THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Monday, June 20, 2022
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met with videoconference this day at 2 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on issues relating to national security and defence generally.
Senator Tony Dean (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Honourable senators, welcome to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. I’m Tony Dean, the chair of the committee, representing Ontario, and I’m joined today by my fellow committee members: Senator Jean-Guy Dagenais, representing Quebec; Senator Clément Gignac, representing Quebec; Senator Peter Boehm, representing Ontario; Senator Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu, representing Quebec; Senator Donna Dasko, representing Ontario; Senator Marty Deacon, representing Ontario; Senator Mobina Jaffer, representing British Columbia; Senator David Richards, representing New Brunswick; Senator Larry Smith, representing Quebec; and Senator Hassan Yussuff, representing Ontario.
Today, we welcome two panels of experts who have been invited to provide a briefing to the committee on the current security situation in Ukraine. The goal of this meeting is to receive an update from our witnesses, and with this in mind, each witness will be invited to provide longer opening remarks to the committee.
If time permits, the remainder of each panel will be allocated to questions.
We will begin by introducing our first panel of witnesses: from the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Major-General Paul Prévost, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff; from Global Affairs Canada, Sandra McCardell, Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe, Arctic, Middle East and Maghreb; and Alison Grant, Executive Director, Security and Defence Relations.
Thank you all for joining us today by videoconference. We have some sense of what your schedules and lives are like in this context, and we’re very grateful for your participation.
We now invite you to provide your opening remarks, and we will open with Major-General Prévost. Major-General, you may begin when you’re ready, and welcome to the committee.
[Translation]
Major-General Paul Prévost, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: :
I am Major-General Paul Prévost. Mr. Chair, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to provide you with an update on the situation in Ukraine.
As director of the strategic joint staff at the National Defence HQ here in Ottawa, I am responsible to provide decision support to the chief of defence staff, General Eyre, on all things that concern military strategy, plans, Canadian Armed Forces operations and logistical support from a strategic standpoint.
[English]
Today, I am accompanied by my colleagues from Global Affairs Canada, and together we will aim to answer your questions with respect to the terrible crisis that is unfolding in front of us.
But first, let me start with some opening remarks where I will cover briefly the situation on the ground. I will then update you on what the Department of National Defence has done so far. I understand you’re looking at the current situation, but given this is our first opportunity to talk to the panel, we thought it would be good to look back at the situation overall, and my remarks, as you pointed out, will be a little longer than we normally do. I will be talking for about eight minutes.
I will first start by saying that most of what we do is well coordinated with our partners at Global Affairs and all other federal partners, the international community and, more importantly, with the Ukrainians.
Last week, Minister Anand and General Eyre returned from Singapore and Europe where they met with their partners in the Asia-Pacific, their counterparts in NATO and representatives from more than 50 countries at the most recent meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group.
I also met last week with my Five Eyes counterparts from the U.S., the U.K., Australia and New Zealand. Today’s subject was at the top of every one of those discussions and with reason. The world has become a more dangerous place since Vladimir Putin began an illegal and unacceptable war of choice against a sovereign democracy.
[Translation]
We now find ourselves in a volatile and dangerous world where those with power—namely Vladimir Putin—is determined to remake the world order to suit his own ends; a world where it is acceptable to attack the social cohesion of liberal democracies and the credibility of our institutions, to ensure our model of government is seen as a failure.
[English]
The decision to illegally invade Ukraine was the decision of Putin alone, and we saw it coming. Our intelligence command, working closely with the Five Eyes partners, started to report in mid-October that a large Russian buildup had started on the borders of Ukraine. From November to February, we watched as the buildup continued, and we prepared our contingency plans. Of note here is that during these months, a large amount of highly classified intelligence was declassified, for the most part by the U.S. and the U.K., to share with the Ukrainians, the international community and the public through the media to show that this invasion was completely the choice of Putin. We all saw it the same way, and we all saw that it was coming.
Since the beginning of the invasion, our intelligence command and their partners have worked closely to counter Russia’s disinformation. Due to those efforts, the Ukrainians and the West are winning the battle between truth and lies. But the Russian narrative remains dominant in many parts of the world and more acutely in Russia. We need to continue working together to ensure the truth remains the basis of our common understanding.
We need to be grateful to the intelligence community for their hard work, their collaboration and the precision which armed Ukraine, our partners and allies and the population with the best information available.
As an example, Task Force Unifier, our contingent in Ukraine, based on the precision of the information, was able to cross safely into Poland in the very last days before the invasion. This was a difficult moment for the members of our task force as they were leaving Ukrainian soldiers behind, their friends, like many others of the 33,000 soldiers we trained since 2015.
On February 24, the invasion started, with little surprise. The real surprise came quite early in the war when it became apparent that the Russian advance was not unfolding like Putin had planned it. You will recall that at the onset, Russians moved along four main axes: one from the northeast and one from the east toward the Donbas to fix the Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine; one from the south, most likely with the objective of seizing Odessa; and one from the north, clearly heading for Kyiv.
Through a series of failures in the planning, logistics, command and control and execution of the operation, and conversely, due to the great agility demonstrated by the outnumbered Ukrainian forces, Russia failed to seize Kyiv, the main objective of this invasion.
[Translation]
By early April, all Russian forces had been pushed out of Northern Ukraine and consolidated their efforts in the Donbas and in the South. The intense fighting continues, but the conflict has moved from one of manœuvre to one of attrition. Little gains are being made on either side, with the most intense fighting being along the line of contact around the city of Severodonetsk at the moment.
[English]
The war in Ukraine has also entered a new phase that is seeing Russia engage in protracted efforts to inflict long-term damage on Ukraine and its people. An example of this can be found in Russia’s use of energy exports as leverage, its blocking of Ukrainian grain exports, and the deliberate targeting of grain storage facilities and critical infrastructure through the use of strategic weapons.
Although the conflict is very static, it is important that Ukraine is able to reconstitute and sustain this battle over time. We and our international partners are coordinating our efforts, and we will continue to do so.
As mentioned earlier, the training mission in Ukraine paused a few days before the invasion, and since then, the bulk of our efforts in Ukraine has been focused on the provision of military assistance. Our first flights of military assistance arrived in Ukraine just a few days before the invasion. Since the war started, we have been sending our assistance through an international hub in Poland.
Since February 2022, Canada has provided $274 million in military assistance to Ukraine. Donated equipment includes M777 artillery guns, drone cameras, armoured vehicles, over 20,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, small arms, sniper rifles, Carl Gustaf anti-tank weapons, rocket launchers, hand grenades, demining equipment, satellite imagery, and non-lethal aids such as protective gear, and close to 400,000 individual meal packs.
So far, the bulk of our support has been to satisfy the immediate needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the current fight, but, more and more, the international community and the Ukrainians are moving toward long-term planning so we can rebuild Ukraine’s military force for future battles. Such planning demands close coordination between allies and partners, requiring coherence, commonality and interoperability. For this reason, a special multinational headquarters has been set up in Europe under the leadership of the U.S. security cooperation command Ukraine. Canada is represented at this headquarters.
Related to the conflict but just outside the borders of Ukraine, the Canadian Armed Forces deployed 120 members to assist Polish authorities in managing the influx of refugees from Ukraine. Our members work alongside our government partners, such as Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada and the Polish forces to provide logistical and mental health support to the millions of displaced Ukrainians.
In NATO, the Canadian Armed Forces has reinforced our assurance and deterrence mission in Europe. As you know, Canada leads the multinational battle group in Latvia, which has been supplemented by an artillery battery of 127 members and an electronic warfare troop. Also, in Latvia, we are reinforcing the Multinational Division North Headquarters with a general officer and additional staff.
At sea, we added a second frigate. HMCS Montréal and HMCS Halifax are operating in the Baltic and the Mediterranean Seas respectively.
Finally, in the air domain, we also deployed a maritime patrol aircraft, and our CF-18 detachment is preparing to deploy in July to take over the air policing mission in Romania for four months starting in August.
Also, on February 28, we deployed two CC-130 military transport aircraft to Europe to move our allies and partners’ military assistance toward Ukraine. To date, the air detachment has flown over 105 missions delivering more than 2.3 million pounds of military assistance.
All in all, we currently have 1,375 members deployed under Operation REASSURANCE, Canada’s commitment to NATO’s deterrence and defence operations in eastern Ukraine.
[Translation]
I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of our CAF members who have served, and continued to serve, on operations such as UNIFIER to support Ukraine and REASSURANCE in Europe, as well as all their family members. Their efforts and commitment are critical at this important time in our history.
[English]
Mr. Chair, this level of commitment to NATO is the highest seen since the Canadian Armed Forces left Europe at the end of the Cold War. Though our resolve remains strong, the ruled-based international order and its essential principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, which have underpinned global stability for generations, is facing a tremendous challenge. The gravity of these times should be apparent to us all.
Thank you. We look forward to your questions.
The Chair: And thank you very much, Major-General. That’s a very, very helpful overview of the situation and Canada’s contributions to it.
Next, we will hear from Ms. Sandra McCardell. Ms. McCardell, whenever you are ready, please begin.
[Translation]
Sandra McCardell, Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe, Arctic, Middle East and Maghreb, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair. It has now been over 110 days since the start of President Putin’s unjustifiable war of choice, where he launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Over 110 days of human suffering, lives lost and incredible cruelty committed against the people of an independent, peaceful and sovereign nation.
[English]
Putin’s actions, and those of his neighbours, have further violated decades of trust built upon the rules-based international order. A permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia itself has violated the UN Charter. This war on the borders of our European partners challenges the international security architecture and has put at risk the global food and energy supply chains on which the world depends.
Since the unprovoked invasion on February 24, Russia’s military forces have continued to commit appalling acts across Ukraine, brazenly destroying cities and attacking civilian infrastructure. Experts, including the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism fact-finding mission, have concluded that Russia is committing serious atrocities and other human rights violations in Ukraine, including war crimes, possible crimes against humanity, and conflict-related sexual violence. Intense fighting continues.
As my colleague from the Department of National Defence has just mentioned, the situation in the East, particularly the Donbas, is becoming more critical as Ukrainian defenders resist the Russian offensive. The current state of the war gives every sign of becoming a protracted conflict.
According to the United Nations, at least 4,480 civilians have been killed, 5,560 injured — and these figures are, almost most certainly, well below the true figures — and nearly 7 million people have fled Ukraine since the start of the invasion. An additional 7 million have been displaced within the country. Over 15 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, amounting to up to 30% of Ukraine’s population.
The humanitarian response, while slow to start, has been scaling up, and the UN, Red Cross, and NGO partners have been able to reach 7.8 million people with humanitarian assistance, but with much more to do.
[Translation]
The ramifications of President Putin’s war are global. We are seeing acute impacts on poor and vulnerable people around the world. The invasion has injected new levels of uncertainty into the global economy, directly leading to historically high food, fertilizer, energy and other commodity prices.
By brutally attacking one of the breadbaskets of the world, President Putin is increasing global food insecurity and poverty, a situation that was already strained as a result of two years of COVID-19.
Since the beginning of President Putin’s invasion on February 24, Canada and our partners, which include the G7, the Five Eyes and NATO, responded swiftly based on Ukraine’s needs, and with an unprecedented level of coordination.
[English]
Of course, Canada’s support for Ukraine precedes the invasion, with $890 million in support of security, prosperity and reform from 2014 to 2022. This year, Canada has provided $245 million to support the humanitarian response in Ukraine and an increase of $35 million in development assistance. An additional allocation of $9 million was made to support those impacted by sexual and gender-based violence, and food security efforts in Ukraine. We have also announced $13.4 million to the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to help counter Putin’s attempts to justify his war through disinformation and the promotion of rampant false narratives around the world.
Through Budget 2022, Canada committed to provide an additional $500 million in military assistance to Ukraine in 2022-23. Of this, $274 million has already been committed to respond to Ukraine’s needs.
We are also looking at Ukraine’s economic stability and resilience, and providing $620 million in bilateral loan offers, $500 million of which has already been disbursed. This complements the disbursements of $1 billion in loan resources through the new Administered Account for Ukraine at the International Monetary Fund. We have also announced an additional $250 million in loan resources through this account to be disbursed soon.
To support Ukrainians who choose Canada as their safe haven, Canada has also adopted a series of special immigration and support measures, including the creation of a new immigration stream to allow an unlimited number of Ukrainians to stay and work or study in Canada on a temporary basis. Through the hard work of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, nearly 300,000 Ukrainians have applied for visas, with 130,000 approved, and more than 42,000 Ukrainians have arrived. Three free federal charter flights have brought 953 Ukrainians from Poland to Montréal, Halifax and Winnipeg in recent weeks. Of course, these new arrivals are receiving support for short-term accommodation and income.
[Translation]
In addition to direct support to Ukraine and its people, Canada is focused on holding Putin, his regime and those abetting him accountable, and to place economic and political pressure on them to stop the war.
[English]
Since January 2022, Canada has imposed sanctions on over 1,070 individuals and entities in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. We are severely restricting Russia’s access to the global financial system; pressuring its economy; and prohibiting the import and export of goods, services and technologies that are key to funding President Putin’s war. We are working with transatlantic partners to identify the assets of sanctioned individuals and are taking steps to allow for the seizure and disposal of any assets.
We are also engaging diplomatically with the global south to address Russia’s disinformation, which has falsely blamed the rise of food prices on Western sanctions. The next opportunity will be the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, where Canada can explain that the disruption of grain exports is a direct result of Russia’s invasion, its blockade of Ukraine’s vast sea ports and its restriction of exports of its own commodities and fertilizers.
Of course, Canada is acting to respond to the needs of the world with more than 500 million in humanitarian food assistance this year.
[Translation]
The principled response of Canada and our partners in support of Ukraine is a demonstration of the need to uphold the rules-based international system. Canada endeavours to maintain and maximize this level of multilateral unity within the broader international community. More so than ever, as the war continues to evolve, we need to stay focused on supporting Ukraine. Canada is unwavering in our commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.
[English]
We will continue to stand with Ukraine, and its brave and resilient people, to ensure the country is free, prosperous and independent. We will also work with allies and across the international community to protect the systems and structures we have all protected and strengthened for decades and that are the cornerstones of our own national security.
I am joined by colleagues from Global Affairs Canada, and we are very pleased to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Ms. McCardell. Those were very helpful comments.
We have time for some questions. I’d like to note that the panel must finish by 3 p.m., and we will do our best to ensure that each group gets at least one committee member to ask a question. We should be able to do two per group in this first round.
There will be three minutes for the question and the answer, so please keep those questions brief.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: It is an honour to begin today’s discussion. I want to start by thanking both of our witnesses very much for their meaningful and enlightening testimony. My question is for MGen Prévost.
General Eyre recently stated the following:
Given the deteriorating world situation, we need the defence industry to go onto a wartime footing and increase their production lines to be able to support the requirements that are out there, whether it’s ammunition, artillery, rockets, you name it.
I have a three-part question. What effect has the large number of weapons and ammunitions we have supplied to Ukraine had on Canada’s ammunition stockpile? What percentage of our shells, for example, are now in Ukraine? How long will it take us to replenish our stockpiles for the military here at home?
MGen. Prévost: Thank you for the question.
With respect to the weaponry that we have provided, as you mentioned, I support General Eyre’s comments on that. We have provided Ukraine with a significant portion of our weaponry from our inventory. We have done so by ensuring that our operational capability can reasonably respond to a crisis on our end, knowing that the primary effort right now is to help Ukraine as best we can.
You asked the slightly more pointed question about how much equipment has been delivered to Ukraine to date. The majority of the equipment that has been announced since February went to Ukraine very early. Drawing internally, from the Department of National Defence’s own stockpile, has allowed us to send the equipment to Ukraine fairly quickly. I mentioned the Carl Gustaf anti-tank weapons, the snipers and several other types of weaponry. We moved quite quickly. Later, the decision was made to send howitzers. This was done over the Easter weekend and the dispatch of guns followed.
With respect to the last announced shipment of howitzers, I don’t have the report showing the exact amount of equipment that arrived on the other side, but we can follow up and provide the committee with the answer. I don’t have those numbers at this time.
Senator Boisvenu: Russia is telling the media—
[English]
The Chair: Excuse me, Senator Boisvenu. Your three minutes are up. We are going to the next senator.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My question is for Ms. McCardell. I would like to address the sensitive issue of Yasemin Heinbecker attending a party at the Russian Embassy in Ottawa. What are the implications of this diplomatic blunder for Canada and for Ms. Heinbecker? Has Minister Joly already wiped the slate clean on this incident?
Ms. McCardell: Thank you for the question. I believe Minister Joly spoke about the situation this week. I will point out, though, that the decision to send a protocol officer to this reception was made by Global Affairs Canada. It should not have been done and no representatives will be sent to events of this kind in the future. Obviously, Russian diplomats would not be invited to events hosted by Canada. I can reassure you, however, that Canada unequivocally supports Ukraine. We actively support Ukraine and will continue to do so.
Senator Dagenais: I understand that Global Affairs Canada made the decision to send the diplomat. However, we must acknowledge that the war had been going on in Ukraine for at least three months. I understand that Ms. Joly was not aware of this and we can go back and forth on this. Between you and me, Global Affairs Canada made a very poor decision, unless they were completely unaware that there was a war in Ukraine.
Ms. McCardell: The decision should not have been made. We regret any misunderstanding of the situation. I think the minister has made it clear that there will be no more presence in this manner.
Senator Dagenais: Thank you very much, Ms. McCardell.
Senator Gignac: I would like to thank the witnesses. My question is for MGen. Prévost. I want to begin by thanking you for being with us. I congratulate the Armed Forces for all the work being done in Europe.
I have two questions and would ask you to be brief in your answers. In the opinion of many experts, Operation Unifier made a difference and helped Ukraine repel the attackers in the first few weeks of the war. First, if another country, such as Moldova, which is not part of NATO, was threatened with invasion by Russia, would Canada have the capability and willingness to repeat Operation Unifier in that other country, as was done in Ukraine?
MGen. Prévost: That would be possible. Of course, these discussions would first have to take place in cabinet under the guidance of Global Affairs Canada. At this time, the Canadian Armed Forces do not have the mandate to mount such an operation. However, they are always well placed to provide training to increase the capability of countries that need it.
Senator Gignac: Second, in your opening remarks, you mentioned that geopolitics has changed a lot and that the world order is changing. I am trying to understand a little bit about how NATO works. According to Article 13 of the NATO Treaty, a country can withdraw from NATO, and we understand very well. If, all of a sudden, one of the members threatens the cohesion of NATO or blocks decisions, is there a process by which the members could expel another member from NATO? Discussions are underway, and there is a problem of cohesion within NATO to accept the membership of Sweden and Norway in the organization. This membership is quite important for the security of Europe.
MGen. Prévost: Thank you for the question. I think Ms. McCardell or Ms. Grant would be in a better position to answer it.
Ms. McCardell: I will ask Ms. Grant to answer it.
[English]
Alison Grant, Executive Director, Security and Defence Relations, Global Affairs Canada: On the question of Finland and Sweden and dynamics at NATO, as you know, Canada fully supports Finland and Sweden’s application to join NATO. They are our closest and most active partners and will make meaningful contributions to our collective security.
It is true that the process going on at NATO is taking somewhat longer than we would have hoped, but as we do when we have points of disagreement within the alliance, we consult, discuss and find a way forward. You’ll see in the news tonight that there were talks in Brussels, which were not definitive, but the process does move forward. We’re confident that the alliance will find a solution and that we’ll soon be able to welcome Finland and Sweden to the NATO family. Thank you.
Senator Dasko: Thank you to the witnesses for being here today. It’s a very important topic.
My question is for MGen. Prévost. Canada has stepped up with a huge amount of military support, as have our allies and friends in the world, such as Europe and the United States.
However, President Zelenskyy continues to ask for more weapons and military assistance. If he is asking for more, and if we’re not providing enough to Ukraine for what it needs to fight the Russians, aren’t we looking at a situation down the road that will spiral downwards? Because if Ukraine is getting more, but they are not getting what they need — and the Russians are relentless; they don’t show any signs of letting up and it looks like they are doing this well into the long term — are we not facing a situation where Ukraine is going to lose? I would like your views on that. Thank you.
MGen. Prévost: Thank you for the question. I made the point in my opening remarks that it’s important at this point to continue to provide Ukraine with the military assistance they require for the current fight but also to look at how we can help them to rebuild for future battles, which is what we’re doing now.
We don’t know where this is going to land, but right now it’s a very close fight along the front. I call that “une guerre d’usure.” Ukraine has had some good victories through the battles, so far. It’s important to continue to support Ukraine. Clearly, the aggressor in this case is Russia. The more we can do to regain the territory that Ukraine has lost so far, the better it will be for everybody. Thank you.
Senator Dasko: But can we guarantee that they will get everything they need or are we actually looking at a situation down the road where they are going to start losing their battles? I’m kind of re-asking my question.
MGen. Prévost: I guess the best answer is that this is everybody’s effort. I think that the current militaries in the West, at least, have given as much as they could from their own inventories. Senator Dagenais asked a question about the industry. The industry has to do their part so we can rearm Ukraine as best we can so that they can sustain the battle as long as they can. It is more than just the military; industry has to be a part of that.
[Translation]
Senator Smith: My question is for MGen. Prévost. During our discussions, it was clear that Canada was being asked to increase its contribution by 2% in terms of good manufacturing practices in order to properly arm our Armed Forces and support Ukraine in this war at the same time.
[English]
As you look forward, how are we doing in terms of arming ourselves, especially when we look at a country like Russia, which has ambitions of travelling through the north of our country, bringing gas and oil to Europe through a much shorter route? How can we equip ourselves to be ready to defend ourselves in the case of any form of aggression by Russia on our northern flank, which is in Northern Canada?
MGen. Prévost: Thank you for the question, which is very broad. I’ll start by saying that in the close fight, we have to reconstitute. The Canadian Armed Forces have lost a lot of members through the pandemic, although not because of the pandemic. We’re now short 7,500 people in the Canadian Forces. This is our focus. We have a focus on culture change and on reconstituting the force. We need to recruit and train more so that we can bring our manpower to a higher level. Reinvestments are also required.
This morning, Minister Anand announced new investment in the context of continental defence and a defence policy update has been announced by the government, which will occur in the fall. All of this will modernize the Canadian Armed Forces so that it’s ready to take on the challenges of the future. This comes at an interesting time in our history. Thank you.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you, Major-General and Ms. McCardell, for your presentations.
I want to thank you, Major-General, and the Minister of Defence, Ms. Anand, for the excellent work you are doing in the Ukraine. You make us very proud.
When you say you are looking to expand the Armed Forces, I hope you are looking at all Canadians, because I know that in my province of B.C., there are many young people who would love to join. I hope your recruitment involves many communities.
My question to both Ms. McCardell and to MGen. Prévost is on women, peace and security. As you know, Canada is a signatory to six resolutions that ensure, especially during war, that we make special efforts to address the needs of women and include them in processes. Normally I would say “peace process,” but that’s in the long term. I’m wondering what efforts you are making in this regard.
Ms. McCardell, you spoke about sexual misconduct. What kind of aid are we giving to the women on the ground? Thank you very much.
MGen. Prévost: Thank you. I will start from our point of view in terms of women, peace and security and gender-based issues in National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces.
We have been working on this for a long time, and we have been a leader in that field. Through Operation UNIFIER, where we were in Ukraine since 2015, we applied what we have learned over the years. We were operationalizing women, peace and security at the tactical and operational levels and through our work on defence reform. We had 12 initiatives under Operation UNIFIER. This is on pause now, but we hope that our efforts with respect to the Armed Forces of Ukraine over the last seven years will have helped in the fight they are currently in.
Ms. McCardell: Thank you, Senator Jaffer. This is a very important issue. Even before the invasion, a lot of the work we were doing in Ukraine, as you would expect, was implementing those fiat priorities, and we have continued that support during this period of conflict.
Specifically, Canada was one of the 39 countries that referred the situation in Ukraine to the International Criminal Court. Part of that is around potential sexual and gender-based violence in a time of conflict.
We have also provided 10 police analysts to support ICC investigations, as well as $1 million to an ICC trust fund to increase the ICC s’s capacity to investigate sexually based crimes and crimes against children. We also provided $2.5 million to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. That was done for accountability and to build our case, so that we can eventually take this and get justice for these victims.
In the meantime, some of our funding is going to psychosocial support for victims and is helping them access sexual and reproductive health services, so really touching on the ground now.
I would close by saying we’re looking at the situation, right now, in a time of conflict, but we also want to consider the voices of women, as you said, as we move forward to peace negotiations one day, but also during the reconstruction as we look at the investments that will be made to reconstruct Ukraine and to ensure that the perspectives of women are included.
The Chair: Thank you both for those responses to two important questions from Senator Jaffer.
Senator Boehm: Thank you to our witnesses. I’ll say in advance that I’d love to be in a second round, chair, but I’ll ask my first questions of Global Affairs Canada.
There will be many summits in the next few weeks. There’s the Commonwealth summit in Rwanda, there’s the NATO summit in Madrid, and there’s the G7 summit in Germany. All of these are opportunities to get strong messages out. Regarding the one in Kigali, in particular, where we’ll be speaking to the African and other Commonwealth states that will be there, Canada I’m assuming would have a bit of clout as the second-largest contributor to the Commonwealth. At the same time, Mr. Putin will follow the usual path that despots take in offering some counter-information and being problematic in that regard. What is being done to focus on getting a message to countries that might not be getting the message about the aggression? That’s the first question.
The second one — I’ve asked Minister Joly this question before — is: With regard to post-hostility planning, is there a plan to look at the long-term assistance that Canada could provide? I’m thinking, in particular, of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for dealing with the displaced peoples in neighbouring countries, neighbouring countries of Ukraine, and indeed for reconstruction and further development beyond what the International Monetary Fund special facility will offer. Thanks.
Ms. McCardell: Thanks. Let me take both of those questions.
It will come as no surprise to find that Russia’s narrative, Russia’s disinformation, has carried far, particularly into parts of the world where they have historically had influence or where there are strong trade ties with energy or grain links. We are absolutely working to counter that. For the past weeks, we have been analyzing, through consultations with our embassies abroad, the key issues that are resonating in each of these countries. If we assess that they are sympathetic to Russia’s disinformation, what are the origins of it and how can we counter it?
In a lot of cases, for example, the origins have been about food security. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, there is a real sense that the West is somehow responsible for the rising food prices. It’s completely false. We have been using our missions abroad — and you are correct. We will absolutely use the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, or CHOGM, where we have the ability to access a wide range of the global south — to counter specifically and in detail what Russia has said. We’ll also use that opportunity to demonstrate that we have been taking concrete response through humanitarian assistance and through efforts to get the grain out of Ukraine to respond to that. That is one of the priorities for CHOGM in particular. The countries in NATO and the G7 are closer partners. It’s more about coordinating how we can respond and work together on that narrative.
In terms of recovery, there is a Ukraine Recovery Conference that’s taking place in Switzerland on July 4 and 5. That will be the first formal recovery conference, so we will be looking at some of the principles — as well as coordinating amongst partners — regarding how we will manage recovery, potentially recovery even during an ongoing conflict. Some of the principles I have just talked about, like a gender perspective. Some of the principles existed before, like reform and ensuring transparency in institutions.
That work will get going in earnest in July, but some of these summits will allow us to prepare the ground for a place where Canada can best demonstrate its leadership.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you. There’s a lot of really valuable information — timely, relevant and urgent — for us today.
My question is regarding a recent announcement by the U.K. that they will train up to 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers every 120 days. Canada, of course, is no stranger to training with the Ukrainian armed forces, and I wonder if there are any discussions of the Canadian Armed Forces, or CAF, contributing to a similar program in the near future.
I suspect Ms. Grant would be the best placed to answer this.
Ms. Grant: I will defer to my colleague from the Department of National Defence on CAF training.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
MGen. Prévost: I can, for sure, take that question. I’ve mentioned we paused our training under Operation UNIFIER, or at least, we left the country just before the invasion started. However, some training has continued throughout, virtually. We have also continued to train some Ukrainian troops in third countries on specific capabilities. I also mentioned that since then, the U.S. is setting up headquarters in Europe to coordinate the longer-term needs of Ukraine not only in terms of building their capabilities but also the training portion of it.
We saw the U.K. announcement last Friday on this. We are also developing our own plans to train as part of those efforts. We are just starting the discussion in looking at what the U.K. has announced and seeing if Canada can help there. It’s the start of a discussion, but we have been looking into our own training plans.
The Ukrainians, up to this point, were not interested in leaving Ukraine. They were focused on the current battle, but we see more and more — and their Minister of Defense, Minister Reznikov, has announced — that they are now willing to leave the country, so we see opportunities here for the Canadian Armed Forces, and we will come back when we have a bit more. Thank you.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you. It sounds like some of that work has continued virtually, which is great to hear.
Is it too soon to ask, as you’re starting to think about this, what the training might look like, or where you might host it? Would it be in an allied nation? Is it too soon?
MGen. Prévost: It is too soon. We know what we are willing to do and the number of people we have to do this in the same context of Operation UNIFIER. However, how Canada will be able to contribute best is what we are looking at right now. We will start discussions with the U.K. on whether we can help them, but there are other places we can do this as well. As I mentioned, there has been some training done since February as well in third countries that Canada participated in. Thank you.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.
Senator Yussuff: Let me thank all the witnesses for being here today. Major-General Prévost, my question is for you more specifically. It may seem quite a strange question, but what is our objective in Ukraine specifically, and how do we know when we achieve the objective?
MGen. Prévost: Our objective in Ukraine is to support that country in winning that war. What Putin has done in that country is illegal. It should be recognized by everyone that this is an illegal action, and we have all the interest in protecting democracy in the long run. Our objective is for Ukraine to win their war.
Another objective is to avoid escalation outside of Ukraine, but we are all in with Ukraine to help them fight that battle as everybody should recognize that this is a threat to the world order — the rules-based international order — and our democracies.
Senator Yussuff: Given the supply of military equipment that we are providing to Ukraine, do we have plans to replenish that equipment as it is being used up?
MGen. Prévost: Yes. That is a question I didn’t have time to answer when Senator Dagenais asked initially.
We will replace the equipment that we have donated. We need the industry that is working under high demand right now to continue to flow weapons toward Ukraine through different countries, but as soon as capacity allows it, we will be able to replenish. We are hoping that the industry is gearing up to increase their capacity, so we can see our donations be replenished in the CAF as soon as possible.
Senator Yussuff: Thank you.
The Chair: This brings us back to the top for round two. There will be two minutes max allocated. Very short questions, please. I will intervene on the button after two minutes. Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: I join my colleagues in saying to the people in the Armed Forces that we are very proud to see how you do your work in Europe, so congratulations and thank you very much. My question is for MGen. Prévost.
We have been hearing in the media for the past few weeks and again this week that the Russians have been bombing military supplies provided by their NATO allies. I would like to get your take on that. Is it a media war or is it real?
How can we currently assess the two sides? Is there a retreat of Ukraine or is it a standstill, so there is no one advancing or retreating?
MGen. Prévost: On the question of armament depots, we know that Russia is targeting them. We know that President Putin is not pleased that the west continues to help Ukraine achieve victory. I don’t have any particular information about whether he is achieving his goal. In some places, we know of attacks that have been aborted, but I have no information on the amount of equipment that has been hit by these attacks.
What we can see is that this number of attacks on strategic critical infrastructure is decreasing over time, depending on what weapons Russia has available. They are getting rid of their weapon inventory while trying to fight this war.
What was the second part of your question?
Senator Boisvenu: Is Russia advancing or retreating in this conflict?
[English]
The Chair: Excuse me. I’m afraid we’ve run out of time.
Over to you, Senator Dagenais.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My question is for MGen. Prévost.
Do the Ukrainian military have the training to use the equipment provided? I heard that even if they had some training, they had to go to the battlefield with their tablets — what we call an iPad — to translate and understand how the device works.
What do you think about the training? Are they getting enough of it?
MGen. Prévost: Thank you for the question, senator.
I would say that they are. First of all, a lot of the equipment being sent to Ukraine — their original equipment being Soviet — is very similar and easy to use. The more complicated pieces, like the M777 guns that were sent, came with translations, and they were also given training on the more sophisticated equipment, like the M777 guns.
In the context of arming Ukraine with standard western equipment — like the initiative the British have announced — this training will serve to train Ukrainians in western equipment in the longer term.
Senator Dagenais: Thank you very much.
[English]
Senator Boehm: My question is for Alison Grant. Ahead of the very large NATO summit that will take place in Madrid, what is your assessment of the state of NATO? Is everyone on the same page? Is everyone ready? What about all scenarios as Russian threats continue and perhaps escalate?
Ms. Grant: Thank you for the question. Chair, we are in the throes of organizing for the NATO summit coming up shortly, June 29-30, and I can tell you the agenda is very large. I think the dynamics at NATO are very good; they are strong, healthy. NATO has been weathering this crisis very well and has responded with strength. We have seen a reinforcement of the eastern flank. We have seen very good and robust discussions about what our posture should be moving forward on the eastern flank too, and very good engagement with Ukraine.
Right now, coming into the summit, I would say our priorities are very much focused on, one, finalizing our discussions on NATO’s new Strategic Concept. This is NATO’s capstone document that carries the organization, and it hasn’t been updated in many years. We’re nearing the finish line here, and discussions have been good with no major dissension.
We are also looking at engagement with Ukraine. President Zelenskyy will be invited to the summit. We are looking forward to engaging with President Zelenskyy there. We are looking at different ways we can strengthen and reinforce NATO’s work, not just on the forced deployments but also on NATO’s budget. Very important. NATO’s budget hasn’t been looked at for a while as well, so those discussions will be key.
I spoke previously about accession discussions. Certainly, we have been having discussions with allies on the accession of Finland and Sweden. That’s something we are hoping to make progress on as well. If not for the summit, then in steps following the summit. Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Gignac: My question is once again for MGen. Prévost.
I want to take advantage of your presence here today because the Minister of National Defence has just announced an investment of $4.9 billion to modernize NORAD, and because this war in Ukraine is bringing attention to the use of supersonic missiles — which is worrying Canadians.
Is our surveillance system currently capable of detecting them, and is our defence system capable of intercepting supersonic missiles?
If not, will this announced investment be able to protect Canadians?
MGen. Prévost: To answer the question, the current systems are not able to detect the hypersonic missiles that were used in Ukraine by the Russians. Moreover, these are systems that have not proven themselves very well in Ukraine.
Our systems cannot detect them, and the investments that the minister announced today will certainly help modernize our current detection systems, which have not been modernized in the past 30 years. So the $4.9 billion that was announced today will be used to increase detection with over-the-horizon radar systems, with space-level capabilities, and to modernize our command, control and decision support systems.
This is a step in the right direction and, obviously, technology is advancing very quickly, and we have to keep up.
Senator Gignac: Will there be interception systems on Canadian soil? Because, at the time, we refused to be part of the missile defence shield, so we don’t have it on Canadian territory.
MGen. Prévost: I don’t have enough details. I did not see the announcement this morning, and I will have to look at what it includes and what is in the program. We are continuing to modernize and, as you know, the defence policy will also be reviewed next fall, so the work is beginning.
Senator Gignac: Thank you, Major-General.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you. This brings us to the end of our first panel. I thank my colleagues for their very helpful and probing questions.
I want to thank you, Major-General Prévost, Ms. McCardell and Ms. Grant, first for joining us today, for being forthright in your answers, for sharing lots of information, some of which we haven’t heard before. On behalf of our committee, I’m going to take this opportunity to thank you for all the important work that you do every day, and I know sometimes through the night. I do that on behalf of all senators and indeed all Canadians, so thank you all very much for joining us. We wish you well. Thank you.
Senators, we are moving to our second panel. For those of you who are joining us live, we’re meeting today to receive a briefing on the current state of affairs on the security situation in Ukraine. I now welcome our second panel to this meeting. We’re joined by Kerry Buck, a Senior Fellow at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and former Ambassador of Canada to NATO; Dr. Alexander Lanoszka, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo; and Dr. Nicole J. Jackson, Associate Professor and Graduate Chair of the School for International Studies at Simon Fraser University. We are still trying to bring online Konstantin Eggert, Baltic States correspondent at Deutsche Welle, Germany’s international broadcaster.
Thank you for joining us today by video conference. I invite you to provide your opening remarks, which will be followed by questions from our members. We’ll start with Ms. Buck.
[Translation]
Kerry Buck, Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, and former Ambassador of Canada to NATO, as an individual: Thank you for this invitation to appear before your committee.
[English]
Since this is the first hearing of the Senate committee on the war in Ukraine, I’ll take a step back and focus not on the details of the conflict on the ground in Ukraine or Canada’s contributions but on what security risks the war poses for Ukraine, the international community and Canada.
I’m basing my remarks on my experience of almost 30 years as a Canadian diplomat dealing with issues of war and peace — so from a personal perspective and my personal analysis.
I’ll talk about two issues: first, why Russia moved against Ukraine, what the Russian end goal is and what that might mean for the future of the war. Second, the risks the war poses for Euro-Atlantic security, including Canadian security interests.
I’ll try to do that in nine minutes.
Here are three reasons I think Putin moved against Ukraine now. First, Democratization. Putin fears colour revolutions. The reason NATO has expanded over the years since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union is not because NATO reached into those states but because former Soviet Union states reached out to seek membership. NATO, in a way, was seen in the early years — post-dissolution — as a gateway to EU membership. Because both NATO and the EU offer a more attractive model than that offered by the Russian president, the worst thing for President Putin is a Ukraine with a vibrant democracy and prosperous economy sitting right next door.
Before the war was launched in February, Ukraine had already achieved a level of governance and economic development that President Putin is unable to offer his own citizens. As a result of the war, for instance, Russian GDP is expected to shrink by 8.5% in 2022. So things will only get worse for the Russian citizenry.
I think the second reason President Putin chose to invade Ukraine was the perceived weakness of the West. At the beginning of the war, he likely had expectations that the western response would be as weak or even weaker than it had been in 2014, when Russia invaded Crimea. And why is this the case? I think there are a number of factors.
First, the U.S. was just coming out of the Trump presidency where American world leadership had been weakened, and President Trump had been visibly Putin friendly and NATO unfriendly. At the same time, there are other European leaders like Viktor Orbán and from time to time President Erdoğan of Turkey whose positions have been more supportive of Russia.
Secondly, it was at a time of a change of leadership in Europe. Last time in 2014, much of the work to stiffen EU positions on Russia and maintain sanctions had involved Angela Merkel and the U.K. This time, the U.K. was not in the EU anymore. Angela Merkel was gone. At the point when Russia invaded Ukraine, they weren’t sure where the new German leadership would go. So I think President Putin had hopes and expectations that western unity wouldn’t be that strong and it would fray quickly.
I think the third reason is Putin’s kind of leadership. What has happened over time is he has consolidated control. He has removed many of the checks and balances that would have been in place even earlier in his own regime. Many of us, myself included, thought Russia was bluffing about an invasion because we assume that Putin wasn’t making his decision alone. Even as late as 2014 when Putin decided to annex Crimea, the move was made after a night of intense discussion with his inner circle in the Kremlin and after commissioning secret polls on public opinion. There was still some semblance of a regime, albeit one in which Putin tightly controlled its reins. But now I think he is alone. He has become a personalist dictator. Rivals are purged, loyalists are rewarded, there is a cult of personality and all authority runs through the glorious leader.
These kinds of dictatorships are more erratic. They are more dangerous to the outside world than other sorts of autocracies. Researchers have looked at this kind of personalized dictator and concluded they are more likely to start wars and also tend to perform worse militarily — not surprising because they surround themselves with yes men.
So what does this mean for the future of the war? The war in Ukraine, unfortunately, is young as wars go. It’s gone through a few phases already as the Department of National Defence witness said previously. The initial phase was where Putin and many western commentators thought that Russia would do well militarily, do so rapidly and even be able to replace President Zelenskyy’s government. This phase ended fairly quickly, I’m glad to say.
The next phase was marked by Ukrainian successes and resilience, made possible by the resolve of Ukrainian troops, Ukrainian leadership and the mobilization of citizens. But there was a lot of western support that helped this outcome. The training effort post-2014 by Canada, the U.K. and others was key, as well as the policy shift in western support from providing only non-lethal and then lethal weaponry to providing more heavy weaponry. This is a more recent shift, and this is really important.
This, I think, led to the third phase of the war — the phase we’re in now — as Russia started to concentrate its troops and artillery to the south and east of the country, appearing to focus on consolidating and expanding its control of the Donbas and maybe attempting to connect to Crimea. This phase promises to be a long one. A couple of days ago right after the NATO Defence ministerial meeting, Jens Stoltenberg said he expects the war to last a very long time. I agree with him. However, it’s anyone’s guess what the trajectory of the war will be.
I see three scenarios, all of which pose immediate and longer-term risks for Canada and the rest of the Euro-Atlantic — the West.
Scenario one is where Russia continues to focus on the Donbas, and the war turns either into a stalemate or a frozen conflict. I think that regardless of the level of military activity in such a scenario, we can expect the Russians to continue to attempt to destabilize the government in Kyiv. On the Ukrainian side, we can expect ongoing insurgency tactics emanating from Ukrainian-controlled territory and also from within the Donbas.
The second scenario is one of escalation. Regardless of the fact that the Russians have chosen to focus their military activities in the Donbas, there is still ongoing artillery and other attacks on infrastructure and civilians throughout the country. The risk of escalation inside Ukraine is very much present. But there is also a wider risk of escalation or spillover outside of Ukraine, whether by design or by accident. There is recent rhetoric coming from the Kremlin and from Kremlin-allied Russian media, showing that Russia is still willing to rattle its sabres against NATO allies and countries soon-to-be NATO allies. It’s not inconceivable that Putin would seek to test NATO resolve by launching smaller-scale attacks against either NATO territory or NATO cyber and maritime domains. So NATO has to be ready.
It’s even more conceivable that an accident would lead to escalation. Russian planes have been flying within metres of NATO planes. There have been near misses at sea. Unlike during the Cold War, many of the guardrails that had been in place to mitigate the risk of accident — lines of communication, arms control or nuclear treaties — aren’t in place anymore. So, the risk is really high, and I include in that — we may want to talk about it in Question Period — the risk that Putin would cross the taboo that has been in place since the Second World War to not resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. I think it would be folly to fail to prepare for this risk.
There is a third scenario, and that is one of Russian defeat. To my mind this is, unfortunately, the least likely outcome. I wish it were otherwise. But the fact remains that Russia has — in spite of its early incompetence in prosecuting the war and the morale of its troops — ultimately, more fire power and more troops. Plus, it’s not consistent with Putin’s view of what leadership is and what greater Russia is to be seen to be losing. So it may come down to defining what victory might look like. If the notion is that victory for Ukraine can only be achieved if not one square inch of Ukrainian territory is lost to Russia, then I think there will be no victory. It’s unfortunate. So at some point, compromise will be needed. But when that point is reached will have to be determined by the Ukrainian leadership and not by others. So western leaders calling for negotiations now will only be seen to be jeopardizing western unity.
Ukraine will have to go into whatever diplomatic talks come about from a position of strength. President Zelenskyy will have to walk a very tight wire in making this call when that time comes. The lesson for the West to draw is that we need to double down on the weaponry and other support being offered to Ukraine.
In all of those three scenarios, the better outcome — or should I say the less worse outcome — will only come about if the West ramps up its support in order to allow Ukraine to move from a position of strength.
My time is running out. I promised to speak to some of the other risk the war poses to Euro-Atlantic and Canadian security.
In many respects, NATO and the West have responded well to the conflict, especially when I compare it to 2014, with NATO unity strengthened, NATO defence plans activated, NATO-EU working hand-in-hand, Finland and Sweden coming into NATO et cetera. That’s the good news.
But there are three areas where there are immediate and longer-term risks that Canada and the international community need to worry about.
It’s obvious that the massive loss of life, atrocities and forced deportation will leave a mark on Ukraine for generations. Western support for reconstruction, war crimes prosecution and economic recovery will be important, now and for many years to come.
When I ran government task forces on major crises and wars, I made sure to take a group offline to think through the long-term needs and how Canada can contribute. I hope and it appears that some of this work is happening now. That’s what is needed for Ukraine.
All of the scenarios I posit also pose a risk of a negative impact on NATO over the long term. Territorially, depending on how much Ukrainian territory Russia manages to control, it will make it more difficult for NATO to defend NATO territory. NATO has to further beef up its eastern flank. I expect to see more of this at the Madrid summit.
I think more important than the geographic challenge to NATO is the risk that NATO unity will start to fray the longer the war goes on. We are starting to see this now. This will take intensive diplomacy over the long haul.
Then the longer-term risk comes home directly to Canada, not just economic shocks and refugees, but beyond that, the Arctic for instance. We have had good cooperation with Russia prewar, even post-2014. That can’t happen now. With Arctic ice melting, we are going to see a lot more traffic in the Arctic. Are we ready? How will Russia position itself?
There are other areas where we need to bolster ourselves. Cyber resilience, including in the private sector, resilience to disinformation that will help bolster our own democracies.
Then, against all of this backdrop, is the need for Canada to have the skilled defence and diplomatic assets in place to influence the direction of the international community response to what I believe is a radically changed international environment, one marked by strategic surprise and violation of long-held norms of international law on territorial sovereignty.
These are all, in my view, areas where successive Canadian governments have underinvested. I would recommend to the members of the committee the report on national security from the University of Ottawa, that we just issued, which makes this same point.
There is a lot of work for Canada to do. We have done really well. We have been in the top tier of countries supporting Ukraine. I’m really proud of what we have done. There is more work to be done. All of this has been brought into sharp relief by the illegitimate war in Ukraine. Thank you.
The Chair: What a start, Ms. Buck. Thanks for that extensive overview.
You may know — and you mentioned the Arctic — that about four or five weeks before the invasion of Ukraine, this committee commenced a study on security and defence of the Arctic with a focus on infrastructure. In that respect, and unfortunately so, we were just in time.
Next, we will hear from Dr. Alexander Lanoszka.
Alexander Lanoszka, Assistant Professor, International Relations, University of Waterloo, as an individual: Thank you. Indeed, I would like to thank the chair and members of the committee for inviting me to appear before you today. It’s an utmost honour for me to be able to participate in these very critical discussions.
[Translation]
Thank you for your invitation.
[English]
I am going to focus my remarks today on the past, present and future of Russia’s special military operation that has racked Ukraine and destabilized Europe. My area of expertise does relate to NATO’s defence deterrence measures, especially along the alliance’s eastern frontier. As such, I will be happy to address questions to that effect.
The special military operation that began on February 24, 2022, represents a severe escalation in the war that Russia had initiated against Ukraine in 2014 when it first seized Crimea and destabilized the Donbas region.
The cannonball runs that we saw toward Kyiv and Kharkiv earlier this year proved to be a military debacle. And from many military specialists, the difficulties experienced by the Russian Armed Forces in going about combined arms warfare stood in sharp contrast to the expectations they had of the Russian military prior to February 24.
The Russian air force had flown very few and very limited sorties. Ukraine remained connected globally in terms of its communications. Its command-control structures have remained intact. Ukrainian resistance has proven to be much more nimble, resolved and capable than previously assumed.
To date, we see estimates ranging from about 15,000 to 33,000 Russian military personnel killed in action, which is a staggering amount when we consider that the Soviet Union lost 15,000 over 10 years in Afghanistan in a war that ultimately contributed to the Soviet Union’s collapse.
Yet, as we enter into this special military operation’s fourth month, I would be careful not to read too much into Ukraine’s success so far.
The fact of the matter is that from Putin’s own unique perspective it is not entirely clear that he is losing. For one, Ukraine has suffered tremendous economic and physical costs, with estimates of Ukraine losing 45% of its GDP this year. For Putin, if he cannot have Ukraine, then presumably he believes that not even the Ukrainians can have Ukraine.
As Russia does not have a credible plan for the post-war reconstruction of those Ukrainian territories that it occupies, destruction for its own sake, at the very most, serves to pile coercive pressure on Kyiv and, at the very least, punish it.
Russia has a heavy artillery advantage that it uses to grind down Ukrainian resistance, especially in Luhansk at present, hence the fighting that we are seeing in and around Severodonetsk.
For another, Russia has gained up to 20% of Ukrainian territory since 2014. It has expanded its hold of territory in the Donetsk Oblast, Luhansk Oblast, as well as in the Kharkiv Oblast.
Crucially, it has seized those parts of Zaporizhzhya Oblast that contain key pieces of national energy infrastructure, and, of course, the port cities of Berdyansk and Mariupol. Russia has also seized the city of Kherson and the eastern parts of that autonomous oblast that give Russia a land bridge connecting Crimea and the Donbas.
Finally, for all the failings of the Russian army, the Russian navy has mounted a very capable blockade of Ukraine from the Black Sea, despite losing the Black Sea fleet’s flagship, a loss that really represented a tactical defeat rather than a strategic one.
That said, there is good news for Ukraine. One is that Ukraine remains extraordinarily resolved to continue fighting. It knows what is at stake here for its own national survival, given what we see happens in Russian-occupied territories.
Though Russia might have artillery advantages, Ukraine has manpower advantages, especially as Russian battalion tactical groups do seem to represent an increasingly spent force being undermanned, as they have been throughout the entire campaign.
Indeed, surveys do indicate that the vast majority of Ukrainians believe that they can yet win this war.
Another is that Ukraine is patient with its application of military force. Russian morale is bad. But the front that Russia has not collapsed because of its mass of equipment. As such, Ukraine goes about undertaking counteroffensives rather judiciously, often making a virtue out of necessity given ammunition shortages and desire to limit losses. It trades territory for time. It’s not unreasonable to think that Ukraine can take back Kherson City this summer.
As Ukrainian forces approach the city, partisan activity there will escalate. We have been seeing that in recent weeks. If Kherson gets liberated, then that puts pressure on the next Russian-captured city of Melitopol. The liberation of that city will further stress Russia’s hold on the land bridge that I just mentioned.
After all, Russian military forces are too dispersed across southern and eastern Ukraine, concentrated as many of them are in some key parts of the Donbas. Indeed, despite claims of high Ukrainian casualties in recent weeks, Russia still has not been able to achieve any sort of strategic breakthrough in the Donbas.
Indeed, Severodonetsk appears to be becoming another Mariupol in the sense that it is a city that should have been quickly overrun but is one where Russia ends up with, at best, a pyrrhic victory instead.
What does this mean for the prospect of a negotiated settlement? I have trouble imagining one in the near future. If what I say is true, then neither side will feel that it even needs to negotiate. That mutual optimism about the war will forestall negotiations, which, again, was something Ukraine did try in earnest throughout March for all the effects that we see to this day.
Besides, I think from Ukrainian perspective, justifiably, any deal now with Russia will simply allow that aggressor country to regroup and to attack again when it’s opportune for it to do so. With western strategic attention now focused on Ukraine and packages of western military assistance arriving in greater amounts, Ukraine will seek the best military solution it can achieve so as to arrive at the inevitable negotiations with the strongest hand possible.
For Russian leaders like Putin, losing in Ukraine is bad, but for reasons that my colleague mentioned — and what I can elaborate in the discussion later on — it’s not necessarily detrimental to his own political survival. Indeed, he can lose Ukraine and still keep power. So he is in no hurry, really, to negotiate even if things on the battlefield are turning against his favour, at least along some vectors. Thank you very much for having me. I look forward to our conversation.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Lanoszka. That was very helpful. The next witness is Nicole Jackson. Please proceed whenever you’re ready.
Nicole J. Jackson, Associate Professor and Graduate Chair, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, as an individual: Good afternoon everybody. It’s an honour for me to join these discussions and to hear all about the vital steps that Canada is taking.
Today in my comments, I will urge the Canadian government to further clarify its goals in Ukraine, as well as the benefits and costs of achieving them. First, I will briefly outline the current security situation in Ukraine as I see it to provide necessary context; and, second, I will point to two possible goals and add some caution as to what each may entail.
The security situation in Ukraine, as we have heard, is dire. It is also fluid and complex, making a review of Canada’s possible options vitally important. The war has moved, as we have heard, to the south and east of Ukraine, where Russia’s military is making incremental advances despite strong resistance. Ukrainians are living in great insecurity, with millions displaced, thousands killed and many alleged war crimes such as extrajudicial killings and sanctioned rapes being reported. Ukraine’s infrastructure, environment and resources continue to be destroyed. The war is also having known and as yet unknown regional and global impacts, including increasing energy and food prices. The longer it continues, the more severe these consequences may be. What does this mean for Canada?
Canada, as we have heard, is contributing considerable financial, humanitarian and military assistance to Canada. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Canada is the fourth-largest contributor after the U.S., Poland and the U.K., in terms of disclosed commitments and deliveries. With our allies, the total spent is estimated to be 85 billion Euros of government-to-government commitments from January 24 to June 7. More commitments for staggering quantities of lethal aid were made in the last week.
The question is: Given the current security situation, what more can or should Canada do? I think that Canada’s key goals could be further updated and clarified. Strategies to meet those goals depend on what is happening on the ground, of course, and how Putin’s intentions are understood.
One goal would be to push Russia out of all of Ukraine’s territory. This is the path that Ukraine has chosen and the Canadian government and our allies are currently supporting. A second goal would be to push for peace as soon as it becomes realistically possible. I will now review both goals.
The current stated goal is to help Ukrainians push Russia out of Ukraine’s territory. In pursuit of this goal, the Canadian government, and others, have pledged to increase the flow of lethal and offensive weapons to Kyiv. A key benefit of pursuing this goal, as we have heard, is that Canada continues to defend Ukraine and Ukrainians and stand for the principle of self-defence and territorial integrity. If Russia were allowed to secure the territories it seized in 2014, and especially to expand upon them, that would leave Ukraine a truncated and poorer state, possibly with less or even no access to the Black Sea. This would be a major loss for Ukraine. Other benefits — and there are many — include the possibility of deterring future Russian aggressions and, many believe, protecting the rules-based or liberal international order.
I believe these are all laudable. However, Canadians need to be aware of five possible negative consequences that this goal may entail. First, as we heard, this could be a very long war of attrition. The actual length is unknown. It could continue for months or years before both sides find that it is no longer in their interests to continue to fight. Many more will die, and the already devastated country will be further ruined giving imagination to the possibility of another Syria.
Second, more and more military aid, such as sophisticated rocket systems and howitzers, may be needed to accomplish this goal. Even then, the results are not guaranteed. Russia may not retreat to Ukraine’s 1991 borders. Russian proxies have been in the Donbas since 2014, and Putin seems to remain intent on retaining the region.
My research shows that in past conflicts in the former Soviet space, in Georgia and Moldova, the Russian regime used a variety of military and other means to hold on to separatist territories. Russia has long destabilized countries to get them to act in Russia’s interest. It will be very difficult to dislodge their troops from Luhansk and Donetsk and Crimea. It won’t be easy to change Putin’s war calculus, which is largely based on emotion and imagined identity. Putin’s prestige is at stake. Sanctions, yes, are affecting Russia’s economy, but they will take time and oil prices remain high.
Third, there is an unknown but real danger of escalation, as we heard earlier. That includes nuclear, chemical and biological warfare and miscalculation as fighting intensifies, new long-range weapons are introduced and some western states become further involved.
Fourth, Russia has many other military and hybrid non-military ways of interfering and creating challenges regionally and globally. Actions taken in Ukraine could inadvertently increase the likelihood of other conflicts. For example, Russian troops remain stationed throughout the former Soviet Union, in Moldova, Georgia, Batumi, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia’s military bases in central Asia, in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and in the nearby Taliban-controlled, famine-stricken Afghanistan was recently abandoned by the U.S. The war in Ukraine shows the danger that these troops may pose.
Fifth, the longer this war goes on, the more Russia will look eastward for allies. Many non-western states are watching to see how unified the West remains and how it responds to Russian aggression. Some will be dissuaded from future military aggression for fear of western responses. Others will perceive the U.S. and NATO as responsible for fuelling the Ukraine war with military aid.
A second goal could be to push for peace as soon as possible. Currently, Ukrainians are not in favour of negotiation and there is little international will to push for it. A realistic goal could be to return to the February 24 pre-invasion lines and then negotiate.
The benefit of reaching a negotiated settlement as soon as possible would be to end the killing and destruction, begin rebuilding, allow refugees to return home and children’s education to resume. It might also help to bring about a political resolution and prevent the Donbas from becoming another so-called frozen conflict, or having Russia annex more territory.
The caution, of course, is that this won’t be easy. With growing evidence of atrocities and little agreement on facts, some will inevitably argue that it is too early, too naive or too dangerous. Putin shows little inclination to pursue peace. Negotiations would require a ceasefire and Russia, yes, could take the opportunity to regroup and attack again. However, the Canadian government should be prepared to support an effort to find a compromise as soon as Ukrainians are ready. Mr. Danilov, head of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, recently held out this real, if still remote, possibility of a negotiated settlement. This would likely include difficult discussions about the rights of Russian speakers in the Donbas, the status of territories Russia seized in 2014 and how the west may provide some kind of security guarantees for Ukraine.
To conclude, Canadians need a clear idea of the aims, financial burdens, the limits and possible unintended consequences of our engagement. Canada could continue to support arming Ukraine and impose more and tighter sanctions on Russia. However, Canadians also need to understand that this may be a long, dangerous and very expensive war of attrition with catastrophic loss of life. Much more sustained military aid will be needed to push Russia completely out of Ukraine, and it may well not be possible. An exhausted stalemate may be more likely than an outright win. Canadians will need to provide more humanitarian aid, help with the reconstruction of Ukraine, and prepare for both known and unknown regional and global consequences. When Ukrainians are ready, I think that supporting their inclination toward peace will be the best way to save lives, stand for our ideals, and prevent further aggression. Canada used to be a peacekeeper nation, and I encourage the Canadian government to think carefully — not just about how to counter the real Russian threat and the costs and the limits — but how Canada may play a role in promoting and enabling peace. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Jackson, for those remarks.
Konstantin Eggert, Baltic States correspondent, Deutsche Welle, as an individual: First and foremost, thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, for inviting me to testify. I am deeply touched and honoured by this chance.
[Translation]
My deepest thanks for this opportunity to offer my testimony to the Senate. I am deeply honoured by this privilege.
[English]
Frankly speaking, after such exhaustive testimonies that we heard, I do not have much to add. But my experience as a fourth-generation Moscovite now living in involuntary exile in Lithuania probably calls for more details about Russia proper and not the situation on the battleground. I will probably proceed with my random thoughts about what I see as important elements of today and the future.
First, in the media, you’ve seen this debate about whether this war is Putin’s war or the Russian people’s war. I have to say, for me, it’s evidently the latter. Although Putin started it, you cannot avoid the conclusion that this is a war that’s been basically accepted by the Russian society. Whether it is accepted because part of Russian society is basically misled by the state propaganda, or whether it is the fact that most Russians prefer to stay out of politics and in the comfort zone of thinking that the Kremlin knows everything better than they do, in the end it doesn’t matter for the Ukrainians. The real situation is this war is prosecuted by Putin with absolutely total permissiveness and total indifference from Russian society. This creates a problem, because that makes this war pretty much executable by Putin. He can go on with it for quite some time, as the previous speakers indicated, and I agree with them on that.
I’m not a military expert, but it’s another matter to say whether Putin has enough resources to sustain an operation that will bring at least some results, but I think that, at least for the time being, he has them. I also agree that this will be a barbaric war of war crimes and indiscriminate shelling, basically something straight out of 1944 than let’s say from the 1991 Gulf War, or whatever. It’s not a modern war. It’s a war where war crimes are a deliberate strategy to instill fear in the Ukrainian population and to destroy and displace as much of it as possible. We have to live with this strategy for the foreseeable future.
Number three, this war will be prosecuted by Putin for as long as he is in the Kremlin unless he is very soundly and visibly defeated, or unless, and this could be a combination of several factors, lack of success on the battleground combines with extreme economic hardship at home. By the way, this may happen fairly soon. We can imagine this could happen fairly soon, but for this to work, one has to have a third ingredient. This ingredient is a realization by the Russians that the war and their economic well-being are connected.
Living in a prosperous Western democracy, you probably cannot imagine, but I think the majority of the population in Russia does not make this connection yet. At least, this population thinks that somehow Putin will find a kind of magic money box to pull the money out of and to finance the war without them paying the price. While he has to be prepared for a very long haul, and this will be an even longer haul because Putin’s strategy for years and years, well before this round of aggression against Ukraine, was focused on two things. One, providing basic economic guarantees to the whole of the population, i.e. not to have a new version of the Soviet Union with empty shelves where people queue for meat and scold the government. This was achieved, and at least for now is maintained by the Kremlin. The second magic solution for the Kremlin, also probably a derivative of Putin’s experience in the KGB in the 1970s and 1980s, was to actually keep the check-in desks at all major Russian airports open 24/7. If you don’t like Putin, go. That has created a situation in which, at least since the beginning of this war, and it started in 2014, hundreds of thousands of people, if not millions of people, left. These are people who are talented, who are self-sufficient and they are the opinion leaders.
Essentially, what you have is a huge Russian emigration that — in the age of social media, you can impact domestic politics at home but, frankly speaking, it will be very difficult. And that’s another important element — Russian society is isolationist and not very well travelled. I would even say much worse travelled than your neighbours to the south, and it is a society that prefers to rely very heavily on the powers that be.
In such circumstances, any kind of opposition has to have a long-term plan how to, A, break through the wall of indifference; B, break through the technological walls that Putin is effectively building in Russia; and, C, offer to the Russians such an irresistible vision of the future that it will start to have an impact domestically. So far we may be only at the beginning of this road.
I’m coming to the close of my opening statement. I’m really sorry; it’s a bit late in Lithuania. There are important things to remember. This war is Putin’s personal project. He started dreaming about it in about 2004 when we first saw quotations from the proto-fascist Russian philosopher, Ivan Ilyin, appearing in his official statements and in his speeches. He sees himself as someone who gives Russia a new destiny and a new national identity. With someone who is hooked on such a mission, it’s very difficult to stop him by sanctions or by even extreme economic hardship.
Another thing that we have to remember, forget all the Western notions about Putin caring about society and about the people. For Putin and his team, Russians that are sent to the front line are cannon fodder. They wouldn’t care how many people die there. For them it’s just statistics, as it was for Stalin.
Number three, human resources for the Russian army, which is not as professional as we thought, are still fairly significant. In the poor regions of Russia, in the provinces, you still have a lot of people who will go and be either called up, or they will sign up a contract to go and fight, because there is no other way out of their drug-addicted, poor neighbourhoods. So he still has human resources to sustain this war.
Finally — and this was, I think, mentioned by former Ambassador Buck — the fact that Putin still sees the West as weak shouldn’t be discounted. Yes, it is stronger than Putin initially thought, but he looks at the visit by Scholz, Macron and Draghi to Kyiv, where the fourth participant, the president of Romania, wasn’t even mentioned in many dispatches, and he sees, okay, yeah, in Berlin, in Paris, in Rome, in Lisbon, there are still people that think that Ukraine is a negligible occurrence on Europe’s eastern flank, which shouldn’t interfere with the great European project, which will be led only by the old European nations.
Let me stress — looking from Vilnius — one of the biggest threats to transatlantic unity is Moscow’s desire to drive a wedge between southern and Eastern Europe and the Baltics and, increasingly, Northern Europe and the rest of the European continent. This is where all Putin’s political operatives will be up and running, as soon as there is a lull in the fighting or as soon as there are first signs of a desire to negotiate. This is something where propaganda will be working 24/7, and this, unfortunately, is a reality of a continent where I live, which cannot be bypassed.
It is quite ironic that a — let’s face it — not very well liked, maybe, in Canada, Prime Minister of Great Britain turned out to be one of the most astute observers of Putin and one of the most resolute European leaders we have today, like it or not. I think that European disunity is probably the most exploitable element that Putin will use.
Sorry for speaking so long.
The Chair: Not at all. Thank you, Mr. Eggert. We decided, in planning this meeting, that we would be doing more listening than talking, and it’s worked out very well for us.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My question is for Mr. Eggert. Mr. Eggert, I listened to you carefully. We have a North American view of what is happening between Russia and Ukraine, and it is often influenced by the United States, our neighbour. I have noticed that the road can be different. I would like to hear your thoughts on Vladimir Putin’s changes in tactics since the war began. Does he still have the same end goal? And what about the financial sanctions imposed? Is that working or is it a bad tactic? The financial sanctions will impoverish his people. May Russians be blaming Putin for making certain decisions? These financial sanctions must be affecting the Russian population.
[English]
Frankly speaking, as I think Ms. Buck or someone else from the participants mentioned, sanctions do take time to work. Sanctions also have a certain unpredictable element about them.
For example, if you listen to what Russian officials are saying — Putin’s pet economists and central bank chairwoman and people like that — it seems that it’s not the financial sanctions that hit Russia that hard because of the surpluses they now produce, still selling oil and gas to the Europeans, to Germans and to others. It is technological sanctions that impact Russia significantly. They blow up the logistics. They hamper production, including military production, because, as it turned out, a lot of stuff that was supplied well into the war by the French, the Germans and some other countries outside of Europe, some of this stuff was dual use.
So what we have is we have real problems, for example, in the Russian aircraft industry, in running the Russian weapons industry and in a lot of other spheres where things may go belly up in a matter of seconds. For example, Tetra Pak is out, so packaging milk now is a problem.
What I want to say is that one should look at the whole breadth of sanctions, be prepared to maintain them, be prepared to increase them and the effects will show, but we cannot predict all the effects, because what is also as important — and I’m finishing — we don’t know really the state of the Russian economy, because the Kremlin — surprise, surprise — lies all the time about the state of the Russian economy. The Russian statistics are unreliable, and only now we discover that a lot of things actually cannot be produced.
The Chair: Mr. Eggert, thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: I thank all our guests. This has been a course on Russia, and it helps us a lot. My question is for Mr. Eggert. The United States withdrew from two costly wars — Afghanistan and Vietnam — because of internal pressures within the country itself, such as protests, but also because of international pressures and the cost of war. What factors would make Mr. Putin feel internal pressure, within Russia, that would push him to move toward negotiations or peace? Could this happen or is there no reason to believe that it could?
[English]
Mr. Eggert: Thank you very much, senator.
The comparison is probably not completely correct between the war in Vietnam and the Soviet war in Afghanistan and then today. Alas, the war in Afghanistan was prosecuted by the Politburo — unelected and undemocratic but still representing the Soviet Union in its entirety and defending the national interests of the Soviet Union as they existed and as they were accepted then.
The Russian government, the Russian leadership and Putin’s leadership today are completely different. That was a great mistake of President Biden to respond to the first massing of troops last year by inviting Putin to Geneva as if he were Brezhnev or Gorbachev. Mr. Putin is no Brezhnev or Gorbachev. Mr. Putin not only rules Russia; he and his clique actually happen to own it wholesale. That is the secret police married to the Mafia. That is really the case in Russia.
That means it’s a completely different sort of government that will not be pushed into negotiating or peace talks by any kind of calls to rationality or even by sanctions. For them to negotiate, they have to suffer a combination of factors, which will be, first, a very clear defeat on the battleground together with untenable economic and social situation domestically. We are a bit away from that. Of course, there is another chance — a chance of a palace coup d’état, Putin dying or whatever, but those belong to a completely unpredictable sphere, and I don’t want to go into that.
That’s why I’m saying we have to be prepared for the long haul.
Don’t treat Putin as Brezhnev; he’s no Brezhnev. He’s very, very unique.
The Chair: You must have a stopwatch in front of you. Well done, Mr. Eggert.
Senator Boehm: I’d like to thank the witnesses.
My question is for former Ambassador Buck. You mentioned that Secretary General Stoltenberg had talked about the war dragging on for years or that it at least has that potential. You’ve been in those corridors of power and in the negotiations, certainly during your time as our ambassador to NATO.
Do you think NATO has the wherewithal to stay the course? We’ve heard about the strategic concept that will be looked at in Madrid. We know that countries are upping their defence spending, but it often depends on how you decide to use the kit. So I would be very interested in your comments.
Ms. Buck: Thank you for the question.
I do think that NATO has the building blocks to stay the course, absolutely. It’s funny; I was doing some research on how often NATO has been called irrelevant, and the first instance I found was about a year and a half after NATO was founded. That comes around time and time again, but NATO keeps not only reinventing itself, but unfortunately, NATO keeps having different and more jobs to do. That’s the case today.
NATO credibility, I think, was damaged by the withdrawal from Afghanistan, but it’s fair to say that after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO’s come back with force, including with recuilt credibility and its unanimity of purpose and messaging.
So NATO’s stronger today than it has been since its founding, I think, but there will be important decisions about keeping up NATO military presence and NATO military readiness. That has already happened after February, and more will happen in Madrid. But what will be needed over the long haul is sustained diplomacy.
I’m also very worried about the 2024 elections in the U.S. because the backbone of NATO is the U.S. Like it or not, it is. It’s part of the equation. If the U.S. starts to pull away from NATO again, all bets are off about the NATO position, NATO strength and how Canada would sit within a NATO that doesn’t have that American leadership.
Senator Boehm: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Gignac: My question is specifically for Ms. Buck, as Canada’s former ambassador to NATO, but Mr. Eggert can also answer, if he wishes. I will go back to my first question about Turkey’s presence in NATO. There is no doubt that, as a member of NATO, Turkey has been very helpful since the Second World War.
However, the purchase of Russian equipment by Turkey a few years ago, contrary to the wishes of members, has upset many. It is clear that there are many commercial, political and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Russia.
Do you think that Turkey is still an asset to NATO or could its presence help reduce NATO’s impact? Is there a mechanism within NATO that could make it so that members could decide to expel Turkey if it does not behave as it should?
[English]
Ms. Buck: Thank you for the question.
Turkey places a value on their NATO membership. It is true that over the last few years, there have been instances where Turkey has taken positions that have been difficult for NATO. As you mentioned, the buying of some Russian military assets, some of their activities in northern Syria when the coalition was still there and now today with the questions they are raising about Sweden and Finland’s membership.
So there’s noise. And those are real policy positions that Turkey has put forward that have been difficult for NATO, but in the end, as I said, Turkey places a value on being in NATO. What I’ve seen is that, because of that noise, consensus will take longer, but consensus will come.
NATO is very useful that way. It’s a channel and a quiet place where hard messages can be delivered. I’ve also seen Turkey play a very helpful role in dealing with some of NATO’s hard issues too. On Ukraine, for instance, because of the Crimean Tatars, you’ve seen Turkey’s position be pretty strong on Ukraine in spite of Erdoğan’s alliance with President Putin. Well, I won’t call it an alliance; it waxes and wanes. It’s almost an instrumental relationship.
So that’s the question about Turkey.
Regarding your question about whether a country can be expelled from NATO, NATO has lived through periods where some NATO allies, in spite of the reference to human rights and respect for democracy in the NATO treaty, have been very far from democracy in the form of juntas, et cetera, and yet they have stayed inside the tent. It’s not something that usually happens at the UN and NATO where a country gets kicked out, but as I said, the beauty of these multilateral organizations is that you can use them to apply pretty extreme pressure when a country is stepping out of line, and it helps blunt more extreme positions that countries take upon occasion.
The Chair: Thank you very much. What a terrific ending to a very important hearing. I want to thank you, Ms. Buck, Mr. Lanoszka, Ms. Jackson and Mr. Eggert. You have joined us at a critical moment, both for us nationally and globally. Thank you for sharing your knowledge, expertise and analysis of the pre-determinants, the realities and some of the potentially chilling outcomes of the invasion of Ukraine. You’ve been generous with your time, and we thank you so much.
I also thank my committee colleagues. You have brought the very best from our witnesses, as you usually do. Thank you, Senator Boisvenu, who prompted this special hearing.
Senators, this marks the last meeting of the committee before the summer adjournment. We have had a busy and productive session, despite the challenging environment. I thank you for your commitment and collegiality. It’s a privilege to be the chair of this committee. Thank you for your collaboration over the past months. I wish you all a restful summer, and I look forward to seeing you upon our return in the fall.
(The committee adjourned.)