THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Wednesday, October 4, 2023
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference this day at 4:15 p.m. [ET] to study foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: My name is Peter Boehm. I am a senator from Ontario and the chair of the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Committee.
As usual, before we begin, I invite committee members here today to introduce themselves.
Senator Housakos: Senator Leo Housakos from Quebec.
Senator Gerba: Senator Amina Gerba from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Ravalia: Welcome. Senator Mohamed-Iqbal Ravalia, Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator White: Judy White, Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator Boniface: Gwen Boniface, Ontario.
Senator Harder: Peter Harder, Ontario.
Senator Woo: Yuen Pau Woo, British Columbia.
Senator Richards: David Richards, New Brunswick.
Senator M. Deacon: Welcome. Marty Deacon, Ontario.
The Chair: I would like to add that in addition to our regular membership, we are pleased to have Senator Judy White from Newfoundland and Labrador with us today.
I wish to welcome our witnesses and all of you today and people across Canada who may be watching us at this time. I would also note before we begin that our clerk, Chantal Cardinal, could not be with us today so we are joined by Sébastien Payet, who will be helping us.
As part of our plan to receive regular updates on an important subject, we are meeting today to discuss the situation in Ukraine. This is the committee’s tenth such meeting since we began looking at this since March 2022. To provide an update, we are pleased to welcome, from Global Affairs Canada, Alexandre Lévêque, Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe, Arctic, Middle East and Maghreb; Alison Grant, Director General, International Security Policy Bureau; and Kati Csaba, Executive Director, Ukraine Bureau.
Welcome, and thank you for being with us today.
Before we hear your remarks and proceed to questions and answers, I wish to ask members and witnesses in the room to please refrain from leaning in too closely to their microphone or removing your earpiece when doing so. This will avoid any sound feedback that could negatively impact the committee staff and our interpreters who wear earpieces for interpretation.
We are now ready to hear your opening remarks, which will be followed by questions from senators. I see that Senator Stephen Greene from Nova Scotia is arriving to join us as is Senator MacDonald also from Nova Scotia.
We have the full committee. Mr. Lévêque, you have the floor.
Alexandre Lévêque, Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe, Arctic, Middle East and Maghreb, Global Affairs Canada: Good afternoon, members of the committee. Thank you very much for your invitation to appear before you today to discuss Canada’s support to Ukraine. It’s a pleasure to be back with you.
My colleagues and I appreciate the opportunity to provide an update on the situation on the ground and to foreshadow what is to come in the months ahead and beyond. I will begin by stating a blunt observation: As we head into winter, we fully expect the war to continue with an ongoing toll on Ukraine’s infrastructure and the mental and physical well-being of its population.
Last winter, Russia attacked Ukrainian power plants and transformers which temporarily left millions of people without electricity, and just last week we saw reports of Russian shelling damaging a heat and power station in southern Ukraine. We anticipate that Russia will continue to target civilian infrastructure and weaponize energy security. Ukraine has made significant progress in repairing the damage that Russia has inflicted on its power sector, but it is clear that it will need ongoing international support to increase its resilience before winter.
Sustaining Canadian and international efforts is critical at this time because Russia continues to bank on Ukraine’s allies and partners growing tired. It thinks that sustained military, financial and political support for Ukraine will weaken, which is why Canada is focusing not only on immediate needs but also on multi-year support.
[Translation]
On September 22, we welcomed the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and the First Lady of Ukraine, Olena Zelenska, to Ottawa and Toronto. Their visit was an opportunity to showcase the strong relationship Canada and Ukraine have built over the years, as well as Canada’s unwavering support for Ukraine as it continues to defend itself.
During the visit, the Prime Minister announced new support, bringing Canada’s total contribution to more than $9.5 billion since the beginning of 2022.
The new initiatives are intended to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience in critical areas, including security, livelihood, democracy and social resilience, and include $650 million over three years for armoured vehicles built in Canada to support Ukraine’s long-term security.
To maintain pressure on the Russian regime and those responsible for its war of aggression, the Prime Minister also announced new sanctions targeting 63 Russian individuals and entities complicit in the illegal transfer and custody of Ukrainian children and in generating and disseminating disinformation and propaganda, as well as entities in Russia’s nuclear sector.
Canada and Ukraine have agreed to work with international partners to establish a working group of eminent persons to provide advice to decision makers on the seizure and forfeiture of Russian assets, including Russian central bank assets.
These actions make it clear that Canada will not succumb to “fatigue.” To cement unity among allies and donors, Canada will focus more on long-term support, including improving a coordinated approach to rehabilitation and reconstruction.
[English]
The principal forum to coordinate support for a Ukraine-owned and led plan for recovery and reconstruction is the Group of Seven, or G7, Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform, or MDCP. At the latest platform meeting on September 26, there was real progress to strengthen donor coordination. Canada and other donors achieved three things: Donors committed to align their support with Ukraine’s national recovery and reconstruction plan; they committed to work toward a harmonized set of reforms and conditionalities, including reform prioritization and timelines; and the G7 reviewed Ukraine’s priority and recovery financing needs for 2023 and beyond.
There was agreement that a focus on inclusive recovery and reconstruction requires more coordination at all levels, and engaging civil society and the private sector. Canada and others recognized the benefits of extending the platform’s membership to non-G7 donors who are making significant contributions to reconstruction.
There is significant work ahead and the needs are extremely high, but these discussions were frank and action-oriented. Coordination is improving and Ukraine’s allies are steadfast in their support to recovery.
[Translation]
In conclusion, Canada will continue to stand with Ukraine in response to Russia’s unjustified war of aggression. We will not give up.
Canada stands with Ukrainians, who are fighting for their country, their communities, their families and their freedom with extraordinary courage.
Thank you for listening. My colleagues and I would be happy to answer your questions.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Lévêque. Senators, you each have up to four minutes for the first round, including questions and answers. I would therefore ask both senators and witnesses to be concise, as usual, so that, if we have time, we can fit in a third round of questions.
[English]
We will begin with questions.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you, for being here today. I wanted to touch on a point that you raised, Mr. Lévêque, and that is the sense of growing skepticism among some of our allies in response to support for Ukraine. The recent Polish-Ukrainian grain dispute, the recent election in Slovakia, the chaos in the House of Representatives in the U.S. and a swing to the right in some countries in Europe, including Italy and Sweden. To what extent may these factors negate the kind of very tight and coordinated plan we have had, to this point, in supporting Ukraine, and what can we do to ensure that support continues to be unwavering?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, senator, Mr. Chair. You’re quite right to identify these as signs that we too are watching and are concerned about. What I would say, however, is that actions speak louder than words. Among all working groups and fora that we are part of, what we see is a continued dedication to help on all fronts, be it military, humanitarian, reconstruction, long‑term recovery, and the examples you cite are quite recent, of course. In the case of Poland, we’ve seen since the grain blockage they have walked it back. There were a few strong announcements there but then being walked back a few days later. In Slovakia the election just happened over the weekend. We shall see again what gets pronounced during an election campaign and what actually happens along with a NATO ally can be very different. In the case of the U.S., we have already received numerous calls from U.S. partners saying, don’t worry, the U.S. is it in for the long term.
We see these as encouraging signs and what we can do about it — to answer the latter part of your question — is continuing to look at this as a long-term project, as it were, especially when we talk about recovery and making multi-year commitments that are much harder to walk back.
Senator Ravalia: To switch gears slightly, the other issue raised periodically and has resulted in some key members of Mr. Zelenskyy’s top brass being removed from their positions is the concern about potential for corruption. Is that an issue that we’re monitoring and is it of concern to us?
Mr. Lévêque: Absolutely monitoring and this is nothing new. There has been corruption in Ukraine since independence, and our development programming and support to Ukraine pre-war has been heavily focused on helping institutions becoming more solid, accountable and transparent. To be honest, I prefer to see scandals like this erupt, people being fired, and corrective measure taken than never finding out about it when you know there is corruption happening anyways. In a sense, this speaks to the efficiency of some of the anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine. It speaks to the more solid foundations that are being developed and the fact that a country and a government are really determined to fight corruption.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you.
Senator Housakos: Thank you, Mr. Lévêque, for your report before this committee. You’ve confirmed what we have heard from experts now for a long time that there doesn’t seem to be an end in sight in this particular conflict, and we’ve seen how much resolve the Russians have in carrying out their operation there.
As a government and Western allies, we have used three tools: Diplomacy with no success, sanctions with limited impact and, of course, we’ve provided financial aid, which I think there is a willingness on the part of the Canadian public and all political parties to continue to stand in solidarity with Ukraine because definitely they’re on the right side of history. As we know, in history, just because you’re on the right side of history doesn’t mean you will be victorious and successful.
Has Global Affairs Canada offered the government — maybe you can offer Parliament — any other tactics and tools in our toolbox that we can use besides economic sanctions and the financial aid? As you know, financial aid cannot continue to carry on in perpetuity; everything has its limits.
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, senator and Mr. Chair. You did touch on the three main levers that are at our disposal. I don’t think there is a magic tool that can be brought out of the toolbox. What I would say, however, are two things. One, there continues to be a way to dig deeper into these three avenues. The most important thing will be to maintain unity among allies, among friendly countries, but to go beyond as well. Maybe that’s kind of a “1(b)” on diplomacy is to work a lot more with countries from the Global South that have also been suffering from the conflict, not directly because they don’t have borders near Ukraine and Russia, but because of the knock-on effects of the economic impact that the conflict has had, in particular food security and food prices.
As part of our diplomacy, what we’re doing more frequently, is widening the circle and working with countries with regional influence to make them advocates as opposed to sitting on the fence and not taking sides. We are seeing a number of them shift their narrative and, behind closed doors, also shift how they address Russia and other allies. A bit more can be done there.
It’s also about preventing sanctions evasion as much as possible. We have now sanctioned over 2,600 individuals and entities. That’s for Canada. We’re now starting to see certain trends being taken in certain trade routes. We can identify countries facilitating circumvention of sanctions. That’s something we can dig into a little deeper.
As for financial assistance, you’re right. These pockets are not endless, but it is about keeping shoulder to shoulder with other countries and making sure that there are no cracks in the unity.
Senator Boniface: Thank you very much for being here again. I want to pick up on your issue of food security and, in particular, on the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
Have there been any advancements in the renewal of the initiative that you’re aware of? What does it mean for the state of food security in Canada and elsewhere?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, senator. To provide a short answer, there are no significant advancements in the renewal of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. We know that Turkey, in particular, which was instrumental in facilitating the deal last time around, is heavily involved in talks. We also know that a handful of other governments are involved. Obviously, we are not at these tables. It appears that Russia’s demands are simply unreasonable and could not be met by the allies of Ukraine.
As we head into winter, with the risks of crops going to waste and as we all desperately look for alternative routes to get important grain coming out of the “bread basket of the world,” pressure will increase. Going back to my previous answer, we anticipate that countries that are much more food insecure than we are — it’s not just about food prices but about food security — will ramp up the pressure. It’s part of the global diplomatic ballet and increasing pressure that has to be applied on Russia.
I’m not an official of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada so I cannot say this with absolute certainty, but we do not see this as having an impact on food security and food prices in Canada. However, these are global markets, so any fluctuation in food markets will have repercussions across the world.
Senator Boniface: As a follow up to Senator Ravalia’s question on corruption, is there some mechanism in place to monitor the movement of organized crime groups and such as the war continues? It’s a ripe market, as you know.
Mr. Lévêque: You mean in Ukraine? First and foremost, partnering and strengthening the capacity of the Government of Ukraine is what we’re involved in along with other allies.
When we look at corruption, it’s typically not organized crime. It’s more insidious than this. Organized crime is probably a bit easier to track than government officials working inside the system. We put emphasis on partnering with organizations. Whatever development assistance we provide in capacity building we do in partnership with organizations with excellent credentials and proven track records. We have our own risk analysis and risk mitigation processes before we provide grants to organizations. When you work with organizations like the UN, and like the IMF in the case of sovereign loans, you know that you’re working with organizations that have excellent risk management and mitigation practices in place.
Senator Boniface: Thank you.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you all for being here today with us. I do appreciate my colleague Senator Ravalia’s question. Mr. Lévêque, it’s when you and I were both at the Bled Strategic Forum in Slovenia where the dial started to change on the conversation. You have indicated that it’s just talk. However, July, August, early September, is where some of these conversations a little different than we had heard and seen before. I elaborate on that a bit.
There is a lot of discussion about NATO membership for Ukraine. Their application for the EU was accelerated since the war began. Furthermore, because of Article 5, there is a lot of skepticism over whether Ukraine could join NATO while it is actually at war. I wonder if the EU membership would have been a realistic possibility. If they did join the EU while at war with Russia, how might that change the conflict, as we know it, logistically?
Mr. Lévêque: Senator, that’s a deep and complex question. You’re correct, some of these questions were addressed at the Bled security conference in Slovenia. I will say a few things about EU enlargement and membership and then turn it over to my colleague, Allison Grant, who is a specialist on security issues and NATO.
First, a general observation on EU enlargement. We are seeing — and we heard this at the Bled security forum as well — a shift in how EU enlargement is being conceived of right now. In the last decade, it was more about protecting borders, being aware of granting too much freedom of movement inside the EU, protecting jobs, et cetera. The filter was much more an economic one than a social fabric one. We’re now seeing a shift toward who has the greatest influence, in which sphere of influence will EU applicants or EU members under consideration fall? That’s when we look at Albania and North Macedonia. Ukraine falls into that category. It becomes more of a geopolitical consideration for EU leaders to consider applications of the EU.
It will take a long time before Ukraine can become an EU member no matter what because they will need to meet a number of conditions that the EU has set, much like NATO has set on corruption, transparency, accountability and the judicial system. These conditions will not be met overnight, but there is a trend and the prism is shifting a bit.
Alison Grant, Director General, International Security Policy Bureau, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you very much. Thank you, senator and Mr. Chair. At the NATO summit in Vilnius, it was clear that Ukraine had moved closer to NATO membership. Secretary General Stoltenberg said as much after the summit, namely, that Kyiv had moved closer to NATO.
We took important decisions there. We agreed on language in the Vilnius declaration that said clearly NATO membership would happen when allies agree and when conditions are met. It’s considered an advance in language. However, three practical things happened: First, we removed the requirement for a membership action plan for Ukraine, which was a positive step for Ukraine; second, we established a new political body at a higher level, called the NATO-Ukraine Council, to strengthen political relations between NATO and Ukraine; and, third, we agreed on a substantial package to improve interoperability for Ukraine and NATO, important steps toward membership. You could say it moved along the membership track.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Welcome, witnesses. My question is for Mr. Lévêque. Over half of the world’s population lives in countries such as India, China, Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa that have opted for a neutral stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A few weeks ago, Canada stepped up to help Ukraine sell a peace plan with Russia to developing countries that have taken a taken neutral stance.
How is Canada planning to do that? How is it going to rally countries that are neutral, or non-allied? That’s my first question.
Second, what concrete measures are already under way to achieve that?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, senator.
That’s a complex question. Maybe I’ll start by talking briefly about the neutral stance of some countries and then comment on the proposed peace plans because there are actually a few.
With respect to neutrality, the vast majority of countries — I believe it was 141 — supported the first UN resolution condemning Russia. That makes neutrality kind of hard to define because the majority of countries condemned Russia’s unilateral aggression. But you’re right that many countries have since softened their language.
However, as those countries began to feel some impact on themselves — such as the food security and food price implications I mentioned earlier — more and more of them have joined the groups discussing peace plans. The best example of that — which brings me to the second part of my answer — is the 10-point peace plan, or peace formula, that Ukraine put forward.
As time goes by, more and more countries are interested in participating in this initiative. The first meeting, which took place in Kyiv, attracted a small number of non-G7 and EU countries. The second, which took place in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in August, attracted over 40 countries, some of which have taken a more neutral stance in the conflict. Things are evolving.
With respect to the peace plans that have been put forward, I would say that the wishes of the country that was attacked and invaded should of course be respected. Ukraine’s fundamental principle, which is 100% ours as well, is to respect the UN Charter, which upholds the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the countries in question.
When a country is invaded and parts of its territory are occupied by a foreign power, it’s very hard to just press pause and start negotiations on the basis of territorial occupation. We don’t yet have the right conditions — both parties agree on this — to launch meaningful peace talks. However, there is a plan in place, Ukraine’s plan, that we support and that more and more countries are endorsing.
Senator Gerba: Thank you.
[English]
Senator Harder: Thank you again for appearing before this group.
A number of the themes one could ask have already been introduced, so let me poll you a little further on the issue of the diplomacy that Canada is undertaking with respect to those who have not fully embraced the approach that we would wish.
You’ve given us a positive answer, which, of course, I accept. But there is a negative side as well that I’d like to point to, and that’s the Group of Twenty, or G20 statement, which fell short of the previous G20 statement. I’d like you to comment on that and what efforts we are taking. I presume these efforts are being coordinated, at least at the G7 level, if not larger than that. Is there an alignment or a realignment of international development assistance that is able to — I don’t want to say “reward” — align with the needs of countries that are facing food security issues with their political stance with respect to the conflict?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, senator, Mr. Chair. First, a comment on the G20 statement. A lot has been written and said about this one. I think much can be attributed to different presidencies will have different approaches to conducting multilateral negotiations. The Prime Minister is even on the record for having said it’s not the language we would have liked, but it was the language that we could get through a consensus mechanism.
The one thing I would point toward, though, is the fact that it wasn’t as condemning as the one in Bali the year before, but it did put the emphasis on the suffering of the people on the need to come to a rapid conclusion. It was different in connotation — it took a different approach — but it wasn’t completely devoid of accusations toward Russia.
That being said, on your question of development assistance, first of all, we’ve made certain that none of the sanctions or export restriction measures affect anything entering the food production chain. We have completely eliminated tariffs on all food imports and exports. We have made sure that no sanctions are applied to fertilizer, precisely to make sure that the Russian narrative of “oh, it’s the Western sanctions that are causing the problem here,” can be easily debunked.
In terms of flow of development assistance, I think the important thing is that, at least for Canada’s case, no development assistance has been diverted to assist Ukraine. Every help to Ukraine has been new and incremental money. Not the case for every single country but largely the big donor countries are in that category. Particularly when it comes to food security, we monitor which countries are the most affected, and through donations to the World Food Programme, we help those most impacted by the food security issue.
Senator Woo: Good afternoon. We understand that we’ve recently appointed a new ambassador to Ukraine. Can you tell us a bit about our diplomatic presence in Ukraine and the nature of the diplomatic work that our team is doing in Kyiv?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you for the question, senator. I can say this takes me back to when we had a very expanded presence in Afghanistan. As managers of these countries’ relations, you always think: Where are we going to find the people to go into these war zones? I can assure you that there is no shortage of volunteers of people who seek the adrenaline and who seek an opportunity to make a difference.
Natalka Cmoc, our new ambassador, has hit the ground running. She was back within a few weeks, of course, during the visit of President Zelenskyy. They have a large team in Kyiv that is involved in just about every sector you can imagine. We have a commercial team, a political general relations team that engages with all levels and segments of the government and civil society, and we, of course, have a large development team that is responsible for implementing, for helping us identify the partners with which we engage to expand our development assistance. I would say it’s a medium-sized embassy that we have nothing to envy to other countries with our presence. We have a robust presence on the ground and very active in all sectors, that is looking at both the immediate, the medium and the long term. We need this particularly to identify what the longer-term reconstruction and recovery efforts will be. We don’t know when the war will end, but we do know that it will end at some point and we need to be already planning for this. It’s something we do in a number of multilateral fora. I mentioned the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform, MDCP, earlier, but that coordination on the ground is absolutely essential.
One more thing I’ll mention about a very unique and important sector of activity for our embassy is this 10-point peace formula that Ukraine has developed. These are 10 distinct working groups that are co-chaired by a senior official from the Government of Ukraine and a number of donor countries. That’s extremely time and labour intensive, and Canada is involved in every single one of those working groups. For some of them, of course, we play more of a leadership role.
Senator MacDonald: I want to pick up on Senator M. Deacon’s questions with regard to NATO, Article 5 and the leaders’ summit in Lithuania.
As you mentioned, they adopted a communiqué so that NATO would be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the alliance when allies agree and conditions are met. President Zelenskyy, who was also attending the summit, criticized NATO for not establishing a time frame for Ukraine’s accession to the alliance. We know they’re a partner and we cooperate with them, but because they’re not covered by Article 5 they’re not a full partner.
What would be considered a realistic timetable by the NATO alliance? Why are they not setting a timetable? What are the essential conditions that have to be met before they would agree to full membership?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, senator. If I may, I will turn to Ms. Grant.
Ms. Grant: Thank you, senator, for the question. Yes, this was a live issue, especially in the lead-up to the NATO summit in Vilnius. It’s true that President Zelenskyy had a tweet that caused some attention and there were active discussions, including at the summit. There were great private discussions at the summit as well. I think the outcome ended up satisfying Ukraine and even positively so in terms of some of the issues I mentioned last time.
Regarding a timetable, that’s a difficult question. It’s difficult to set a timetable on a membership track such as this. For other countries that joined and became members of NATO, no timetables were set either. There are a number of conditions, but there’s no checklist per se. It’s a consensus decision, so in many ways it is a political decision of all the NATO allies around the table. But there are things that have to be met such as democratic reforms, reforms in the military and interoperability standards. These are part of it, as well as it being a consensus decision.
I think there are risks, obviously, to a timetable. There are risks probably to Ukraine as well as the allies in setting something out like that. It could be either too short or too long. As I mentioned, there’s really no precedent. For all those reasons, there’s resistance to the idea of a timetable.
Senator MacDonald: I would assume that President Zelenskyy wants to be a full member. Has NATO provided him with a hard list of things that have to be met and a timetable for him to meet these conditions?
Ms. Grant: Thank you, senator. Yes, there is a considerable dialogue between Ukraine and NATO allies, and NATO as an organization, about the standards that need to be met and all the work from now until then. There are a number of ways we do that with Ukraine. There’s what’s called Ukraine’s annual national program, a set of short-term and long-term standards, almost like a reform pledge that Ukraine makes to NATO. That’s an active discussion. We referred to it in the Vilnius declaration as well and called it a modified program considering how much progress Ukraine has already made. That goes on.
On a political level, we established the NATO-Ukraine Council. It was already used. We had the first meeting at the first ministers level a few days ago. Around the table there, we’re able to talk to Ukraine not only in times of crisis but also in terms of Ukraine’s capability and what it needs from the alliance, again looking at high-level standards for the military. We have a number of different mechanisms and channels to have that discussion with Ukraine.
Senator MacDonald: Thank you.
Senator Richards: Thank you very much. This is a question about a terrible faux pas we made a couple of weeks ago in the other place. Is there any indication of how much damage that did, not only in Canada and Ukraine’s relationship but with what is possibly the anti-war movement within Russia itself? It’s certainly being used as a bona fide achievement by Putin. I’m wondering how disastrous that is. There was a fairly substantial anti-war movement within Russia. That has to be dampened by this egregious thing that happened in the other place.
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you for the question, senator. First, Russia’s disinformation machine has jumped on this as adding fuel to the fire. However, serious partners, including those that are in the anti-war movement, saw quickly — that is, when they relied on reliable information — that this was a mistake. It was an egregious mistake; you are correct. However, it was a mistake. The government apologized and the Speaker of the House of Commons apologized and resigned, which led everybody to conclude that this really was just a mistake, however serious it was.
I get a lot of these questions as to whether it’s impacted our relationship with Ukraine. Not at all. There’s the understanding that this was an unfortunate mistake. It’s the same with our allies and with people who follow reliable news sources. It has not fundamentally changed the way people view the conflict because of the realization that it was an accident, a mistake.
The Chair: Thank you. I want to thank Senator Richards for asking the elephant in the room question because I was going to ask it. I fear that there will still be fallout on the Russian side. Of course, this is fodder for disinformation campaigns that have to be countered.
I was going to ask a question as well — and we’ve touched on this repeatedly here as well — about the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant which is, of course, one of the largest in the world. There are continuing concerns about its safety and the way it has been managed because it’s under Russian control. Is there any new information that you could share with us about the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, inspections or the level of risk that we see — increasingly so if Russia gets a bit more desperate in the war effort and if there are concerns among allies in our government about that.
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I’ll ask Ms. Grant to address the technical part of your question and I’ll address some of the announcements that were made as part of the Zelenskyy visit.
Ms. Grant: In terms of developments at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, Director General Grossi from the IAEA’s September report called the situation difficult and precarious. He reported that staff at the nuclear power plant continued to work under difficult conditions. He said there are regular detonations and gunfire in close proximity to the plant as well as a continued military presence at the site, which you’ve already mentioned. Furthermore, he said that although IAEA experts have some access to some areas, they need much more unrestricted and timely access to various parts of the plant as well.
In one of the previous IAEA reports as well it was said that they hadn’t observed attacks from or against the plant nor an impact on the six reactor units or storage facilities for fuel or radioactive waste.
In terms of IAEA oversight, there have been regular rotations of IAEA experts at the plant. This has been with direct support from the Canadian government. We’ve supported IAEA activities in Ukraine, $2 million worth to date, in terms of getting in, not only in Zaporizhzhia but work around the Chernobyl plant as well.
Mr. Lévêque: Ms. Grant just touched on this. I wanted to flag that as a recognition of the seriousness that Canada assesses nuclear issues in Ukraine.
Part of the announcements that were made in the context of President Zelenskyy’s visit was to announce just over $4 million to strengthen nuclear security measures at the Chernobyl exclusion zone and again to clearly mark our disagreement and displeasure with the Russian authorities and figures involved in security around nuclear plants. One of the three buckets of sanctions announced as part of the Zelenskyy visit was to target nuclear actors in Russia.
The Chair: May I ask, as a quick follow-up, because it rings a bell from my distant past when I was working on the Chernobyl Shelter Fund issue through the G7: Does that fund still exist and does the EBRD, or European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, still support it?
Mr. Lévêque: I know exactly what you are talking about and I remember the G7 summits, during which we kept extending.
Kati Csaba, Executive Director, Ukraine Bureau, Global Affairs Canada: My understanding is that the fund has been completed because the work on the sarcophagus was completed.
Senator Housakos: Has Global Affairs and has the government considered extending our sanctions to third-party nations — nations that have tacitly, or even more openly, found ways to support Russia, and many nations that have been all too happy to displace Canada, the United States and others who have executed economic sanctions against Russia? Have we made a list of those nations and have we considered sanctioning them?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, senator. It’s a very good question. You will recall from my previous appearances that I used to be very involved in sanctions, so I’m always happy to come back and discuss sanctions.
We are limited and confined to the existing legislative framework when it comes to sanctions. The way it is structured does not currently allow us to do third-party sanctions. When a regulatory sanctions package is created, it is for a country, and it’s individuals and entities within that country that can be targeted under the regulations.
Having said this, we absolutely track what you rightfully point out, which is sanctions evasion. I mentioned earlier that we can detect certain trade routes and trade anomalies.
For example, if a certain dual-use good is forbidden under our sanctions and all of a sudden we see that the exact amount — or close to the amount — that was reduced in terms of trade with Russia, we see an equivalent gain in UAE or Turkey or a number of other countries, it obviously puts the bug in our ear.
When we compare the data with other countries that have perhaps larger volumes of those dual-use goods but with the same bumps in other countries, we typically collectively approach authorities of those countries to alert them to what we’re seeing. It may be honest, innocent oversight on the part of those governments. We bring that to their attention to make sure they can crack down on what amounts to circumvention of sanctions. We don’t have the legislation in place, but some countries do, such as the United States.
Senator Housakos: Of course, the government can easily amend legislation, and rather quickly, especially when they have control of the House of Commons and full control of the Senate. My question still bears to be asked: Has the government taken under consideration these measures as possible tools in order to put more pressure on Russia?
Mr. Lévêque: Obviously, I cannot comment on what the government might consider doing. What I can tell you is that, at the current time, there is no consideration to modify the legislation on the autonomous sanctions regime.
Senator Housakos: In your professional opinion and in your experience, is there a risk that Ukraine becomes the modern-day Cyprus for us in the Western world? Thirty years from now, will we continue to rip our shirts in indignation in diplomatic fora and in the United Nations and send letters of condemnation, yet never move the yardsticks forward?
The Chair: All that in 30 seconds, please.
Mr. Lévêque: I can only answer by being optimistic because I know that, first of all, we try to learn from the lessons of the past and apply different techniques and tools to different situations, and because we continue to detect unprecedented unity among allies and friendly countries to effect change in a certain historical direction.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I have a question about the Black Sea deal that Russia ended. That agreement made it possible to export over 33 million tonnes of grain, primarily to developing countries. Since then, Ukrainian ships have been defying the deal by using very costly routes to get their grain out.
Do you think the grain deal will eventually be renewed? What is Canada doing to make that happen?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you for your question. That’s a huge concern of ours, especially with winter coming. because of the horrific impacts the situation can have on civilians. Obviously, the most vulnerable are always the ones who pay the price. I’m relatively optimistic because I believe there will be pressure worldwide, not just from Ukraine’s allies.
This is no longer about taking sides in the conflict. This is a humanitarian issue, and I see growing pressure from countries in the global south, sub-Saharan African countries in particular, that are suffering mightily because of the grain shortage. I think diplomatic pressure will eventually result in Russia having to negotiate an acceptable deal. We know that several countries have Russia’s ear — I mentioned Turkey earlier — and are very involved in the talks.
As I said, Canada isn’t at the table and has no direct influence on this, but what we can do is make sure facts and stats are available in multilateral forums, such as the G20 and the UN. That’s what we and our allies are doing.
Senator Gerba: Thank you for that answer. I see that we can’t do much and are hoping pressure will come from the countries that are suffering because of this. What impact did the terrorist’s assassination have?
Mr. Lévêque: Are you referring to Prigozhin, from the Wagner Group?
Senator Gerba: Yes. Has his death had any repercussions in Ukraine?
Mr. Lévêque: Basically, the consequences have been minimal to non-existent. The main reason for that is that Wagner troops had already been largely withdrawn from Ukraine following the very brief mutiny in June, which happened because of infighting between Prigozhin and the Russian defence ministry. So the vast majority of Wagner troops were already out of Ukraine.
Essentially, his death and the dissolution of the Wagner group will probably not have a direct impact on the ground.
Senator Gerba: But a few weeks ago, we learned that the Wagner group is back in Ukraine.
Mr. Lévêque: It’s not so much that it’s back, it’s that there’s the Wagner group and there are soldiers associated with it. Some of them were absorbed into regular Russian forces, and some are elite forces. So it’s possible that some individuals who previously worked for Wagner are still on the ground, but they’re there as an organizational force hired by the Russian government to conduct certain operations on the ground. It’s minimal at this point.
[English]
Senator Ravalia: I would like to dig a little deeper on the issue of BRICS. BRICS+ includes invitations to Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Argentina, Egypt and Ethiopia. Fourteen other countries have expressed a willingness. Are we seeing an alliance that has some cohesion for a relationship with Russia potentially creating a divergence in our global community, sort of us versus them, a new Cold War? Putting aside all the issues of Ukraine and the general sense that we get is that the global south will respond to this very egregious activity by Russia, from the conversations that I have with people that I know quite well in the global south, it seems like it’s relative indifference, not that charged “yes, we have to do something about this.”
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, senator, for the question. Obviously, we have watched this with great interest. First, I would say that on the surface of it, countries getting together to talk about issues that they have in common is nothing new and, at first glance, nothing too alarming. We have seen such groupings in the past, whether it was called the Group of 77, or the Non-Aligned Movement. Groupings have come and gone. I think there is a legitimate number of issues that some countries that are part of this enlarged group have with the international institutions that they find have not served their needs or their purpose or their preoccupations. Some of these organizations are the Bretton Woods Institutions that defined or were designed for a different time. We actually agree on a number of issues that they have with these institutions, and we have been calling for the reform so they are more reflective of today’s power centres, economic need, human need, et cetera.
Having said all this, I have yet to see an analysis that tells me what this group is fighting for. All we know is what they are against. What truly aligns them is still a question that is outstanding, and I don’t mean at all to denigrate what they might try to accomplish together, but it is still not entirely clear to me what it is they are fighting for, not against.
Senator Woo: What is Canada’s view on the upcoming election in Ukraine next year? Are we talking to the opposition parties and getting a sense of their comfort level for an election next year and the desirability of an election and so on?
Mr. Lévêque: That’s an excellent question, thank you, senator. It is, first and foremost, obviously, an issue for Ukraine to decide on, and we know that under martial law, which has been renewed now, the holding of elections is not possible.
It’s interesting to read expert reports on the pros and cons of whether you hold an election in the middle of a war. Obviously, democracy is about a lot more than just going to vote. What are the risks associated when you have an immense displacement of populations, when you have the vast majority of the men in fighting health on the front and fighting the war, when you have tremendous disinformation capacity being disseminated throughout the country? The inability to have proper debates on proper issues because of the distraction — that’s all part of the democratic ethos. Is holding elections for the sake of holding elections the best thing to do? Experts are still assessing this. As far as we’re concerned, we will do what we can to support. The first date for parliamentary elections was late October; that’s clearly not going to go ahead. I think the next date for the presidential election was in March sometime. We will see how things evolve between now and then. The government has not taken a position on this per se. We want to assist the government of Ukraine and Ukrainians as a people to make the best decision for what would be a truly democratic event.
Ms. Csaba: One point on that, we are currently working with one of our partners in Ukraine, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, IFES, to provide technical assistance so that when Ukraine is ready to hold elections, they will be able to hold inclusive, free and fair elections.
Senator Woo: We would not raise an issue if the current Ukraine government chose not to hold elections next year, and neither would our allies. Is that a fair assessment?
Mr. Lévêque: Given the current circumstances, that would be a fair assessment.
Senator Woo: Thank you.
The Chair: I have a question for Ms. Csaba because it relates to a study that we have almost completed here in this committee on the fit-for-purpose nature of Global Affairs Canada as a department. You had a bureau that is, as I look at it, fairly integrated. You have, I’m assuming, security experts; you have development experts as well. I don’t mean this as a softball question at all, but does this structure work well for you? We have also had witnesses at this committee from partner organizations who obviously are looking for increased funds for projects. You have project-based work; you have work that is done through multilateral organizations; there is coordination with allies and through the G7.
Could you explain to us how your bureau works? It has been up and running for some time now, presumably, and hopefully there will be a sunset period in the future, but how do you see it working and how do you see it going ahead?
Ms. Csaba: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for this question and I am happy to speak about the work of our bureau.
We were established not only to lead on our relationship with Ukraine but also to coordinate efforts across the Government of Canada. I believe that in the teams that we have set up now, we have a political team, which focuses both on our bilateral relationship with Ukraine as well as multilateral relationships in support of Ukraine as well as a development team that manages our development assistance with Ukraine.
We don’t currently have trade resources within our team, but we have them in the neighbouring bureau, and we work closely together with them. I do believe that it is an efficient structure. We have recently gone through a coherence evaluation in our branch, and certainly we can look at the Ukraine Bureau as being one which is closely integrated, where there is a lot of interaction between the development work that we were doing and our broader relationships with Ukraine and with other partners in support of Ukraine. So we are all, in a sense, working toward the same objectives and goals as to how we support Ukraine.
In terms of length of existence, that is an open question. As you know, the estimates of the recovery needs for Ukraine are above US$400 billion as of earlier this year. The need for reconstruction support and assistance will be there for years to come, so that will, in part, determine how long our bureau will continue to exist and what form of support we will continue to take.
The Chair: Thank you. Do you also handle out of your bureau outreach to the Ukrainian-Canadian community?
Ms. Csaba: We do. We have a member of our team who is responsible for liaison with the Ukrainian-Canadian community, and we have regular meetings with them.
The Chair: Do you coordinate with our closest allies who in some instances would have similar special bureaus set up or task forces?
Ms. Csaba: Yes, we do. As part of the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform that Mr. Lévêque mentioned earlier, that is one of the functions, at least within the G7 community. We work closely with our counterparts. We have preparatory meetings at my level with my counterparts from other countries where we are preparing the issues that we want to take forward, how we want to support Ukraine and the ways in which we can coordinate best, to provide that support.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator M. Deacon: It’s a gift to have the three of you here this evening. I am thinking as I listen, in case there is anything else we want to know before we finish and we walk out.
We talked about the financial support that Canada has given. We talked about other different types of support that have been provided and that will continue. Is there anything else, while we’re on the conversation today, that Canada could be doing to support specifically the Ukrainian economy or its infrastructure through protracted conflict like this? I’m thinking about equipment. Is there a need for Canadians to help in reconstruction, or maintenance, or when it comes to the Ukrainian energy grid? Is there a stone that we haven’t turned, that makes sense to consider?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you, senator. When the treasury has already spent $9.5 billion to support a country for a year and a half, it is hard to think of what we haven’t done. Yet, the conflict isn’t over and there is a need for continued support. Other than saying we can do more of the same, there are ways to do so. Off the top of my head — and I would invite my colleagues to weigh in as well, since it’s an open-ended question — I think there are deep opportunities to involve the private sector particularly on future recovery efforts. We’ve already started doing this. There have been global meetings inviting the private sector. When the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Mr. Shmyhal, was in Toronto a few months ago, that was the focus of his visit. President Zelenskyy attended a business round table in Toronto about 10 days ago. This is happening already.
Collectively, as governments, we will have to find ways to de‑risk private sector investments. The tools exist for providing sovereign guarantees, but they are not always there to provide wartime insurance. That is one area where I see an opportunity for governments and the private sector to work more deeply together and to potentially open up a lot of capital.
Regarding the trilateral partnership, we tend to be thinking in terms of our traditional tool set, but I was recently approached by a European ambassador of a small country who said, “We manufacture this demining equipment. If ever you are short on your supplies and you have some funding to dedicate to this, let’s try to get the two countries working together.” This is a country close to Ukraine. There is trilateral cooperation of this sort. Maybe we can push ourselves a bit out of our comfort zones and explore what partnerships can look like. These a couple of thoughts.
The last would be more on the diplomatic side. We need to continue and double down reaching out to non-traditional partners to say that the longer the conflict lasts, the longer countries like Brazil, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, the middle-sized growing economies, or regional powers, will be impacted by the secondary and tertiary effects of the war and will be drawn in to play a helpful role whether it is a mediating role, or being directly involved in negotiations, or shifting the position of the so-called global south.
Perhaps multiplying our efforts by reaching out to the G7 and EU countries and really engaging them in what is a global issue is something we can explore further.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I’m pleased to tell the witnesses that because of popular demand we are going to have a short third round.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I have a question for context that’s important nonetheless. Since the start of the conflict, Ukraine has received some $100 billion in aid from its allies, half of which is from the U.S. Recently, an additional $24 billion in American aid was suspended even though Russia announced that it will bulk up its military budget by 68% for 2024.
Given what’s happening and what we’re seeing in U.S. politics these days, do the allies have a sense of what would happen if the U.S. government were to change hands?
Mr. Lévêque: Thank you very much for that question, Madam Senator and Mr. Chair. We could get all hypothetical about this, and of course we have to consider all the circumstances and sequences of events that could change the game. Let me just say that, for now, despite what we’ve seen in recent days in the U.S. Congress, we’re still getting assurances from people at the highest levels indicating that the United States’ short- and long-term commitment is secure. Obviously, it’s up to the Americans to detail how they’ll deliver on those assurances. In the short to medium terms, we foresee no major changes on the part of the U.S. government.
I know my colleague, Ms. Grant, is part of a number of conversations about security, especially with G7 countries. I’ll turn things over to her.
[English]
Ms. Grant: To add to what Mr. Lévêque said, on the U.S. first, we’ve seen bipartisan support for further military aid to Ukraine even in this time of rapid developments in Washington. Recently, President Biden has said he has a plan to get more military support to Ukraine.
At the Vilnius submit in NATO — I keep referring to it but big decisions were taken there — Canada worked hard to have a joint declaration signed by the G7 to pledge long-term military and security support to Ukraine for Ukraine’s self-defence. This is long-term multi-year support. Since that time in July, in Vilnius, we have had 20 countries adhere to the G7’s joint declaration of support to Ukraine. You saw during President Zelenskyy’s visit where Prime Minister Trudeau said we were pivoting to provide multi-year support. There is a strong political trajectory to start looking at that sustained support over multiple years. This is primarily military and security support. Of course, the United States and other members of the G7 were central players in getting that joint declaration signed. It is a recent declaration. We are working hard now to bring it to life among the G7 and the 20-plus adherence. We expect to see a number of bilateral security arrangements that will be signed by members of that declaration with Ukraine, including by Canada, that will pledge this multi-year security support. It will reaffirm and entrench it. Thank you.
The Chair: I will ask the last question. It’s following up on something Senator Woo raised earlier and Senator M. Deacon more recently.
Many of us had the opportunity to meet with Ukrainian legislators — that is, members of their legislature — both in a bilateral sense and also more recently at the OSCE parliamentary assembly in Vancouver at the beginning of July. These were positive meetings, but Ukraine is still a democracy that is very much in its infancy and it needs support. In terms of any advice that we can give to you as a committee, maybe this is something that the government should be looking into, namely, how to support legislative contacts. We do this, but it’s mainly them coming to us. Perhaps that could be enshrined in the work that’s being done. If you have any advice to us — you’re in a public forum — as to how we could do that, we would welcome that as well.
Mr. Lévêque: First of all, thank you. We’re not accustomed to coming here and taking advice from you. Thank you for the guidance and advice. It’s sincerely appreciated, because you have more contact with parliamentarians from around the world than we do.
I’d like to turn to my colleague, Ms. Csaba. An important part of our programming is to support democratic development in Ukraine. I’ll turn to her so she can tell us more specifics.
I take on your wise words on this and that it’s something to be focused on. As you say, this is still a relatively young democracy and we want to find all the levers of the democratic space. I reiterate that it’s not just about elections; it’s about creating an ecosystem that is conducive to a richer democratic environment. That involves having solid parliamentary institutions, transparency, free media, solid civil society, et cetera. It really is a package.
Ms. Csaba: I can say, having been involved with our development assistance to Ukraine over several periods in my career that we have been working with Ukraine on democratic reforms since the first days of its independence in 1991, in various ways, including through various reform processes. We’ve done a lot of work in judicial reform, electoral reform and so on.
In terms of the point you make about increasing contact between parliamentarians in Canada and Ukraine, one of the announcements that came out during the visit of President Zelenskyy is that $2 million has recently been provided to the Parliamentary Centre to continue providing technical assistance and support to the Ukrainian Parliament. That will allow, of course, for further contact to take place over the coming years. These are areas that we will continue to explore and we understand the importance of legislature-to-legislature contact as well.
The Chair: Thank you very much for that. On behalf of the committee, I’d like to thank Alexandre Lévêque, Alison Grant and Kati Csaba for joining us today. We had a very rich discussion and we appreciate your candour, as I’m sure all Canadians do.
Colleagues, we will reconvene tomorrow at 11:30 in this room for a meeting on the situation in Haiti.
(The committee adjourned.)