Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs
Issue 26 - Appendix "A"
Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. President
LAWYERS' ALLIANCE FOR WORLD SECURTY
COMMITTEE FOR: NATIONAL SECURITY
November 2,1999
Dear Prime Minister
It is of considerable importance that the nuclear strategy of NATO be consistent with the non-proliferation priorities of its member states which are all states parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). NATO is expected to reaffirm its existing nuclear strategy this December prior to formal approval at a NATO summit in Washington next April. Reaffirmation of the old Cold War era strategy without revision would have a negative impact on the international non-proliferation regime.
During 1994 and 1995, 1 led a global diplomatic effort on behalf of the U.S. Government to achieve the indefinite extension of the NPT. I travelled to approximately forty capitals and consulted personally with representatives of over one hundred of the states parties to the Treaty. During this process I became acutely aware of the concerns of many states parties with regard to the future viability of the Treaty.
I believe that the NPT regime will be in grave jeopardy if significant progress is not made toward the Article V1 disarmament obligations by the five nuclear weapon states parties by the 2000 Review Conference. Despite this, it seems unlikely at this time that the nuclear weapon states parties will make such progress consistent with Article VI and the Principles and Objectives Document adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference before the 2000 Conference. Even the START process, which is, alone, inadequate to meet the concerns of the non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, appears bogged down at present with no immediate hope of major progress. Furrhermore, some are arguing that India and Pakistan should be accepted as nuclear weapon states; an acquiescence that would devastate the NPT regime. The importance of the NPT vas clear to all when it was extended indefinitely, but if the circumstances described above do not improve over time, influential states such as Indonesia, Egypt, and Japan may begin to question the Treaty's effectiveness as an instrument of their security policy.
The policy choices that NATO makes regarding the deployment and conditions of prospective use for nuclear weapons will. increasingly impact the health of the NPT regime. If NATO members continue to support policies that assign a high political value to nuclear weapons, for instance as an essential bulwark of Alliance cohesion, the cost in terms of the effectiveness of global non-proliferation efforts will be significant Nuclear weapons are irrelevant to the vast majority of the threats that NATO faces today; their only utility is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others. Nuclear proliferation, however, would pose a significant security threat to the Alliance as a whole as well as to individual members. Presently, NATO policies favoring reliance on nuclear weapons and attaching a high political value to these weapons benefit the Alliance very little, but the cost of these policies is becoming very.high in terms of the non-proliferation efforts they impede.
I strongly recommend that the strategy review to be undertaken at the upcoming NATO Ministerial account for the Importance of the NPT regime to Alliance security. Specific Alliance contributions to the implementation of the Principles and Objectives on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament agreed to at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference should include:
- NATO should no longer refer to nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO as "' an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance." (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Art. 55) Attaching a high political value to nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the legal obligations of all NATO member states under the NPT and NATO's stated objectives regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and is theref6re detrimental to the security of NATO and its members.
- NATO should announce that, as a matter of Alliance policy, it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict
- NATO should support transfer of nuclear weapons from operational status to storage with the intention of looking toward the eventual elimination of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.
- NATO should announce a new High Level Task Force of the North Atlantic Council to study the future role of nuclear weapons in Europe with the intention of identifying areas In which Alliance policy could promote effective non-proliferation, through arms control as well as current counter-proliferation measures.
- NATO should announce that the nuclear sharing arrangements developed in the late 1960s are no longer necessary or appropriate. The plans and procedures for transferring U.S. nuclear weapons to NATO Allies in time of war are of dubious legality with respect to Articles I and II of the NPT and have been criticized by South Africa and others as inconsistent with the objectives of the NPT.
Implementation of measures such as those described above would constitute an important contribution by the Alliance to the continued viability of the NPT regime and would thus support Alliance security and stated policy objectives. In light of new threats and changing economic and political conditions, these steps would generate a substantial non-proliferation benefit, thereby enhancing the security of NATO and its members. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions about this letter or would like to discuss the relationship between nuclear weapons policy and non-proliferation further.
Sincerely,
Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.