THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Monday, March 28, 2022
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met with videoconference this day at 2:03 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on issues relating to security and defence in the Arctic.
Senator Tony Dean (Chair) in the chair.
The Chair: Welcome to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. I’m Tony Dean, senator from Ontario, and chair of the committee.
I’m joined today by my fellow committee members: Senator Jean-Guy Dagenais, Quebec, deputy chair; Senator Dawn Anderson, Northwest Territories; Senator Peter Boehm, Ontario; Senator Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu, Quebec; Senator Donna Dasko, Ontario; Senator Marty Deacon, Ontario; Senator Mobina Jaffer, British Columbia; Senator David Richards, New Brunswick, and Senator Hassan Yussuff, Ontario.
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Today we continue our study on security and defence in the Arctic, including military infrastructure and security capabilities. We have two panels of witnesses appearing today.
In the first panel, we will explore the geopolitics of the Arctic. We welcome Mr. Rob Huebert, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary; Mr. Whitney Lackenbauer, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North and professor at Trent University; Mr. Andreas Østhagen, Senior Researcher, Fridtjof Nansen Institute & High North Center at Nord University and Global Fellow at Wilson Center; and Mr. Wilfrid Greaves, Assistant Professor of International Relations, at the University of Victoria. Thank you all for joining us today by video conference.
We will now begin by inviting you to provide your opening remarks, which will be followed by questions from our members. I remind you that each of you has four minutes for opening statements. We will open with Professor Rob Huebert.
Mr. Huebert, you may begin. Thank you for joining us.
Rob Huebert, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, as an individual: Thank you very much, senator. It’s indeed my honour to be here to be testifying before you.
I also would like to point out it’s my privilege to be able to testify along two ex-students and one student that should have been a student, if I had been faster with my emails.
I have three points I’d like to start with. The first one is Canada is facing two existential threats to Arctic security. The first one, of course, is climate change. We’re not here to talk about that. I’m here to talk about the existential threat that is now facing Canada because of geopolitical shifts that are occurring.
Canada — and I want to make this point as explicitly as I can — faces a threat and it is becoming a more dangerous threat as time goes. It’s not about Russian invasion, or land invasion; that’s not a threat, though that’s often used as a red herring.
Canada also is not protected by geography, though several of our colleagues are making this statement in the media quite a bit lately and this is, frankly, wrong.
And it’s not about Arctic sovereignty. Arctic sovereignty is an important issue, but this is not what we’re here to talk about. We’re here to talk about Arctic security.
The threat is clear. The threat is a Putin regime that sees NATO as an existential threat. It has seen NATO as an existential threat — because of the Canadian clause in the creation of NATO in which you have to be committed to democratic principles — since at least 2008 when it declared war on Georgia to prevent Georgia from joining NATO. It then demonstrated in fact the degree to which it sees NATO as a threat by its beginning of the Ukrainian war in 2014.
Canada, therefore, given our commitment to collective security — and given our commitment to ensuring the protection of an orderly international system as a member of both NATO and NORAD — is directly threatened by this regime.
What we have seen also within this regime since 2008 is the development in which to engage us in war. Let me be very frank on this. There is a tendency of seeing them as a competitor, seeing them as somebody who is doing domestic protection. In my view that is, frankly, wrong.
The first elements in which they are engaged upon war is, of course, in terms of hybrid warfare and weaponization of social media; we’re seeing this in the American election, the separatist movement in Spain, the Brexit vote in the U.K. and I suspect we will find indications of influence in Canada.
But more importantly, and this is where the North is so directly threatened, is the development of Russian offensive systems in terms of the ability to engage in war since 2006, when they embarked upon this measure, which basically placed the Arctic as the region in which the Russians would be directing any actions.
The Russians have changed their posture of nuclear deterrence to one of nuclear war fighting. They now have over 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons within their inventory. Those are to fight wars, not to deter wars. They have delivery systems that are increasingly deployed from the North that are increasingly confounding our ability to detect them through the NORAD systems. These include hypersonics, the undersea Poseidon system, Kinzhal cruise missiles and so forth.
They also have the development — and this is something that is often overlooked — of being able to completely disrupt our northern communications with a very distinct policy to having the ability of anti-satellite and anti-undersea cable capabilities.
They demonstrated this undersea cable capability with their attack on Norway just prior to relaunching their attack on Ukraine in February 2014.
They’ve demonstrated they can shoot down satellites by shooting down one of their own in February.
Ultimately, what we see clearly is a pattern of behaviour. Russia is not to be ignored. It is not to be belittled, but it is to be recognized as the threat that it is; the threat that it has developed is, of course, focused on its capability.
Canada may wish that it had the ability to ignore or be ignored by Russia, but the reality is that this is not the case. Therefore, we need to be taking this threat as seriously as we are able to. We need to ensure that we are able to respond to it. I’m more than happy to elaborate, in the question period, on what I believe those necessary steps are for Canadian security. Make no mistake about it: Canada is at risk and the risk is growing. Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Huebert. I have no doubt there will be some questions in response to your statement. Thank you.
Next, we’ll hear from Whitney Lackenbauer.
Whitney Lackenbauer, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor, Trent University, as an individual: I’ll begin by stating that I live in Oxford County, on traditional Anishnabek and neutral territory that is covered by Treaty 3, the “Between the Lakes Purchase” of 1792. By taking the time to acknowledge the land that I stand on, I remind myself of the long history of silencing in this country and the need to speak truth on the journey towards reconciliation.
[Translation]
Senators, it is my pleasure to appear before you today to discuss security and defence in the Arctic —
[English]
— through a Canadian lens. Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine beginning in late February has confirmed that Arctic cooperation is not insulated from the events of the broader world. We have witnessed the spillover of international tension into the sphere of circumpolar affairs, which raises fundamental questions about stability and cooperative governance in the region. That said, we need to be more careful than ever to base our decisions on well-grounded assessments of Arctic defence and security. I do not think that there is a greater likelihood of conflict arising over long-standing Arctic disputes, Arctic resources, boundaries, state sovereignty or shipping lanes. There’s no greater likelihood of this now than there was a month or even a year ago.
In Canada, we often talk about the Arctic as if it is a single space. Some issues and threats are truly circumpolar in orientation, but other aspects are best considered through a regional perspective. For Canada, this might include recognizing the distinct threats faced in the Canadian Arctic and those facing our allies in the European Arctic or in the Bering Strait.
While the world faces the globally increased risk associated with Russia’s blatant disregard for international law and the rules-based order following its further brutal and unlawful invasion of Ukraine, the threats and risks faced in Eastern Europe and the Arctic parts of Canada are distinct.
I do not think direct Russian military action against Canadian Arctic territory is at all likely for reasons of Russia’s national self-interest, which we can discuss later if that’s the wish of the committee. However, I do think that the Canadian Arctic faces a distinct constellation of risks, and clearly understanding these risks will allow us to appropriately allocate resources and efforts to strengthen our short- and long-term defence and security.
The framework I find helpful to sort Arctic defence and security threats is one that looks in, to and through Arctic Canada.
The first category of threats are those that pass through or over the Arctic to strike at targets outside the region. These include cruise missiles, hyperkinetic glide vehicles, bombers and ballistic missiles. It is important, as I see it, that these weapons and delivery systems are not primarily oriented at striking Arctic targets. They are strategic systems geared toward the global balance of power and deterrence. Similarly, hybrid threats to cybersecurity — including those embedded in Chinese telecommunications infrastructure, if they are allowed in Canada as part of our solution to Arctic infrastructure gaps — will constitute a threat to Canada through the Arctic.
While it’s best to situate these threats on the international level of analysis, not the regional security one, they do have an Arctic nexus, because we have Arctic capabilities that are important to detecting, deterring and defending against these global threats, and we should be investing in them more. To suggest that these are about defending the Arctic specifically, rather than about defending North America more generally, is a misrepresentation.
The second category of threats are those to the Arctic. Like climate change and pandemic threats, military and hybrid threats from outside the Arctic may portend, or threaten, particular locations and populations in the Arctic. Some are kinetic threats. We might think of Thule, in Greenland, as an obvious target in the case of a general world war given its strategic significance. However, I do not think most threats to the Canadian Arctic are conventional military ones. Instead, we might look, as Professor Huebert said, to misinformation campaigns designed to undermine the credibility of an Arctic actor or our democratic systems or to polarize debate on a sensitive issue. This category might include an attack below the threshold of armed conflict on a piece of critical infrastructure, such as a power plant, that would be designed to create panic and force Canada to direct its efforts and resources into dealing with that domestic problem.
The third category of threats are those in the Canadian Arctic. These include transport safety threats, like major air or maritime disasters; threats to populations from basic energy and water infrastructure failures; and the risk of political polarization. As the recent water crisis in Iqaluit demonstrated, Arctic citizens look to Canada’s military capabilities for vital emergency response if and when essential systems and services fail.
Arctic Canada faces a crisis of equity, independently worthy of prioritization, that can also be exploited by adversaries through disinformation efforts intended to sow discord and destabilize domestic risk environments. I actually think Canada’s 2017 Arctic defence policy does a good job at distinguishing between the international and Arctic regional levels of analysis. It references NATO’s role vis-à-vis Russian force projection into the North Atlantic rather than concern about military conflict arising from Arctic disputes.
Thus, I want to emphasize that as Arctic defence and security become more explicit priorities for Canada, for NORAD and for NATO, we need to carefully distinguish military threats to North American security that may pass through regions of the Arctic from those risks and threats arising in the Arctic because of local or regional vulnerabilities. Each risk axis requires solutions, but together, they form a matrix of Arctic resilience.
Most importantly, I hope that smart investments in Arctic defence and security are aligned with civilian priorities or provide dual use, or military and civilian, benefits wherever possible. I look forward to discussing this further during the question period. Thank you, senators.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Lackenbauer.
Next up is Mr. Andreas Østhagen.
Andreas Østhagen, Senior Researcher, Fridtjof Nansen Institute & High North Center at Nord University and Global Fellow at Wilson Center, as an individual: Thank you very much. I’m on a bit of an unstable internet connection in Florida with my mother-in-law. I’m not in Norway where I normally reside.
First of all, thank you for having me. I wouldn’t say I’m the foremost expert on the Canadian Arctic. However, I have been working in the Norwegian and broader security environment, so it’s important to bear in mind that many of my reflections come from the Norwegian security perspective on the Arctic. I’ll keep it brief, as we’ve been asked to do, and make three overarching points that we could elaborate on. In some ways, they reflect what’s been said already by Professor Lackenbauer and Professor Huebert.
The first one is that we, as researchers looking at Arctic security and conflict — and perhaps also as politicians — tend to define Arctic security in terms of static results, or we tend to find the answers to the question of conflict in the Arctic — such as whether there will be a scramble for the North — without taking into account that things change quickly. That’s a given in international politics at large, but perhaps even more so in the Arctic because of what the others already mentioned and what we could discuss: the various climatic, economic and political changes in the North.
It’s important to recognize that although we tended to say, in the past, that the chance of a conflict emerging or erupting in the Arctic was rather low, these things are also open for reinterpretation.
This leads to what overlaps with Professor Lackenbauer’s point about the different ways of interpreting threats to the Arctic. I take a different approach. I call it the different levels of Arctic security dynamics or different interactions in the Arctic. The point is still the same as the one Mr. Lackenbauer is making, though. It’s the need to differentiate between what happens at a circumpolar level.
[Technical difficulties] still, even today, maintains a strong interest in keeping Arctic relations peaceful. Russia still maintains an interest in the primacy and the safeguarding of the Law of the Sea in the Arctic and separating the circumpolar dynamics from those dynamics that, say, have something to do with conflictual issues elsewhere.
The most obvious example, of course, is relations between NATO and Russia that might be dragged into the Arctic. We’re seeing that happen now, maybe the most we’ve ever seen in the modern history of the Arctic due to the invasion of Ukraine. China and the focus on China in the Arctic can in many ways be said to follow the same logic. It only to some extent has to do with Chinese actions in the Arctic. Instead, it has a lot to do with the systemic rivalry between the West, or the U.S., and China, dragging that into the Arctic. We have to separate between these things.
Adding a third layer to it are those specific points in the Arctic where conflict might erupt. I’m particularly talking about the European part of the Arctic. This is also my third point, the need to differentiate between the North American parts of the Arctic and the European parts of the Arctic, at least when we’re talking about immediate threat.
Professor Rob Huebert highlighted that there is no threat of a direct invasion in the Arctic, but for the Norwegian Arctic, there definitely is. Norway shares a land border and a long maritime boundary with Russia, and those security relations are now more fraught than ever.
There are issues in the Arctic. Not the [Technical difficulties] scramble for the Arctic, the resource race that people were talking about a decade ago, but there are specific issues, whether it’s fisheries in Svalbard or around the archipelago, or the legal status of the various passages or whether it’s the continental shelf extensions. There are issues in the Arctic that might not lead to outright war or hostility among states but that still might be a dispute that might erupt into something more, especially now given the security situation with Russia. There again, the European Arctic is in a much more vulnerable situation than the North American Arctic.
I’ll leave it at that. I’m looking forward to your questions. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Østhagen.
Finally, we go to Professor Wilfrid Greaves; please proceed.
Wilfrid Greaves, Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of Victoria, as an individual: Good afternoon, senators. I’m honoured to be here. Thank you for inviting me to discuss these important issues related to politics and security in the Arctic. I’m privileged to be speaking with you today from the traditional territories of the Lekwungen-speaking peoples on southern Vancouver Island, where I’m fortunate to live and work.
I’m particularly honoured to be here in the company of my distinguished and expert colleagues. As they and others have noted, it’s an important and uncertain time in global politics, with significant ramifications for Canada at every turn. We all know the crisis into which Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has plunged the international community. We all know the current and likely future challenges to the liberal international order posed by a powerful and authoritarian China. We all know the urgent need to make the investments necessary to support long-term human development and well-being and we all know too well the present and looming menace which the climate crisis poses for our world.
Each of these challenges runs directly through the Arctic, and we must acknowledge that they are substantial. However, Canada does not face these challenges alone, nor does their urgency mean there are no opportunities for international cooperation, mutual benefit or human and economic development.
In my remaining time, I wish to offer the following thoughts on the implications of the current moment for the future of Arctic politics.
First, for more than 30 years, the Arctic has been characterized by cooperation among states, Indigenous peoples, non‑governmental organizations and, increasingly, non-Arctic states. This model of pan-Arctic cooperation has made considerable achievements, including facilitating international agreements governing Arctic search and rescue, oil pollution preparedness, scientific cooperation and High Arctic fishing.
The Russian Federation, which accounts for around half the land, water, coastline and the people in the entire global Arctic, was a vital partner in these negotiated political achievements. Effective pan-Arctic cooperation will always require Russian participation. However, Russia’s aggressive and destructive international behaviour makes the prospect of continued cooperation at this time extremely problematic. Canada and the other members of the Arctic Council have paused their participation in the institution’s work pending assessment of how best to proceed under the current circumstances.
Essential cooperation may continue, but at this time we should recognize that one of the costs of standing against Russian aggression in Eastern Europe is Russia’s full participation in the governance of the Arctic region. The bodies of the Arctic Council will remain limited in their work until the war against Ukraine is resolved, and the manner of that war’s resolution will impact the future of Arctic politics and cooperation.
With that in mind, I believe that Canada would be well served to seek opportunities for cooperation with its other Arctic neighbours, four of whom are also NATO allies. The recent announcement regarding renewal of NORAD’s North Warning System is an example of necessary defence cooperation in the region. However, other issues persist, be they Arctic boundary disputes or ongoing disagreement over the legal status of the Northwest Passage. Addressing such issues among friendly allied nations in the Arctic will only strengthen their unity and effectiveness in the face of external challenges. If done well, they may even achieve important domestic priorities related to economic and social development and reconciliation with Indigenous peoples.
Although no institution will replace the Arctic Council, the other seven Arctic states are free, democratic societies aligned in their values and many of their interests, and we should pursue all opportunities to deepen their collaboration on Arctic issues until such time as real pan-Arctic cooperation is again possible.
My final point, however, is that nothing about the current crisis in Ukraine or its implications for cooperation in the Arctic affects the ecological, economic and human realities of climate change. Although in the near term there is continued need for the extraction and consumption of fossil fuels, this historic moment in global politics should affirm the trend in the North American Arctic away from fossil fuel development.
The 2016 United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement between Prime Minister Trudeau and former president Barack Obama was an important milestone in this process, designating virtually all Canadian and American Arctic waters off limits to future offshore Arctic oil and gas licensing. In 2021, the newly elected Government of Greenland instituted its own ban on oil and gas drilling within its waters.
We have seen in recent weeks how the immediacy of war can distract us from the longer-term imperative to make our economies and societies more sustainable, but the future of healthy communities and economies in Canada’s North and across the Arctic cannot be based on the energy systems of the past, particularly when they are the very root of the problem that is driving both chronic and acute challenges across the region and globally. In defending ourselves against aggressors, we cannot fail to also secure ourselves against the climate threats of our own collective making.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Greaves. Thank you all for your opening statements. They are a very helpful exploration of lenses and the various degrees of tensions and conflicts that are in play here, both locally and globally.
We will now proceed to questions. Please note that this panel must finish at 3:05. In order to allow as many questions as possible, four minutes will be allotted for each question, including the answer. I ask that you keep your questions succinct and, where possible, that you identify which witness your question is directed to.
I’d like to offer the first question to our deputy chair, Senator Dagenais.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My question is for Mr. Huebert.
The positions Russians have taken over the past five to seven years seem to be fairly clear when it comes to the claims of oil resources in the Arctic.
Russian political power is steadfast in stating that its economic development relies on oil, while Canada is talking about giving up on that energy sector.
Russians still believe in oil, but I would tell you that Mr. Trudeau’s government prefers to talk about the environment.
That said, do you think Canada’s political battle with Russia is already lost, as Russia has doubled the number of military bases to monitor the Arctic territory since 2015 and as it clearly wants — and I am indeed saying that it clearly wants — to develop oil and the navigable passage?
Or do you think Russia will use its army to assert its authority in the Arctic?
[English]
Mr. Huebert: You ask almost as if it’s a possibility. It’s already been occurring. One of the most outstanding statistics that often gets overlooked is that immediately after the sanction regime was put into place when the Ukrainian war began — and I want to stress that the war started in 2014; it didn’t start in 2022 — we have targeted sanctions against the Russians for their northern oil, and in fact their oil production increased substantially. They don’t make any of their Paris numbers, and this trade goes with China.
We don’t know what the deal was that they signed with the Chinese. That remains a secret. But it was signed between Putin and Xi at the highest level. So, we do see the production. We also see, incidentally, and as is often overlooked, that the Norwegians also increased their oil — not to the same degree as what the Russians have done, but earlier in 2021, they, of course, opened new territories on their ocean resources to develop.
The Russians have been developing the ability to fight a war since 2000 when they almost lost the first battle against the Chechens. We see the continuation of the ability, and they have to pay for that ability. That ability to pay comes from their oil and gas and that is why it was so important for the Russians, when we attempted to bring in the sanction regime, to keep the oil flowing to the Chinese as they have. So we see a direct relationship between their geo-economics through the use of oil to their growing geostrategic capabilities overall.
I dare say, sir, what you also have to add is that we see a clear development of the ability to engage in tactical nuclear war. I want to make this very clear, because this is a shift that people have not recognized. Even with Putin’s statement about the threat of nuclear war; they issued that statement — that policy position — a year ago, and the types of weapon systems are, in fact, nuclear-war-capable, and the Americans have been responding in response. So all of this is tied together to your very good question. They need the economics to be able to challenge us in terms of the rest of Europe. They’re arming themselves with that capability.
The Chair: Thank you so much for the question and that answer.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: Welcome to all the witnesses, whose comments are very educational. My question is for Mr. Huebert.
I have read a number of your articles and comments you have made on the Trudeau government. After Ukraine was invaded, specifically, you said that “... the Trudeau government will respond with firm words of encouragement and support, but do as little as possible.”
What is your position on the situation in Ukraine? Do you think the Canadian government’s response is too weak concerning a potential expansion of Russia toward other countries?
[English]
Mr. Huebert: If I’m being honest, and I know that is what is required of our testifying, I would say yes. Because what we’ve seen clearly from Georgia onward is that we’ve attempted to appease the Russians by looking for other means of cooperation. We look for other avenues of saying, “Well, what’s happening in Chechnya is just too bad; it’s too bad that there were probably about 80,000 casualties in Chechnya. It’s too bad there were about 110,000 casualties in Georgia, but that doesn’t really pertain to us; we can still do business.” So after the war started in 2014 in Ukraine, it was clear it was a pattern of behaviour. It was clear that the Russians will see this as a continuance, and I would suspect that their next targets will be Moldavia followed by the Baltic states.
Once again, when you are dealing with an authoritative regime that is intent on using military force as an expansionary capability, the only means by which you are able to respond is a form of deterrence that has to be based on a willingness to actually engage in battle if necessary. Otherwise, we know in terms of how these states have regimed that ultimately they will continue until they’re met with such resistance, and that means that, for example —
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: You say that the Canadian government’s response to the situation in Ukraine has been relatively weak. Earlier today, the Prime Minister announced that F-35s might be purchased to replace the F-18s. In your opinion, has Canada’s response been far too weak? Should we be sending a clear message to Russia that we don’t accept the illegal invasion of Ukraine?
[English]
Mr. Huebert: I will agree with you, sir, because when the government changed its decision to provide RADARSAT — and that deals clearly with a northern asset that is so superb — we changed the view and, after 2014, did not provide the Ukrainians with the RADARSAT imagery. We also did not provide lethal aid, when in fact we don’t have a policy against the provision of lethal aid as demonstrated by our policy towards Saudi Arabia. Also, when it came to any type of munitions or support, we did not change that position until the war resumed in February of 2022.
We did maintain the trainers in Ukraine — but, of course, we pulled them out as soon as a threat was imminent — but that was about the only thing we can find that we actually provided in terms of meaningful support. We provided political governance assistance. We did a very good job in helping them to deal with some of the corruption issues they had. However, in terms of the military side of our contribution to them, after the war began in 2014 — maybe it’s a shortcoming of me as a researcher — I cannot find any policy actions that contributed to the kinetic capability of the Ukrainians to defend, with the exception of Operation REASSURANCE, which was also very important.
Senator Anderson: Qujannamiik. My question is for Professor Huebert or any other witnesses that would like to add to the response. I’m from the Arctic. I see very little in terms of enhanced Arctic security. In your opinion, what is Arctic security?
I just want to add that we cannot totally disregard the impacts of climate change in the Arctic. I’m very familiar with it, coming from Tuktoyaktuk and given a recent conversation I had with Brigadier-General Godbout from Joint Task Force North in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, regarding their engagement in Operation LENTUS, which responds to climate change impacts. They responded to three such cases in a short time frame, which was unprecedented and places a strain on their military response.
In your opinion, how does Arctic security look, given the challenges we currently face and also in terms of the capital planning, infrastructure and appropriate allocation of resources and the time that takes for them to happen in the North?
Mr. Huebert: You’ve asked perhaps the most profound question of our time, because we are facing, as I said in my introductory comments, existential threats, and by existential, I mean to the very existence. Climate change, as you’ve just so eloquently pointed out, is a direct threat in terms of our existence and our future, and there’s no taking away.
The military threat that the Russians now pose, particularly when we bring in the nuclear capability, is of equal importance. The real challenge that we now face is that actions to respond to one of these threats contradict our actions to respond to the other. Professor Greaves is absolutely right. We need the Russians to be able to cooperate with us and the Chinese to address the issues of climate change that you are talking about. But the problem that we face when we have a country such as Russia, who is so clearly directed at challenging, if not defeating, our way of life, is that the question of cooperation becomes so problematic. In other words, if we have a country that is so willing to go to war, as it has demonstrated, how do we then have the capability of cooperating on climate change? As we saw in terms of their increase of oil production after 2014, I think we’ve seen part of the problem that comes in this context.
You asked what we need to do in the Arctic. The first question that we see is NORAD will become more integrated with NATO, and that is a function of the weapons systems. We no longer have the luxury of time, if we ever had it. The hypersonics are now so fast that you need to make decisions almost immediately. This is what General VanHerck, the commander of NORAD, refers to as decision-making superiority. We need to have the domain awareness of knowing what is happening at every single level. That has to be understood, and that’s why there are certain steps, such as the Pathfinder initiative, which is trying to be able to not only get the information together to understand it but also having a third step, and it is a step that Canadians don’t want to hear about. We also have to start developing the ability to respond when these threats develop.
So if a Poseidon torpedo is launched against a Canadian target — north, south, wherever it’s going — you need to respond immediately. If a Kinzhal missile is launched from a Tupolev Tu-95, you have to have your weapons systems in place to respond. That means Canada has to go from the sensors and the ability of knowing to the ability to react, and we have to do it with our NATO allies and with the American allies. There’s no way we can do it by ourselves, but we have to make it a meaningful contribution. Otherwise, we end up in one of the worst sovereignty issues that I think we worry about the most, and that is when the Americans and possibly the Europeans start saying Canada can’t do it, and they have to do it for us. And then we lose all ability to contribute to this discussion and, basically, to the defence of Canada.
The Chair: Professor Huebert, in view of the nature of that question, I’m going to ask our three other witnesses if they would like to add to the debate. I see Professor Lackenbauer would like to go first.
Mr. Lackenbauer: Thank you, senator. I think Rob gave a very narrow articulation of security.
To the senator’s question, we need to look at security as having at least five dimensions: military, political, economical, environmental and societal. Dealing with a lot of security issues would require whole-of-government and whole-of-society responses. That would include community partners like Sergeant Jackie Jacobson, Master Corporal Emmanuel Adams, and the Tuktoyaktuk Canadian Ranger Patrol. It will involve our Coast Guard Auxiliary and the private sector. Real opportunity spaces exist for alignments between very real defence and hard security requirements: airfields, telecommunications, port and harbour facilities. All of these are also critical enablers to bolster these other sectors of security.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Professor Lackenbauer. Professor Greaves, did you want to contribute to this question?
Mr. Greaves: Thank you, I would like to respond. I agree with Professor Huebert that it’s a profound question: What does security mean? It is an important one that can lead us in many academic directions. I would suggest that we should understand security as not having a particular given or objective meaning. Security is given different meanings in different countries in different contexts, depending upon their particular combinations of values and interests.
In the case of Canada, and the Canadian North, I would suggest that this thing that we call “security” is something that is determined through a process of interaction between at least four different kinds of points or nodes. The first would be governments, the federal government most prominently; the second would be expert opinion, my distinguished colleagues among them; the third would be general Canadian public opinion; and the fourth would be the opinions of northerners themselves, people who live in the North and are most directly affected by many of these considerations.
I think, as my colleagues know well, when we look over several decades, we see the meaning changing. There isn’t a given meaning. We give meaning to this question of what security means and how we should respond to it appropriately. When we’re doing that properly, I would suggest we’re doing so in light of the best evidence, analysis and facts that reflect the world of that moment.
So this question of what Arctic security looks like is in some ways, but not exclusively, up to the members of this committee and other decision makers, and then, of course, the people of the North to decide. We don’t always agree about that and that process of different definitions of Arctic security is, I think, also a very well-established part of this discourse.
Mr. Østhagen: Thank you, senator. I would like to dive into one thing that Professor Huebert highlighted, and it’s deterrence. It’s not necessarily widening the scope of security, but it’s the main thing Mr. Huebert highlights as to how to provide security, and it is deterrence.
In this session here, the focus is on Arctic deterrence, so Arctic security.
I think it’s important also to highlight that this deterrence is connected to all the other different domains where we engage with Russia. From a Canadian point of view, there is Canadian participation vis-à-vis in Ukraine or supporting Ukraine; Canadian participation in the Baltics, in NATO operations in the Baltics, supporting the Baltics, deterring Russia from doing something with NATO allies in the Baltics; Canadian participation in the ongoing Cold Response military exercise in northern Norway, the Norwegian Arctic, deterring Russia from doing something there; and deterring Russia from doing something in the Canadian Arctic. These things are all connected. You can’t just look at one of them.
I would like to highlight the cooperation point with Russia. I take the point that dealing with Russia is increasingly difficult, but in certain domains and on certain issues you have no choice, barring outright conflict with Russia, to actually engage with them. This is from a Norwegian perspective, but we are a neighbouring country with Russia. We have to talk to Russia about management of the resources that we share at sea with Russia. We have to talk to Russia about nuclear safety protocols when they are transporting nuclear waste along our coasts, despite what happens in Ukraine.
I think it’s important to highlight that, yes, we can deter Russia, and that is the goal. That has been the Norwegian policy long before 2014 or what happened a month ago. But at the same time, we also have to deal with Russia in certain domains, and these are two sides of the same coin.
The Chair: Thank you very much. That’s great.
Senator Richards: My question is for Mr. Huebert. We have the leader of the NDP expressing his dismay that 2% of gross is simply an arbitrary number. I thought when he said that maybe he would go to 2.5% and that would be great. Which is to say we don’t spend hardly enough on our defence, and we have 1,500 rangers protecting the North.
I also think that China is an underground player in Russia, and is, if not directing Putin, certainly allowing him to do what he does for their own nefarious interests, so I think they’re as much a player in the Arctic as Russia is in a certain way.
I come back to my original statement about 2% of gross. How much do you think it would take to get our Armed Forces up to speed?
The 82nd Airborne, for instance, has more forces than all our Canadian Forces does and that is really a shame, sir.
Mr. Huebert: Those are excellent questions. There are three points to it.
First of all, on the one point, the 2% is arbitrary in one sense; in other words, NATO had to create something to say we have to do more. So you can argue in terms of whether 2% is a sacrosanct number. If we get there, do we stop? No, we don’t.
The second point emphasizes something that Mr. Lackenbauer said earlier. Regarding a lot of the materials that we had said in Strong, Secure, Engaged, if we actually did what it called for, we would be a long way in terms of being able to provide for the necessary security of Canadians and northern Canadians.
I’ll point out that Finland, Denmark — no, I was going to say Sweden, but that would be a slip — but Finland, Denmark, the U.K. and the Netherlands were all able to make decisions on the F-35 within a two- or three-year period; in other words, decisions were made very quickly. I think the Finns gave us a real example in how to move fast.
And the reality is we need to have the surveillance capability and we need to have the war fighting. That also means that we have to have the frigates going, something else that hasn’t gone. Can we do it? Well, the Finns did it. The Ukrainians were developing it. So it is, indeed, possible but we have to do it.
And we’ve shown no signs since having a fully costed defence policy of 2017 that, to a very large degree, got a lot of issues correct in terms of their anticipation. We just have not delivered on it. That is the first step.
We will have to go further. We will have to go to space assets. We will have to go there in terms of a response. And we have to go lower. We have to make sure that the runways, the hangars, all these issues that seem sort of bread and butter are actually properly ensured, that the runway in Inuvik is able to handle our air-to-air refuelers and the technical side. So it’s the big and broad, but we have to do it.
Senator Dasko: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to the witnesses for being here today. I have a couple of questions.
I want to focus in on the readiness of NORAD and NATO to respond to the threats as you see them because, of course, we are members of NATO and we do operate in that context. So how ready are they to respond to the threat? I’d like to ask Professor Huebert this question.
And I would also like to add that last week at this committee we heard from witnesses from the Armed Forces. And if I could sort of paraphrase what they said about these issues, I would say it’s something along the lines of the plans that our military has are appropriate to the threats that we are being faced with.
So, Professor Huebert, I’d like you to respond to that. And again, they are saying that the plans in place — not everything is, of course, built yet — are appropriate.
Those are my questions. Thank you.
Mr. Huebert: I would say the plans, as we understand it, are appropriate. The Strong, Secure, Engaged defence policy gives us a good guidance in terms of how to proceed. It’s a very good first step. But they remain plans to a very large degree.
How well are we prepared for meeting Russia in terms of a conventional war if they decide to, say, expand to the boundaries where we are supporting the Ukrainians? And that remains a possibility if we read between the lines on Putin’s speeches. I would say at this point in time we’re probably moderately well prepared to be able to engage upon that.
The deployments that we’ve had that have been pointed out in terms of some of the deterrence meetings that Mr. Østhagen was talking about have been in place since the Ukrainian war began in 2014.
The problem that we have, though, is how seriously we should take Putin’s threat to use tactical nuclear weapons. In that regard, I don’t have much confidence that we’ve given it the thought that is required because we assume that we would never do that. That is so unthinkable to use Herman Kahn’s famous terminology, thinking the unthinkable. I don’t think that we’ve gone on that particular context.
And I also don’t think that we fully have appreciated that in any war that will start on a regional basis, Canada is completely involved because of its NATO commitment. Are we at a war‑fighting capability? I don’t think we’re at that capability because we didn’t think it was going to come to that.
Are we able to meet in terms of deterrence? Yes, I think that we’re at a reasonable stage at that point. But we need to be going to the next stage, in my view.
Senator Dasko: Are you referring to NATO and NORAD in your answer, or are you just referring to our own readiness to respond?
Mr. Huebert: Sorry, you asked about NORAD.
Yes. In NORAD, I think if we take seriously the public comments that General Glen VanHerck has given in testimony before Congress, NORAD is not ready to meet the hypersonic threat. In other words, he’s a very straightforward-talking leader, and in testimony that I have read he has said that they cannot detect all of the hypersonic threats.
They can also not detect at this point all of the autonomous underwater vehicle threats that they’ve seen the Russians have ready.
So I think that if the Americans are acknowledging with their senior leadership of NORAD that there are questions in terms of how much they would know, I think it’s a fair and safe bet to say that Canada is not prepared either.
Senator Dasko: Thank you.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you, chair.
And thank you to all four of you. I’ve learned a lot from you. Thank you for your presence. Because of time issues, I will limit my question by asking Mr. Greaves and Mr. Lackenbauer.
I’ve been a member of this committee for many, many years. And for many years we studied the issue of terrorism. And on that issue, I always used to remind my colleagues that security is also an issue of Canadians feeling secure in their country and them getting the best security if the people are able to give you intelligence.
So my questions are probably very different from those of my colleagues, and that is on the increased military presence. All I ever hear is we have to increase our military presence. We have to get all kinds of military equipment into the Arctic area. What does it do to the human rights of the people on the ground? And what does it do to their way of living? I think that is also a part of security.
I’d love to hear from you, first, Professor Lackenbauer. Sorry if I have pronounced your name incorrectly.
Mr. Lackenbauer: No, it was great, Senator Jaffer. And thank you for a very important question.
So I think there is the long history in the North of dealing with various surges of military presence, so we can learn from those histories.
What I find marvellous, and I think what many of the federal officials found during the consultations both leading to Strong, Secure, Engaged and the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework was a strong desire by northerners to be part of this security opportunity set that is unfolding.
So I think in your question there’s also great opportunities to leverage the tremendous amount of expertise, knowledge and awareness of homelands that have been inhabited for as long as anybody can remember, in sharing that knowledge as a complement to many of the other systems that Professor Huebert and others are referring to as part of the system of systems; that situational awareness is not just satellites in space; it’s not just the North Warning System being modernized; it’s all of the people who are around and aware of what is going on within their area. That’s the human environment as well as the physical environment.
We can certainly do better to find ways of harnessing all of these sensors that are out there: human sensors, sensors possessed by a whole bunch of different government departments at different levels of government, using the Inuit-Crown Partnership to tighten some of those relationships between rights holders and knowledge keepers at the community level and work together as a team synthesizing all of this information, and not only having that information being shared with defence decision makers — obviously, one client of it — but also sharing it with people at the community level.
I think we will really cause harm if we treat this as a trade-off between hard security and human security. In Canada, we need both. Our government is committed to doing both. It’s striking an appropriate balance and actually increasing the overall pie that we’re dedicating to all of these dimensions of security.
The Chair: In balance, let’s move to Professor Greaves. You have one minute remaining.
Mr. Greaves: Thank you for the question. I would echo much of what Professor Lackenbauer just said.
But I would add that, in addition to the history of negative impacts on northerners of various military and other state activities, one of the really important developments that’s occurred in the aftermath of that is the growth of Indigenous governments and the growth of Indigenous organizations who play a vital role in representing the views, perspectives and interests of Indigenous peoples in relationship to the Crown.
What I would note is that in addition to the existing relationships and organizational structures that exist within Canada, I believe it would well serve Canada’s Arctic security interests to extend those kinds of relationships outside of our own borders toward our Arctic neighbours. The Government of Greenland should be seen as a vital partner both in terms of regional continental defence and security, but also as an Inuit-led government, as an Inuit polity, and an important actor in the representation of Arctic Indigenous peoples, and similarly in the western North American Arctic, the Alaska-Yukon border region, regarding the need to engage with Indigenous peoples and the representation and sub-state governments in order to ensure that any negative effects on northerners and Indigenous peoples are mitigated to the greatest degree possible. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Greaves.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to all our witnesses for being here this afternoon. There is a lot of information and certainly many questions we could continue to ask. I’m going to ask for two quick elaborations.
Mr. Huebert, you were talking about Russia and its ability to fight, not deter, war. You also talked about communications in the North. I believe the reference was to a lot of undersea security capability. Would you mind elaborating on that? What do you believe the present capability is now and what we should be thinking about around that undersea security capability?
Mr. Huebert: We don’t talk about this enough. Thank you for a very important question.
Most people think our communications are all just through the air, through the internet, and that communications no longer have a physical bearing. The reality is that they don’t. They are, of course, cable-based, and people who live in the North know the vulnerability of not having cable communications.
What the Russians have been developing — we can trace this back to about 2008 — is the ability to have several submarine capabilities that can cut those cables and cut communications. In Canada, we have to start giving serious thought to how we defend against these submarines. In some instances they’re manned, and in other instances they are autonomous underwater vehicles. We have to be able to deter and stop the submarines when they’re coming in or near our undersea cable capabilities. We also have to have the ability to repair any damage that is done. This is a capability that we have not been looking at to this point and probably will have to.
It also leads to the overall ability to detect and determine the new class of stealth submarines that are coming in the future. Currently, the Russians are focused on what is called bastion defence. For the time being, they will keep most of their subs around the Russian area, but as they move to develop the cruise missiles, they have what is called an SSGN, which is a submarine that carries cruise missiles. It’s with cruise missiles that you need to come in closer to the coastlines, and therefore we need to have the detection capabilities to determine and stop that threat if necessary.
Currently, we have no subs that can go into the Arctic region. That means cooperation with the Americans, unless we were to enter into the agreement. The Australians are entering into talks with the Americans and British to build nuclear subs. Once again, perhaps that could be something in the longer term, because there is the possibility of a Chinese SSGN threat going into the future.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
Professor Lackenbauer, one question that you offered to elaborate on or a comment you made near the end of your presentation was with respect to civilian protection. Could you take a moment to elaborate on what that encompasses from your view?
Mr. Lackenbauer: With a lot of attention being directed toward Arctic security, we find ourselves with a singular opportunity right now to find natural alignments between necessary investments in defence and hard security capabilities and what are very well-known, well-documented and well‑articulated civilian needs in the North.
Speaking to communications, we can’t be thinking about simply getting broadband access or reliable communications to the North. In a world of intensifying competition, we need to build in strategic redundancy. It doesn’t make sense to lay a dedicated military top secret cable without bundling that together with civilian cables that at the same time can be serving community needs.
We’ve had the needs assessments. The moment now is to take stock and in an agile manner synchronize efforts across Canadian governments and with Indigenous leadership. That, to me, is absolutely ideal, to see forward momentum and to find ways of carving out dual use wherever that is possible. It’s not always going to be possible. We need to make sure we don’t set up unrealistic expectations that every investment will have a civilian benefit, but wherever that can be the case, we need to make sure we are grounding these investments in what has been well established at the territorial, Indigenous government and Inuit Nunangat levels, to take that as an example.
The Chair: Thank you, Professor Lackenbauer.
Senator Boehm: I’d like to thank our witnesses for their comprehensive overview of the security situation in the Arctic. I know time is working against me, so I’ll try to ask this quickly, having listened to other responses.
We in Canada have been complacent with respect to Arctic security. Professor Huebert, I know you’ve been writing and researching this for years. We’ve benefited from your knowledge on this. I believe all four of you have mentioned increasingly that there’s going to be a convergence between NATO and NORAD in terms of interoperability but also in terms of strategic policy focus.
My question, and perhaps we could start with Mr. Østhagen and then others can chime in if there’s more time, is on the issue of deterrence. Can we, as Canada, learn from the three European members of NATO, and even those who are not members of NATO — I’m referring to Sweden and Finland — in terms of preparedness, deterrence and also engagement, since our engagement with Russia for almost 15 years now has been very poor and really founded more in terms of side conversations at the Arctic Council?
Mr. Østhagen: Thank you very much, senator. I’ll be very brief in my response.
The quick answer to your question is yes, I think there’s a bit to learn. Having lived a bit in Canada myself and doing my PhD there and working there for a bit, it did sometimes strike me that the Canadian Arctic security debate is very either-or. It’s either serenity or, say, play down the military dimensions but up the climate or Indigenous dimensions.
As the other experts on this panel have said, these are not necessarily mutually exclusive options. There’s room for some more. At the same time, I don’t see that Canadian defence needs to develop in the same way that the Norwegian, Swedish or Finnish defence has. Canadians face a rather different security situation than the Arctic European NATO members or Sweden and Finland. That’s also important to recognize.
As Professor Huebert highlighted as well, there are different types of capabilities, whether it’s subsea or whether we’re talking about missiles or cyberspace, which also hasn’t been highlighted here. You can also talk about China and the role that could play in the Arctic, given certain vulnerabilities.
I do think that, yes, there’s something to be learned. At the same time, in general now, all of the Arctic countries, whether they are NATO members or not, have woken up to this new reality. Professor Huebert mentioned 2014, but we could argue that it happened even before that, in 2007 or 2008. But it has been a slow awakening, and I think we all have to reinvent how we deter Russia in the Arctic.
Also in this debate as to whether Russia had a defensive or aggressive posture in the North, I was always a bit in between, but obviously what happened in Ukraine changes our perception of Russia in the Arctic — although it must be said that Russia has not done something in the Arctic after the invasion in Ukraine. They haven’t dragged the conflict northwards, because they would not actually benefit from that. At the same time, it’s changed our perceptions of that, and that’s why the exercise Cold Response that is taking place right now in northern Norway, with a Canadian contingent, is very important. Thank you.
Senator Boehm: Thank you.
The Chair: I apologize to Senator Boehm and to our witnesses. Senator Boehm says he was just getting started. I have a sense that we all were just getting started. It’s very difficult for me to intervene and bring us to the end of this panel, but we have others to hear from.
On behalf of the committee, Mr. Huebert, Mr. Lackenbauer, Mr. Østhagen and Mr. Greaves, thank you so much for provoking an interesting debate and some really probing questions to which great answers were provided. You’ve guided us through a very helpful discussion. We’re at the beginning of this, and you’ve given us a number of lenses to look through. We’re taking the concept of differentiation away with us today, because there is no one single lens, obviously, through which one can understand the issues we’re looking at. So thank you very much for your contributions.
We are now with our second panel, and we are looking at governance and cooperation on Arctic security. We welcome today Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Professor, University of Western Ontario and Senior Fellow at the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History at the University of Toronto; Suzanne Lalonde, Professor, Faculty of Law at Université de Montréal; and Lassi Heininen, Professor, University of Lapland, Finland, Leader of Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security, and Chair of the Arctic Circle Mission Council on the GlobalArctic.
Thank you for joining us today by video conference. We’ll now invite you to provide your opening remarks, which will be followed by questions from our members. I remind you that you each have four minutes for opening statements. We will begin this afternoon with Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon. Over to you, Ms. Riddell-Dixon.
Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Professor, University of Western Ontario, and Senior Fellow at the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History, University of Toronto, as an individual: Thank you very much.
At present, the biggest military threat in our Arctic is the potential for spillover from Russia’s war in Ukraine. This is a threat that’s been discussed by previous presenters, both this week and last.
Therefore, in my four minutes, I want to focus on a different issue, one that is often mentioned in the media, although the coverage tends to be superficial and often misleading: namely, the allegation that Russia is aggressively claiming Canada’s Arctic seabed resources up to 200 nautical miles, which is 370 kilometres, from our shore.
Contrary to this allegation, Russia is, in this case, abiding by international law and, frankly, it is only doing what Denmark/Greenland have already done and what Canada is likely to do in the near future.
Last spring, Russia filed an addendum with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, revising its 2015 submission pertaining to the Arctic Ocean. On the map that I sent you, you can see Russia’s delineation depicted in yellow. Russia’s proposed extended continental shelf now stretches from its exclusive economic zone all the way across the Arctic Ocean to the exclusive economic zones of Canada and Greenland.
Last spring, when Russia filed this expansive delineation, Western media accused Russia of aggression. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, those criticisms have resumed. However, Russia’s expansive delineation does not violate international law, nor is Russia’s behaviour very different from that of its Arctic neighbours.
I hope you will give me the opportunity to explain why this is the case during the question period.
As you can see from the map, there are large overlaps between the extended continental shelves delineated by Canada, Denmark/Greenland and Russia. The light blue lines north of Alaska indicate the area likely to be included in the U.S. submission, although we won’t know the exact details until the U.S. actually files its submission with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The green and yellow stripes indicate overlaps between the delineations of Canada and Russia, and the pink and yellow stripes indicate overlaps between the delineations of Denmark/Greenland and Russia. The area outlined in blue, which includes the North Pole, indicates overlaps in the extended continental shelves of Russia, Canada and Greenland.
The overlaps are huge, and they’re going to be even bigger when the United States files its submissions, which raises this question: What are the prospects for maritime boundary delimitation? In other words, what are the prospects for resolving the overlaps? Sadly, the highly cooperative relations that Canada had with its Arctic neighbours, including Russia, in the delineation of their respective Arctic continental shelves have ground to a halt in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In closing, I chose to focus on the extended continental shelf, not to minimize the threats of Russian aggression emanating from other parts of the world but because misconceptions about this issue are prevalent and because, in formulating effective policy, we need to be clear about what is and what is not a threat to Canada’s national security.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Riddell-Dixon.
[Translation]
Suzanne Lalonde, Professor, Faculty of Law, Université de Montréal, as an individual: Thank you. Honourable senators, it’s an honour to be here with you. As an expert in the law of the sea, I want to share with you some preliminary thoughts.
In today’s environment, it’s hard to insist on what the law brings and its strengths. However, even at its most basic level, the rule of law principle provides countries with a stable, predictable and orderly environment in which to operate. It’s a bulwark against the arbitrary.
The five Arctic coastal states recognized this when they adopted the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008. Through this instrument, the five countries committed to respecting the legal framework of the law of the sea, peacefully resolving their disputes in the region and taking a more collaborative approach.
The moratorium on high seas commercial fishing adopted in 2017 was born of an initial agreement among the five countries. The Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation was also negotiated in 2017.
Therefore, despite tensions resulting from the annexation of Crimea or accusations of interference and hacking, the countries in the region remained certain that it was in their overriding national interest to abide by legal rules and build on cooperation.
Given the aggression in Ukraine, I don’t know when, or even if, it will be possible to reestablish common ground as things were.
[English]
However, at this point, I would like to emphasize that even this commitment to the legal regime formalized in 2008, while critical, could only take us so far in regard to some highly sensitive issues. When it comes to the extended continental shelf, it has been repeatedly emphasized that the A4 — A5, including Russia — have been playing by the rules of the game. Indeed, all of the Arctic coastal states, save the U.S., have now filed their final submissions to the commission.
The maps published by the different governments reveal clear areas of overlapping claims, including, as Professor Riddell-Dixon has just told us, between Russia, Canada and Denmark/Greenland. Yet the rules of the game, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, provide no answer in terms of resolving these competing claims. Article 76 unambiguously declares that the commission process does not and cannot settle the issue of overlapping outer limits of the Arctic continental shelves. The legal regime has always provided that it is up to the states concerned themselves, through diplomatic channels and political dialogue, to determine their mutual boundaries.
The severance of relations between Russia and the West, therefore, does not bode well for the resolution of this sensitive issue. Vigilance will be needed.
But perhaps the long delays that afflict the commission process will actually be beneficial. Perhaps sufficient time will elapse to allow for a return to the collaborative approach that, thus far, has characterized the process unfolding in the Arctic. The commission is actually estopped, according to its own rules of procedure, from considering a submission if it includes an area in dispute, if there are overlaps, unless it has the prior concentric of all the parties to the dispute. Canada, Denmark and Russia have each given their explicit consent and have allowed the commission to proceed and evaluate their neighbours’ submissions.
I have to say that this is in stark contrast to other areas of the globe, like the South China Sea.
Adherence to the legal regime and dialogue are both necessary if Canada is to finally resolve the limits of its outer continental shelf in the Arctic. For this reason, I feel it would be essential to re-establish, at some point, lines of communication with Russia.
Finally, I have prepared and submitted briefing notes on the Northwest Passage in case it is of interest to the committee members. It’s well known there is a stark difference of legal opinion between Ottawa and Washington on the legal status of the Northwest Passage. I would stress that Canada and the U.S. have a long history of respectful collaboration in the Arctic. This pragmatic approach of agreeing to disagree and then proceeding to resolve issues of mutual interest and concern, I would argue, is more important than ever as the Arctic region bears the brunt of climate change and as foreign interest in the Northwest Passage increases.
Finally, as for Russia, on this issue, we have been unacknowledged allies. The Russian Federation’s legal claim regarding the Northern Sea Route is almost the perfect mirror of the Canadian legal position. If Russia were to contest Canada’s position, it would be torpedoing its own claim. A rational analysis of its own national self-interest should therefore ensure the absence of any Russian challenge on this question at least. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Professor Lalonde.
Lassi Heininen, Professor, University of Lapland, Finland, Leader of Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security and Chair of the Arctic Circle Mission Council on the Global Arctic, as an individual: Good afternoon, senators. I send my best regards from Tromsø, in the northern part of Norway where I’m visiting the meeting of the International Arctic Science Committee.
I took the theme you gave us for this session seriously, and I summarized it as the “cooperation of governance to increase security.” First, I will outline briefly what I mean by this. Cooperation is an immaterial basis for human existence. It comes from the human instinct to survive. I argue that is something that we have had during the history of humankind and that we’ll have in the future.
In terms of governance, the previous speakers have said an important part of governance comes from international law and treaties. However, there are also other aspects of governance. In the Arctic, we don’t have a specific treaty, so cooperation is important for governance, particularly functional and flexible cooperation. This is a priority for the Arctic states in their policies. They emphasize the importance of functional cooperation on environmental protection, scientific cooperation, climate mitigation and trade.
I know people say that there is a new reality today, but I don’t understand that. Have we lost these aspects? I don’t think so. They are still there. If an Arctic treaty was not possible earlier, it’s not going to be possible in the near future either. That’s why to have good governance, we need functional cooperation. That will increase security.
Security, as was mentioned in the first panel, is how you define it. Security should be redefined every now and then. There are different premises, but I would say that military security is a very narrow understanding of security. There is, of course, some hysteria now because of the Ukrainian war, but that doesn’t mean that there won’t be other premises of security, first of all, because of environmental degradation, pollution and climate change. Security belongs to many people, not just the elites. You also have the people, citizens and civil society, and they know what security means to them. That’s why we have to listen to their voices, and we have to be ready to make a paradigm shift on security.
I’m worried that states are failing in their most important task, which is to secure the everyday life of their citizens, because of climate change. I’m not convinced that state leaders really understand what their main task is. We don’t even remember that a few months ago there was a conference in Glasgow on climate change. The media has completely forgotten it now, and that makes me worry about this.
When it comes to the Arctic, it’s interesting that this war didn’t start there. Although there were several experts and policy makers who predicted that for years, it never happened. We have not had a regional conflict or war in the Arctic — not during the Cold War and not after it. It’s just a story. There is a high degree of legal certainty, and that is something that we should appreciate. That is very much because of functional cooperation. Functional cooperation has occured because of the common interests of all parties, and it has been mutually beneficial. Of course, because that is the case, we would like to continue it. We don’t want to lose that. Much like environmental protections from the 1980s, this has been a success story. Climate change is a uniting threat multiplier. We have not lost them, but we might lose them if we don’t appreciate that, and if we do not continue that cooperation.
I don’t want to pass along any alarming messages because I don’t think it’s relevant. It’s interesting that since the Cold War, there have been nuclear weapons systems and a great power rivalry in the Arctic. Still, we have been able to continue this cooperation because it has been mutually beneficial and it has been attractive for the parties.
The question of what we do now is something we discussed yesterday, for the whole day, here in Tromsø. How do we maintain that cooperation? How do we keep some common ground there? It’s challenging and difficult, but it’s not impossible. We can do it if we concentrate.
I will say one more thing: Professor Lalonde said that we agree to disagree. This is very important. I’m afraid that we have lost this wisdom from the Cold War, because we don’t have procedures or structures like arms control. That is one reason why we are where we are now. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Professors Heininen, Riddell-Dixon and Lalonde.
We will now proceed to questions. Please note that four minutes will be allotted to each question, including the answer. Again, I ask that you identify which witness your question is directed to and to keep your questions succinct in order to allow as many interventions as possible.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: I’d like to thank our witnesses. My question is for Ms. Lalonde.
Ms. Lalonde, when we read about what has been done in recent years to conquer the Arctic, we learn that Vladimir Putin’s government has entered into hydrocarbon university research agreements with China. In addition, Russian oil companies based in the Arctic have developed investment alliances with oil companies like BP and ExxonMobil in the United States, as well as other companies in Italy and Norway. This was, of course, before Russia invaded Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the Government of Canada is talking about protecting the environment and polar waters, in addition to having to respond to Indigenous land claims to Arctic waters. Do you believe that the strength of Canada’s claims and positions, particularly on transit fee collection on the Northern Sea Route, will carry any weight in potential discussions with Russia and even other countries such as the United States, so that the Far North waterway becomes international?
Ms. Lalonde: Thank you for the question, senator.
I just wanted to clarify that it is Canada’s idea to set up a fee collection system and operationalize the Northwest Passage, much like the Russians did with the Northern Sea Route.
It’s a great question and very sensitive one, according to my colleagues at the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Canada has chosen to be transparent and conciliatory to the international community in managing the Northwest Passage.
You’re absolutely right to point out that, as a country with sovereignty over these waters, Canada could set up a regime like this. In fact, many are calling for it, especially since we already provide the search and rescue capabilities to anyone who wants to venture into our waters.
I think the perspective has always been one of reconciling and reinforcing Canada’s position, and that Canada manages these waters not due to strong and aggressive nationalistic ambitions, but with great environmental concerns for our Indigenous peoples in the region. These communities depend on these waters, and we’re not looking to make them an economic resource at this point, but only to promote sustainable and responsible navigation.
It’s kind of like we’re trying to strike a balance to get the community on board with our position. That’s my understanding of the Canadian approach.
Senator Dagenais: Don’t you think that Russia’s attitude is much more interventionist than Canada’s, and that it’s putting pressure on Canada, as well as China?
Ms. Lalonde: What I’ve heard is that Russia is going a little too far. For example, a South Korean company was not happy when it had to pay daily for an icebreaker when there was no ice.
This could one day hinder the Northern Sea Route’s competitiveness. Keep in mind that this is dramatic, because climate change could even make the transpolar route available in the next few decades, meaning that neither the Northern Sea Route nor the Northwest Passage will be so alluring or appealing.
I think Russia may be pushing it a bit too much and shooting itself in the foot in terms of what it hopes to get.
Senator Dagenais: Thank you.
Senator Boisvenu: My question is for Mr. Heininen. We know that after the Second World War, Finland signed a “treaty of reassurance” with Russia, in which Finland agreed to certain limitations the Soviet Union was demanding in terms of Finland’s armed forces, to reassure Russia that it was neutral.
Do you think this policy is changing in Finland right now? There have been rumours that Finland may be planning to join NATO.
If it does, could all of this exasperate Russia even further, much like when Ukraine showed some interest in NATO?
[English]
Mr. Heininen: Thank you, senator, for your question. Yes, after the Second World War, after having fought two wars against the Soviet Union, we made a ceasefire. There were certain things that we could not have — for example, submarines. However, we could have our own army. The arms came from the Soviet Union at the time but then more and more also from Sweden and the U.K. later on.
That was the Treaty of Paris, saying what we were allowed to do. But when the Soviet Union split, Finland agreed with the Russian Federation that these paragraphs were not in force anymore. After that, Finland bought its fighters first from the U.K. and then the U.S.A. — like the latest one, the F-35.
If Finland will join NATO — that is possible, yes — then, of course, Russia will change its policy toward Finland because then Finland belongs to the military bloc. That is going to be a big difference from what the situation is now.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: Thank you very much. My other question is for Ms. Riddell-Dixon.
In the past, you have expressed some reservations about the policies of the Harper government, which was very suspicious of the Putin regime. As we know, Mr. Harper made a statement during discussions between the G7 countries in which he asked Mr. Putin to withdraw from Ukraine, among other things.
Given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, do you believe that being so naive for the past decade has led Russia to feel almost no threat to invade that country and take more control over the Arctic?
[English]
Ms. Riddell-Dixon: I don’t recall ever speaking on that topic. In terms of Russia taking over the Arctic, I don’t see that as any kind of immediate threat. Russia has a vested interest in obeying the law of the sea because the coastal states have done better than any other countries on earth in terms of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, and Russia benefits tremendously from this.
In terms of the extended continental shelf, it has done everything in accordance with international law. It has conducted scientific research, it has related the scientific data to the Convention on the Law of the Sea and it has made submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Its submission is currently being reviewed by a subcommission of the commission, and it will await the results. It has filed and refiled submissions, but that’s perfectly legal. Actually, the submission process is in no way necessarily at an end.
I’m sure that Canada is going to respond, since Denmark has claimed all the way from our exclusive economic zone and that of Greenland to Russia’s exclusive economic zone. Since Russia has done the same thing in reverse, I think it very likely that Canada is going to do the same thing. The sad thing about it is that the more overlaps you have, the more negotiations you’re probably going to have to work out some kind of an agreement.
The Chair: Thank you for the question and the answer.
Senator Boehm: This is a very interesting discussion, and I’d like to thank our witnesses. I think we’ve seen that although the Russian Federation complied with the usual approach to the maritime dispute in terms of making its application — we’re waiting for the U.S. as well — in the past we’ve had a little bit of fun, such as Canada and Denmark switching the flags on Hans Island, for example. We’ve also seen a Russian submarine plant a flag on the North Pole. Russia has the advantage with the port of Murmansk and ports in the North. It could make a bit of a show of force in terms of reinforcing its claim. It has indicated it is suspending any potential discussions with Japan on the Kuril Islands in terms of territorial claims. In democracies, of course, we also have elections, with one coming up in the United States.
In the way foreign policy works, the international lawyers will work on submissions, but then, eventually, the decision becomes political, and that’s where there are no guarantees.
Starting with Professor Riddell-Dixon, would you be tempted to speculate as to where this might go, beyond the parameters of what we’ve seen thus far?
Ms. Riddell-Dixon: In this case, I think it’s going to go through the usual legal channels. If you think of the 2010 agreement between Norway and Russia for the Barents Sea, that was a dispute that dragged on for some 40 years. It was initially a dispute with the Soviet Union and Norway in the middle of the Cold War, and they negotiated and negotiated. Finally, after about 40 years, they came up with a resolution.
That’s how most maritime boundary disputes are done. I expect it will be the same with this particular one.
Yes, there are going to be disputes, but it’s in nobody’s best interest to have a big brouhaha or resort to military power.
The other thing we have to remember is that the extended continental shelves are not going to be established for decades — maybe not even in my lifetime. First, you have to have the commission coming back with recommendations, and then the coastal state takes those recommendations. Assuming it agrees with them, then it can establish its extended continental shelf, but then you’re going to need maritime boundary delimitation between all the countries involved.
Canada is something like eighty-fourth in a huge queue of countries waiting to have their submission looked at. So is Denmark/Greenland, so they’re not going to get their responses, nor are we, for at least 10 years.
The other factor that feeds into this is the fact that there’s no pressure to develop on the Arctic extended continental shelf. There are still plenty of resources on land, and there are resources in the exclusive economic zone. As a general rule, the further you go out from our coastline, the fewer resources you find. It’s going to be horrifically expensive to try and develop those resources. It’s an environmental nightmare.
One thing Canada should be thinking about, though, is that we need to put a lot more energy into developing the regime that will govern our extended continental shelves, both off the Atlantic, where there is actually pressure to start moving ahead with development, as well as in the Arctic. We also have to make sure that Indigenous groups are able to participate fully and benefit from this, and that we really get all the stakeholders to the table. This is something that former senator Charlie Watt was pushing for, but I don’t think there’s been very much effort. That might be something that maybe your committee should be thinking about, too.
Senator Boehm: I’d like to ask a quick question to Professor Lalonde.
Regarding the Northwest Passage, Professor Lalonde, there was an entente cordiale between Reagan and Mulroney at the time. We are looking at the future of presidential elections. One former U.S. president even suggested purchasing Greenland at one point.
How secure is our entente cordiale as we look ahead?
Ms. Lalonde: Relationships between coast guards or transport departments can withstand high-personality disagreements, I hope.
The 1988 cooperation agreement has withstood the vagaries of different political parties or administrations, so I’m going to opt for optimism and say, again, that I think we can. Because we can agree to disagree and we understand we’re not going to shift the official U.S. position, but we can get on with the business of governing collaboratively for the sake of North America, I’m going to say I think we can ride out any short-term storms.
Senator Dasko: Thank you to our witnesses today.
One of my questions, I think, was more or less resolved by Senator Boehm’s question, so I’ll dive into the others.
Professor Riddell-Dixon, I would like to clarify the status of the claim that Canada has made. You have said that Canada will be making a claim, yet we have this lovely map here that has boundaries already that suggests Canada has made a claim.
I wonder if you could just clarify this: What is the status of the Canadian claim? Does our claim, or will our claim, be likely to reach Russia’s economic zone just as their claim has reached 200 nautical miles off our economic zone? Is that where our claim would go? That is the first question.
Then I want to clarify the process of how these claims are resolved and have been resolved in the past. Would you say that they have tended to be resolved through a bilateral process, or is there ever a process of arbitration or any of those kinds of processes that have gone into the resolution?
Thank you.
Ms. Riddell-Dixon: Thank you.
As you can see on the map, the green is Canada’s delineation. Canada drew an arbitrary line, and what you see here is the maximum extent of Canada’s delineation, but that is not the maximum extent of Canada’s delineation. The Lomonosov Ridge basically runs across from north of Ellesmere Island/Greenland over to Russia. That means that all three countries could claim an extended continental shelf because the Lomonosov Ridge meets conditions spelled out in the Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Canada presently still has this arbitrary line, but I think it very likely that, given the fact that these other two countries have done these expansive delineations, Canada will too.
In terms of how one resolves these things, in the area where you have three countries with overlapping extended continental shelves, it’s going to take deliberations among the three. Otherwise, it will probably be done bilaterally.
For over 10 years — in fact, starting in 2007 — the scientists from Canada, Denmark and Russia began meeting. Then they were joined by people from the foreign service, and then the United States came in. They have been discussing issues of delineation but also delimitation, which is establishing the political boundaries. So there’s been a whole history of working on these problems.
Obviously, everything is thrown into disarray because of Russia’s aggression with Ukraine, but there’s going to come a point where they have to reopen those negotiations, and in our case, I think it will be done bilaterally and multilaterally. But there are disputes in other parts of the world over the extended continental shelves that have been taken to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and, like any court, it renders a judgment.
Senator Dasko: Thank you.
Senator Yussuff: Thank you, witnesses, for being here today. I very much enjoyed your presentation.
I have two questions in two parts to the whole panel. For the last many decades, cooperation has really defined stability and security in the North. The reality is that climate change is exacerbating the conditions in which we can have access to these waters we’ve never seen in our lifetime.
Is that likely to really change the cooperation we’ve seen over the many decades in the past, and is it likely to create tensions?
The last point I would make is this: Has any of the other countries — Denmark, Finland and Norway — changed their position in regard to how they’re looking at issues, given what has happened in Ukraine?
The Chair: One minute to each witness. Let’s start with Professor Heininen.
Mr. Heininen: Senator Yussuff, thank you for your very important question.
It’s very difficult to say, of course, as to how we are going to continue this cooperation, but in my presentation, I said that the common interests are there and they have been there. So I think that is very much saying that, by some way, to a certain extent, the cooperation will continue.
And you mentioned climate change. I think that is very much a kind of threat multiplier, which will make clear to the parties that we can solve this only by cooperation.
Finland has not changed any policies when it comes to Arctic cooperation, and I’ve heard the same with other Nordic countries. The seven member states of the Arctic Council are together in saying they don’t cooperate with Russia at this time. But then, of course, individual contacts are there. Academia and researchers, many of us have already tried to find out ways to continue cooperation with Russia.
Ms. Lalonde: I would say to the senator’s question that I think the loss of ice has increased access and has put the Arctic in the limelight. As long as it was frozen and inaccessible — it was a couple of American and Canadian experts that argued about the Northwest Passage. What we see is suddenly an awakening of interest.
I feel a little uncomfortable in speculating as to whether that will lead to less cooperation. I would say that perhaps cooperation will be needed more than ever, because I think there’s already increasing activity because of increasing access. I think we need to get it right. As Professor Heininen is underlining, we have to cooperate to be able to come to terms with some of these ecosystem-wide problems.
Ms. Riddell-Dixon: I concur with my colleagues. I agree that climate change heightens the impetus for cooperation.
In terms of changing attitudes, I would say the one attitude we have seen is the attitude towards the Arctic Council and the fact that, apart from Russia, all the others have condemned Russia’s invasion and have also suspended the whole operation in the Arctic Council. That’s a big change. In the long run, it’s important to keep talking to Russia, because it’s through talking that you work out agreements, and the alternative is pretty dire.
Senator Anderson: Qujannamiik, witnesses, for your participation today.
Quite often we speak of the Arctic and it’s spoken of in terms of like we don’t live there. I’m from the Arctic, and it seems like the human aspect is often forgotten.
As Inuit, we have always lived, travelled and relied on the Arctic Ocean and Northwest Passage for our survival. Given the territory is changing, and due to climate change, it does not mean we have disappeared because of the emerging access, renewed international interest, because of oil, gas and natural resources, and what is now becoming more accessible.
Does the Convention on the Law of the Sea diminish and marginalize Indigenous peoples’ rights to the Arctic Ocean, or does it factor in historical use and inherent rights of Indigenous peoples?
My question is geared towards Professors Heininen and Lalonde, who mentioned the Convention on the Law of the Sea.
I would like to know — and I’ll use some of Professor Heininen’s terms — how important is consultation with owners, people, citizens and civil society to securing the continental shelf and its role in Arctic defence and security? Thank you.
Mr. Heininen: Senator, thank you for your question. I think it is very important that people living in the Arctic — whether they are Indigenous peoples, like you mentioned, or other people there — have been heard. This includes not only issues dealing with regional development, for example, but also when it comes to security.
This is very much my point, how they can define their own security and the premises of that security. Of course, climate change is very much threatening the everyday security that they have.
The more activity you have in the Northern Sea Route, the more it’s a question of who will define what kind of development you will have in the future. I’m afraid that Arctic states are not thinking that it’s not only economic activities they should develop but a much broader issue, and they should take into consideration people living in the region.
Ms. Lalonde: Thank you for this important question. I think the Law of the Sea does make space for historic rights, but it’s always geared towards states referring to historic rights over waterways. We’re slowly seeing an Indigenous human rights regime coming into contact with the Law of the Sea and some of the rights emanating from that human rights regime — specifically, Indigenous — that Indigenous peoples have rights in marine spaces that must be recognized.
That’s why I defend so strongly Canada’s position on the Northwest Passage. If they are internal waters, then we do have a responsibility. There’s been some movement, though not enough, to recognize that those waters have to be co-managed with Indigenous communities and Indigenous stakeholders.
With the marine corridors initiative, hopefully we’re having real consultation where Indigenous communities have a say in how they are governed, managed and monitored. This is the way forward. It has to be. This is the model. It’s easier within the Canadian legal regime if we have a responsive federal government, for instance.
Ms. Riddell-Dixon: Thank you. International relations and international law certainly focus first and foremost on states, but within that, then it’s the state that has to set up the regime.
I would argue that within our own country, within Canada, it’s important for the Canadian government to be having discussions about what is the regime going to be to govern the development of the extended continental shelf, as well as within the exclusive economic zone.
Article 82 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea sets up a regime whereby the country that benefits from having the extended continental shelf has to pay royalties. But who is going to pay those royalties? And what if, in the process of devolution, these rights now belong to Indigenous peoples? Is it Canada that has to pay? Is it Indigenous groups?
A lot of important questions need to be asked. I would argue that, in this case, there’s not too much to be done in terms of international law apropos of getting concrete rights, but there’s a lot of work that could be done within Canada to forward those rights.
The Chair: We have a hard stop, so I’m afraid this brings us to the end of our meeting. Thank you for the final question, Senator Anderson.
Thanks to our three witnesses, and our earlier witnesses, for all your contributions today. You’ve shared a great deal of information with us. You’ve shared perspectives with us on a range of issues, and it will help us considerably as we go forward with the remainder of this study. We appreciate the time you took with us today to be with our committee. With that, I want to wish everyone a good evening.
(The committee adjourned.)