Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Energy, the
Environment and Natural Resources
Issue 18 - Evidence, May 12, 1999
OTTAWA, Wednesday, May 12, 1999
The Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, met this day at 12:40 p.m. to examine issues relating to energy, the environment and natural resources in Canada.
Senator Ron Ghitter (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Today, we are privileged to have one of our own taking a more activist role in an area in which she has considerable expertise and involvement. The Honourable Senator Lois Wilson will talk about her experience in the nuclear power area and with the Seaborn panel.
Please proceed.
Hon. Lois Wilson: You have in your hands, honourable senators, a document that I will not read; I will speak only to the points which are highlighted. I will also address the executive summary of the Seaborn report. I will try to be brief in order to leave more time for questions.
Nuclear power generation started with the nuclear era during the Second World War. There has always been secrecy surrounding nuclear issues because, in the beginning, it was intimately connected with the military.
In 1981, the Ontario and Canadian governments jointly issued a statement that directed Atomic Energy of Canada Limited to develop the concept of deep geological disposal for nuclear fuel wastes. Their agreement indicated that no site would be selected until there had been a full federal hearing, and approval of the concept by both governments.
The Seaborn panel was appointed in October 1989. I was one of eight members. We were a multi-disciplinary group which included an environmentalist, two engineers, an aboriginal person, a biologist, a nuclear radiologist, the chair and myself. One could have anticipated that such a group would not agree on too much.
The mandate was unusual and narrow. We were to review only the disposal of nuclear waste but not its origin. In addition, we would not look at the total nuclear fuel cycle. We heard many objections to this from the public who told us that there was no point in looking only at the disposal of nuclear waste without looking at the total picture. Lamentably, that was outside our mandate. However, we did ask for public input, and their concerns were outlined in our report.
We were also to review a "concept" which is much more difficult than reviewing a site, a program, or a project because it is undefined. We were to establish a scientific review group of distinguished scientists who would help us assess the acceptability and the safety of the concept. Unfortunately, no parallel group of distinguished social scientists was appointed. Consequently, we began under the mistaken assumption that the concept was purely a technical matter.
Some members of the panel were not technical people, and that led to discrepancies and confusion.
We were to review a broad range of policy issues which we subsequently expanded by requiring AECL to review all the options in detail. However, that was never done. In addition, we were to conduct a review in five provinces. It took us eight years to do that, including the time when AECL was responding to our requests.
You have the key panel conclusions in the executive summary at the back of the document that was handed out. I will comment on some of the panel's recommendations and the government's response, because that is where we are right now.
There were two major points of divergence between the panel and the government's response. One was on the question of safety: Was the concept safe or not? The second was about who would manage the disposal of nuclear waste.
The consensus of the panel was that there was no consensus. We agreed that we disagreed. We believed that lack of consensus would be honoured not only in the report but in the government's reading of the report; otherwise, two colleagues and I would have written a minority report, which we did not do.
The Government of Canada never acknowledged that there was a divergence of opinion within the panel. We stated in our report that safety is a key part of the concept but that it has to be viewed from a complementary perspective, that is, complementing the technical perspective, which is valid in the social scientific community.
The fact that the panel disagreed on the safety of the concept reflects the deep division in Canadian society about this whole issue. It must be viewed with profound seriousness.
The response of the Canadian government to the panel's report of December 1998 misrepresented or misunderstood, I do not know which, the panel's key conclusions, and particularly the first one about safety.
The conclusions of the panel can be found on the second last page of my documents under "Key Panel Conclusions." There it is stated:
From a technical perspective, safety of the AECL concept has been on balance adequately demonstrated for a conceptual stage of development, but from a social perspective, it has not.
It was our conclusion that safety had to be looked at from two perspectives. We included many caveats, even from a technical perspective. A lot of work still had to be done.
That has never been acknowledged. We are concluding, from both the government response, which I have here, and the media, that the panel found the nuclear waste disposal concept developed by AECL to be technically safe, but that it did not have broad public support. The matter of some members of the panel judging it as unsafe has been dropped entirely. The difference of viewpoint within the panel has been disregarded.
The media repeated, ad infinitum, that the concept was technically safe and needed only public acceptance. The impression was that all we had to do was to tell the public that it was safe.
Senators may wish to ask questions on those two issues before I continue with my remarks. They are: There was a split panel; and there was a misrepresentation on safety that continues to this day.
The Chairman: Could you explain what you mean by "social perspective"?
Senator Wilson: I will try to be clear. The flaws identified by the scientists disturbed those who said it was unsafe from a social perspective. They felt that their concerns had not been addressed, even from a technical perspective. Those were people who were more interested in the consequences of nuclear power, that is, an accident. We were assured time and again that an accident would not happen. The public, however, was not persuaded and pointed out the consequences if an accident did happen. In view of that, they did not think it was safe.
Certain individuals were very uncomfortable with computer modelling because it is conceptual and has never been tested or demonstrated. This was computer modelling that had to be valid for the next 1,000 years. There was some scepticism about that.
People had more confidence in the human ability to control things than in technical passive safety. The proposal was to bury the waste and make it passively safe. We need never worry about it again. They wanted a clear ethical and social assessment. They acknowledged the possibility of human error, but they had as much confidence in humans as they had in some technology of which they were unsure.
Although we asked time and again for them, we were not given details of the worst case scenarios. We were repeatedly told that it is safe. The Doubting Thomases repeatedly asked for the worst case scenarios to be spelled out. The caveats expressed the doubts of those who did not feel that the safety standards had been adequately demonstrated from a social perspective.
Senator Spivak: I do not understand why that is not a technical matter. If you have a concern about computer modelling, because that is not "real time," as they say, why would that not be a safety consideration from a technical point of view? Why were earthquakes and water supply interruptions not considered to be technical matters?
Senator Wilson: Those issues were all raised but, ultimately, we were assured that an accident would not happen. We were assured that it was technically safe. Some of the panel were not convinced that it was even technically safe. In our initial hearings, our scientific review group, Environment Canada, and many other groups, listed deficiencies and shortcomings. In fact, about 95 items were listed as being technically deficient. We were charged with assessing the safety of the concept.
We were also charged with assessing the acceptability of the concept. The panel was unanimous in its view that the concept had not been demonstrated to have broad public support and did not have the required level of acceptability to be adopted as Canada's approach for managing nuclear wastes.
There were several reasons for that. We were told that there was a lack of public confidence in the implementing organization. At that point, AECL was not named as the implementing organization, but AECL and Ontario Hydro were the proponents. There was a lot of scepticism about their role.
Although the panel asked AECL to bring forward several options, we were provided with only one option: deep geological burial. We thought that the public deserved to know whether there were two or three options so that we could choose the best.
We believed that the role of decision making by an informed public had not been adequately addressed. The panel was unanimous in stating that there was no public acceptability of this concept, and that should be considered.
The panel recommended certain options. The first was a modified AECL concept, that is, deep geological burial, but modified. The second was to have storage at reactor sites where the waste is presently stored, or centralized storage either above or below ground.
I have a cabinet document, which states that the development of other options was not in AECL's mandate, which is true. However, the panel, through the environmental assessment guidelines, directed AECL to bring us more options. However, that was never done. The most recent communication from NRCAN, dated December 3, 1999, indicates that they will return to cabinet with the preferred option within 12 months.
I will now deal with some of our recommendations.
First, we suggested that the aboriginal community be fully consulted and that they design the process with the help of government. Not one aboriginal group which appeared before our panel was in favour of the concept. Even the Meadow Lake First Nation in Saskatchewan, which initially thought it would be a good way to make money, subsequently changed its mind. Consultation with and by aboriginal peoples is absolutely central, because the intention was to bury the waste in the Laurentian Shield -- and we know who lives there. Our own consultation with aboriginal people was not comprehensive. That must be a primary consideration.
Second, we recommended that the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Agency include federal and provincial governments, electrical utilities, and people with engineering, scientific and social science skills. We further recommended that the staff include people who knew something about public education, as well as scientific and technical matters. We also noted that an aboriginal person should be included.
Instead of following that recommendation, the government has recommended that this responsibility be given to Ontario Hydro and the utilities of New Brunswick and Quebec. Our fear in this regard is that the representation is not broad enough. We do not look upon this as a purely technical issue. Unless society understands what this is all about, there is the possibility of civil disobedience, as happened in Germany.
The panel recommended that the agent be subject to multiple oversight mechanisms, including federal regulatory control with respect to its scientific and technical work; to policy direction from the federal government; and to regular public review, preferably by Parliament. However, the response of the government reduced our recommended oversight mechanisms to one federal oversight mechanism.
We spent a lot of time on public participation and gave a lot of thought to what should happen. Many of the participants who intervened were represented as special interest groups and were said to be opposed to the disposal concept, thus discounting the validity of their interventions. However, many of those groups were public interest groups as opposed to special interest ones, and not all were opposed to the concept.
I came to the panel completely ignorant of the whole issue, which is why I was appointed. The government wanted people without a bias, and I certainly did not have one. I was swayed many times by witnesses as we went along, those both for and against the concept, until I came down on the side I am on.
The Canadian Academy of Engineering Royal Society of Canada was one of the few groups that brought scientific and social assessments to our panel. They integrated those two things as we wanted.
We recommended that a public participation plan be developed and implemented, but I have little confidence that that will happen. By way of illustration, in February of this year, limited public notice went to selected segments of the public who were invited to participate on a certain date and comment on three key points identified by the government as the federal oversight mechanism. I had letters about how badly organized that process was. Apparently, the participants sat around in a circle; their comments were not systematically recorded; the issue of social safety and nuclear waste was not mentioned; and the timetable was tight.
The notices for this process did not go out to all of the original interveners. Some interveners heard of it by word of mouth, and some just happened to read the notice. It was not well organized. If that is an example of public consultation, then I have no confidence in it.
One of the key points related to a plan to address deficiencies. I mentioned the panel indicated that:
If the AECL concept is chosen as the most acceptable option after implementation of the steps recommended above, governments should direct the NFWMA, together with Natural Resources Canada and the AECB or its successor, to undertake the following: review all the social and technical shortcomings identified by the Scientific Review Group and other review participants; establish their priority; and generate a plan to address them. The NFWMA should make this plan publicly available, invite public input, then implement the plan.
The Government of Canada agreed with the intent of this recommendation. It indicated that there would be a review, but said nothing about establishing priorities, involving the public, reviewing shortcomings, and generating a plan to address any shortcomings.
Normally, in an environmental review, a list of deficiencies is issued. The proponents then have to correct them before proceeding. In this case the panel felt that the scientific model presented by AECL, which was widely criticized by scientists and others, did not merit the granting of more money for research since it was considered inadequate from the beginning. We noted about 95 shortcomings and recommended they address them if they wished to proceeded with that model.
Let me say one word about the exports of CANDU reactors since this subject was raised yesterday in the committee. The question is always asked: Do they operate efficiently? Are they safe? I think those questions are valid and they were answered well. No one, however, asks: Does Romania or China know what to do with nuclear waste? The answer is that there is no safe demonstrated model in the world. One has to wonder about the ethics of exporting CANDU reactors to countries that are not as advanced in their research on the disposal of nuclear waste as we are. Even our research does not yet have the required level of acceptability to be adopted as Canada's approach to manage nuclear waste
We were told that the international consensus on this topic is that it is quite safe. I always raise the question: Amongst whom was the international consensus? Was it among only the technical people? The answer always was, yes, because society as a whole has never had any input into this matter. My thesis is that there cannot be international consensus so long as only the technical side is heard.
Finally, we mentioned that aboriginal consultation, public education and information, and the development of options -- all items we recommended -- would take at least three years. However, the cabinet document states that a three-year delay in revising the AECL disposal concept is too long and that, by that time, much of the existing human and physical infrastructure that could be used will be disbursed.
We can expect a resolution on this issue within a year. I believe that this is the most serious mistake the government may be making. Without adequate public information and education, particularly without thorough aboriginal consultation, because they will be the people most directly involved, it could end up in public opposition.
I hope you will read our extensive report as well as the government's response which is readily available.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Senator Wilson.
Senator Gustafson: When I first came to Ottawa some 20 years ago Atomic Research Energy of Canada Limited had an excellent display in room 200. I happened to go to school with a very bright young fellow who became a researcher with AECL. He told me that atomic energy was the most positive thing that could happen.
I recall phoning the Minister of Energy at that time, and asking whether they were on top of this. He told me that it was not politically acceptable at that point in time. That is what I hear you saying today. Technically, they have decided that putting the waste in the ground and letting it dissipate into the rock through the ages is a good idea, but politically that is not acceptable. Twenty years ago, 80 per cent of the population were opposed to uranium development. What do you estimate that percentage to be today?
I also recall being invited for dinner by the ambassador of France when I was Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister. He wanted to know what I thought the future of the Reform Party was in Western Canada. I often smile about how I mislead the man. At any rate, after some discussion, I asked him what his background was and he told me that he was in the uranium industry. He proceeded to tell me that, in France, 75 per cent of all electricity comes from uranium power. He also commented on how vast the holdings of uranium in northern Saskatchewan were, thus indicating that we were sitting on the Saudi Arabia of North America.
My view is that Canada should probably be a leader, and will be one day be a leader, in this area. Do you think it is fair that people who do not understand are taking a social position, as you call it, against those in the industry and who understand the technical aspects of what is happening? It brings into the question the whole idea of democracy.
Senator Wilson: That is one thing it does do. We did not quite say it is technically acceptable. We can bury all this stuff and it may be politically acceptable.
We did, however, point out that, even those who told us that it was technically acceptable, qualified that by adding the words, "on balance." That indicates some hesitation, even at the conceptual stage of development. There has been no demonstration of the technical merits. As I mentioned 95 deficiencies were identified. That means that, technically, an awful lot of work still needs to be done.
Apart from that, the social view of safety is about safety, not acceptability.
I would reiterate that there was a division of opinion on the safety aspects. It is a controversial subject and full of conflict. Part of my hesitation with what the government seems to be doing, which is charging full ahead, is that it does not understand the deep, profound fears and dread that some people have, and the division in society which this could exacerbate.
Senator Gustafson: Were the fears expressed related in particular to the transportation of the goods?
Senator Wilson: We had a long section about transportation and whether that should be by truck or ship, especially in and around the northern Ontario communities which have a single highway over a single bridge, and the risk of forest fires and dangerous ice conditions on the road. We had many interventions about transportation. It was difficult to deal with because it is conceptual. We did what we could, but there is no specific plan at this point.
Senator Hays: It is very nice to have a senator appear before our committee as a witness and giving us expert advice.
My question arises out of my own lack of expertise and understanding of all the ramifications and issues involving nuclear waste disposal. As I listened to you, senator, it struck me that you and your colleagues were searching for a perfect solution. Not being able to find it, you appear to have agreed among yourselves to make a report on less than a perfect solution. It seems that we are still trying to find a perfect solution.
Is there a less-than-100-per-cent-safe system we should be pursuing for dealing with the disposal of nuclear waste that is better than what we are doing now, which is storing it on site?Is there an interim measure we should consider while we wait for the perfect answer -- which we may never find?
Senator Wilson: We could not see a perfect answer, so we did the best we could.
We were informed that the waste could stay safely in the pools at Pickering and Bruce, where it is produced, for 100 years. Having accepted that, the panel recommended that, if we have 100 years leeway, we should be doing what you suggested senator. We should ask the scientific community to research some of the other options to see if we can come up with something within the 100 years that instils more confidence in the public and scientific community. We have only been at this for 50 years, which is a short time. The fact that we have 100 years' lead-time before something has to be done, partly shaped what we wrote in our report.
Most countries are leaving it in the pools or transporting it and running into conflict situations when trucks are used. People do not want it coming through their community because it is a highly toxic material. They are afraid of leakage.
Senator Hays: It occurs to me that one of the major dilemmas is that people are demanding that the problem be solved but they do not want to be involved or exposed to risk. It is the "not in my backyard" scenario. Is that the issue?
Perhaps we could find a place that is geologically stable where it is not an issue. In that context you mentioned aboriginal communities as being unanimously opposed to agreeing to any particular course of action other than the one we are now following, and they may not even agree with that.
Is there a place in the world where it would not be in someone's backyard and everybody would feel safe because no one would be directly affected?
Would you also please comment on the role of the aboriginal communities?
Senator Wilson: Even in an area where there are no people, there would still be animal life and an ecosystem.
When I say that the aboriginal people were unanimous I am referring to the those we heard from. They were, by no means, all the aboriginal people in Canada. Those who did appear before us did not simply say that this material was unwanted, they put forward their whole holistic philosophy of the earth and humankind and how they work together. Many of them objected to what they called the desecration of the earth.
One particular fellow from northern Ontario said, "You people always take something from us. You took our lakes and our trees, but you are not going to get our rocks." I am sure he did not really understand the issue, except he did understand that we were proposing to dump our waste on those who are perceived to have little political power.
Senator Hays: It was a regard for the earth, for nature.
Senator Wilson: Yes, it was a regard for the earth mostly. That is the main message I received. The message was that the people in the south who generate this waste should look after their own garbage. Perhaps many of them do not realize that their electricity is generated by nuclear power. Of course, it was pointed out to us that some aboriginal communities do not have electricity.
Senator Spivak: I do not want to discuss the 95 deficiencies at the moment. What is really disturbing about this is the role of the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Agency. It is disturbing for many reasons.
I would like to know more about the scientists on the Seaborn panel and whether there was any conflict of interest.
These utilities, while they may have the expertise, are not known for protecting the public interest. Nor are they known for doing public consultation in any way that makes any sense. None of the corporate sector is interested in public consultation, they are only interested in public manipulation to suit their ends.
The Chairman: That is your own view.
Senator Spivak: I think that is accurate.
The Chairman: You are not speaking for the committee.
Senator Spivak: If I were a company interested in selling, it would not be my job to protect the public interest. That is the government's job; and that is what they should be doing.
You cannot blame these people for pursuing their ends. I do not mean it in any malicious way but in a real political sense. That has been the experience.
How set in stone is the government's response? Is it possible that there might be second thoughts about how this is being structured? What about questions on environmental assessment? Within this management regime, might they consider other options? Have they accepted the concept of deep geological disposal? Are they open to leaving those residues where they are for 100 years until we can gain more knowledge? There are many questions to be answered.
The Chairman: Which one do you want answered?
Senator Spivak: They are all about the same subject, the Nuclear Fuel Waste Agency.
Senator Wilson: You know as much as I do about whether the government`s position it is set in stone or not. I am new to Parliament Hill.
The panel was most disappointed that this unanimous recommendation about the makeup of the nuclear waste agency was not accepted by the government. We heard from many witnesses about Ontario Hydro's failure to protect the fund that was to be used for the disposal of nuclear waste. The money was spent, becoming only a book entry. When this became known, it did not do much for public confidence in Ontario Hydro. This event was the reason we felt that, in order to have the public's confidence and trust, the new management agency should be separate from Ontario Hydro.
What other questions did you have?
Senator Spivak: Is environmental assessment open to other options?
Senator Wilson: I do not know how they can develop other options when we are to hear about the preferred option by this December as there is not enough time. The mininster has said, "I will bring you the preferred option by December."
Senator Spivak: How is the Nuclear Waste Management Agency to negotiate the localization of waste? Will there be public consultations and environmental assessments? I do not understand.
Senator Wilson: Legislation will be introduced, and that is where you can get involved. I think this committee should know about the issue before the introduction of the legislation.
Senator Taylor: Thank you, Senator Wilson for bringing this matter to our attention.
The technical aspect of the refining and use of uranium seems to be handled relatively well, but there are obviously some social problems related to safety and that is worrisome.
No one seems to know how uranium is transported today from the plant to where it is used. It is my understanding that we only retrieve about 10 per cent of the uranium that is available before the fuel is considered to be waste. Perhaps it should be used again and again because about 93 per cent of the energy is still left in that so-called "waste." Was that matter raised in your panel's inquiry?
Senator Wilson: Unfortunately, as I mentioned, our mandate was narrow, and every time we tried to discuss something outside of that mandate, we were ruled out of order.
Senator Taylor: Did anybody come to your committee and compare the pollution resulting from nuclear energy with that produced by either natural gas or coal? Were you told how many deaths are related to asthma or other lung diseases? As you know, we just entered into the Kyoto Agreement to cut down emissions from these other energy sources. As you know, China and Korea, which are certainly not short of coal, are buying and using our reactors in order to reduce air pollution. Did anyone who appeared before your committee weigh the alternatives? We now know about asthma, pollution and even global warming.
Senator Wilson: The panel was quite aware that nuclear energy is cleaner than coal. That is one of the things in its favour. It still does not solve the question we were charged with: What do you do with the waste? You started off your questions by saying that, technically, it seems to be handled well.
Senator Taylor: I am quoting your report.
Senator Wilson: Our report does not say simply, "Technically, it seemed to be fine." There are many things to be reviewed and corrected there. We were aware of the clean energy aspect of this question. However, we were charged with the question of what to do with the waste, and the clean aspect of this method of producing energy does not touch on that problem.
Senator Taylor: In your view, would it be immoral to export the waste to a country that would want to store it? Of course, they would be charging us for that service.
Senator Wilson: What do those countries do with the waste? It seems to me that some of them are not as well equipped nor as advanced as we are in research for the disposal of nuclear waste. I do not know what will happen 20 years from now when X number of countries have nuclear reactors. I hope that, by then, some of the options will have come up for review.
We did not look at the options because they were not presented to us. However, we stated that we needed options.
Senator Adams: You mentioned that you met with aboriginal people. Were they from Ontario as well as Manitoba?
Senator Wilson: We visited Manitoba, Ontario, and New Brunswick.
Senator Adams: Were those chosen because there was storage available in those areas?
Senator Wilson: I wish I knew. I kept asking that question: Why these ones and not that one? Perhaps part of the answer to that question had to do with accessibility. Among other places, we visited Serpent River, a native tribe at Pinawa, which is outside Winnipeg, and Longlac.
Senator Adams: Did you suggest that the government would pay those communities to store that waste?
Senator Wilson: No, we explored the issues with them in the same manner as we did with the dominant community. Our mandate was to study the concept of what we will do with the waste, but the aboriginal people did not confine themselves to the mandate. They simply reacted to the whole concept of nuclear energy.
Senator Adams: We have been told that in Europe and in northern Russia, they are dumping some nuclear waste into deep water in the high seas. People say that the barrels containing the waste will break. Will they stay on the bottom?
Senator Wilson: The Canadian government was aware that there must be a better solution, and that is why the whole process was started. It was to try to find a safe way of disposing of this waste. That is to the credit of the Canadian government.
Senator Adams: Might it be better to drill a hole through the ice in Greenland and put it down many thousands of feet. Have you heard about that as a possible solution?
Senator Wilson: We heard about everything. We heard about shooting it to the moon and about dumping it into the ocean. There was little scientific evidence to back up any of this. All those ideas were mentioned.
The disposal of it in the Laurentian Shield was a multi-barrier system. It would take you a week or so to really explore the proposal. You cannot simply dig a hole and dump it in. That is a simplistic view of what was proposed to us.
Senator Johnstone: I come from Prince Edward Island and I do not think we have any uranium there. Therefore, I will try to be objective, although I acknowledge that it is a dangerous substance.
We are told that oil is finite and we must consider all new sources of energy.
How real are the objections to this proposal? For instance, my grandmother would not use the telephone. It was a newfangled device; therefore, it was dangerous. When the automobile came to Prince Edward Island, it was all right to drive it outside the towns at 16 miles an hour, but not in town. In town, a man walked in front of the car with a flag. When the bridge to Prince Edward Island was talked about, people feared that it would destroy our way of life, that it would be an absolute disaster for Prince Edward Island.
How seriously do you take these objections, and are there not some positive aspects to this also? Is it not possible that that waste can be transported and disposed of safely?
Senator Wilson: The panel are not at all against technological change and progress. Let me reiterate, our mandate was not to look at the whole nuclear picture, but only at the disposal of nuclear waste. We had all shades of opinion presented to us from those who would like everything nuclear banished, to those who said that nuclear energy is a good thing, but who still do not know what to do with the waste. They told us that we should keep producing nevertheless. Others said we should not produce any more until we find a safe method of disposal. Sweden did that at one point, and then they reversed their stand.
The dumping must be taken extremely seriously because of the possibility of leakage, not into the human food chain and water, but because of environmental concerns. The biologist on the committee had some interesting input on that one.
It was not only people who defended not having it in their backyard who came to us, but also people who really have a much broader perspective on Canadian society and what it would mean for Canada. Some said that, if there were a system for neutralizing the waste, they would support it. Others said that, even if there were such a system, they would prefer that nuclear power be wiped out. There was a broad spectrum of opinion. That still exists, and it will probably continue to exist.
Senator Kroft: I have one observation. I agree with you, Senator Wilson, that the acceptance of the social consequences and the framing of opinion in a way that would make it more acceptable are the most difficult issues.
It strikes me that the real issue we have to address in order to understand the politics of it, is the degree to which there is acceptance of the whole concept of the use of nuclear energy.
Your last response suggested that there is a span of opinion. It seems that if a survey were done to assess opinion on who were entirely uncomfortable with the idea of nuclear energy, it would probably be found that many of the objections rest with people who have never, and may never accept the idea of nuclear energy. If that is the case, then the discussion about the method of monitoring, finding a solution, and the technical aspects, is probably all for naught because the concern is more fundamental.
Senator Wilson: Some would say that. They would be against nuclear energy because they see no way of controlling it.
Senator Kroft: My point is that they have a mindset, which we may all share to some degree, that there is no way we can adequately deal with this.
Having been a member of that panel, are you left with the feeling that there is a solution to this?
Senator Wilson: No, there is not at the present time.
Senator Kroft: I am not talking a technical solution. Do you think that we will ever persuade the public that we can use a nuclear generation system that produces nuclear waste without government having to impose a set of decisions on a minority -- and we do not know how big it is -- that will never accept this? What is your sense of acceptance?
Senator Wilson: The acceptability by the public will depend on whether there is a safe method of disposal.
Senator Kroft: Are you hopeful that, through technology and education, we could get to the point of broad acceptability of use?
Senator Wilson: It must first be safe. Then it might be acceptable.
Senator Kroft: We are going in a circle because the question I am asking is whether you believe that people will ever be convinced that it is safe?
Senator Wilson: I think so. I am hopeful. We asked the scientists to go back and reconsider their positions, because we had a lot of concerns. They wondered why science was being attacked. We told them it was not an attack but that we wanted a better scientific solution to this problem.
If a safe disposal method can be found, then some of the acceptability question would be resolved. However, there will always be some people who will want nothing to do with it, at any level, and that has to be respected.
The Chairman: Thank you Senator Wilson. One of the benefits of having you as the expert is that if we have more questions, you will not be far away.
Senator Wilson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The committee adjourned.