Honourable senators, I rise today on a matter of great importance — my motion for the Government of Canada to call upon six or more of the current parties to the Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam to agree to reconvene the International Conference on Viet-Nam.

In an effort to end the Vietnam War and come to a lasting resolution, the Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Viet-Nam and its protocols, commonly known as the Paris Peace Accords or Paris Agreement, were signed by the U.S.; the Republic of Vietnam, called South Vietnam; the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, called North Vietnam; and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Vietnam, called Viet Cong, in Paris on January 27, 1973.

Some of the key provisions of the Paris Peace Accords called for a ceasefire throughout Vietnam; bans on introduction of war material and military troops into South Vietnam; and creation of the International Commission of Control and Supervision, called ICCS, to monitor the implementation of specific provisions of the Paris Peace Accords.

According to Article 19 of the Paris Agreement, from February 26 to March 2 a second international conference was held again in Paris, which, among other things, established the ICCS rules of conduct and its reporting mechanisms to support the agreement’s implementation.

The conference was concluded on March 2, 1973, by the signing of the Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam, called the Act, wherein the parties to the Paris Agreement and eight other countries — Canada, France, Hungary, Indonesia, Poland, the U.K., the Soviet Union and China — pledged they would, henceforth, not only uphold and support its terms, but also abide by its provisions, including those related to foreign interference. Both the Paris Agreement and the Act were registered with the United Nations Secretariat on May 13, 1974.

In addition to the many Canadian soldiers who died during the Vietnam War, Canada made significant contributions toward the effort to reach a lasting peace in Vietnam.

It was part of the first International Commission for Supervision and Control – Vietnam, established by the 1954 Geneva Accords.

It was part of the second International Commission for Control and Supervision — the ICCS — established by the Paris Peace Accords, sending peacekeeping forces in 1973 to investigate compliance and uphold its provisions; and, more importantly, is a signatory to the Act of the International Conference on Viet‑Nam.

As one of the signatories to the Act, Canada played an integral supervisory role in the effort to support peace. As part of the ICCS — along with Poland, Hungary and Indonesia, which were at the time, respectively, communist countries and a dictatorship — we made key contributions by investigating and overseeing that respect of the ceasefire, withdrawal of troops and return of captured military and civilian personnel were maintained.

Unfortunately, Canada’s role was rendered difficult as it was the only democratic nation member of the ICCS — the four nations had to unanimously agree to investigate the violations. During Canada’s time as a member, at least 18,000 ceasefire violations were reported. During the same time, only 1,081 complaints were investigated by the ICCS.

Despite the subsequent invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam’s Communist forces in 1975, in absolute violation of the Paris Peace Accords and of the act, I believe they remain valuable diplomatic tools for the resolution of disputes between signatory parties that arise from violations of their terms.

I wish to draw your attention to Articles 7(a) and 7(b) of the act, which provide a useful mechanism for dispute settlement in the event the Paris Peace Accords are infringed upon.

Article 7(a) allows the parties to determine necessary remedial measures in the event of a violation of the Paris Peace Accords:

. . . which threatens the peace, the independence, sovereignty, unity, or territorial integrity of Viet-Nam, or the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination . . . .

Article 7(b) reads:

The International Conference on Viet-Nam shall be reconvened upon a joint request by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam on behalf of the parties signatory to the Agreement or upon a request by six or more of the Parties to this Act.

Canada has a vested interest in continuing to uphold stability, peace and democracy in Asia. To this end, it is incumbent upon Canada’s government to call upon six or more of the current parties to the act to agree to reconvene the International Conference on Viet-Nam.

There are compelling arguments that indicate there are sufficient grounds to engage Article 7(b) of the act and thereby reconvene the said conference.

On April 23, 2015, the Journey to Freedom Day Act was adopted. The first two elements of its preamble acknowledge the involvement of the Canadian Forces by assisting in the enforcement of the Paris Peace Accords and the subsequent invasion of South Vietnam by military forces of the People’s Army of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front in 1975. Considering these first two elements of the said preamble, the Parliament of Canada unequivocally recognized violations of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam and its Protocols; and the Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam.

Not only are there no provisions within the Paris Agreement allowing the parties to terminate it, but also the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties— which provides the mechanisms for states to either withdraw, terminate or suspend treaties — is inapplicable in this case as it came into force after the Paris Agreement was reached. Article 4 of the Vienna Convention regarding its non-retroactivity makes it impossible to invoke it. Furthermore, the United States has never ratified it.

Additionally, when the U.S. and Vietnam decided to establish diplomatic relations after the fall of Saigon and the reunification of South and North Vietnam, public statements referring to the Paris Agreement were made by their respective officials, thus suggesting it could be considered as still in force, at least in part.

As is the case with the Paris Peace Accords, the act is bereft of provisions that allow for its termination or for sunset clauses to its application.

Also, since the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties came into force after the act, the convention is also inapplicable to the act. Contrary to the Paris Peace Accords, where customary international law makes it difficult to give a clear-cut and conclusive answer because of the ambiguity regarding its status, in this particular case, one must look to customary international law to interpret the act. Such an interpretation would imply that the act continues to be in force, as it specifically provides a mechanism for the international conference to be reconvened without the U.S. and Vietnam jointly requesting it.

Therefore, the act continues to be binding on the other eight signatory countries. Furthermore, the act is listed among multi-party treaties and agreements by the U.S. Department of State as still being in force as of January 1, 2020, with Canada still listed as one of the parties.

For the purposes of reconvening the international conference in accordance with Article 7(b), in fine, Canada, France, Hungary, Indonesia, Poland, the U.K., the U.S., Russia and China — most of which are democratic countries, including Hungary, Indonesia and Poland, which were not at the time — should be considered as being the current parties to the act. For the reconvening of the international conference to take place, at least six of them should agree to it.

Alternatively, and pursuant to Article 7(b), in limine, the reconvening of the conference could also happen if the U.S. and Vietnam jointly request it, provided that Vietnam clearly states its intention in continuing North Vietnam’s participation in the act.

Ultimately, if there is a consensus among the parties that the Paris Agreement continues to be in force, it can then be reopened and renegotiated. The same applies to the act; in its case, it would allow for the international conference to be reconvened in accordance with Article 7(b).

Furthermore, during a luncheon address by the former U.S. Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, at The Nixon Center in Washington on April 24, 1988, entitled “Vietnam, the Paris Agreement and Their Meaning for Today,” he said:

. . . because an agreement that you don’t enforce is a surrender; it’s just writing down surrender terms. And that we never intended.

Every senior member of the Administration—including myself, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State—is represented in compendiums of statements that said publicly every other week that we intended to enforce the agreement. There was nothing new about that.

Moreover, reconvening this international conference can also be a valuable mechanism to initiate negotiations in some of the most pressing geopolitical issues in Asia today, such as the South China Sea dispute. Articles 4 and 5 of the act indicate that its signatories, including China:

. . . solemnly recognize and strictly respect the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam, as well as the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination. The Parties to this act shall strictly respect the agreement and the protocols by refraining from any action at variance with their provisions.

In 1974 and 1988, China invaded Vietnam’s Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands, respectively. These invasions are violations of the act, allowing any signatory country to reconvene the international conference as per the conditions set out in Article 7(b) of the act.

On December 30, 1974, President Ford signed Public Law 93-559, Section 34(b)(4), which requires the U.S. Executive Branch to reconvene the international conference in the eventuality of any violation of the Paris Peace Accords. By the intermediary of Article 7 of the act and by invoking the spirit of Public Law 93-559, the U.S. has legal grounds to initiate the reconvening of the international conference and to force signatory governments to a conference table where China has no veto power and where it can be held accountable for its unlawful invasions and its disruption of stability in the South China Sea.

Additionally, on April 24, 2018, we passed a motion in this chamber calling upon the Canadian government to take a leading role in urging all involved parties in the South China Sea dispute to promote peace by supporting international law and its regional partners and allies, as well as by taking additional steps necessary to de-escalate tensions and restore peace and stability in the region.

More recently, during an appearance at the House of Commons Special Committee on Canada-China Relations this April, Minister Sajjan said:

. . . Canada opposes land reclamation projects and building outposts in disputed areas for military purposes. We support lawful commerce, freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight in accordance with international law.

We will continue supporting our allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in the face of unilateral actions that undermine peace and stability. . . .

The minister delivered a similar speech during the 12th South China Sea International Conference, held in Vietnam in November 2020. It is worth mentioning that Canada is also actively maintaining a naval presence in that region.

Colleagues, for all of these reasons, it is therefore of the utmost importance to reopen this important debate and conference and to give serious consideration to reconvening the historic multilateral forum that is the International Conference on Viet-Nam. I truly believe this would be a vital policy tool and a useful means for the diplomatic and peaceful resolution of conflicts in Asia. Thank you.