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THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

EVIDENCE

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OTTAWA, Monday, November 24, 2025

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs met with videoconference this day at 4:01 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on defence procurement in the context of Canada’s commitment to increase defence spending.

Senator Hassan Yussuff (Chair) in the chair.

[English]

The Chair: Good evening, colleagues. I call to order this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs.

I am Hassan Yussuff from Ontario and the chair of the committee. I am joined today by my fellow committee members. I welcome them and ask them to introduce themselves.

Senator Ince: Thank you, Mr. Chair. My name is Tony Ince, senator from Nova Scotia.

[Translation]

Senator Youance: Suze Youance from Quebec.

[English]

Senator Al Zaibak: Good afternoon. Mohammad Al Zaibak, Ontario.

Senator Anderson: Dawn Anderson, Northwest Territories.

Senator Cardozo: Andrew Cardozo, Ontario.

Senator McNair: Welcome. John McNair, New Brunswick.

Senator Dasko: I’m Donna Dasko from Ontario.

The Chair: Thank you, colleagues. We are meeting to continue our study of defence procurement in the context of Canada’s commitment to increased defence spending.

We have the pleasure of hearing from three panels of witnesses today, including academic experts and representatives from Canada’s Arctic communities.

For the first panel, we welcome, by video conference, Anessa Kimball, Professor, Department of Political Science, Université Laval; and Ugurhan Berkok, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Economics, Royal Military College of Canada. We thank you both for joining us today.

We will begin by inviting you to provide opening remarks, to be followed by questions from our members. A reminder that you each have five minutes for your remarks. We will start with Professor Kimball.

Anessa Kimball, Professor, Department of Political Science, Université Laval, as an individual: I would like to thank the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs for the opportunity to share some reflections on defence procurement in the context of increasing defence spending.

As a professor of political science at Université Laval, I co‑direct the Canadian Defence and Security Network. My research is on the economics of military spending and defence and security cooperation.

I begin with noting that NATO partners first agreed to increase defence investment 22 years ago, which, in 2014, became a formal commitment. That notwithstanding Canada and its allies recently committed to another NATO target for defence spending, it will raise its investment in defence from 2% to 3.5% of GDP within the next decade. Given the important investment this represents, it is essential Canada seize this opportunity to increase its resilience through strategic partnerships built with carefully selected partners. Canada must resist the inefficient forces of economic protectionism and other types of offset structures with the potential to reduce its capacity to attract foreign investment and partnerships.

Defence procurement markets resemble oligopolies instead of free market structures, where states lack free agency due to the constraints of public finance and public regulations. An impending defence investment strategy should identify the means through which Canada will develop its improved defence capabilities by developing strategic interdependence with key partners while continuing to be a credible partner to the transatlantic alliance. I will describe several points that Canada should consider while implementing this generational opportunity to invest in its defence and close with some thoughts on how to make the said investments benefit Canadians.

First, Canada should procure defence with a focus on and attention to defence outputs in terms of capabilities, assets acquired and capacities expanded rather than prices and spending as its measure of success.

Second, identifying outputs permits a re-linking to the 2018 Defence Capabilities Blueprint Canada already decided upon, and it permits the public to observe that the Liberal government delivers upon its promises. I have not seen indications of the alignment of the announced defence spending with the Defence Capabilities Blueprint itself, which has not been updated since December 2024.

This is an important mechanism for transparency. Procurement invested in defence capabilities are needed to reinforce resilience and must reinforce Canada’s potential for independent as well as coordinated action with key partners. It should seek the development of independent capacities in key areas where NORAD acts as a sole provider of a particular asset or capability.

Second, Canada must exercise stronger foresight in financial planning of the Defence Investment Agency, or DIA. In terms of implementing the improved costing recommendations from the Auditor General’s report on the F-35s, for example, the major projects that would be adopted by the Defence Investment Agency should probably be re-estimated based on that report alone. As Canada seeks to diversify its partners, currency dislocations across partners can become consequential misestimations over time. This is an area that needs more attention by defence economists.

Canada has over 150 defence capability procurement projects under way, notwithstanding its new major ones under development, noting the Defence Investment Agency has mandated the management of only those with over a $100 million minimum threshold. This means that currently, about 90 projects would be ineligible for the efficiencies of the Defence Investment Agency.

Finally, the government should consider how to ensure this substantial investment benefits Canadians. First, the DIA labour force should be diverse, pulled from private and public sector along with those recently trained. Its mandate indicates its staffing currently draws expertise from only five different public agencies, with no mention of other labour markets, such as universities and private firms. It raises the question of how diverse its staff could be, since most of those agencies already lack sufficient numbers of visible minorities and First Nations staff members. Released public service members are unlikely to possess the high-skilled niche capabilities required for this generational innovation shift. Civil service is not generally perceived as the prime source for innovative labour. The first look would be to the private sector and then universities for our next generation of experts.

Second, immigration and labour mobility are needed, since there is much talk of international partnering. For example, consider highly skilled defence and security labour mobility agreements with top international partners, such as Sweden. Similar to the intra-European labour mobility market, Canada should develop its own defence labour mobility market. This means that the DIA’s synergies must flow through education and university into academic programs with high-skilled, paid professional internships for university students who then transition to quality defence sector employment, noting the current decentralization process negatively affects labour markets. The appropriate balance must be found between diversifying partners, industrial and technical benefits demands and buying Canadian to avoid protectionist tendencies.

I wish to thank the committee for their service and would be pleased to answer any questions its esteemed members may have.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Kimball, for your presentation. Next, we will hear from our second witness, Dr. Ugurhan Berkok. The floor is yours for five minutes.

Ugurhan Berkok, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Economics, Royal Military College of Canada, as an individual: Thank you to the committee for having me testify before you.

My presentation will have about four parts. For the first one, I want to state some of the projects that I worked on regarding defence procurement. I worked on in-service support, or ISS, which is critical especially for the large platforms.

Naval ships; public-private partnerships, such as — we don’t have this in our forces, but they have it in Britain. Some work well; some don’t. I worked on the Munitions Supply Program, NORAD economic benefits and I’m finishing work on a European rearmament program. Various European governments are participating in joint procurement. I worked extensively on our Industrial and Technological Benefits, or ITB, policy just engaging in a project on critical minerals, which is becoming more and more important.

What I want to start with is a bit of the way I look at our procurement. I’ll start with an example.

Australians in particular — and I appreciate the fact that Australians are living in a very dangerous part of the world, for them, defence comes first, and they are not engaging in any economically unjustified investments in building their platforms in Australia. That doesn’t mean that they are not investing in their operational capabilities. For them, that is a life-or-death matter, so they divided their expenditures into three, basically. One, obviously, no questions asked — they have to be manufactured and supported in Australia.

The rest is split into two. They have some, of course, industrial policies, and then, of course, they have some capabilities or some platforms they can produce at home. We are learning from those.

I’m moving to the Canadian defence industrial policy basically beyond our Munitions Supply Program. It is, by definition, with evidence, a very inefficient policy. We are sticking to it for the past 40, 50 years.

First, we define the priority sectors. We call them key industrial capabilities, and they vary widely. Way beyond any of the requirements of defence.

Then the way we are using what is called multipliers to direct defence investments, incentivizing defence investments into sectors. For example, aerospace, where we are at the frontier technologically. The third problem is we don’t incentivize those investments toward exports. So once a contract is finished, companies do not have any incentive to continue trying to export. And on that, the fourth problem, we don’t collect data to assess the ITB.

My next point is on what I call Canada’s pivot in terms of defence procurement toward Europe. We have already seen Swedish royals here regarding, potentially, Saab’s joint manufacturing of the fighter aircraft, plus the global IDISR aircraft, in terms of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

We have advanced sectors where we can export to Europe, such as aerospace, AI, quantum technologies, sensors, simulators, optical systems. We also have the critical minerals and Europeans don’t, so we have some comparative advantages there, but we have to understand that the protectionist ITB policies have to be abandoned so that we can move forward with Europeans.

If you ask me questions, I can tell you about our past successful projects.

For example, Bombardier was able to sell the ISR aircraft to Britain. They are the biggest business jet, Global Express, as militarized by Raytheon, today’s RTX. Another successful one is, of course, our F-35 project because the industry and technological benefits did not apply, but our aerospace companies —

The Chair: Dr. Berkok, could I ask you to try to wrap up, and then we could move into some questions where you might go a bit more in depth?

Mr. Berkok: Sure. This was my last point. I’m done.

The Chair: Okay. Thank you so much.

We will now proceed to questions. Colleagues, our guests will be with us until 5 p.m. today. As always, we will do our best to allow time for each member to ask their questions. With that in mind, we will allot four minutes, maybe a bit more today as a result of our attendance, and that’s for each question, including the answer. I will ask that you keep your questions succinct in order to allow as many interventions as possible.

I will offer the first question to the vice-chair of our committee, Senator Al Zaibak.

Senator Al Zaibak: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Ms. Kimball and Mr. Berkok for your presentations and testimony.

My question is directed to Ms. Kimball. Given Canada’s commitment to reach 3.5% of our GDP on core military capabilities, what are the most significant economic bottlenecks that could prevent us from translating increased spending into actual deployable capability?

Anessa Kimball: Thank you for this question. The most important thing right now is that we have a number of large projects that we’re trying to put forward, and there’s uncertainty as to when these timelines will align on top of the commitment we’ve made to 3.5%.

For example, one of the things that we talk about is that we’re going to spend a lot of money on subs, except for it’s not clear that we will have spent the money nor produced them by the time that we should have made the investment toward 3.5%. One of our biggest challenges is essentially the speed of our system and the speed with which we make the decisions toward the products we want to develop.

We are faster if we get off-the-shelf things that other countries are developing, but we need to think about what we can develop at home, and I worry that we will focus so much there that we will get behind where we need to be with our commitment to the NATO alliance.

Senator Al Zaibak: I heard you talking about the new Defence Investment Agency, or DIA. Do you believe that Canada’s new DIA has enough authority and independence to correct 50 years of structural fragmentation?

Anessa Kimball: I would say, based on what I’ve read of its mandate, it will depend a lot on the willingness with which its leadership wants to tackle changing some of those issues. It’s not clear to me that it will have all the authority it needs. It will matter a little bit in terms of how much the other agencies are willing to negotiate and cede, and what we don’t want is for this to turn into a war over authority. Like I said, a lot of the projects won’t even simply be in that, so we will still have a lot of our projects that will be in the inefficient other system anyways. It’s not clear that we will be making things entirely more efficient, but we will be removing steps for large projects.

Senator Al Zaibak: Thank you.

Canada relies heavily on allies for advanced platforms, from F-35 sustainment to submarine technologies. How should Canada balance the need for interoperability with allies with ambition to grow our domestic, homegrown defence industrial base? Either of you can answer this question, please.

Mr. Berkok: Interoperability is taken as — in general, this is not the military’s view — just having the same equipment, which is incorrect.

For example, the best example, if you go back about 35 years, Japan did not participate in the allied operation to push back the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Japan contributed USD15 billion at the time, so that was a very strategic support to interoperability.

Whereas if you go all the way down from strategic to very technological interoperability, you have to have the same aircraft. In Afghanistan, we did not have the same equipment. It will take various levels of interoperability that will define the acquisition of proper equipment.

In Afghanistan, we were in a completely different area than many of the Europeans. We were more like with Americans. You needed more interoperability than being there supporting the operations.

Senator Cardozo: Thank you to our witnesses for being here. Professor Kimball, I’ll ask you first about what I would call developing the defence industry. You’ve talked about this, and I get your point about if we focus totally on developing the industry, it will take a long time, so we need to do some buying off the shelf.

I really want to focus on that first part, which is developing the industry, because I think it’s a once-in-a-generation opportunity to really develop this industry for the good of Canadians.

My sense is developing the defence industry involves at least these four things: an opportunity to build the companies, creating good Canadian jobs, creating and keeping intellectual property, or IP, and developing, ultimately, exports.

I get your points, too, about developing education and training in Canada, including internships. I think that’s a really good point. And also ensuring the diversity of people whom we hire. I wonder whether you could add to the sense about developing the defence industry in Canada for the long term.

Anessa Kimball: Right now, as Mr. Berkok said, we’ve identified the key capabilities, but when it really comes down to it, the link between what we want that capability to do in terms of giving us a defence output remains a little bit nebulous at times. In my mind, some of this is, like we say, identifying the sectors where we want to be acting and developing, and then there are other sectors where we’ve invested quite a bit and we’re just maintaining a little bit of our place in the current system.

This comes down to, in some senses, education and ensuring that there is that link that goes down into the skills that we are essentially building into the next generation and what we want out of the next generation of Canadians as employees in this sector.

It’s more than simply investing and supporting that there are jobs and that we maintain jobs. It’s more than just supporting a certain export sector. It really needs to go into the academic programs, and that’s where I think that there is a disconnect right now.

Senator Cardozo: How would you see that happen? Academic programs are provincial. Do you see the opportunity for universities to be developing those programs more? How would that happen?

Anessa Kimball: This is where that conversation has to take place between the three types of actors: the federal, the firms, the provincial and the universities.

Right now, given that there’s a little bit of a conflict over the educational space, what it really looks like is that firms tend to partner with universities in the same province, and this is not really great for labour mobility. For example, most Quebec students look to Quebec firms, where really we should be looking about how we can take this labour and transfer it across our provincial borders.

That’s where right now we have a disconnect, where the universities in Ontario don’t really collaborate very much with the firms in Quebec and vice versa. The firms in Ontario don’t collaborate with the universities in Quebec.

How do you break those two solitudes in some senses?

Senator Cardozo: What are your thoughts about creating and keeping IP in Canada? We don’t have very good IP policies.

Anessa Kimball: Yes, this is less an area where I am an expert, but I agree with you, that we do not have very good IP policies, and that is part of one of our challenges. I would defer to Mr. Berkok if he had more to say on that.

Senator Cardozo: Okay, please, professor. I think I have a little time. Please go ahead.

Mr. Berkok: I cannot really speak to IP. I haven’t worked on it, but I can talk about a little bit — I don’t know how much time I have. We don’t have to build every single industry that feeds into our capabilities.

Let me just give you the really a surprising conversation I had with the Vice-Admiral Topshee last week at a conference. I’m not questioning our naval shipbuilding industry, but we should never have been in that industry in the first place. First of all, the frigates, now called destroyers, cost us 40% less than if we bought them from allies. We don’t have to go too far, Europeans or Koreans.

In some places, the cost will tell us not to get into every sector. From aerospace to various quantum technologies and everywhere we have an edge, we should get into those.

Senator Cardozo: Thanks for that. I do hope we remain ambitious in terms of developing our industry and not buy too much off-the-shelf.

[Translation]

Senator Carignan: I would like to know what you think about the agency’s approval or acquisition thresholds. I believe they are around $100 million. Is that sufficient? Should it be more, or less, and why?

Anessa Kimball: I believe the choice of the $100 million threshold may have verged on being random, but this is already crossing into defence capabilities somewhat. They probably looked at the projects they have and considered what the target maximum capacity for the agency would be, determined that there would be a maximum of around 60 projects, and lined those values up with that.

Given that there are big projects planned for the future, there are lots of little projects, projects that might be very important, that will not be covered. So I am not sure we know what waste there would be with the other hundreds of projects that are not included in the Defence Investment Agency’s threshold figure. That is my question.

Mr. Berkok: Very good. The threshold is very low because if we go back to the early 2000s, back then, the supply vessel, which we still do not have — there was a Dutch vessel available for $600 million Canadian. So if we think about it, $100 million was the figure from an earlier time.

Senator Carignan: What you are saying is that most medium-sized and large infrastructure items will fall below the agency’s threshold, so there are few purchases, except for routine purchases that will be under $100 million?

Mr. Berkok: I agree.

Senator Carignan: The night-vision binoculars were contested by Canadian suppliers, among others, because the design in the tender was made to favour another outside firm. That was the $100 million. It was for night-vision goggles. Is that too low? It’s low, but is it too low?

Mr. Berkok: I still think there is a big difference between procurement of warships and other types of procurement, for example. There can’t be a single threshold for all types of procurement.

Anessa Kimball: When we talk about night-vision goggles, that is at the individual level, for soldiers, while when we talk about big projects, we are talking about investments in ships and fighter jets. These are comparable projects. They are projects that are actually going to take up large chunks of the budget. I would say that it depends on what our goal is. If we are very ambitious, it means we will probably have a lot of projects that will be below that limit. However, it depends on how the future of defence acquisitions in Canada takes shape.

Senator Carignan: Thank you.

[English]

Senator McNair: The change to having one individual, the Secretary of State, responsible for procurement, is that a step in the right direction, the centralized model, getting away from what we have had traditionally for the last number of years, the decentralized model? I’m curious as to what immediate, short-term and longer-term actions you would recommend that the Secretary of State should take to jump-start reforms to Canada’s defence procurement process.

Mr. Berkok: Is it addressed to any one of us particularly?

The Chair: Yes, to both of you.

Mr. Berkok: I am not sure whether your use of “decentralized” fits the phenomenon we’re talking about. Basically, what you called decentralization is ISED, PSPC. Of course, there are Treasury Board of Canada and the Department of National Defence, or DND. They are different screens, so to speak.

Rather than decentralization, a particular project has to go three or four hoops toward the final approval. If you are using the word “decentralized,” for example, in terms of shipbuilding, we are at the stage, where, soon including Hamilton, we are going to have four shipbuilders in the country.

My opinion, based on many studies that have been conducted, is that the ITB policy either has to be seriously reconsidered and improved, or we have to move to a different industrial policy. I do not know what is coming out of the Defence Department in this regard, but perhaps toward the end of December, as I have been told.

In my opening statement, I indicated the problems I see with the ITB policy. There are ways of improving it.

Senator McNair: Thank you, Mr. Berkok. Professor Kimball.

Anessa Kimball: I would echo the point on the ITB, which is that it is inefficient.

These are the two competing forces of trying to centralize to have more efficiency versus having oversight. In centralizing, we are trying to reduce the oversight and trying to make this procurement more effective or more efficient and, hopefully, quicker, maybe cheaper. We’re not sure yet.

At the end of the day, as we release or reduce oversight, we also run the risk of having more inefficiencies. Finding that sweet spot will be difficult and a challenge for this investment agency. I hope that they will have clear criteria for costing and trying to figure this out, clearer than what they’ve had previously.

Senator McNair: Thank you.

Senator Dasko: Thank you to our witnesses today. My question is for Professor Kimball.

You talked about outputs, per se, as important in the process. I am not sure I understand exactly what you are saying and what those outputs are. I would like to drill more deeply into what that means.

One assumes that the military outlines the needs they have. Then, through the process of goal setting, they come up with the kinds of products we need to purchase. At the end of that process, we have them, and we meet those needs, presumably.

I am not sure what the outputs are. Is the output related to military goals or is it related to societal or economic measures that we should be focusing on?

Could you dig more deeply into that, so I understand what you mean by “outputs”?

Anessa Kimball: Yes. This gets back to the comment that in these discussions we tend to focus on that number, which is how much we spend. Instead, I would rather focus on what we are getting out of the spending with respect to what we need, so defence capability’s blueprint, and also in terms of what we purchase with respect to what we think we would be committing to our partners and allies in various international missions.

I feel there is a disconnect in terms of this holistic thinking about, for example, what NATO might require in a given year from Canada across the many missions that NATO actually has. At any one time, NATO is actually running at least six to eight different missions or operations. We know a lot about the ones that Canada is involved in — enhanced Forward Presence — but there are a number of others. So having a better idea about that.

I would argue it goes maybe even further back to ensuring that we are helping to secure the capabilities that NATO and Canada agreed to even back at the Prague Capabilities Commitment in 2002. We designed a world in 2002 where we said in 25 years, we want to have this set of capabilities. Now we are nearly 25 years later, and I’m not sure that we have actually realigned all of that.

In some sense, that defence output is the jet, it’s the tank, but it’s also what we need relative to what we said we need. We have identified our needs. Are we actually making that?

Senator Dasko: What about the fact that our needs and the situations and circumstances have changed? Have they not?

Anessa Kimball: Absolutely, they’ve changed. There are some things that we have been talking about for a number of years and, I would say, are consistent things that we need and that we simply have not invested in. For example, some of those things would be related to satellite and space technology. Twenty years ago, we knew that we would need to be investing in those, and, yet, it is only in 2025 that we are announcing we are investing in an independent space launch capability.

It is some of those things we need to try to align better.

Senator Dasko: I’m fine. Thank you.

The Chair: Dr. Berkok, you can certainly intervene.

Mr. Berkok: I just wanted to mention the recent work, partly because one of my colleagues, who is the best-known defence economist in the world. I’m sure everyone is familiar with what health economists call quality-adjusted life years, or QALY. Life expectancy is about how long you live, whereas quality-adjusted life years are how healthy you have been over those years.

In defence, first, it is similar to firefighting. If there is no combat, there is no output produced. Anyhow, it is like insurance. Firefighting is insurance. Defence is insurance. We are trying to create a deterrent force. Defence output, actually there are exceptional cases where the defence output has been measured.

If anybody is interested, I can provide more information on that.

The defence output proper is how successful you are — it’s gory to talk about —in defeating your adversary. It could be destroying their equipment and capabilities.

Until the moment of combat, you cannot measure that particular defence output. When you talk about capabilities, that is not an output, that is an input.

A famous statement by Henry Kissinger who said, “We’ll never know whether we deterred the Soviets.”

That is a very tricky term because of the difficulty of measuring it.

The Chair: Moving now to our second round.

Senator Cardozo: I want to continue the discussion with both professors.

In terms of what I would loosely call developing the pipeline of talent and expertise if we’re going to develop this industry. Professor Kimball, you talked about this in your remarks. Could you say more about how we go about doing that?

How many universities or colleges currently have programs we could develop further?

Anessa Kimball: Yes. To develop this pipeline, in one sense it comes down to determining what are the types of analytical and methodological skills we want these individuals to have as they go into the market? It has to go down into literally thinking about the types of courses we want in our academic programs.

I will give you an example relevant today. If you looked in Canada to see how many universities offer a course in defence economics, the economics of defence and security spending, you would find fewer than five universities in Canada.

For a country that is going to be investing 3.5% of its GDP in defence in the next ten years, it is surprising.

Some of our NATO allies take this more seriously and there are entire universities where you can study this; there are research chairs. We simply have not invested in Canada seriously in those types of issues, defence economics and management. It is limited to a couple of universities, the Royal Military College. I think that is part of where it starts.

Senator Cardozo: On the one hand, studies in the defence industry and, on the other hand, it would be training engineers to work in the industry?

Anessa Kimball: Yes.

Mr. Berkok: Thank you. I wanted to contribute.

First, let me talk about the engineers. You mentioned and used the word “engineer.” You don’t need military engineers, you can always hire civilian engineers to work with defence.

In terms of defence economics courses, my colleague, Ms. Kimball, mentioned that, at most two at the undergraduate level. I’m proudly saying that we have two at RMC.

The other thing I wish to add, it is not only the courses we offer at universities but as of this morning I know we are going to have a meeting on December 17, the Chief of Staff to the Assistant Deputy Minister, in the Defence Department. Out of RMC, and potentially other colleagues, interested colleagues from other universities, I will lead the project on offering the Defence Department a course certificate in procurement, in particular in responding to the need that the Defence Department shipped 50 officials to the new Defence Investment Agency under Public Services and Procurement Canada.

There is at least a gap there, but a course we are going to offer might fill part of that gap, I suppose.

In terms of defence management, I do not know any university offering it. Perhaps at RMC, in our management department, there are courses. I am wearing my RMC hat.

Senator Cardozo: Professor Kimball, I may be quoting you wrong, but you spoke about focusing on certain sectors within the overall defence industry.

What is your sense of where we are strong and where we should look at developing first in the short term, in the next two to five years?

Anessa Kimball: Some of this is going to depend on the countries that the government has to identify for the strategic partnerships. In general we talk about where we have our strengths and that’s where we should reach out. In reality, it takes a mix for cooperation and good partnership. You want some areas where you’re strong, but also areas where you need support.

I worry a little that we say these are our great areas, but say less about are the areas where we need support. What makes cooperation happen is that you can contribute, but you also have needs.

We look at AI, cyber, some of these areas. I would also point out some of the areas that we are talking about have heavy environmental implications, but we have not been talking about them. We have been putting environmental implications to the wayside.

This is a major concern, if we are trying to motivate young people to study defence. They are interested in climate change and the environment, and they are, certainly, concerned about those types of issues. There is a risk here of falling into a trap.

Senator Cardozo: Am I right, Professor Berkok, you said that — I’m paraphrasing you here, or using a different example — we do not have to build the whole plane or jet but we can specialize in some parts of it.

Mr. Berkok: Correct. I gave you the example of Raytheon, now RTX, the American corporation. The aircraft they produced, Sentinel, was used by Britain from 2007 to 2021. The airframe was our Bombardier aircraft. We know Bombardier invested billions but they were able to produce the narrow-body jet; now it is the Airbus 220. We have that particular niche capability. Moving forward, this same type of aircraft Saab offered to strategically partner with Bombardier.

The Canadian partner, Bombardier, will produce the airframe and the Swede’s Saab will produce whatever equipment is needed in terms of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR, capabilities, and it is an upcoming procurement project in Canada.

When you rub shoulders, you are going to learn. The Swedes are saying, “We will transfer the technology.” These are opportunities we must not miss.

Senator Cardozo: Thank you.

Senator McNair: With respect to the F-35s, I am curious as to what you see as the advantages or disadvantages of operating a so-called mixed fleet of fighter jets with some F-35s and some other type of fighter aircraft. You mentioned the Swedish fighter. Do the disadvantages outweigh the advantages?

Mr. Berkok: I am interpreting that you are asking me the question? Shall I go ahead?

Senator McNair: Sure.

Mr. Berkok: Let me put it this way: I have a friend, he just hung up his uniform. He used to fly the Airbuses we have in the forces, the tanker or transport aircraft. In terms of the combat aircraft, he used the term “playground.” What he means by playground is the infrastructure, the personnel and technicians and other inputs to fly that aircraft. The military is quite correctly concerned with the fact that running two fleets will be costlier. That is absolutely correct.

We have to look at the coexistence of these fleets from several directions to get a full evaluation. There is NORAD. It makes a lot of sense to have F-35s flying together with American aircraft. In terms of operational interoperability, it is crucial we fly F-35s with them.

As well, in terms of other interventions, peace support operations or any other overseas operations, that necessity for interoperability can be at higher levels because not everyone will have F-35s. Some will have other aircraft. That is the military’s view in this case.

Economically speaking, the F-35 is the best thing that happened to our aerospace industry. Minister Joly said the economic benefits are not enough. She did not take into account the quality of the economic benefits. Canadian companies, about 40 of them, manufacture and send Lockheed Martin parts made in Canada. People think only of final outputs in terms of equipment, whereas Canadian companies have been extremely successful in winning all those contracts, which proves that they are technologically at the frontiers.

On the other hand, I’m split. Just three days ago, last Friday, the same friend said, “You don’t support Gripen, do you?” I do not have to support anything. We have to look at it objectively. If we’re not buying Gripen, we can develop with Saab, Bombardier, plus Gripen, a sixth-generation aircraft. It is not Gripen versus F-35, but Gripen 6.0, so to speak. There are many moving parts moving forward.

At the moment, nobody can deny it is going to be costlier if we buy half-and-half. I read in the press that we should buy 44, half of them, and then buy some Gripens.

Anessa Kimball: In terms of the costs, Dr. Berkok is on point that running a mixed fleet is going to be more costly. What is interesting is one of the things Saab tries to sell the craft on is that the Gripen does have a lower cost of use. It has a lower operational and maintenance cost of use over the life of the aircraft.

Again, Saab produces many wonderful products. There are many areas where Canada and Saab can open collaboration and I see absolutely no reason why Canada could not have its highly skilled workers produce Gripens that goes elsewhere. There are other NATO allies, for example, who use Gripens. Maybe Canada becomes interested in leasing Gripens for central and eastern European partners who cannot afford them and then this becomes a part of our contribution. I do not know. The idea that it is one or the other and there is somehow a trade, this is just political pundits speaking. It is certainly not economists because we would say there are many areas where there could be cooperation in the next five to ten years rather than they are competing with one another.

Senator McNair: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

[Translation]

Senator Youance: Professor Kimball, you talked about Canada having to seize the opportunity to strengthen its alliances and achieve resilience. What type of resilience are you referring to? Resilience in terms of Canada’s defence capability or in terms of procurement policy? To what extent can we incorporate resilience into procurement policy, apart from budget considerations?

Anessa Kimball: When we talk about resilience in terms of defence and acquisition, we are talking about supply chains, value chains and choosing our partners strategically. Maybe we will identify certain countries with which we want to explore greater collaboration, such as South Korea, with which we have a very minimal defence footprint. South Korea has capabilities that are well worth Canada considering. We tend to look to Europeans. This is the time to expand our partnership opportunities.

Resilience starts with infrastructure and extends to ensuring that our defence sector will be resilient if there is ever a complete break from the Americans. We are highly dependent on them. Even in our major defence acquisition projects, there is integration. From that standpoint, I suggested identifying what NORAD has and what Canada does not have. This has to be considered, because we might be completely locked out of any access if our collaboration with the Americans were to end. Where do we stand? It seems to me that there are several sectors in which we would be at risk without support from our allies and partners like Five Eyes, or at least access to satellite information supplied by them.

Senator Youance: Thank you.

How sustainable will the partnerships be? Are they not going to turn on us as the United States has done?

Anessa Kimball: That depends a lot on how we build our partnerships with our allies.

I am looking at how our defence and security agreements are conceptualized. There are ways of trying to protect our interests, including by making sure there are provisions for review. The whole thing will be reviewed every two or three years, and if changes need to be made at some point, they will be made. We have just signed an agreement with Australia and India. It contains provisions like this.

We need to build trust. Trust is not going to be built overnight; it will be built step by step, project by project.

Senator Youance: I have a little question for Mr. Berkok.

You mentioned public-private partnerships. Which would be needed to support a robust and adaptable defence industrial base for Canada?

Mr. Berkok: Thank you for the question.

The word “private” is not really desirable in this country. Six or seven or eight years ago, however, I went to England and took a close look at the tanker aircraft program, and the general I talked to told me that it was working too well. That being said, the same partnership method is not working too well with their supply vessels. It depends on the terms. For the tanker aircraft, he told me it was working very well. I can always give you the report I submitted to the Ministry of Defence.

Senator Youance: Thank you.

[English]

The Chair: Colleagues, this brings us to the end of our time with this panel. I want to thank Professor Kimball and Dr. Berkok for taking the time to meet with us today. We greatly appreciate your contribution, time and knowledge.

If you have anything you would like to forward to the committee, please do. We welcome any suggestions you have or any writings or papers.

Mr. Berkok: Thank you.

Anessa Kimball: Thank you very much.

The Chair: For those joining us today live, we are meeting to hear witnesses for our study on defence procurement in the context of Canada’s commitment to increase defence spending.

For the next panel, we are pleased to welcome Philippe Lagassé, Associate Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. Thank you for being here. We also welcome Jill Scott, Principal, Royal Military College of Canada. We’re having an alumni meeting here today. Thank you for being here.

I will begin by inviting you to provide opening remarks, followed by questions from our members. You each have five minutes for your opening remarks.

We’ll start with Dr. Scott. You’re welcome to begin your remarks when you’re ready.

[Translation]

Jill Scott, Principal, Royal Military College of Canada: Good evening everyone. Thank you for the invitation. I am delighted to be here with you.

I acknowledge the land the Senate of Canada sits on is the traditional and unceded territory of the Algonquin Anishinaabeg peoples.

[English]

By way of background, as Principal of the Royal Military College of Canada, known as RMC, I serve as special advisor to the Minister of National Defence and have overall responsibility for the academic mission at the college in service to the Canadian Armed Forces, CAF, and the Department of National Defence, DND.

Prior to this appointment, I spent over a decade in senior administrative roles at large research universities. As a full professor, I have a strong track record of scholarly publication and excellence in teaching and graduate supervision. I take my citizenship seriously, and I’m proud to serve RMC, DND and Canada.

For those not familiar with RMC, it’s a military unit and a defence university with a special mission to educate officers for the Canadian Armed Forces through a four-pillar, four-year program including academics, fitness and wellness, bilingualism and military leadership. It offers 22 undergraduate programs, 14 graduate programs and several professional military credentials. The Royal Military College of Canada’s educational enterprise is uniquely focused on developing ready, resilient and relevant forces.

What is less known about RMC is that it has a vibrant research enterprise with the highest concentration of the university-based defence experts in Canada, including five Canada Research Chairs, carrying out $20 million annually in fundamental and applied research in diverse fields, including quantum, cyber, AI, drones, remote sensing in Arctic regions and permafrost infrastructure, but also in military mental health and gender inclusion, electoral integrity, security and intelligence, and, of course, defence procurement. The Royal Military College of Canada provides important innovations for the CAF and Canada’s defence and security enterprise, and now is the time to expand and accelerate this work.

There has been much discussion about defence sovereignty, but we also need to be concerned with defence research sovereignty. This means ensuring we protect and maintain our own capacities to develop defence innovations whether in tech, policy or social enterprise. We do not want to outsource this capacity.

While your committee is interested in defence procurement, we cannot and should not buy everything we need. A strong defence and security enterprise also requires investing in a brain trust and a talent pipeline of defence scientists for the future. We can procure drones, jets, tanks and submarines, but we want to exercise sovereignty around the design authorities for the next generation of high-tech tools by developing the AI that runs those technologies. This will ensure that our values and ethics are baked into the code.

Research investments can sometimes pay off quickly, but the most important breakthroughs often take decades. We must plan for both immediate and long term and invest strategically. We need both fundamental and applied research. Applied research yields specific results, but curiosity-driven research is what yields the most disruptive innovations.

In our current times, research security is paramount. This is why we are partnering on a super-secure computing project. Crucially, RMC is the only university that can do classified research. We have the requirements, but more investments are needed. We need, at this time, large multi-institutional, multidisciplinary collaborations between and among industry, government and universities, nationally and with trusted international partners. The Royal Military College can work with Defence Research and Development Canada, known as DRDC, and other agencies to build and facilitate these partnerships, aligning to the priorities set out in our strategic documents.

The Royal Military College of Canada has worked extremely hard in recent years to be at the forefront of diversity and inclusion. As a defence university, RMC does not simply apply Gender-based Analysis Plus but has researchers investigating how to bring about lasting change in military institutional culture for every equity-seeking group and Indigenous Canadians. As we grow our defence enterprise, we need to deeply embed these practices into the CAF.

Finally, as we commit to getting to 2% or 3.5% or even 5% of GDP, we need to ensure that we do so in ways that drive economic growth and development in the areas that matter most to Canadians: housing, health care, infrastructure and social benefit.

This means promoting dual-use technologies, investing in low-technology-readiness projects, but also triple-use tech which supports the defence enterprise, economic growth and social benefit.

In sum, we cannot and should not buy everything we need to bolster our nation’s defence. Now is the time to invest in research, and RMC can help. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Scott.

Next we’ll hear from Dr. Lagassé.

[Translation]

Philippe Lagassé, Associate Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the committee to discuss defence procurement.

Canadian defence procurement needs to be reformed. There is a consensus on that point. What does “reform the procurement process” mean? Very simply, that the government needs to be far less risk averse.

There are too many ministers, departments and competing incentives involved. Agile methods should be embraced and a new approach to emerging technologies is required. More generally, there is simply an overabundance of process in the procurement system.

[English]

The government recently established, the Defence Investment Agency, the DIA, to help address these process issues. The DIA seeks to reduce the number of different departments involved in defence procurement and accelerate processes overall. The establishment of DIA and its efforts to reduce processes are a good start. There still are limits, however. Currently, the DIA is limited to acquisitions of over $100 million.

Second, the DIA has been established as a special operating agency within Public Services and Procurement Canada. It does not have its own statutory authority or footing.

Third, it is under a Secretary of State for Defence Procurement as opposed to a full minister. All of this is a good start, but we should hope to see more.

As well, I would like to discuss the importance of being mindful of the policy and planning sides of the procurement equation. It is tempting to reduce the purpose of defence procurement to buying what the military needs, but that leaves out a critical part. Defence procurement is about buying what the military needs to meet the government’s policy objectives. These objectives can address what the government wants the Armed Forces to do and, more broadly, what purposes the government sees for defence acquisitions, including industrial policy, economic growth and international partnerships.

[Translation]

Meaningful defence procurement reform must also involve stronger ministerial leadership. In many ways, we have the defence procurement we have because successive governments have been unwilling to change it. In other words, we have the procurement process we want. We should be calling for ministers to exercise their defence policy-making authority more decisively and perhaps empower them to make procurement decisions based on their judgment of what’s in the national interest.

[English]

It is often said that procurement is too politicized in Canada. Politics is not always about partisanship, and I note that I’m saying this in the upper house.

Making defence procurement an instrument of statecraft is a form of politics as well. Canadian governments have tended to shy away from making military acquisitions political in that sense as a tool of diplomacy, nation building and indeed realpolitik.

As noted, there are signs this is changing as the 2025 Budget’s proposed Defence Investment Agency and promised Defence Industrial Strategy highlight. But ministers need to be bolder, especially if they want a more sufficient and sovereign Canadian Armed Forces. Making that happen quickly and effectively will require the Prime Minister and cabinet to make better use of their policy-making authority.

[Translation]

Finally, we need to ask what kind of military is required to give effect to policy. This aspect deals with complex issues, such as managing fleets and supply chains; ensuring jointness, integration and interoperability between systems; and optimizing effects, all within a defined fiscal envelope and with limited human resources.

This aspect of defence procurement cannot be sped up too much. Smart procurement requires us to plan deliberately, then act quickly. Shortcuts and cut corners in the planning phase can end up delaying things quite a bit.

[English]

You have to think slow to act fast. The need to plan deliberately is particularly important in Canada. The public is currently supportive of major defence spending increases. If rushed or reckless planning leads to a series of procurement controversies, however, the public may sour on defence spending. If that happens, we may have a faster procurement system, but one that has far fewer things to buy. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Lagassé. Now we will proceed to questions from my colleagues. We will start with our vice-chair, Senator Al Zaibak.

Senator Al Zaibak: My question relates to Canada’s procurement weakness, or perceived failure, which has often been linked to unclear lines of accountability between various departments.

In your view, which specific governance reforms are necessary to ensure that one authority is clearly responsible for delivering major military projects? The DIA could be a start, but as you said, it may not have the authority to do what’s needed.

Mr. Lagassé: On your point, part of the challenge is that we have multiple departments who all have accountable ministers but all have different objectives. The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces seek out the best equipment for the Armed Forces based on defence policy. Public Services and Procurement Canada seeks out the fairest contracting vehicle to do that, and industry seeks to ensure the Canadian industry benefits from these contracts. Finally, Treasury Board and Treasury Board Secretariat try and ensure that risk is as minimal as possible.

The question becomes how do you align these incentives more effectively, and I think you’re correct. The DIA is a first step in that direction, but it requires a better statutory framework. What I would recommend, and something that is worth looking at, is the Defence Production Act. The last time that we tried and succeeded in doing the level of defence spending and industrial participation that we are currently envisaging was leading up to the Korean War.

If we look at the 1950 Defence Production Act and understand the lines of accountabilities and authorities that it gave the minister responsible for defence production, we have a good model of what we could do.

To your point, senator, if we want to have an accountable minister that has the authority to act, we should consider amending the Defence Production Act to ensure that there is a responsible minister with the authority to bring all those incentives and all those plans together.

Senator Al Zaibak: Thank you. Thank you, both. You presented very interesting perspectives.

My question to Ms. Scott relates to investment and procurement. Investment in R&D, which as you rightly stated take a long time to yield results, and distinguishing that from investing in homegrown technologies and industries, defence industries, that has passed the R&D stage and is in a stage where they need commercialization, productization, and scaling up.

Where are our defence procurement practices aimed at this point and how can we use this opportunity now to support our homegrown technologies in that stage?

Ms. Scott: I can speak to a part of your question. It’s very clear that you can’t just do research. You also need to ensure that those platforms are there and that those capacities are there to mature those innovations into something that it can actually be used, manufactured and operated.

It’s clear that more investments are needed in that phase, whether we’re talking about ways to ensure that defence scientists work with industry meaningfully, that there are investments in incubation and investments are made in building those kinds of partnerships, whether those be at the national, local or international level. It’s clear that industry has to play a central role and it has to be a back and a forth. It can’t simply be a one-way street. Those best innovations really are a question of iterations.

Those are deep partnerships, and there are some true challenges in our current procurement system in building those kinds of dialogic developments.

Senator Al Zaibak: Thank you. Looking to your recommendations as to how to overcome that. Thank you.

[Translation]

Senator Carignan: I would like to ask a question about another stage regarding technology. We have seen that the Canadian government was not very good at defence procurement. I think it is even worse when the time comes to get into technology. I think the federal government has a lot of trouble acquiring technology systems, as do some provincial governments. I am concerned about defence in particular.

I would like to hear your thoughts on the risks you see regarding several things, in particular acquiring and integrating technology, the creation of the agency for projects over $100 million, and the expenditures of $100 million and under that will follow the usual process. Some technology projects will be under $100 million. How are they going to be integrated with what is being purchased by the agency? I am very concerned. How does that seem to you? Do you have the same concern? If so, what kind of solution is there? Can we have someone in charge of technology in the agency or something that will allow for better integration? Buying submarines is one thing, but knowing how the technology is integrated with the F-35s and the entirety of the systems as a whole is another. I am concerned. I would like to hear your thoughts on that.

Mr. Lagassé: I agree with you, Senator Carignan. This is an important issue. One of the major challenges faced by the Canadian Armed Forces with the existing processes that we have is that when the statement of requirements is created, it sometimes takes as long as ten years to acquire capabilities. Statements of requirements are not updated with cutting-edge technology.

Regarding integration, we are very much dependent on having the United States develop its technology and systems. We acquire American capabilities, and this ensures integration between the systems, because the system has already been made by the United States. We must recognize that when we start trying to diversify our capabilities, that will create more of the challenges you referred to. I agree entirely that this will call for planning by the department or agency to ensure that when certain technologies are developed, not only will we be able to purchase them quickly and often to ensure that we stay on the cutting edge, but we will be looking for a way to integrate the technologies we develop here in Canada with those of our allies. This is actually a rather big challenge. As you note, this will become increasingly difficult.

On the other hand, I would note that we should be able to adopt procurement methods that we can use to acquire technology capabilities faster, particularly in IT. They exist. We know what they are. I hope this new agency will incorporate these new methods for acquiring new technologies more easily and faster.

Senator Carignan: Even if it is under $100 million?

Mr. Lagassé: Ultimately, the agency will grow and then also handle acquisitions under $100 million. I am assuming that it will become more integrated and that all military acquisitions will come under the agency. Even if that is not the case, I hope that if the regulations and processes can be changed to allow the Department of National Defence to use these new methods, the agency will also be allowed to do so in both cases. This is more a question of processes that need to be adopted and not necessarily of the department or the agency.

Senator Carignan: Thank you.

Ms. Scott: I would add to the discussion that we have to keep in mind that the reason we are seeing challenges with equipment is that no major investment has been made in our military equipment for 30 years. There is a culture that impedes spending of every sort. Certainly that is to ensure accountability, but it will take time to change that culture. It is truly a risk-averse culture. I believe it will take time. It will take hard work to change it.

Senator Carignan: Would the fact that the agency and procurement are not the same entity and will necessarily be acquiring or investing in technology create a problem? Do you think they will be able to find solutions for integrating the work, to ensure that the technologies can be dovetailed?

Ms. Scott: That is a good question. I am not sure I am an expert on that.

Senator Carignan: Thank you.

[English]

Senator Cardozo: Let me start with Dr. Scott, can I ask you about the skills and expertise development we need? You spoke about RMC focusing on training the officer cadres and research.

Do you see your role growing as the defence industry grows in Canada? Going forward, what else do we need to be doing across the country to train more people? You had a chance to listen to the previous panel. Both in terms of research, but I am thinking in terms of training the people who will build and manufacture the equipment we are looking for.

Ms. Scott: I have made the point here that the Royal Military College has some specific capacities. It is true it is a small institution. When we compare the size of this institution, it does not compare in size to the largest post-secondary institutions in the country.

When we talk about sheer capacity, we are going to absolutely need to partner.

It is important to point out it is the only defence university and the only institution that is properly in the federal sphere. It is inside DND. That affords it a certain kind of, let’s say, orientation that is important when we go forward and start to make these investments.

We are going to need capacity building across the sectors. Collaborations are going to be required, whether that be in research or in the kinds of specific programming we want to develop.

Dr. Berkok spoke eloquently about some of the challenges with educating for defence procurement. We are having conversations right now about the development of specific credentials to support specifically in the area of defence procurement, understanding that when you build those kinds of programs it is not simply that you deliver it in a box. You know, here is this knowledge and we will give it to you.

We are talking about graduate certificates and diplomas, these kinds of things that bring other larger projects. You need to have a critical mass of researchers who are thinking about this and building this program, but using the opportunity to build the program as a way to grow our knowledge base in these areas and sectors.

The role of RMC is to educate but also to facilitate the development of these kinds of partnerships and provide a guiding role because of the density and intensity of expertise we have. I would say regardless that we offer 22 undergraduate programs and 14 graduate programs, certainly not all of those are exactly oriented toward defence. It is nonetheless in a defence university. This is the air that we breathe.

Whether that be civil engineering and the work on permafrost — roads that are permafrost resistant — or in the area of environmental assessments and specific work with the military, there are really important capacities there that can add value.

I am not talking specifically and uniquely about procurement, but we have to think about brain trust and those other kinds of capacities together with our questions on procurement.

Senator Cardozo: I am focusing on developing the industry. Would you agree there is a fair amount of transferability of skills? For example, we are seeing it already, the auto industry is being cut back because of tariffs. Is there room for some of those workers to work in the defence industry, such as building light armoured vehicles, for example? Isn’t that directly linked?

Ms. Scott: That is an excellent question. We should not underestimate the challenges in terms of taking a sector — here the auto sector is experiencing certain kinds of challenges — and saying, surely, there must be a way to reorient this sector toward defence technologies.

That is a pretty substantial challenge. I am not saying that it cannot be done. What I am saying is we have to be realistic about the time that would be necessary to do that kind of reorientation. We can talk about upskilling and reskilling. Truly, it is harder than it looks. It requires a little bit of realism.

Senator Cardozo: Second round.

[Translation]

Senator Youance: My first question is for Ms. Scott.

You partly answered it when you answered Senator Cardozo. You talked about how the college can position itself, the challenges of reorienting the auto industry, and so on. To what extent can this reorientation or local innovation in defence supply chains be competitive at the international level? Second, could Canada learn lessons from successful international experiences in industrial cooperation and defence technology?

Ms. Scott: Those are big questions. The question about local innovation and how we can —

Senator Youance: Be competitive.

Ms. Scott: — be competitive at the national and even international level. Honestly, I don’t know whether I am the expert on that. My expertise lies more in the area of post‑secondary and university research.

Senator Youance: Could you answer as regards research?

Ms. Scott: As regards research, certainly there are many things to add. We build on strength. For example, if we look at our contributions at the international level, Canada really has a lot to offer. The thing is to reorient the research undertaken by some universities toward defence. From the discussions I have had in recent months, I see that there is a real desire to make an intensive and ambitious move into this very important moment for Canada.

Senator Youance: Thank you.

For Mr. Lagassé, once again, you have answered my question somewhat. However, to what extent will the creation of the Defence Investment Agency make it possible to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the procurement process? I would like a more specific answer regarding the decision-making transparency process. How can the government reconcile democratic transparency and strategic effectiveness in procurement decisions?

Mr. Lagassé: Thank you, Senator Youance.

Creation of the agency, in itself, does not necessarily increase transparency. I would even say that absent other measures, or even in the government generally, it is still a challenge. As you say, it is still a problem.

I will cite the example of your own committee. I sincerely believe that as members of this committee, you should have security clearance so you can evaluate certain projects, among other reasons, and so the generals and officials who appear before you, in some cases in camera, are able to explain why certain choices were made. Why was a statement of requirements developed that takes us in a certain direction? It would no longer be simply telling you that you have to trust us, that these are statements of requirements and you just have to accept them. That is not a democratic process. You are the upper chamber, so you should be able to study these questions in a less partisan manner. It is an important opportunity for you to have security clearances, to be able to understand why these choices are made and the reasons why the processes follow these methods. It is one approach.

There should also be consideration of adopting the British model in which the chief administrative officer of the agency is personally accountable to the Committee on Public Accounts, unlike a chief administrative officer who must answer, but where the minister is accountable. There are several other processes.

That is a very good question. We have to change not only to ensure greater transparency on the government’s part, but also to improve your role as parliamentarians in these processes.

Senator Youance: Thank you.

[English]

Senator Dasko: Thank you, witnesses, for being here today.

My question is for Professor Lagassé. You talked about the importance of planning deliberately in terms of setting our needs and how we should focus on this. Yet, the government has taken spending from 1.4% of the GDP to 2% of the GDP — approximately $40 billion to $60 billion spending — within about a year.

How is it possible to do the planning deliberately? Was the deliberate planning already done in the past? How can we possibly do that?

A related question goes along these lines: You have talked about the importance of government policy and planning to determine what the goals and needs. Again, how does that policy and planning on the part of government relate to the fact that we are increasing defence spending because of our commitment to NATO. So we are going from 2% of the GDP — which we are intending to reach — to 3.5% of the GDP. Is there a relationship between our needs and these goals?

Mr. Lagassé: Thank you, Senator. I will start with the first question. Is there a plan within such a short period of time?

I would suggest to you that there is good news here. If you look at Budget 2025, some of the line items that were identified for the new capital spending — including armoured vehicles, trucks, precision strikes — are projects that began in 2017 under “Strong, Secure, Engaged,” the previous ministry’s first defence policy, and those projects ultimately proved themselves to be underfunded within the budget allocation that the previous ministry had put forward.

There are a number of these projects that the military maintains — what it calls its “key capabilities list” — where it identifies gaps in the current capital spending expenditure. Some of the spending over the short term corresponds to some of those areas clearly identified, which were lacking spending.

The other $11 billion outlined in Budget 2025 is for digital infrastructure for the Canadian Armed Forces. This is a well-understood need. The Canadian Armed Forces are still working with siloed networks and older legacy systems. This is also understood as something that needs to be done.

There is quite a bit of planning. The military always over-programs. It is always prepared to do more if it is given more money. Some of you may recall that Minister Anand came out in the media and tried to push the government on 2% in some of the later years of the Trudeau ministry. There was already a plan in place.

To your second question, which is, going forward, how are we going to plan all of this? What is behind all of this? You are seizing on something which is important. We cannot simply move ahead with increasing from 1.4% of the GDP to 2% of the GDP over the next five years without a new defence policy. That defence policy should clearly articulate what we are hoping to achieve with this spending and in what areas.

In the final months of the previous ministry, it was understood that a national security strategy was being put together. A lot has changed since November 2024. I would hope that the national security strategy has been and is being revised.

Once it is released, I believe it is incumbent upon the government to begin plans to issue a new defence policy that will flow from that national security strategy, which will clearly identify where our additional expenditures need to go and which capabilities should be built in Canada in order — as you are suggesting — to have a clear policy foundation for the spending so that there are clear indications and initiatives that guide where those defence dollars are going.

Senator Dasko: Thank you. I have a question for both of you. This has to do with the current procurement drama between the F-35s and the Gripen.

How do you think we should think about the choice? When criteria should we be thinking about when we are making the decision between these two products?

Mr. Lagassé: Ultimately, it comes down to a choice between two different sets of considerations.

If you are seeking to maximize your military effectiveness and efficiency, you will go with a single fleet of the F-35s.

If, however, you are hoping to balance efficiency with alliance diplomacy, economic investment in Canada and the building of sovereign capacities, then you may choose to have a mixed fleet. I must stress here that I hope it is a mixed fleet and not a replacement of the F-35 by another fighter simply because that would be too onerous on the Canadian Armed Forces. We are already training on the F-35 and have already acquired 16 of them. That, I believe, is the real trade-off we are facing. Do we want to maximize military effectiveness and efficiency or do we believe military effectiveness and efficiency should include considerations of budding new and stronger partnerships with recently admitted members of the NATO alliance? Do we also want to build up Canadian industry? That ultimately is the government’s choice in terms of what they believe is the best course of action.

Ms. Scott: I am not sure that I have that much to add to the consideration here. My hope is that, going forward, these discussions can be more evidence-based.

Senator Dasko: Thank you.

The Chair: That brings our first round to an end. We will start second round with Senator Al Zaibak.

Senator Al Zaibak: Professor Lagassé, in your view, what will determine the success or failure of the Defence Investment Agency during its first 12 months, and what metrics should we use as parliamentarians to measure progress?

Mr. Lagassé: The first measure would be to see how it handles the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, which is the signature project it has been given, what level of transparency is provided around that acquisition, whether or not it moves at the pace that it has been promised to move at and whether or not it delivers both the capabilities and the economic investments it envisages.

More generally, I would want to see what changes are being made to procurement regulations and processes that will enable the Defence Investment Agency to speed things up as it has promised to do. If you notice that it is simply moving lines and boxes around the government, and there is no real change to the underlying authorities, processes and regulations, then that will be a negative metric. I would encourage the committee to keep a close eye on any legislative changes or changes to regulation, procedures and things of that nature.

There are a number of internal documents within the Government of Canada, which details how defence procurement is done and what needs to be followed, including the project approval directive. If none of that is simplified, then I suggest you should hold the ministers to account for that.

Senator Al Zaibak: Thank you.

From a defence procurement perspective, to what extent do you think the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces and Canada’s defence industry could benefit from recent security and defence partnerships reached with the European Union, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Poland and Sweden?

Ms. Scott: One of the things we should ask ourselves is: How big is Europe? Europe is getting bigger. We are asking ourselves: How European is Canada? Leaning into those partnerships, I think, is an important thing.

The Royal Military College of Canada now has the capacity to participate fully in the Horizon Europe program of research, and we have a number of irons in the fire in that area. It is a small start, but we’re definitely leaning forward.

Senator Al Zaibak: Anything to add, Mr. Lagassé?

Mr. Lagassé: Briefly, senator, the issue is if you wish to grow the Canadian defence industrial base, what you need fundamentally are buyers. I cannot stress this enough. If you want industry to invest and capitalize on the investment the government makes, they need a buyer. That first buyer of choice must be the government of Canada, but through these partnerships, we can hope that our allies buy too.

However, that will require far greater diplomatic commitment to ensuring those partnerships result in something tangible. It would mean, I would argue, having to invest far more in the Canadian Commercial Corporation, so it can do this job of selling Canadian goods to allies, and perhaps, most importantly, it means demonstrating us buying from them and them buying from us. There has to be some reciprocity in here. That is one concern I have. We are all looking for allies who want to buy our goods but we do not necessarily want to tailor our processes to make it easier to buy from them.

Senator Al Zaibak: Having buyers is so important, with Canada being the number one buyer. What about investment? Do you have any concerns about having those partners investing in our strategic defence industry in Canada? Once they invest, they also become logical and natural buyers.

Mr. Lagassé: Yes. It is a question of what kind of partnerships you want to develop.

As you are aware, currently the Canadian defence industrial base is largely geared toward selling to the United States. This makes sense because they have been our closest ally. It was the most profitable market for us to be doing these things. Similarly, when we bought as much American capability as we did, the return on that investment was, as the previous panel noted, for instance, in the case of the F-35, building up the Canadian industry to sell to other allies.

You are correct that we always need to be mindful of what it is we are hoping to achieve exactly. If we are trying to build sovereign capability with sovereign ability and sovereign control over all aspects of what we are trying to do, that is a different equation than building to export exclusively. I think that investors and industry need to be aware or know what exactly it is we are asking of them.

The American market will always be the most attractive market for our defence industrial base. We need to actually demonstrate to them that the Canadian government and other allies are equally willing to buy if we expect them to develop sovereign capability.

Senator Cardozo: Professor Lagassé, I appreciate what I would call the rational policy making or decision making that you have outlined. Being a lifelong student of political science myself, I feel it is music to my ears but something we read about from 40 or 50 years ago. I appreciate your goals, and I am not knocking them, but have we ever had such a rational process of decision making in the defence industry, which, as you noted as well, gets political at times?

Mr. Lagassé: We have in times of conflict. There is a good book that was just released by Allan Levine called The Dollar a Year Men that details how Canada built up its defence capacity in the Second World War. It always helps to have a goal and urgency.

You are correct in pointing out that in the absence of clearer public support and existential threat, it becomes more difficult to get all of these things to line up because various incentives and interest groups, and others, get involved in the process.

You are correct. That is one of the biggest challenges to ensure that there is some coherence to what it is we’re trying to achieve and to have clear policy direction noting what it is we expect industry to do.

We can do this, though, I would suggest. It is simply a question of trying to ensure we have continued support over successive governments about what we are trying to achieve. That is going to be probably the challenge I would rest with those of you here in the upper house. Regardless of the government’s stripe or whatever it is, as the upper house, continue to assist the strategy to be coherent and guide it in a particular direction.

Senator Cardozo: You have been a member of the Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition. What do you have to share with us from there as to where things went? Are there good or bad examples of things that went right or wrong in the process that you were involved in?

Mr. Lagassé: The Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition advises the minister on all defence procurement and coast guard projects over $100 million. I was involved in over 100 projects and advised the minister on 50 of them. I would say the good examples were those where you have a clear indication of what it is that the government is hoping to achieve and where ministers understand what the implications of their policy direction are.

I worry about a possible tension that is brewing — and we’re already seeing this on the fighter file and, potentially, as well on the airborne early warning file — where the military will attempt to safeguard that policy, that requirement setting process, and interpret policy in a particular way. If the government is not able and the ministers are not willing to make their intentions absolutely clear, then both the military and the review process involved in those requirements may go in a different direction than what the government expects. I would say that the biggest challenge to that process is when ministers are either not fully engaged with the policy direction that they are offering and, therefore, don’t fully appreciate what it is that they are directing the Canadian Armed Forces to do. An equal risk is of not having the military onside when it comes to what the government is hoping to achieve, and I worry that we’re seeing evidence of this already, and I simply hope we find a way to reconcile the government’s intention and the military’s interpretation of its mission so that we don’t allow that to derail these massive defence investments that we’re seeing.

Senator Cardozo: And what are your views on the fighter jet?

Mr. Lagassé: On the fighter jet, I was also on a panel from 2012 to 2014 reviewing all the evaluations and options on the fighter, so I’m a little reluctant to comment on that. Part of it having provided advice to ministers on this, I don’t want to get too much into it.

I will simply point out that it is up to the government to tell us what its objectives actually are. If it is seeking maximum military effectiveness and efficiency, that’s one thing.

If it is seeking to have economic benefits and strategic partnerships, that provides another direction as well.

What I would encourage strongly is that I would rather the Canadian government commit to what it has already done and perhaps consider an additional fleet on top of that, as opposed to cancelling the current F-35 buy simply because — and this is not a question of good or bad fighters — the CF-18 fleet is at the end of its life. It must be replaced. Any delay to that process will have serious implications, so I would rather Canada acquire 88 F-35s as a matter of course, whether it chooses to complement that fleet with other fighters, that’s a possibility, depending on what the government hopes to achieve.

The Chair: Thank you. I have a couple of questions. Dr. Scott, you are here obviously from the one and only military college we have in the country.

Given the massive investments the government is about to make in regard to our spending, it also means our academic knowledge and strength will need to be sharply supported.

The college has not fared very well in regard to government commitment to the college. Previous budgets have reduced the commitment to the college. Is there a need for us to rethink, given now that the government is making this a priority in spending but also recognizing that the world is significantly different than we once thought it would be?

How do we try to make the argument that given this is an important part of the defence department way of training and recruiting and advancing its own knowledge, how do we do that to ensure the college’s sustainability, but also the support is also there too, to help do the work that is required?

Ms. Scott: Thank you for the question. First of all, the Royal Military College is one of three campuses that serve this mission. There’s the Royal Military College in Kingston. There is the Royal Military College Saint-Jean, and there’s also the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. They all have specific missions, but I want to ensure that people understand that we have the Canadian military colleges.

As you know, there was the Canadian Military Colleges Review Board, which was stood up, and they began their work in January of 2024. They delivered a report that came out in March of this year. We are in a period of transition and a period of renewal.

I am very optimistic about the future of the Canadian military colleges. There has been an absolute razor-sharp focus on the regular officer training plan, the undergraduate naval and officer cadet training to become officers of the Canadian Armed Forces.

While this is the core of our mission, the centre of our mission, the raison d’être, and it’s extremely important, we need to be thinking about what else we can do with these institutions and what critical capacities these institutions have beyond simply undergraduate education.

If we think about historically, often we thought about the research mission, which, by the way, started right after World War II. There were some really prescient and visionary leaders who saw and understood that we needed research-intensive education for our officer corps, but I think too often it’s been considered that this is to enrich that training, to enrich that education.

We really do need to be thinking about the capacities that are there in terms of the innovation and research enterprise that can be mobilized to meaningfully support this particular moment.

Beyond that, I think one of the things we haven’t thought maybe enough about, perhaps, is the Regular Officer Training Plan, or ROTP, civilian university strand, which educates just as many officers for the Canadian Armed Forces as the Canadian military colleges.

When we’re talking about force regeneration, and as we talk about defence procurement in this larger landscape, we can’t forget about the vast challenge of meeting those requirements to educate and recruit a whole next generation of not just leaders for the Canadian Armed Forces, but the forces themselves. We need to be thinking critically about expanding that mission as well.

The Chair: My second question, I guess maybe both of you could think about this.

In the context of our procurement, northern communities have great expectation what this might do for them in the context of how we see this investment. Given the challenge we face with climate change and the North being much more prominent in our thinking about how we defend the North, how can we assure northern communities that the work and the efforts and the investment that will be made will put them centre in the context of our understanding that we need to be very different than we have done in the past? Yes, military jets, submarines are all important, but in the context of the support we will need in the North, this will probably be one of the greatest moments in our history, given the challenges we face with climate change. How do we strengthen that relationship with the northern communities given that they have great expectations of what this investment might bring about in regard to their communities?

Mr. Lagassé: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would just note that part of the defence investment portfolio that we are seeing going forward is in infrastructure. A lot of the infrastructure that will be required to operate effectively in the northern areas will also have civilian uses, or should have civilian uses.

If we can make transport to those communities more effective, more seamless, that would be a net benefit to those communities. Always something to bear in mind when we are augmenting those capabilities.

That being said, it’s also critically important as we move forward that we have proper environmental assessments of what it is that we are doing as part of our defence infrastructure footprint. There are many bases across the country, for instance, that were they to be closed would require massive decontamination efforts, and we have to be mindful going forward of what kind of environmental footprint we leave in these Arctic communities when we invest significantly in defence infrastructure.

Ms. Scott: At the Royal Military College, we have a Canada research chair, Dr. Ryley Beddoe, who works specifically with the ministry of transport in the Northwest Territories on the question of road infrastructure and permafrost, and so we have several researchers who are actively engaged with the North.

When we talk about the North, when we talk about Indigenous communities and national sovereignty, we have to think in incredibly different ways. We know so much about what it takes to build healthy northern communities. How much are we engaging northern communities in what it really means to be healthy? Those are very important questions.

Whatever we are going to do, this cannot be people thinking that they know what’s best but rather people working together. It’s critical for our national sovereignty that we build and integrate reconciliation into everything we’re thinking about when we think about defence and the North. That’s a long journey.

The Chair: On behalf of our committee, thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. If you have any other thoughts that you would like to share with the committee, please do so. Our study will continue into the new year. Any thoughts you would share with us would be very important in regard to what we ultimately produce as we hear other witnesses before the committee and consider them.

Thank you, too, for the work you have been doing in the past in helping advance the policies of our government. You both would probably agree with me that, if we were able to take politics out of our defence strategy in this country, it would go a long way, but in the context of our politicians getting elected, many things that we do in this country remain political. As the upper house, we will do our best to hold them accountable in the other place, but, in reality, Canadians ultimately have the final say in what happens in this country. Thank you for being here.

For the next panel, we’re pleased to welcome by video conference from the Northwest Territories, Grand Chief Frederick Blake from the Gwich’in Tribal Council. The chief is accompanied by David MacMartin, government relations consultant.

From the City of Yellowknife, Ben Hendriksen, Mayor, and from the Town of Inuvik, Mayor Peter Clarkson. We will begin by having you provide opening remarks, followed by questions from our committee members. I remind you that each of you have five minutes for your opening remarks. We will start with Grand Chief Frederick Blake.

Frederick Blake, Grand Chief, Gwich’in Tribal Council: Good evening, senators, I’m the Grand Chief of the Gwich’in Tribal Council, or GTC. Thank you for the invitation to meet and contribute to your study of defence procurement in the context of Canada’s commitment to increase defence spending.

This is a very important issue for both Canada and the Gwich’in Nation. Canada’s defence expenditures pertaining to the North provide a tremendous opportunity to kick-start a process for achieving a significant and enduring contribution to economic reconciliation for the Gwich’in. It’s a perfect segue from Ms. Scott.

I will begin by highlighting aspects of Gwich’in history and traditions that are relevant to your study, and the potential for optimizing the impact of defence procurement expenditures that Canada is proceeding with.

Gwich’in is Canada’s northernmost First Nation. Our traditional territory spans across the northern Northwest Territories, Yukon and Alaska. It is a mirror image of the 2,400‑kilometre migration route of the Porcupine Caribou Herd. Porcupine caribou are the foundation of Gwich’in culture, history and identity. Porcupine caribou are the centrepiece for the Gwich’in Tribal Council logo that appears on the text for my remarks today and as the centrepiece of the GTC flag.

Gwich’in’s relationship with the Porcupine caribou and our traditional territory has existed for thousands of years. Gwich’in tradition features a strategic approach to organizing and managing the process of hunting and harvesting Porcupine caribou. It features clearly defined leadership roles and teamwork, reflected in a diffusion of clearly defined roles among participants in the hunt.

This approach is similar to the NATO orders format that guides the strategic approach of the Canadian Armed Forces, to organizing and implementing major operations. Meshing together these Gwich’in and CAF traditions of strategic approaches to major operations, featuring teamwork and partnership, offers a good path to pursue for achieving economic reconciliation progress through the implementation of Canada’s northern-focused defence procurement.

This approach should be based on the foundation of the Gwich’in treaty relationship with the Crown and Canada. It started with the signing of Treaty 11 at Tsiigehtchic and Fort McPherson in 1921 and evolved to the Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement, or GCLCA, modern treaty signed in 1992. The GTC is the entity representing Gwich’in modern treaty rights.

The approach should also be based on key elements of Canada’s policy framework.

One of the pillars that Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy is based on is ensuring that it benefits northern Indigenous Peoples. The GTC contributed to the development of Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, advocating for investments in rural and remote communities.

Climate change is impacting core infrastructure in our communities, causing road and cemetery erosion in Tsiigehtchic, Fort McPherson and Aklavik. Investments to address this are needed.

The key defence procurement opportunities for Gwich’in arise from two main sources: the NORAD modernization project announced in 2022, and the 2024 “Our North, Strong and Free” renewed vision for Canada’s defence.

Most significant are the three upcoming infrastructure and support capabilities project in Inuvik. These include upgrades to NORAD northern base infrastructure, upgrading fighter infrastructure projects and strategic transport tanker capability projects.

The Inuvik projects present dual-purpose project opportunities such as power grid modernization, waste water treatment plan, fuel facilities and airfield upgrades.

There are immediate defence procurement opportunities for Gwich’in, advancement of which should be based on several key principles, as follows:

First, a focus on the modern treaty rights holder and work through the GTC and the Gwich’in settlement area, or GSA.

Second, give preference in procurement to the GTC in the Gwich’in settlement area. This will require coordination between Canada and the Government of the Northwest Territories. For example, DND is reaching out to the Gwich’in to discuss procurement related to Inuvik airfield upgrades.

In contrast, the Government of the Northwest Territories, or GNWT, has sought to proceed with an Inuvik air terminal replacement project on a public tendering basis, without giving preference to Gwich’in businesses. We are addressing this issue with the GNWT.

A consistent approach across governments in giving preference to Gwich’in for projects in the GSA is necessary. This will reflect the spirit and intent of our two treaties and will contribute to economic reconciliation.

Third, a developmental partnership approach is needed. Defence procurement projects have a long-term focus. They present an opportunity to work in partnership to create new Gwich’in business capacity for the long term.

This partnership can and should extend to partnerships with private sector prospective bidders on defence procurement projects. A key Gwich’in objective is to work with Canada and potential private sector partners to develop new, sustainable capacities for Gwich’in and for Gwich’in businesses.

Fourth, emphasize dual purpose infrastructure investments. DND is open to focusing on this. We look forward to working with Canada to advance dual-purpose investments that will both support defence investments and respond effectively to the effects of climate change.

Thank you for the opportunity to share our views and ideas about how to ensure that defence investment related to procurement can make an optimal contribution to economic reconciliation.

We appreciate the very positive and respectful approach that the Department of National Defence, and the Canadian Armed Forces have taken in reaching out to engage with us as they plan their defence investment procurement processes.

We are very excited about this opportunity. We are also optimistic that by working together respectfully in partnership, we can make real progress toward achieving economic reconciliation.

Mahsi’cho. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Grand Chief Blake, for your opening remarks. We’ll come back to you in a minute after we hear the other presentation from our committee members.

Next is Mayor Ben Hendriksen from Yellowknife. Mayor, the floor is yours.

Ben Hendriksen, Mayor, City of Yellowknife: Thank you very much and good evening in Ottawa, committee members.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today. My name is Ben Hendriksen, and I serve as the mayor of Yellowknife, the capital of the Northwest Territories, in a city that stands at the crossroads of Canada’s northern resilience and sovereignty.

We are a city with a long history of welcoming and collaborating with the Canadian Armed Forces, Joint Task Force North, Canadian Army Reserve and the Canadian Rangers.

I join you today from Chief Drygeese Territory, the traditional land of the Yellowknives Dene First Nation. It is with respect for this land, the Indigenous peoples whose land I call home and all the people I represent as mayor that I offer my remarks.

Yellowknife is no stranger to the challenges of climate change, geopolitical uncertainty and economic transformation. Our story is one of constant renewal. In my State of the City Address in September, I spoke about the need for a new playbook for Northern prosperity, rooted in strategic infrastructure, economic diversification and community resilience. I believe that Canada’s defence investments must reflect these same principles.

As the Deputy Premier and Finance Minister of the Northwest Territories has said recently and often:

It can’t be on the backs of 45,000 Canadians to support Arctic security or to unlock the wealth of the North.

In December of last year, Yellowknife City Council unanimously supported a resolution welcoming investment from the Department of National Defence in Yellowknife. The Arctic Economic and Security Corridor, which our council also endorsed unanimously by resolution earlier this year, is a nation-building opportunity that aligns defence priorities with climate resilience, Indigenous partnership and leadership, and economic sovereignty.

As a Yellowknifer, it is great to see the leadership of Indigenous governments on this potential project, to see the collaboration across territorial borders with Nunavut and to see the sense of urgency from the federal government.

Recently, I also signed an MOU with the mayor of the Town of Inuvik, committing to collaboration between our two N.W.T. communities as we both see an influx of defence attention and investment. Investment isn’t just about how much. It’s about how impactful it can be in the communities where Canada wants to assert our sovereignty and ensure our security. At a time when the diamond mines that have powered the Yellowknife and N.W.T. economies for decades are nearing the end of life, the opportunities for critical mineral exploration and mining are also real.

Yellowknife is the logistics centre for the North Slave Region and the launchpad for the rest of our territory and for Western Nunavut. Yellowknife isn’t just remote; we’re ready.

Today, I want to share six benefits that Yellowknife and the North provide for defence industry procurement.

First are economic and strategic advantages. Yellowknife has a stable economy. We have higher-than-average household incomes and low unemployment. It’s already a hub for Arctic logistics and mining which means the supply chains, expertise and infrastructure are in place. We are rich in critical minerals in the North with 25 of Canada’s 34 essential minerals. This makes the North a key player in Canada’s green transition and global partnerships.

Second are its strategic location and national relevance. Yellowknife is the northern and Arctic logistics hub. It sits on the shores of Great Slave Lake, right in the heart of Canada’s North. From here, you can have year-round access through a 24/7 airport and all-weather roads. The airport is just five minutes from our downtown and connects directly to Edmonton, Calgary, Toronto and Vancouver. Seasonal winter roads extend that reach even further.

The Northwest Territories is a strategic centre for military operations and satellite communications, and we host critical infrastructure like the North Warning System and the only road to the Arctic Ocean — though hopefully that changes in time with more roads heading north. Yellowknife’s location supports not only regional but national defence priorities, including sovereignty, cyber security and diplomatic outreach.

Third is the authentic cold-weather environment. When we talk about testing equipment for Arctic operations, we need real-world conditions. Yellowknife and the North deliver that. While, in my opinion, winters here are more beautiful than anywhere else in the world, they are inarguably cold and consistent with extreme temperatures and challenging terrain. These diverse landscapes provide ideal conditions for developing and testing gear, vehicles, and technology.

Fourth are infrastructure and support services. Yellowknife has built the infrastructure and expertise demanded by remote operations. The city has communications, health care and emergency services. It’s home to businesses that specialize in logistics, transport, engineering and environmental services. These companies already support mining and Arctic operations, so they get what it takes to move people and equipment safely and efficiently in northern conditions.

Fifth are a skilled workforce and training capacity. This region has over 80 years of mining and exploration history. That means a workforce that knows how to operate in tough conditions. Aurora College and the N.W.T. Mine Training Society provides specialized training programs, ensuring a steady supply of skilled workers for technical and logistical roles. Over 800 individuals have been placed in mining jobs through these programs. That experience translates directly to defence procurement projects and to the well-being of northerners.

Sixth and finally are Indigenous partnerships and intergovernmental collaboration. Yellowknife has a strong record of collaborating with Indigenous governments and organizations. These partnerships aren’t just good practice; they’re essential for sustainable development and align with Canada’s reconciliation commitments. Joint ventures with Det’on Cho Group of Companies and Tlicho Investment Corporation in Yellowknife show how Indigenous participation drives economic growth and strengthens community ties. Modern treaties and self-government agreements contain rights, jurisdictions and authorities that must be honoured and leveraged to promote economic resilience and sustainability.

To make these opportunities a reality in the North, we need investments in basic infrastructure, which Canada can then build upon alongside northern communities. Without investments in this infrastructure, power generation at a territorial level and ensuring that the utilities paid are affordable to northerners, many of the things I have talked about today as real opportunities may stay as ideas on a page.

Defence procurement with a northern lens must ensure that the people in the North of Canada see benefits within our communities and not just on the edges of their communities. Thank you for this time to prevent this afternoon. I look forward to the opportunities to answer any questions. Màhsi’ cho.

The Chair: Thank you for your presentation, Mayor Hendriksen.

Finally, if you are ready, Mayor Peter Clarkson, you are up next.

Peter Clarkson, Mayor, Town of Inuvik: I am ready. I’d like to thank the Senate committee for the opportunity to present today on procurement by the Department of National Defence, or DND.

I will give you a bit of context initially, to follow up on what Grand Chief Blake and Mayor Hendriksen had to say. Inuvik is an Indigenous community in the Northwest Territories that is 2 degrees above the Arctic Circle and has a population of approximately 3,300 people. Inuvik is home to the Gwich’in and Inuvialuit Nations, other Indigenous and Métis people from throughout Canada, as well as other people from throughout Canada and throughout the world.

Inuvik is strategically located for Arctic security and had a military base from 1966 to 1986 with approximately 200 personnel and their families.

Inuvik has had a NORAD forward operation location which has accommodation for 250 personnel, an CF-18 hangar and an operations building since the early 1990s.

In March of 2025, then Minister of Defence, Bill Blair, identified Inuvik, Yellowknife and Iqaluit as Northern Operational Support Hubs. The Department of National Defence’s Operation NANOOK, this past February and March, was based out of Inuvik and had over 750 military personnel from Canada, the U.S., Sweden and other countries participating over the six weeks, and was the largest Operation NANOOK ever held in the Arctic.

Looking at some of the capacity and recent infrastructure successes, Inuvik has local businesses and contractors’ capacity to manage and complete some of the NORAD modernization infrastructure projects. The Northern Operational Support Hub in Inuvik will be a major infrastructure development in the Arctic, strategically located in Inuvik which is a regional centre with support services and road access, close to the Beaufort Sea, Russia and Alaska. The Russian border is 2,000 kilometres from Inuvik and 6,200 kilometres if you fly to Moscow. To put that into context, if you drive from Inuvik to Ottawa, it is 6,600 kilometres.

The NORAD modernization infrastructure in Inuvik will require billions of dollars’ worth of civil work for aprons, building pads, access roads, construction of aircraft hangars, warehouses, ammunition storage, security facilities, fuel storage tanks, additional military accommodations, support facilities, work camps and other related infrastructure.

This is why we think it is important to have good policies on DND procurement. Arctic security and Arctic sovereignty depend upon Canadians living in the Arctic, working in the Arctic, and raising their families in the Arctic. Northern businesses and contractors based in the Arctic employ people, contribute to the communities and need to have access to DND infrastructure projects. The DND procurement policies need to consider how northern businesses can be awarded DND contracts. The Department of National Defence’s procurement policies need to consider full cost accounting for Arctic infrastructure projects. Local businesses and contractors employ people and reduce the need to fly workers in and out and accommodate them in work camps. Local businesses and contractors are also available for further maintenance work on DND infrastructure. Local businesses and contractors contribute to the community by paying municipal taxes to support their communities.

Inuvik has mechanical, electrical and civil contractors who have worked to complete several facilities and infrastructure projects. Recent success stories include the Inuvik Tuktoyaktuk Highway at $300 million, the Inuvik runway extension at $240 million, which was a partnership between the Gwich’in and the Inuvik development corporations, the Inuvik Tuktoyaktuk coastal erosion abatement project at $53 million, as well as the Inuvik ground stations, DEW Line site cleanup and several housing projects.

We need to do things differently in 2025 and beyond with DND procurement in the Arctic as things have changed since the DEW Lines were constructed in the 1950s and the forward operation location sites constructed in the 1990s. As mentioned previously by Grand Chief Blake, DND and the communities need to work together to see how procurement and infrastructure projects can have local community benefits. The identification of dual or multi-use facility needs to be explored and discussed. Possible projects may include work camp-to-housing options after construction, enhancement of water and sewer facilities, warehousing that can be shared by municipal governments, Rangers, Coast Guard Auxiliary and ground search and rescue. A natural gas line extension from Inuvik to the airport would be a really good shared project for all of the DND infrastructure.

I truly believe working together for sustainable Arctic communities and Arctic security can happen, and certainly, the communications we have had with DND so far shows they want to work together. Future DND procurement processes in the Arctic need to consider longer-term Arctic capacity and working together with local contractors and businesses. Canada needs sustainable communities for businesses in the Arctic for longer-term Arctic security. The Department of National Defence needs to ensure their tenders for Arctic procurement include using northern contractors and businesses with clear clauses and enforceable targets. Arctic security and sovereignty require year‑round sustainable Arctic communities and businesses, not just during construction phases. People need to live in the Arctic, work in the Arctic, raise their families in the Arctic and prosper in the Arctic. Thank you for your time.

The Chair: Thank you all for your presentations. We will now proceed to questions from colleagues. This panel will be with us until 7:20. For us to do our best, members will ask their question, and we will allow you time to get the proper answer.

We will start with Senator Al Zaibak, our deputy chair.

Senator Al Zaibak: Thank you, all, for your presentations and recommendations.

Assuming you have had opportunities to share those recommendations, provide specific proposals and suggestions and share them with our Prime Minister and cabinet ministers, I wonder what kind of reaction, receptiveness and tangible cooperation have you been receiving from our elected officials so far?

Mr. Hendriksen: Go ahead, Grand Chief. I feel like you deserve to go first.

Mr. Blake: Thank you for the question, Senator Al Zaibak.

Through the discussions we have had with DND, we’ve found it is promising that they are open to working in partnership. They are keen on it. It is an opportunity to speed up the process. What they are most interested in — believe it was Philippe Lagassé in the last panel who mentioned it — the process is quite long at this moment. Anyway to speed that up is helpful. The best way we have seen in past is through partnerships, whether it is through negotiated or Indigenous partnerships, that is the best way to go. I know the ministers are open to that. We have had many good discussions, and we are looking forward to what it has in store. Thank you.

The Chair: Are there other panel members who wish to comment or add to what the grand chief has just said?

Mr. Clarkson: Briefly, I did meet with Minister McGuinty from DND when he was in Inuvik this summer meeting with the Inuit. I have had discussions with our MP, Rebecca Alty. Certainly, they are in favour of doing whatever they can to work with local businesses, with Indigenous governments and development corporations to move things forward in the Arctic because they see the importance of that. Those are welcome comments from both of them.

Mr. Hendriksen: I would add a similar sentiment. Any conversations we’ve had with my former colleague, now Minister Alty, my predecessor in this role, were positive, and same with anyone else within DND Joint Task Force North, et cetera. Go down the list, there were positive comments.

As I had mentioned in my remarks, I would highlight, too, that within modern land claim treaty agreements, as well, there are obligations. There are many things that are good to do regardless, but there are also obligations within many of the treaties that the government, I’m sure, is mindful of, too.

Senator Al Zaibak: That is encouraging to hear.

I will shift to NORAD modernization, which will require new radar sites, communication networks and housing and transportation links. My question is: What regulatory, logistical or financial barriers must Canada overcome to ensure these projects are delivered on time and in partnership with your communities?

Mr. Hendriksen: I can jump in first, gentlemen, on that one.

From a Yellowknife perspective — I would argue it is across the board, but definitely from the Yellowknife perspective — when it comes to general infrastructure, we are like the rest of the country. Our infrastructure was built in the 1960s and 1970s. It has kept pace with our community to date. In terms of ramping up to more capacity, which is what the government is looking for, Yellowknifers are interested, obviously, in the opportunity to be part of the security and sovereignty discussion.

There are water and sewer questions in Yellowknife. It is hard to explain in a Senate committee. Our airport is five kilometres outside the city. It is not on potable water right now. Our water and sewer lines do not run to the airport. In terms of ensuring that infrastructure is available to the airport, that requires significant investment.

The dual benefit from a dual-use infrastructure perspective is there is significant land within our city that we have been unable to develop for housing or light industry over the years, and it is predominantly because we have not been able to afford the infrastructure connected to it. This is where the dual infrastructure is important for a sovereignty and security perspective. Having the conversation and connections, which again have been positive to date about what the dual impacts for the communities we’re in, is important. In our case, water and sewer are the big ones, as well as opening up land for housing. The barriers are questions regarding land.

People would look at the North and see unlimited land. When we get into discussions about geography, we are on the Canadian Shield and surrounded by lakes, granite, land claims and commissioners’ land, which is Crown land owned by the territorial government. We, as a municipality, have very little land. We are working with our Government of Northwest Territories partners, the Dene First Nation Tłı̨chǫ government and the federal government to discuss those issues. Those are not only challenges but also real opportunities to meet the need, the moment and the pent-up demand for Yellowknife.

The Chair: Does anyone else wish to comment?

Mr. Clarkson: Within Inuvik, I would say there are no regulatory hurdles. The development is at the airport, and it is an extension of the current forward operation location site. Again, DND was involved in the extension of the airport runway. This would just be adjacent to that area and that land would be available for that purpose.

Mr. Blake: Thank you. If I may add, as I mentioned earlier, we have many similarities on how we conduct business, learning from the past working together with DND on how we could do things better. Also partnering with the private sector that has a lot of experience with many of these projects, whether it is in the South. I know there have been a number of projects on that basis down in the South. That is what we’re looking to do, to partner with someone who has a lot of experience in that field who are successful in many of these bidding contracts. I thought that I would share that.

Senator Cardozo: Thank you to all three of our witnesses. Let me start with a general question about what you see are the skills development that could happen through the development of this industry in the North and in your territory. Will there be a need to upskill people in certain areas? What are the facilities you have? Would people need training in southern colleges, universities? To what extent?

I am trying to understand more about how this defence policy can enhance employment opportunities for people across the country, in this case in the North.

I will ask Grand Chief Blake to start, then Mayor Hendriksen and Mayor Clarkson.

Mr. Blake: A great question.

With skills development, in speaking with DND, they gave us a good idea of what is required. They are also willing to work with us, to come to the schools and educate our students on what is going to be required and to try to encourage them to get into these fields. As I mentioned with the private sector, finding partners who are willing to do the same, also ensuring that many of our contractors and anyone who wants to go to work have the proper security clearance to work on those bases. That is what we are looking at. To ensure we get the maximum benefit out of this opportunity and I know DND is interested in that as well.

Mr. Hendriksen: Thank you, Senator. A few things came to my head as you were asking that question. One is, this is outside of a municipal jurisdiction, of course, but the government of the Northwest Territories has been working for the last several years on a potential transition of Aurora College to a polytechnique university and so creating upscaling capacity within the territory itself. That is one place that the federal government can work on with the territorial government. There is a campus within Yellowknife. The main campus is in Fort Smith but there is a satellite campus in Yellowknife, as well as in Inuvik.

A second piece, as I mentioned in opening remarks, the Mine Training Society over the years has upskilled around 800 people to work at the diamond mines, which are currently closing or in their closure process over the next several years.

As we talk about defence, part of sovereignty and defence is making sure that our communities in the North are strong. If people are living here, there is nothing that shows sovereignty more than having Canadians on Canadian territory. One industry that has driven the North for years is the mining industry. As I was mentioning, around the critical mineral development there is huge potential, both from a mining potential, but also from a skills potential. More broadly in terms of industry, seeing that transition of northerners from the current diamond mines over to either the defence industrial strategy or over to new mining opportunities that exist as well. We do have capacity as a territory and a history of doing that. Then, finally, we’re speaking with Joint Task Force North, NORAD, Canadian Armed Forces more broadly, the Reserve Force and the Canadian Rangers. There is interest, obviously, always in working with northerners to bring them into the forces as well and find opportunities, whether it is through the reserves and Rangers at a more on-the-ground level or more broadly as well because no one can show sovereignty stronger than northerners themselves. There are those opportunities that are definitely available, too.

Senator Cardozo: Thank you. Mayor Clarkson?

Mr. Clarkson: Yes. I think there is an opportunity for all sorts every training. There will be the need for many heavy equipment operators, many class 1 truck drivers. They will need to move mountains basically to provide the foundation that they will need to put the aprons on the foundations for the buildings and then the access roads. That will be one area, certainly heavy equipment operators, and class 1 drivers. I think all of the trades will be needed. There will be a need for plumbers, electricians, carpenters, steelworkers. By working with the Indigenous groups and with the Aurora College, some of the private companies to begin that process and get people into the trades, what will be a huge step in being able to employ more and more local people, not only from Inuvik, but from the entire region as Inuvik tends to be a regional hub where people will come in and work when there is work. There’s quite a bit. By some planning and thinking, which we have time for, I think there is a lot that could be done.

Senator Cardozo: Thank you, mayor. Grand Chief did you want to add something. You have your hand up.

Mr. Blake: Yes. I wanted to mention one thing in speaking with DND, this project is looking to go until about 2040. All this training should also include the ongoing maintenance to ensure that our future generation, whether it is electricians, plumbers, are in place to take on many of these jobs.

One thing I wish to note as well, I am not sure if many of you have been up to Inuvik, but there are many challenges. We are going to be faced with capacity. Even many of these training opportunities, I wanted to mention that in the surrounding communities, the adult learning centres have been taken out of our communities, so I think as Indigenous governments we’re going to have to play a big role in ensuring that the trades are taken on by our governments to ensure our people have that opportunity. I wanted to share that.

Senator M. Deacon: Thank you to our guests for being here today. It is remarkable, the promotion and sharing of your areas combined with the need for collaboration and ensuring that people in your communities are involved. Mayor Hendriksen, I look forward to seeing you in February in Yellowknife. It’s hard to believe as a committee it has been over three years since we have done our study. I will refer to that in a moment on sovereignty. It is something that three or four years have passed.

Related to that, there is no question that procurement in the North needs to look beyond big-ticket items like NORAD modernization and ice breakers. It needs to equip the northern communities, as you say, and other domestic agencies with the right kit and equipment for sovereignty, and concerns like search-and-rescue.

In a prior report, this committee recommended that the government establish a permanent Arctic search-and-rescue roundtable comprised of representatives from the federal, territorial and Indigenous governments as well as community-based organizations including our Canadian Rangers.

I wonder, as we are here today in this spirit, if our witnesses have seen the right messages from the government on this front and taking these other aspects of Arctic sovereignty seriously. Mr. Hendriksen first.

Mr. Hendriksen: I actually don’t have much to add on that question. I’m not sure what that leaves you with, senator, but I don’t have much to add on that.

Senator M. Deacon: That’s fine. Thank you.

Mr. Clarkson: I can certainly add a bit. With the Operation NANOOK that we had here for six weeks in February and March, DND had incorporated extensive use of the Canadian Rangers from across Canada. The Rangers did a lot of on‑the‑land programs where they were going out with Ski-Doos and setting up the camps, but the Rangers were the leaders to do that. They were teaching a lot of the reservists and other people from throughout the military, and so there was a huge dependence on that.

One of the multi-use projects we’re talking about with DND is a heated garage, cold storage and a fenced yard that the town needs, but also the Rangers need a base to operate out of. If they are gearing up with a bunch of Ski-Doos and toboggans to go out on the land for some exercise, they need a place to do that, and DND has been very receptive to looking at a shared-use model that will support the Rangers, ground search and rescue and the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary, because we have all three here in Inuvik. I think DND has understood that they are on the ground, and they play a valuable role in Arctic security.

If we are spending billions of dollars on F-35s, maybe they should also put some money in allowing the Canadian Rangers to have some capacity and a place to meet and a place to have an office and a place to store their stuff as opposed to it being all over town.

We are getting some good messages from that, and we will proceed to work with our local Rangers, the Coast Guard Auxiliary and with ground search and rescue and DND on if this is a viable shared-use facility with the municipality and with these other groups.

To us, it looks like, yes, this is a no-brainer, and we should work together, because everybody wins, then.

Senator M. Deacon: Thank you.

Mr. Blake: Thank you, Senator Deacon. Great question.

Over the years, DND has done a great job working with the 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, or 1 CRPG, out of Yellowknife and all the communities that have the Canadian Rangers. I’m not only saying that because I’m a Ranger myself, but I’m seeing firsthand the Operation NANOOKs that they have had over the years. I had the opportunity to go on one in 2005 up to the north magnetic pole. We were 60 kilometres from there.

In our communities, they are the first call when it comes to search and rescue, because a lot of our small communities, all we have are the fire departments, and the Canadian Rangers are always called when someone’s missing or to go and check on them and make sure they are safe.

As we move forward, I think we do need to have better communication, as you mentioned, with the roundtable leaders, whether it’s in the region or in the communities to ensure that we have good plans of search and rescue.

I know DND is very open to that as well.

Mahsi.

[Translation]

Senator Youance: You have touched on the subject of my question. There is a unique situation in the north where defence and procurement actions must be based on three things: national capability, international rescue missions and climate warnings. To what extent will the actions undertaken, such as the NANOOK operation during February and March, produce tangible benefits for your communities, and what are those benefits? The question is for both our witnesses.

[English]

Mr. Hendriksen: I guess I’ll jump off first this time. The impact of Operation NANOOK in the North generally — again, I’ll speak specifically to Yellowknife — it’s always impressive to see the mobilization in Yellowknife as the jumping-off point. It’s probably in a different way than Peter Clarkson and the Grand Chief in Inuvik. We don’t see it as closely, because they tend to leap off into areas around Yellowknife and the surrounding region, but we see the action at the airport. We see the mobilization in Yellowknife before they do the jump off.

Yeah, it’s a significant contribution to Yellowknife to show the importance of Yellowknife as a strategic location within the Northwest Territories and within Canada. The North is unique, but also to northerners, it’s just home. Having the presence of the military and the mobilization of Operation NANOOK every year, and, as we are seeing the conversations about increasing capacity in the North and the greater importance of those training operations, that’s all surge capacity that we need to be conscious of in our communities as well.

Even in Yellowknife, as the largest community, we’re still just slightly over 20,000 people, and so 20,000 people in a community or city anywhere else in the country, they tend not to see surges of people that large, never mind what Inuvik experiences.

The spin-off benefits for our community are significant, but going forward, as we look at the longer-term investments, that will be even more impactful from a long-term capacity and not just an annual spin-off benefits spend.

Mr. Clarkson: Certainly, this past Operation NANOOK, which was six weeks long, had huge benefits for Inuvik and the region.

Just in municipal facilities, they had rented some of our recreational complex and some of the other facilities for that entire six weeks, and I think the rent was over $90,000 during that period. They were also staying in hotels. They were staying out at the Gwich’in camp and the Inuvialuit camp. They were renting vehicles.

Pretty much everything, every part of the local economy was touched by that operation. All of the Rangers in Inuvik were employed during that period. They were renting snow machines and renting heavy equipment to move and offload things.

It was a huge exercise, but there were a lot of economic spin‑offs during that period, and there was a broad base of benefits throughout the region.

Mr. Blake: Thank you. I don’t want to repeat anything, but I believe it was March when Operation NANOOK took place, as Mayor Clarkson mentioned, and DND makes a huge contribution to any community that they travel to. We have seen it in Inuvik, for example.

As you mentioned, they have rented the Gwich’in Wellness Camp. They did a bunch of training out there. They also helped in the search and rescue for one of our members.

Also, under the training, there’s a lot of information that’s shared. A lot of our Rangers share their traditional knowledge with the military, and that helps them to survive out in the wilderness or on the tundra. I’ve seen firsthand the positives of these operations, and it’s welcome in a lot of our communities and throughout the Arctic. Thank you.

[Translation]

Senator Youance: Thank you. You mentioned that your communities share cultural ties between Alaska and Yukon. Does this transnational territory bring with it specific challenges in terms of Canadian and American policy actions in the area of defence?

[English]

Mr. Blake: Thank you, Senator Youance. When it comes to the policies, like many of our hopeful partnerships, for example, we are all signatures to the PCMA, which is the Porcupine Caribou Management Agreement.

Our partners in the Yukon and N.W.T., including Inuvialuit, we all work together to manage the Porcupine caribou. Alaska will not take part. That’s similar to anything we try to do partnerships with.

The main thing is for the Gwich’in our main priority is our Porcupine caribou. We work together to lobby to protect for example the 1002 lands which, as we all know, President Trump recently announced they are going to open our calving grounds to oil and gas development. That’s the biggest challenge there.

I know the DND is also working closely with the Arctic Rangers in the Yukon. They have their own operations there. I thought I would share that. Thank you.

Senator Cardozo: Maybe this should have been my first question, but could you tell us what aspect of defence are you really talking about? I’m thinking of Arctic sovereignty and defence. Inuvik and the Gwich’in Nation, you’re closer to the Beaufort Sea. Is part of what you would do in defence about defending the North? Would you see there being bases there, army or air force in the long run, or naval bases in the ocean?

I have one other question, if you’ll excuse me, which is: How do you pronounce “Arctic”? Do you pronounce that first “C” or not? Go ahead.

Mr. Blake: Thank you. It’s Arctic. With Arctic sovereignty —

Senator Cardozo: You don’t pronounce the first “C”? Is that right?

Mr. Blake: Yes, we do. Arctic, yes. It might be my lingo.

When it comes to defending the North, we actually have a base. I’m sure Mayor Clarkson will touch on that. We do have a base in Inuvik at this moment.

Senator Cardozo: Okay.

Mr. Blake: It’s limited. What the Rangers do, we have operations outside of Tuktoyaktuk, which is up on the coast, or Aklavik. They travel throughout. We have a lot of areas to cover and that’s the work of the Rangers. They have opportunities to put in a proposal to, for example in Aklavik, do an operation with the Rangers in a community to go up to Herschel Island which is close to the border of the Yukon up on the Arctic Ocean.

It’s all about sovereignty. As I’m sure you all know, Russia and other countries are trying to claim parts of the Arctic, which is clearly Canadian. That’s the whole intent of the Rangers; they are like the eyes and ears of the land and share that information with the 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group in Yellowknife.

I hope that answers your question.

Senator Cardozo: Do you see there being an air force base somewhere around there, a serious air force base where CF-18 jets would land? Do you see that happening someday?

Mr. Blake: We already do. Maybe Peter Clarkson wants to touch on that and then I’ll follow up.

Mr. Clarkson: Yes. The CF-18s have been landing in Inuvik since the early ’90s.

Senator Cardozo: Thank you.

Mr. Clarkson: There’s a hangar for them.

What we’re also going to see, I don’t think we’re ever going to see a base like we used to see in the ’60s or the ’80s where the families would move up and work out of an area.

I think the military these days is changing, or has changed, and so Inuvik will be a forward operation location or a northern operational support hub for the air force, mostly. That’s what it will be.

The infrastructure they are looking at building is infrastructure for the future F-35s and for the C-130s, which will be the air tanker which will be based in Inuvik. There’s about 30 personnel who then are required to make that air tanker work. That air tanker would go up and fuel the CF-18s, F-35s or even the F-16s that the Americans have over the Beaufort somewhere. That, we have been told, will be located in Inuvik.

As far as moving families, building houses, I don’t think that that’s the model the military is using now. They would rotate people in. Currently in Inuvik at the forward operation location, there’s anywhere from 8 to 10 military personnel there 365 days of the year. They rotate in and out, like people would at a work camp. They don’t live here full time. We do have a good relationship with them. Many of them come into our fire department and practice.

I think that’s the kind of military operation and the support Inuvik would provide. Hence, that’s why the runway was extended by 50%, so that these larger aircraft — like the F-35s, C-130s and C-17s — could land more safely.

Senator Cardozo: Thank you for that explanation.

Mr. Hendriksen: First, I also agree with the Grand Chief, Arctic.

In terms of what it look like — sovereignty, security — much of what Mr. Clarkson says applies to Yellowknife. We are currently a forward operation location, just like Inuvik.

We have been identified, along with Inuvik and Iqaluit, as the northern operating support hub locations. The discussions we have been talking about today, that’s what a lot of that work is focused on and around the air force.

With Yellowknife, of course, we then also have Joint Task Force North located here as well. We already have quite a significant presence of military personnel in the city.

One other piece I wanted to reference ties into this in terms of the sovereignty, security and international relation aspect of the previous question and about how does that work?

Yellowknife is far away from the American border, unlike Inuvik. Part of the work we’re trying to do as a city around sovereignty is making those connections across borders as well.

Yellowknife and Inuvik are part of something called the Arctic Mayors’ Forum, which is mayors from across Alaska, Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut. In addition, all of the Nordic countries, we are part of something called the Arctic Urban-Regional Cooperation group which is, again, mayors from across the European Union Arctic, as well as the Canadian Arctic.

We host the ambassadors’ northern tour every few years as well, having the chance to show international visitors the North and what truly the Canadian North is from a sovereignty perspective, then building that real security in terms of those Northern Operational Support Hubs and forward operation location bases, but then also that soft sovereignty and security as well, I think, are all part of the importance of these conversations.

Senator Cardozo: That’s very illuminating. Thank you for those answers.

The Chair: Thank you so much, Grand Chief Blake, Mayor Hendriksen and Mayor Clarkson, for taking the time this evening to participate with us. This is an important part of the work we hope to contribute to, in the context of our study on procurement.

If there are any further thoughts you may have that come to you a bit later which you want to provide to the committee, feel free to do so.

Grand Chief, I know you have your hand up. I just want to make sure I catch you before we conclude. Please go ahead.

Mr. Blake: Thank you. On that last question, I just wanted to add that the community and the region of the Mackenzie Delta in Inuvik are very open to any investment by the military. It’s looking to expand, pretty much double the presence that’s there at the moment, and I don’t see any opposition.

Touching on the Northern Operational Support Hubs, investment in the community, they are looking at about 250 to 500 more people at the base, and we need to look at what we need to offer for services.

Also, drones training and testing would have to be off-site from the military base, so that’s one thing we’re talking with the Department of National Defence about. For example, Fort McPherson might have something set up there to do testing on drones, because it can’t be too close to the facility there. I just thought I would share that. I would also like to thank you all for this opportunity, and also thank you for your service to the country.

I know you don’t hear that often, but as a leader, I know the challenges we all face, so I would just like to say, thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you again, all three of you, for taking the time and for the thoughtfulness of your presentation.

I’m sure that when we put together our report and conclude, we will make sure that you have a chance to look at it. Like our Arctic study when we had a chance to come up and visit you, I hope this will be an ongoing relationship in which we continue talking about the greatness of our country and how we do things differently in regard to the North.

This brings us to the end of this panel. I want to thank you all again for your time. We appreciate the discussion we have had. This concludes tonight’s agenda and our meeting. Our next meeting will take place Monday, December 1, at our usual time at 4 p.m.

I want to wish you all a good night. Thank you again for participating.

(The committee adjourned.)