APPENDIX — Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act
Bill to Amend--Third Reading
December 17, 2020
Honourable Senators, I am honoured to be speaking to you today from Antigonish, the meeting place of the five forked rivers, where the branches are torn off by bears, in Mi’kma’ki, the unceded territory of the Mi’kmaq people.
Colleagues, as we have been gathering on line and in the Senate chamber this week to discuss matters of life, death and the humane alleviation of suffering, I am reminded of Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights — that everyone have the right to life, liberty and security of person.
Honourable colleagues, I am pleased to speak to you today at third reading of Bill S-2, An Act to amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, an act that, at its core, is about life and the security of persons here in Canada and globally.
Colleagues, on November 5th I began my 2nd reading speech by highlighting the importance of this piece of legislation given our ever-changing world order.
Yesterday, at our Foreign Affairs committee meeting, Veronica Stromsikova, Director of the Office of Strategy and Policy at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, reminded us of how critical it is to be alert to the rapidly changing and difficult to predict global security environment.
It is more important than ever to have effective rules, structures and systems in place to help guide states and businesses in the international system.
The work of the United Nations over the past 75 years has helped solidify a rules-based international order, a set of norms, institutions, treaties and arrangements that has provided rules of the road for managing competing national interests, facilitating international cooperation and fostering peace.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is the perfect example of what the world can accomplish when it comes together for peace.
Adopted in 1997 it was the world’s first multilateral disarmament agreement to provide for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction.
In November 2019, as a result of significant effort by Canada, the United States, and the Netherlands, the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention took the decision to add four new categories of toxic chemicals to Schedule 1 of the Convention’s Annex on Chemicals. Included among these new chemicals was the Novichok-type nerve agent used in the attempted assassination of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, United Kingdom. A variation of this poisonous nerve agent was used earlier this year in the assassination attempt on Alexei Navalny.
The term Novichok means “newcomer” in Russian and has been applied to a group of advanced nerve agents developed by the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s.
This addition to the CWC Annex renders Canada’s Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act out of date. And this is the very issue which Bill S-2 seeks to resolve.
As I mentioned in my previous speech, Bill S-2 is a simple yet essential bill. The bill amends Canada’s Chemical Weapons Implementation Act in order to clearly align our Act with the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC.
Bill S-2 amends our Act to remove the old, out of date, list of prohibited chemicals appended to that Act and makes it clear that the current up to date list of prohibited chemicals under the Convention is kept by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and is readily available on its website.
During second reading of Bill S-2, Senator Ataullahjan, the critic of the bill, indicated that she didn’t believe anyone in this chamber, or indeed within the Parliament of Canada would object to this legislation. She also cautioned us, though, that this bill by itself would not solve the global chemical weapons threat. She encouraged us to delve deeper into the matter of practical ways Canada could pursue to prevent the kinds of recent Russian and Syrian attacks on their own citizens and to better enforce the Convention.
Senator McPhedran also rose at second reading and spoke in support of Bill S-2, but she urged us to encourage Canada to also take a stand against the proliferation of nuclear weapons by prohibiting them and signing and ratifying the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
The Bill was sent to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on December 2nd where an efficient and thorough study of the bill was undertaken.
The report of that committee was tabled by our committee chair, Senator Boehm yesterday.
The committee convened 4 panels and heard from 7 witnesses, including senior representatives of the International Security and Political Affairs division of Global Affairs Canada, the Chair of the Biological and Chemical Defence Review Committee, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and a professor from Royal Military College who has worked from the early days on the Chemical Weapons Convention.
It is clear, colleagues, that Bill S-2 demonstrates Canada’s commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention and most importantly solves the issue of our act being out of date.
Unfortunately, Bill S-2 alone does not reduce the risk of a foreign actor, like the Russian Federation, using a Novichok for nefarious purposes. It does, however, make it fully clear which chemicals are subject to control within Canada.
The broader questions of reducing the risk of chemical warfare or targeted chemical attacks on individuals, and holding perpetrators to account, are questions the Government of Canada is clearly seized with, and as we heard in witness testimony , to which it continues to devote significant diplomatic and financial resources.
Alongside our allies, Canadian embassies and High Commissions around the world regularly promote the importance of the OPCW and seek broad support on decisions to bolster the Chemical Weapons Convention.
It is likely that many of the decisions taken within the OPCW, including the creation and funding of the team investigating chemical weapons use in Syria, passed by large margins because of Canada’s advocacy.
Also, through the Weapons Threat Reduction Program, Canada’s flagship contribution to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction that was launched at the 2002 G8 Kananaskis Summit, Canada has contributed more than $230 million to combat the spread of chemical weapons including their destruction in Russia, Syria, Iraq and Libya. To complement this, Canada has contributed to the OPCW’s new centre for chemistry and technology, thus bolstering its investigative capabilities.
Honourable colleagues, as you can see, Canada has been a proud leader in the fight against chemical weapons. We were one of the first countries to sign the Convention on January 13, 1993 and we remain faithfully committed to the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
98.37% of the world’s declared chemical weapons stockpiles — 71,123 metric tonnes, have been destroyed to date. This is a significant step for the international community, but we know the work is far from done.
While 193 states have signed the chemical weapons convention, 4 States remain outside the Convention, with Israel having signed it but not yet ratified it, and Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan having done neither.
Colleagues, amending the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act is an act of good governance, with two main benefits.
First, it makes clearer which chemicals are prohibited to Canadians without explicit authorization, and secondly, it is also underscores our commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention and more broadly to the rules based international order.
Honourable colleagues, I would like to conclude with these thoughts. We cannot forget that real people are behind the stories that fleetingly captivate the headlines about dangerous and deadly chemical weapons use.
People whose lives can be ripped apart by the cruel and arbitrary actions of states, and in some cases, non-state actors, that ignore the laws, the norms and the obligations that have evolved over time to help foster and maintain global peace and security for all persons. Many of these people have come here to Canada seeking a peaceful and secure place to live.
We must think of them today as we weigh our legislative and political responses to those actions.
Colleagues, at this time of year, people of many faiths and cultural traditions are gathering to celebrate peace, love and community.
Many do that with symbols of light. Be they the clay diyas used by Hindus, Jains and Sikhs in their recent celebrations of Diwali, the candles lit by Jewish families for the eight days of Hanukkah, which ends tomorrow, the birthday candles celebrating the Ismaili Muslim celebration of Khushiali, the black candle lit on the kinara in celebration of the first day of Kwanza, December 26th, the light of the star that shone brightly over Bethlehem marking the first Christmas or the lights we adorn our trees and homes with at this time of year.
Colleagues, I believe that the global disarmament effort is an important beacon of light for so many in this world.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is a powerful disarmament instrument.
Let’s support Bill S-2 and its swift passage to the Other Place so that Canada’s Act implementing that convention is clear and up to date.
Colleagues let’s add our light to the world today, as we advance, in this concrete way, one of Canada’s important contributions to world peace.
Thank you, Merci, Wela’lioq.
Colleagues I rise today to speak to third reading on Bill S-2, An Act to amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act.
As Senator Coyle has explained, with this Bill the Government proposes amend the Act to add four new categories of controlled chemicals, banned by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
The Bill would add Novichoks to the list of banned chemicals.
Novichok is an umbrella term that collectively includes several families of nerve agents developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War under the scope of its chemical weapons program.
Although Western governments were aware of the Russian program, and of Novichok agents by the 1990s, they did not seek to include these agents in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) negotiations for fear of compromising sources and methods, and due to the proliferation risk associated with publicizing a new class of nerve agents.
As a result, when the CWC was opened for signature in 1993, its original Schedule 1 omitted the Novichok families of nerve agents.
After attacks in Salisbury, England, in 2018 where Novichoks were evidently used, Canada, the Netherlands and the United States jointly submitted a proposal to formally ban Novichoks.
After considerable discussion an agreement was reached among the various state parties and Novichoks will now been added to the list of banned chemicals.
What is interesting is that a consensus was formulated to accomplish this. While initially objecting, Russia later modified its own proposals allowing the approval of both its proposal and the joint Canadian-Dutch-American proposal by consensus.
At the time, this agreement was described by some as a victory for diplomacy and international cooperation and the amendment entered into force on June 7, 2020.
Regrettably, however, much of this is smoke and mirrors. There is no certainty that all the state parties that are signatories to the Convention will actually abide by its provisions.
The evident poisoning of Russian Opposition figure Alexi Navalny, with an apparent Novichok agent, just four months ago, and just two months after Novichoks were supposedly banned, is testimony to that fact.
I believe it is very important that the CWC regime has strong verification provisions. But even with such provisions, we cannot be sure that adherence to the regime by all states is guaranteed.
When I spoke to this Bill at second reading several weeks ago, I suggested that several questions had to be addressed in Committee related to Canada’s plans concerning the implementation of this legislation.
•Is what we are doing actually going to prevent similar attacks?
•How do we plan to engage in our allies on this matter in the years ahead?
•How do we plan to convince other countries, Russia most notably, that such chemicals must be effectively controlled?
•How far are we prepared to go to impose sanctions on countries that violate these provisions?
•Are we actually prepared to sacrifice other interests in order to achieve the objectives of the legislation that we have before us today?
These questions were posed to Canadian officials at the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee by myself, by Senator Ngo and by other Senators on the Committee and, in general, the answers confirm it will take considerable effort to effectively maintain this expanded CWC regime and to hold states who may violate the regime accountable.
With respect to the first question, I asked Mr. Dan Costello, Assistant Deputy Minister, International Security and Political Affairs at Global Affairs Canada whether these measures will prevent future attacks. He responded quite frankly by saying:
“We have no illusions that this act to amend Canadian domestic implementation legislation will have an effect in assuring prevention around the world, because that’s clearly beyond what we can reach through our domestic legislation.”
He said that while this legislation will not prevent future attacks he hoped that the Bill would be part of an effort to strengthen international rules and implementation mechanisms to build advocacy among like-minded allies.
I thought that this was an honest response that goes beyond some of the rhetoric that we have heard from the Government.
For instance, when he introduced these measures, Minister Champagne argued that, through this action, “Canada is taking a strong stance for a safer world by controlling dangerous chemicals”.
Well clearly what we are talking about here is in reality a more modest step.
For this to be successful, it will need to go beyond just being a public relations exercise and it will require continuous and close engagement with our allies.
It will also be important for the Government to figure out exactly how we are going both pressure and engage with Russia on this matter.
That is because it is very clear that Russia has been prepared to use toxic agents against dissidents in order to send a message.
The message is that we will find you, and we will eliminate you if we believe that you have betrayed, or pose a threat to, the State.
It is a chilling message. But the use of toxic agents, not only in the Salisbury attacks and in the Navalny poisoning, but also in a previous infamous attack in which a former Russian intelligence agent, Alexander Litvinenko. He was murdered in London in 2006 and his murder illustrates that this is a pattern.
On the other hand, we have the fact that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons itself has confirmed that of 2017, Russia has destroyed 39,967 metric tons of chemical weapons.
Officials informed us at Committee that they believe that about 98% of the world’s chemical weapons stockpiles, totalling 71,000 metric tonnes, have been destroyed. This makes the Russian component of that campaign significant.
So Canada and its allies are on the horns of a dilemma: we have to call out the Russians for their behaviour — behaviour is clearly repulsive and murderous — but at the same time the issue is more complex.
Senator Ngo raised this at Committee when he asked officials whether Canada is ultimately prepared to push Russia to the point where it might leave the Chemical Weapons Convention regime?
Mr. Costello responded to that question by stating
“It’s an interesting comment in the sense that you’re rightly pointing to the fact that, on the one hand, we want to insist upon consequences for this kind of outrageous behaviour, this flagrant violation of international law and international relations, while at the same time we want to encourage the most transgressive and difficult actors internationally to remain within the bounds of the norms and standards of international law and international treaties”.
Indeed, that is the essence of the dilemma.
So I must return to the concerns that I expressed when I spoke to this Bill at second reading.
We still do not really know how the Government is going to actually enforce the broader objectives related to this legislation.
As I stated at second reading, it is very easy to declare that Canada is, as the Government has claimed, taking a “strong stance” for a safer world. It is quite another thing to put that claim into practice.
Unfortunately, I am reminded of the fact the fact that this is the same Government which also arrogantly declared in 2015 that “Canada was back” as a strong actor on the international stage.
But since that time, many of our bilateral relationships around the world have collapsed and we recently lost a bid to secure election to the United Nations Security Council — despite spending hundreds of millions of dollars in that effort.
What I fear is that what the Government is proposing here with this legislation is an initiative that falls within the same category.
That is, a relatively inexpensive and ultimately minor public relations success which, in the end, may actually mean very little of substance.
One way that the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee might try to ensure that this does not just evolve into a forgotten public relations exercise would be for the Committee, in a year or two, to call the Government to account in order to evaluate what has actually been accomplished to implement the “strong stance” that Minister Champagne claims the Government is taking.
I would certainly support such an initiative and if the Government is serious, I would hope that it will be anxious to report to the Committee on all that it has achieved.
Thank you!
