these amendments are aimed at promoting accountability and ensuring that those who have benefited from the Putin regime are no longer able to access their assets in Canada and to redistribute the assets to those affected.
[Translation]
In terms of next steps, work is underway on the mechanics of this new scheme to ensure that it is implemented successfully. To that end, discussions with implicated stakeholders, including relevant departments and agencies, will continue in parallel with the introduction of these amendments.
We hope this overview has been helpful in the context of your study. We welcome the opportunity to answer any questions you may have today.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
The Deputy Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lévêque.
[English]
Before I open the floor for questions, I would remind members who are participating remotely to use the raise hand function, and you will be added to the list of questioners, which the clerk is maintaining. I also wish to advise members that each of you will have a maximum of four minutes in this round for both questions and answers, and I would invite you to be guided by that timing.
Senator MacDonald: I’m going to ask about something that Mr. Lévêque raised. Mr. Lévêque, you said that it is prohibited for persons in Canada and Canadians abroad to engage in any activity related to any property of these listed persons or to provide financially related services to them, subject to certain exceptions. Could tell us what these exceptions would be, and are they ad hoc or is there a list of exceptions that are reviewable?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you for the question and for allowing me to clarify.
These exceptions are typically included in the order-in-council that is produced and approved when a new measure is introduced. For example, if a determination that certain financial transactions are prohibited, there may be an exception provided for humanitarian assistance. If a ship ban or aircraft of Russian origin prohibition is introduced as is currently the case, it’s the same thing. Humanitarian exceptions would be applied. For example, if a Russian aircraft happens to be near Canadian airspace and needs to declare an emergency, that aircraft would not be rejected by air traffic control. If a ship is carrying humanitarian goods, consideration would be given to these goods reaching Canadian shores, but these are always embedded in the order-in-council that is published on our websites.
Senator MacDonald: Do those people who find themselves sanctioned have any mechanism to appeal or to ask for an exception, or does the demand for exception have to come from our side?
Mr. Lévêque: Indeed, any sanctioned individual whose assets or financial dealings are prohibited does have an opportunity to apply for a permit under that system. It’s well publicized, and there’s an email address that lands in our department at Global Affairs. A permit can be requested to seek an exception. A number of pieces of information are required and must be provided, and it is under the responsibility and authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to either grant or deny such a permit.
Senator MacDonald: Thank you.
Senator Oh: Thank you, witnesses. The media reports regarding the amendments in Division 31 have been linked to current sanctions imposed on Russia under the Special Economic Measures Act. What is the value of assets currently frozen or liable to be frozen in relation to Russia?
Mr. Lévêque: Mr. Chair, I will need to redirect this question to my colleagues from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who are with us today. The main reason being the fact that reporting entities, like financial institutions that collect that information, do not share it with Global Affairs. Global Affairs is not, under current legislation, a disclosure recipient of such information, but I believe the RCMP has some of this information that can be shared.
The Deputy Chair: Could I ask Chief Bradshaw to respond?
Chief Superintendent Kelly Bradshaw, Director General, Financial Crime, Federal Policing Criminal Operations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Good morning. I would like to answer that question, Mr. Chair. The RCMP’s role is to collect information on assets owned or controlled by a designated person. To date, there has been $85 million in assets reported to the RCMP that have been frozen. As well, $253 million in payments have been blocked. This is what has been reported to the RCMP.
Senator Oh: I have a follow-up question. Does the government intend to seek the forfeiture of Russian assets in Canada on a significant scale? What will become of these assets following the forfeiture?
Mr. Lévêque: I’ll have a first crack at that question. The intent of the legislation is to allow the government to use new tools at its disposal in order to seize and forfeit these assets. It will be up to the government to decide how wide and how big to go, but the intent is definitely to start identifying assets to pursue and to freeze and forfeit them shortly after Royal Assent is received for Bill C-19.
There are many avenues the government could pursue when considering what to do with these assets once they are forfeited, but as I indicated in my introductory remarks, the intent is to use the corresponding money value of the recovery of these assets to benefit the victims of the invasion in Ukraine. This can take the form of providing humanitarian assistance with reconstruction or helping any form of victim of the war led by Russia in Ukraine. How it will be done will be guided by government decision in due course.
Senator Oh: Any comments from Ms. McDonald?
Lynn McDonald, Director General, International Economic Policy, Global Affairs Canada: Good morning, Senator Oh. It’s nice to see you again. I have nothing further to add to the comments made by Mr. Lévêque at this time.
Senator Oh: Welcome back to Canada.
Ms. McDonald: Thank you very much, senator.
Senator M. Deacon: I’m trying to ensure I don’t repeat anything from the previous questions, but I want to come back to this Division 31 Magnitsky Act piece. I wonder if you could help me further understand or outline how such a decision can be made under this legislation. Is it still with the court, or is it the minister who decides how the seized assets will be spent? If it’s the courts, what is the process for getting there? If it’s the latter, are there enough stipulations in the legislation to allow for a transparent process in coming to a decision?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you for the question. I will begin answering this and then ask my colleagues from the Department of Justice Canada to provide any supplementary technical information on how the process will be pursued.
The senator correctly pointed to the fact that there are several parts to the process. The first one, in this case, under the amendments that are being proposed is that a minister would have the responsibility of making an application essentially, of proposing which assets could be seized and forfeited, and then would refer this to a provincial court, I believe — a Superior Court of the province — in which the assets happen to be owned.
Then, of course, the reason for which this process has been selected is to ensure fairness in the process. To your point about transparency, that is the intent, to make sure that a court gets to make that evaluation on the application by a minister.
As to the rest of how to process would evolve, perhaps my colleagues from Justice would like to weigh in.
Carlos De Vera, Counsel, Global Affairs Canada Legal Services, Department of Justice Canada: Good morning, senator. Thank you for this opportunity to add to ADM Lévêque’s comments. Essentially, it’s exactly as he said it. Once an asset has been seized through the Governor-in-Council order, the minister would then apply to a court to seek forfeiture. The court would then give notice to any interested parties pertaining to that asset to make representations prior to forfeiture, and then after forfeiture has been determined, title of the asset would transfer to the Crown. The Crown would then decide on the disposal and use of proceeds at that point.
The act sets out the specific directions by which the net proceeds can be applied, namely, as mentioned earlier, the reconstruction of an affected state, restoration of peace and security, and compensation for victims.
Senator M. Deacon: In following this a little bit deeper, I think we all know that the freezing of assets is used as leverage to get foreign officials and others to change their behaviour and to put pressure on them and their benefactors in charge of policy. I wonder, if we seize these assets, is there a worry we will lose these assets? Is there a way to return the money to the officials in the event of some agreement?
Mr. Lévêque: You’re absolutely right that the original intent of existing legislation is aimed to modify behaviour. We are talking here about situations in which behaviour has not yet been modified. Plenty of warnings have been given before the sanctions were applied, after the sanctions were applied, and this in a way takes it to the next level. I guess the incentive for the other oligarchs, for the other sanctioned individuals, to modify their behaviour is by observing that they may actually lose their assets indefinitely.
To answer the second part of the senator’s question, no, under this proposed modified legislation, once assets are forfeited and repurposed, that’s it. They are gone forever, hence the importance of having due legal process and for a court to pronounce itself on this.
The Deputy Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lévêque.
[Translation]
Senator Mégie: My question is also for Mr. Lévêque. Thank you to the witnesses for being here. According to Canadian values, someone is presumed innocent until found guilty. How will the federal government be able to determine that the assets are ill-gotten, precisely because they come from a government deemed corrupt? A government may be deemed corrupt by everyone, but the individual may have accumulated wealth without having committed theft or embezzlement. What tools are available to the federal government to verify all this?
Mr. Lévêque: That is an excellent question. I will repeat what I just said in the last answer, which is the main reason why we developed this change in the legislation to introduce a process that would go through the courts. However, you are absolutely right that in the past the only mechanism that existed to confiscate assets or private property was laws that dealt with assets that had been acquired through illegal or criminal processes.
This is a different sphere; in fact, it is not about the manner in which individuals acquire their property and wealth. Rather, their culpability is linked to the fact that they are themselves closely associated with a regime that is considered to be in violation of international law and that has committed grave breaches of international security. This association is therefore the element that subjects the person to the suspension of their assets. Again, the legal process will have to determine what is or is not fair to impose, depending on the Canadian legal regime.
The Deputy Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lévêque.
[English]
Senator Coyle: Thank you to Mr. Lévêque and all of our witnesses. Several of my questions have been asked, but I now have one that came to mind about when the assets have been seized or forfeited and now we’re at that point of repurposing.
I want to better understand what goes into the decision making around how those assets are repurposed or redistributed and who the intervenors might be in terms of helping make those decisions. Is the Ukrainian state involved, as one example? If these assets were gained illegally, perhaps on the backs of the Russian people, for example, is there any thought to some redistribution also within Russia? I’m curious how those decisions will be made.
Mr. Lévêque: I think it is fair to say that the way the legislation or the proposed amendments are being developed is to give the government the flexibility to determine where we can maximize reparation, how we can maximize the impact on the most affected victims.
No specific process is included in the legislation at this time. The determination will likely be made in consultation with key ministries but potentially also with civil society, with diaspora groups and with partners on the ground so we can really identify where the greatest needs are at any given time. So there is a bit of flexibility there, precisely to answer to the highest level of vulnerability on the ground.
Senator Coyle: I should probably know the answer to this, but I don’t so I’m going to ask the question. Because this is such a new thing for Canada — and I am supportive of it — I am curious what we will put in place to review the outcome of this process so we can learn from these early examples of the implementation of this amendment.
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, senator. You raise a very good point. I would say that in general, Global Affairs’ approach to any program, to any activity, is always to embed in the very design of an approach a way to assess the results. This is not unique to Global Affairs; it is done across government.
You bring up a very good point and something that we need to reflect on. It will be an important trigger that I take away from my appearance before this committee today to make sure that in the very design and implementation of this new regime, we embed a way to assess the effectiveness of particularly what you mentioned, the repurposing and the destination of the repurposed funds.
I would like to thank the senator for the suggestion and the reminder of the importance of making sure that is embedded in the very design of this project.
The Deputy Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lévêque.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I thank Mr. Lévêque and his team for being here. My question is for the representatives of Global Affairs Canada.
Mr. Lévêque, you said earlier that the possible exemptions from sanctions and licensing under subsection 440(1) authorize the department to issue permits that would allow activities that are prohibited under the Special Economic Measures Act, the SEMA, to take place. The law firm McCarthy Tétrault has argued that this would allow GAC to mass process the numerous permit applications it currently receives from Canadians and Canadian companies regarding conduct that may constitute a violation of the sanctions in this legislation.
What do you think of this statement by McCarthy Tétrault? Would these general permits simplify GAC’s work?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you for the question. It is true that, depending on the authorities granted to the Department of Foreign Affairs, the possibility of granting permits en masse or in large groups is very much part of the authorities. It is an option that can be used.
I would say that the obtaining or delivery of permits is not set up to evade sanctions. It’s really to grant, in exceptional cases, exceptions if it is found that the interests of Canada or Canadians, including humanitarian interests, would be disproportionately affected in relation to the impact of the sanctions. It is a mechanism that is used sparingly, but always in keeping with the original intent of the imposition of sanctions. That is why these are the exceptions, not the norm.
From a technical point of view, is it possible to issue permits on a, let’s say, more inclusive basis or in larger groups? Yes, absolutely, that is a mechanism that exists and that can be made available to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Senator Moncion: Mr. Lévêque, my question concerns potential retaliation from the Russian authorities. By imposing sanctions as we are doing now, have we assessed the risks of the same situation occurring again, with the Russians retaliating, for example, against certain wealthier Canadians who do business in Russia?
Mr. Lévêque: You are absolutely right. In fact, this is an approach to Russian policy that we have no doubt observed. “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” is obviously a motto of the Russian government. We have seen that whenever individuals have been sanctioned, the Russian government has responded by listing politicians, businesspeople, bureaucrats, and so on. Yes, it is fully expected that Russia will do the same if the bill is passed and if we take the opportunity to implement it. That’s part of the risk, and that’s why the government wants to keep some flexibility in terms of identifying the individuals who are sanctioned, and the assets and property that are identified for forfeiture.
At the same time, it is about maintaining a dialogue with Canadian entities and individuals who have operations, assets and property in Russia, so that they are fully informed of the risks associated with their own operations.
We have some insight into Canadian investments and business presences in Russia. We are proactively raising awareness with them. Of course, they already know that they are in a market where the rule of law does not always reign supreme. There are inherent risks to operating in Russia. This would certainly increase those risks, and we are well aware of that.
From a balance perspective, we think it is a risk worth taking, but communication and transparency with stakeholders will continue to be part of our modus vivendi.
Senator Moncion: Thank you very much.
[English]
The Deputy Chair: We’ll move to the second round.
Senator MacDonald: I want to go to Division 18 of the bill. I’m intrigued by the provision that speaks to crimes in space. The provisions of Division 18 would essentially extend Canadian law —
The Deputy Chair: We’ll deal with section 18 next week. We’re dealing with 31 today, so I’ll put you on —
Senator MacDonald: I’m still intrigued with 18.
The Deputy Chair: You can give them a heads up.
Senator MacDonald: I have a question on Division 31, which states:
The purpose of this Act is to enable the Government of Canada to take economic measures against certain persons in circumstances where an international organization of states or association of states of which Canada is a member calls on its members to do so . . . .
And then it gives all the particulars. These are objectives we all agree with. However, Division 31 also seems to place enormous power in the hands of government:
. . . cause to be seized or restrained in the manner set out in the order any property situated in Canada that is owned — or that is held or controlled, directly or indirectly — by
(i) a foreign state,
(ii) any person in that foreign state, or
(iii) a national of that foreign state who does not ordinarily reside in Canada.
Is it accurate to say that, under these provisions, the assets of a foreign national could be seized even if they have absolutely no connection to the actions that the state of which they are citizens is committing? Is that possible? What prevents otherwise innocent foreign nationals from possibly being targeted simply because they have assets that the state may wish to seize?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you for the question. I want to introduce one step between, just before what the senator was mentioning. It’s not the goods or the assets of just any foreign national that can be seized under this proposed legislation. The assets need to belong to an individual or an entity who is already under sanctions. So the work and the research that goes into identifying individuals put on the sanctions list needs to happen before assets can be seized and forfeited.
Second, at the risk of repeating myself, that is precisely why we want to make sure that a court process is in place. After the government has identified assets to be potentially forfeited, it would be run through the superior court of the province in which the assets happen to be owned. This will follow the usual due court process.
I would also add that under our current sanctions regime, it is possible for an individual or an entity to request to be delisted. The burden of proof, of course, is on that individual to demonstrate that they have distanced themselves from the regime or the activities that we are denouncing, but that is also part of the recourse of existing SEMA and JVCFOA legislation.
Senator MacDonald: I have a supplementary question. Clause 441 creates new paragraph 5.4(1)(b), which states:
4.2 (1) On application by the Minister, a judge shall order that the property that is the subject of the application be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of Canada if the judge determines, based on the evidence presented, that the property . . . is owned by the person referred to in that order or is held or controlled, directly or indirectly, by that person.
So is it the intent to leave very little practical redress and little judicial discretion, or am I missing any redress that a foreign national has under this division?
Mr. Lévêque: My reading of that new paragraph is that it is the room for redress that is being provided, but my colleague Mr. De Vera might wish to weigh in on this to provide additional technical details.
Mr. De Vera: That’s correct. The point is to give procedural fairness to the person affected by the seizure and imminent potential forfeiture of their property to a court. It would essentially be the same information that the Governor-in-Council had in obtaining the seizure order in the first place, but this time, as seen through a judicial lens.
[Translation]
Senator Mégie: The committee recently studied Bill S-217, which had similar features to Division 31 of Bill C-19. I will refer you to a part of Bill S-217 that is missing from Division 31 of Bill C-19. It’s a section that talks about the creation of a registry accessible to the public containing information about the name of any person or entity associated with the frozen assets and the value of the frozen assets, as well as provisions relating to the obligation of the person or entity receiving the money to report to the court on its use.
How, if at all, will the Government of Canada consider implementing these two provisions between Bill S-217 and Division 31 of Bill C-19?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you for the question. Indeed, there are many similarities and some differences between Bill S-217 and the amendments we are discussing today. I had the pleasure of being with you a few weeks ago to discuss Bill -217.
The provision to which the honourable senator refers is not included in the proposed amendments to the budget implementation bill for the simple reason that concerns about privacy and private information could be raised if such a registry containing information about individuals and their private property were to be published.
Having said that, I would draw your attention to the following fact. In the budget implementation bill, there is a proposal to create a national registry of beneficial ownership, which would be a first in Canada. This proposal would allow for the publication of a federally registered company registry. It is one more tool to improve transparency and to prevent the ownership of companies and assets — particularly by foreign actors — from being camouflaged in numbered companies or somewhat obscure corporate entities.
Senator Mégie: Thank you.
Senator Gerba: The consolidated list of Canadian autonomous sanctions currently includes over 2,500 individuals and entities. In particular, there are two African countries concerned, Zimbabwe and South Africa, for a total of almost 180 entries on the list. Could the amendments contained in Division 31 of Part 5 of Bill C-19 apply to any of the individuals and entities currently sanctioned?
Mr. Lévêque: The very simple answer is yes. This is not reserved exclusively for the situation in Ukraine that was provoked by Russia. These changes to the legislation would give the government one more tool and allow it to use seizure, forfeiture and redistribution of seized assets, or at least their nominal monetary value, for any sanctioned individual or entity.
So, yes, absolutely, the proposed amendments would apply to any sanctioned entity under the two acts that we are talking about, the SEMA, and the JVCFOA.
Senator Gerba: Thank you.
[English]
The Deputy Chair: Mr. Lévêque, I will ask you a question that is a supplementary to Senator MacDonald’s first question. You spoke about the exception that is provided within the order-in-council. It makes perfect sense to me, but I just want to know whether and how there would be public disclosure of when those exceptions would be used.
Mr. Lévêque: So the orders-in-council themselves, of course, are public. Once they are signed by the Governor General, the orders are uploaded on a variety of websites. I’m not 100% sure, so I might need to turn to my Justice colleagues here, but my only doubt is regarding the permits that are issued and whether those are public. I don’t believe they are, but that’s the only tool we have to request an exemption from the sanctions as they are applied. Perhaps Mr. De Vera can confirm my assertion on this.
Mr. De Vera: That’s correct. The permits are not public. The exceptions, which are set out, for instance, in the case of Russia in the Russia regulations, are there for all to see, are public and online. If someone is concerned about whether a certain activity is prohibited under the Russian regulations, they can go and look to see if there are exceptions to those provisions in the same regulations. At that point, they can proceed.
But, generally, permits are for prohibited activity that are not covered in any exception.
The Deputy Chair: Thank you.
Colleagues, I see no further questions, so we have come to the end of this portion of our meeting. I’d like to thank the officials for their answers and for bringing to our attention some of the concerns that have been shared with you.
(The committee continued in camera.)