THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Monday, November 21, 2022
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs met with videoconference this day at 4:03 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on issues relating to security and defence in the Arctic.
Senator Tony Dean (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Honourable senators, welcome to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs. I’m Tony Dean, a senator from Ontario and chair of the committee.
I’m joined today by my fellow committee members Senator Peter Boehm, representing Ontario, Senator Donna Dasko representing Ontario, Senator Pat Duncan representing Yukon, Senator Clément Gignac representing Quebec, Senator Victor Oh representing Ontario, Senator David Richards representing New Brunswick, Senator Larry Smith representing Quebec, and Senator Hassan Yussuff representing Ontario.
For those watching today’s session, we are continuing our study on security and defence in the Arctic, including military infrastructure and security capabilities. Today’s topic will be the modernization of the North American Aerospace Defence Command, or NORAD.
For our first panel, we welcome to the committee Dr. Andrea Charron, Director and Associate Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, via videoconference; Dr. James Fergusson, Deputy Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, also via videoconference; and in the room with us is Dr. Ross Fetterly, Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
Thank you very much to all of you for joining us today. We’re looking forward very much to your remarks. We will begin the session by inviting you to provide those remarks, which will be followed by questions from our members. We open today with Dr. Andrea Charron.
Andrea Charron, Director and Associate Professor, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, as an individual: Thank you very much for the invitation.
NORAD modernization goes beyond NORAD. It is a rethink of continental defence writ large. Traditionally, the defence of North American has been via NORAD and surveillance of the air and, later, maritime approaches to North America between 10 and 2 o’clock. The conventional threats today remain air threats in the main, although maritime threats are fast becoming more of a concern in an Arctic context. Cyber threats are fewer mainly because, in much of North America’s Arctic, there are few cyber assets. The unconventional threats, which I take to mean non-military in nature via the classic definition, are human-security-related concerns, including poor housing and lack of infrastructure, both of which are compounded by climate change. We are in the age of deterrence by denial, because punishment is unthinkable, at least in the form of a first strike by the West. As noted in the newly released U.S. Arctic strategy, conventional and nonconventional threats are colliding, so how we think about them needs to adapt as well.
I wish to raise five challenges that could hamper Canada’s ability to ensure that NORAD modernization plans come to fruition. They are, one, the ability to spend the money; two, the lack of information on the U.S. plans; three, the lack of national integration; four, the inconsistent meetings of the main advice bodies and commands; and five, the ability to keep sustained attention on NORAD.
First, $87 billion, or the cash equivalent, has been pledged by the Government of Canada to continental defence. It is an unprecedented amount of money for Canada to spend. We have a dismal record om spending large amounts of money on time and on budget. What is more, the system of systems that are needed and that are contemplated means that Canada needs to plan what parts of the projects need to come first. For example, it is pointless to have the new radar systems in place if there is no communication backbone to receive the information, no analysts to interpret the information and no interceptors to scramble. I am not privy to the detailed plans of how the projects interconnect and what needs to come first, second and third, but I suggest this will be a challenge for industry and for the Canadian military.
I would also advise that the details of some of the plans — for example, the over-the-horizon radar plans — need probing and cannot be left to the military alone to devise. Questions to ask about the over-the-horizon radar, for example, include the following: What will be their fuel sources? Will their frequency affect other systems? Will the sites be affected by permafrost melt? Will rights-holders co-develop the plans for location, maintenance and training opportunities? Will space weather affect the radar’s functioning?
Next, and related, we have few details on the U.S. contribution and plans. If Canada is responsible for 10 to 2 o’clock, presumably the Americans have 2 to 10 o’clock, including responsibilities for Canada’s coasts and the southern approaches to North America. Will this information be shared? What are the funding amounts? What are the maintenance costs going forward? Presumably, any systems based in Canada are Canada’s to bear exclusively.
Third, the integration of effort between other government departments and the CAF is lacking generally. While USNORTHCOM’s GIDE, or Global Information Dominance Exercises, are starting to integrate information among the U.S. combatant commands and allies, there is very little information exchange between Arctic communities and the federal agencies that create and disseminate the various operational pictures. For example, the Marine Security Operations Centre in Halifax that creates the Arctic maritime operating picture from information from various federal departments is to be lauded. Allied information is added, and a common Arctic maritime picture is created by NAVNORTH for NORAD, which exists at the end of the intelligence food chain. However, there is no direct local input into the picture, nor is the picture shared with local communities. Therefore, they often find out that a cruise ship is heading toward them when they physically see it. Communities have vital local information that could enhance the common picture, but increasingly it is they that need the information, especially as they are often first responders in crises and disasters. Likewise, local communities can warn of changing wildlife migration patterns, pollution trends and can notify of vessels of interest, as has been the case in the past. Recognizing Canada’s and the United States’ fundamental requirements as parties to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, forming and nurturing relationships with Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic needs sustained attention. Co-management and co-development of plans and information data integration are vital.
Fourth, while I am thrilled the Permanent Joint Board on Defence is meeting, it likely needs to meet more than once a year. I would also be curious to know the perspectives of Global Affairs Canada and the U.S. Department of State, given that NORAD is bounded by an international agreement. The Tri-Command — NORAD, USNORTHCOM and CJOC — does not seem to be meeting regularly either. Especially in an Arctic context, CJOC has an important role to play given importance of the Rangers, the Joint Task Force North and the Royal Canadian Navy, which are all outside of NORAD’s purview.
Fifth, and finally, I think the biggest challenge is going to be keeping NORAD modernization the priority given global issues and shifting attention. NORAD has been out of sight and out of mind for much of its 64-year history. Given Canada’s 20-year budget horizon for NORAD modernization, what assurances are there that the Government of Canada and the U.S. can sustain their attention to NORAD through successive changes in governments? The over-the-horizon radars and the other plans for NORAD are vital, but ensuring sustained, consistent funding and attention to NORAD, nurturing relationships and holding the Permanent Joint Board on Defense and commands to account will challenge the Government of Canada, and these are often the first challenges to be overlooked.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Charron.
James Fergusson, Deputy Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, as an individual: I will keep my comments brief and focused upon some general considerations regarding NORAD modernization and some specific considerations related to the Arctic.
First, at the general level, the Canada-U.S. Joint Statement of August 2021 keeps NORAD in its dated, Cold War box relative to the NORAD agreement and its terms of reference, even though the world and threat environment have radically changed, which in turn dictates a reconsideration of its missions relative to a pan-domain threat environment. Second, NORAD modernization also has unspoken larger policy implications, especially in relation to expansion to Greenland and Iceland and with it the relationship between NORAD and NATO. Finally, recent developments in the U.S. regarding the integration of air and missile defence systems have implications for the ballistic missile defence issue in Canada, especially with regard to the new hypersonic threats and, in so doing, for outer space as well.
With regard to the Arctic component, the deployment of one of the two over-the-horizon radar lines in the High Arctic, the upgrading and possible expansion of forward operating locations and communication requirements carry both benefits and costs for the Indigenous and local communities. On the benefit side, these investments will provide new areas of employment and development and training for the communities directly affected. New communication systems vital to move large amounts of data, possibly including fibre-optic lines, hold the potential to significantly improve community access to a variety of things which the South takes for granted, including better access to health services. On the cost side, there is the issue of sustainability of economic opportunities relative to what happens after these planned investments end. In addition, the government and national defence will need to be very careful in the planning and execution of these investments, given the limited access and transportation resources. Third, the process will also likely have a range of social and cultural implications which need to be carefully addressed, suggesting the consultation process will likely prove lengthy and at times difficult. Finally, the Government of Canada is not structured to ensure that defence investments take into account all the range of actors with different views and interests relative to Arctic security.
I look forward to your questions and elaborating on the above considerations and others related to Arctic and NORAD modernization. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Fergusson.
Ross Fetterly, Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, as an individual: Thank you for the invitation here.
As the RCAF comptroller and business planner over a five-year period up to 2017, I learned that managing any complex organization during a period of significant institutional change, particularly in the case of large and complex organizations such as the Canadian Armed Forces and Department of National Defence, requires careful and constant attention to the essentials of management.
The management of defence resources is about transforming them into military capabilities in a relevant manner and in accordance with government policy. The decision-making process in defence is a complex process, with elements of rationality interspersed with competition for scarce resources, and negotiations that result in solutions, while not always based on logic, can be accepted by the major stakeholders. This forces national defence institutions to constantly choose between near-term and long-term demands on resources. NORAD modernization certainly falls in that category.
The topic today is NORAD. The Defence Research and Development report that has been or will be distributed to you concludes that the binational NORAD alliance between the much larger U.S. and its smaller neighbour Canada in terms of economy and population is an asymmetrical alliance. In alliances of that nature, the smaller country lacks the incentive to share the burden with its neighbour due to the dominance of the larger power. Nevertheless, due to the increasing threats to North America, prioritizing continental defence due to the increasing security threat from China and Russia may induce greater collaboration and investment between Canada and the United States.
Discussions on burden sharing in an alliance, or in a binational defensive organization like NORAD, need to place readiness as a primary institutional priority. Of primary importance is the ability to measure readiness. In essence, if you can express readiness in quantifiable numbers, then this illustrates your understanding and application of readiness concepts. In contrast, the inability to quantify readiness demonstrates a lack of knowledge about the subject. Viewed from that perspective, debates regarding the defence budget are, in many respects, a debate over readiness.
There are three fundamental readiness questions with implications for the RCAF and for NORAD. First, readiness for what? What types of conflict must NORAD be able to face? Second, readiness for when? What is the time interval required to respond to threats to North America? And, third, readiness of what? This requires an understanding of which parts of the American and Canadian militaries need to be ready — and that includes NORAD — and at what state of readiness.
In NORAD modernization, structural readiness is an essential component of that process. This type of readiness is necessarily outward looking towards having the right infrastructure, equipment and weapon systems, as well as the trained crews and personnel to operate them successfully when engaging the opponent. Of particular importance to NORAD is the amount of time it takes to develop structural readiness, as it takes considerably more time than for operational readiness. Furthermore, technical modernization of infrastructure or weapon systems, as we are to see in NORAD modernization, are increasing the amount of time needed to operationalize new or modernized units. Consequently, a certain level of structural readiness can be reviewed as a prerequisite to operational readiness in the operational environment of the North American Aerospace Defense Command.
Asymmetry of information at various levels within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces challenges business planning, making it a central, integrating element of the resource management process. Understanding the process of NORAD modernization in the combined U.S. and Canada defensive alliance in the coming years will likely be a preoccupation of both governments in an increasingly contentious international strategic environment.
Finally, discussions regarding modernization of NORAD capabilities remain just beyond the horizon. It brings the reliability of Canada into question on a capability that directly affects the security of North America. For Canada, NORAD modernization will increase the size of the bow wave of projects by the department, with the addition of work that will add to the existing capital program, further exacerbating the capacity of government to direct expenditures to other defence capital equipment projects as well as a variety of personnel recruitment or capability issues. This will require additional people in the public service, military as well as contractors, to manage this increase in the defence capital equipment program.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Fetterly.
We will now proceed to questions. I would ask participants in the room to refrain from leaning in too closely to microphones or to remove your earpiece when you are doing that; this will avoid sound feedback that could negatively impact committee staff in the room. I also ask that you keep your questions brief and that you identify which witness your question is directed to.
Senator Gignac: Thank you to our witnesses.
In 2005, the Canadian government declined to join the U.S. in the ballistic missile defence. Do you think that Canada has to reconsider that position? Do you believe that it creates a handicap in NORAD at this point? Those questions are for any of the three witnesses. We can start with Mr. Fetterly.
Mr. Fetterly: In projects or developing new initiatives such as you’re talking about expanding, it takes a considerable amount of time and development. These are long-term activities that have to be started fairly early in the process, whereas, where we find ourselves now, we have a NORAD system that, largely, was built for previous generations. We need to work with the United States collaboratively, because it is a binational organization, to establish what capabilities we want out of a modernized system, and then, what is the burden-sharing between the two? That can be costs, facilities or various things of that nature.
Senator Gignac: Thank you. Mr. Fergusson, do you have any reaction or comment on that topic?
Mr. Fergusson: Yes. To be fair to the government and the department, I would note that the defence minister in her announcement last June did say that the policy on missile defence, and not to participate, remains in place, but they are keeping a close eye on it, if I can put it that way. It certainly needs reconsideration, for two reasons. To put that in context, nowhere have I seen, for a long time, any explanation for the government’s policy on nonparticipation. They just say we won’t participate. There is no presentation as to why that policy is in place and what the implications one way or another.
In terms of the two key implications, one is effectively a question of where the United States proceeds in terms of deploying a third site in upstate New York, where the environmental studies have been completed. There is no indication when or if they will move forward. If they do, that raises direct implications in terms of Canadian territory, specifically in terms of the potential value of battle damage assessment radars, queuing support to American interceptors. That could be done under the NORAD umbrella with little change. Nonetheless, as long as the United States is in a position that it does not believe that it needs Canada for its ballistic missile defence, then there’s very little Canada can do except indicate to the United States we’re interested in participation and then enter into discussions and negotiations.
More importantly, this is an issue about the future of NORAD and whether it will potentially remain as the centrepiece of Canada-U.S. defence cooperation in North America. There is the blurring of the aerospace world, particularly with the development of hypersonic vehicles, which aren’t cruise missiles, and the integration on its way in the United States of air and missile defence capabilities. What were separate systems are now being blended and integrated together to enable it to deal with a complex set of potential threats at the same time. This then raises questions for Canada. If hypersonic vehicles are blurring the line between cruise missiles and airplanes, on the one hand, and ballistic missiles, on the other hand, which is where the United States goes, it really is a central issue for how then does NORAD, and thus Canada, play in the defeat side of the equation vital for a credible deterrence by denial. I’m a firm believer that this needs to be reconsidered. There are a number of issues that Canada doesn’t know anything about because the United States operates in a situation of, “Do you have a need to know or a right to know?” Until a step is taken by the government, it cannot answer those questions.
Senator Gignac: I think the world has changed since February when Russia invaded Ukraine. You can see that Russia uses missiles. I am hoping the minister listens to this testimony. Thank you.
The Chair: Dr. Charron, this is a critical question. I sense you might want to jump in.
Ms. Charron: Yes. Thank you.
NORAD has the warning function; USNORTHCOM, right now, has the defeat function.
The ground-based midcourse system, which we essentially did not say yes to, is really designed for North Korean missiles. We have to be careful that we don’t think about ballistic missile defence and freeze it to the current requirements and capabilities. This is a hot topic for the U.S. I know that they’re spending a lot of time and money, as Dr. Fergusson says, looking at hypersonic weapons as well.
At the end of the day, this would require a reopening of the binational agreement. I would caution, be careful when we do that, how we do it and whether it is just for this particular issue. There may be other issues we also want to investigate.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Richards: Thank you to the witnesses.
We’ve been all around this topic, and you have probably been asked it a dozen times, but do you think the U.S. needs to have faith in us as a willing and able partner in North America anymore, since we don’t have the F-35s yet, our frigates are way behind schedule and our North is pretty well an open border in many ways? If not, isn’t it our own responsibility to be able or to become able or to hope to become able, with or without the U.S., to protect our own borders and to implement things that will be able to do that? Mr. Fetterly, maybe you can start.
Mr. Fetterly: Thank you.
I think the U.S. certainly wants and would like Canada’s participation in a lot of the activities they do, simply so that they can say to the American population itself, “Look, we have Canada onboard with us. We’re a binational organization. We have another country involved with us.”
Also, the Americans want to have fairly cohesive coverage of the approaches to North America. Having a binational approach, there’s a common operating picture with both senior military from Canada and the U.S. in the decision-making process. That allows both countries to coordinate and act as one organization in one group.
Senator Richards: The heavy lifting is done by the U.S., right, sir? This is what I’m talking about. It’s our borders; it’s their heavy lifting. That is always a concern of mine, and perhaps other Canadians as well. Is there anything we can do to rectify that, or is that the way it will be?
Mr. Fetterly: To use an economic term, “free riding,” Canada has been a free rider for decades off the Americans in defence.
I would say in the conflict in Afghanistan, and I served in Kandahar for nine months, that I was immensely proud of the Canadian military personnel who were there and the job that they did. The problem is, there’s just not enough of them.
Senator Richards: Yes, sir. I am very proud of the Canadian military as well. Thank you very much.
Senator Duncan: I would like to express a particular thanks to all of our witnesses today. Your presentations have been most informative. Thank you.
I also serve on the National Finance Committee, so my questions are focused on the money in this discussion. You may want to defer, or the witnesses may want to answer, but we had substantial information on what the U.S. has in terms of resources and contributions to northern security. We know that Canada’s contribution includes financial resources and personnel. Clearly, they’re much different. Do any of you have a breakdown of what that financial contribution is? I’m particularly interested in what the financial contribution is in Alaska compared with Canada’s North.
Ms. Charron: The shorter answer is we don’t know the full extent, or at least it’s not made public, nor do we know the sort of agreement that might be negotiated between Canada and the U.S.
The only thing we have to go with, for example, is the North Warning System, which at the time, in the 1970s, was negotiated at 60% U.S. contribution to the cost, 40% from Canada, and then Canada assumed all of the maintenance costs going forward. We don’t know if this sort of arrangement will continue. Certainly, we fully expect that Canada will be 100% responsible for all maintenance costs going forward and, given the extent of the systems we’re talking about, that is not insignificant.
Mr. Fetterly: I would just add that having worked as a coster in the Department of National Defence and also as the air force comptroller and business planner, it’s hard to come to an exact cost. Do you use the aviation fuel that the F-18s were using to fly up North, the cost of the F-18s per hour and the air-to-air refuelling? All those costs were absorbed by the air force as part of the air force budget. To calculate how much Canada is actually contributing, you have to have firm rules and guidelines of what is and isn’t included because countries tend to throw everything including the kitchen sink into their estimates to try to make themselves look good.
Senator Duncan: I appreciate what you’re saying when getting down into the details. In a ballpark way, we know that there are more than 35 F-35s stationed in Anchorage, and we know that the closest F-18s are in Cold Lake, Alberta, so we in the Yukon are heavily dependent on Alaska. My question really relates to whether we know what the contribution is by the Americans to defence in Alaska in a ballpark way. What I’m looking for is to assess to what extent the Americans place a greater emphasis on defence and Arctic security than the Canadians.
Mr. Fergusson: If I could address that, it’s hard to know how much more emphasis they put on this than we do. It goes back to the previous question about burden sharing and Canada’s contribution and whether the United States thinks we’re making a fair contribution. I think it’s important to remember that this gets blended into the NATO issue and broader international peace and security contributions. Both the United States and Canada have been laggards in continental defence for a long time, and that’s something to be recognized.
To answer your question, the problem is what is NORAD modernization and what is not NORAD modernization but continental defence modernization, which is different. There are other utilities or uses that their forces, such as those deployed in Alaska, play for other elements of the American strategy, such as their global prompt and global strike posture, which we aren’t involved with at all.
Clear communication from the government and the department about numbers and where they’re going has not been good at all. They really need to be a little more transparent so the analysts and senators like yourselves have a better idea about this. If you look at that, 10 to 2 is Canada’s contribution to NORAD modernization, and you might even think that, really, in terms of Canada’s geopolitical situation, that’s also our contribution to continental defence, whereas 2 to 10 is the American contribution. In other words, we’re going to pay one third for this and the United States is going to pay two thirds.
If you take the numbers that are thrown out — again, it’s difficult to be able to parse what is NORAD and what is not NORAD relative to the national interests of Canada — and you just take the $40 billion that was announced by the Defence Minister last June and sort of clarified, if you take that narrowly, theoretically, we’re going to invest $40 billion and they’re going to invest $120 billion into this. I don’t know the numbers; that’s just a guess.
Certainly, these numbers are difficult in part because NORAD modernization is only a component of continental defence modernization, but Canada seems to be stuck primarily in the NORAD modernization world and not continental defence, which is another issue.
Ms. Charron: If I may, I want to add that NORAD has very few assets. Everything is chopped over, so control over operational command.
It looks like Alaska has tons of F-35s just sitting there waiting. Most of those are actually earmarked for INDOPACOM. They are not for NORAD. While we may think that they can simply come and help us in an Arctic context, unless they have been earmarked for NORAD missions, they are not necessarily USNORTHCOM’s to command; they’re INDOPACOM’s.
That’s one of the things we’ve had a really frustrating time trying to understand. USNORTHCOM is the military Arctic advocate for the U.S. military, yet I still don’t know what that means. I don’t know what actually falls under USNORTHCOM in an Arctic sense versus what falls to INDOPACOM. You have three combatant commands that all have an area of responsibility in the Arctic, and it’s not clear whose resources go where and what happens in a crisis situation; hence the reason for the focus, I think, on things like GIDE, the Global Information Dominance Experiments, to at least be better about sharing the information among the combatant commands.
Senator Boehm: My initial question is for Professor Charron, but I would like to hear from the other panellists as well.
I think we can all agree that reforming and modernizing NORAD is a big deal. In practice, as I look back, there have been a lot of military-to-military conversations. There have been foreign policy aspects to this as well. As I recall, as the senior official responsible for the United States at the then Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2005 — and Senator Gignac touched on this — the ballistic missile defence decision was a quick one because we were moving in another direction, and then we changed. There was a lack of communication across the piece. Now, whether this is military to military or military to foreign policy people, I don’t know, but this also existed in the United States where DOD and the Pentagon were not necessarily speaking to the State Department.
One of Professor Charron’s comments was about the lack of attention. If this is such a big deal, then we have to really roll out communications in all directions so, when getting to the financial piece, the taxpayers will understand what is actually happening. Also the policy planners, be they at the State Department or at Global Affairs Canada, will have a better idea as well.
This also then gets into the planning aspect because so often — and one of the panellists said it — there is this collision between the need to know, or the secrecy part of it, and what would be good to know. The sweet spot is probably somewhere in between to make sure you have enough there to convince the body politic that it is important and a good thing.
Professor Charron, I will start with you. I guess it wasn’t a good question.
Ms. Charron: I’m trying to understand the question.
Piecing this together, the main advisory board for the Western Hemisphere is the U.S.-Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense. It has been, I would say, in a coma for many years. It seems to be waking up and doing things, but it only meets once a year. It not only has to deal with continental defence but what the U.S. and Canada are going to do with Haiti, for instance. What are we going to do with drugs and refugees coming up from South America? How is North America going to hang together in this contested world with the pacing threat that China represents and the persistent proximate threat of Russia? Importantly, the PJBD is sort of a civilian advice-making board, and it includes many more things than NORAD modernization. I really think it needs to meet more often.
Also, we need to make sure that the civilian leaders are asking the tough questions. Things are becoming so complicated on the technical side that the assumption is that we’ll just kind of figure it out or trust what’s going on, but there are some really basic and important questions to ask, for example, regarding the infrastructure money that we have spent. It’s one thing to have over-the-horizon radars, which sounds fabulous, but if you still can’t flush toilets at most bases because the sewer system is so old and disintegrating, then that will just compound other problems, so we need to start asking some really important basic questions. This is not a criticism of the military, which has highly technical knowledge, but they need to be able to bring it down to the basic level so that we can make sure we’re asking those really tough questions that might get overlooked.
Senator Boehm: If I understand correctly — and let’s use the PJBD example — instead of focusing on an annual event in terms of planning, it should be more of a continuous process. Not everything has to be examined at the annual meeting, necessarily, and if you have push-and-pull factors in between, you can address those as well. Am I correct?
Ms. Charron: Yes. For example, I wonder if the defence committees of your Senate and their Senate have ever met and had a conversation. Maybe that’s required. Maybe the House of Representatives and the House of Commons need to have these conversations. I know there are parliamentary committees that go on search-and-find missions, but we really need to start to have those non-partisan debates that help to inform and instruct the military. After all, we’re supposed to have civilian oversight.
Senator Boehm: I was discussing that very point with U.S. senators in Halifax this past weekend.
Mr. Fetterly, please go ahead.
Mr. Fetterly: That’s a great question.
I was complaining a number of years ago and was saying to a senior official within the Department of National Defence that the federal government wasn’t giving us enough money to be able to do our job effectively. He said quite simply, “Ross, most Canadians aren’t interested in defence. They’re interested in federal policies that benefit them.” To a certain extent, that’s the case today, but I would argue that we’re in a different environment now with Russia and China. We’ve got a lot of threats in the world, and we need that interest.
The problem is that policy planners need to be more engaged and work with the federal government to provide options and ideas about what we can do with the money if they get it. If you look back to the years of the fleets we’re flying now — the F18s and the Canadian patrol frigates — it was a Liberal government that decided they had to do something and then it was the Mulroney government that came in after that got a lot of the press for unrolling them, but it was two of our large parties in Canada that, at different times, decided that we needed to focus on defence. We need something like that now where parties will work together to support a larger defence budget to help Canada in a world that is increasingly contentious.
Mr. Fergusson: I will speak very briefly on this because there are a lot of issues involved here. If I had more time, I would certainly talk about the missile defence saga since it began in the 1960s.
Let me build on what Dr. Charron was talking about. It’s very specific or general level, depending on how you want to look at it. You have very close military-to-military relations as a function of NORAD. As you move out of NORAD into the departments and the other services, they are less tight and less regular. Then if you look at the structure of the relationships, the institutions and the relationships between the services across the border, it remains embedded in the 1960s and 1970s. It hasn’t changed. The whole structure of our relationship on continental defence, of which NORAD is an important component and demonstrates the benefits for deepening and restructuring the relationship, is simply being ignored.
As Dr. Charron said, there seems to be no interest on either side in reopening the NORAD agreement and its terms of reference, but I don’t know if there has been any push to do so or if there has been any real understanding that, given the way the world has changed and technology has changed, this has to be seriously looked at. That includes the position and role of the PJBD when it’s all piecemeal. Everyone talks about the need to integrate our defence efforts between us, and we’re not doing that. That’s vitally important, in my view.
Senator Dasko: Thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
Dr. Fetterly, I can tell you, having been a public opinion pollster for 30 years, that you’re absolutely right. Defence was never high on the list at all. In fact, if you asked Canadians about 20 or so areas of spending and where we should do more, defence was never there during those years. Whether it’s changed or not, I don’t know, because I haven’t seen anything recently. Anyway, you’re certainly right about that.
My question is about priorities for NORAD. Dr. Fetterly, you mentioned what you thought was a priority: readiness. But I would like to ask Dr. Charron and Mr. Fergusson about what you feel should really be the priorities for NORAD today, given the environment we’re in, the changed geopolitical environment, the new threats and the new technologies. Dr. Charron, you were speaking about a lot of different things in your comments. You talked about consultation, on the one hand, and the systems on the other. What do you both feel really should be the focus of NORAD as we go forward? What are the priorities?
Ms. Charron: I can begin.
Because we’re in an age of deterrence by denial, it means that we need to be able to see and know what’s going on, which is a real challenge in Canada because it’s so large. We have the largest coastline. I think the U.S. has made it very clear to us that we need to be able to see more of what’s going on. Making sure that we do have those radar systems in place and being able to link them is going to be a priority from NORAD, but if you ask people in the Arctic what their priorities are, they are very different. It’s basic housing, clean water, infrastructure, communications systems and the internet.
Going forward, if we’re going to have those complicated systems to be able to detect things and they all require communication backbone, we have to make sure that it’s not to the exclusion of services to those in the Arctic and somehow we find a way to make them dual use, multipurpose or, at the very least, we make sure that if we’re laying tracks for the military, we’re laying tracks for the communities as well.
Mr. Fergusson: I would just add that it’s very clear in my mind, at least, having read the fact sheet from the Department of National Defence last July, the minister’s address in Trenton last June and the joint statement of August 2021, that they have identified the priority, first of all, as surveillance and reconnaissance, because the North Warning System is not only obsolete and out-of-date but is a pressing vulnerability because there are certain things we have difficulties tracking because of the changed threat environment.
The problem is that if you think in the sense of the $4.9 billion committed for the next five or six years, that’s to build radar lines. It can’t be just to build the radar lines because, as Dr. Charron points out, while the new radar lines are very important, unless you have communication systems — secure and redundant ones — then the lines aren’t going to do you much good. You can’t have that unless you also modernize command-and-control arrangements — the various combined air operations centres and the regional commands of NORAD relative to NORAD headquarters. Those three are simultaneous priorities because one does not work without the other two.
The pressing priority relative to those three is a simple one: time. Time is not on our side. This has been a lengthy development process that now is pressing. Twenty years is a fine deadline, but things have to move. Of course, there are political and bureaucratic forces at play, both in Canada and the United States, which make this problematic.
Mr. Fetterly: We have talked a lot about funding NORAD itself, but there are a lot of enablers that need to happen. The Department of National Defence’s capital project, the future fighter — it will take up a lot of time and effort of the people in National Defence headquarters to bring in the next generation of fighter. There is work on a number of other projects, information technology and so forth. My point is that Canada has a lot to do to clean up and get up to speed with equipment and people. We’re short over 10,000 military personnel. Canada needs to put a focus on bringing people in and making sure that capital equipment programs are on time and on budget. We need to have our own house in order to provide the capabilities that we are committing to under the NORAD agreement.
Senator Yussuff: Thank you to the witnesses for being here today. Thank you for your contributions so far. I’m not sure if we’re helping Canadians understand the complexity and the challenge we’re faced with or if we are confusing them even more.
Putting that aside, the government has made a commitment to renew NORAD, and we might understand it to be different things, based on where one is sitting. We as senators have travelled to the North. We saw radar stations and some of the bases. We saw the lack of readiness and saw the challenges we face. It is a given that the country has to come to terms with helping the ice systems in the North, as there will be far more access to it during this part of our lifetime than at any time in human history. More importantly, we’re dealing with a lot of existential threats from other countries at the end of the day.
All of you have talked about continental defence and the NORAD renewal as if they’re separate things, and they may be in one way, but in some ways, they’re not. Without adequate radar equipment and readiness in terms of planes on the ground to respond, we can’t respond. On the other hand, we don’t have the ability in our country to respond to missiles coming in because we don’t have a missile defence system in Canada. Canadians want to understand how these things are so different, given that our government is going to spend a lot of money.
The third point I want to make that’s equally important is that the communities in the North have different expectations as to what the spending will mean for them. They’ve been waiting for generations to see investments in their communities. They’re ready to host bases in their communities, and they see this as an opportunity for development.
None of this is easy, and Mr. Fetterly, you did say that Canadians will not wake up in the morning and think that military defence is something they should be cheering their government about, given all the other social problems we’re dealing with. So how do we get Canadians to appreciate the challenges we face?
The last point I would make is that we are dealing with something that was not part of the previous part of our history. We now have hypersonic missiles that travel at a speed where, before we can fully detect them, they’re already here.
All of that changes the reality we’re dealing with and will provide quite a tremendous challenge on defence for the government. If we want Canadians to understand this in a way that would be sympathetic, how do we explain all of this?
Mr. Fetterly: That’s a good question.
The communities in the North have a great contribution to make. They’re the eyes on the ground. They know the terrain, and they know the land. The Canadian Forces does a good job working with the Rangers up North. The Rangers have been training the regular force and reservists in operating in that environment.
The other issue is defence infrastructure. Infrastructure in the North is several times more expensive than it is down South. There’s permafrost you have to deal with. There’s getting everything you need to build structures up North. There is the cold climate. There’s the higher expense of building up North as well. Defence infrastructure, from my perspective, is something that needs to take priority in the North because, if we want to have a greater footprint up North, there will have to be some kind of infrastructure to operate out of.
Ms. Charron: When we break it down to what Whitney Lackenbauer calls “threats through, to and in the Arctic,” the Canadian Armed Forces don’t have a purview for many of the real issues in the Arctic, so we really need a whole-of-government approach. That’s why, for example, we need radar systems that are multipurpose because that information is not only important in a NORAD context but also for the Canadian Coast Guard, Transport Canada and other government departments in Canada. Rather than thrusting the Canadian Armed Forces always into the lead position in the Arctic — they’re not supposed to be the lead. They should never be the lead. It really is these other government departments that should do that. That is why we really need to start integrating our efforts and sharing information with the other government departments and make sure these multipurpose systems also have a benefit to those in the Arctic.
I am not suggesting we need new bases in the Arctic, because, frankly, I think the Canadian Armed Forces would be twiddling their thumbs. Really, we need more dentists, more doctors, more Health Canada and more CBSA people to process the travellers coming through the Arctic. That is where I sort of part company with Dr. Fetterly.
Mr. Fergusson: Let me add two things to this.
First, and I’m not being critical of Indigenous knowledge, local knowledge, the value of the Rangers, et cetera, but let’s recognize that in the defence of North America, the key issue in the Arctic context is threats through the Arctic. These are increasingly complicated because of advanced long-range cruise missiles, hypersonics, as well as ballistic missiles sitting there. It’s going through it. That makes nice rhetoric but we have to recognize what limitations, in fact, those types of capabilities really have. Indigenous knowledge perhaps about where to put radar sites is very important, but that’s not the key thing here.
To answer your bigger question: I’ve said this for years. No one likes it. I am a democratic political heretic. Let’s leave the public out of this. This is not about the public. I have heard for decades now, since I was young, “How do we educate the public? If the public only understood. It’s very complicated. If we could only get them interested.” You know what? It fails time and again.
It’s not just in Canada. Yes, the U.S. public has much greater commitment to national security and the armed forces than we do, but if you asked them about NORAD, they know as much about NORAD in the American public as the Canadian public does, because they are fixated — like our country is fixated, the departments and the governments — with this idea that the defence of North America begins by committing overseas.
The real question is, how do you educate and get attention from decision makers, political decision makers, in Canada as well as the United States, as well as in the services, in National Defence headquarters and in the Pentagon, that this defence problem is important and a priority? That’s what the real issue is. I always come to the conclusion that when talking about getting the public, the public becomes an excuse not to do anything. That’s what happens here.
Now, there are, of course, competing interests for resources, et cetera, but this is about leadership from the government. That’s the target that really has to be dealt with. Otherwise, as Dr. Charron pointed out in her introductory brief, there is a real danger that the governments and the departments will lose interest over time and neglect North American defence, which they have done pretty well since the 1950s, except for minor modernization. This is much bigger.
Yes, you can take away my Canadian citizenship, if you like.
The Chair: We are at the end of round one of our questions. Are there any other questions in the room for our witnesses this afternoon? It doesn’t look like it. I will then call this first panel to an end.
I offer, on behalf of my fellow committee members, sincere thanks to you, Dr. Charron, Dr. Fergusson and Dr. Fetterly, for the time that you have spent with us today, for the thought that you put into your submissions to us and for your thoughtful answers to some very important questions. I expect that these are questions that we’ll see repeated in our session later in the afternoon when we hear from senior NORAD chiefs. For now, thank you. We could not do this work without you. We are reliant on the testimony, expertise and judgment of our witnesses, and you have helped us considerably today. On behalf of the committee and the Senate of Canada, thank you very much for your advice and for the work that you do every day on behalf of Canadians in your important academic roles.
For our second panel, we welcome by videoconference from the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, NORAD, Lieutenant-General Alain Pelletier, Deputy Commander; Major-General Iain Huddleston, Commander, Canadian NORAD Region, Canadian Armed Forces; and Jonathan Quinn, Director General, Continental Defence Policy.
Thank you all for joining us today. We will begin this session by inviting you to provide some opening remarks, to be followed by questions from our members. I understand that opening remarks today will be delivered by Lieutenant-General Alain Pelletier. You may begin whenever you are ready.
Lieutenant-General Alain Pelletier, Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today.
As mentioned, I am Lieutenant-General Alain Pelletier, and I am the Deputy Commander of the North American Aerospace Defence Command, well known as NORAD, here at our headquarters at Peterson Space Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
[Translation]
Joining me this afternoon are Major-General Iain Huddleston, Commander of the 1 Canadian Air Division and the Canadian NORAD Region, and Jonathan Quinn, Director General, Continental Defence Policy, within the department.
[English]
As Deputy Commander NORAD, I am the second-in-command and support the Commander NORAD, U.S. General Glen D. VanHerck, in the execution of our missions, responsibilities and functions as outlined in the NORAD agreement and the NORAD terms of reference.
[Translation]
The NORAD agreement establishes three primary missions for NORAD in North America: aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning.
[English]
In the context of our NORAD missions, North America means Alaska, Canada, the continental United States, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, including the Air Defence Identification Zones around our countries, the air approaches, the maritime areas and the maritime approaches.
It is worth mentioning that NORAD also delivers what’s called the Integrated Threat Warning and Attack Assessment for all types missiles, a mission that spans the entire globe.
The Commander NORAD, or I as the Deputy Commander NORAD in his absence, are responsible to the Government of Canada and to the Government of the United States of America for the execution of our missions. Subordinate NORAD organizations include the Canadian NORAD Region, or CANR; the Continental U.S. NORAD Region, known as CONR; and the Alaskan NORAD Region, known as ANR, all led by their respective NORAD region commanders, with embedded U.S. and Canadian Forces members.
NORAD has a history of evolution that has ensured the command is positioned to effectively respond to changes in the security environment and technological advances. Over its history, the threat to North America has evolved from a northern approach long-range aviation to now a 360-degree threat that comes from all domains.
[Translation]
For the first time in our collective binational defence history, we now have two strategic competitors, Russia and China, both with nuclear weapons, and a third actor, North Korea.
With climate change under way, Russia, China and other countries are more and more interested in the Arctic. As a result, the Arctic continues to evolve into an increasingly globalized and contentious interconnected region.
[English]
From a NORAD perspective, the concern is that the Arctic is the closest path to attack North America. Our adversaries have already modernized their Arctic infrastructure. They have deployed new coastal and air defence missile systems, upgraded their maritime forces and increased their military exercise and training operations with a new command organization that is dedicated to the Arctic.
To effectively execute our assigned NORAD mission, we must outpace our global competitors, deter our adversaries, deny and defeat threats through all-domain awareness, information dominance, decision superiority and be globally integrated with our allies.
[Translation]
In June of this year, the Minister of National Defence announced funding for Canada’s continental defence capability, which includes modernizing NORAD.
[English]
NORAD modernization will contribute to the defence of North America and help address the evolving missile threats and maritime warning challenges consistent with the NORAD agreement, helping to ensure our continent is a secure base to project power and engage abroad.
[Translation]
NORAD Headquarters is, in fact, working closely with National Defence Headquarters and the Pentagon to synchronize and coordinate NORAD’s modernization from a procurement project perspective.
[English]
As threats continue to rapidly evolve and the Arctic becomes increasingly accessible, it is important for both countries to field critical capabilities as soon as possible that will enhance our domain awareness, enable persistent operation and provide national decision makers with adequate time to make key decisions.
[Translation]
Thank you for the opportunity to address your committee. We are ready to answer your questions.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much for that presentation. It is a great start for us.
[Translation]
Senator Gignac: Thank you, Mr. Pelletier. We thank you for everything you and your team are doing at NORAD. We’re very proud of you.
I want to continue the discussion we started with the previous panel. I was going back to the Canadian government’s decision in 2005 not to help develop the missile defence shield. The world has now changed and technology has evolved. We see that the Russians can now use hypersonic missiles.
Is it a handicap that Canada isn’t involved in the missile shield? If so, shouldn’t Canada join in this initiative because, as you mentioned, the threats have changed over the past several decades?
LGen. Pelletier: I will start, and then Mr. Quinn will take over regarding policy-related issues.
As you said, and I mentioned it in my opening remarks, the threat is evolving. Right now, NORAD is concerned about the evolving threat. Things have grown beyond the ballistic missile issue. We need to be aware of the dominant threat posed right now by the cruise missiles being supplied to Russia. We also need to be aware of the development of hypersonic missiles, both cruise missiles and other types. These missiles can be deployed and they include multiple warheads. This new development means that our defence system must also evolve and be able to perceive, detect and characterize the threat that’s growing beyond the traditional ballistic missile profile.
We continue to pursue this mission, despite our handicap in the air due to a lack of sensors. We are doing our best to detect missiles, which is part of NORAD’s mission in terms of aerospace warning.
Mr. Quinn, would you like to add anything with respect to policy?
Jonathan Quinn, Director General, Continental Defence Policy, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Thank you for the question.
[English]
I don’t have much to add other than affirming the fact that Canada’s policy has not changed as a result of the investments that were announced in June in NORAD modernization. I would say that for the roles that NORAD does play, as General Pelletier mentioned — an active role in the integrated threat and warning assessment against all classes of aerospace threats and also actively contributing to defending against non-ballistic aerospace threats — the initiatives as part of NORAD modernization in terms of surveillance, command and control, modernizing northern infrastructure and enhancing the Canadian contribution and support capabilities as well as the new investments in research and development over the 20-year period of the NORAD modernization plan will all collectively enhance Canada’s contributions to missile defence writ large and contribute to us being a value-added partner in terms of defending our shared continent against those aerospace threats. Thank you.
[Translation]
LGen. Pelletier: As Mr. Quinn said, we continue to evolve. The over-the-horizon radar will help us improve our long-range detection system. We’re working with those who provide us with these aerospace capabilities to modernize them, expand our decision time and reduce detection time.
Senator Gignac: Thank you for the information, Mr. Pelletier. I believe I asked one of your colleagues this question last spring, but I want to make sure I understood his answer. Right now, Canada doesn’t have the capability to detect hypersonic missiles, let alone intercept them. Is that true?
LGen. Pelletier: As deputy commander of NORAD, I can speak to the capability provided to us at NORAD, not to Canada’s unique capability. The decision to take up aerospace detection was made in 1958, and we’ve been doing it ever since. As a binational command, I can’t say that in the Canadian “silo” that we don’t have that capability. There is strength in numbers, and it’s that strength that allows us to carry out a detection element.
The challenge is not just carrying out initial detection, but also tracking the missile on its trajectory. That’s what we’re working on right now, both on the Canadian and U.S. side of the space, to make sure that systems are in place to monitor this evolving threat.
[English]
Senator Duncan: Thank you to our witnesses who have made their presentation this evening.
I would like to follow up with a question. There was a reference by Lieutenant-General Pelletier regarding all domains and the interconnectedness and the North being the closest path. You also mentioned Alaska and gave the acronym for it. Being from the Yukon, I am, of course, close to and grateful for the Alaskan presence in the North. Can you elaborate on your point about all domains and what you meant by that? I’m thinking of cybersecurity.
LGen. Pelletier: Thank you for the question.
Obviously, when we look at NORAD, the tendency is to think about aerospace and maritime because that’s very specific to our mission. The reality is that to be able to deliver a fulsome awareness not only to the commander here but also to the national decision makers, both Canada and the U.S., we are looking at what comes in in the information space, the cyber domain and what may be in the maritime, aerospace and the land domain that could inform, as well as the space domain which is near and dear to NORAD’s earth heart. The aggregation of the information available across all those domains may actually inform the commander and national decision makers of the intent of a competitor or adversaries to employ forces against North America. That’s what we mean by all domains. Our mission remains focused on the aerospace domain, in the execution, and in the maritime domain as it relates to warning, but we remain interested in every other piece of information that may reside in the other domains to make the assessment.
Senator Duncan: To follow up on that, for example, we’ve seen news stories of Alaskans deterring Russian fighter jets from entering North American aerospace. We’ve seen Russians recently landing in Alaska in light of the forced conscription with the invasion of Ukraine. How do those events play out in terms of your work? How does that information, or versions of that information, get into the Canadian conversation about defence?
LGen. Pelletier: Thank you for the question.
You mentioned the Alaskan NORAD region, ANR. They do intercept on a fairly regular basis, like our Canadian NORAD region fighters who are deployed in our forward operating locations in the North, because the Russian long-range aviation may be coming from the Aleutian chain, but they may also be coming from the North Arctic. We’re in the position to do the detection when we have an opportunity to detect. We’re limited there, especially the northern flanks. Then we will design a plan to act on the incursion both in the Alaskan and Canadian NORAD regions according to what is known, what is detected and what needs to take place. Both of these regions affect that area.
How does that make it into the Canadian discussion? We have a mandate to report. Obviously, we report to both national entities. Also, we will report, using our public affairs, on events that take place in the Alaskan and Canadian NORAD regions, or the Continental NORAD region, on intercepts that take place by any of the regions as it relates to potential threats to NORAD and both countries. We do report. NORAD has a public affairs team. We also have a public affairs team in each of the regions to ensure that that message is available to the Canadian public. What I don’t control, obviously, is the intake of that message in the regular discourse of the public.
Mr. Quinn, or Major-General Iain Huddleston, who is responsible for the Canadian NORAD region, do you have anything that you would like to add?
Major-General Iain Huddleston, Commander, Canadian NORAD Region, Canadian Armed Forces, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Sir, thank you, and thank you for the question and the opportunity to respond.
I don’t have a great deal to add to what General Pelletier suggested, but on the operational side of this discussion, we track through our Combined Aerospace Operations Centre here in Winnipeg the types of information that you’re asking about with a direct link to NORAD, and also the other links that we have to both the Canadian Joint Operations Command and the Government Operations Centre in Ottawa. We have work to do in terms of making those processes seamless and digitalizing them. We are at the centre of these discussions and become aware of them and act where appropriate.
In those two instances, when it’s an ANR focus, we are led by ANR in the NORAD response; then, CANR prepares to provide back-up as appropriate by either forward deploying our assets or otherwise supporting them.
Senator Dasko: Thank you to our witnesses today.
Lieutenant-General Pelletier, our committee travelled to the North last month. We travelled across from east to west. We visited the NORAD centre in Inuvik and other military installations in the North. One of the comments I heard, and I can’t remember who it was from but it may have been someone speaking at the NORAD centre, was that because of the focus of the Russian efforts in Ukraine, in fact, they are spending less time in their activities in their North and, therefore, possibly may be less of a threat around the North than might have been thought before. I wonder if you have any thoughts about that. Thank you.
LGen. Pelletier: Thank you for the question.
We appreciate the visit of the committee to the FOL Inuvik, as well as other locations. Hopefully, the members there have been able to illustrate a few of the challenges associated with the mission, which are obviously, at times, daunting in the Arctic operating environment.
First of all, let me give a little bit of background. Since 2007, when the Russian long-range aviation resumed their patrol in the North, we’ve seen an average of six to seven flights a year. Between 2007 and up to now, it could range from 15 down to 0. Zero happened when the Russian long-range aviation suffered a couple of crashes around the years 2014-15. We have seen a reduction this year, especially since the February 24 illegal invasion of Ukraine by Russia. However, some of those activities have now resumed. We continue to monitor the activities. The activity is not only limited to the long-range aviation. Russia uses its submarines now both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts to actually demonstrate its strategic capabilities and to present a threat to North America.
Moreover, if we set aside the instruments, Russia has, over the last decade, modernized a number of bases that used to be present during the Cold War. They had been put in cold storage, and now they have modernized and have not only increased their presence but moved their presence forward by occupying some of their islands and giving the capability to project power forward through the Arctic from those operating locations. We are talking over 10 bases that enable them to operate in the Arctic. That Arctic presence has not decreased over the last year. We’re monitoring, again, that activity.
As I mentioned in my opening remarks, they published an Arctic strategy, I believe last year. They now have a command that looks at the Arctic, at the northern part of Russia’s territories.
Senator Dasko: Thank you for that.
I was reading a report in the media today that suggested that almost half of the Russian military has been either killed or wounded in their Ukrainian efforts. Do you have a comment on that? There are many people who believe that the war in Ukraine has revealed the poor training of the Russian military and their poor motivation, as well as possibly the poor resources they had going into it. Now, their losses are very heavy as a result of the Ukrainians’ efforts and the massive assistance they’ve received from countries like the United States. Ukrainians have prevailed — not entirely — but the Ukrainians have done extremely well, given those resources, and the Russians have done very poorly. I wonder if you might want to comment on that.
LGen. Pelletier: Thank you for the question.
Obviously, our hearts go out not only to the Ukrainian military but also the Ukrainian population who have suffered since February 24 as a result of that illegal aggression and invasion by Russia.
Unfortunately, I cannot comment on the statistics. We’re keeping track of the capabilities that might affect North America specifically. The Canadian Joint Operation Centre follows and supports the activity of the CAF military in support of NATO, and the activities in that theatre would be the ones we are following.
However, one thing to add to my initial comments is that the unfolding activities on the ground in Ukraine should not be taken as an indication of the poor capability of Russia with its strategic capabilities. As I pointed out, the long-range aviation has been demonstrated over the years. Not only have they modernized it but they have demonstrated the ability to project power and employ forces. They have modernized their cruise missiles to be able to reach North America. They’ve increased their long-range aviation by, again, modernizing the bases. Now there are strategic capability exercises by new submarines that are quieter and therefore more difficult to detect and have an ability to actually launch cruise missiles to North America. Again, that operates pretty much with some degree of impunity in the Atlantic and now in the Pacific. Yes, the tactical execution in Ukraine may be one thing, but we remain focused on the capabilities that have been demonstrated and that are part of Russia’s military’s doctrine to actually exercise using long-range aviation and their strategic naval fleets.
Senator Boehm: I’d like to thank our witnesses. Lieutenant-General Pelletier, it’s good to see you again.
I want to ask where and how the planning for the modernization plan is going. In June, we saw the announcement of $4.9 billion over six years in terms of Canadian spending. That’s a large amount. Working forward, it would require a lot of work in the investment areas that were identified, dealing with all stakeholders and perhaps with private contractors, but what interests me most is the coordination. With the U.S., you have your military-to-military contact. The U.S. government also has an inter-agency process that involves other actors and departments, most notably the National Security Council and the State Department. We have something similar in Canada. My question is really on the consultative and the planning machinery. How much are you widening the tent, if you’re prepared to talk about that, in terms of who is involved and how these various elements work?
Is there enough preparedness in the system to be able to react in an agile fashion to an unknown or unanticipated threat? I was stationed in Washington at our embassy during 9/11. Those of us working in that area all knew that there was a threat. We didn’t know how imminent it would be. Then when it occurred, of course, NORAD went into action, scrambling fighter jets and doing other things.
I wonder how much of this is baked in. Is there a new governance structure because you’re looking at almost $5 billion in expenses? How is that going to work, looking ahead over the next years, in terms of the investment plan?
LGen. Pelletier: Thank you for the questions. They’re broad questions.
I’ll start off by saying that NORAD welcomes the announcement of the Canadian government with regard to not only the budget letter but also the subsequent announcement that resulted from the NORAD modernization.
I would say that this is a continuation of the work not only that has taken place over the last three years at DND and the Canadian Armed Forces to understand what NORAD modernization and continental defence are but also to define what they need to be. It is also a continuation because NORAD for the last three years has published what is called the Integrated Priority List, or IPL, which is a trimmed-down list of NORAD and USNORTHCOM that specifies the requirements of both commands. We took that list, shrunk it to address just the NORAD requirements and published it to both the Canadian leadership as well as the U.S. leadership in order to actually socialize what requirements we have as a command moving forward.
Now, because of the engagement over the last couple of years resulting from the sharing of the IPL, I and my predecessors have been engaged with both countries to ensure that our requirements were well understood and that the bridges were established, and if the bridges were not established, that the bridges were built so that communication can flow across both countries, across the border, in order to actually advance capabilities to suit our requirements. NORAD modernization was a stepping stone to move forward.
Since then, the Royal Canadian Air Force, RCAF in our parlance, and the U.S. Air Force, USAF, have teamed up to work collaboratively in the advancement of the project associated with the over-the-horizon radar, because the U.S. will also be procuring over-the-horizon radar in order to complement the ecosystem of detection and sensing capabilities to address one of our gaps, which is domain awareness. I’ll give the floor in a minute to Mr. Quinn, who can speak to the policy relationship with both countries to advance.
In addition to the RCAF-USAF relationship, Defence Research & Development Canada, DND and the research labs in the U.S. are also collaborating to advance research in common areas that will go after the evolving threats that are hypersonic missile detection and the like.
There is good collaborative work. As I mentioned, here at NORAD, I’m able to see both sides of the equation. I’m making sure that the bridges are built in order to actually answer the proper coordination moving forward.
Before I turn it over, I’ll address the element of agility. We’re trying to remain agile. It is a word that is part of my lexicon. I challenge every region — CONR, CANR and ANR — to remain agile. We try to stay ahead of the threats. We have a super and extensive relationship with all the intelligence agencies that actually support our missions, both in Canada and the U.S. and across the Five Eyes community as well. We do so to be able to stay ahead of the threat. Even though we try to expect the unexpected, there may be surprises, as we saw with 9/11. We’re always trying to maintain the posture and readiness in order to be able to respond in an agile and rapid way.
Now I will turn it over to Mr. Quinn to talk to the policy aspect of it.
Mr. Quinn: Thank you for the question. I’ll be brief, but I have a couple of things to add to General Pelletier’s great answer.
As he mentioned, from the outset in terms of the identification of the requirements, Canada and the U.S. have been working side by side in Colorado Springs. That led to the Integrated Priority List that General Pelletier mentioned. The next step along the NORAD modernization journey was the publication of a joint statement on NORAD modernization back in August 2021. That’s where we engaged at the policy level to translate the Commander NORAD’s requirements into a list of investment priorities from each government that would guide our shared efforts on NORAD modernization. That was very helpful in generating support and kind of guiding us to what was eventually announced last June.
Now that we have a decision on which initiatives are going to be pursued and at what level of funding, we’re working very closely with the U.S. I have regular touchpoints with my counterpart in the Pentagon. We had a really good discussion last month at the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which is a high-level Canada-U.S. dialogue where we talked through NORAD modernization implementation. My team also has a working group with their counterparts at the Pentagon, where we draw in representatives from other implicated parts of each country’s institutions, from infrastructure and environment to the respective air forces, just to make sure that the communication lines are wide open and that we’re identifying challenges in implementation early and working through them.
We’re at the very early stages. The announcement was just in June, but we are setting up detailed plans with milestones and setting up project offices here at National Defence headquarters to advance the specific initiatives. As General Pelletier said, the RCAF, which is the lead for a large portion of the Canadian investments, has set up a really strong active working relationship with our counterparts in the U.S. Air Force, who have the lead for the bulk of U.S. efforts on NORAD modernization. I’ll leave it there. Thank you.
Senator Yussuff: Thanks to the witnesses for being here.
I guess my question is about the time frame that we’re working with. We’re looking at a six-year horizon to complete this. Given the changing environment that we’re dealing with, I’m wondering if this is this adequate, recognizing our security is totally dependent on the systems that we have in place to at least alert us and our opportunity to respond to the threat, if there is a threat in this reality. From your perspective, Lieutenant-General Pelletier, do you believe this time frame is adequate given the reality and the challenges that we’re faced with? We’re seeing certainly some fairly aggressive actors on the scene, and deterrence is obviously not part of the vocabulary anymore. Are you satisfied that we are on the right path, or should we maybe rethink the time frame that we’re looking at?
LGen. Pelletier: Thank you for the question.
Obviously, as an operator, I always want to go fast, and that stems from my origin. I flew CF-18s, which have a tendency to go fast. The commander, General VanHerck, would also say that the threat is here now. The faster we’re able to address the threat, not only in terms of detection but to actually be able to deter it and to defend in the event of aggression, the better it will be.
However, I think that we also need to put things into perspective. The government announced back in 2017 the release of the Canadian defence policy — Strong, Secure, Engaged — that resulted in the fielding of capabilities that we are about to see on our front lines. We’re seeing the future fighter capability advancing rapidly, which will lead to the replacement of the CF-18 fleet. We’re also seeing the strategic tanker capability, which will be replacing our current strategic fleet of tankers. On top of that, the $4.9 billion is not only investing in research and development but also in the launching off of the definition phase of some of the other projects that are listed as part of the overall NORAD modernization, which is going to go beyond the six years and could extend up to twenty years.
As operators, as users and as the deliverer of the capability that NORAD provides, we’re going to be working with both the Canadian Armed Forces as well as the U.S. Department of Defense in order to advance capabilities as rapidly as we can, given the standard constraints associated with the process that both countries have to operate with.
Mr. Quinn, is there anything else you want to add from a timeline programmatic perspective?
Mr. Quinn: Thanks very much, sir, and thanks for the question.
I would maybe just clarify that the Canadian effort on NORAD modernization is actually a 20-year horizon, just to explain that this is a wide range of new initiatives that we’re looking to pursue. Some of them are in the relatively early stages of development, and some others are quite complex and implementation will take some time. The idea here is that we can proceed with planning and implementation with confidence because we know that that $40 billion of accrual funding is in the framework for that 20-year time horizon.
The only other thing I would mention is that part of that $40 billion is roughly $4 billion over the 20 years for research and development. The idea there is to make sure that we’re constantly looking ahead and researching solutions to tomorrow’s threats so that we can stay ahead of competitors as they continue to fulfill their military modernization and also to keep up with our close allies in the U.S., obviously and in particular.
Senator Yussuff: When we went up to the North, we were able to visit a lot of our facilities up there. You certainly have a lot of my sympathy in the challenges you face, but sympathy is one thing. The reality, of course, if that we’re going to build new infrastructure, this is going to be a huge challenge. The speed in which the Arctic is changing is already upon us, and in engaging with the First Nations communities, they have expectations. They would like to see, of course, investment that’s going to build infrastructure that they can benefit from, not just for the military, but equally, the opportunity to be part of the discussion and the collaboration as to how they can play that role, recognizing the Rangers already play an important role in terms of our Arctic defence at this point in time. Is that conversation integrated and robust?
More importantly, in terms of building new infrastructure, the permafrost is melting, so I guess there would have to be a lot of research on how we can build facilities that will withstand the challenges we’re going to be faced with, both in the short term but also on the long-term horizon. Perhaps you could shed some light in terms of the work you’re doing in preparing for this.
LGen. Pelletier: I’ll start with the question and then pass it over to Mr. Quinn and General Huddleston as to the specifics of the actual engagement with the northern communities and Indigenous nations.
First of all, I agree that the challenge presented by the Arctic is a huge one. It is a very challenging operating environment for the operators and the machines, and it’s also challenging because of the large area that we have to deal with and the very limited amount of resources and network that exists in that area. The challenge of building in the Arctic is not lost on us. Fortunately, CANR, the Canadian NORAD Region, has done work in exploring some of the Arctic capabilities, such as rapid repair facilities and the like, in order to actually develop agility for operations in the North.
The infrastructure is currently existent. What we are trying to accomplish is an ability to maintain persistence in the Arctic, not a permanent presence because that could be an expensive proposition but persistence so that we’re able to respond to an increased threat in that region. That architecture and the infrastructure that exists out there need the required modernization in order to not only meet the future threat but also to be compatible with the advancement of our own capabilities to include the fielding of the future fighter capability.
I’ll turn it over to Mr. Quinn to discuss the overall engagement with the nations in the North, but I would say that it’s very important for us that we maintain good relations. I know the Alaska NORAD region maintains a relationship with the northern communities throughout their operations and activities. We do as well in Canada. We’ve looked at NORAD modernization in the last two years as we’ve evolved prior to the announcement as to how capability could not only serve the purpose of DND and the Canadian Armed Forces but could potentially be dual purpose or multipurpose in the capability delivery for other entities out there.
Mr. Quinn: Thanks very much for the question. I would add a couple of things to General Pelletier’s response.
First, I would just point out that as we were developing the proposals that eventually turned into Minister Anand’s announcement in June, we did reach out, through the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework and other forums, to engage northern communities and northern leadership, in the first instance, to get as clear a sense as we could of their requirements for infrastructure and other challenges. We will be using the information gathered and those relationships that we’ve established through those tables to actively seek out opportunities as we implement the NORAD modernization initiatives for dual-use infrastructure, and we fully intend to have more detailed, targeted consultations with northerners as implementation proceeds and as planning progresses. We have a sense of where we intend to enhance infrastructure across the North, but the specific plans are still very much in development, and there are still lots of opportunities to work closely with northern communities to make sure that we’re maximizing all of the opportunities for dual-use benefits.
We also have in mind another commitment to make sure that we’re looking for opportunities to help with economic development in northern communities. This committee has heard previously of the contract that was awarded to the Nasittuq Corporation for the maintenance of the current North Warning System. That’s an Inuit-owned corporation. We would anticipate similar opportunities going forward as we implement all of the initiatives associated with NORAD modernization for similar kinds of economic opportunities for northerners as we go forward.
Thank you very much.
MGen. Huddleston: I would add from the operational perspective that we currently are not limited in executing our mission in the North, but we are challenged in certain ways. Operating fighters in the North is a difficult business, particularly with the weather that generally affects the forward operating locations, and the NORAD modernization plan brings with it significant investment in the four forward operating locations that we have currently in the North that will help address some of those challenges in order to make our fighter operations in Northern Canada more viable and more robust.
In terms of the air transport and other types of air operations that we conduct in the North, again, they’re not limited in any way by our current footprint in the North, but they could very much be improved by the provision of hangarage and other sites, such as sustainment and support infrastructure. That’s very much a focus of defence, but it’s a focus of the defence policy update, not of NORAD modernization. NORAD modernization is very much focused on the NORAD problem, and there’s a significant investment being made, as I said.
From a consultation and an engagement perspective, the 1 Canadian Air Division, Canadian NORAD Region, is very focused on making sure that the local communities where our FOLs, forward operating locations, are located are fully informed and engaged in our activities. We have more of that actively happening in the South, specifically Cold Lake with respect to the range that’s north of Cold Lake, and in Goose Bay currently, but we’re very much aware of how our operations are underpinned by the local communities in the North. Really, without their support, we would be unable to execute our mission. It’s a true priority for my division.
Senator Yussuff: As we’re considering all of this, we’ve had two new countries join NATO. They are Arctic nations. This is certainly going to bring NATO into some forward engagement in terms of Arctic security in general because of Sweden, of course, and Finland. Does this change the thinking, generally speaking, around how all these nations are now part of NATO, and is NATO going to be playing a bigger role in regard to Arctic security from a perspective of those Scandinavian countries that are now included as part of the NATO family?
LGen. Pelletier: Thank you for the question.
It’s not lost on us that, with the inclusion of Finland and Sweden, all of the Arctic nations but one, i.e. Russia, are going to be part of NATO. I believe those nations are already contributing to Arctic security, but obviously, everything, as I’ve learned in my training, is relative. We see it from a North American perspective; they see it from a European perspective. At the end of the day, it resides as the Arctic security.
We’re moving forward with regard to a discussion as to how we’re going to be able to actually better ensure Arctic security through the sharing of data so that we gain better domain awareness of what they know versus what we know, of what flies and floats in the Arctic and the reasons for that. That’s a relationship that will evolve, I suspect, over the next couple of years.
As you’re probably tracking, General Eyre, Chief of Defence Staff, hosted the Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff of all but Russia, in August in Newfoundland, and that was probably a good stepping stone in terms of how to move forward in ensuring that the Arctic remains a safe and secure region.
Mr. Quinn, is there anything on the policy aspect?
Mr. Quinn: I would add maybe just a couple of additional points.
From a NATO perspective, I’m not sure we necessarily have yet seen Sweden’s and Finland’s accession translating into a sense that there will immediately be a greater role for NATO in the Arctic writ large. I suspect potentially more of an active role in the European High North and that kind of European portion of the Arctic. Given that we have NORAD in North America, I’m not sure we would see that translating necessarily into a greater NATO presence or level of activity beyond what we have now in the Canadian Arctic.
I would point out as well that we’re certainly actively engaged in policy conversations at all levels with our Arctic allies. We share many of exactly the same challenges in our respective areas, and we see lots of opportunities to deepen collaboration with them to tackle some of these defence and security challenges in the Arctic. To that end, Minister Anand has launched a Security and Defence Dialogue with her counterparts in our Arctic-allied nations. That’s going well, and there is lots of good information being shared. You will have seen as well obviously that the NATO Secretary General visited the Canadian Arctic in the summer, and that yielded lots of good conversations as well about where NATO is heading on issues of northern defence.
It’s a great question, and still pretty fresh with Sweden’s and Finland’s accession, very fresh, and I think maybe even pending a couple of final hoops to jump through. We’re looking forward to that and will be monitoring the evolution of NATO in the future.
Thank you.
The Chair: Before we go to the next round, I have a question. I’m going to go back to the threat of the new generation of missile technology — hypersonics and things of that nature. We have heard there are answers to these threats, such as the use of over-the-horizon radar and different forms of perhaps aerospace surveillance, both of which are going to take some time to procure and develop. That suggests there will be something of a gap. During that gap, are there interim measures of other sorts that are available to you that will give us a measure of assurance that new forms of missile technology can be addressed? That is the first question.
Second, when it comes to these new forms of over-the-horizon radar, are these things that can be bought off the shelf? Are they out there being produced already by defence contractors or firms, or do they have to be purpose-built?
LGen. Pelletier: Thank you for the questions.
First, as it relates to surveillance, missile threats present a problem of detection, tracking, characterization and of potential defence. Right now, NORAD is tasked to do the detection, threat warning and attack assessment that we talked about earlier. We’re also charged with the defence against cruise missiles. NORAD is not tasked to defend against ballistic missiles, and we are not yet tasked to defend against hypersonic light vehicles.
Regarding the detection itself, we have some systems that are able to detect a launch. The challenge is with different systems. For instance, China developed and tested a forward orbital bombardment system. They have been putting and keeping that missile in orbit, so the element of tracking that system needs to be refined. We need to continue to work on that tracking mechanism.
When you have systems like those or like cruise missiles, which are manoeuvrable, and you don’t know where the target is located, they present challenges of their own. We need to have a defence design that we have been working on for the last many years to answer so that we’re able to actually defend what needs to be defended. That remains a policy question, because we need to have the Canadian and the U.S. governments provide us, through NORAD, what they see as elements to be defended.
With regard specifically to cruise missiles, we have in our defence design the use of fighter aircraft, the airborne early warning platform that the U.S. provides to the command, to detect and engage cruise missiles. The latest round of cruise missiles that have a lower radar cross-section present a challenge in the detection and engagement capability. For that, we’re leveraging the arrival of fifth-gen aircraft like the F-22 and the F-35 that are equipped with special radar that gives us an ability to detect and engage those cruise missiles. Given the number of cruise missiles available to our adversaries, however, that might present a challenge depending on the attack angle and the final target. That relates to surveillance.
We welcome the announcement both by the U.S. and Canadian governments to actually move forward with over-the-horizon radar, which will close the gap on the detection not only of the Arctic aerospace but also other avenues of approach, such as over the Atlantic and the Pacific. As I illustrated in one of my original answers, the threat may be coming from submarines that are capable of launching advanced cruise missiles from undersea, which makes initial detection difficult. Over-the-horizon radar will enable us, through a network of systems, to detect threats over the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific. Those systems have been fielded by our allies, so we’re in discussion with one of our allies that had fielded a previous generation of that system. The intent is to field an advanced over-the-horizon radar that will enhance detection. It is looking at over-the-horizon radar not only in terms of detection of cruise missiles but any potential threat that may be coming from the air and space, using every element of the capability itself.
Mr. Quinn: To your first question about the gap period and the interim measures, I would say that, from a North American perspective, when we’re talking about deterrence, there are two kinds of deterrence: deterrence by denial, which is robust defences so that the adversary is deterred because they know their attack would be thwarted easily, and deterrence by punishment, which is when you can’t avoid an attack, the idea is that the response will be so overwhelming that it serves as a deterrent. During the gap period, we would be relying probably a little more heavily than we would like on deterrence by punishment until we can reinforce those North American defences to bolster the deterrence by denial.
On the over-the-horizon radar question about off-the-shelf versus developmental, from a Canadian perspective, there are two key aspects of what our contribution would be. One is what we’re calling Arctic over-the-horizon radar, and that would be a site located somewhere along the Canada-U.S. border that would see up and out roughly to the upper reaches of the Arctic Archipelago. The technology for that one is quite mature. We will move ahead with implementation and fielding of that system as quickly as possible.
The second Canadian contribution we’re calling polar over-the-horizon radar. That would be a site located in the Canadian High Arctic. For that one, there is still a little bit of residual research and development to do to resolve interference caused at that high latitude by the Aurora Borealis. It is eminently solvable from what I understand; I’m not a scientist but I understand they are close to cracking that one. With that one, there is still a little development to do, but the idea is that it would be fielded roughly two years after the lower-latitude system.
The Chair: Thank you very much for those responses. They are very helpful.
We are now in the second round.
[Translation]
Senator Gignac: I have two questions for Mr. Pelletier. Thank you again for your patience and for being with us today.
In your opening remarks, you said that NORAD’s missions were aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning. When the unfortunate events, to which our colleague Senator Boehm referred, happened on September 11, 2001, we saw how efficient NORAD was in terms of aerospace control. Due to climate change, maritime traffic is likely to increase significantly and people are talking about opening the Northwest Passage.
My question is, as part of the modernization of NORAD, do you feel it would be worthwhile to add maritime control in addition to maritime warning? Right now you have aerospace warning and control, but on the maritime side you only have warning; you do not have maritime control. Given that the North makes up 40% of Canada’s land area and we are likely to see a lot more maritime traffic in the next few decades, do you feel maritime control should be part of NORAD’s modernization?
LGen. Pelletier: Of course, NORAD’s position is that this is a political issue. NORAD has evolved over its history, beginning in 1958 with aerospace warning and control. The maritime warning mission was added in 2006. We evolve according to the comfort level of governments, if they are comfortable acting in a binational manner.
When we started discussing the modernization of NORAD, that was one of the questions I asked, whether there would be an evolution, a change in the mission. At this point, both governments are comfortable with the mission as assigned, and the maritime control mission is continuously carried out in step with our naval warning mission. It is being carried out by USNORTHCOM (U.S. Northern Command), which is also under the command of General Glen D. VanHerck, who plays two roles. The mission is carried out in concert with Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), in cooperation with NATO and EUCOM (U.S. European Command) in the European sector, as well as with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command on the Pacific Coast.
The mission has been carried out over the past several decades, and both Canada and the United States carry it out on a regular basis. The mission is currently under way and no changes to the mission are anticipated at this time.
[English]
Jon, is there anything that you want to add on the policy side?
Mr. Quinn: I think General Pelletier has covered it very well, but I mentioned earlier in the discussion this joint statement on NORAD modernization that was published in August 2021. In addition to outlining priority areas for investment, the other purpose of that particular document was to agree with the U.S. on exactly what we meant by NORAD modernization. During the conversations with the U.S. on this, we quickly came to the shared realization that there was enough to do to modernize and enhance NORAD’s ability to fulfill its current mission set and that there was enough urgency to do so and enough solid agreement on exactly what was needed to do to better enable NORAD to fulfill its current mandate and that opening up the agreement to add additional missions would slow things down and complicate things unnecessarily when there was this urgent requirement to better enable NORAD to fulfill its current roles and functions. As General Pelletier said, there are many other mechanisms in place to coordinate operations in the maritime domain, so there was not a sense that this was a big gap that required urgent attention on our side. Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Gignac: My second question is about Canada having no nuclear-powered submarines. You mentioned that Canada is investing in its new fleet of F-35s. You also mentioned investments in tanks. Right now, the Chinese, the Russians, the British and the Americans all have nuclear-powered submarines, which are needed to be taken seriously in the Arctic.
Some witnesses have said that Canada should acquire some. I understand that my question doesn’t really fall under your responsibilities as deputy commander of NORAD. I also understand that maritime control is not NORAD’s responsibility, but what’s your opinion on this? Should Canada purchase nuclear-powered submarines to ensure its sovereignty and security in the Arctic?
LGen. Pelletier: Obviously, as you said, this is not part of my responsibilities. Submarines, whether nuclear, diesel or electric, are primarily part of the naval control component as opposed to maritime warning. Given my level of expertise and my fighter experience, this is completely out of my area of expertise.
I won’t extrapolate as to what would be good or not good. I don’t know if Mr. Quinn has an opinion from a policy perspective, per se.
Mr. Quinn: Thank you, Lieutenant-General.
[English]
I don’t necessarily have an opinion, but I would point out one aspect in case it is of interest to the committee. The NDDN, the House National Defence Committee, published a report recently to which there was a government response that indicated that the Department of National Defence and the CAF have stood up a project office to begin exploring the eventual replacement of the submarines that we currently have in service. Not being an expert, I won’t presume to hypothesize about whether or not they would be nuclear powered, diesel or electric. I would just point out the continued requirement for the Canadian Armed Forces to have submarines. There is an increasing realization that whatever solution is eventually put in place, they should be capable of operating in all of our maritime approaches. Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Gignac: I’d like to tie this into my previous question. Lieutenant-General Pelletier, if NORAD had maritime control in addition to maritime warning, you would have an opinion on this, because it would become your responsibility and the question would arise as to whether or not to acquire nuclear-powered submarines.
LGen. Pelletier: Of course, if we had that mission, we would develop the expertise to do it and if we did, I would have an opinion to express. For the time being, it would be pure speculation. Therefore, I will leave it to the opinion of the CJOC commander who is currently on that mission in Canada.
Senator Gignac: Thank you, Lieutenant-General Pelletier. I didn’t mean to exaggerate, but for those listening and watching us, I wanted to point out that it’s important we ask ourselves if maritime control should be a NORAD responsibility, since the issue is sure to come up if we want to secure our sovereignty and security in the Arctic, due to climate change and the opening of the Northwest Passage. Thank you, Lieutenant-General Pelletier.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Our final question this evening goes to Senator Duncan and, failing any other hands waving in the air, I will do a brief wrap-up before we end.
Senator Duncan: Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity.
I would like to build on the discussion of what occurred on 9/11. On that September date, two Korean jetliners landed in Whitehorse. The line of defence in Whitehorse at the time was the RCMP Emergency Response Team. I was the sitting premier at the time and learned later that the Prime Minister had been prepared to deploy the CF-18s from Cold Lake, Alberta. I heard more from the governor in Alaska than I did from any Canadian, military personnel or political. I appreciate that National Defence is a national responsibility. Those CF-18s are a long way away compared with the CF-35s in Fairbanks, Alaska. I’m not arguing for a military base. My point is to emphasize how dependent the Yukon part of Canada is on Alaska for our military support.
My other point is from a policy perspective. We’ve talked a lot tonight about the modernization of NORAD and the improvements that have been made. I would like to know if there has been in these improvements an inventory of the current resources that are present in the North. For example, every community in the Yukon is connected by internet, and there is a secondary internet connection, a fibre-optic line, being built now along the Dempster Highway as a secondary communication line. In the whole-of-government approach, do the military and NORAD have in the policy branch an inventory of resources that are currently there? We hear repeatedly about what is needed. Also, is there a requirement in that communications plan for greater community communication? We talked about it. Is there a whole-of-government and a top-to-bottom approach in terms of communication with First Nation, provincial and territorial governments and others on the ground such as the RCMP? Is there a requirement for that communication?
LGen. Pelletier: I will start off and turn it over for potential inputs by the commander of CANR, who does the tactical to operational aspects, as well as Mr. Quinn from a policy perspective.
I can say that on 9/11 — near and dear to my heart — I was on duty in Goose Bay, not in Whitehorse or Yellowknife on the day it happened, and we saw similar responses.
In our role, obviously, the Canadian Forces, with about 67,500 people, and short of that right now, cannot be everywhere, so we leverage the presence and the work that we do with the interagencies, whether here in the U.S. or in Canada as well. We have had facilitating engagements here in NORAD which we followed through with Public Safety in Canada a few months after and with the Federal Emergency Management Agency here in the U.S. to ensure that the partnership is built between the two countries’ main actor on reacting to some of these events in terms of consequence management. I have had personal engagement with our Public Safety team to understand not only what action they would take but how communications flow up to the federal government and down to the province, the community or municipality. Obviously, they are the experts in that area, but I can tell you that the engagements have taken place.
You pointed out that the F-35s, F-22s and the F-16s in Alaska are closer than Cold Lake. That is not lost on us, and we’re keeping Whitehorse as a deployment area, an ability to flow assets as required.
I can also tell you that all three regions are interconnected, and we have the ability to flow assets north and south of the 48th but also across CAN region and the Alaska region, and we do that on a regular basis because that’s fluidity and transparency. General Huddleston may want to expand on that. Also, the ability to flow forces as required is integral to our agility in the implementation.
To respond to your second question with regard to the inventory, NORAD embarked last year on the inventory of assets not only in terms of fuel but also infrastructure to better map its logistics footprint and how much is missing in order to be able to develop and sustain an activity in the North. We’re not the only ones who have done that. CJOC, the Canadian Joint Operations Command, has done that as well in order to better inform their activity in line with the defence policy.
The last point I will make is comms are essential, and the work at the community, municipal, provincial and territorial levels is crucial to move towards what we have come to realize here in NORAD and USNORTHCOM, which is that resilience of a nation and, in this case, of a binational agreement, is not only the responsibility of folks in uniform. It is also a whole-of-government and a whole-of-nation effort, and that resilience starts at the municipal level.
Mr. Quinn: Thanks very much for the question.
It’s a good question on the communications point, and it’s unfortunate to hear that someone who was premier of the Yukon was hearing more from her state counterpart than from the Canadian government. I’m not sure that this is a silver bullet, but I would add that very recently we in the policy division at National Defence recognized intergovernmental affairs as a bit of a gap in the service that we were providing, so some time ago we stood up a new division, a directorate general for intergovernmental affairs, which is leading efforts on communicating for any range of issues with territorial and provincial governments and with First Nations. They’ve been doing great work to date engaging on particularly those sensitive issues. There is no shortage of them, and I’m not sure again that that necessarily would have changed the specific experience in that case, but it’s certainly an important role, and it became quickly apparent how sorely needed it was just based on how busy that new division has become. It is a great point, and I completely agree that better comms are called for, and hopefully we are starting to do better on that front.
MGen. Huddleston: I don’t have a lot to add to General Pelletier’s point with respect to the sustainment and communication challenges in the North, other than to say that we are very focused on identifying those limitations, specifically at the Forward Operating Locations but also more widely across the northern airfield infrastructure. Our focus is primarily on airborne communications, and the gaps that exist in that regard. One of the projects in NORAD modernization is focused on addressing that through the provision of a satellite that will give us satellite comms across the North. Your point about the internet and the redundancy that exists in Yukon is interesting, and, of course, that would underpin operations at an airfield, which is one of our concerns at the FOLs, the resiliency and the redundancy that exist at each location. On the sustainment side, we’re primarily focused on fuel storage capacity that is existing or potentially needs to be invested in, and also in terms of hangarage for the different aircraft types that we would hope to see in the future engaged in a mission in the North.
On the Alaskan point, I wasn’t part of NORAD on 9/11 as I was in Greenwood flying the Aurora as a captain, but we are integrated with the Alaskan NORAD region. To General Pelletier’s point, we have a fluid construct that allows American fighters to come into Canada to help us with intercepts where our CF-18s are not able to intercept in the time required. We also have the opposite where Canadian CF-18s can cross into the United States, whether it’s Alaska or the continental United States, in order to have the same mission impact against the threats that we’re trying to address. From my perspective, the fact that an American fighter was involved in a NORAD mission in the Yukon is not a surprise at all.
I don’t have anything to say about the lack of communication to you as the premier other than to say that in my previous job I worked at the Canadian Joint Operations Centre, and CJOC is very focused on improving their links with the emergency management organizations in each province and territory, which might help to get at some of the problems that you’ve identified.
The Chair: Colleagues, this brings us to the end of our meeting.
Lieutenant-General Pelletier, Major-General Huddleston and Mr. Quinn, on behalf of the committee and my committee colleagues, I thank you very sincerely for joining us today and for staying with us. There were a lot of questions and a huge amount of interest, and you have provided candid answers and information that will be very helpful and instructive for us as we bring our study to a conclusion.
While I’m on the matter of thank yous, Canadians don’t get a chance to thank you very often for the work that you do and the sleep that you lose. We have the honour of doing that, and so on behalf of all those Canadians out there that you keep safe, we extend their thanks to you also for the work that you do every day.
Our next meeting, colleagues, will take place next Monday, November 28, at our usual time of 4 p.m. eastern. With that, I wish everyone a very good and a safe evening.
(The committee adjourned.)