Honourable senators, I rise today to speak to Motion No. 36 moved by our colleague Senator Housakos.

I do not and cannot support this motion, colleagues, for a number of reasons. I will not dwell on the points made by Senator Housakos, Senator Carignan and Senator Dalphond in their excellent speeches. Rather, what I intend to do is outline the foreign policy reality, with which I have a bit of experience, and state why, in particular, Canada cannot simply recognize the “Republic of Artsakh.”

A common theme among motions on foreign policy — and there are several before the Senate — is that they often seek remedies that are in practice far more complex than the motions reflect. In other words, the Government of Canada is often asked to take actions that are unrealistic and untenable.

And while the Senate can make its feelings known to government on international issues, only the Crown has the power to make decisions and act on foreign policy because it falls under the Royal prerogative. I think we all know that.

As it relates to this motion, it, among other points, asks the Senate of Canada to call upon the Government of Canada to “. . . recognize the independence of the Republic of Artsakh.”

To start, Canada recognizes the region in question as Nagorno-Karabakh, because it is, under international law, part of Azerbaijan.

Artsakh is the name Armenia and Armenians use for the region, which they see as a reflection of their national identity and statehood. Fair enough.

This dispute over territory is, of course, at the heart of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On that basis, I will refer to the region for the rest of my remarks as Nagorno-Karabakh to be consistent with Canada’s policy and that of all our allies and like-minded partners.

Were Canada to recognize the independence of the disputed area in Armenia’s favour, it would be the first and only sovereign country in the world to do so. Some jurisdictions have taken this step but they are limited to subnational entities. These include the state of New South Wales in Australia, a few states in the United States and several municipalities in the state of California in Italy, to name but a few. So not exactly the best case here for Canada to join in.

On November 25, as some of you know, our counterparts in the French Senate passed a motion that, among other points, invited the French government to “recognize the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.” The motion passed nearly unanimously by a tally of 305 to 1. On December 3, France’s National Assembly also passed a motion calling on the government to recognize the region as a republic by a margin of 188 to 3.

Rather than taking these votes as a sign that the Senate of Canada should follow suit, it is important to note that France and Turkey have been feuding lately, specifically over free speech and concerns about Islamic extremism, as well as commercial and territorial interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, as Senator Housakos has rightly pointed out.

The motions in the French Parliament and the count by which they passed must be seen for what they are: political statements against Turkey, a staunch ally of Azerbaijan, and shows of support for France’s sizeable Armenian community, rather than actions based on sound foreign policy — what we would call realpolitik. Canada’s position on Nagorno-Karabakh emphasizes the importance of a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the crucial role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the OSCE, and the principles of non-use of force, territorial integrity and self-determination.

While Canada recognizes Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, its position does not prejudge the form of a future settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh question, within the OSCE’s Minsk Group, co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States, which play a central mediating role. The other permanent members are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Turkey. As such, recognizing the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh would not be consistent with Canadian policies, nor the policies of Canada’s allies and partners, all of whom support the Minsk Process. In addition, were Canada to recognize the region’s independence as a republic, it would contradict Canada’s support for territorial integrity elsewhere in the region, including in Ukraine and Georgia.

Armenia and Azerbaijan would each prefer that Canada call the other side the aggressor. From a foreign policy standpoint, there were aggressors on both sides, and victims too, as tends to be the case in armed conflicts. It is important to keep in mind that, in matters of international affairs, things are rarely binary.

Many of you will have been contacted by the embassies of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and by members of each country’s diaspora community in Canada. A different story will emerge depending on who is telling it, but we must remember that there are usually three sides to every story.

This latest round of fighting was a flashpoint in a long-standing conflict going back to 1991, but it is not clear which side started it this time. This is one reason why, with foreign policy motions, it is crucial to have all the facts, especially regarding conflicts such as this, that are not as well-known or understood outside of Global Affairs Canada.

I would encourage colleagues to call on — as I did and do — the expertise of our best-in-the-world public servants at Global Affairs Canada, who are always ready and willing to provide briefings to senators and staff.

On September 27 of this year, fighting broke out between the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan along the so-called “Line of Contact” in Nagorno-Karabakh. On one side, Azerbaijan said it launched a military operation in response to shelling along this Line of Contact. On the other, the Armenian government accused Azerbaijan of launching an air- and artillery-attack on civilian settlements in Nagorno-Karabakh.

This is what I meant by three sides to every story. What was consistent across both sides is that facts on the ground were difficult to verify. There was a high level of misinformation and disinformation. Both sides continually accused each other of war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law, and political rhetoric from both sides was aggressive, with each claiming to have inflicted heavy casualties on the other. Further, I have received lists from both sides of foreign fighters allegedly involved in the conflict.

At the end of the day, the real tragedy is that of the civilian populations in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. There have been many innocent victims on both sides, colleagues.

This brings me to my next point; one which has concerned me and many of us for some time. I mentioned earlier in my remarks the many communications from the Armenian and Azeri communities in Canada to senators since October 28, when Senator Housakos moved this motion. It is a stark reminder, fuelled by remarks made in this chamber and beyond, of the impact of diaspora politics on our legislative discourse, and of the inherent danger in one ethnic community working against another in their new home, which is our country, Canada.

Diaspora communities are important. Their diverse cultures and histories make Canada and our society richer and more vibrant. And, of course, they are also politically important in domestic terms. My own parents came to Canada as Transylvanian-Saxon refugees from what is now Romania. On one day in September 1944, they and their families were forced to flee the place, people and things they held dear for over eight centuries. They lost everything. Many senators proudly share similar family stories and have themselves lived the refugee or immigrant experience.

Diaspora communities also often play an important economic role in promoting tourism, culture and trade between the countries they call home. Some of the best ambassadors for a country are members of its diaspora community. However, when one community is pitted against another in a country far removed from a conflict, there are often consequences.

Right here in Ottawa, the potential for such deadly consequences played out when, in 1982, Turkish diplomat Colonel Atilla Altikat was assassinated while driving to work. An Armenian militant group claimed responsibility just hours after the colonel was gunned down; revenge, it said, for Turkey’s central role in the Armenian genocide of 1915.

At a 2014 memorial for Colonel Altikat, Paul Heinbecker, a former Canadian ambassador to Germany and the United Nations, and former colleague of mine said:

Canada cannot survive as a multicultural, diversity-valuing society if national, ethnic or religious groups import their conflicts into Canada.

Diaspora politics is the tinder of a fire that could consume not just those who ignite it, but all of us.

This is why diaspora politics are of concern — because of what can happen when all anger is unleashed. What we are seeing with this motion and with the reaction to it by the diasporas of both sides is a prime example of diaspora politics.

Obviously, this current fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan has not resulted in violence on Canadian soil, but I wanted to provide an example of the extreme potential consequences.

What must be understood is that, as with all ethnic conflicts, fighting today between one side and the other does not just suddenly appear out of the ether.

When fighting erupts between groups, they are usually flashpoints in long-standing conflicts, the results of years, maybe decades, generations or even centuries of disputes over territory, religion, and ethnic and tribal differences.

The soldiers fighting this latest battle were raised — as were their parents, their grandparents and ancestors, as was I — to have a strong connection to the history and national identity of their respective country’s ethnicity and/or languages, especially in contrast to the other side.

In the case of this conflict, it is further complicated by the fact that Armenia’s population is mostly Christian, while Azerbaijan’s is mostly Muslim. And it is that strong connection to home, whether home is the country of birth or ancestry, that fuels the passionate activism of diaspora communities, especially when their homeland has a history of war and/or oppression that forced its residents to flee and seek refuge elsewhere.

This is totally understandable. This is why a motion being debated in the Senate of Canada about a long-standing conflict in the Caucasus is getting so much attention: because of the strong connection to homelands marked by ethnic conflict and the flight of their people.

The communities in Canada are strong and well organized, especially the Armenian community, which is why there has been so much response to this motion, and perhaps why it exists in the first place. It is important to stand up for what is right and to call attention to situations that could escalate to ethnic cleansing and genocide, which we’ve seen far too many times, even in recent history. I appreciate Senator Housakos’s concerns in that regard, and I share them.

However, we must also be careful about wading into a long-standing ethnic conflict and demanding that our government do things that it cannot do because it is what a diaspora community wants to hear.

The actions we take and the words we say in this chamber have real-world impacts and consequences, colleagues, and we must be mindful of that.

On that note, I wish to briefly comment on the point of the motion that calls on the Government of Canada to “uphold the ban on military exports to Turkey.”

Following allegations of Canadian sensor technology in Turkish drones being used by Azerbaijan’s armed forces, Canada suspended the relevant export permits to Turkey on October 5 to allow time to further assess the situation.

Canada remains the only country to take measures in this area. While restrictions continue to apply to military exports to Turkey, Canada considers on a case-by-case basis whether there are exceptional circumstances, including but not limited to NATO cooperation programs, that must justify issuing an export permit for military items. So, exceptions might be made when circumstances warrant but there is no plan to remove the overall ban.

On November 9, the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan ended with a peace deal brokered by Russia and Turkey. Armenia was required to put down its weapons and leave the areas surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.

Russia now has its armed forces, 2,000 peacekeepers, in the corridor connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, which it has always prized for its strategic value, and Turkey will have a direct transportation route through Armenian territory to Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea, giving Turkey access to Central Asia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

So, while many innocent Armenian and Azeri civilians fled the places their ancestors called home for centuries and others died, Russia and Turkey both came out as winners. That is what I meant about foreign policy not being binary, especially when it involves a long-standing ethnic conflict from which regional powers stand to gain.

Foreign policy is hard, colleagues. It directly impacts people’s lives, their physical safety and their economic and social well-being. There are real consequences to the choices governments make when it comes to foreign policy — some positive, some negative. This is why we must understand how and why these decisions are made, even if we do not always agree, and that these issues need to be handled very carefully and diplomatically.

Working through formal channels of direct bilateral communication behind the scenes is how the real work gets done. Just because we do not always see the work in public does not mean it is not happening. Though, in this case, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, François-Philippe Champagne, twice issued joint statements — on September 29 and October 5 — interestingly, with his British counterpart, Dominic Raab, condemning the violence on both sides, urging an end to continued military action, and calling for a peaceful resolution through the Minsk Process.

Senator Boehm, I’m sorry, your time has expired. Do you wish for five additional minutes?

I could probably do it in one minute.

Is it agreed, honourable senators?

Further, Prime Minister Trudeau spoke with the Prime Minister of Armenia and the President of Turkey, and Minister Champagne spoke with his counterparts in those countries too. Leaders and foreign ministers of other countries have done the same, and they have also been speaking with each other. This is diplomacy.

Colleagues, I was not sure I would speak on this motion. However, given the number of foreign policy motions before the Senate, with their varying degrees of practicality and the diaspora element in this case, as well as my previous life and career as a diplomat and negotiator, I felt I should add my perspective.

I will vote against this motion if the times comes, and I thank you for your attention and indulgence.

Of course.

Thank you very much for the questions — three, I think — Senator Housakos.

On the first point, although I am a historian, at least by academic training, I don’t have all the details. I just know that the territory has gone back and forth any number of times. There has been movement of peoples there. Well, I’ve read the history; I just don’t have it all in my mind at the moment.

To the second point, whether this was a creation of the Soviet Union, I would go even further and agree with you and say Joseph Stalin bears a lot of responsibility here, but he’s not around to defend himself, thankfully.

On the third point on Turkey, I don’t know. My understanding is that there is a dialogue going on with Turkey. I think relations have been strained a little bit. Turkey is a member of the G20, as you all know, and is a member of NATO. Some of these discussions are taking place there. In a recent meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I know there was robust debate about Turkey and the Turkish representatives were very much on the defensive. So I suspect on that last point, which I appreciate is a key point, there will be more discussion in the future, including on the internal affairs of Turkey, the human rights situation and developments you have outlined in your speech.

Senator Boehm, thank you very much for that enlightening speech, which we all should take to heart. You mentioned the 1982 event at the western parkway and Island Park Drive. There is a memorial there to the Turkish diplomat who was murdered. However, in 1985 we lost a great Canadian, a young man, a student at the University of Ottawa, Claude Brunelle, who was a security guard at the Embassy of Turkey. It seems to me that the warning you serve to us tonight, would you agree, is not just theoretical but actually practical, and we’ve seen it in this very capital city of ours?

Thank you, Senator Duffy, for your question and your comment. The longer version of my speech did have a reference to the memorial, which is very close to the Island Park bridge going across the Ottawa River, and also a reference to Canadians who had fallen, who had been killed or wounded in the diplomatic service of their country, but I think the point you make is very valid.

Are honourable senators ready for the question?

It was moved by the Honourable Senator Housakos, seconded by the Honourable Senator Smith, that the Senate of Canada call —

Is it your pleasure, honourable senators, to adopt the motion?

All those in favour, in the chamber, please say “yea.”

All those against, in the chamber, please say “nay.”

In my opinion, the “nays” have it.

I see two honourable senators rising. Is there agreement on a bell?

We need to leave for a 30‑minute bell. Is it agreed? A 30‑minute bell. The vote will take place at 8:19.

Call in the senators.

Honourable senators, I would like to explain my abstention to you out of respect.

I’m a member of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. At the beginning of our term about three years ago, we had a discussion with respect to votes on matters, particularly foreign affairs, but matters that may impinge on national security issues. Whether or not this motion is, I’m not commenting.

The reason for this decision as a group was so that colleagues do not have a perception that we either have been or have not been privy to any classified secret information, and therefore having that inform our decision. So I will on this and other like motions abstain.

Thank you very much for the opportunity, Your Honour.

Honourable senators, I ask leave of the Senate that Inquiry No. 12 on the Notice Paper be brought forward and called now.

Senator Cordy is seeking leave. Is leave granted?

Senator Cordy, leave is not granted.