THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, May 30, 2024
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met with videoconference at 11:31 a.m. [ET] to examine foreign relations and international trade in general.
Senator Peter M. Boehm (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: My name is Peter Boehm. I’m a senator from Ontario and the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
Before we begin, I want to ask all senators and everyone else attending in person to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents.
[English]
Please take note of the following measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, particularly our interpreters who need their earpieces to do their work.
If possible, ensure that you are seated in a manner that increases the distance between microphones. Only use a black approved earpiece. The former grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times. When you are not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose. I thank you all for your attention and cooperation.
[Translation]
I now invite committee members in attendance today to introduce themselves, starting on my left.
[English]
Senator Downe: Percy Downe, Charlottetown.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Amina Gerba from Quebec.
[English]
Senator McNair: John McNair, New Brunswick. I’m representing Senator Deacon today.
Senator MacDonald: Michael MacDonald, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia.
Senator Woo: Good morning. Yuen Pau Woo, British Columbia.
Senator Harder: Peter Harder, Ontario.
Senator Boniface: Gwen Boniface, Ontario.
Senator Coyle: Mary Coyle, Antigonish, Nova Scotia.
The Chair: Welcome to all who are watching us deliberating today on SenVu across our country.
Colleagues, we are meeting under our general order of reference to discuss Canada’s engagement and relationship with Europe and the European Union, or EU, in advance of European elections that will be held from June 6 to 9.
Today, for our first panel, we are pleased to welcome from Brussels by videoconference Ailish Campbell, Ambassador of Canada to the European Union, Global Affairs Canada; and with us in the room to support the ambassador is Isabelle Poupart, Director General, Bureau of European Affairs at Global Affairs Canada.
Welcome to both of you. Thank you for being with us today. Before we hear your remarks and proceed to questions and answers, I would ask everyone present to please mute the notification function on your devices.
We are ready to hear your opening remarks, and these will be followed as per usual by questions from senators seeking answers.
Ambassador Campbell, the floor is yours.
Ailish Campbell, Ambassador of Canada to the European Union, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, Senator Boehm.
[Translation]
Honourable senators, Mr. Chair, let me first thank you for inviting me here today.
[English]
I am very pleased to speak with you today on Canada’s commitments and engagements with Europe and the European Union. I would like to make five fundamental points about the Canada-EU relationship.
The first is that the Canada-EU relationship is of geostrategic importance to our values and interests. There is a unique, treaty-based architecture to our partnership.
Canada’s relationship with the EU has grown exponentially since it was founded in 1957 as the European Economic Community. Our Canada-EU partnership is critical in the face of great power competition, challenges to the rules-based international order and threats to our democracies. Governed by our Strategic Partnership Agreement, or SPA, and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, or CETA, signed in 2016, the partnership encompasses social, environmental and economic cooperation as well as a range of development and peace and security issues.
This structure means that Canada has the most clear, high‑level and strategic relationship with the EU of any non-EU member state outside of the European Economic Area, or EEA. It includes leader, ministerial and increasingly parliamentary cooperation and civil society dialogues. This strong architecture is essential as threats to our mutually shared values and interests proliferate.
Secondly, CETA is one of the most ambitious trade agreements in the world and is a model of sustainable and secure trade investment. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement has created a platform for innovation and business exchanges with all 27 EU member states and with the European single market of almost 450 million citizens and consumers. We will keep improving it, for example, by strengthening trade and sustainable development provisions and finding new opportunities for exporters including small business and Indigenous exporters.
The results are enormously positive. Since the agreement came into force provisionally in 2017, Canada-EU bilateral trade has grown over 60% to over $126 billion. Canada-EU two-way investment is also up over 40% with Canadian investment in the EU valued at $248.8 billion and the EU’s Foreign Direct Investment, or FDI, in Canada at over $305 billion.
Canada investors including our pension funds are respected for their acumen and good governance. I would also like to note that we are strong supporters — both Canada and the EU — of the multilateral trading system at the World Trade Organization.
My third point is that while these successes are very important, Canada and the EU must continue innovating and improving our partnerships, and I hope this committee’s work and recommendations will help push us forward.
[Translation]
The last Canada-European Union Summit, held in St. John’s, Newfoundland, in November 2023, had three key outcomes: the conclusion of major negotiations on Canada’s participation in the Horizon Europe flagship research program; the launch of new digital partnerships at the ministerial level; and the establishment of a Green Alliance between Canada and the EU to deepen our cooperation on climate change, biodiversity and pollution.
Fourth, as threats to our way of life increase, Canada and the EU will focus on new ways of cooperating on security and defence.
Regarding Ukraine, our cooperation is steadfast. Canada and the European Union will cooperate in imposing sanctions on Russia and Belarus, in training Ukraine’s armed forces and in reconstruction. We also cooperate on providing humanitarian assistance, including in Haiti, Gaza, Syria and other countries.
Canada has also long partnered with the EU in its military assistance mission in Ukraine (EUMAM) as part of common security and defence policy. We contribute personnel to EU missions in Armenia and the West Bank.
Hybrid threats are an area where the EU’s unique capabilities help it respond rapidly and with scale and where we can expand our security and defence partnership. We also thank the EU for its support on arbitrary detention.
[English]
The fifth and final point is that we would like to continue to intensify our relationship, including in democracy protection and promotion. The Canada-EU partnership is one with a track record of trust, credibility and consistent delivery of outcomes for our citizens. This is a vital year of change for the EU with the European parliamentary elections from June 6 to 9 in the second‑largest democratic exercise in the world after India. Roughly 375 million voters will elect 720 members of the European Parliament for the next five-year legislative term.
The elections come with significant challenges. Canada is working alongside the EU and other G7 partners via the Rapid Response Mechanism to counter disinformation and foreign interference.
It has been my honour to serve as the ambassador of Canada to the EU since November 2020. During this time, I witnessed firsthand the strength of the Canada-EU relationship and the dedication and creativity on both sides to advance our priorities, from vaccines to firefighting and our unwavering support for Ukraine. These examples speak clearly to our ability to execute together and align on our values in the face of polycrises.
I would also like to thank our entire team here at the Mission of Canada to the EU, including our Canadian and incredibly locally engaged staff for their support in preparing my remarks today to you, senators.
[Translation]
I look forward to working with you, honourable senators, and with Canadians to continue to advance our values and interests with the European Union as we are truly stronger together.
Thank you for your attention, honourable senators.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much, ambassador, for your comments.
Colleagues, we will do what we usually do and go to four-minute rounds, question and answer.
As usual, I would encourage you to keep your questions fairly precise and your preambles short so that we can extract as much information as we can from our witness, Ambassador Campbell, today. We will begin with the committee deputy chair, Senator Harder, followed by Senator Boniface.
Senator Harder: Thank you, ambassador, for being with us and Ms. Poupart as well. My question is with respect to CETA. There was a setback in the French Senate. We still have outstanding ratifications among I believe 10 jurisdictions. How do you see a ratification of CETA going forward?
The second part of that question is the political drift in Europe appears to be counter-free trade. Do we risk missing the ratification windows, ambassador?
Ms. Campbell: Thanks so much, Senator Harder.
I think on CETA, the most significant achievement in the last two years since I’ve been here is seeing Germany, which is one of the economic engines of the EU, ratify CETA. That was a very significant moment because if we were dealing with some of the challenges including, as you know, in a bicameral legislature in France, a house that has voted for CETA and a Senate that has now voted against CETA and another amount of reconciliation to understand what the French parliamentary or the National Assembly’s final view will, in fact, be.
We’re in a different position with 17 Parliaments having approved CETA than we might be if we were in early days. So 17 Parliaments, and again Germany the most recently and the Netherlands having ratified. Ten remain exactly as you said, France being among them.
I will say a couple of things. First of all, good news on our side, CETA is ratified. We’re actually ready to modernize this agreement as we have modernized other free trade agreements, but it must be brought into force.
Interesting, a recent study by Prime Minister Letta of Italy, on the request of the Belgian Presidency, suggested innovations on the EU side such that they change and adapt their own procedures for ratification. So I just want to take note that really we’re in the EU’s hands. This is the EU’s homework as to how they ratify this agreement, and they should take as much time as they need to get this process right, because the agreement is really working well for exporters on both sides being provisionally in force.
You asked a question I think — I’ll encapsulate it. Protectionist sentiment is absolutely growing in Europe, and we’ve seen that on a number of fronts. That’s why I think it was incredibly pressing that we concluded this agreement when we did in 2016/17. This architecture is completely different than the EU has with other partners and it means we have a legal basis on which to continue to innovate and adapt.
The numbers speak for themselves. There are success stories on all sides. It’s why speaking on CETA at a human, local and community level is so important. It’s why parliamentary outreach to the 27 Member States, and in particular I could recommend outreach to Parliaments in the 10 Member States that have not yet ratified CETA. Because I think nothing is better than dialogue in terms of explaining the real positive results. Thanks.
Senator Harder: Just as a quick supplementary if I could.
Ms. Campbell: Please.
Senator Harder: Of the 10 that are outstanding, do you have a sense of which are the most ripe for proceeding?
Ms. Campbell: Well, I take note of the recent Greek Prime Minister’s visit to Canada. Again, I think nothing is better than crystallizing and talking face-to-face. That’s why I encourage parliamentarians, as I say, in virtual and in real life to get together with their parliamentary colleagues. Because it’s easy to say things that I would argue are often not factual about this agreement. It’s much harder to do that when you’re in dialogue with the partner who has shown an incredible dedication and adaptability to this relationship, ourselves and with the European Commission.
We got positive soundings from that recent visit. Timing is, of course, up to each of the individual Member States.
Senator Harder: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Boniface: Thank you very much, ambassador, for joining us. I wanted to follow up on your comments on Ukraine. We had the Ukrainian ambassador here yesterday. I’m wondering with the way things seem to be shifting in Europe whether or not you expect that positions from the European Union will change with respect to Ukraine or what you see going forward.
Ms. Campbell: Yes, that’s such an important question. I think we’re only seeing a deepening of the EU’s commitment to Ukraine, and specifically the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine for actual membership in the European Union. That’s a very long process. But essentially, the door has been opened for Ukraine to evolve beyond a free trade agreement partner and a structured partner — which they already have various platforms for engagement with — to being on the road to EU membership. I don’t think anything could be clearer alongside, I’ll just say, three other factors.
The one is that arms provisions to Ukraine are increasing, not diminishing. There is going to be the use of the European Peace Facility to also make joint investments in defence production inside Ukraine itself to shore up supply chains. So on the military side, again, an increase.
Second, the sheltering of over 5 million displaced Ukrainians, again that support is unwavering, mostly women and children who require support. That number was as high as 7 million in the immediate aftermath. That number does fluctuate. But we have seen real support on the temporary protection side as well.
Third, I would say financially. The EU has just passed together — ensemble — a legal structure for allowing them to freeze the windfall proceeds on Russian state sovereign assets. In other words, the sovereign assets themselves are still frozen, but as they mature and produce interest, that interest can now be legally seized and applied through a structured legal process for the benefit of Ukraine, and we’ve seen the EU work together. That took 27 Member States because their sanctions regime requires unanimity to work together on that.
I think that the circumstances are challenging. You heard directly from the ambassador who is based in Kyiv. What I can tell you is the EU, of course, with Ukraine on its border and Russia on its borders, with its strong sense of democratic support for Ukraine is only articulating more pathways for engagement with Ukraine.
I hope that helps, senator.
Senator Boniface: Thank you.
I wonder if you can give us some reflection on the impact of Brexit on the European Union and given all the shifting winds politically in Europe, whether or not you see how that’s going to work going forward.
Ms. Campbell: Only the easy questions from you, senator. Listen, I think many of us miss the United Kingdom inside the EU, and it was a fantastic partner to have inside the EU for Canada. It’s, of course, the will of the British people themselves in their referendum to depart. Again, what I think is interesting is that we have created a new kind of cooperation here in Brussels because we’re now both outside as third-country partners.
What’s been very interesting is to see CETA really stand as a robust, comprehensive agreement, and to also understand some of the unique facilitation particularly around Northern Ireland that’s also required to guarantee peace. If you have to make lemonade out of lemons, we’re going to learn a lot of things about improving trade facilitation and, I hope, reducing the burden for exporters from the U.K.’s experience in the EU.
The U.K. is, of course, an incredibly strong member of NATO, NATO being a completely distinct institution. I just take note that now that we have Sweden and Finland as members of NATO, it’s only Malta, Cyprus and Ireland that are EU members that are not in NATO. So we continue to have this unique security and defence cooperation with the U.K. in NATO and then alongside some of our work with the EU.
Maybe the last point that I’ll make is that on some of the unique features that we have with the EU, including the ability to recognize professions in some of our services agreements, we’ve actually gone beyond, in some cases, the U.K.-EU partnership. We’re all finding our way forward, but I think it’s important to keep all channels open and cooperation solid. As I say, our instruments have served us well, even though it has been a difficult transition — a difficult divorce, so to speak.
Senator Woo: Thank you, ambassador, for being with us. I wonder if you can give us commentary on the EU’s opposition to Georgia’s foreign agent registry and what the reasons are for the EU’s displeasure.
Ms. Campbell: The principles of democratic accountability, of transparency on the registry, that it’s impartial and that there is not a crackdown on free speech would be some of the principles that are at play here. I think what’s interesting is that the President of Georgia, as you know, has been strongly against this legislation, and the EU has telegraphed very clearly that Georgia is not in line with its commitments under its association and now work on opening accession negotiations with the EU, should it continue.
The importance of dialogue in this case is really important because, as you know, the Georgian citizens themselves are demonstrating against this law.
Senator Woo: More specifically about the provisions in the proposed Georgia legislation that are objectionable, I understand registration is required for entities that receive foreign funding, with 20% of their budget coming from a foreign source. Is that the principal objection or are there other concerns?
Ms. Campbell: There are other concerns, and I’d be happy to get back to you in writing.
Senator Woo: I appreciate that. Maybe you can also give us an update on what the EU is doing with its own proposed foreign influence/foreign agent registry, which I understand is also facing a lot of opposition from civil society groups across the union.
Ms. Campbell: What I think has been interesting is that the EU has already proceeded with a required notification process regarding foreign subsidies, including any state actor. That is now in force. We’ve already started to proceed with some, if you will, commercial elements on this.
On other aspects, there are consultations ongoing, and I would be happy to provide more information in writing. There is no proposed legislation as such, but it’s coming.
Senator Woo: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Ambassador, if you and your team could send that information through the clerk of the committee, that would be appreciated.
Ms. Campbell: Sure.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: I want to thank all of our guests and witnesses. Thank you for being with us in person, Ms. Poupart. Ambassador Campbell, the EU has just launched the Boost Africa initiative which seeks to reduce poverty in Africa. I would like to know if this program has been presented to you. What role would Canada play in that program?
Ms. Campbell: Thank you for the question. I can tell you three things. First, that is an EU program. It is based on humanitarian assistance, but also on trade, health and infrastructure. Second, we focus a lot on infrastructure under the Global Gateway program. As a G7 nation, Canada is a member of that platform. In addition, we can choose specific programs or infrastructure in Africa, Asia and Latin America. So we can be a member or play a role in specific infrastructure projects other than through the Global Gateway program. Third, the EU has an important relationship with the African Union. We actually have a new ambassador based in Africa for that reason. The African Union is to some extent an institution that is modelled after the European Union.
Senator Gerba: Thank you. My second question has nothing to do with Boost Africa; it pertains instead to the Canada-EU summit held in 2023. The two parties committed to accelerating the green shift. To this end, the Green Alliance was established on the themes of cooperation, including climate action, the protection of the environment and oceans and the transition to renewable energy. Can you tell us more about the activities of the Green Alliance right now? What are the results of this cooperation between Canada and the EU?
Ms. Campbell: Thank you. As to the Green Alliance, we have established cooperation on carbon pricing and border carbon adjustments. [Technical difficulties] because this is something very technical introduced by the EU.
[English]
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism has begun to be provisionally enforced, and we’ll also start taking receipts next year.
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism requires recognition of our pan-Canadian carbon pricing system. That’s the first part of our agreement. The second is to deepen cooperation at the multilateral level, in particular around biodiversity, deforestation, ocean protection, plastics and other issues. And third, based around a good bridge to our work in clean tech, also on hydrogen and work on nuclear.
There is a very interesting base in our climate change law for this work, and it has been elevated to the ministerial level. I think the capstone is a commitment to have ministers and the commissioner of the environment and climate change here at the European Union commit to regular meetings.
Senator Gerba: Thank you.
Senator MacDonald: My question is for the ambassador. I would like to pick up on what Senator Harder was asking about in regard to CETA.
There are 10 member states that have still not signed up, significant states like Italy and Poland. I’m just curious, could you expand a bit on what their issues are? We’re familiar with what France said, but I would like to hear more about the other countries and what the major obstacles are with them.
Ms. Campbell: Sure. Thank you, senator.
When it concerns member states that have not yet ratified, I’m going to be perfectly frank — I don’t want to prejudge what their concerns are because their parliaments have not yet had hearings. It’s incredibly interesting to me that some member states have chosen not to advance CETA for a debate, as of yet.
What I can say more generally and broadly is that there is a growing protectionist sentiment in Europe. It has very little to do with Canada. It has to do more, I would say, with concerns about support for farmers and farming income. I think there is a great focus on agricultural imports meeting EU standards — in other words, not lowering EU standards for third countries. On that basis, Canada has shown very clearly that we can meet EU standards and that we have a very high-quality product.
Again, I want to highlight the difference between broader trade concerns and the actual reality of Canadian products.
There have been governments of the further right that have had other focuses during their mandates. There have been coalition governments, and I would highlight among those, the Netherlands and Germany. Ireland, for example, which has not yet ratified, where the CETA has been a topic of the coalition government itself, deciding how to focus among coalition members with very diverse views on how the governing coalition will manage CETA.
In the first two cases, the agreement was to work with Canada through the European Commission — because, ultimately, our counterparty is not each individual state, our counterparty is the European Commission — in order to provide additional provisional information to satisfy, for example, Germany on provisions related to investment, which we did through an exchange of letters. In the case of the Netherlands, there was a procedure whereby the Senate voted for CETA where one party — Goud Nederland, which is the Dutch party representing senior citizens — broke with its party politics, which is against free trade writ large, but voted for Canada and CETA.
It’s on a case-by-case basis, senator. It’s complex, and I think it’s important that we just stay calm, credible, steady and ready to answer all questions of our partner. If you can’t do free trade — it is more regulated, managed and rules-based trade — with Canada, who can Europe trade with? I think they are very seized to ensure that they continue with the ratification process.
Senator Downe: Thank you, ambassador. The parliament of Cyprus had a vote, and they rejected CETA. How does that impact the agreement?
Ms. Campbell: It was a non-binding voluntary vote, so it did not have an impact on CETA. The other dimension is that each member state has its own ratification process just as Canada has its own national legal ratification process. The ratification processes in each member state are unique and depend on its parliament and on its configuration of governance.
A negative vote in parliament has been explained to me by our legal experts and the European Commission as not signifying an automatic national “no” to CETA. The parliament may vote no and then have a conciliation process with the executive branch of its government in systems that are different than Canada, which has both a parliament and an executive who ultimately must determine what the final national opinion on CETA is.
It is only considered to be a negative vote once the head of state at the European Council notifies the European Commission that his or her nation is voting with a no vote, and that has not happened to date.
Senator Downe: But in Cyprus, my understanding is that the president and his party is in favour of CETA, but they don’t have the votes in parliament, and the parliament in Cyprus rejected CETA. If that stands, what happens to CETA and the part of the agreement that is not covered? I understand it’s about 10%.
Ms. Campbell: The value of what is not in force, provisionally, is 1-2%, but I think the more fundamental question you have is a legal one. The notification is the first thing that must happen — from the member state to the European Commission — which has not yet happened.
Once the commission is notified, the process from there is in the hands of the commission, and there would need to be a notification to Canada, and the commission has told us in previous discussions that they would have to take a pause because they have never been in a situation at any point in time in which they have gone through a process like CETA, and they want to do member state consultations with all 27, including at that moment — should it come to pass — with all those other member states that have ratified. So, there is not a clear-cut definitive answer that I can give to that question, nor have we received one from the European Commission.
Senator Downe: Do I have more time?
The Chair: You do. You have one minute.
Senator Downe: Ambassador, the other comment I hear from European ambassadors in Ottawa is their surprise that the Government of Canada has not better prepared our business community to take advantage of CETA. Our trade deficit has gone up since CETA was signed by 44%. What do you think the government should be doing to increase the opportunities for Canadian business, given this increasing trade deficit since CETA was signed?
Ms. Campbell: The interesting thing about the point we’re at with CETA, senator, at this moment, is that the take-up of the preferential trade rates between Canada and the EU is higher than it was with NAFTA at this same point.
In other words, something positive has happened in terms of taking up the preferential rates guaranteed by a free trade agreement that are on top of the World Trade Organization. That tells me that exporters of all sizes are learning. They are applying and using those preferential rates faster than they have in previous trade agreements, and it tells me that we can do even more to inform exporters about the benefits of CETA and the fact that they have preferential rates.
A trade deficit is generated by many macroeconomic factors. The trade agreement being in existence is a positive factor. Preferential rates being in existence is positive, as long as there’s what we call preferential trade utilization, which is increasing. It’s now at about 60%. We can always inform small business better.
I think the overall composition of Canada’s exports and who we’re exporting to, and, for example, if there is an individual exporter or supply chain, it is their choice — based on price and competition — to export to the United States, Europe or Asia.
It would be fantastic if we had even more product, and when it is in short supply we are able to provide it to everyone who has it in demand, not only the highest-paying market, which, for example, for some of Canada’s agricultural products may be in Asia. Again, that’s the exporter’s choice as to where they provide that good.
Overall, I think we can also improve our clean technology exports. That would also be a major opportunity for us, as well as services.
The Chair: Thank you very much, ambassador. I see you wearing your former hat as chief trade commissioner, so I know you could go on at length on this important subject.
Senator Coyle: Thank you, ambassador and Ms. Poupart, for being with us. A couple of my questions have been asked, so I will go to another question that I have.
You mentioned that in the upcoming elections there will be problems with foreign interference and disinformation. It would be interesting for us to hear what form that interference is taking and what kind of disinformation it is. I don’t mean the substance of it, but the channels, et cetera, and perhaps even sources of disinformation, and what’s being done about it. You said that Canada’s helping with that. This is important for us when we have our own election in the near future, but also because the outcome of these elections is critical for our relationship as well.
Ms. Campbell: Yes, senator, thanks. It’s such an important question, and I want to highlight that the EU has worked incredibly hard over its last legislative term to pass legislation, which is proposed by the European Commission, then approved by the European Council of all 27 member states and then reviewed and ratified by the over 700-member European Parliament. It’s a very complex legislative process around here.
They have a Digital Services Act and a Digital Markets Act as well as an Artificial Intelligence Act, which are now coming into force. All these tools together focus specifically on the channels, which is the subject of one of your core questions: What are the channels? And the channels are largely digital. They are online. They are using influencers, which is the use of social media, including TikTok, Instagram and Facebook, and it’s digital broadcasting.
The EU having an expanded tool box to engage with the various digital platforms — the Metas, the Googles, the TikToks of the world — has been absolutely important in terms of their engagement around presenting factual information and taking information down.
Another cross-section I want to make is to sanctions. There has been a great focus on Russian disinformation, in particular, in the European Union. Several Russian-sponsored broadcasters have been put under sanction in the European Union. Canada has worked closely on aligning with those sanctions. These are broadcasting actors that are broadcasting in EU member state languages.
On Facebook, in particular, the amount of disinformation posted by influencers that is unfactual is really tricky. When it is in the form of an opinion, the EU is still a free speech, open market for ideas. In particular, with its World War II experience — and, in many cases these countries were part of the Soviet Union and fought revolutions, have become independent states and are now members of the EU — these countries are as keen on free speech as we are. It’s countering where that is paid for by maligned state actors. Processing some of that which aligned with sanctions has been incredibly important in terms of tracking where funding is coming from for some of these sources.
We have been cooperating on that through the G7’s Rapid Response Mechanism. From the G7’s perspective, that is an information and observation platform that allows our researchers to highlight areas in which we think there may be active disinformation and foreign interference and share that information with the EU and its member states for them to consider how they would take action.
I can’t agree with you more that it’s an essential area for us to be better prepared on and where we can learn lessons from this massive June 6 to 9 election here in Europe.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I will ask a question, and I am following on what Senator Coyle has just asked.
A few days ago, the leaders of the two largest EU members, Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz, penned an op-ed in the Financial Times that set a vision, mainly an economic vision, for the future of the EU. Among other things, they talked about their collective and common ambitions in both Germany and France, and their conviction that the EU needs more innovation, more single markets, more investment, more level playing field and less bureaucracy.
Having an op-ed like that setting out a position come out just before the European elections is significant. It’s setting a marker in terms of public opinion not only in the EU but also in France and in Germany. The mood is more towards protectionism and anti-bureaucracy if surveys in these countries hold true.
Ambassador, I would like your views on the positioning of these two countries. I would like to bring in Isabelle Poupart on the German question as well, given your long experience as our Chargées d’Affaires in Berlin. Ambassador, if you would go first, please.
Ms. Campbell: I would be pleased to do so because I think you’re asking a fundamental question about where the EU is headed, Senator Boehm, and I want to make three points.
Tying it back to the question on Brexit, even those governments that have been the most vocal about their concerns about the EU and have used the EU as a stalking horse for every problem that may exist nationally have, in practice, become pro‑EU Europeans.
The Brexit example is a bright-line test in terms of what actually happens when you exit the EU and the challenges that ensue for both businesses and people. It’s been quite interesting to see — and you have great experience with this from your own time serving as an ambassador in Europe — the shifting nature in which the EU is discussed. The link I want to make there is with what we’ve seen during the pandemic — that is, the war on Ukraine, increasing threats, concerns about how to assert European values and interests with a global contest or the hegemonic rise of both China and the U.S. — the EU is stronger together. The member states know that they are stronger articulating their single market, their economy and jobs, innovation and social structures, together. That’s taken on incredibly innovative ways that are not treaty-based.
This is a really interesting point about Brussels and the activity here and all the structures here, including the fact that every eight weeks we have all 27 EU leaders sitting down together, without officials. I repeat: 27 leaders sitting down in a room and having deeply political conversations about current and future issues. We’ve seen that even when something is not in the EU treaties, member states bring their challenges to Brussels and ask, “How can we create new mechanisms, whether that’s for buying vaccines or for buying arms?”
The EU has created the European Peace Facility. The fact that some member states who are avowedly neutral and not NATO members permit the structure but don’t participate in it so that arms can be bought, purchased and moved into Ukraine is another startling and clear innovation in the way in which the EU uses this platform.
You will see more EU. The real challenge in front of President Macron and Chancellor Scholz is how to finance and fund it. I think that op-ed was quite significant in suggesting that some of their discussions about more EU-level funding proceed because we need France and the other member states, but critically Germany as the economic powerhouse and a conservatively fiscal member of the EU, to be supportive of EU resources. I defer on Germany to Ms. Poupart as well.
The Chair: Thank you very much. This gives the opening to Director General Poupart, please.
[Translation]
Isabelle Poupart, Director General, Bureau of European Affairs, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you about Germany. Germany has seen tremendous change in the past two years — a classic Zeitenwende, or turning point — in response to Russian aggression and the huge threats to Germany’s energy supply in particular owing to that aggression.
That has opened the door to greater cooperation between our two countries, in the area of energy in particular. Chancellor Scholz and Vice-Chancellor Habeck visited Canada and we signed a hydrogen partnership. A lot is happening in that area right now, but this goes even further. Our shared commitment to decarbonization and the green shift is equally strong. We are doing that right across the EU of course, but also with Germany.
Innovation is also very important because Germany has sometimes been criticized for being too static in its approach. The Zeitenwende is also accelerating all processes. There are opportunities for Canada in that regard. One in particular is the Hanover fair, which is the most important platform for innovation and industrial transformation in the world. At the end of March 2025, Canada will be the partner host country at the Hanover fair. We already had an impressive delegation this year: More than 75 Canadian companies were represented. We want to double than number next year. This is really a great opportunity for Canada to strengthen cooperation in all aspects of trade and innovation that are of shared interest with Germany. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much for that information.
[English]
Senator Harder, did you want to follow on this particular point?
Senator Harder: I did, actually.
Ambassador, you referred to innovation taking place in Europe. We have heard from Ms. Poupart about the events in Germany and that interaction with the EU.
I’m wondering how we, in the Government of Canada, are becoming more innovative in the relationship between our bilateral missions and our multilateral coordination so that we can take advantage of the innovations taking place in the EU to advance Canada’s bilateral interests that are pan-European. Can you comment on innovation taking place with us?
Ms. Campbell: Happy to, and what’s essential here is to know that we take a network approach to the European Union. So I’m based here in Europe, and we have an incredible platform that we report on and provide opportunities based on EU activities. That goes home, of course, to Global Affairs Canada, to the Trade Commissioner Service, to Export Development Canada and others. It also goes out to the network of posts here.
I would say that, in particular, the Trade Commissioner Service is incredibly well networked, and we coordinate using digital tools in order to share, for example, company interests. I can give you an example of Canadian wind, nuclear companies that are pursuing EU legislation and advocacy, specific member state investments, and actual products and co-development of innovation and research and development all in different member states. That coordination is very strong.
We have an opportunity in blended finance and infrastructure in third countries where the EU is very active, for example, in the Caucasus, in Africa.
A good example for that might be some of the just energy transition work that we have done in order to improve clean technology outcomes in countries like Vietnam where Canada and the EU and others are all participating, because the opportunity, for example, in some of the clean-tech infrastructure, digital infrastructure, Canada may not do that alone but will do it in partnership, for example, with the EU and its institutions like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
I hope that’s useful. Over to Ms. Poupart.
Ms. Poupart: Thank you, Senator Harder, for the question.
In addition to what Ambassador Campbell has just said, I would like to bring in the program Horizon Europe which is the world’s largest collaborative science research and innovation program with a budget of €95 billion. As a result of the Canada‑EU summit last November, Canada is now in the process of becoming an associate member of that program. That will open all kinds of new cooperation with our EU counterparts in that field, and the question you asked is very important because after the summit when I had my first call with all the European heads of missions, I told them, “Now you have to read the summit decision that was agreed to and actively search for opportunities in the countries where you’re based so that the links can be connected.” It’s great to agree to something at the EU level, but then it needs to trickle down and be used in all the capitals and in a very networked way, as Ambassador Campbell, has already said.
I think “we’re on it” is the answer to your question.
Senator MacDonald: This question is for both the witnesses. I will just ask something a little different here.
There are eight members of the Arctic Council, and one of them is Russia. What’s the future of this body? Do you see a future for the Arctic Council or is it just a hollow shell now? Does it have any future?
Ms. Poupart: Thank you, senator, for the very interesting question. I’m responsible for 30 countries plus the European Union, but I don’t cover the Arctic, so it’s a difficult one for me to answer. I could give you my personal opinion, but I don’t think this is what you are interested in.
What I see from the group of colleagues working just across the hall from us at the Pearson Building is that we continue to engage when we have interests but that at the political level it has become much more difficult.
Our interests are so important that we cannot let the Arctic go, and we have many ways other than the Arctic Council to continue to have a very active Arctic policy.
Senator MacDonald: Ambassador, do you have anything to add?
Ms. Campbell: Yes, I think what’s interesting is that the European Union is not a member of the Arctic Council. It’s only national governments, and so it’s been interesting to see that the member states that are EU members — so that includes, for example, Sweden, Denmark, and Denmark through what I think is most vitally Greenland — have aligned with us in our continued efforts to focus on where we can engage Russia on climate change and science and Indigenous leadership in the Arctic, and create additional institutions where we hope, one day, there will be a more peaceful ability to pursue our interests in the Arctic.
The European Union would like to become more active in the Arctic, and some of that includes infrastructure investments, specifically in the Far North in its member states Finland, Sweden and Denmark. Norway is not a member of the EU but is a member of the European Economic Area. So I would underscore Ms. Poupart’s point about creating additional structures and also listening to the people who live in the Arctic themselves about how they are engaging with Russia. The geography doesn’t change, and so we may be in situations, particularly in some areas that relate to, for example, safety in the Arctic, where we will continue to engage Russia over flights, for example; and if there is, for example, any kind of a search and rescue-related activity, there’s coordination to ensure assistance.
We will see the EU become more active over the coming years, and I think Canada’s leadership in the Arctic is essential so that we articulate our interests and our values. Particularly, Canada is much stronger on Indigenous engagement, both at a national level and at a multilateral level than I’ve seen here in the EU, and it’s something that I think we strongly bring to the table and will keep articulating here when it comes specifically to the Arctic.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I would like to thank the senator for posing the question. Our National Security and Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee did a study on the Arctic, but since then, Sweden and Finland have joined NATO, and we know Arctic Council activities are suspended because of the Russian Federation, but that doesn’t mean that at some future point this committee wouldn’t have a look at Canada and Arctic cooperation, and particularly with the Europeans. I think it was a very good question to ask.
We have come to the end of our time, and on behalf of the committee, I’d like to thank Ambassador Campbell and Isabelle Poupart for being with us today. Very important themes were discussed, and ambassador, we’re going to hear from your Ottawa-based counterpart in a few minutes as well.
I want to thank you for the work that you and your teams do. We are very proud and very pleased that you could join us today.
The Chair: Colleagues, we will now proceed to our second panel. We’re very honoured to welcome Her Excellency Melita Gabric, European Union Ambassador to Canada from the Delegation of the European Union. To support the ambassador, we have Gabriela Alexandru, Head of the Political Section, and Magdalena Ciesielska, Deputy Head of the Trade Section.
I would like to thank you for taking the time to be with us today. You heard the discussion with your counterpart in Brussels — our ambassador there — and, of course, there will be much that will come forward that will be similar in this. We’re ready to hear your opening remarks, and they will be followed by questions from senators.
Ambassador, you have the floor.
[Translation]
Her Excellency Melita Gabric, European Union Ambassador to Canada, Delegation of the European Union, as an individual: Mr. Chair, it is a great honour and I am truly delighted to speak with the honourable committee members about relations with the EU and the future of our partnership and friendship.
[English]
This hearing is indeed very timely, coming one week ahead of our European elections, which are starting next week. They will take place from June 6 to 9.
My colleague and friend, Ambassador Campbell, already said a lot of things I intended to share with you, which only confirms how like-minded we are and what great partners and friends we are. But let me try to say a few things from the point of view of how our relationship has evolved over the last years.
First of all, I would say that our relationship has never been closer than it is now. Of course, this is also a function of the two framework agreements we have: the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, or CETA — a lot was said about it already — and our Strategic Partnership Agreement. These two agreements actually underscore and give a framework for our institutional cooperation. I cannot emphasize enough how important these are, because under these two framework agreements we have numerous — dozens and dozens — dialogues that are really structured ways of cooperating on a myriad of issues from security and defence to energy, climate, human rights and fisheries — you name it.
This institutional framework has been in place for six years. It is evolving. Our partnerships are evolving in the areas of digital, green cooperation, green technologies, environment and so forth.
In view of the two major crises that befell this world over the past years — the COVID crisis and the aggression against Ukraine — our relationship has only been strengthened. Let me explain.
First of all, I will talk about COVID. As the EU ambassador to Canada, it gives me great pleasure — and I am actually proud — to be able to say that during the first few months of the vaccine rollout, it was the European Union and its member states that provided Canada with the vast majority of vaccines. This was during the times when vaccines were in short supply. This certainly cemented our friendship further.
I will now talk about Ukraine. From the very beginning, we’ve been working very closely with Canada, and we appreciate everything that Canada is doing in support of Ukraine, European security and Euro-Atlantic security.
One thing that also became very clear and was brought into high relief due to this aggression against a sovereign country by Russia is the realization that we need to work closer, integrate our supply chains with those partners who share our values and with whom we see eye to eye on the issues of democracy, the rule of law, international law and so on. De-risking and diversifying our supply chains is one of the lessons that we learned on both sides of the Atlantic. Here, we see that we are enhancing our cooperation in this regard as well.
In short, because our values are so aligned, because we have such aligned interests, and because we have this strong, robust institutional framework, it is my firm belief that the path that is set for our relations is solid for the years to come. This is basically what I wanted to share by way of introduction, and I’m looking forward to your questions, honourable senators.
The Chair: Thank you very much, ambassador.
Senators, as before, you have four minutes. Keep your questions precise, and we’ll move to a round two as well.
Senator Downe: I want to return to Cyprus. I’m trying to understand what’s going to happen there. The president and his Democratic Rally party are in support of ratifying CETA, but the parliament in Cyprus rejected the agreement. The president did not officially notify the European Union because he wants another vote, but we can all count, they don’t have the votes.
What happens if that is rejected? What happens to the European Union, to other countries that are still considering it? What happens to the agreement and how it impacts our country?
Ms. Gabric: Thank you for this question, which is one of the questions that we’ve been focusing on ever since we have been faced with this situation where some countries have not ratified CETA.
First of all, actually. The European Parliament approved the CETA agreement back in 2017. Today, as we heard before, there are still 10 member states who did not ratify for different reasons.
Your question is rather of a procedural or legal nature. My answer to it is as follows: When the Cyprus parliament voted against the ratification, the government did not decide to notify the European Commission. In such a case, that has no ramifications and no consequences for the overall application of the CETA agreement. The CETA agreement has been provisionally applied, which means that 97% or 98% of its provisions are actually in effect. Even if none of the remaining 10 member states ratify it, the CETA agreement continues to be in effect. There is actually no sunset clause in the agreement.
This is hypothetical, it has not happened before, but in the case that a government of one of the member states decided to actually notify the European Commission, then the European Commission would have to decide what action it would take or what the next steps would be.
Senator Downe: As I understand it, part of the problem is that hasn’t been figured out, as you correctly identified, that if you are notified that it has been rejected by a country, it goes back to the argument of whether it is the incompetence of the European Union or individual states. Has that been determined? You correctly identified the percentage in force now, but on an ongoing basis if it’s rejected, does that number change?
Ms. Gabric: You are right to point out that part of this agreement is actually of mixed competence, which means that both the institution, the Commission, and the member states have competence over it.
The process of exactly how the European Commission — it would be the European Commission who would have to react or would have to decide on the next steps. What exactly the procedural steps would be are still under consideration. For the time being, as I said, it’s a hypothetical situation.
Senator Harder: Thank you, ambassador, for being here with your colleagues. I want to follow up on Senator Downe’s question with respect to CETA.
I was comforted by your comments that our values are aligned and that you believe our relationship is solid for years to come. They would be more solid were CETA to be ratified. As Ambassador Campbell pointed out earlier, the counterpart is the Commission. What is the Commission prepared to do with respect to the 10 outstanding ratification processes to advance ratification? We are just the dance partner; we’re not the party.
Could you describe for us what the commission is doing and how the 10 outstanding ratification processes can proceed and in what time frame?
Ms. Gabric: Yes. One thing that is important to note is that the utilization rate of CETA is still quite low. Of course, that means that we should continue on both sides of the Atlantic to promote CETA and its benefits. I would say that is especially important for the small- and medium-sized enterprises. In Europe, 90% of the economy actually relies or is produced by SMEs, and SMEs frequently don’t have the capacity to actually access these benefits. Part of it is also to continue to improve CETA through cutting further red tape and so on.
CETA is actually such an excellent progressive agreement, it has all these inbuilt mechanisms through which we are actually continuously improving it. That would be the second element.
The third element is, of course, that there are some things called trade irritants in our relationship. Addressing some of those could also help with the willingness or political will, if you will, in member states to ratify the agreement.
Senator Harder: If I could just push a little bit on what the commission is doing with respect to working with the 10 outstanding jurisdictions to encourage early ratification.
Ms. Gabric: It is the European Commission. It is the Directorate General for Trade, and it is also the European External Action Service, or EEAS. We are part of the EEAS, that is our foreign service. We are all involved in promoting CETA. I would like to emphasize that the European Parliament is very active in this file as well. I believe that there is also some dialogue with our counterparts in Canada on this. Quite recently, we have seen a report that came out from the European Parliament that was extremely positive about the results of CETA, not only results in terms of trade but also in terms of impact on the environment and also ESG standards.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Welcome to the committee, Your Excellency. We are delighted to have you here. I would like to pick up on something mentioned with the previous group. I am referring to the outcome of the European elections because the prime minister of Hungary, who will be the next president, stated that the European elections will probably be seen as deciding between war and peace in Europe.
What are your thoughts on the outcome of those elections? How will they impact and influence the situation in Ukraine, for instance?
Ms. Gabric: Thank you for the question.
[English]
One thing that seems to be clear from what we can surmise from the polls is that we will have more of an influence from the far right, but that the centrist groups or political parties, political groups, will remain the prevalent power in the Parliament.
What exactly this will mean for the relations of power within the Parliament after the election of 720 members? It would really be a speculation to try to answer more specifically what you asked, but I would say that, across the board, it has become evident in Europe, regardless of where on the political spectrum you sit, that defence and security are an important area where we have to develop as the European Union. It is widely expected that we will actually continue to develop in this area or in this direction.
Perhaps at the beginning of this commission, the soon-to-be outgoing commission, their ambition was to become a geopolitical actor. With Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it was an inflection point that prompted us to become a geopolitical actor in a rather fast manner. When I say “geopolitical actor,” one of the most important demonstrations of that is actually that we are now providing military aid to Ukraine and that we are actually developing our own military capacity.
Senator Gerba: Thank you.
Ms. Gabric: Basically, this would be my expectation. We will continue to go down this road. We now have the Defence Industrial Strategy through which we want to revitalize our defence industry within Europe and through which we also want to incentivize Member States to work collaboratively to purchase military weaponry and materiel in a collaborative manner. Of course, I would be remiss if I did not emphasize that we are doing this in the way that is compatible with NATO standards. Developing our military security capacity will also strengthen NATO.
Senator Coyle: Thank you so much for being with us, Your Excellency.
In our previous discussion with Ambassador Campbell, the issue of the Canada-European Union Green Alliance came out, and I think you may have also made mention of the issue of energy and clean technology, et cetera. Would you be able to expand for us on how you see the relationship between Canada and the EU developing around new forms of energy, in particular? I’m from the East Coast of Canada and offshore wind, green hydrogen, et cetera, I know it is very important in our relationship with Germany, for example. Can you let us know where is the European Union seeing this relationship between Canada obviously Germany, but even beyond Germany, going in the area of green energy?
Ms. Gabric: Yes, green energy is certainly one of the areas where we see great potential for developing our relations with Canada.
When we had the energy crisis after Russia invaded Ukraine, we were very much looking to Canada to see what can be done in the short term, especially on LNG. Basically, what was determined was that it is not an avenue that could lead to results in a timely manner. The thing is that in the EU, LNG is seen as transitory fuel. I’m prefacing my answer to you because you are from the east part and we were certainly looking at some of those terminals as to whether they could actually be put to work to export LNG.
Now, I think that avenue is more or less abandoned, but we are very much interested in developing together supply chains on hydrogen, green hydrogen in particular, or hydrogen that is produced from wind or solar, from hydro, from clean energy sources.
In Europe, we have the Hydrogen Bank; we set up this bank. It is manned both for the internal stakeholders and for third-country stakeholders. The idea of this bank is to establish a veritable supply-and-demand market. On green hydrogen, which, of course, is still developing and in many ways is quite aspirational, but we are very much encouraged by what has been done so far with Canada, and also we see great potential on the Canadian side of this.
Senator Coyle: Thank you.
Senator MacDonald: Thank you, ambassador. Anybody who enjoys politics, who are watching the European elections, if there was a significant change in the composition of the European Parliament, how do you think it will affect our relationship with the European Union? How do you compare our relationship with the European Union then with the individual nation states in Europe? Do you see a change if there is a big change in the composition of the European Union itself, the Parliament?
Ms. Gabric: I would say as follows. No matter what the composition of the next European Parliament is going to be, we have this wonderful, very solid and vigorous institutional set-up between the EU and Canada through these dialogues that I mentioned earlier, apart from the two framework treaties. Through these dialogues, we have cooperation that happens on a daily basis at all levels of government. Of course, we also have the important parliamentary exchanges.
This institutional framework, which includes officials from all levels, most of the time is quite technical. My expectation would be that this robust institutional framework will allow for our relations to continue as they are and continue to be reinforced. That’s one part of my answer to your question.
The second part is that these fundamental values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law are fundamental values both for us and for you. I don’t think that will change or change dramatically. Those values really underpin our relationship, and I think that they are also very important for our future, that we are like-minded in regard to our values.
In terms of our interests, no matter what colour or how the Parliament will turn, whether it goes a bit to the right — as I said, the expectation is that the centrist political parties will remain in a majority position. Regardless, the interests that we were discussing, for example, on hydrogen, I would also emphasize our interest in developing further our relationship or our cooperation on critical raw materials. I think this deserves fundamental interest, which will allow us to continue to develop our relationship.
As I said at the beginning, it became quite clear to us how important it is to integrate our supply chains, especially in, for example, critical raw materials and energy with like-minded countries, with countries like Canada, so that we avoid a situation of over-dependency. The other thing is diversification. We also hear from our Canadian interlocutors that there is great interest in diversification of the supply chain.
I think here we see eye to eye, both in terms of our values and our interests, and we have a very solid institutional framework. Whatever happens in the elections on our side of the Atlantic or, down the road, your side of the Atlantic, I think we will continue to have an excellent strategic relationship.
Senator MacDonald: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, ambassador. Thank you, senator. I wanted to follow up on what Senator MacDonald was asking and ask more specifically about the European External Action Service, which, of course, you are a member of in a way, but it also features that permeability. In other words, you were Ambassador for Slovenia in Canada and then you became Ambassador for the European Union. You have colleagues who make that movement back and forth. The service has been around, what, for about 14 years? There are 4,000 employees. I had the pleasure of meeting with the Secretary-General in your presence, Stefano Sannino, when he visited Ottawa. And of course, this committee has come out with a report on the foreign service and the future of the foreign service.
In the current polycrisis environment, where do you see the European External Action Service going? Will it continue to expand? Will it look for more innovative ways of working? What you have established basically is your own diplomatic service, and it seems to be working.
Ms. Gabric: Thank you for that question. Indeed, it’s a rather young diplomatic service. It’s been evolving quite dramatically over the last years, and we have a combination of diplomats who come from the institutions and diplomats who come from member states.
My guess would be that this diplomatic service will continue to evolve. I shouldn’t say evermore of diplomatic functions, but certainly, it has been widely accepted as our foreign affairs ministry, quote unquote, because we are a supranational entity, so we don’t have ministries — we have Directorates-General, or DGs, and we have the EEAS.
It will depend on how exactly the EEAS will evolve down the road. It will also depend on who the next HRVP, the high representative who is also the vice-president of the commission, will be. A certain level of agenda setting will obviously be done by the new head.
In the last period, we saw much more emphasis on security and defence. This is something that was greatly expanded over the last, I would say, four or five years. It actually started before the aggression by Russia with our strategic compass, when we started working on the strategic compass, which was basically when the decision was made that we need to be more focused on security and defence issues. The tasks of the EEAS are external relations and security and defence files.
The Chair: Thank you, ambassador. Just to follow up, you had that very interesting mixture of personnel that would come almost on a secondment from member states. Then you also have a more permanent service as well, and this works together.
In terms of recruitment, are there any difficulties where you would have, shall we say, a member state whose government regularly criticizes the European Union, still remains inside to receive benefits, yet is also providing personnel of their own nationals through the External Action Service? I know it’s a difficult question, but in terms of the evolution and the impartiality of the service you wish to have, is that a factor?
Ms. Gabric: It is my understanding that very many criteria and considerations are contemplated when decisions are made. I can tell you that the selection process is very rigorous. There are no written rules about how many ambassadorial positions, for example, a member state should have, but certainly, a certain level of parity or balance is taken into consideration.
Perhaps this question is a little bit above my pay grade, as I do not necessarily deal with these dilemmas, but I think it’s always kind of a mix of considerations that prevails at the end.
The Chair: Thank you very much. We’ll go to round two, colleagues.
Senator Harder: I wanted to invite you, Ms. Gabric, to speculate a little further. This is a follow-up to Senator MacDonald’s question about the aftermath of the elections. Could you outline for us your expectations with respect to how the commission itself will get formed and ratified by the parliament and whether, in advance of that, you see any kind of rebalancing of commission roles? You have mentioned how the High Representative in the last number of years has taken on greater importance in the allocation of political authority within the commission. How do you see the post-election scenarios for the commission evolving?
Ms. Gabric: The most important thing to point out is that we have our treaties. Our treaties lay out the functions and the way that our institutions work. That’s the basis, and those are the fundamentals that will continue.
As to how the commission will position itself politically, we will see. It depends on the results of this election. For the time being, the projections show that we will have a high level of turnout. Around 80% of Europeans think it is important as to who will lead the European Union and that the European Union has a real and direct impact on their lives. This has definitely improved or became more apparent at the level of our electorate, as to the role that the European Union is playing. On the one hand, it became more apparent, but on the other hand, the European Union has also evolved significantly. It evolved as a geopolitical actor, but it also became more connected internally. We now have competencies in areas that were not there before COVID, for example. We had a joint platform to buy vaccines or to contribute to the production of vaccines. I mentioned our defence industry strategy through which we are developing as an actual defence actor.
In terms of how the EU has evolved, I would bring to your attention that during the crisis, we went to the international markets and borrowed jointly. Some call this our “Hamiltonian moment”; we mutualized our debt. That was an important moment in the evolution of the European Union.
Certainly, our treaties are the basis — the sacrosanct foundations — of the functioning of our institutions. The political contents will be decided by the electorate. Three hundred and thirty million people will be voting. The preliminary results will be published on June 9 in the evening.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Gerba: Your Excellency, just recently, the EU adjusted its approach to China, which it now sees as a partner, competitor and systemic rival. This approach illustrates the multifaceted complexity of relations between the EU and China.
First, I would like to know how the EU balances this relationship in terms of development, competition, fear and the challenges that China poses today.
Second, are Canada and the EU cooperating to address the opportunities and challenges in the relationship between China, the EU and Canada?
Ms. Gabric: You are quite right: The relationship is very complicated.
[English]
It is increasingly complicated. You are right; you said it correctly. Yes, we see China as a partner, a competitor and a rival. Our strategy lays out these three strains of cooperation or competition.
Politically speaking, our relationship is complicated by the support that China gives to Russia. For example, 80% of the goods that Russia needs for its military comes from China. That’s one estimate that we have.
China’s posture in the Taiwan Strait or the Indo-Pacific also complicates our relationship.
On the economic front, we see that China has been distorting our trade relations with different means at the state level. We have initiated investigations into electric vehicles and photovoltaics to establish whether we should introduce some countermeasures.
Having said that, I would add that we want to continue with our relations with China on the basis of transparency and predictability in our trade relations.
There are also issues on which we want to work closely with China, for example, combatting climate change. Here we also have this format together with Canada called the ministerial meetings on climate action, or MoCA, where our ministers meet regularly and address the issues of climate change and environmental action.
Senator Downe: Ambassador, I appreciate you may not have this information on hand, but perhaps you could send it to the clerk of the committee.
I’m interested in trade. Canada does a good job of signing free trade agreements, but of the 15 countries we signed agreements with, after we signed, the trade deficit has increased with 11 of them, including after CETA. The year prior to the signing of CETA, our trade deficit with the European Union was $30 billion. Last year it was $53 billion.
Does the EU have an organized trade incentive policy? How do they prepare their business communities for the new opportunities, trade deals — per cent, or is it left up to individual states and countries? If you could get that information to us, I would appreciate receiving it. Maybe you know, off the top of your head.
Ms. Gabric: We will look into this and send you more precise information. CETA was negotiated by the European Commission digital trade. So, is the question about the deficit?
Senator Downe: My real question is: Through what incentives and programs do you prepare your business communities for the opportunities of a trade deal? Canada seems to be falling short in that area. I’m just wondering if you have an overarching program or do you leave it up to the individual countries to identify opportunities in Canada?
Ms. Gabric: These business deals are at the level of member states or their stakeholders, so we are not involved with that directly, but at the level of, for example, promoting CETA and its benefits and the nature of the free trade agreement — these are areas in which we have competence.
Senator Downe: Thank you. I look forward to receiving whatever you have.
The Chair: Are there any other questions that anyone wants to ask the ambassador?
If not, ambassador, I want to thank you and your team on behalf of the committee for being here. Your frankness is appreciated. Good answers to all of the questions, and I’m not sure all committee members know this, but I know that you are coming to the end of your assignment here in Ottawa, so different futures await you, and more adventures, perhaps, as well. On behalf of the committee, I want to thank you for your service for the European Union here and in promoting the Canada-European relationship during your tenure. Congratulations on that.
(The committee adjourned.)