THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Monday, May 9, 2022
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met with videoconference this day at 2 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on issues relating to security and defence in the Arctic.
Senator Tony Dean (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Honourable senators, welcome to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. I’m Tony Dean, senator from Ontario and the chair of the committee. I’m joined today by my fellow committee members, Senator Jean-Guy Dagenais, Quebec, Deputy Chair; Senator Dawn Anderson, Northwest Territories; Senator Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu, Quebec; Senator Jane Cordy, Nova Scotia; Senator Donna Dasko, Ontario; Senator Marty Deacon, Ontario; Senator Mobina Jaffer, British Columbia; Senator David Richards, New Brunswick; Senator Larry Smith, Quebec; and Senator Hassan Yussuff, Ontario.
For those watching today’s session, we’re continuing our study on security and defence in the Arctic, including military infrastructure and security capabilities. This is our fifth meeting of the study, and our topic today is Canada’s defence capabilities and security infrastructure in the Arctic, including in the context of climate change.
In the first panel we welcome Dr. Michael Byers, Professor at the University of British Columbia; Colonel (Ret’d) Pierre Leblanc, President of Arctic Security Consultants; and Dr. Peter Kikkert, Irving Shipbuilding Chair in Arctic Policy at the Brian Mulroney Institute of Government, St. Francis Xavier University. Thank you all for joining us today by videoconference. We will now begin by inviting you to provide your opening remarks, to be followed by questions from our members.
Michael Byers, Professor, University of British Columbia, as an individual: Thank you. It’s very good to be here.
[Translation]
I speak French, but I’ll deliver my remarks in English today.
[English]
I’m particularly pleased to be presenting to your committee on this in that Arctic security issues are often politicized, and it’s nice to have a body responsible for sober second thought to try to develop an accurate perspective on both the risks and the absence thereof in some instances.
I’m going to be speaking mostly to Russia today. If someone wants to ask me about China, I’d be happy to take questions on that. I also want to emphasize from the beginning that in my view, in the Canadian Arctic, there are issues that are far more pressing than security, namely, climate change and the situation of our Indigenous peoples. But I will be focusing on security today.
One of my core points here is that there are in fact two Arctics from a security perspective. There’s the European Arctic, which is becoming a very dangerous place, and there is the North American Arctic, and specifically the Canadian Arctic, which remains a relatively safe place.
To speak to the European Arctic very briefly, most of Russia’s second strike nuclear capability is based on the Kola Peninsula, and particularly through the submarine ports located there. That makes the northwestern part of Russia a core strategic interest for them, and therefore the proximity of NATO countries, the situation of Norway, which has a land border and a maritime boundary with Russia, and, of course, the Baltic states and Poland, the entire east/west front is very close to the Russian Arctic. We had this situation during the Cold War. Canada played a major role with our North Atlantic fleet in the anti-submarine operations. We were on stand by throughout much of the Cold War to provide soldiers and equipment in defence of Norway. The increased danger in the European Arctic is something that I encourage this committee to focus on as to how Canada could increase its contribution to NATO in that part of the Arctic.
The North American Arctic is different. First of all, Canada is a long way from Russia. The closest portions of Russia to the Canadian Arctic are 1,500 kilometres away from the northernmost parts of Canadian territory. We’re talking here about Franz Josef Land, and if you start in Tuktoyaktuk, the far east Russian coast is 1,500 kilometres. Most of the Russian coastline is 2,500 kilometres away from the northernmost Canadian Arctic coastline. I shouldn’t need to remind anyone on this committee that Ottawa is 4,000 kilometres away from Alert, Canada on Ellesmere Island. So Russia is a long way away from the Canadian Arctic and even further from any large population centres in this country.
The other thing I need to point out is that Russia is the largest country in the world. It is an Arctic country like Canada. Russia already owns roughly half of the Arctic, incontestably, under international law. It has vast expanses of land and maritime zones, vast resources that are as yet unexploited. It has no need for any more Arctic. It’s also grossly overextended militarily and economically because of the war on Ukraine, because of its adventure in Syria; the list goes on. It’s a country that’s in economic and demographic decline. It’s hard to see a rational case for Russia wanting to provoke any kind of tensions in the North American Arctic.
The Arctic is — and Colonel Leblanc will speak to this, I am sure — a cold, dark, dangerous region. The climate and geography of the Arctic are Canada’s strongest protection. I can’t help but quote General (Ret’d) Walter Natynczyk from the Halifax International Security Forum a decade ago when he was Chief of the Defence Staff when he said that if someone were to invade the Canadian Arctic, his first task would be to rescue them. I’m not worried about the Canadian Arctic from a Russian military threat.
As I said, I’ll speak about the land, maritime and air issues in question. I want to speak briefly to the space dimension. We have a phenomenal trio of assets in polar orbit launched in 2019. I’m speaking about RADARSAT Constellation, which is operated by the Canadian Armed Forces, which gives us incredible surveillance in the Arctic and up to 20 passes a day; very rapid imaging and access to imaging so that we know what happens in the Canadian Arctic. We can see any ship that enters the Canadian Arctic, track that ship and see activity on the ground. It’s an incredible asset. When we talk about our military capabilities, it’s often overlooked.
We’re also seeing a dramatic increase in communications abilities in the Arctic. You all know about SpaceX, which has launched more than 2,000 of its Starlink broadband satellites, an increasing number of them on polar orbits; incredible broadband in the Arctic that was not there a couple of years ago.
The final thing to say is that we have pretty good radar coverage over the Arctic, thanks to American phased array radar stations at Thule Air Base in Greenland and at Clear Air Force Base in Alaska. These are rendering the northern warning system redundant, if not obsolete. The Canadian government is committed to developing over-the-horizon radar; they gave a developmental contract to Raytheon a few years ago. These systems already exist, they work. The U.S. uses them for the Caribbean and Pacific. The only challenge in the Arctic is dealing with the unstable nature of the ionosphere in the Arctic; the solar weather or the Aurora Borealis. But I’m sure the space scientists involved will sort this out. Again, I don’t see much of a problem in the North American Arctic in terms of threats to the Canadian Arctic or our capability to detect threats that are coming through space or closer to the surface towards southern Canada or the United States. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Byers. I’m sure you’ll be getting some questions from my colleagues.
Next we will hear from Colonel Leblanc. Please proceed when you’re ready.
[Translation]
Colonel (Ret’d) Pierre Leblanc, President, Arctic Security Consultants, as an individual: Members of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, thank you for this opportunity to express my fears regarding the security and defence of this magnificent part of our country.
[English]
We live in very dangerous times. Despite international condemnation and sanctions, Russia is pursuing the invasion of Ukraine.
North Korea is threatening the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles and has increased its stockpile of nuclear weapons.
China has lifted its smiling mask, has bullied Canada repeatedly, as well as other countries, and is poised to annex Taiwan by force.
Democracies are losing ground around the world. The rules-based order is under attack. Canada needs to improve its defence posture.
The Arctic is warming at three times the rest of the planet. The ice is disappearing. Access is increasing and so is human activity. I have been recommending the increase of defence assets in the Arctic for the past 22 years. Since then, there has been progress but more needs to be done.
As a sovereign country, we must have complete domain awareness. We must also have the ability to act when we identify illegal activity or come under attack.
Successive NORAD commanders have stated that the Canadian Arctic will play a pivotal role in any future conflict. Russia, China and North Korea, the main adversaries of the U.S.A., would possibly attack through the Arctic, whether it is with bombers, hypersonic cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles or intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The present North Warning System is obsolete and needs to be replaced with some urgency as part of the NORAD modernization. Given the threat through the Arctic, Canada should consider joining the ballistic missile defence program to increase our contribution to the defence of North America.
In the Arctic, the main awareness is achieved through the collation of information from multiple sources, the input from RADARSAT Constellation, the newly deployed Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships, the Canadian Coast Guard icebreakers, one Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as well as intelligence sources such as ship automatic identification systems.
The government must make sure that we invest sufficient funds to secure and maintain those various sources of information in the future.
One of the solid investments Canada could make would be to develop Resolute Bay as a central Arctic security hub. The key elements would be the establishment of a forward operation location for the F-35 and a deep-sea port. At the moment, there is a 2,800-kilometre gap between our forward operation locations in Inuvik and Iqaluit.
The expanded Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone requires the air force to be able to operate further north. Those two facilities could support the operations of the Canadian Forces, including fighters, reconnaissance drones, the CP-140 long-range maritime patrol aircraft. They would also support the operation of the navy, the Coast Guard and other federal departments with Arctic responsibilities.
Another would be to deploy capability to monitor underwater activity. This could also be done from Resolute Bay using a combination of underwater sensors and long-range autonomous underwater drones.
Canada must have the capability to act when a situation similar to the New Zealand sailboat challenging the Northwest Passage occurs. Canada must be capable of taking over a vessel that does not respond to commands.
To support domain awareness and government operations in the Arctic, it is essential to invest in robust national communication infrastructure with full control of the data over those systems.
I am disappointed that the Enhanced Satellite Communication Program — Polar, started in 2009, is contemplating a full in-service date of 2036, some 27 years after recognizing a high-priority program.
The Telesat Lightspeed Constellation, similar to the system mentioned previously, will be able to provide resilient, secure broadband communication as early as 2026 to support all government Arctic communication needs, including that of the Canadian Forces.
Most of my recommendations will create employment and business opportunities in the Arctic and contribute to the defence of Canada, NORAD and NATO.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Colonel Leblanc.
We now go to Dr. Kikkert. Over to you when you’re ready.
Peter Kikkert, Irving Shipbuilding Chair in Arctic Policy, Brian Mulroney Institute of Government, St. Francis Xavier University, as an individual: Good afternoon, senators.
I’d like to begin by acknowledging that I am joining you from the ancestral and unceded territory of the Mi’kmaq people. I’m honoured to be here and thank you for the opportunity.
If you think back to the threats through, to and in the Canadian Arctic framework that Dr. Lackenbauer shared with you a few weeks ago, my focus is on threats in the region, particularly on the challenges to community safety and security posed by the broad spectrum of natural and human-made hazards created or exacerbated by climate change, from tundra and wildfires, to flooding and melting permafrost, to the issues raised by increased outside human activity from environmental pollution to marine transportation accidents.
The risks posed by these hazards are amplified by the presence of remote and isolated communities in austere environments with limited infrastructure, few emergency response resources and little access —
The Chair: Dr. Kikkert, would you slow down a little bit so we can assist you with translation?
Mr. Kikkert: Absolutely. The risks posed by the hazards I just mentioned are amplified by the presence of remote and isolated communities in austere environments with limited infrastructure, few emergency response resources and little access to rapid external assistance.
Mitigating and responding to these risks requires whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches in which the defence team has important roles to play, particularly in disaster response, search and rescue and developing infrastructure resilience.
In 2021, the CAF responded to floods in the Yukon, Northwest Territories and the water crisis in Iqaluit. Due to limited territorial assets, this disaster-response role will only grow in frequency, scope and complexity.
To best prepare the CAF to continue to expand its annual Operation NANOOK TATIGIIT — a whole-of-government exercise that has simulated a wide array of disaster scenarios, ensuring it engages territorial, Indigenous and local levels of government — it must also ensure that its southern-based immediate response units and Arctic response company groups can rapidly deploy to the North if their services are required.
Further, the diverse network of actors responsible for disaster management in the North must maintain relationships year-round to facilitate rapid cooperative responses.
The CAF also bolsters local response and relief capabilities through the Canadian Rangers who, given their presence, capabilities and community relationships, regularly support other government agencies during emergencies and disasters.
By increasing the capacity of Ranger Patrol Group headquarters to support these operations, and through additional Ranger training and exercises focused on emergency response capability, the CAF could build upon their proven effectiveness and bolster community disaster resilience across the North.
The tyranny of distance, time and environment — and the position of primary CAF SAR assets in the South — impose special challenges on northern SAR operations while the rapidly changing environment is increasing the caseload and the risk of low-probability, high-consequence events like major marine disasters.
To better mitigate these challenges, the National Search and Rescue Secretariat should re-establish the Northern Search and Rescue Roundtable, which operated between 2010 and 2016, to bring together first responders and policy-makers from the North and the South to co-develop a comprehensive northern SAR strategy.
The impacts of climate change, including melting permafrost, coastal erosion and severe weather, pose challenges to infrastructure across the North, including runways, harbours, bridges and houses.
While the committee has already heard that any investments in defence infrastructure should consider military and civil requirements, our close allies offer models for other contributions that the defence team might make. The U.S. military’s Innovative Readiness Training programs in Alaska and Australian’s Army Aboriginal Community Assistance Programme show how military personnel can support local communities and private industry in constructing resilient critical infrastructure. As of 2021, the Australian Army has delivered 45 projects in 43 Indigenous communities, building everything from airfields to barge landings, to water- and waste-treatment plants, and to housing and recreational facilities, all while building the employable skills of local Indigenous participants. The program is embraced by Indigenous communities for its positive socio-economic and infrastructure contributions, while the Australian military highlights the training and skills development it provides its personnel.
Fundamentally, the evolving threats to community safety require local solutions. One such solution, developed through research with community responders in Nunavut’s Kitikmeot Region, is an Inuit Nunangat community public-safety officer program. Based in their own communities, Inuit officers can focus on emergency preparedness, search-and-rescue coordination, marine safety and fire prevention. With such a broad focus, this program would break down the silos of responsibility that exist across the agencies responsible for community safety and security in the North, facilitate the kind of whole-of-society emergency management envisioned by the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework and offer a novel way to operationalize the new Inuit Nunangat policy.
Inuit have long said that sovereignty begins at home in strong communities. So, too, does national security and disaster security, and investment must reflect that.
I look forward to discussing these issues and ideas further during the question period. Thank you, senators, very much for your time.
The Chair: Thank you very much to all three of you. Thank you for three very different perspectives this afternoon.
We’re now going to proceed to questions. Please note that the panel must finish at 3 p.m. In order to allow as many questions as possible, we’re going to allot four minutes for each question, including the answer. Therefore, colleagues, I ask you to keep your questions succinct and identify which witness your question is directed to.
I’d like to offer the first question to our deputy chair.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My first question is for Colonel Leblanc. I don’t mean to condemn Prime Minister Trudeau’s recent positions on the invasion of Ukraine, but we’ve heard him say that Vladimir Putin is nothing but a war criminal.
Does that kind of attack leave us even more vulnerable when it comes to defending Canada’s rights in the Arctic, or do you think that the Russians’ military capabilities have been weakened by the war in Ukraine and that Mr. Putin will thus consider the Arctic less important?
Col. Leblanc: That’s a tough question to answer. Yes, Russia will be diminished by its current efforts in Ukraine, but we shouldn’t conclude that its forces are completely useless. One of my fears is that our Canadian Forces station in Alert is vulnerable. One of the Russian air bases is only 1,500 kilometers from Station Alert, whereas we support Station Alert from Trenton, 4,000 kilometers distant. If Mr. Putin senses that we’re a wounded animal, it would be easy for him to attempt a random strike to punish Canada for supporting the situation in Ukraine. An attack on CFS Alert would be relatively easy to do. In a way, we might be more vulnerable because we’ve become one of Mr. Putin’s targets now whereas we previously weren’t.
Senator Dagenais: I have a second question concerning Canadian military equipment. The Russians have 55 submarines, and Norway is buying fighter jets and submarines; every country has submarines except Finland and Denmark. Canada has four, but they aren’t operational in the Arctic. Is Canada wrong not to have acquired more military equipment and to be advocating diplomacy instead?
Col. Leblanc: My preference would be more equipment and less diplomacy. Intense diplomatic efforts were made just before the invasion of Ukraine, but to no avail, and weapons are now becoming important for Ukraine’s survival. Canada probably doesn’t have the financial resources to equip our submarines to operate under the polar ice. What’s required are excessively costly nuclear submarines. They were suggested for the first time in 1988, but Canada ultimately cancelled its plans due to budget restrictions. However, we can increase surveillance in the Arctic archipelago by using underwater sensors and long-range drones to conduct patrols there so we can see what’s happening in our waters and take action accordingly.
Our CP-140 long-range patrol aircraft have anti-submarine capability, but they’re deployed thousands of kilometers away from the Arctic, and their ability to identify submarines under ice is virtually nil. They have to be under water, not ice.
[English]
The Chair: Sorry, our time is up. Senator Dagenais, before we go to the next question, we’re going to have to ask you to use a headset for your next intervention because the sound quality is not as good as it should be.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: Welcome to our guests. Mr. Chair, I believe you got it right in the introduction: We have before us two presentations that I think are quite opposed. Consequently, I have more questions than answers, but I nevertheless want to thank our witnesses. I have two questions. Mr. Byers, you discussed Russian military thinking, and you said that, in that thinking, the North isn’t where they could intervene militarily. I’d like you to explain your reasoning because I don’t see any logic in Russian military intervention. What we’re seeing in Ukraine proves that.
Colonel Leblanc, you brought up a very interesting topic, the development of a northern hub in Resolute Bay. That aligns with my own concerns. I’d like you to tell us more about it.
[English]
Mr. Byers: Thank you for the question. To clarify my analysis, I am extremely concerned about Russia in the European Arctic, which is between 2,500 and 3,000 kilometres away from the closest part of Canada. I’m worried about the increased activity in the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea. I will point out that the United States reconstituted its 2nd Fleet in 2018. These problems have been building. I’m very concerned about Russian threats to the Baltic states and, potentially, to Finland and Sweden as they seek NATO membership.
My point is that for an overextended Russia, which already owns half of the Arctic, there is nothing that it seeks in the Canadian Arctic. Indeed, it would be overextended. Engaging with the United States and Canada together, because we are partners in both NATO and NORAD, there is no rational way that Russia would seek to invade or attack Canadian infrastructure or even to set foot on Canadian soil in the Canadian Arctic.
I did speak to the threat of missiles coming over the Arctic: ICBMs, cruise missiles and now very fast cruise missiles —hypersonic missiles — that are launched into space and then come down and travel quickly close to the surface for long distances.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: Pardon me for interrupting, Mr. Byers.
I’d like Colonel Leblanc to tell us in 20 or 30 seconds what the benefits are of developing a “northern hub” base in Resolute Bay.
Col. Leblanc: The benefits are that we could combine all the resources of the various departments that have responsibilities in the Arctic. The Canadian Armed Forces and Coast Guard are responsible for much of that, as are the Canada Border Services Agency, Environment Canada and so on.
Canada is criticized for not having enough marine infrastructure in the Canadian Arctic. As traffic increases and human activities expand, there will eventually be a disaster in the Arctic. Three cruise ships have foundered in the Canadian Arctic. That’s no theoretical exercise; it’s something that actually happened. Fortunately, no lives were lost. In Resolute Bay, we could bring together all the necessary resources for search and rescue, environmental incident interventions and Canadian Forces operations support, by which I mean refueling Arctic patrol ships and changing crews. The same would be true of the Coast Guard. Air traffic control would be easier.
You’ll soon receive a French copy of an article published in the Hill Times that provides a lot more detail on the idea. This will also create commercial opportunities in the Canadian High North such as supplying liquefied natural gas to support marine and other activities. Incidentally, the Resolute Bay community itself could be fully served with natural gas rather than diesel. There would be a lot of upside in doing that in this central area. Resolute Bay is located in the busiest part of the Northwest Passage. At some point all ships travelling west to east pass off Resolute Bay.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Colonel Leblanc.
Senator Anderson: My question is a follow-up to Senator Boisvenu. I am also interested in the comment from the colonel on the idea of a Forward Operating Location in Resolute Bay.
There are already three in the two territories, one in Inuvik, one in Yellowknife, and one in Iqaluit. I’m from Tuktoyaktuk. I live in the Arctic; I’m from the Arctic.
Recognizing that right now, they are working on extending the runway in Inuvik, can you tell me, would your idea of a Forward Operating Location in Resolute Bay be tracked from the current existing ones, and how would that impact in terms of manpower, infrastructure and equipment? Is there enough? What is the cost if you were looking at another Forward Operating Location?
Col. Leblanc: I would say there are two arguments here. The one in Inuvik should continue. Most of the Russian bomber activity we have experienced in the past have been on the west side of the Arctic. Let’s say west of Prince Patrick Island, north of Alaska. That’s where a lot of the Russian bombers have been coming close to our Air Defence Identification Zone.
Recently, we had one case where a bomber came close to CFS Alert. To be able to reach CFS Alert from Inuvik, you’re looking at about 2,000 kilometres. It’s impossible right now to do that with fighters in any short period of time. It would also require a fuelling tanker to be airborne at the same time to be able to support the fighters, because the amount of fuel they carry is not sufficient for them to do the interception and come back. You need to send a tanker as well.
If you start doing that from Resolute Bay, the distance is much smaller. It’s more practical, and we would be able to challenge anyone that comes into the northern part of the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone.
In terms of manpower, I would guess that Canada would have the capability to do both simultaneously. Whether the financial resources are there to do that, that’s another matter.
If I can come back to my point about living dangerously, what we are seeing right now was not predicted. We never thought that Russia would actually go forward with the invasion of Ukraine. Russia is acting irrationally and may continue to do so in the future.
On the other hand, China is watching the situation to see, as they have stated publicly themselves that they are willing to take Taiwan by force if need be, when the timing of that would be. What if China does that now? How would that change the geostrategic situation in the world today?
I think it behooves us to increase our defence posture given that times are getting increasingly dangerous.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Leblanc.
Senator Jaffer: My question is to Mr. Kikkert and Professor Byers.
My concern is that there is so much activity and attention being given to the Arctic that there is a concern about Indigenous rights and protecting Indigenous ways of living. From the lessons we have learned in the South, all the mistakes we have made, are we implementing them or still making the same mistakes when it comes to the rights of Indigenous people and their way of life?
If you could start, Mr. Kikkert.
Mr. Kikkert: Thank you for the question, senator. In recent years, with the construction of the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, there has been a focus on co-development and close collaboration, moving on from consultation to true co-development, at least in terms of the construction of the framework. However, there have still been a lot of questions raised by Natan Obed and other Inuit and northern Indigenous leaders about how much that co-development is going to extend to the actual implementation of that policy. At one point, President Obed did make a comment about how bureaucracies are very slow to change.
I think that while there has been progress in what you’re talking about, there is still a lot of room for improvement. There is a lot of potential within the new construction of the Inuit Nunangat Policy and the idea that policies and programs should be framed with Inuit Nunangat in mind.
I am excited to see where that goes. That policy has been closely co-developed by Inuit leaders and southern policy-makers, and I believe there is a lot of room for growth within that space that has been created. There has been improvement in recent years, but, of course, it always needs to get better.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you. Professor Byers.
Mr. Byers: I agree with my colleague. It’s all about implementation. If we’re talking about security, well we have human security. What about the fact that tuberculosis is endemic in the Canadian Arctic? What about the fact that intimate partner violence is at levels that greatly exceed anywhere else in Canada?
We have a social, economic and health crisis in the Canadian Arctic, and we need to have the implementation of all of the promises of all of the plants. I fully support a strong Canadian military, but I believe our spending on the military should be focused on those areas where it’s needed the most in the foreseeable future. In terms of the Arctic — the European Arctic, not the North American Arctic — that is the detection of incoming missiles, especially cruise missiles. We need to be careful about how we spend our money.
The military would want money for everything, as would every other agency and department. We need to be smart. We need people like you to make directions to ensure that real needs are addressed first. Thank you.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much for the question and answer.
Senator Richards: Thank you to the three witnesses. I have a question about the military.
Russia and China have little concern for the Inuit. Their idea of climate change would turn most Canadian environmentalists pale. I think we have a triple threat with their determined exploitation and their disdain for Canada and Russia’s increasing military capability in the North.
I’m addressing Mr. Leblanc. For 39 years, we have been preaching more military hardware in the North and in Canada. It would be good to realize our sovereignty depends on it. Would it take a change of mindset among a great many Canadians to be able to do that, sir, or is the government up to speed on this? I’m afraid they haven’t been up to speed on this in 40 years.
Col. Leblanc: Thank you, senator. I think the main responsibility of the government is to assure the security of its people. Without security, everything else may not happen.
I would agree with you that over the years, insufficient resources, in my opinion, have been placed on security of Canada. We must be able, as I said in my remarks, to have complete domain awareness of what’s going on in the Arctic. Although we have made some progress, there is still some room to grow, especially in terms of if we do observe something that’s illegal, we need to be able to take action.
You may remember the so-called rust buckets from China who came close to the western coasts of Canada before they were turned back. If one was to try to run the Northwest Passage on the claim that it’s an international strait and therefore they have the right of transit, how would we be able to stop that vehicle or ship at the moment? We have to have these capabilities, and I’m not sure they are fully in place at the moment.
Senator Richards: Colonel, just a quick comment. Do you think this would need a change in our Canadian mindset about what the military is and what its function is in order to realize these capabilities?
Col. Leblanc: I’m of the opinion that every time that Canadian sovereignty is challenged, the citizens of Canada really get upset quickly and want their government to be able to do something about it.
Unfortunately, during the lull between incidents where sovereignty is threatened, the citizens of Canada seem to be somewhat indifferent to what the government is doing, provided that the balance between butter and guns is the right one. It will probably take an incident in the Arctic, especially where our sovereignty is challenged and the government doesn’t have the means to fully act on it.
Senator Richards: Thank you very much.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to our witnesses and guests for being here. My first question I’m going to direct to Mr. Byers and anyone else can jump in and also answer.
Last year, it was revealed that Canada was purchasing AEGIS Combat System for our future warships. According to an article you wrote at the time, it allowed Canada to participate in a continental ballistic missile defence program with the U.S. Some suggest we would be doing this.
Recently, when Russia indicated it was willing to use nukes, my mind went to what that meant for Canada and our Arctic air space as a path for intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Are you still of the opinion that the AEGIS purchase suggests Canada plans to participate with the U.S. in continental ballistic missile defence? If so, given the recent Russian aggression, might this be a wise decision at this time?
Mr. Byers: Thank you for that question. I wrote that article, not because I was opposed to the AEGIS Combat System for Canada. I was opposed to that decision being made without a fulsome public and parliamentary debate.
You will remember how 15 or 17 years ago we had a very big debate in Canada as to whether Canada should join U.S. missile defence. Ultimately, Prime Minister Paul Martin decided not to. It is now happening without a public debate because of the purchase of AEGIS class systems for Canada’s new surface combatant. That was the point, let’s have a debate about it.
Secondly, the AEGIS class system and the U.S. missile defence system is not directed against Russia. Russia has far too many missiles, multiple war heads, the ability to deploy decoys. The system is designed to protect against North Korea and possibly Iran. The whole reason why Russia and China are developing hypersonic missiles is to provide an additional way of evading U.S. missile defence.
Do we want to go down that arms race? That again should be part of a public debate. But again, let’s be clear. We have the ability to detect ICBMs coming over the Arctic. We need the ability to detect cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles coming over the Arctic. I support the development of over-the-horizon radar. The question of whether we participate in trying to shoot them down is a second question that needs to be debated.
Senator M. Deacon: I have another question. I wonder if anyone else wants to respond to that. I’ll honour that first.
Col. Leblanc: If I may add a comment, there is no point in identification of incoming missiles if you can’t do anything about it.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
The Chair: Any other quick thoughts?
Senator M. Deacon: My other question was regarding Canada’s military presence in the North. As a result of an interview that David Cohen, the U.S. ambassador to Canada, made a few weeks ago, he had some candid conversations with cabinet members about Canada boosting its defences. Others have used the term embarrassing when it comes to the military presence in the North. Is this a fair assessment? Are we ill prepared? What are your thoughts? It might come out in some other answers also given our time constraints. Thank you.
Mr. Byers: I think that question was directed at me. There are things we should do to strengthen our defence capabilities in the Arctic. The most obvious one is to initiate the procurement of replacement search and rescue helicopters for the Cormorants, which not only provide a search and rescue capability, but also the ability to deploy armed personnel on to a ship that is trying to evade Canada’s sovereignty into the Northwest Passage, the kind of thing that Colonel Leblanc mentioned as a possibility.
So there are some things that we need to do in the Arctic, but the idea that Russia is going to invade the Arctic is, in my view, exaggerated. The real threats involve search and rescue, constabulary issues, criminal activity and the environmental, social and health crises that are playing out in Canada’s Arctic communities today.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Dasko: Thank you to our witnesses. Listening to the presentations, I noticed that Professor Byers and Colonel Leblanc have, I guess, different views about some of Canada’s capabilities in the North. I was hoping that I could ask whether either of you would agree with anything that the other person has said about these capabilities in the hope that, when we explore it this way, there might be a truth somewhere in the middle where we might be able to say that is really what it is. For example, Professor Byers has said that he feels that Canada has great surveillance, communications abilities and radar coverage, whereas Colonel Leblanc suggested that, for example, our northern warning system is obsolete. I don’t know if that sounds like a convoluted question, but I’m wondering if either of you might agree with the other one on some of the capabilities that Canada has.
Col. Leblanc: Let me jump in first. I will agree with Dr. Byers that I don’t think Russia would want to invade Canada per se with the aim of staying on the ground. But an economy of effort operation, if Putin wanted to lash out at Canada, would be to attack our station Alert with a group of Spetsnaz or special forces. What assets do we have to counter that? What air defence do we have in CFS Alert, for example? What is our capability of knowing that this event will take place and follow it in real time? When you look at all the assets that are required to do that and you look at what Canada has in place, you will find it’s very limited.
Mr. Byers: I’ll add to that. I would imagine that Vladimir Putin would see the Canadian embassy in Kyiv as a far more attractive target than Alert if he wanted to strike at Canada today. We do have some assets in the Arctic. Colonel Leblanc has been talking about Resolute. We actually have a cold-weather training centre there for the Canadian Armed Forces. We have the Polar Continental Shelf Program with a warehouse. We have a runway that can host C-17 heavy transport aircraft. So we actually have more capability in the Arctic than even experts like Colonel Leblanc will sometimes indicate. The other thing to say is that he hasn’t mentioned the refuelling base at Nanisivik, which should be in operation within the next year or two. It has been a long time coming. It will provide the refuelling capacity he wants at Resolute.
What I’m saying is let’s be clear, let’s be objective and let’s be up to date in terms of our understanding of available technologies. Yes, the North Warning System is obsolete. That’s why we need over-the-horizon radar. In the meantime, we have great capacity to provide that missile detection function of ICBMs from Thule and Clear Air Force Station Base in Alaska. The situation is not dire, we just need to be smart as we move forward. And let’s not forget about the European Arctic, where Canada could make huge contributions to NATO in the northeast Atlantic and in support of Norway, and probably Sweden and Finland in the next couple of years.
The Chair: Thank you both for rising to the challenge of Senator Dasko’s challenging question.
Senator Yussuff: Thank you, witnesses. My question will be for all three panellists. Canada has announced that we will be reviewing our defence policy shortly. What would be the two or three things you would like to see as part of the defence review policy, recognizing that you have some very different perspectives that you would like to offer and given that this is an opportunity for us to look at those issues long-range? If each of you could offer two or three things you would like to see as part of the defence review policy.
Col. Leblanc: I think I have mentioned the ones I would see going forward. Communication is going to be a very important element of it. For Canada to actually have control of that information, control of the satellite and control of the ground stations so that whatever information is being produced is completely under the control of the Canadian government. The replacement of the North Warning System — let’s call it the NORAD modernization, whatever that includes. I think there is still going to be an element that is going to be on the ground in Canada over and above the over-the-horizon radar, which has some limitations in terms of what it does cover, as well as the development of Resolute Bay, as I’m suggesting.
You will also shortly receive a copy of the article that I have written that expands in more detail on what the development of Resolute Bay would entail and that it is, in fact, anchored on the facilities that we have there already. Thank you.
Mr. Kikkert: Thank you, senator. I would highlight what Dr. Byers has already highlighted and what I highlighted in my initial statement — improving the search and rescue infrastructure that the Canadian Armed Forces have access to. We just saw this week that the British Columbia coastline was underserved. Our SAR resources had to shift Hercules from Winnipeg to the West Coast. We need additional Cormorants. The Griffon helicopters we have in Trenton could be replaced by Cormorants, for instance. Search and rescue is one of the most public-facing jobs the Canadian Armed Forces have, so any investment in that pays dividends in terms of lives saved and providing an economic safety net for those Canadians who are endeavouring to do jobs in the wilderness or maritime sphere.
Search and rescue resources can be improved, and I think a broader national conversation about the role the Canadian Armed Forces is to play in disaster response and relief activities is very much necessary. It would be very timely given that this role is likely to increase going forward, particularly in the North where there are no other assets or resources that can respond in the way the CAF can. Those two areas, search and rescue and disaster response, are going to be primary roles for the CAF moving forward, and we should be having conversations right now about what those look like in future years.
Mr. Byers: I don’t need to speak to search and rescue, because my colleague has underlined the importance of that. I have already mentioned the need to have modern radar in the Canadian Arctic, and I think the Canadian government is moving in the right direction on that.
The only thing I would add in terms of the Canadian Arctic is in terms of the training of our personnel. I have mentioned the cold weather training centre at Resolute. We should be ensuring that every single infantry soldier in Canada goes through cold weather training so that we can deploy them to the Arctic if necessary. We have C-17s that can get them to dozens of gravel runways on relatively short notice with Griffin helicopters to provide air support. We have that. We just need to make sure all of our personnel are trained. The additional bonus is that much of Canada has Arctic weather for large parts of the year, so that cold weather training serves in terms of things like disaster relief for all of Canada. We need an Arctic-trained military, but whether it will be responding to the Russians in the Arctic — I don’t think so — or whether it is doing disaster relief — absolutely — and maybe it will be responding to Russians in Norway, Sweden or Finland, which have Arctic conditions. Wouldn’t it be great to have a fully trained Arctic army available to provide support for our NATO allies there? Thank you very much.
Senator Smith: To the three panellists, the thing I’m trying to understand is — and could you make some contribution — how do we change the cultural sea shift with our government in moving forward with whatever policies we choose in the North?
The Chair: I will give witnesses thirty seconds each. Let’s start with Colonel Leblanc.
Col. Leblanc: I’m sorry. I’m not sure I understand the question.
Senator Smith: How do we implement a cultural change that propels our government, leadership and military to work together to come up with a cohesive policy in the North?
Col. Leblanc: I would imagine that some form of a campaign of education would be the way to go. Inform the public and have more debate, as Dr. Byers has suggested, so that some of the decisions made are informed ones.
Senator Smith: Thank you.
Mr. Byers: I think it’s happening to some degree. The relationship between the Prime Minister and Natan Obed, President of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, is a strong and positive one. Things are starting to happen.
The issue now is not planning but implementation. We have phenomenal leadership from Indigenous peoples across the North. Our Governor General is herself an Inuk from the North. I think it’s starting to happen.
Obviously, having Senate committees, holding hearings on these issues, and encouraging debate with academics and with government civil servants are all part of this. You’re doing your part. I’m doing my part. My colleagues are doing their part. The Governor General is doing her part. Let’s keep doing it, perhaps with greater urgency, as those environmental and social and health crises continue to unfold.
Mr. Kikkert: I would say that ensuring that ongoing safety and security committees have a permanent and sustained Northern and Indigenous presentation will be essential to accomplish what you’ve suggested. Again, if you are to re-establish the Northern Search and Rescue Roundtable, ensure Northern leadership and first responders are represented on that roundtable. It’s the same with any other safety or security committee formed to discuss such things: Ensure those Northern and Indigenous voices are given sustained presence.
The Chair: Thank you all for a terrific set of presentations. Colonel Leblanc, Dr. Byers, Dr. Kikkert, you gave some very thought-provoking presentations, which I think drew good questions. We’re grateful for your time and expertise. You’ve been very helpful to us today. Thank you very much.
We move now to our second panel as the committees continues exploring security and defence in the Arctic, including military infrastructure and security capabilities. We welcome Mr. Adam Lajeunesse, Associate Professor, Public Policy and Governance, St. Francis Xavier University; and Ms. Magali Vullierme, Researcher, CHUM Research Center, Université de Montréal, and Observatoire de la politique et la sécurité de l’Arctique, École nationale d’administration publique. Thank you both for joining us today by videoconference. I invite you to provide your opening remarks, which will be followed by questions from our members.
We will start with Mr. Adam Lajeunesse. Mr. Lajeunesse, the floor is yours.
Adam Lajeunesse, Associate Professor, Public Policy and Governance, St. Francis Xavier University, as an individual: Good afternoon. Thank you for this invitation to address the committee. I’m pleased to be able to participate in these important discussions.
My remarks today will focus narrowly on security infrastructure in the North, although my areas of expertise cover Arctic defence more generally, and I have written books on sovereignty, the CAF, the Arctic and China’s Arctic interests. I’m happy to answer questions on that broader swath of related topics.
To begin, as I’m sure the committee is aware, the Arctic is changing rapidly. Ice levels are declining, and the Northwest Passage is opening to more activity over longer shipping seasons. While the passage is not on the cusp of becoming a new global sea route, we are seeing more community resupply activity, resource shipping, cruise tourism, fishing and other local or destinational activities.
Over the medium term, a number of new threats will come onto the horizon because of that. We are obviously seeing great power conflict with Russia that is going to demand greater situational awareness in the North, while, as has been mentioned, an assertive China that calls itself a new Arctic state is expanding its capacity to operate in the Arctic.
As other witnesses have mentioned, while military conflict in the Canadian Arctic is highly unlikely, we now need to consider a much wider range of threats stemming from destinational activities that are below the threshold. Trespassing is a real possibility, as are environmental degradation, illegal fishing and even challenges to Canadian sovereignty in certain exceptional circumstances.
Simply put, a more permanent presence is required in the Arctic to respond to a wide variety of safety, security and potentially even defence threats.
Canada requires improved situational awareness, as you’ve already heard, as well as the capability to act on threats when they have been identified. The good news is that we are moving in that direction. We have two Arctic and offshore patrol ships, AOPS, with the Royal Canadian Navy, with another six being built for the navy and Coast Guard. In theory, we will have two new icebreakers, as well.
What is missing is the local infrastructure to maintain and support those ships in the North. It’s one thing to send a frigate or two up for a couple of weeks during Operation NANOOK every year, but it’s quite another to support several ships on operations over the course of an entire shipping season. The recent transit of the Northwest Passage by the HMCS Harry DeWolf demonstrated the precarious nature of refuelling, in particular. There are no refuelling facilities in the Canadian Arctic, and so the Harry DeWolf was refuelled by a contracted tanker — or at least it was supposed to be, but it did not arrive at the appointed time at Arctic Bay. The AOPS then scheduled fuel off of Tuktoyaktuk and then Cambridge Bay. On both occasions, it didn’t show up.
The Harry DeWolf was able to proceed west with sufficient fuel to make the trip to the Pacific. However, the Coast Guard’s fleet was, I’m told, briefly immobilized due to a lack of fuel. We saw a bit of a competition for fuel between the navy and the Coast Guard.
The need for refuelling and resupply facilities has been recognized for years and is becoming even more important. Now, the Nanisivik Naval Facility was intended to fill that role but is well behind schedule. It will also be seasonal, with limited resupply capabilities beyond fuel.
In the Arctic, resupply and supporting infrastructure is sparse, and the Government of Canada needs to do a better job of leveraging what is there and building for dual-use purposes. Across the Arctic, communities are clamouring for marine infrastructure to support resupply operations, fishing and tourism. Mine sites are either running port facilities or planning new ones.
There is no need for the navy or Coast Guard to establish or staff their own standalone facilities going forward. Now, a standalone facility it is ideal for many reasons, and there was solid rationale for building Nanisivik. But in the Arctic, perfect is often the enemy of the good.
The Government of Canada should look instead for opportunities to partner with communities and businesses to support dual-use infrastructure. The construction of berths and refuelling facilities would support communities, lower costs of living and support economic development. Infrastructure in communities would also provide local support and individuals to maintain those facilities.
Improving access and lowering costs of living are at the heart of Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, and if that can be done while supporting infrastructure to the CAF, then that is a win-win.
Likewise, Canada should look at partnering with businesses operating in the area. Baffinland, for instance, operates a large iron-ore mine in northern Baffin and has a far more developed port infrastructure than the navy. Of course, the company built it far faster than the government could. Subsidizing the construction or running of that kind of private infrastructure supports Northern development and offers a potentially better resupply option at a reduced price.
I’m not recommending partnering with any particular company, but as Canada expands its AOPS operations into the western Arctic, the navy will need new facilities there. Partnering with communities and communities in the Bathurst Inlet region, where new infrastructure and mines are being explored now, should be a priority.
To summarize, Canada is facing an infrastructure deficit in the North that will become more apparent as activity grows and the government fleets in the region grow with it. Building that infrastructure will be expensive, so we should make sure we are getting maximum value. Thank you. I’m happy to take questions afterward.
The Chair: Dr. Lajeunesse, I have no doubt that you will get questions.
Next, we will hear from Dr. Magali Vullierme. Welcome.
[Translation]
Magali Vullierme, Researcher, CHUM Research Centre, Université de Montréal, and Observatoire de la politique et la sécurité de l’Arctique, École nationale d’administration publique, as an individual: Good afternoon, everyone. I’ll be speaking in French.
[English]
It will be easier for me and I will have more precise vocabulary, but I am happy to take questions in English as well.
[Translation]
It’s an honour to be invited to testify today. I hope the information I provide can be of use to you.
Very quickly, to provide some context for my remarks, I am a political science and sociology researcher and have been working on Arctic subregions since 2012. I have conducted many studies on the ground in those subregions, particularly with the Canadian Rangers. I have also worked on health security and climate change, more specifically on accelerating permafrost thaw, which is why I will be discussing that topic with you today, if you are interested.
Before sharing the key points I consider important in discussing the impact of climate change on Canadian infrastructure, I think it’s interesting to note that the very definition of the boundaries of the Arctic subregions is shifting as a result of those changes in the climate. The northern subregions of the eight Arctic countries may be delineated based on three criteria: they are located either north of the Arctic Circle, in the 10 degrees Celsius isotherm, which is the area where the average temperature in the warmest month is below 10 degrees Celsius, or north of the tree line, which is the line of transition between taiga and tundra.
As you will notice, the last two criteria, the isotherm line and the tree line, are directly affected by climate change. According to the studies and research, trees are increasingly spreading north into the tundra. This is all the more obvious considering the average 10 degrees Celsius isotherm. For example, in the summer of 2021, a temperature of 48 degrees was recorded in Russia, in the republic of Sakha, also known as Yakutia. So the boundaries of these Arctic subregions are shifting. In the long term, will that result in a redefinition of those boundaries of the Arctic regions [Technical difficulties] criterion for determining the elements that make a region a [Technical difficulties] although that’s not the crux of the matter, but I felt that was important [Technical difficulties].
[English]
The Chair: You are cutting out a little bit. If you turn off your camera and turn it back on again, it might help. The feed is freezing a little bit. Please continue.
Ms. Vullierme: I’m very sorry for that.
[Translation]
First of all — and every witness has made this point today — all the Inuit Nunangat communities desperately lack infrastructure, housing and access to potable water and hospitals. I can identify two specific needs regarding mixed-use and military infrastructure today. The first is the need for better connectivity, particularly thanks [Technical difficulties] here suggested a collaboration between the private and commercial sectors, which Professor Lajeunesse suggested earlier. The second was relayed to me by the Commander of the second Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, Lieutenant-Colonel Mainville, who feels that these patrols would benefit from a multipurpose building in the communities where [Technical difficulties] impact of climate change [Technical difficulties].
[English]
The Chair: Excuse me, Dr. Vullierme. It might be better, if you don’t mind for the time being, if you could turn off your camera and we’ll just take the sound feed and then come back to you for questions. Thank you.
Ms. Vullierme: Okay. Sorry for that.
[Translation]
Let’s talk about the accelerating permafrost thaw affecting all circumpolar regions. Very quickly — since I know you’re aware what permafrost is — it’s any ground that remains at a temperature less than or equal to zero degrees for at least two consecutive years. However, as a result of climate change, the permafrost active layer, which is at the surface, now freezes and thaws to greater depths and over longer periods than previously. This has major consequences for Arctic infrastructure.
I’ve submitted some maps to you to illustrate my remarks. As you can see on map 1, permafrost covers most of the Russian Arctic and a large portion of the Canadian Arctic and Alaska. You can also see some on the coast of Greenland, Iceland and Norway.
As of 2017, 60% of Arctic communities and 70% of civilian and military Arctic infrastructure had been built on permafrost. Russia has been particularly affected by this phenomenon, as is clear from an official report that was published in 2021 and that states that the foundations of more than 40% of those buildings had already been deformed by this phenomenon, and we know that approximately 65% of Russian territory is situated in permafrost zones. It is very important that we conduct a special, in-depth study on this phenomenon in order to be in a better position to anticipate it in future.
If you also look at the maps I sent you showing airport locations and road systems in the Arctic subregions, you can see that Canada won’t be outdone in this area. Our road systems are most widespread in Yukon and the Northwest Territories. In 2019, the federal transport minister announced a $707 million investment in projects designed to adapt to accelerating permafrost thaw. Among other things, the idea was to monitor landslides along the roads and subsiding airstrips notably in Iqaluit and Tasiujaq and Salluit, in Nunavik.
If you look at map 3, you’ll see that the airports of all the Arctic communities are located in permafrost zones. I draw your attention here to a major difference between the western Arctic, of which Canada is a part, and Russia. Most Russian communities are supplied by helicopter, the advantage of which is that helicopters require landing areas that are much smaller and therefore easier and less costly to maintain.
These risks will also weigh on the northern warning system, for example, because our radar installations are located along coastlines, where there’s a risk of coastal collapse exacerbated by accelerating permafrost thaw and climate change.
These are a few points that I feel are essential for the purposes of today’s discussion. I apologize for my unstable internet connection. I hope it didn’t take away from my remarks and that they were at least intelligible. Thank you very much.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Vullierme. We will now proceed to questions. Please note that four minutes will be allotted for each question, including the answer. Again I ask that senators identify which panellist your question is directed to and please keep your questions succinct in an effort to allow as many interventions as possible. The first question goes to deputy chair, Senator Dagenais.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: I’m going to ask Mr. Lajeunesse a few questions.
I’d like us to focus for a while on the military deployment of the Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic. Unless I’m mistaken, we can expect some adaptation problems in various areas, including on the ground, in the various local communities. Can you tell us about some of the shortcomings that the Armed Forces will have to correct in order to be more effective?
[English]
Mr. Lajeunesse: I think the first area to look at is equipment. As has been the case with almost all of our procurement programs, the Canadian military has moved very slowly to replace and upgrade some of its equipment to pieces that will work better in the Arctic. A big part of that is the technical challenge, the fact that things work very differently when it’s -40 degrees, such as grease in mechanics, electronics and batteries. Operating in the Arctic is an entirely different ball game for a lot of our equipment. What I would suggest as a path forward, and this is recognized, of course, by the CAF, is a bigger focus on equipment, snowmobiles, infantry equipment and so forth.
As to training, there have been a couple of points made about how you most effectively train the Canadian Armed Forces to operate in the North. There are two different avenues, two different schools of thought here. One that was mentioned — I think by Dr. Byers — is that we train everyone and we make training very broad. That was something we did in the 1970s in something called the New Viking program. Now, the problem with that is that you get a very broad but very shallow pool of trained personnel. What the Canadian Armed Forces have been doing is trying to focus their Arctic training on a smaller group that will be more effective, that can be deployed more reliably, such as the Arctic Response Company Groups and various, what are called, IOCs.
History has shown that that is probably the best path forward. Arctic training isn’t something that you do and then you never forget it. It’s something that has to be maintained. It’s something that if it’s not done in a relatively intense fashion, you lose it, like a language, if you will.
What the Canadian Armed Forces have been doing is focusing their training on a smaller group that they can reliably project north, and I think history has shown that that’s the way forward.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Now, as a result of reduced Russian military capability because of the war in Ukraine, can we expect China to become more interested than Russia in deployment in the Arctic for shipping and fishing?
[English]
Mr. Lajeunesse: I’d be happy to answer that.
The first part of that question is commercial transit. China is interested in commercial transit of the Northeast Passage above Russia. If you read the political statements, there’s a lot of optimism. There’s a great deal of enthusiasm. The reality behind that, however, is very different. The Russian Arctic is not a particularly attractive business model for shipping companies, and there hasn’t actually been a lot of follow-through on that initial optimism that you read on the front page of the papers, if you will. So China is cautiously optimistic about developing that shipping route; however, I would take a lot of that with a grain of salt.
Now, the Northwest Passage is much, much less likely to be developed as a shipping route used by Chinese vessels, both for reasons of hydrography — it’s a much shallower route — and it’s more dangerous, there is less infrastructure and because, frankly, I don’t think the Canadian government would be particularly happy to have those ships. So that is a less likely phenomenon.
The fisheries question you raised is one that I’m hearing more and more, and that is a serious risk. China has the worst fishing reputation and record in the world for illegal fishing and unsustainable fishing practices. China’s far seas, deepwater fishing fleets are state-sponsored, and they have been rapacious in their activities off Africa, South America, Asia and elsewhere. There’s no reason to believe that they won’t ultimately find their way into the Canadian Arctic or into the American Arctic, into the continental shelf and that offshore area within the Arctic Ocean. That is one of the future threats that we need to monitor, have situational awareness about and have response capability.
The Chair: We’re going to move now to Senator Anderson, and later, if there’s time, I’m going to bring Dr. Vullierme back into the conversation if she has some comments to make.
Senator Anderson: This is for Dr. Vullierme. I am from the Arctic, and I want to ask you, within the Northwest Territories, the change in temperature, ice conditions and permafrost melt pose challenges to all the communities in terms of our subsistence living, travel, capital planning, supply of fuel and supplies. In your opinion, can you please expand on the role of permafrost melt and the environment changes factoring in on Arctic security and defence, as well as the challenges they present in infrastructure, equipment training and personnel?
Ms. Vullierme: Thank you for your question.
[Translation]
The major challenge of the permafrost melt is that there are not many ways to deal with it. One option, for road infrastructures for example, could be to intensively maintain stretches of road built on melting permafrost. A Transport Canada initiative was conducted from 2010 to 2020 and published in [Technical difficulties].
So that initiative showed that sections of roads built on permafrost would have to be rehabilitated every six to seven years at an annual cost of C$20,000, which is five times more expensive than for other stretches of road.
Another solution, other than this costly intensive maintenance, is the installation of thermosiphons. Commercial techniques can be used for these. One such technique with thermosiphons was used by Total in the Yamal Peninsula, with refrigerant tubes installed at the base of infrastructures to keep the ground frozen and prevent accelerated permafrost melt. The system could be used on all roads and has been installed in a number of locations along the Alaska Highway, but it can’t be used for landing strips, where obstructions are prohibited.
The third option is to move infrastructure. That would be phenomenally expensive. That’s why I spoke earlier about the importance of looking into the matter to ensure that future facilities are placed in areas less subject to accelerated permafrost melt and to monitor the impact of melt on infrastructure.
To give you an example of military considerations, I did a study on the ground in Siberia, in Tiksi, a Russian military base, which had to be shut down for several months in 2012-13 as a result of ground degradation. The only option was to use helicopters to fly in supplies to the town of Tiksi, and its 4,000 residents.
That’s a major challenge for military training. I know from conversations I’ve had with Canadian Rangers that winter training has already been affected by the faster permafrost thaw rate, which made for shorter training periods. This is a major challenge in terms of logistics and scheduling.
We have also recently seen the United States Congress implement its strategies in Alaska, whereby Congress highlighted this concern about the faster permafrost melt and noted that it was essential to anticipate where the thaw was going to occur in order to maintain Arctic training operations and assess the imminent challenges of environmental management. The changes were underscored not only for existing infrastructure, as well as planned future infrastructure developments in Alaska.
There are nine military bases in Alaska: three air force bases, three army bases, and three Coast Guard bases. If we compare the location of these bases to the maps of permafrost zones — whether inland permafrost, or at the dividing line between a coastal permafrost zone and a non-permafrost zone — there are only three Coast Guard bases to the south of the permafrost zones. So in the longer term, the United States is also going to have a problem in maintaining their facilities and their military base in Alaska because of this acceleration; hence the importance of monitoring permafrost melt in Arctic strategies.
As I mentioned at the outset, there are no easy solutions. That’s why I have the impression that I am providing you with more problems than solutions, although the idea identified by the United States as well was really to fund hard scientific research into the phenomenon. There you go.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Vullierme.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: My question is for Mr. Lajeunesse. It’s clear that the government’s Arctic policy for a number of years now has been one of diplomacy. I believe it was Bismarck who said: “Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments.” Is it possible to believe that in the North, in the Arctic, we can continue to maintain a policy according to which we may not be a military power, but can continue to be a country that can influence other countries to do more than we do? Can this position with respect to the Arctic, between economic development and the Northwest Passage, be maintained without Canada improving its northern military capacity, whether in terms of early warning or having a presence?
[English]
Mr. Lajeunesse: Senator, to begin with, you have to look at the development of Arctic policy a little bit differently. Arctic policy has been expressed differently by the current government and its predecessor, the Harper government. However, at its core, in terms of what money has been spent on by and large and what the government has been trying to achieve, there has actually been a great deal of consistency. The rhetoric has changed quite a bit, but the policy has not shifted.
Now, as to your final point about Canada controlling development, that is not necessarily in danger. The investment in the Canadian North, shipping in the Canadian North, control and policing constabulary duties are all controlled by Canada. Recently, the government denied a bid by a state-owned Chinese company to purchase a gold mine, which is a good example of Canada demonstrating that its security priorities extend to the Arctic and that the government is aware of the dangers posed by, for example, foreign direct investment from competitors like China.
I hope that answers your question. It’s a bit generalized, but if there is something specific you would like to ask about, I would be happy to answer.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: Mr. Lajeunesse, according to what we appear to be seeing — by which I mean a form of collusion between China and Russia in terms of their cooperation in the North — are there any areas of conflict between those two countries that might, even though relations between them may appear to be harmonious, indicate that they are not?
[English]
Mr. Lajeunesse: Senator, it’s an interesting point. There are significant points of friction between China and Russia in the Arctic. I wrote a piece on that recently. China and Russia have very different understandings of the international law of the sea as it pertains to the Arctic. I won’t go into the details, but China simply assumes maximum access and freedom of navigation, whereas Russia has closed off a great deal of its maritime Arctic space. Russia, like Canada, sees the Arctic as a region that should be governed by the Arctic states first and foremost. China has long pushed for more access and influence for non-Arctic states like itself.
From an economic perspective, there has been a great deal of collaboration between China and Russia. After the invasion of Crimea, Russia turned to China for investment and for a market for its Arctic oil and gas. On one hand, that appears to be a win-win, or as the Chinese Arctic policy has put it “a close collaboration.” However, looking below the surface, you realize the Chinese are taking advantage of the Russians, because the Russians have few other places to turn. The Chinese have been getting amazing prices on Russian oil and gas. The Chinese government has been dictating the location and details of pipelines. China and Russia have been cooperating in the North but there is a great deal of tension beneath the surface.
The Chair: Thank you very much. That brings us to the end of our time on that one. What a great question and a terrific answer.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to the witnesses for being here this afternoon. I have two questions. My first question is in regard to the Canadian Rangers. Dr. Vullierme, that would be great for you.
As we witnessed over the course of the pandemic, the rangers have served their communities capably and admirably when called on. I wonder if this is an area of the Armed Forces that we can invest in as we look to expand a healthy presence in the Arctic. As I understand it, they receive only basic training and only recently had their arms upgraded for the first time since the 1940s. Should we seek to train and recruit in this area, or do you see that part of the work as being okay right now?
[Translation]
Ms. Vullierme: Thank you very much for that question about the Canadian Ranger patrols. It’s true that they have been very useful and even essential in combating the spread of COVID-19 in the communities.
The Quebec Rangers were the first to be mobilized, and they helped slow the spread. They did admirable work. Having spoken to people there, the presence of the rangers was very reassuring to the population.
I don’t know how familiar you might be with these patrols, but rangers are recruited from the communities in which they grew up and are often community leaders. This is essential if they are to understand local needs and how to go about working in the communities with their fellow residents and their families.
You spoke to me about two points in connection with expanding the role of the rangers: training, and numbers. However, all the communities with the capacity to host ranger patrols already have Canadian Ranger patrols. So it’s not a question of opening new patrols, because the communities could simply not come up with that number of rangers. I was often told, by the way, that it was better to have a small number of well-trained people than a larger number of less well-trained rangers, because they are less involved in community life.
It’s important to mention here, particularly since we were talking about battling COVID-19, that people didn’t understand at first; the rangers aren’t there to enforce the law, for example. So there was a misunderstanding. They are not there to enforce a curfew. They are there to help their community. They are essential for land search and rescue operations in their own communities, even though they are second, not first, responders. They are the ones who know the terrain and the climate and are essential for this work. That’s why, in anticipation of today’s meeting, I went and asked Lieutenant-Colonel Mainville, the commander of the Quebec Rangers, whether he had any specific infrastructure needs.
As I explained in my preliminary address, he told me that he felt these patrols needed a multipurpose building in those communities where the Canadian Rangers operate. The building could accommodate various federal government organizations, depending on the specific needs. It would also serve as the building for ranger training, and for activities of the Junior Canadian Rangers, who play a very important role in terms of the intergenerational transmission of knowledge in Arctic communities, and who are, of course, mainly Inuit.
He felt that a building like that could be used to store equipment safely, by which I mean the weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, rations and all the equipment for the Canadian Rangers and Junior Rangers. He added that agreements with the local governments could reduce costs. So there you are, I am transmitting his message.
Among other specific infrastructure requirements, connectivity is not up to scratch for both the civilian and military sectors. I mentioned earlier the option of underwater fiber-optic cable technology, which was also mentioned by Colonel Leblanc. There is of course the Far North Fiber project announced at the end of 2021, which would cross the Northwest Passage. This technology could play a dual role, first by monitoring climate change, using small sensors attached every 70 to 100 kilometres on the cable, and also by monitoring climate changes on the ocean floor, by measuring water temperature, flow, and pressure.
However, from a military standpoint, cables and sensors also need to be used to track the movements of ships, including submarines, in the Northwest Passage. This would be a low-cost investment for Canada, which could use sensors for commercial projects. It would achieve a degree of maritime awareness, which means tracking maritime activities. This need was mentioned earlier by military personnel, including Colonel Leblanc .
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Vullierme.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you very much for your presentations. I found them very interesting. I have two questions, first for Professor Lajeunesse.
We talked about China and access and how Russia is turning more and more to China because that is one of the countries that is open to them. The same kind of thing happened in Africa. I’m a person of African descent, and I know how the Chinese came in. When the African countries were not able to get support from the others, they turned to China and now China practically owns most of the resources. I hope I’m exaggerating about Africa.
My question is this: With the access it may get to the Russian Arctic, do you think there are things Canada should be doing to protect its territory? Is there something specific we should be doing?
Mr. Lajeunesse: Thank you, senator. It’s a great question. I’m in the unusual position of being able to say we are actually in good shape, which I think you hear very rarely in these committees.
To begin with, looking at Chinese investment across the circumpolar Arctic outside of Russia, Chinese investment has been in free fall. It has been increasingly shunned by the Nordic countries — Iceland, Greenland — and recently by Canada in the Arctic. Several years back when Chinese investment was seen as a way of building the Arctic, it was seen very much as a win-win proposition by every Arctic country. Recent developments — Hong Kong, Xinjiang, the South China Sea, Taiwan, COVID-19 — have turned almost the entirety of the Arctic outside of Russia against Chinese investment. You see that in polling across the board. The very last Chinese development project in Greenland was recently bought out by the United States — EXIM Bank. China now has no presence left in any operating or ongoing projects in Greenland, which is striking.
As I mentioned earlier, there was that incident of the Chinese state-owned entity being denied access to a Canadian gold mine, which I think is very relevant to the future. The reason we do that, I believe, is not because gold, for instance, is a strategic resource. It is not because that particular location would give China access to the Northwest Passage. I think that’s an exaggeration of the military dual purposing of resources in the North. Rather, I think what we need to be concerned with — and what we are concerned with and aware of — is the influence that a Chinese company would have in a small community in the North. You can buy out an oil sands project in Alberta, but that’s going to be a very small percentage of Alberta’s economy. You are not going to gain leverage over the Alberta government, for instance. But in the Arctic, the ownership of a large resource project could quite conceivably give a state-owned entity control over a good chunk of that territory’s annual revenue. It could give it control over a very large percentage of that region’s employment. It would give a state-owned entity leverage over that community and that territory and, through them, over Canada.
I think that is the main concern with Chinese investments in the Canadian North. The good news, from my perspective at least, is that across the Arctic, western countries are seeing that danger increasingly clearly and have been turning against that very dramatically.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you very much. Chair, do I have time to ask a second question?
The Chair: You do.
Senator Jaffer: My question is to you, Dr. Vullierme. Are there any human rights violations that might come from militarizing the Arctic, from current geopolitical tensions in the Arctic and from climate change and the shifting landscape of the Canadian North?
[Translation]
Ms. Vullierme: So your question is whether a military presence might lead to human rights violations? Is that right?
Well, for Canada and the Canadian Rangers, the answer is definitely no, because the Canadian Rangers are reservists. As reservists, they really decide for themselves whether to join a patrol. In the meetings I had for my doctoral work, which goes back a few years, the Inuit rangers I spoke with said that the main reason they joined these patrols was to save lives, meaning search and rescue operations to rescue people caught in a blizzard, and saving the lives of people in their community.
I never saw any problems with ranger patrols as a potential tool for acculturation by the Canadian Army. As reservists, if Inuit rangers were not in agreement with what was happening on the ground, they would simply leave these patrols. If that were to occur, the patrols would no longer operate and could no longer exist in the Canadian North.
Significant work was done in terms of cultural understanding and adapting military culture to northern cultures. It’s true that I’ve been talking mainly about the Inuit because I only ever worked with Inuit ranger patrols, but there are also First Nations ranger patrols and francophone ranger patrols, on the Lower North Shore in Quebec. But then we’ve been talking about the Arctic, and that means the Inuit, and this military training adaptation can be seen in the relationship to time.
The sense of time in the North is different than it is in the South, and the Canadian Army understood this very well in its organization of the Canadian Ranger patrols. You can’t organize training in the North the way you organize it in the South. You have to listen to the elders and people in the community if you want things to go well and for intercultural communication to occur with mutual respect.
I hope that answers your question. Don’t hesitate to let me know if you need further details.
[English]
The Chair: We have time for one or two further questions.
Senator Smith, over to you.
Senator Smith: Mr. Lajeunesse, you mentioned refuelling and resupply in supporting infrastructure. We don’t really need permanent military facilities. You talked about joint partnerships with communities. Could you expand on that and highlight the importance of getting the Indigenous population and indigenous leaders tied in economically to these opportunities?
Mr. Lajeunesse: Yes, absolutely.
One of the main things we need from a military perspective is a place for Canada’s growing fleets to come up alongside. The Coast Guard is supposed to be getting new ice breakers. The navy and Coast Guard are absolutely getting eight, new Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships. They need fuel. They need provisions. They need a stock of parts. If something breaks, you can’t go back to Halifax very easily. You need facilities.
The original intent was to build this facility at Nanisivik. It has been scaled down considerably. It is now going to evolve into a part-time fuel station operating in the summer alone. It is a very good location, but it is a standalone facility. It is about 30 kilometres away from the nearest community, which is Arctic Bay, which means that there is no one to maintain it, no one to patrol it. It becomes more expensive in that respect. It has also taken 10 years to build, and it is not even finished.
What we have are communities, none of whom across the North have good maritime infrastructure. Every community in the North is looking for berthing facilities, breakwaters, some kind of harbour facility to support tourism, fishing and resupply. These are all infrastructure components that have a dual use.
A port, a harbour that can support an Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship to support its refuelling, replenishment and resupply for four days of the year can support the community the rest of the year; it can make cruise ships more likely to visit and drop off people who currently have to go in over the beach. It can make refuelling much easier; it can make fisheries much more profitable.
Of course, if you have a place to drop off goods that is not on the beach, you make getting everything into that community cheaper. As soon as it becomes cheaper, standards of living go up. Houses and food become more affordable. It’s a virtuous circle.
As I said, there are reasons we built Nanisivik as a standalone that I am not going to get into, and they are good reasons. Going forward, if we are going to need more infrastructure, it seems logical that the thing to do is to expand that infrastructure in communities or in partnership with mine sites that are already building it to get maximum value for our dollar and ensure that those defence dollars also do double duty, as it were, supporting those communities and improving quality of life there.
Senator Smith: Where would you start? What community?
Mr. Lajeunesse: That’s a good question. I’m not going to give you a guess at that because I don’t know exactly how quickly we are going to roll out navy operations into the western Arctic. The obvious answer is generally somewhere in the western Arctic, because that is where there is a major gap right now from a navy and Coast Guard perspective.
In the eastern Arctic, we have Nanisivik. It will be built. It is fairly close to Resolute. I know that Colonel Leblanc was talking about Resolute. We already have a refuelling facility close to that location.
As time goes on and we want to evolve beyond a fuelling facility, and we want some place to actually supply goods and potentially even weapons systems, then it should be community-based because you need a location that has people and staff who can staff, guard and maintain the facilities. I can’t give you a particular community right now.
The Chair: Thank you for the question, Senator Smith.
Thank you to our witnesses today, Dr. Vullierme and Dr. Lajeunesse, for sharing your very deep knowledge of the Arctic with us and for responding fully to all of our questions. You have been generous with your time, expertise and insight. You have been patient with the technology. We thank you both and wish you well.
Senators, our next meeting will take place next Monday, May 16 at our usual time of 2 p.m. As you know, Divisions 19 and 20 of Part 5 of Bill C-19, the Budget Implementation Act, have been referred to this committee. As a result, we’ll be stepping away from our study on Arctic security and military infrastructure to begin our pre-study of this bill.
I do note that we have been moving along fairly briskly. We have made good progress thus far. I’m looking forward to turning back to this important work as soon as possible.
With that, I wish everyone a good evening.
(The committee adjourned.)