THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, September 29, 2022
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 11:30 a.m. [ET] to study foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: My name is Peter Boehm, I am a senator from Ontario and the Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
Before we begin, I wish to introduce the committee members who are participating in today’s meeting: Senator Gwen Boniface from Ontario; Senator Mary Coyle from Nova Scotia; Senator Marty Deacon from Ontario; Senator Amina Gerba from Quebec; Senator Stephen Greene from Nova Scotia; Senator Peter Harder from Ontario, deputy chair; Senator Michael MacDonald from Nova Scotia; Senator Victor Oh from Ontario; Senator Mohamed-Iqbal Ravalia from Newfoundland and Labrador; Senator David Richards from New Brunswick; and Senator Yuen Pau Woo from British Columbia.
[English]
We have a full house, colleagues.
I wish to welcome all of you, as well as people across Canada who may be watching us today. Today, as part of our ongoing plan to receive regular updates on a very important subject, we are again meeting to discuss the situation in Ukraine. We have two panels of witnesses, all of whom are appearing via videoconference.
For the first part of our meeting, we are pleased to welcome Maria Popova, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, McGill University. Professor Popova is a return witness from whom we first heard on March 3. Next will be Aurel Braun, Professor, International Relations and Political Science, University of Toronto. To round out our first panel, we have Jane Boulden, Professor, Department of Political Studies, Royal Military College of Canada, Queen’s University.
Welcome and thank you for being with us today. We are ready to hear your opening remarks, and I think we’re sticking to our usual format of five minutes each. This will be followed by questions from senators.
Maria Popova, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, McGill University, as an individual: Thank you for this opportunity to testify at such a pivotal moment in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Russia’s presidential spokesman Peskov has just announced that tomorrow President Putin will sign a decree annexing four Ukrainian regions to Russia following sham referenda that were held earlier in the week. I want to focus my remarks on how we should understand this moment in the war and what Canada should do in response.
First, the sham referenda have no legitimacy, and we really probably shouldn’t even be using the word to describe these actions by the Russian state. The expression “voting at the barrel of a gun” is usually used figuratively, but these votes were conducted literally by armed occupying forces. We know that the Russian military went door to door in places like Kherson and watched how people filled out the ballots, and those who refused to vote were threatened with punishment.
Some believe that Russia is conducting these votes to give a veneer of democratic legitimacy to its conquest of Ukraine. This interpretation, in my opinion, misunderstands Russia’s goals. Russia knows that the votes are a sham. It also fully realizes that the West also knows that they’re a sham. The goal of holding these votes is two-fold: first, to signal to the residents of these Ukrainian regions that Russia has occupied them forever and they must submit to its authority, so it’s a gaslighting method; and second, to use the sham results and the annexation decrees to give pause to the West and to change the course of the war by threatening with escalation if Ukraine tries to retake these regions militarily.
So what should Canada do? First, we need to make it crystal clear not only that the referenda and the annexation decrees have no legitimacy under international law but also — and more importantly — that they will have no bearing on Canada’s commitment to help Ukraine liberate its territory. We should emphasize that Canada recognizes Ukraine only in its internationally established borders and that neither referenda nor annexation will affect this position.
Second, we should continue and, if possible, boost military and financial aid to Ukraine to help the acceleration of Ukraine’s successful counter-offensive from September. Military aid to Ukraine is being used to its full potential and 100% on target to liberate Ukrainian territory. In this pivotal moment when the Ukrainian army has momentum on its side, NATO allies should try to build on this success to help the Ukrainian advance. We have seen time and again in this war that the Russian president understands force and his army retreats when defeated, so the best strategy to end the war is to help the Ukrainian army win it. The West needs to remain united and send a strong and confident response to Russia.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Popova. I wanted everyone to know, in case our witnesses are not aware, that the Senate passed a motion yesterday condemning the so-called referenda and other measures.
Aurel Braun, Professor, International Relations and Political Science, University of Toronto, as an individual: Thank you for the invitation. I will be looking at the meta picture.
From the horrors of the mass graves in liberated cities in Ukraine to growing evidence of gruesome torture and war crimes by Russian troops, and with millions of Ukrainian refugees, we have indelible images of the devastation of the unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine. Yet, the damage goes beyond Ukraine, the primary victim of Vladimir Putin’s ambitions. We are also witnessing a brazen attack on international law, a fundamental challenge to international institutions and an impetus for nuclear proliferation, all made worse by the Kremlin’s attempts at nuclear blackmail.
To understand the full reality, we need to have more than snapshots, so we have to find a way of melding the past, present and the future. We must face inconvenient truths. Moscow bears responsibility for the tragedy in Ukraine, but we also ought to acknowledge the unwarranted failure of Western deterrence. The Biden administration prides itself on having predicted the invasion, but they did not prevent it. The Putin regime’s accountability does not relieve us of the responsibility for failing to prevent this aggression. If there is to be a just conclusion to this war, it is not only that Ukraine needs to survive and prevail, but the West has to re-establish its deterrence, and for that, we first have to admit that Western policies bordered on the irresponsible. I hasten to add that when I suggest that this aggression was preventable, I do not mean to imply that the West provoked a reactive or victimized Russia to engage in aggression. Moscow has agency, and its invasion of Ukraine is certainly not an act of self-defence.
This takes us to the first concern, which is the tendency in some quarters to confuse cause and excuse. Though undoubtedly Moscow has been unhappy with NATO enlargement, it is not the primary reason for invading Ukraine. Let us not forget that NATO membership was not a tangible concern in 2014 when Russia first invaded Ukraine.
Second, we need to appreciate the domestic motor forces that drive Russian foreign policy and the changes in the international system. Some may view Putin as a failure for his current unsuccessful invasion of Ukraine; in fact, he invaded Ukraine because he was a failure within Russia. That is, Russian foreign policy is impelled by four intertwined current and impending domestic crises: a political legitimacy crisis, an economic crisis, an identity crisis and a succession crisis. Vladimir Putin has tried to stay in power through manipulation by using a kind of political magical realism where he combined the repressive and the risible. The reality is that in 22 years, he has failed to modernize a country with almost unlimited potential, and he has had to look for external successes to divert attention away from his massive domestic failures. The corrosive kleptocracy that he runs has been a disaster for Russia and its people.
At the same time, we have witnessed a return of geopolitics in a particularly virulent form, where the use of violent hard power has led to what Putin has viewed as external successes from which he benefited with consequent domestic increases in popularity and legitimacy. This preference for force projection was perhaps best expressed by former deputy prime minister Dmitri Rogozin, when in 2015 he quipped that he was not worried about Russians being denied visas because “tanks don’t need visas.” The seeming success of hard power projection by Putin and the feckless Western response could only encourage him to believe that gambles paid off. Far from playing chess, he has been playing poker.
Third, Russia, as any country, needs to be right-sized. The West failed to do this. Even though Russia is but a remnant of a superpower with none of the attributes, except for its nuclear weapons, Western timidity, short-term and short-sighted interest and a misguided belief in interdependence theories mis-sized Russia. The consequence of this has been that instead of deterrence, the West has shown deference. While Putin sharply increased military spending, European countries and Canada dramatically reduced the size of their own forces and greatly limited military expenditures. Further, West European, and particularly German, dependence on Russian energy provided Moscow with funds and extra leverage, while Washington’s insistence that NATO will defend alliance territory, but not beyond — hoping not to provoke Putin — therefore could be read in Moscow as providing a green light for Putin vis-à-vis Ukraine prior to February 24. In sum, Ukraine appeared to be a soft target.
Fourth, Russian now is basically trying to use nuclear blackmail in addition to energy as a means of dividing and panicking a West that has provided considerably less support to Ukraine that Kyiv needs or deserves. Yet, it should be understood that giving in to the Kremlin’s nuclear blackmail in Ukraine would not be the end of Putin’s external ambitions but only the start of new ones.
In conclusion, Vladimir Putin continues to gamble, and he has shape-shifting goals. The best response for the West is to restore its deterrence and follow the strategy outlined by the former British prime minister, one that is not risk-free but appreciates that the Russian leader is not a suicidal fanatic: Putin’s invasion of Russia “must fail and be seen to fail.” Then let the Russian leader find his own off-ramp.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Jane Boulden, Professor, Department of Political Studies, Royal Military College of Canada, Queen’s University, as an individual: Thank you for the invitation to be here.
I made an educated guess at what some of the others might be discussing, so I’m going to pick up on two issues and talk about the broader implications, but I’m happy to speak on a variety of questions relating to what we’re seeing. I will speak on two separate but linked issues that have emerged as a result of the war in Ukraine and are particularly important to Canada’s foreign policy, and those are the United Nations and nuclear weapons. Both are areas where Canada can take the lead in the international arena.
In the realm of nuclear weapons, if we look at the past year, we’re seeing what seems to be some contradictory trends. On the one hand, we have in place a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons. In January this year, the five original nuclear weapon states signed a statement agreeing that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Both are positive developments. On the other hand, we are now in a situation where the possible use of nuclear weapons in battle is high. There is a lot to discuss there, but with respect to nuclear weapons, I will focus on the implications for non-proliferation in particular.
First, the situation raises a question with respect to long-term implications for how we think about nuclear weapons. Would Russia have been deterred from attacking if Ukraine had the ability to threaten nuclear escalation? Many of the ideas that underlie an acceptance of the nuclear weapon status of a small number of states assume responsible behaviour on the part of existing nuclear weapon states. If that assumption no longer holds or is in question, states may begin to reconsider their non-nuclear weapon status, especially if they are in contentious regions. This does not necessarily mean we will instantly see states moving to acquire nuclear weapons, but it does mean that we are entering a period in which the assumptions underlying the existing nuclear weapons architecture, and the foundation that upholds it, need to be reassessed. In the past, Canada has taken a lead role on nuclear arms control issues and nuclear thinking generally, and I believe it could do so again.
Second, with respect to the United Nations, the war in Ukraine has once again raised questions about the nature of the UN Security Council. When the UN was formed, everyone understood that the existence of permanent members with veto power meant that the Security Council would be unable to deal with any conflict that involved a permanent member. States pushed back on this idea when the UN Charter was under negotiation. The response from the bigger powers was that it was this or nothing, but more specifically, that as permanent members, they would act responsibly, they would act in concert with one another, and they would bear the burden of ensuring that the organization worked, which is what the smaller states were looking for, an organization that worked. In order to bring the organization into existence, states accepted that bargain.
We’re now in a situation, however, where those assumptions have been challenged and pushed aside, most especially with the current war in Ukraine. This has put increased pressure on the question of Security Council reform. This is a challenging issue. Opening up the question of composition of the Security Council is likely to be resisted by permanent members and raises difficult questions about how a reformed Security Council would look, but the inability of the UN to deal in any effective way with the blatant violation of the UN Charter, the ongoing and open violations of international law by a permanent member with nuclear weapons, ultimately undermines the UN’s credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of many states. All states have a stake in ensuring that the UN is not damaged by its inability to address the war in Ukraine. Canada is one of those states whose past and future are tied strongly to the ability of the UN to work effectively. Canada has been a leader on UN issues in the past and could take the lead on this issue now.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Boulden.
[Translation]
Dear colleagues, I wish to inform you that you will each have a maximum of only four minutes. This includes questions and answers.
Therefore, to members and witnesses, please be concise. We can always go to a second round if we have time.
[English]
We will now go to questions.
Senator Oh: Thank you, witnesses. My question is to all. How have the international sanctions affected Russia’s economy and the Russian people? Do you have any recommendations for additional sanctions?
Ms. Popova: The goal of the international sanctions has been to make it difficult for Russia to wage the war as opposed to a goal of hurting the bottom line for Russian citizens so that they would stop the war. We see that the Russian economy is feeling the brunt of the sanctions. What should be done next and what could be done would be a broader increased sanctioning of Russia’s energy exports in order to decease the flow of revenue to the Russian state, making it even harder to wage this war.
Mr. Braun: Sanctions do not have a particularly successful history in the way they have been used. They are a blunt instrument. The notion that there are smart sanctions is an academic myth. The effect is always limited. The intended target is not the only one that is hit; there is a great deal of collateral damage. Sanctions must be combined with other elements. This is why it’s so important that Ukraine needs to win on the ground. The sanctions have a corrosive effect, but they take time. There is a question whether secondary sanctions could be applied against other countries, such as China and India — which, by buying a lot of Russian energy, are in essence supporting the Russian war machine.
Ms. Boulden: I agree with what the first two witnesses have said, and I’ll underline it a bit. For sanctions to be effective, they have to be tied to specific aims. If one of the aims is to affect the war effort on Russia’s side, I agree we need more energy-related sanctions and we need to work hard to get other states onside. That’s one of the dilemmas with sanctions. The more you want them to be effective, the more costly it will be to the sender states, those implementing the sanctions, so it makes it harder to get states onside, but that’s one area where we need to do more work.
Senator MacDonald: I’ll direct this first question to Professor Braun, but everybody is invited to respond.
Professor, you lately commented on the events in the war and that Putin has failed to achieve most of the objectives he set out at the beginning of the war. His unpopularity at home is growing, but some of that unpopularity is due to the fact that he has failed in his objectives and may not be based in disagreements on the objectives themselves. Do you think there’s a likelihood that he could be overthrown? If he were overthrown, would he be replaced with somebody better or worse?
Mr. Braun: These are not only important questions, but they’re very difficult to answer because of the nature of dictatorships. Dictatorships tend to look very strong and stable until all of a sudden they no longer look strong and stable. Social science has not been very good at prediction. This is why we failed in many ways to predict the revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, the ingredients for change are there in Russia.
This fear that if Putin is overthrown, he might be succeeded by somebody worse, assumes that those who hold a harder line have a solution, and they don’t. This is, again, why it is so important for the West to be determined, united and strong. It is to convey to those who want to pursue this war the hopelessness of their operation. This is why Boris Johnson said the Russian invasion must not only fail but must be seen to fail.
Russia and Russians in general do not have an anti-democratic gene. When we look at history, we can see that after the Second World War, Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and militaristic Japan all transformed into successful, thriving democracies. There is no reason why, at some point, Russia cannot do that as well.
Senator MacDonald: That’s encouraging.
Ms. Popova: I’ll jump in to confirm the point that the collapse of authoritarian regimes is usually sudden. We are not seeing strong signals from Russia right now suggesting that there is an alternative waiting in the wings for Putin or that there is significant public discontent. We see more evidence, in fact, that Russian society is willing to follow policy regardless of which direction it goes. I’ll give one small example. Two days before the mobilization announcement, polls showed that only 20% of Russians supported mobilization. Mobilization is announced, and the next day 50% support mobilization. We don’t see a strong sense that there is opposition brewing within Russia right now.
Ms. Boulden: I agree that when authoritarian regimes go down, it’s often sudden. To add to that, it generally brings a period of instability. One of the concerns about possible post-Putin — whenever and however that happens — is what Russia itself looks like in that period of instability and the knock-on effects that might have regionally but also internationally.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you to our witnesses.
My question is for Ms. Popova. The recent election results in Italy, and to a lesser extent in Sweden, are disconcerting in terms of a sense of a more pro-Putin sentiment and a shift to the right in these countries. With winter coming and the reality of gas embargoes from the shutdown or sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, can we expect support for Ukraine to remain unwavering amongst our allies, given these pressures? Thank you.
Ms. Popova: That’s a good question and a very important one. There are some signs that potentially in the winter support may go down. However, public opinion in Europe is still very much pro-Ukraine. The German government has been in some ways underperforming, given what the German public actually supports. It remains to be seen how the new Italian government will behave, but the winner of the election has signalled support for Ukraine, at least rhetorically for now. Yes, the danger is there. However, I think Putin is committing a strategic mistake similar to the one he committed in Ukraine. By pushing Europe and threatening it with all sorts of disasters, it is actually driving it away and hardening Europe’s position in support of Ukraine rather than softening it.
Senator Ravalia: If I could follow up on the German question, recent reports indicated as well that Germany was reluctant to send tanks and other military equipment to Ukraine for fear of escalation. You suggested that Germany may not be punching fully to its weight. Do you think this is purely related to the economic ties and the dependency on gas?
Ms. Popova: It’s partly related to that. It’s partly a feature of Germany’s strong legacy of taking a cooperative stance vis-à-vis Russia. The concerns about escalation might have had some grounds early in the war. However, with any new arms deliveries from the U.S. to Ukraine, for example, we have not seen an escalation in response by Russia. At this point, I think the German government’s arguments about how they fear escalation are losing credibility.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you very much.
Mr. Braun: Social scientists often tend to think in terms of systems, but individuals are important as well. We cannot understand what is happening in Germany without looking at Olaf Scholz. In some ways, he is already isolated within his own government. Some of his allies are pushing for him to take much stronger action. He is incredibly reluctant and acts in a very timid fashion. What he’s saying is basically, “We are not going to provide heavy armaments and we are not going to provide tanks because we don’t want to be the first one.” It’s almost asking the Biden administration to take the first step.
In a sense, Germany needs to be pushed because part of what has happened is due to Germany allowing itself to be so dependent on Russia and Germany providing so much in terms of funding, building up the huge sovereign fund that Russia had that gave Russia the confidence that it could survive the sanctions. Germany bears a lot of responsibility, so when I talk about the fact that Western deterrence has failed and we have to look at our own issues, I think Germany illustrates the problem in the West of why this invasion was not prevented when I would argue that it was preventable.
Senator Harder: Thank you to the witnesses for a very provocative set of comments. I am particularly interested in Professor Popova’s and Professor Boulden’s response to Professor Braun’s description of the Western response as being “feckless.” I would argue that NATO’s response has not been feckless but rather strong, evidence of which is that both Finland and Sweden almost immediately took steps to join NATO; that the German government, despite the criticisms that have been raised with respect to Germany, took unbelievably quick and surprising action in both raising the military expenditures but also putting aside 30 years of German foreign policy with respect to Russia; and that President Biden has mustered Western support for both arms shipments and unity that has even included Turkey, and this morning Erdoğan was equal in condemning the sham referenda as anybody else. This is a tricky time for leadership and NATO, but to call it “feckless” I think is irresponsible. I would be interested in your response.
The Chair: Professor Braun, I think that was directed to you. The others, too, but let’s start with Professor Braun.
Mr. Braun: Thank you so much for giving me the opportunity. I wish I had Senator Harder’s optimism, but I’m afraid the facts just don’t support what you’re saying. The promises made by the German government are not the same as the changes in policy. Olaf Scholz committed himself to spending 2% of the GDP. Is he doing that, senator? No, I don’t think so. He promised to provide major to help to Ukraine. Is he doing that? How many Gepard anti-aircraft tanks has Germany provided? Look at the statements coming from Ukraine and the extreme dissatisfaction.
Yes, the fact that Finland and Sweden decided to join NATO are important and tells us how Russia has alienated these countries, but when the Germans are telling us that the cupboards are bare, when the German chief of staff tells us that one third of the German air force could not fly, how is that responsible? How did NATO act in a responsible fashion when we let our defences run down so much?
Ms. Boulden: If we look broadly at the question as opposed to some of the specific states, I’m going to agree with Senator Harder that I think what we have seen is a pretty strong NATO response. I also think it’s fair to say that, at the beginning, Putin probably assumed that the opposite would happen and that we would see much more of an internal struggle and much more in the way of states saying, “I’m not so sure I’m up for this,” in terms of a strong united NATO response, because it brings costs to everybody. We haven’t seen that. We have seen a relatively unified response, especially on key issues.
I would just pick up on the previous point about escalation and concerns on the part of some states, particularly Germany as we were talking about here. I would add that layer. Whenever you’re talking about a NATO state and making decisions in this regard, you have to also assume that what is happening in the back rooms is that they are checking in with everybody: If we did “x,” is this going to result in an escalation? The U.S. is obviously playing a lead here, connecting with all member states in this way, but also communicating with Russia. We kind of sometimes forget that. There is a lot of back room — that’s not quite the right image but back channel discussions happening, and it speaks to the extent to which both sides so far are super concerned about ensuring that nobody makes a move that inadvertently brings about escalation. So from a NATO perspective, from a West perspective, I think that’s a pretty good indication of a strong unified response.
The Chair: Thank you, Professor Boulden. Sorry, Professor Popova, we’re out of time on that segment, but we can pick it up later, I hope.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you for being with us today. It is greatly appreciated.
I am jumping perhaps a little bit on something that was mentioned earlier in the presentation, but I am going to come back to it. This will be directed to Professor Boulden first. We have heard, and described by all of you, in the last month of some Ukraine momentum, and an increasingly desperate regime in Russia seems to continue. As he becomes more desperate, of course, there is worry that Putin could get more aggressive in resorting to a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon on the battlefield. I recognize what has been said thus far, but if it comes to this, what is left in the diplomatic arsenal of Canada and our allies to condemn such a move in a way that would hurt the regime? Is there room for more sanctions? What would be our best options without escalating this into a wider global conflict?
Ms. Boulden: In terms of responses, there is always room for more sanctions. Always. Were that eventuality to occur, were we to see the use of a battlefield nuclear weapon, it would prompt quite a significant and even more unified — not just NATO — international response in terms of whatever measures were decided.
The problem is — and this references one of the things I was saying earlier — that we’re not going to see that through the context of the UN Security Council because Russia is a permanent member and is going to block absolutely anything. But the General Assembly provides a venue. I think there would be lots of multilateral action happening to try to find ways to respond diplomatically to Russia.
Sanctions are going to be the first move because sanctions are traditionally one step short of war. They are seen as that internationally. They are that kind of signal, so that would be the first move. There would also be a lot of continued effort to engage with Russia to bring about de-escalation. Putin does not gain a lot on the battlefield by using a battlefield nuclear weapon or tactical nuclear weapon. It’s also a form of signalling. I would argue that the other thing that has to be happening as a prelude — and I think it’s happening every day — is that reaching out and trying to de-escalate in advance, if you like, trying to send signals to Russia to not allow it to go down that route.
Ms. Popova: The U.S. has actually signalled that the use of a tactical weapon in Ukraine may trigger a conventional military response by NATO, so intervening militarily with troops on the ground to help Ukraine. This is used as a deterrent signal to Russia.
Mr. Braun: It would be a grave mistake to suggest that the response would be diplomatic. We went through the Cold War. We deterred the Soviet Union, which was a superpower. Russia is not. Nuclear deterrence is still very important. This is where we don’t signal specifics, but we must let Russia know that this kind of escalation would result in catastrophic consequences for Russia.
Senator Woo: Thank you, witnesses.
My question is for Professor Boulden, and it’s on the issue of the end game and what role negotiations and — let’s call it — peace talks might play. I address the question to you because you did not speak to battlefield issues in your effort to be a team player with the other witnesses, for which we are grateful. The other two witnesses seemed to imply that there really is no role for near-term resolution until and unless Ukraine regains all of its territory, presumably Crimea as well. Would you weigh in on this question and tell us your views on the battlefield dynamics and whether there is a role in the relatively near term for active discussions on cessation of hostilities?
Ms. Boulden: Thank you. From a conflict analysis perspective, we’re at a stage — and we have been in this stage for a while, I think — where neither side has an incentive to engage in serious, active peace negotiations. That doesn’t mean there aren’t necessarily some feelers being made.
If, for example, we just take Ukraine to start with, especially given the gains it’s made recently, but even before that, their war aims continue to be the whole thing, all their territory back, which is a totally logical, sensible goal. It is their territory. There is some sense, with Western support, that over time — debate about how long that might be — perhaps that’s achievable. As long as you have that in your head as a decision maker, there is a disincentive to enter into peace negotiations. It’s an ironic and unhappy linkage, but that linkage is there.
I think it’s similar, in a way, from the Russian end, but for different reasons. Putin needs and wants — and we really see that in the past week — this to be over. He, in contrast to Ukraine, has shifted, I would argue — I think others could dispute it — his aims over the course of this conflict and is now really focused on those disputed areas, so he has a disincentive to negotiate because that is a more manageable war aim from his perspective than taking the whole picture.
Senator Woo: If I could ask not what the Ukrainians and the Russians might want but what third parties such as Canada should be doing, should we be orienting our responses in such a way that we incentivize both sides to start talking, or should we take the view, perhaps, of Professor Braun, which is the Boris Johnson view that Russia must lose and must be seen to lose? I’m not sure what that really means, but that’s a whole different approach to the end game than one that tries to bring forward some resolution in the nearer term.
Ms. Popova: I would say that the reason it’s not in third parties’ interests to push peace is that even if such peace is achieved, it will be temporary. It will not be lasting peace, because the only way in which we can achieve lasting peace is for Russia to reassess its goal of controlling Ukraine. It has not done that, so there is no point in a temporary cease-fire and preparing for a new war at a later date.
Senator Gerba: Thank you to our witnesses. Allow me to ask my question in French.
[Translation]
I am much more interested in the role of the United Nations, particularly the UN. The UN has often condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine. However, over the course of the votes, a group of countries that has formed always abstains. They are called the “abstainers.” In February 2021, this group went from 35 abstainers, out of 193 countries, to 58 in the latest vote. These abstentionist countries regularly include China, India and some 20 African countries, representing 50% of the world’s population.
My question is for the entire panel. How do you view this growing group? What role could Canada play in uniting these groups?
[English]
Mr. Braun: Obviously the damage that this war has caused reflects the globalized system that we are living in. Food insecurity and the impact on countries around the world is very severe, and this is where Canada can make a difference. We are a major player. We are a G7 and a G20 country. We have surge capacity in terms of food supplies. We should do whatever we can to diminish the negative impact of this, especially in the case of the countries that are most vulnerable, because this is where China and Russia have tried to use their influence. We can see that not only are these countries suffering but sometimes they are coerced. It is in our interests, not just from a humanitarian perspective but from a geopolitical perspective, that we should be involved in this, and we should play a significant role.
Ms. Popova: I will just say that a lot of these countries had been looking at this conflict as a regional conflict and have tended to abstain as a result of that. However, it is becoming more and more clear that this conflict actually has repercussions for the entire world and for these countries as well, so I expect that over time they will more likely come around than dig into a position of trying to ignore the war.
Senator Boniface: My question is a follow-up from Senator Woo’s question to Professor Boulden. I wonder what you think the impact is of the partial mobilization that was announced this week. Some numbers say 300,000 reservists were called up. What will be the impact that we will see on the ground? Secondly, what is your assessment of combat readiness, given that they are in the reservist category?
Ms. Boulden: Thank you. This is also an area that is difficult to track with open source and what I’m going to say is based on open source.
I think there are a lot of questions about the readiness of those troops. We hear reports of them being sent straight to the front with no training, no preparation. I think some of that is probably true. It’s hard to judge numbers of how many are actually getting straight to the front without any kind of intervening preparation at all. There are also mixed reports on who is being called up. I’m doing the traditional academic thing and saying, well, it kind of depends, we’ll see. One thing we can say about numbers is that 300,000 — if that’s what we end up seeing in the end — is a lot of troops. That can make a difference on the battlefield just by the sheer fact of numbers.
Having said that, the issues I raised — training, preparation, equipment, morale — which have been a problem all the way along, will be a factor in the effectiveness of those troops. Then we have to add in that Ukraine is continuing to get quite effective and quite usable — that’s not the right word — military equipment from the West that does have a significant impact on the battlefield and that can sometimes overcome numbers in certain situations. I don’t think it’s necessarily going to turn the tide, which is maybe what you were after, but it might be a factor in the medium term just by sheer numbers.
Mr. Braun: Stalin said that quantity has a quality of its own. Very large numbers can make a difference, but they don’t always do. I suspect this will cut both ways. They may conceivably have an impact, but I’m very skeptical they would make a difference on the ground, but if these raw troops thrown in sustain very heavy casualties, that will reverberate within Russia itself.
This is why I’m very cautious with looking at opinion polls shifting from day to day because, in the longer term, we are seeing people in Russia voting with their feet and trying to get out, hundreds of thousands of people getting out. When casualties increase, then you have this corrosive effect, and this is where the regimes gradually begin to face the kind of forces that can ultimately lead to their disintegration. It’s a very risky move on the part of Vladimir Putin that can, as I said, go both ways.
Ms. Popova: I will just very quickly agree.
The Chair: Excellent. Thank you. I appreciate that.
We are at the end of our first round. We still have time for a few more questions. I have two senators for round two, and then I would like to make a comment as well, as chair.
Senator MacDonald: I want to go back to the issue of nuclear weapons being used. This past week, Josep Borrell from the European Union, the representative for foreign affairs and security policy, said the war in Ukraine has reached a dangerous moment where nuclear escalation is a real possibility. Professor Boulden, you have also stated today that the chance of nuclear weapon use is high. This is a very disturbing thing to even think about. Our own Chief of Defence Staff told the Defence Committee that nuclear crisis management is something we have to relearn. How do we manage this issue? If we’re facing this looking down the barrel of a gun, how should this issue be managed?
Ms. Boulden: Thank you. I think the likelihood of use in the battlefield is higher than it was before. I wouldn’t necessarily rate it as high. As I mentioned earlier, other than signalling, which is not to underestimate the power of that with a nuclear weapon, there is not necessarily a huge amount of military gain. The traditional assumption is that Putin would do this when he has no other choice.
What we should do in terms of managing it in the West and, in general, the international community, and I don’t necessarily have specific ideas about this, is try to find ways at each stage as we’re moving forward.
People use the phrase “off-ramp,” that Putin needs an off-ramp. I wouldn’t necessarily use that phrase. Putin needs to always feel that there is an option other than that one, nuclear battlefield. I think that one of the reasons we see such strong signalling from the U.S. on this, particularly from Biden over the past week, is precisely because he is pushing back on that point: Don’t go down this road. He is helping to shepherd the decision-making in a certain direction.
Ms. Popova: Even though the signalling is, of course, dangerous, I would remind people that the Russian army lost several battles in this war and retreated rather than escalated to nuclear use, so nuclear use is still not a very likely outcome.
If it comes to the point where Russia is about to finally lose the war and Putin’s back is against the wall, this is, of course, the most dangerous moment. But keep in mind that he may not actually recognize that he is in that moment and may end up not having an opportunity to make the decision to use nuclear weapons because he may be removed before he realizes how badly he is losing.
Mr. Braun: In this kind of situation, we need to relearn the lessons of the Cold War, and that is that sometimes it’s important to communicate less and do more, because you can mis-signal, and the Biden administration has mis-signalled repeatedly. If we chart his conversation signals to Russia, they have not worked very well. What often happens is that a party that has vastly greater resources, which is the West, has to retain escalation dominance. This is the message that has to be conveyed, not in words but in deeds, to Russia and to the Russian military.
We should not infantilize the decision-making process in Russia. Vladimir Putin can take care of himself. He has shown himself to be imaginative in explaining away setbacks. He can do that rather than resorting to nuclear weapons.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I wanted to follow up on Professor Braun’s statement. There is indeed a link between abstentionists and the fear of the consequences of this war. Moreover, I wonder whether the tripartite agreement between the UN, Turkey and Russia for the distribution of grain will not be compromised, given the current context that has still not been settled.
The Chair: Thank you. That’s an important question on food security. I don’t know if anyone wants to respond quickly, because we have to transition between panels.
[English]
Professor Boulden, could you perhaps touch on that?
Ms. Boulden: I will by kind of linking it to a broader question, which I meant to link to earlier. We’re starting to see some nuance in the responses by India and China. I think this does link to what you were saying about food insecurity in the sense that those states that have been on the fence or abstaining and so on might be reading those signals as well, and we might start to see some shifting on those kinds of policies. But I agree with you that this is a crucial and difficult issue that needs to have a higher profile than it has had so far.
The Chair: I just wanted to make one comment as chair. I’ve found this discussion very enriching and excellent, and one of the things that I take from it is that the point of food security is very important.
Senator Gerba pointed out that we’re talking about 50% of the world’s population abstaining on these key UN resolutions. It will be interesting to see whether there is movement in the General Assembly as the war progresses, and indeed, as Mr. Putin gets more desperate, including whether there is a mechanism within the Charter — I know there is one, but it’s never really been used — to actually expel a member from the Security Council. Personally, I don’t think that will work. In any event, we can take some small comfort in the fact that there seems to be a connection between Washington and Moscow in discussing the nuclear issue, but we don’t know to what extent.
My third point, as Professor Boulden said, is that there has never been this much behind-the-scenes consultation between allies, whether it’s in the G7 or at NATO, since forever. You can’t make a comparison to the post-World War II period, or indeed the heights of the Cold War, because we have better technology now with which to communicate. It is not just in-person summits. I will leave it there.
On behalf of the committee, I thank our witnesses for their excellent presentations. No doubt, as things go, we might ask you to come back again. As we turn to our second panel, I would ask our witnesses from panel one to leave or to remain if they want to hear the next part of the discussion, but please turn off your cameras.
As a particular honour today, joining us from the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the International Organisations in Vienna, Austria, we are pleased to welcome Emine Dzhaparova, who is the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine. Also joining us from Ukraine and, indeed, she was listening to the first panel as well, is Olga Aivazovska, Civil Society Activist and Chair of the Board of Opora.
First deputy minister, welcome. You have the floor.
Emine Dzhaparova, First Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister of Ukraine, as an individual: Thank you, chair, dear senators, friends and partners.
It is indeed an honour to speak to you with special greetings from Vienna as I am here for the OSCE visit. We also had a couple of hours of very vivid discussion with a very high level representation at OSCE reinforced permanent council that was dedicated to the sham referendum by which Russia is trying to legitimatize newly occupied territories. It is a special honour to join this conversation.
Allow me, please, to reflect on my personal experience of the war so that you have a sense of what the war looks like not only on the map but also in the human being’s heart.
Before going to my five-minute speech, let me thank you for yesterday’s motion that was unanimously adopted by the Senate in which you denounce fake referendums and condemn Russian coercion and violence in the occupied territories of Ukraine. I believe it is a very important signal, which I will take to my homeland. Ukrainians are accurately following every single statement, every single declaration, and take them as a strong act of support.
At 8 o’clock in the morning on February 24, while hundreds of cars were leaving the city of Kyiv, I was rushing to my office in the ministry where I had to take the leadership, as my minister was actually coming back from the United States. After this first planning meeting, I decided and suggested to over 100 diplomats who came to the ministry to check the bomb shelter. This was the first time in decades that someone actually entered this bomb shelter. Our Ukrainian diplomats were in a keeping-the-spirit-high mood, talking and joking.
After that, I went back to my office, which is on the upper floor of the ministry. I had a cup of coffee and was standing in front of the window, watching the perfect Dnipro River view of the city, of the capital. Then the first missile arrived and came to the premises of the intelligence service. I saw the cloud of smoke and then heard the very distant sound of explosion. I was stunned for a second. Then I screamed out to my staffers to immediately go down to the bomb shelter.
The second time our diplomats went downstairs, there was a grave silence, no jokes, no talking. We understood that our lives had been changed forever. Everything that a human being might talk about, the house, life, family, dreams and plans, are not things we can talk about any more, and this is the most difficult thing that any human being can survive when there is war. You don’t know what kind of future is there.
With the war, today approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory is under occupation. Russia reproduces the same pattern that had been applied in Crimea, which is it my homeland because I represent the Indigenous Crimean Tatar population, and also in Donbas since 2014. It appoints an occupation administration, imposes Russian passports and legislation, recruits Ukrainian men into the Russian Armed Forces, jams the Ukrainian TV and radio signals, installs the Russian mobile connection and actually starts to zombify the Ukrainian population, torture chambers and mass graves in Izium, the Bucha massacres, the destruction of Mariupol and recent detonations, Draconian verdicts against my friend who is the first deputy head of the Mejlis of the elf-governing body of the Crimean Tatar people and who was detained for 17 years in prison just for participation in the Crimea Platform Summit a year ago, as well as his friends, two cousins and two brothers who also received 13 and 15 years in the prison for nothing actually.
All this shows that the real face of Putin and Russia is not the trying to defeat but that their ultimate goal is to destroy Ukraine. I think that another goal is to eliminate Ukrainian identity as well as the identity of the Crimean Tatars and other Indigenous people of Ukraine.
In addition to that, Russia is deliberately keeping the world on the verge of a nuclear disaster. Moscow ignores the IAEA call for the immediate deoccupation of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant and cessation of any hostilities against any nuclear facility in Ukraine. Instead, it continues keeping forces at the plant, keeps shelling and destroying the civilian infrastructure and actually blackmailing countries. We understand that it is agony, but let me reiterate that our vision and our position is that we are not scared. But we have to take this danger seriously. We have to treat this nuclear danger seriously.
Another prime example of brutal disregard for international law is conducting sham referenda in the occupied territory of Ukraine under the guns. The aim is clear: it’s to steal our territories, as Russia did in 2014. Against this background, Russian invaders cynically attempt to forcibly mobilize men in the occupied territories. I believe that this is yet another crime, when they are trying to put Ukrainian citizens in the Russian army and send them to fight and to kill Ukrainian citizens.
There is this panic, for example, in my homeland, in Crimea, where Russia disproportionately targets Crimean Tatars in the Russian Army. You know the pro-Ukrainian position of the overwhelming majority of the Crimean Tatars. For years, they have demonstrated revenge because of their Ukrainian position. A lot of Crimean Tatars are trying to flee from the peninsula, which is actually deportation or death when there is a physical elimination. There is this need to separately consider this very worrisome issue when the ultimate goal of Russia is to destroy Crimean Tatar’s identity.
What needs to be done? It will be short and brief, and it is something you already do. I’m very grateful to Canada and to the people of Canada for the tremendous support that we have. Believe me, it’s something that is a fuel to keep our spirits up and to fight with dignity and actually to do something that we are supposed to do, which is to fight for our nation and future. This formula is simple. It has also been vocalized by the Ukrainian leadership — President Zelenskyy, Prime Minister Shmyhal and Minister Kuleba. It is the constant weapon supply. In order to survive, we have to have this assistance. If it is not there, of course, you cannot compare the capacity of Russia and Ukraine. We always say that because of this assistance, we remain resistant and remain as fighters.
The financial issue is that there is this gap in the Ukrainian budget. Every month, there is this gap of $5 billion U.S. between income and the expenditures that we have. Weeks ago, the Ministry of Finance presented the budget for 2023, where we have approximately only 20% allocated for the defence and security sector. Of course, financial assistance is also something that is a survival layer. I’m also very thankful to the Canadian government for allocating the assistance that we see.
On the sanction policies, we believe that the core nature of aggression is very simple. If it’s not stopped, it becomes bigger. Actually, the Crimean lesson is one that we all have to learn, because the impunity that Russia saw since 2014 — and I remember this feeling because I was in the peninsula, travelling as a journalist back and forth. I had a very desperate feeling because I did not know why the world was keeping their silence. I think we all demonstrated a certain level of numbness. When I say all, I mean Ukraine and the international community. The full-fledged invasion is actually a direct consequence of this impunity that Russia had. We should not repeat this mistake. The war has to be contained in Ukraine, because if it’s not, then the question is, who will be next? What will be next?
So to contain this war, weapon supply and humanitarian assistance, because 15 million Ukrainians are affected by this war. They either became internally displaced persons or refugees. Over 8 million Ukrainians are now all over the world, as well as in Canada. Yet another gratitude goes to you for helping our people to survive, but as my president says, this is not an eternal story. We will expect our people to come back to Ukraine to recover and to rebuild my homeland.
Accountability also matters. When we talk about accountability, we refer to ICC and the team of Karim Khan, who is trying to work on the crimes against humanity, war crimes and we believe the crime of genocide, which should be encompassed by his mandate. There is not any possibility to punish the leadership of Russia for the aggression crimes, so we decided to launch a separate tribunal on aggression, and we also invite countries to share this initiative by joining the multilateral agreement that will be performed in order to be a part of this tribunal.
On the compensation mechanism, I know that your legislation is also being prepared to have this consequence when it comes to the assets of Russian people, Russian criminals and the Russian country as such in order to cover the needs of Ukrainian people when we survive the post-war period.
Also, there is the Kyiv Security Compact that has been presented recently, which means that while we are working towards NATO, I know there is no unity in member states on the accession of Ukraine to NATO, but I think it is fair enough to say we need some sort of guarantees. These should be political, economic and security guarantees that we performed. The Yermak and Rasmussen team was also very vocal in performing these initiatives. We should also like to have your feedback and invite you to this discussion. It’s about G7 and G20 countries that would also be part of these guarantees.
The Chair: If I can interrupt you, Deputy Prime Minister, with apologies, we’ve given you a bit more of a time cushion in terms of your comments. Many of the things you were going to say will come up in the question period.
Olga Aivazovska, Civil Society Activist, Chair of the Board of OPORA, as an individual: First, I want to thank you, senators, for yesterday’s strong support of the resolution about the pseudo-referendum organized by Russia on occupied territories of Ukraine. The fake referendum has no sign of free and legal process. It discredits the institutions of democracy, the participation of citizens in governance and doesn’t rely on the legislation and the constitution, international standards and best practices. It began two days after the announcement of a fake referendum by the officials in Russia and took place under the pressure of armed soldiers of the Russian army who go to the apartments of citizens and force them to vote at home, choosing between ticking a box on the ballot or their lives. Simultaneously with the vote and the collection of personal data of citizens, assessment of their ability to resist the occupying authorities and intimidation took place.
On September 21, Vladimir Putin made a statement about holding a fake vote in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblast and announced partial mobilization. All things considered, including the recent decisions of Russian Parliament to amend the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the Kremlin is preparing for the escalation, declaration of martial law and continuation of armed aggression against Ukraine. After the intimidation of the voting and illegal annexation, Russia plans to declare these territories under its jurisdiction. According to the Kremlin scenarios, a fake referendum would create legal grounds for Russia to enact these territories tomorrow. It is related to Russia’s fear of losing the weak gains from armed aggression during the first months of the full-scale war.
Pseudo-referendums are totally null and void from a legal point of view. Opora strongly condemns the initiation and holding of such annexation referendum. Their result will be a priori null and void. This action of aggression poses another threat to global security and to the international legal order that developed after World War II. They consolidate the negative practices that have already become established after the annexation of Crimea and are pursued by totalitarian and authoritarian regimes with ambitions to use the tool of people’s power, pseudo-elections and pseudo-referendums, processes, public consults and so on and so forth, for the conditional legitimization of nonlegal actions.
As a result of the deoccupation of the part of the territory of Ukraine, the world has seen numerous facts of systematic war crimes targeted against Ukrainians. Fake referendums in the occupied territories will identify the persecution of Ukrainians and lead to new murder, torture, forced mobilization of Ukrainian citizens to the military force of the Russian federation and other forms of violence and violation of the law of pending war.
Russia has been systematically expanding its presence in the occupied territories and creating the right conditions for their illegal integration. The civilized world must not allow the Crimean scenario to happen again. The reaction to the illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories must not be weak. This state of affairs requires action from the international community. It is necessary to significantly increase military assistance to Ukraine required for the liberation of the occupied territories and for armed defence of aggressors.
Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Aivazovska. We will now move to questions, starting with the deputy chair of the committee.
Senator Harder: Thank you to both of our witnesses for giving us the raw, first-hand observations and accounts of what is happening in the field. Like many senators, I have a personal relationship with the territory. Both my parents came from an area that is right beside the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. What you are reporting confirms what I have heard through the network of immigrants.
My question is for First Deputy Foreign Minister Dzhaparova. You are in Vienna for the OECD. You have described the conversations your foreign ministry is having with NATO and the like-minded. How would you characterize the support that you are receiving from NATO? We had an earlier witness describe it as “feckless.” I understand you are still requesting additional resources, but how would you describe the collaboration you are having with NATO, the OECD and other like-minded organizations?
Ms. Dzhaparova: Thank you, Senator Harder, for your question. Indeed, it’s probably one of the toughest questions that might be raised, and I will try to be frank with you.
In our constitution, two foreign policy goals are enshrined, which are the full-fledged membership both in the EU and NATO. With regard to the violation of all possible norms since 2014, our domestic discussion in parliament, government and civil society was very accurate in asking what kinds of guarantees we could have. In the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances of 1994, Russia, as well as other countries, had been assuring our guarantees for the sake of nuclear security when Ukraine, as an act of its own will, got rid of nuclear potential and, instead, we had nothing. Russia then smoothly entered our territory. The question was — and I think it was a very fair question — what could Ukraine do when the enemy is as strong as Russia and a permanent member of the UN Security Council and is a country that is supposed to be a global guarantor of security? Of course, the number one issue for us was the integration in transatlantic space, not only the European space and not only within the economy.
I believe that behind this discussion there was and is a fear that if Ukraine is allowed as a member to NATO, it might provoke Russia. But you know what I understood from the Crimean lesson? The only provocation for Russia is hesitation to act. I think we have to be much more decisive. While we are trying to find the proper language that Putin might hear, the proper person or the proper leader Putin might listen to, we fail. When we’re trying to appease Putin or trying to negotiate or speak about negotiation, which we are interested in because we want to resolve the war by peaceful means, it doesn’t work because Putin takes it as a weakness. The only language he understands is the language of strength, the language of power. This is the fear that was always on the top of and behind all the decisions since 2014, and it’s now more and more a factor that less impacts the situation.
I hope that, step by step, we’ll come to this unanimous feeling that Ukraine is not only an inherent part of the European family but also the transatlantic family. We have one of the strongest armies, I think, in the world, with the experience of having been invaded by the second-largest army in the world. The main success story not only of my country but for Canada and the globe is that we proved that the Russian army is incapable and is not the second-largest army in the world. This was a myth of its glory and strength. With NATO, even though there is no unanimity, we will keep on following this path when we define that we want to be a part of NATO. While it’s not there, we are discussing other creative formats when we are requesting the guarantees, like the Kyiv Security Compact. We have a tremendous ambassador. She was also with those ambassadors who were briefed.
The final point is this: We are living in extraordinary times. Something we never thought could be a reality is now a possible thing, especially with regard to the enlargement of NATO. I think that, sooner or later, Ukraine will join NATO.
Senator M. Deacon: I truly and deeply thank you for being with us today. The level of information you’re sharing is greatly appreciated.
The question I’d like to ask focuses on Ukrainian children. There is no question that this war has presented Ukraine with a series of many horrors, including the forcible kidnapping of Ukrainian children by Russian troops. They are taken to Russia and put up for adoption. Right now, is there any way that your government is able to identify at least some of the children who have been taken? It’s my understanding that these kids are removed from their families when their parents are sent to prison camps. Can extended family report the children as missing when this happens? Is there any kind of database where we can hope to get some of these children home in the future? Deputy minister, I’ll direct that to you first, but both of you are welcome to respond.
Ms. Dzhaparova: Thank you, Senator Deacon, for your question.
The problem is that we officially do not have any access to the occupied territories. The filtration camps and forcible deportation that took place in the occupied territories is something where we can only guess the scope of the consequences when it comes to this humanitarian issue, especially with regard to the safeguarding of our children. There are no lists of orphans or those taken into the Russian mainland.
We try to face this challenge by being vocal and trying to speak to UN agencies and the United Nations. They have the networks of ICRC or the High Commission on Refugees having at least partial access to the occupied territories. What we request is to actually deal with this specific issue within UN efforts. There are some efforts that have been performed, and I hope, at the end of the day, we will manage to come up with any kind of result.
The children issue is the toughest one, because over 350 children have been killed with Russian missiles or shellings. The most emotional story for myself was a story of an 11-year-old boy who was raped in front of his mother, and then he lost his ability to speak. The only way he communicated with the world was drawing black lines on paper. Now, to my knowledge, he started to draw colourful lines. This is a disaster that any child who survived shellings and bombings might fear and feel. I will also be grateful if you raise this issue with UN agencies. I know that you have been donating money for the winterization plan that the UN launched, and that also covers this issue of children.
Ms. Aivazovska: First of all, you might know that yesterday the so-called ombudsman in Russia said for the children that had an experience of a trip from Ukraine to Russia, the first stage was very scary but now they’re happy to be a part of Russia. And it happened during a few months. Of course, it’s a type of activity that has connections with genocide, but we have to talk about sanctions against those people who misuse their position as ombudsmen and who are damaging the situation with children.
We don’t know official data of how many children were relocated from Ukraine, from occupied territories, to Russia. Of course, Ukrainian civil society and the Ukrainian state do not have access to this information or these children. That’s why we must develop a special program to find them. We should use everything we can to do so — even cyberspace. We need to use any possible instruments to find these children and to get them back in the future when Ukraine will win. I believe that.
The next question has a connection with war and with children. We have to support Ukrainian children everywhere, including those in Ukraine under Ukrainian government-controlled territories, because Russia is damaging this generation of Ukrainian children. These children do not have access to education or to books. Sometimes they have to go to shelters three times per half a day because their lessons and exercises are in a school that may be bombed at any time.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I’m sorry for interrupting you, but we’re past time on that particular segment. We can pick it up perhaps later.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you very much to our witnesses for your very compelling testimony today.
My first question is to Ms. Aivazovska. Could you outline the current status in a broad sense of health — you alluded to education as well — and the structures of delivery within the country, recognizing that obviously the occupied territories are much more vulnerable and damaged? Are there particular areas of humanitarian need, particularly in health, that you think Canada could assist with? Thank you.
Ms. Aivazovska: Thank you very much, but I’m not an expert in health care. I’m the mother of a young boy. I know very well how Ukrainian mothers are feeling now. After two years of COVID measures and online schools, we don’t have access to good education. We have to find solutions for all the children who are now abroad. Apart from IDPs, internally displaced persons, about 60% are children who need to have access to Ukrainian schools and to the local schools abroad so that they will be capable and competitive in the future when they return to Ukraine to rebuild it with their parents. This is causing huge damage to Ukrainians and to the Ukrainian children who stayed in Ukraine. That’s why I’m calling for support of Ukraine with education because it’s about each and every one. Sorry, but I’m not an expert in health care.
Ms. Dzhaparova: Me neither. I’m very sorry for not being able to give you a comprehensive response to this question.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you very much.
Senator Richards: Thank you very much to the witnesses. I can’t imagine your pain. I can hear it in your voice, however.
I was going to ask this question to the former panel but I couldn’t get to it, so maybe you could respond. What weapons and military aid are most required? How long does it take from the promise of hardware from NATO, or from the West, to the Ukrainian forces receiving such hardware where it is most effective? Now that winter is coming on, will the Ukrainian forces be able to resupply their front lines?
Ms. Dzhaparova: When it comes to the military supply, of course, it’s the weapons that we need. These are the MLRS, multiple launch rocket systems. These are the Canadian optics for UAVs for the drones that we need. These are armoured vehicles. These are 155 millimetres artillery ammunition, antitank and air defence equipment, additional drones for adjusting artillery fire, tents and winter uniforms for soldiers. This is very brief, and it’s the least of what we need. To conclude, at the end of the day, the efficiency of Ukraine and Ukraine’s victory is decided on the battlefield. Unfortunately, we need a constant supply of weapons. Otherwise, we will not be able to resist. Believe me, we are very thankful to Canada and to other countries for this tremendous support.
Senator Richards: The last part of my question was, How long does it take for hardware when it is promised to be received by the Ukrainian forces? What is the length of delay here?
Ms. Dzhaparova: I will not tell you the details about the delay. It’s now more or less smooth. The important step was the lend lease law that the United States adopted that drastically changed the possibility for a counter-offensive. Due to this assistance, as well as the assistance that came from other countries, we managed to succeed at Kharkiv and in other cities that we de-occupied. Now, the main effort goes to the east and the south, which is the Kherson region. The toughest is Soledar within the Donetsk region. We will keep on fighting. The delay is not as critical as it used to be. Still, it’s not about the delay or about the time. It’s about the continuation of this supply. We must have a long-term vision that we will be supplied and assurances that we will be supplied with the weapons.
Senator Richards: Thank you very much.
Ms. Aivazovska: Strengthening sanctions is also necessary to ensure that Russia is not able to manufacture and maintain high-tech weapons containing many components supplied by NATO countries. Russia’s army already feels the consequences of the lost success to western technologies. Please continue on that way.
We have to remember that we already see the third countries helping Russia with drones and other military equipment. That’s why if there is any possibility to stop them, I believe that Canada, G7 and the big partners of Ukraine have to work on that field. It’s very important. We see how the drones are already damaging our siege because Russia took these technologies into account and have used it in Ukraine.
Senator MacDonald: My first question regards the refugee situation. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reports that more than 7 million Ukrainians have registered for temporary protection. Can you describe how the refugee crisis is evolving? What can Canada do to further assist in responding to this humanitarian crisis?
Ms. Dzhaparova: I have touched upon this issue before. Approximately 15 million Ukrainians were affected by the war. That is in addition to the 1.5 million Ukrainians since 2014 who became IDPs, internally displaced persons, for example myself when I left Crimea. Half of these 15 million Ukrainians are now resettled in Ukraine. Regarding their health, it involves basic needs: food, shelter, housing, clothes, medical treatment and medicines. Almost the same is implied to those Ukrainians who became refugees. Approximately 8 million Ukrainians are all over the world. Regarding the security issue and the documentation issue, most of the families have been running away from the war. They did not have proper documents, so now our Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been helping them with proper documentation.
I would like to focus your attention on the Russian propaganda because they are again trying, by hybrid means, to use this issue when lives are involved. These people are not always angels. We have these cases where Russian people pretending to be Ukrainian citizens were causing different scandals in some of the capitals in order to discredit Ukrainian refugees and the tremendous support we have. If you travel to any capital in Europe, you see hundreds of Ukrainian flags. You have a feeling that you are in some way in an embassy of Ukraine.
So what is needed is actually something that has already been done by the United Nations — this winterization plan they have elaborated. This is where you should work and donate money for this humanitarian assistance.
Senator MacDonald: I have another question. We know the countries in the West that have supported you. Which countries did you expect support from but have been disappointed in? Which ones haven’t stepped up the way they should?
Ms. Dzhaparova: Senator MacDonald, I’m a diplomat. I might disappoint you.
Senator MacDonald: I’m not a diplomat, so I’ll ask the other witness what she thinks.
Ms. Aivazovska: Thank you for this question. I’m not a diplomat. I’m from civil society. I can tell you what I want, but I want to quickly answer your previous question about refugees.
The problem is that we have so many people abroad. We don’t know the end game — the time when the war will end — and it’s very important to build connections between these people and the Ukrainian State because they have to want to go back to Ukraine.
The first stage is about EU membership, because Ukrainians are Europeans and they want to live in the European part of the world with European values. That’s why it’s about membership. Secondly, it’s about political involvement, because next year, if martial law ends, we are going to have parliamentary elections. All the people who have political rights have to be included in this process. It’s about technologies. It’s about critical diplomatic infrastructure. It’s about media coverage.
Another question was about IDPs. The problem is that we are so close to winter. Everyone knows about that. But Russia is working on that stage and is going to break critical infrastructure. That’s why having enough funds and some resources to develop mobile heating systems is, in Ukraine, very important, especially in big cities, which are not as flexible as small villages. They don’t have access to wood and other such type of resources.
But your question was about disappointment. I can tell you that Hungary, of all the EU, is a country that is damaging Ukraine every day, unfortunately. This is a huge problem for us. The next country that is scaring us is Israel, because many years ago, Ukrainian society focused on the technologies, policies and instructions of how Israel survived as a state. Now we see that there is no political will and there are the same positions about Ukrainians and Russians. Israel doesn’t want to support us with military supplies or technologies, unfortunately. The problem is that it’s a bad point, unfortunately, because Ukrainian society had some trust through the resilience of Israel with their history.
One last point about refugees is that because of the mobilization of men in Russia, we know that hundreds of thousands of Russian men are going to escape from Russia. What we see as a problem is that the refugees from the Ukrainian side are mostly women and children, and the refugees from Russia will be men. It’s scaring us because they are not like regular men with peace positions about this crisis or the Ukrainian-Russian war, unfortunately. They will damage, and we will have problems and crises between the refugees in the EU, in Canada, in the United States and other countries that allow these Russians to live in their countries. So we have predicted this crisis, and to think —
The Chair: I’m going to interrupt you because of the time. Thank you very much for your comments. I find the comments on refugee movement particularly interesting. If you do wish a diplomatic career in the future, you will know which countries to avoid, I suspect.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I will continue with the non-diplomat, Ms. Aivazovska. The so-called referendums that Russia is organizing right now on the occupied Ukrainian territory will probably result, very soon, in some form of annexation. This also means that Russian law and legislation will likely or potentially apply in these territories.
Could you tell us a bit about the likely impact on the Ukrainian populations affected by these annexations? Do you think Russia could use these populations to mobilize them as a war force at this time?
[English]
Ms. Aivazovska: Thank you for your question. This is very important. We have to talk not only about semilegal results or outcomes of the annexation but about the human dimension of this process.
The problem is that it’s very predictable that Russia is going to mobilize Ukrainian men who are staying now in the occupied territories into the Russian army. This is a huge damage for the Ukrainian nation not only ethically but politically. This is part of genocide activity because they are going to use these men on the front line, and those men will be in between two armies. They will not have any choice or possibility to survive. We are talking about hundreds of thousands already.
The next stage will be the passportization of Ukrainians staying in occupied territories. Then we will have a new problem on a new legal position. We will have Ukrainians who, under Russian pressure, will take Russian passports. These people will be under the Russian jurisdiction as a personality, not the territories. So it’s a huge damage too. After the end of this war — I believe Ukraine will win — we have to decide how to take these depassportize or take these passports off because we will not have any cooperation between the two states for many years. It’s obviously [Technical difficulties] predictable. These bilateral or [technical difficulties] for humanitarian stage, for the human rights I mentioned and so on and so forth.
The next problem, of course, is about security, because people who are staying in occupied territories now are like slaves. They don’t have the right or possibility to leave these territories in the Ukrainian direction. We know about that. We saw eye witnesses. We have their testimonies that months ago, some of the people had to go through 63 checkpoints to leave Khersonska oblast. They don’t have a choice. They have to stay in that territory or leave through Russia. They don’t have any possibility of going back to Ukraine in an easy way.
That’s why this human dimension has to be our focus as much as the potential damage of nuclear weapons.
Senator MacDonald: I’m fascinated by this number. According to the UN, of 7.4 million refugees, almost 2.7 million have migrated to Russia. What are their circumstances? How are they being received? How are they being dealt with?
Ms. Aivazovska: As I know, there are many Ukrainians who didn’t have any choice about where to go if they stayed on occupied territories already or territories under Russian control. In the first months of this war, of full-scale aggression, we saw when the Red Cross helped to build corridors to Russia, not to Ukraine, unfortunately. That’s why these people didn’t have a choice.
It is the same story with those who stayed on Kherson Oblast. It was very difficult to run through all of the checkpoints to Ukrainian territory, but many of them left Ukraine through Russia but to the EU. That’s why it’s very important to have cooperation with Estonia, with Finland and other border countries, because they have direct access to those people who had experience in filtration camps. People are scared, because many have neighbours and relatives still staying on occupied territories. We have to take them into account and to give them a chance to testify, to give their evidence to law enforcement bodies on their territories or to joint investigation teams which are working on the documentation of war crimes.
Senator MacDonald: I understand the circumstance that caused them to have to go east into Russia, but I’m curious as to how they are being received and how they are being handled. What are their circumstances now? Are they migrating on to the Baltic countries, or are they stuck in Russia? How are they being treated?
Ms. Aivazovska: There are different situations, because we are talking about more than 2 million people. We have cases when these people who had experience with filtration camps were kidnapped. They didn’t know where they will be the next day. They just had a chance to use buses or trains, and nobody knows what the direction is. So they were kidnapped by Russians and relocated to far, far districts of the Russian Federation. This is a problem.
But people who had volunteers or access to NGOs, even in Russia, all those people who tried to help them, they had to use this conversation and communication to leave Russia to Estonia or Finland, and there were many people like that. But they are scared now, because they had experience to communicate with Russians. It wasn’t their choice or their political will or their position, but they were kidnapped as well. Now they are very close to testifying about filtration camps. That’s why we need awareness campaigns in all countries closer to Russia as to why they need to testify, how it’s important for future accountability processes and how it’s important for justice.
I want to mention what the deputy minister said, that it’s very important now to start — not talk — but to start to work on the process of establishing special treatment now because of acts of aggression. Russia has to be toxic, and we are talking about justice, which is the mission already for many Ukrainians, because they lost their homes, cars, relatives and families. And what are they calling for? They want justice. They want punished Russian and Kremlin’s headquarters and Putin personally.
The Chair: We are almost out of time, but I will use my privilege as chair to, in fact, ask the last question, and it is really for the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine. In my previous life, I was a diplomat, and I began very young in what was then, in our ministry, the Soviet and Eastern European Division. That gives you an idea of how long ago that was and how old I am. One of the things we were looking at at that time was the Helsinki Final Act — the CSCE, as it was called. Of course, that all morphed and grew into the OSCE, and, of course, you are in Vienna now, which is the seat of the OSCE. We, as Canada, had always seen that organization as very useful because it was an organization where the Russian Federation was also present and, after 1989, of course, the different countries who had joined. I would really like your view, perhaps, in real time, because you’re there right now, on the effectiveness of the OSCE, which, of course, has been so helpful over the years to Ukraine, whether it’s in election support and other programming to which Canada has contributed. I would really like a short assessment of where you think the organization is at this moment.
Ms. Dzhaparova: Senator Boehm, as a diplomat to a former diplomat, let me assure you that age is nothing; energy is important. I can feel that you are talking with a zeal.
The Chair: That’s why I’m here.
Ms. Dzhaparova: Thank you so much for your support and for your kind words and your question.
When it comes to the OSCE and its efficiency and then the Russian participation in the international foras, you know that our foreign policy goal is to suspend Russia from participation in as many international fora as possible. We did so in Human Rights Council in Geneva, we did so in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, and it was a very practical way of slamming Russia, showing and saying you have consequences and you will have consequences. Sanctions, this isolation, this is something that we should perform.
When it comes to the OSCE, just today it was a very symbolic thing when Helga Schmid, who is the Secretary General of the OSCE, and I signed the exchange letters, saving the presence of the OSCE as a project manager in Ukraine. What Russia did with its veto right — because you know all the decisions in OSCE have been taken with consensus — they did their best to block the budget, to cut the SMM, which is the Special Monitoring Mission. It was a very large mission and the biggest one in Europe, and they were actually verifying the cases when Russia was also attacking Ukraine, so it was a very practical support, and we needed this SMM in Ukraine. But Russia, with the veto right, suspended this SMM. So by having this letters of exchange procedure, we safeguarded OSCE in Ukraine, which is a political demonstration that Russia cannot just blackmail the OSCE.
To conclude myself, we are now discussing the very concrete projects within the humanitarian assistance of OSCE. This is yet another, let’s say, winterization issue, and then in the future, we hope that demining process will be covered by OSCE activities, and infrastructure, because, you know, the recovery effort that we are now trying to also keep — and our president is also vocalizing this — is something that would also go for OSCE, but in the future. So today it is mostly humanitarian issue.
The Chair: Thank you very much for that description. That’s very useful for the committee.
On behalf of the committee, I would like to offer extreme gratitude to First Deputy Foreign Minister Dzhaparova and Ms. Aivazovska for your presence today and for your openness in meeting with us. I want to assure you of the solidarity of this committee with the government of Ukraine and Ukrainians, and we would like to hear from you again, because we know it’s going to be a very long road. Thank you very much for joining us.
Colleagues, I just wanted to mention that there will be no meeting next Wednesday. Our next meeting will take place one week from now on Thursday, October 6, 2022.
(The committee adjourned.)