Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs
Issue 2 - Evidence
OTTAWA, Tuesday, October 26, 1999
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs met this day at 9:10 a.m. to examine the ramifications to Canada of the changed mandate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Canada's role in NATO since the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the end of the Cold War and the recent addition to membership in NATO of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic; and of peacekeeping, with particular reference to Canada's ability to participate in it under the auspices of any international body of which Canada is a member.
Senator John B. Stewart (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honourable senators, for our meeting this morning, we had hoped to have the Minister of Foreign Affairs and possibly the Minister of National Defence before us. However, because of events in Pakistan, Mr. Axworthy could not be here. There was a question as to whether or not we should proceed with the meeting. I decided that, since senators had made plans to be here and since there was work to be done, we should go ahead without the ministers.
We will start off with a briefing on the East Timor situation. It is interesting that the Yugoslav-Kosovo situation dominated the news for many months and then disappeared, at least from the current news, and then the focus shifted to East Timor, which is fading from the news.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations has referred to "the CNN factor"; in other words, what we are seeing is the effect of the CNN factor in focusing the public's mind on specific situations intensely and then shifting to something else.
We will commence this morning with witnesses who will discuss the East Timor situation.
Please proceed.
Mr. Joseph Caron, Assistant Deputy Minister (Portfolio: Asia Pacific and Africa) Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: On behalf of our department and colleagues at the table, we welcome this opportunity to discuss the background to the situation in East Timor, the present situation, and where it is headed.
It might be useful to situate the current situation by reflecting on the past for a moment. Indeed, in the distant past, when we were all at school, we studied about the lure of the Spice Islands as an attraction to the countries of Western Europe, in particular, to travel the seas and to supply Europe with various goods. Many of the spices came from what are now the islands of Indonesia. Where East Timor is situated was an area of confluence between Dutch and Portuguese sailors, explorers, and ultimately merchants. The island of Timor was the subject of some conflict at various times between the Dutch and the Portuguese, but ultimately, in the middle of the last century, they divided the island into West Timor and East Timor, with the Portuguese occupying East Timor.
The inhabitants are not noticeably different from one end of the island to the other. Ethnically, it is largely the same. The same language is spoken, et cetera, but the colonial history obviously is very different. The East Timorese became Christians and indeed remained subjects of Portugal until 1975 when the Salazar dictatorship in Portugal fell and there was disorder in all of Portugal's former colonies, including in East Timor, where a group declared independence, wishing to create their own state. This was followed immediately by an invasion by the Indonesian military in 1975 and then in 1976 by annexation by the Indonesian Parliament.
In the intervening 23 years, the Indonesians attempted to integrate East Timor, but obviously with very little success, probably using an excess of military force in their security concerns over political integration. So the independence movement did not die away but in fact grew. There was a great deal of instability and there were occasional massacres.
The situation essentially came to a head at the end of the Suharto administration. After Suharto was forced to leave power and elections were called, the dynamic changed completely. The long history of international appeals to allow the East Timorese to determine their own future finally resulted, in January of this year, in a decision by then president Habibie to offer to the Timorese either an opportunity for greater autonomy, but within the Indonesian federation, or total independence, and that was the subject of the referendum that was held on August 30.
Prior to that, the terms of that referendum were set by the United Nations, which had, over the years, been conducting a dialogue between Indonesia and Portugal as the previous colonial power. Therefore, the conditions under which this referendum took place and the situation in which we find ourselves even today, or at least until the new UN resolution that will transfer authority to a UN mandate comes fully into effect, largely has been defined by the agreements of May 5 between the UN, Indonesia, and Portugal.
The decision by Habibie to have this vote was very controversial, to say the least, within East Timor itself. Forces sympathetic to autonomy, indeed forces that would have preferred continued integration under the same formula, were in some cases violently opposed to the referendum. Indeed, there were substantial cases of civil conflict even before the referendum. However, there was also an expectation in Jakarta and other capitals, and probably within Dili, that the outcome of the referendum would be a close call, that it was not a foregone conclusion. So there was a lot of sensitivity in Jakarta and elsewhere that the event organized by the United Nations not tip the scales one way or the other. I think that virtually any independent observer would have thought that a "close call" was dreaming in technicolor.
I was in Dili and Jakarta in August before the vote and it was very hard to find anyone who was reasonably independent of thought and vision who thought that it would be anything but a landslide by the independents, which in fact it was. Ninety-nine per cent of the approximately 640,000 eligible voters voted, and almost 79 per cent voted in favour of independence.
[Translation]
Despite all the questions throughout the international community, the United Nations and even Indonesia, as to whether the vote should not take place because of the instability in East Timor, many wondered whether a delay might not be best. That the vote should proceed was essentially the decision of the UN Secretary-General based on advice he got from Mr. Ian Martin and other UN representatives, governments and observers. It was a unique opportunity but it was still a risk.
That said, on the day of the vote, August 30, things went along in a climate of peace and stability quite to the international community's surprise. Once again, this was perhaps a reflection of the pro-integrationist forces who had a chance of winning. As we have seen, that is not what happened.
The vote took place on September 30 and on October 4 the decision was formally announced by the Secretary-General of the UN in favour of independence. After that, there was a swift decline in security in that province and everywhere in the country. You mentioned the CNN factor and that is what drew CNN and the international media, including the CBC and everyone else for the vote, but also after the vote.
The least that can be said is that this was a period of tremendous violence; large areas of urban centres were destroyed. In some cases, it was total destruction, in others only partial. The city of Dili, which normally would be the capital, was devastated. These were not huge cities but rather small towns of some 20,000 or 30,000 souls and, of course, they were the security centres of a population that is partly urban and partly agricultural.
With all that as background information, Canada, throughout this period and actually since 1975 or 1976, did show much interest in this matter. I was at the Indonesian desk some decades ago. Even in those days, every year, in the United Nations, we had to deal with the question brought forth by Portugal as to whether Indonesia should be condemned for its invasion. There was always some interest, although it is rather weak as the Timorese population in Canada is only two people.
That said, the interests of equity, democracy, and of allowing this population to speak out -- il was complaining with more or less vigour about the Indonesian invasion, including the presence of a military force -- all of this made East Timor a very important matter for us.
With the political situation, the possibilities and the opportunities, the Timorese had evolved at the end of the Suharto era. We looked anew at subjects raised time and time again, to wit encouraging the Indonesian government to allow the vote, and making sure that the vote was done properly in a climate of peace and security. That was not really done before the day of the vote. It must be said that the May 5 agreements gave Indonesia the responsibility for security and the whole international community had to respect that reality.
During the last two years, we asked for public consultation and there were many meetings with Mr. Xanana Gusmao, the potential head of East Timor.
We contributed much to East Timor's development and we still show interest and shall continue to do so in the coming months. If you do not mind, I will ask Mr. Paul Meyer to follow up with the UN questions.
[English]
Mr. Paul Meyer, Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: I will limit myself to a brief description of the UN dimension of setting up this force. As you will be aware, the context was the May agreements among Indonesia, Portugal, and the UN regarding the popular consultation. At that time, in June, the Security Council established the UN mission in East Timor to oversee this popular consultation. Canada contributed police and electoral observers to this mission, and the council was regularly briefed.
As Mr. Caron explained, the conditions for a free and fair ballot were not ideal. However, there was a clear message that East Timorese themselves were anxious that the ballot be held despite the imperfections regarding the security situation, which remained the responsibility of the Indonesian government.
The vote was held in remarkably peaceful circumstances on August 30, with a high turnout and a clear majority expressed for the independence option.
The situation rapidly deteriorated the day after with a clear abdication by Indonesia of the responsibility to provide security in the aftermath.
There followed an intense period of diplomatic activity, in which the Canadian Foreign Minister played a role in ensuring that Indonesia was held to account. Ultimately, this engaged the Security Council, which dispatched a delegation to Indonesia and East Timor to establish the facts on the ground. In turn, they put pressure on the Indonesian government to accept an outside force.
That force, the INTERFET multinational force, led by Australia, was mandated by UN Security Council resolution 1264 on September 15 and entered East Timor shortly thereafter.
Although Canada's preference in keeping with our traditional approach to UN peacekeeping operations was for a blue beret operation as soon as possible, we recognized that the seriousness of the situation and the need for the quickest response meant that a multinational force led by the Australians was the most expeditious variant available to us.
I stress that we wanted to see a blue beret UN peacekeeping force put into place as soon as was feasible. This was already flagged in the UN resolution. I am pleased to say that yesterday the Security Council in New York passed UN Security Council resolution 1272. That resolution set up the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. That administration will take over the military functions of INTERFET, as well as establish a wide-ranging civilian administration to administer the region on behalf of the UN and to prepare for the assumption by the East Timorese themselves of responsibility for their own affairs.
This is a significant force, I should add. The Security Council authorized 9,000 troops, more than 1,600 police officers, and some 200 military observers.
Colleagues from DND can outline the Canadian contribution to this mission; it is a significant one. On the police side, we have already identified four police trainers and six officers who will participate in the civilian police component.
The peacekeeping operation is mandated to extend until January 2001. The Secretary-General also indicated yesterday that he has decided to appoint Under-Secretary-General de Mello to be his special representative. He is a very experienced diplomat who was heading up the Office for Coordinating Humanitarian Assistance within the UN.
[Translation]
Once again, Canada is involved in a peacekeeping operation which demonstrates its desire to significantly contribute to the search for international security everywhere and anywhere in the world.
[English]
That ends my comments. Perhaps I could turn to DND for just a brief description of the nature of the Canadian contribution to the peacekeeping operation.
The Chairman: We are particularly interested in the nature of the Canadian contribution since part of our reference refers to our competence to perform various peacekeeping tasks. I will read a few of the words.
There is reference first to NATO and then in our mandate we have the words "and of peacekeeping, with particular reference to Canada's ability to participate in it under the auspices of any international body of which Canada is a member." In this case, the auspices would be the United Nations.
We are interested in the nature of our contribution and whether or not that contribution could be made easily, given the nature of the Canadian Forces.
Colonel Walter Natynczyk, Director, J3 Operations, Department of National Defence: Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to provide you with a short briefing, which I hope will address many of the points you have raised. You should be aware that Operation Toucan is the name given by the Canadians Forces to the operation in East Timor.
[Translation]
I have a few historical notes concerning our contribution to fight Japanese encephalitis as to the threat and the cost estimate it raises at the end of the engagement.
[English]
As to background, as was mentioned, Australia is leading the international force, or INTERFET, in East Timor. They are contributing approximately 4,500 troops toward a planned force of approximately 7,500. Indeed, other nations are joining the cause as well and producing additional troops.
In terms of our own contribution, from the outset we conducted a military assessment to determine what kinds of units we would deploy into theatre, which would be ideally suited to the kinds of missions they would have to perform, mindful of our current contribution to our ongoing operations. You should be aware that we have more than 4,000 troops currently deployed overseas.
Additionally, it was important for us to keep in mind that our contribution was to have a minimal impact upon our Y2K preparations.
I will talk about three components that we have deployed into theatre. The first is the air component. In this regard, we have deployed two Hercules transport aircraft. We have deployed 105 people to maintain the aircraft, as well as an aircrew. The aircraft contingent is based in Darwin, in the northwest corner of Australia. They flew their first mission into Dili, East Timor, on September 28. To date, they have carried an excess of 1.1 million pounds of cargo and over 1,000 troops, going back and forth to Dili, and we have been very satisfied with their performance.
[Translation]
The ship Protecteur left Esquimalt on the West coast on September 23 with 270 people on board. HMCS Protecteur pursued training en route both for the ship's crew as well as the helicopter crew. HMCS Protecteur is now in the port of Dili to take on the tasks of its Australian counterpart HMAS Success.
[English]
Concerning the land component, we have prepared 240 personnel from the troisième bataillon Royal 22e Régiment, and that includes command and support elements. We have deployed seven light vehicles for their support. They began their deployment on October 15, after completing a comprehensive training package that we conduct for all of our missions going overseas. They went to Townsville, Australia, where there was a period of additional training involving cultural awareness and integration with the New Zealand forces, and that has concluded over this past weekend. At present, they are loading an Australian ship, the Tobruk, and preparing for their deployment to the south shore of East Timor, an area near a town called Suai, and that should occur within the next 48 hours. Among these three components, we have some 650 Canadian service members deployed.
I want to talk about an essential component in the planning for this operation, that is, the Japanese encephalitis. This disease is prevalent in the rural areas of the Orient. Indeed, many of the tourist bureaus will indicate to tourists travelling in the area that they should undertake a vaccination protocol of two types, a long and short protocol. This has been an essential factor in our preparation, in that we had to incorporate this protocol into our training package and prepare our troops for the region. We are not the only country to face this; most of the countries going into the region had to prepare their soldiers in this way as well, including the New Zealanders.
In terms of the threat to the Canadian forces in this region, our concerns focused on four main groups that our troops will encounter: The Indonesian armed forces, the pro-integration militias, the pro-independence militias, and even some of the refugees in the area.
You will be aware that, in the period of instability following the elections, we have had concerns about how things would develop. Today, the situation is much calmer; it is improving day by day.
The other great challenge has been the environment. It is a hostile environment, with regard to the diseases, insects, snakes, and so on, not to mention the monsoon season, which is due to start in the next few days.
You should be aware that, in terms of command and control, the Chief of Defence Staff maintains full command of all Canadian forces deployed. We have established a Canadian contingent commander, Captain Roger Girouard, and he maintains the operational command of all Canadian forces in the region. The Chief of Defence Staff has given to the commander of INTERFET, General Cosgrove, operational control of our troops. That control has also been delegated to the commander of the New Zealand battalion under which the company, the land component, will be operating. However, our Canadian contingent commander, who currently resides in Dili, East Timor, will maintain operational command of all the Canadian forces deployed on this operation.
In terms of rules of engagement, you should be aware that this operation is under the United Nations Chapter 7, which allows for use of force for mission accomplishment, and we always retain the ability to use force for our own self-defence. We are quite satisfied that the rules of engagement are sufficiently robust to ensure that our soldiers can achieve their mandate and protect themselves.
[Translation]
The changes in supplementary costs are of about $33 million. The evaluation is based on 60 days for our Hercules transport aircraft and six months for sea and land involvement.
[English]
At the end of these timelines, it is my expectation that we will have completed the transition to a United Nations component, ending, from our perspective, our commitment to this region.
In conclusion, I should just like to say that we have encountered a number of significant challenges in this region regarding the Japanese encephalitis issues and the inoculation regimes. We are deploying to the other side of the world, and it is about 25 hours by aircraft into this region. We are dealing now with a tropical climate, one that we are not accustomed to in Canada, and we are about to learn about the monsoon season, which is to commence shortly.
Canadian forces members who have trained for this operation are the products of a tremendous training system. They are well prepared with the appropriate equipment to complete their tasks.
Mr. Ted Langtry, Director General, Indonesia, Philippines and South Pacific Programme, Canadian International Development Agency: I too should like to take the opportunity to give you a brief update of the activities of the Canadian International Development Agency in East Timor. I will give you a quick overview of some of our historic activities in the region, and a more specific update of some of our current activities. I will also give you some indication of what other donors are contributing to the situation in East Timor.
With respect to the historic activities of Canada in the region, CIDA has been operating in East Timor since 1979. The assistance has been channelled primarily through non-governmental and international organizations, such as the Red Cross, CARE, Unitarian Services Canada, and so on. Support has focused on developing the capacity of local organizations and institutions to strengthen East Timor's civil society in an attempt to improve socio-economic conditions. In recent years, our contribution to East Timor has averaged approximately $1.2 million per year. This has placed Canada as the third largest donor in East Timor, behind the United States and Australia.
With the signing of the May 5 accord that led to the vote on East Timor independence, CIDA initiated some additional activities, primarily in support of that vote. These new initiatives were focused in two main areas. The first was direct support to the UN-sponsored election or process. As was mentioned earlier, this dealt primarily with the provision of civilian police and election advisers who contributed to the management and administration of the vote. The second part was again primarily through international and local NGOs. The focus of this activity was voter education. Also, as the level of tension in the area was clearly increasing and there was some concern about how long it would continue, we made some investments in processes around peace and reconciliation.
In hindsight, one could argue whether or not we were successful there, as things got bad. In any case, we contributed more than $3 million toward the referendum.
We then fall into the post-election period -- that is, the period after the August 30 date -- when things became very chaotic. There was much violence, widespread destruction, and dislocation of a large portion of the population, estimated in excess of 50 per cent of that population. CIDA's efforts then moved towards emergency humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. Additional moneys have been committed to organizations such as the Red Cross, food aid, water and sanitation. Rehabilitation has been channelled through NGOs such as World Vision and CARE Canada. In addition, moneys have been channelled through various UN organizations, in particular, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees. These funds are used to assist with resettlement of the some of the people who were displaced as a result of the violence. In this regard, as recently as yesterday, Maria Minna, who is the Minister for International Cooperation, under which CIDA falls, announced another $1.5 million in emergency assistance. In the current fiscal year, CIDA's commitment to East Timor is at $6.7 million. As I indicated earlier, that compares to our average commitment of $1.2 million.
In terms of development challenges for East Timor, this is a peculiar situation. We have an emerging small nation and, therefore, the challenges are considerable. East Timor does not have a large population. It is difficult to say what it will look like when the resettlement is completed, but the population will probably be under 800,000 people. Approximately 80 per cent of the population are subsistence farmers and there is not a strong natural resource base in the region. Many of the skilled people that had been in East Timor were not East Timorese but were Javanese and they have left the region as result of the violence and the choice to move towards independence. Therefore, East Timor has both a low-skilled population and one that is small in numbers. The situation is thus one of limited assimilative capacity.
In terms of development assistance, at this point there are three stages. We have already described the immediate needs, which are humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. The timeline for that will be a minimum of 6 months, but more probably in the order of 12 months, or perhaps a little longer. The present food supply in the region will serve for a number of months. There are reasonable provisions of medical services in the area; however, there is considerable lack of medicines available to these medical facilities. There is a lack of seed for the current population to start its replanting. The next cropping season starts right now in East Timor. Should we miss this cropping season, the requirement for longer-term food aid will be greater. Transportation also continues to present a challenge in distributing these materials, food, et cetera, to the people in most need.
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA, which is a UN body in Geneva, organized a mission in mid-September of various UN agencies to go to East Timor to assess what the humanitarian requirements will be over the midterm. While we have had some preliminary indications of the dimensions of those needs, we are still awaiting a final assessment, which we expect to have any day now.
Beyond the humanitarian requirements, the second stage is the transition government, which was described earlier. This is a medium-term requirement driven primarily by the United Nations, which will assume the responsibility for administration in East Timor until the East Timorese capacity is such that the local population can manage itself. The time to do this is probably over the course of at least several years. The UN is currently doing more detailed planning as to the extent of the resourcing that must be brought to bear as well as some additional cost estimates.
The final phase is the longer-term development scenario for East Timor. This development is focused more on enhancing the socio-economic well-being of East Timorese. This will continue for a number of years. The World Bank has initiated a joint assessment mission, which arrived in East Timor yesterday. This mission will be looking at the immediate and longer-term development needs of the region. The mission includes experts in civic government, judiciary, macroeconomics, agriculture, community development, et cetera.
The joint-assessment team will be in East Timor for about three weeks. Following their assessment, they will prepare a report, which will be considered at a donors meeting sometime in early December. We will get an assessment of the longer-term development needs for the region as well as an indication of what the real costs will be.
With respect to the donors, as I mentioned earlier, until this year Canada has been one of the primary donors in East Timor, along with the Americans and Australians. With the breakthrough on the East Timor issues that have resulted from the agreement of May 5, there has been a growing interest from other donors, both bilateral and multilateral. For example, Portugal, which was the former colonial master of East Timor, feels a special obligation to the region; as well, there is a high probability that Portugal will become the primary bilateral donor to East Timor. Australia, a neighbour of East Timor, also has a special interest in the development future of the region and will continue presumably to be a major donor. In addition, there will be the multilateral sources. The World Bank and the Asia Development Bank will be expected to play important roles in the future of the region.
As to actual disbursements in support of the humanitarian assistance, the largest contribution to date has, I believe, come from the Americans. That has been primarily in the provision of food aid and transportation.
As you can see, there is a lot of donor interest in the area. In order for the international assistance to have the most positive impact on East Timor, a high level of donor coordination is essential. I referred earlier to the joint-assessment mission of the World Bank. That mission is the first comprehensive effort to achieve this coordination. For CIDA's part, we will continue to collaborate with other donors to ensure that our assistance to East Timor is timely and effective.
The Chairman: I have a series of questions; however, I see that Senator Bolduc would like to lead off, so I ask him to proceed.
[Translation]
Senator Bolduc: Mr. Caron, could you tell us, from the department's point of view, why Canadians are there? Is it because of a request from the UN? Is it the minister's role on the Security Council that forces us to act? Is it the acceptance of the new strategic concept of human security that is motivating us to get involved as soon as there is a human rights problem somewhere in the world? Is it our friendship with Australia and the Commonwealth or our economic relations in APEC and with Indonesia? Is it CNN or the CBC that apparently really like referendums? Could we have a clear idea of the fundamental criteria leading to a very activist kind of boy scout activity in international relations everywhere in the world? I heard the American, Mr. Kennan, say that it was ridiculous and even unrealistic for the Americans to try to police the world, but apparently we Canadians seem to think we are able to do it.
There are problems everywhere in the world. People are killing one another in Africa all the time. In Sierra Leone, among other places, it is been going on for five years. We have not shown up there yet.
Why does Canada show up in those places? One might understand our presence in Kosovo, as we are part of NATO. We are 10,000 miles away from those people. I have nothing against them, but I would like to know why? Maybe some time later a judge might ask us to prosecute criminals. Will we be in that country for another 25 years like in Cyprus? In other words, what is the problem and why are we involved in those countries?
Since the beginning of your presentation, you have been saying it is a good thing to do and we must participate in these missions. I would like someone to explain why. We are placing our resources here and there and everywhere in the world. It seems to me that if we develop a large-scale concept of human security, at some point we are going to have to be present everywhere in the world. We are already having trouble getting our Hercules to fly and that concerns me somewhat.
Mr. Caron: Your questions are not simple ones, Senator Bolduc. This is a fundamental question of foreign policy. Essentially, you have touched upon several of the reasons explaining our participation and interest in East Timor.
It is true that East Timor is an island of some 890,000 souls. It is very far from here and there are very few Timorese in Canada. My colleague informed you of the problems this new political entity will be facing.
Prima facie, it is quite legitimate for one to wonder about that. It goes without saying that Canadian participation was not decided upon without serious thought having been given to the motives. First of all, we have to think about our interests in the Asia-Pacific region. It is true that it is quite a distance away but it is becoming more and more important for Canada.
During the 90s, we did not have any challenges to peace and security in the area, but our interests were ensured through great stability in the region. Geographically speaking, Indonesia -- where East Timor is located -- is one of the biggest countries in the world. There are 17,000 islands and it has a population of about 220 million. Despite instability, the country showed rather impressive economic growth.
Economic stability is important for the whole South East Asia region and even beyond because this country straddles the sea transportation routes between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean through which passes a lot of the oil that feeds Japanese industry. Economic stability in Indonesia is thus absolutely central to Canadian interests.
This is a new country that is developing and heading towards democracy. We saw the effects of that last week. This is a country in which a lot of other countries have interests, such as the success of its evolution from a colonial history through a period of quasi-military leadership and now, real democracy. Our interests would be very ill served if the country were to fall apart.
We are in Asia for the reasons you all know. APEC is visibly a very important member and its stability is essential. In a macro sense, that is what matters. In a more micro sense, it is a matter of human security. You are quite right, we cannot be everywhere all the time. In fact, there is not a single country in the world trying to do that.
We are all witnesses of the situation in Washington these days and even a country that is that great has its own debates about its international role. The situation and the conditions were such in East Timor that the international community could play a role there. It played it more swiftly than UN practice does.
If we look at the experience of the last 10 or 20 years, it remains feasible. This is a theatre where our geopolitical interests and the fulfilment of our foreign policy priorities can come to fruition. It is true that in Africa there are a lot of areas where things are not going well. You raised the matter of Sierra Leone. In that case, the conditions surrounding international action remain far more limited. Of course, one must make choices and for the reasons I have just given, we chose to act in East Timor.
Senator Bolduc: I am interested in the criteria. You decide to go to East Timor but not to other places. It seems to me that is serious. There are human lives involved here, resources and budgets.
I suppose we will have to support the Foreign Affairs Department on this. I understand the tradition that has evolved over the last 50 years; the decision must be made by the minister and the government.
We would have to establish a certain number of criteria that would lead us to making the decision to go ahead. We should also keep our leeway and diplomatic discretion till the end. Parliament is a little helpless in this situation. We are basically just informed of what action was taken.
In the world to come, Canada's international action will have to be subject to more supervision based on certain criteria. It is a bit like the international financial architecture, it is not easy to define.
I get the impression I am still living in the period where the king had absolute power and decided that you were going somewhere rather than somewhere else. It is difficult for a parliamentarian to accept that situation.
Mr. Caron: Some of your questions are definitely political in nature. I will let my minister answer those. I think we have the support system you were mentioning. It is a support system that allows Canada's foreign policy to have a multidimensional perspective.
That support is, in part, to do things well at many levels. There is also the support of resources. That is what brought about your comments. I do not represent authority, that is my colleagues. In some international interventions, we only had four or five people involved.
In Sierra Leone, we are thinking of having five military observers and maybe one or two police officers. The choice is made, in part, based on circumstances and availability of resources. It is true that in many fields we act based on our capacity. That defines part of our foreign policy and, thus, our image in the world.
[English]
Senator Andreychuk: It seems to me that you gave a compelling reason, Mr. Caron, for why Canada should be concerned about Indonesia. Its stability and success are integral and important to Canada for all the reasons that you gave.
Your conclusion leads me to believe that we should not have entered into Timor if we were concerned about the stability of Indonesia, because now we have set up the dynamics of an independent Timor. Why is Timor more available for independence than all those other independence movements in Indonesia and all of the islands with emerging pro-independence movements, some with less than 800,000 people and some with more? We have taken action to accelerate the independence movement in Timor. How is it in our best interests to have a situation that will perhaps lead to more destabilization of Indonesia?
I did not hear you say once that the independence of Indonesia was essential to our security. You were saying that it was the stability of Indonesia that is important.
You said we were in Timor because it was one area where the UN could play a role. Is this to say that we are only there because the UN found its role there? I am concerned that we have not made a decision about East Timor and Canada's reasons for being there directly.
Mr. Caron: Let me respond as follows. I would dispute one of your premises, senator. I do not think that we set out necessarily, nor at any point was it the Canadian objective, to create an independent East Timor. There are certain realities on the ground. The place had been invaded by the Indonesian troops and then integrated forcibly, I think is the best way to put it. The UN did not recognize this act. What we have called for consistently, and with increasing frequency over the more recent period, was providing the Timorese with the option -- creating an electoral circumstance that would provide the Timorese with an opportunity to decide what it is they wanted to do. That is what we favoured, and that is what happened.
I am quite confident that this was and is important for the objective of overall Indonesian stability as well. It was a festering wound in the Indonesian archipelago. It has been now dealt with, for good or bad. I would argue that playing a role and being there served our interests directly.
Senator Andreychuk: Will Canada play a role in allowing other pro-independence movements in Indonesia to have the same result as East Timor?
Mr. Caron: That is a hypothetical question.
Senator Andreychuk: There are two areas that now want further autonomy or independence. There are pro-independence movements in two other Indonesian areas. Will Canada afford them the opportunity to choose, as it did in East Timor?
Senator Grafstein: There are six or seven of them.
Mr. Caron: You have individuals everywhere calling for greater autonomy.
Senator Grafstein: They want self-determination.
Mr. Caron: That is their prerogative, but I do not think that is the issue here. The Indonesian government must deal with these disputes internally. There is a new president who, in his remarks since his election, has indicated that he wants to decentralize the decision-making power or taxation or what have you. Nevertheless, there is a recognition by the new president that he must deal with these various movements. It is not up to Canada to tell him how to do it, but it is up to Canada to encourage the Indonesian government to respect human rights, political rights, and all of those essential components in order to make Indonesia truly a strong country.
Senator Andreychuk: At what point did Canada change its perspective? We have always said that we were pushing Indonesia to respect human rights, not only in East Timor but also throughout Indonesia, because the same repression was going on in other areas. That has always been Canada's stance. At what point did Canada say through our foreign policy that it was in our interests to support the movement towards independence and to favour, as you said, the choice for the East Timorese? Again I hear you saying that all those issues should be resolved internally by Indonesia for all those other areas. What made East Timor so special in the mind of the Canadian government, and at what point did that occur?
Mr. Caron: Let me start with your comment about the minds of Canadians. Certainly in the minds of Canadians there was a great deal of interest in the issue. We received thousands of messages, particularly by e-mail, on this issue.
As to the situation in East Timor, it was occupied forcibly and integrated forcibly. It was not recognized by the United Nations as a integral part of Indonesia, which even President Habibie ultimately acknowledged at the beginning the year. That very particular set of circumstances does not apply anywhere else in Indonesia.
Senator Stollery: It applies in West New Guinea.
The Chairman: Reference was made to maintaining stability in Indonesia. I would suggest that one of the reasons we have been so keen to try to solve the East Timor problem has been that the population there is largely Christian. That gave many people in Canada, the United States, and European countries a special concern for that situation, a concern that they might not have had if the population had been Muslim, for example.
You talk about all the communications you received. I wish to ask if indeed we contemplated the possibility, right from the start, of independence. Was it not our expectation that the focus of the vote would be on autonomy, yes or no? Did not the independence option come upon us, in a sense, by surprise, so the present situation is one which we had not contemplated?
Mr. Caron: People have speculated on the outcome of the vote. As I said, when I went to both Jakarta and Dili, the first question I asked everyone was related to what they thought the outcome would be. I got various answers, as I would in any election.
Did we think about what might happen if the vote were in favour of independence? Of course, we thought about that. We also wondered what would happen if the vote were for the greater autonomy being offered by the Indonesian government. However, there is only so much contingency planning that one can do. We had to be very sensitive in the international community, starting with the United Nations, not to be seen as prejudging the outcome. We were caught on the horns of a dilemma because, even before the vote, we were perhaps the most active member of the Security Council urging, inside the room, that the UN get ready for every outcome, and that meant every outcome.
There was a lot of resistance in some quarters to doing that because of frequent accusations, beginning in Jakarta, that the UN exercise was biased. The interests of the international community, of Indonesia, and of East Timor would not be served by creating that impression. For one thing, it was not true.
Senator, if you are asking me whether there was some speculation that independence would be the choice, yes, of course, there was such speculation.
The Chairman: I have a question based on something that I have read, though I do not have the piece here.
Did Canada press for the inclusion of the independence option on the ballot? Or did we want the autonomy option?
Mr. Caron: No, we did not press the government.
The Chairman: How did that option get on the ballot? Was it done by Indonesia?
Mr. Caron: Yes, it was done by Indonesia.
The Chairman: Why?
Mr. Caron: You will have to ask the Indonesians.
The Chairman: We can speculate a little. Was it not to confront the East Timorese with the prospect of going independent with a population less than that of the province of Nova Scotia, for example, and with an economy that, it has been said, is hardly viable? Were they not trying to scare them into voting for autonomy?
Mr. Caron: The circumstances were, as I have described, that East Timor had been invaded. This was not recognized by the UN. This was a UN process. As far as the questions on the ballot are concerned, if you ask me to speculate, there were those, probably including a large number of integrationists, who did not even want the greater autonomy option. They liked things the way they were. The option was not on the ballot to continue the relationship between Dili and Jakarta.
The Indonesian government in the end put on the ballot first the greater autonomy option. Second, as was agreed on May 5 with Portugal and the United Nations, they put the independence option.
Our interest throughout has been to ensure that the UN process can move forward and that the East Timorese are consulted. We supported the talks between the Portuguese government, the Indonesians and the United Nations, but we did not dictate the substance of those talks.
Senator Grafstein: I come back to the question to which my colleagues on the other side and the chair have alluded. Here we appear to be out of theatre, out of region, out of sync with the UN. Let me just start with the UN. My understanding of the UN structure is that there is a supernational structure at the top, organized and motivated by a permanent Security Council, amplified by an extended Security Council, all based on regional pillars. Canada is not a member of the regional pillar in this particular region. Why are we there?
We are talking about the scope of the United Nations as we have envisaged it. Each region is to get together to preserve the Charter impulses of the United Nations by region. Why are we there? Are we now considered part of the Asian pillar of the United Nations?
I will follow up by saying that we have avoided, other than in Korea for different reasons, being an active member of that sub-region. In UN theoretical terms, how do we justify breaking the criteria of the UN superstructure, aside from being, as our colleagues opposite have said, a boy scout? We are all interested in being boy scouts -- or scouts, I should say. I want to be gender-sensitive.
What is the rationale under the UN theory? What is the rationale under the strategic alliances in that region? We are not part of SEATO and we never have been. At the strategic level, we are not there. Why are we there now? Why are we the third largest donor in this region? Why are we about to spend $30 million of taxpayers' money outside of our region, outside of our theatre, and out of sync with the United Nation's operation as it was projected to us in 1947 by Mr. Pearson?
Mr. Caron: Regarding the UN, I will turn to Mr. Langtry on the development side and to Mr. Meyer on the issue of how the UN operates.
First of all, I am sure we do not wish to cast aspersions against boy scouts or girl scouts. These are fine institutions, which we all support.
My understanding of our engagement on peace and security in Asia Pacific goes beyond Korea. We were in Asia Pacific during World War II. We were in Vietnam for the first international joint commission. We were in Vietnam for the international commission for control and supervision. In fact, that was my first foreign posting. We have been in Kashmir. We continue to have a role in terms of monitoring the ceasefire going back to 1951 in Korea. We have a record of significant credibility in the region. This just did not pop up as something that was new.
Mr. Meyer: We need to distinguish between the UN Charter and some procedures. In terms of election of non-permanent representatives to the council, there is a regional approach, but nowhere in the Charter is it suggested that countries are there to pursue their regional interests. It is not that we, the peoples, pursuing our regional interests, have come together to form the Charter of the United Nations.
It is recognized that the obligation is that for all the UN member states for the global community, while acknowledging that, in terms of ensuring that regional interests get some reflection, there are these informal arrangements for nominating and electing the rotating members of the council by regional groups. That is an important distinction in terms of UN operation.
Mr. Langtry: To put it in context, the East Timor program has in fact been supported as a subcomponent of the Indonesian development assistance program. This past July, at the annual donors meeting, where the donor community pledges what it will contribute in the forthcoming year to each country, the total pledge was $5.9 billion U.S. Canada's contribution was .3 per cent of that, so we are a minor donor in terms of the total amount of aid flows into the country.
Last year, we in fact disbursed in total $39 million Canadian to Indonesia. Of that, $1.2 million went to East Timor. Therefore, relatively speaking, the bulk of our program goes to greater Indonesia rather than to East Timor.
The fact that we are the third largest donor in East Timor is largely a reflection of the relationship that we have had with the Indonesian government. We actually have a very good relationship with the Indonesians. There has been highly controlled management of East Timor, and most donors were not allowed to work in that region. It was an area where there were basic human needs. In some cases, people were simply incapable of feeding and housing themselves. That is how we became one the main participants in East Timor.
Still, our contribution was relatively modest. It has been in the $1.2 million range in the last several years. This year has been exceptional because of events in East Timor.
Greater donor interest has materialized for East Timor. I have no idea where we will be on the list, but we will certainly not be third. We will be way down the list. We will not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a major contributor in the future evolution of this country.
Senator Stollery: Many of us believe that our resources in this country are stretched, and that is the reason for the tenor of some of our questions.
I was in Portuguese Timor in 1961 when it was a penal colony. Was there not an attempt by Portuguese-trained Marxists to take over when Portugal pulled out in 1975? Was that not the reason that Indonesia invaded, and was the invasion not supported by Australia, the other regional power?
Mr. Caron: In the 1960s and 1970s, the Salazar administration was fighting anti-independence movements all over Africa. It is interesting to note that many of the senior players, either in the pro-independence or pro-autonomy lead-up in East Timor, were former comrades-in-arms in Mozambique or Angola. The Portuguese integrated the colonial forces and shifted them around.
I know nothing about the political views of these people coming back, but certainly some of them were back in East Timor in 1975. The government collapsed in Portugal, there was chaos in Dili, and there was a declaration of independence, so to speak, which precipitated within 24 hours the Indonesian move.
I frankly do not recall what the Australian position was at that time. Perhaps one of my colleagues does.
Senator Stollery: The Australian position is well known. Surely, one of your people knows what happened, why Indonesia invaded, and whether or not it was supported by Australia. I would be interested to hear what you have to say because it is an important part of the scenario.
Mr. Caron: I cannot answer your question in detail. Indonesia was obviously concerned about having half of this very small island going in a direction with which they did not agree.
Senator Stollery: What direction was that? Were they Marxists or were they not? Is that what the Indonesians thought?
Mr. Caron: Presumably that is what the Indonesians thought. I am not well briefed on that period. There were Marxists and there were nationalists. There were those who wanted to keep the distinction from Indonesia, and all that got into the mix.
Senator Stollery: Did Australia support the invasion?
Mr. Caron: I do not believe so, but I do not know what their position was. It depends on what you mean by "support the invasion."
Senator Stollery: Has Australia, generally speaking, supported the occupation of Portuguese Timor by the Indonesians? Do we not know that?
Mr. Caron: I am not sure what "support" means in this case, but I am reminded that Australia did recognize Indonesia sovereignty in 1978.
Mr. Meyer: Australia was unique in the international community in recognizing what they saw as a fait accompli with a very important regional partner. I would say that it was not typical in terms of the attitude of the national community.
Senator Stollery: The only country near Portuguese Timor is Australia. At the only airport in the country, at Baucau, I recall listening to these very arguments between the Marxists and what I would call ultra-Montanist Catholics. The only airline connection with the country was to Darwin, Australia. It is all very well to say what the rest of the international community thought about the situation, but most of the Portuguese, when they left Timor, did not go to Portugal but to Australia. Australia is clearly leading this current mission, is it not?
Mr. Meyer: Australia is heading the multinational mission. It is yet to be determined who will lead the UN peacekeeping mission.
Senator Stollery: Will this nonviable state wind up being controlled by Australia or Indonesia?
Mr. Caron: The question of its viability will be worked on actively by the international community, starting with the UN. As far as who will be supporting it, in the short and medium term I suspect that several countries will play very significantly, including Portugal. I suspect that the Japanese will have an important role, as will the United States. We will have our place around the table.
As to whom they will feel beholden, they will be beholden to their neighbours, that is, Indonesia and Australia, as well as their donors and those who have abiding interests in that region.
Senator Andreychuk: We often have laudable reasons for intervening in countries. There are always justifications for doing so, such as to bring about democracy, to allow self-determination, to stop repression by other states, et cetera. My overwhelming concern is the security and safety of individuals and the right to life. We are studying Kosovo and we are now looking at East Timor. It seems we go into these areas for laudable humanitarian reasons, as well as for safety and security reasons; however, we end up taking more lives than perhaps would have been already taken. We become almost complicit in the behaviour of those whom we dislike most, that is, the dictators and those who lead the repressive regimes.
In East Timor, should we not reconsider our position in supporting the UN decisions? We know, and we have been told by our own observers, that, if we pushed the button on independence and that vote in August, more lives would be lost. There was already killing by both sides. Over the years, the rebels have been noted for taking action that would not be in line with Canadian standards. The Indonesian government has done the same thing.
We have always said that what is most important is human rights. However, we were caught in accepting a UN process that said, "We will trust the Indonesians to guarantee safety and security in East Timor." All the while, we knew that they would not or could not guarantee safety. I believe more lives were lost as a result, not on voting day but shortly thereafter.
How can we change from having the UN move in, which is something we seem to want? How can we change our own foreign policy so that we do not contribute to more death, destruction, and the violation of human rights? How can we salve our consciences from the deaths that we knew would happen? United Nations observers in Canada said, "Trust us. We will guarantee your safety." What we were really saying was that we were hoping that Habibie could do it when we should have known that he could not.
Mr. Caron: The circumstances in East Timor were very particular, and there is no need to go over them again. Indonesia had concluded that, one way or another, they had to bring closure to this issue. From a humanitarian point of view, with the benefit of hindsight, a situation was created that cost a great many lives. However, we have had that situation in East Timor for some time. It was time to seek the views of the East Timorese. They decided what course they wanted to take. The international community, including Canada, now wants to work to assure that the costs have been tallied. The people of East Timor and this entity that they will ultimately rule -- and there are many tiny states throughout Oceania -- can now have some small role to play. They can satisfy their public in terms of the social, political, and economic needs that exist.
Senator Andreychuk: Mr. Chairman, that was not responsive to the question I asked. Allowing the East Timorese to make their own decisions is laudable. However, Canada has placed itself in a position of supporting the United Nations, knowing full well that lives would be lost after the vote. The East Timorese voted with an assurance from the UN process that they would be protected.
The Chairman: Senator, it is good to have your concern on the record because when Minister Axworthy is before the committee, he will come, I presume, prepared to deal with your concern.
[Translation]
Senator Losier-Cool: We discussed at length why Canada is now in East Timor. What interests me most today is to discuss Canadian participation in this conflict and first of all, the financial aspect. Minister Eggleton mentioned that it costs 33 million to be part of INTERFET. CIDA has just added 6.5 million. What would the total cost be right now?
Second, we know that our Canadian military forces are divindling. Besides the 250 people who left Esquimalt, how many Canadians are there in East Timor at this time? Are we offering humanitarian services to deal with the trauma suffered by the Timorese?
Third, as a CIDA representative is here today, will Canada's participation in East Timor be detrimental to our existing international development programs?
Col. Natynczyk: The 33 million dollar cost is impressive because of the deployment of the required staff and military equipment. Among other things, this cost includes the Australian soldiers and equipment.
Mr. Meyer: Some 10 police officers will assist in the operation which will cost CIDA about a million dollars.
Col. Walter Semianiw, Director of Peacekeeping Policy: Unfortunately, it is hard to anticipate the final cost. The World Bank's cost evaluation is under way. With the UN, you also have evaluation problems in the area of the mechanism. Of course, for this peacekeeping operation there is a Canadian contribution as a donation to the UN, an amount that represents about 3 per cent of the costs for operations like this one.
[English]
Senator Losier-Cool: Regarding human capacity, how many Canadians will be in East Timor?
Mr. Langtry: Again, in terms of those directly supported by our program, there are not very many. We have staff with CARE Canada there right now. I am not sure of the exact number, but it is in the order of five or six. They have a much larger staff than that, but most of those staff are locally engaged.
Other international NGOs also have staff, some of whom may be Canadian. The UN will be recruiting from the international community various kinds of expertise, some of whom will be Canadian. For example, I know of one Canadian who was there during the recent difficulties after the vote, and he has just returned.
As to the total composition of Canadians who will be there, either directly supported by us or recruited through other mechanisms, it is a bit difficult to anticipate, but I would say that 20 Canadian citizens will perhaps be working in East Timor as the dust begins to settle. That does not include the troops.
The Chairman: Does anyone from National Defence wish to comment?
[Translation]
Col. Natynczyk: We have about 650 military personnel involved. On the land forces side, it is the infantry. We can maintain a company in East Timor. On the naval side, we have another mission on the east coast. In the air, we have two Hercules aircraft and our commitment is for 60 days. We can sustain these three elements for this six-month mission.
[English]
Senator Losier-Cool: My final question relates to how our participation in East Timor could affect future or existing programs of CIDA.
Mr. Langtry: We are, in fact, in the process right now of trying to identify what that impact will be. It is a little unclear where our niche in East Timor will be as the broader donor community comes on board. Although we have been there for a number of years and have established our own network of contacts in East Timor, as I mentioned earlier, the assimilative capacity is quite limited in East Timor and, therefore, there will probably be a fair amount of competition for those people. It is possible that people we have been working with will be picked up in other efforts in the donor community.
At the very least, we would expect to continue working in support of some of the community development projects, such as rural water supply projects that we already have in place, largely because we have a good mechanism to do that, we have a good track record, and we have had a good success rate. There is still a need for that kind of work so we would expect to continue in that sort of thing. We have had as well a responsive program in there that is supporting local, small-community initiatives. Basically, they come from the community. The community identifies things with which they feel they could use a little assistance. I expect that that will be particularly useful in the immediate future, as various levels of reconstruction and rehabilitation might be required.
In terms of a broader, new niche, frankly, we really are waiting for this more elaborate assessment to come from the World Bank. Some of the observations that were made in earlier questions regarding the viability of East Timor clearly show that it is an important issue. I think that we are largely dependent on the World Bank assessment of what they feel are the economic development options that this relatively small area will have.
As I mentioned, the current resource base is quite low. There is reasonably good agricultural value there, which could be developed more completely. There is a largely unexploited offshore or marine fisheries resource that traditionally has not been used by the East Timorese. There is speculation regarding offshore oil and gas. Depending on whom you ask, that potential is high or it is almost non-existent, so that one is a bit up in the air. There is some speculation that there are actually some untapped mineral resources that could contribute to their economic well-being.
There are at least some options that need to be explored to determine whether they can make a meaningful contribution in terms of the economic viability of East Timor. Frankly, we are not in a position to assess that at this point. We are waiting for the assessment that is being undertaken by the bank.
The Chairman: I have a question to ask before we conclude. The Security Council has authorized a UN transitional administration for East Timor. Is it too early to ask if we know to what extent Canada will participate in that UN transitional administration?
Mr. Meyer: Mr. Chairman, as you said, it is still early. The strength has been indicated. I think we will have to pursue discussions with colleagues at National Defence, but I imagine there would be a possibility for some overlap between our military contribution through INTERFET and the new transitional authority.
I indicated that our initial planning regarding police would see some 10 police officers participate. I suspect, as is often the case, that the UN, as it identifies additional needs, may put out requests. To the extent that we are in a position to contribute people, usually individual experts, we will definitely give those requests serious consideration.
Senator Di Nino: I have a supplementary question. One of the recurring opinions that has been expressed during this particular study has been the concern over the adequacy of the resources of the armed forces in general, but in particular those forces that are being asked to go to some of these trouble spots. Could you tell us whether you believe that, for this mission in particular, but also in general, adequate resources are being provided to the armed forces to do their job?
Col. Semianiw: In response to your question, clearly the answer is yes. When one looks at East Timor, part of the planning phase for a potential mission is to examine all of those criteria: for example, what is asked from the United Nations, what do we have available, and do we have the tools that are needed to be able to achieve the mandate and achieve the task. When specifically focused on East Timor, the answer is yes. Clearly, the requirement on East Timor up front was for a light infantry company. We could provide that, as well as ships and aircraft.
Senator Di Nino: And in general?
Col. Semianiw: In general, with each of the missions, the answer would be yes. If I look ahead, and look at the Sierra Leone question that was asked earlier as to what we could provide, we have done staff checks, have worked with the government and with DFAIT, to identify that we could provide five military observers.
I come back to a point that I should like to make, which is that it is an issue of both scope and type. When one examines these United Nations missions, one must look at each of the missions specifically to identify what has been provided and what is the size. When you look at Sierra Leone, the intent is to provide five military observers. With respect to East Timor, the number is approximately 650. Each mission varies.
Regarding the question as to whether we have the scope and the capacity to carry on supporting missions, it is a matter of what the UN requests -- in other words, whether we are able to provide what is requested. In the case of East Timor, what was requested was not for military observers for this phase of the operation but for infantry, and in that respect, for ships and aircraft, and we could provide that. If the UN had asked for military observers, that would have been within the realm of the possible. In the case of Sierra Leone, what has been asked for is military observers for the UNOMSIL phase of the operation. Therefore, at this point, yes, we have the capacity to provide what has been requested by the UN and approved by the government.
Senator Grafstein: I will raise some questions and perhaps the witnesses can respond or, perhaps, the minister.
In recent times, Canada has led the way on human security as it applies to the rule of law. This follows up on some questions asked by my Senate colleagues. One of the reasons Canada become involved, and CNN, at the same time, was the massive violations of human rights. It is estimated, I understand, that somewhere between 10 and 40 or 50 per cent of the population have been forcibly dispossessed, including many tragedies. When I say that I mean massacres, and so on.
Canada led the way in the establishment of the international criminal tribunal in The Hague, and on the specialized tribunal in Yugoslavia, for the investigation of egregious breaches of human rights. I have not heard that as part of any of this discussion this morning. In other words, are we in Canada focusing on investigations as part of our mission in the robust stage, chapter 7? Are we leading the way to establish a specialized tribunal to deal with East Timorese breaches of international law? Will Canada continue the role of leadership to establish a tribunal of this nature as it has at The Hague and as it applies to Yugoslavia?
The Chairman: If we could get just a brief answer to that it would be helpful.
Mr. Caron: Yes, just briefly, the issue of impunity and our concern about that obviously applies in this case. We were very active in Geneva in promoting the establishment of the commission of inquiry, which is to report, I believe, by the end of the year.
The Indonesians themselves have established their own inquiry and the forces behind that, the Human Rights Commission, is a group that we have long supported. The process is launched. We must wait to see where it will lead. At the moment, we are not at the stage of discussing trials or what have you. It is still at the inquiry stage.
The Chairman: Gentlemen, you have heard some of the views of members of the committee and you have been most helpful in attempting to deal with those views. We are most appreciative.
Honourable senators, we will take a five-minute break before hearing from our next witness.
I wish to suggest to you that we should plan to have a brief in camera meeting at the end of the testimony of the next witness to discuss the future business of the committee.
The witness now before the committee is Professor Albert Legault. We have not had a biographical note prepared, so I have asked the professor to tell us a little bit about his professional interests, as a background for his testimony.
Please proceed.
[Translation]
Mr. Albert Legault, Professor, Institut québécois des affaires internationales de l'université Laval: I am both honoured and touched to be before such a distinguished and redoubtable audience because I have seen the questions put to the previous witnesses and I have also seen that those questions can be dangerous and that it is always hard to answer that kind of question.
Since 1966 or 1967, peacekeeping has probably been an important element in my career as, at the time, I was assistant director at the International Information Centre on Peacekeeping Operations in Paris. My specialty is strategic studies. The end of the cold war only sent me back to my old stomping grounds, in other words, peacekeeping. This conjunction of UN, peacekeeping and strategic matters, after 30 or 35 years into my career, make me a specialist in these matters.
Please rest assured that even though I have a 16-page text I will simply attempt to summarize the 3 or 4 last pages or the conclusions that I find the most interesting.
We are in a transitional phase, it is said, for several reasons. First, all the essential and important questions remain unanswered. The matter of NATO's self-proclaimed seisin over Kosovo is a legal question which remains unanswered and has no solution. The question of NATO's new strategic concept also remains open, as between Europe and the outside zone, we still have no particular lesson to offer. The matter of NATO's opening-up also remains unsettled. So it is really a transition.
I would still like to emphasize that over the last few years, there might be one element that I think to be essential and one of the senators mentioned it before, and that is the appearance of new standards in international law. The three main standards are the creation of international criminal courts, humanitarian interventions and a kind of intervention in the domestic affairs of a State that one could define as supervising elections or a democratic process with a view to ensuring the consolidation of peace within those countries.
There is no consensus in the international community on these three new standards due to a large extent to the initiative of members of the Security Council. It can therefore be considered a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power of the members of the Security Council, or decisions resulting from such a power, rather than conventions of international law.
The question that should be asked, and that is obviously of interest to committee members since I listened to the previous discussion, is the following: have we gone from a century where minorities have been minoritized through dictatorships, as was the situation in the USSR, to a century where minorities have been majoritized, as we have seen in Kosovo and East Timor?
There are four important points I would like to emphasize. The first is probably the most important: I think that some thought should be given to creating a new architecture for preventive diplomacy.
Preventive diplomacy, as experienced under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and as we attempted to set out in our presentation to the 50th anniversary of the General Assembly of the United Nations in the Canadian report entitled, "Developing a Rapid Deployment Capability", all these efforts have unfortunately failed, probably because no one has been willing to dial an international 911 while the body was still alive.
When I talk about a new architecture for preventive diplomacy, I am thinking mainly of chapter 6 of the UN Charter concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes and I personally would like to see, if we can take any inspiration from Kosovo and East Timor without prejudging the merits of these particular cases, I would like to see the Security Council set up a committee for the examination of minorities, a committee that is able to do a more integrated study of such matters than is being done at the present time.
It is done in the financial field, taking into account the architecture of the international financial system. Why is it not practised in the area of peace and security? How can we manage chaos and all the unpredictability it implies? A whole process is required. I am thinking in particular of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms Mary Robinson, the High Commissioner for Refugees and chapter 6 of the Charter on the peaceful settlement of disputes. Why can we not have a follow-up committee for particular States that are most likely to flare up in the future?
This new structure is cruelly lacking and the Security Council is not assuming its responsibilities. Everything is now being done through informal groups. If the Japanese are willing to go to Cambodia, the Australians to Timor and the Americans to Kosovo, then everyone is happy. In other words, everything is being done behind the scenes and although this is in keeping with the interests of national States, it is not necessarily in the interest of the international community. If such procedures had been in existence, we might not have found ourselves in the same situation in East Timor.
Various people and observers have noted that Kosovo is the beginning of a new era. On the contrary, I think that Kosovo is the end of an era. Europe and the countries of Europe were unable to tolerate the political cancer at its fringe and the problem was finally settled. The only communist regime that had not gone along with the transition was outlawed and the question of the former Yugoslavia, although not completely settled, is in a process of settlement and should result in Europe as it once was, particularly since the collapse of the former empire of the USSR. Europe will once again take shape in its previous form. It is not a supra-federal Europe, it is a political process similar to the globalization of trade now taking place, even though there may be a democratic deficit or a lack of political legitimacy in this new organization known as the European Union.
The end of this era is of profound significance. Europe will be built without Russia and that means that we shall continue to do with Russia what we did in the past, promote political, economic and military partnerships and develop a strategy to limit the damage. A way must be found to limit the damage following the disintegration of an empire. In the history of humanity there are few empires that have broken apart in such a peaceful manner. The rebirth of Europe in a relatively peaceful climate at the end of the Cold War is a remarkable success story. Canada will not be called upon to make as great a contribution in the future in Europe. These two parallel processes of a Europe in the process of formation, along with a partnership association with the new countries in Central Europe and Eastern Europe, signal an important change and we will not be called upon to the same extent in the future.
The Kosovo crisis led to some simple political conclusions for Europeans. NATO may intervene in Europe but the outside zone is the business of the Americans: do not expect us to do anything, if ever we decide to get involved, it is probably because we are looking after our own interests. For Canada the outside zone has a different meaning. Of course there was the Gulf War and many examples where I think the role of Canada can be measured solely in relation to what the Americans want from us. The outside zone is no longer so much in relation to NATO but the type of relationship we wish to maintain with the United States.
Taking into account all of these considerations, our present participation in Europe could perhaps involve economic negotiations with bilateral partners as part of a discussion on the creation of the North Atlantic Free Trade Area. Our role in Europe is seldom recognized even though we do a good job. Canada's greatest contribution was during the Korean War where 30 to 40 per cent of our defence resources were devoted to this so-called UN operation which in fact was carried out under the direction of the United States. We gained no greater influence with Washington than if our participation had been commensurate with our capacities.
One of Canada's great virtues is the diversification of its political, military and economic relations. The partnership for Peace should continue to be strengthened because Canada does have an important role to play in this respect. It is part of the financial compensations of Europe or NATO towards Canada. Soon about a hundred participants from Eastern European countries will be coming to the training centre for peacekeeping in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia. We must diversify our military relations with la Francophonie. I would like to salute the recent decision of the Department of Foreign Affairs to set up in Montreal a bureau for the Lester B. Pearson centre in Cornwallis.
In view of the constraints that apply to Canadian military forces, we should take advantage of the respite we may have in Europe over the coming years to negotiate the continued maintenance of our presence in exchange for political or economic compensations or the reduction of the number of our soldiers taking part in operations abroad so as to maintain a better balance between the instruction and training of officers taking part in our combat forces and our peacekeeping missions.
For the past seven years in Valcartier I have had the opportunity to teach military officers. The constraints are very severe. We often pursue contradictory aims. In 1999 I submitted to the Government of Canada through Minister Young the report on the reform of the Canadian Armed Forces. One of the most significant conclusions of this report, along with three other reports from different sources, related to the education of our armed forces: we will no longer be able to look after the education of our armed forces currently, because of the great constraints on the present military.
[English]
The Chairman: I believe that the committee formed the view, as a result of the testimony we heard here and of what we were told in Europe, that the European countries are now giving a new emphasis to the idea of a European security and defence identity.
This raises a question for Canada. Let us assume that the ESDI -- that is, European Security Defence Identity -- is achieved. I realize that there are questions concerning its achievement, but let us assume that it is achieved within NATO. What role does that leave for Canada in NATO? Under the ESDI, the Europeans will provide personnel and a significant amount of equipment. NATO will be providing intelligence, heavy lift, command and control structures, to some extent, but those NATO aspects will be coming from the United States. The question that concerns me is: Insofar as NATO operations in Europe are concerned, what will be the real role of Canada? Possibly, we will become increasingly an adjunct of the U.S. armed forces, integrating our air force and our ground soldiers with theirs. Whether or not that will be attractive to Canadians is a question that I will not attempt to answer.
To summarize, if the ESDI is a success in Europe, what role is left for Canada?
Mr. Legault: That is not an easy question to answer, but I have had the same answer for over 30 years. In 1968, I was the only professor to testify before an external affairs committee -- as it was then called -- to defend NATO. We must be a member of NATO. The question is: How do we participate? Do we maintain troops or do we participate, militarily speaking?
NATO is a vast alliance. It has been extremely useful, especially in the area of Armed Forces, for training purposes. The 30 years or so that we have been in Germany has been extremely useful for the Canadian armed forces. We have had the ability to conduct military manoeuvres with our allies and to participate within an integrated command structure.
You have been careful to specify that the problem may not be so large for the navy and the air force, which is totally integrated. I do think that Canada is a very schizophrenic country. The navy and the air force is U.S. business; the army is a different element. Do we integrate with the Americans or do we participate with the Brits, as we are doing in East Timor; or with the Australians? What should be done with the land element of our Canadian forces? This has been a difficult problem since the formation of NATO. What we were doing in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo with allies who share common values with us is a useful training ground for the Canadian forces.
By definition, crises are unpredictable. As I said earlier, I am not sure if we will be called upon again in the future to participate in NATO missions in Europe. I think the Americans are, more and more, disinclined to take an active role in Europe. I think everyone has agreed with that. The European identity is a possibility for minor missions, for verification missions, and for minor conflicts, but certainly not for a crisis as big as the one we lived through in the Kosovo experience. It is a possibility, but I assume that, if things turn sour in Europe, the Americans alone can do it again. They may be called, but I do not foresee any political event in next 10 to 20 years that would force the United States to come to the defence of Europe again.
You are right in the long term. The United States is becoming less interested in Europe. I think they will maintain a minimum amount of troops in Europe because those are important as a stepping stone or as a springboard for operations in other areas, such as the Gulf. The fact that they had a huge presence of military forces in Europe at the time of the Gulf War made quite a difference for the United States. I think they will continue to be present.
The European Union, or even the western European Union, can only undertake operations with the consent of the NATO council. Therefore, it will be extremely difficult for Europe to undertake operations if the United States does not agree with the purposes of the operations. Again, if this is being done, it will be done for minor missions, because I do not see any possibility in the next 10 to 15 years by the Europeans to carry out military operations on the scale we have noticed in the past year or two with Kosovo.
I am not sure that I answered your question, but I think those are the lines I would look at to give you a response.
Senator Andreychuk: Assuming that you were wrong and that there would be similar Bosnias, maybe farther east, et cetera, do you feel that the Europeans could handle a situation without the Americans? We are given to believe that, under ESDI, they are thinking about coming together, because they have profited from their experience in Kosovo and that they will now "look after their own house," as they say. However, their capacities are too depleted to manage something of that size or even something smaller. We were told repeatedly that the Americans were a necessity, whether or not they wanted them there. It was an embarrassment to have to be led in some cases by the Americans, but none of them have the capacity to manage on their own. They seem to have a renewed vigour to want to regain that capacity by combining or amalgamating, but how realistic is that?
Mr. Legault: I share your scepticism. As far as Europe is concerned, I said before that, should Europe intervene, it could only be on a minor scale and for minor conflict. However, they did try to handle the situation in Yugoslavia for four years before the United States decided them to help them out. I guess the United States was quite happy to see them in this particular situation for about the last four years.
The Balkan situation is a special one. There are some problems in other areas, especially in Eastern Europe. Perhaps the European Union could deal with some of the situations if it does not get out of hand or if the Russians are not tempted intervene. They do have some ability. The real problem is: What do you do if the situation becomes difficult? In that type of situation, the Americans are absolutely dispensable. They are even indispensable for some minor operations, such as intelligence-sharing. It is not only the ability to transport troops abroad that counts; it is the intelligence, the management of intelligence, and the decision-making process.
On the decision-making process, I am very sceptical, unless the European Union -- and I do not give that as a good example -- can do what NATO has done; that is to say, delegate our votes to two or three or four countries, let us assume the Brits, the Germans, the French, and maybe the Italians. Unless the other national votes are delegated to those four, nothing will be done.
In other words, the decision-making process that was adopted within NATO at the time of the Kosovo crisis was done by simply giving our vote to the Secretary General. We agreed that we must intervene, and the Secretary General decided when to intervene. Unless something similar happens within the European Union, I remain very sceptical.
If there is one issue on which it is difficult to share, it is life and death. I assume Europe has not reached that process yet. It does not have the ability to intervene efficiently except perhaps in some minor situations. This is where the alliance is still vital.
The alliance is really an insurance policy against major developments in Eastern Europe. That has never changed, and I think it will remain so for a long time. I am not too worried.
However, in answer to your question, I do not believe Europe has the capability to intervene efficiently.
[Translation]
Senator Bolduc: If there is an American veto, will we go along with them in order to maintain a good relationship? Is that what Canada's role in NATO is? In a way, NORAD is even more vital for us.
Mr. Legault: There is no particular problem in NATO with respect to the navy and the air force. As for our immediate environment, we are more concerned about access to American technology. The submarines we recently acquired did not give rise to much debate in the press.
The navy and the air force are essential to the Americans when it comes to a blockade or the control of a strategic zone. That does not cause any real problems for Canada other than for the troops. We should involve our diplomats more than our military on the front since we are not in a position to provide this resource. In any case, such a contribution will always be minimal and will always be part of a British or multinational command. It would not add a great deal to Canada's influence in its relationship with the U.S. or the international community. I would not like a parliamentarian to be in the position of having to negotiate with European countries to obtain something in return for our presence in Europe. They would not take us very seriously.
Senator Bolduc: That is what they said to us when we met them.
[English]
Senator Andreychuk: You have said that education was one of your preoccupations for the military. One of my preoccupations is that I am not sure we have decided on the task for which we are training our military. We seem to still be training them for combat in a traditional engagement process, particularly with the land forces. On the other hand, we are increasingly placing them in unique peacekeeping roles. My concern is whether we have the right complement, whether they are well trained, whether they have the right equipment to do what they are actually doing.
Mr. Legault: This particular problem has largely resulted from internal conflicts within the armed forces themselves, especially within the army, which was unable to decide what equipment they wanted and so forth. There is a responsibility there and it may take another ten years to catch up.
Peacekeeping has allowed the forces to renew some equipment in the land element, especially the Coyote, which is a very effective land vehicle. The army did get something in return for their peacekeeping missions. They are better protected now than they used to be. More improvements must be made.
However, I think your question is larger. What shall we do? What missions should we give them in the future? How do we deal with this particular problem? In my opening statement, I said that we should aim at a certain kind of equilibrium between their peacekeeping and their ability to fight. The ability to fight is still a common mission and a common objective of the 1994 white paper on defence. I do not think that has changed. If it is to change, that decision should not come from the armed forces but from the political people, from the Parliament.
If you want only an army of police or constabulary force, the political people can make that decision. It is not the business of the armed forces to decide what they should do.
At the same time, we are trying to cooperate, to include both elements. I think it would be difficult to maintain this situation over a long period. We do have a certain amount of time either to adjust or to decide to train people to fight wars or to train people to do peacekeeping only.
The argument being presented by the armed forces -- and I am sorry my colleagues from the DND have left the room -- has always been the same. If you train the troops well for war, they can do peacekeeping. The problem is that the training and the type of equipment changes very rapidly. Some adjustments may have to be made within the next five years. I do not know if we are hoping for a new white paper on defence. I am happy that this is not included in the decision I must make within the next five years.
Senator Di Nino: My first question deals with NATO's unilateral actions in Kosovo being taken without a UN mandate. What is the impact of that on the future of the UN? What is the effect of that on potential conflicts elsewhere in the world where the UN would normally play a role but where that role may now have been neutered by NATO's actions?
Mr. Legault: It has put the United Nations in a difficult position. As you know very well, the action or the diplomacy of the G8, plus the final resolution of the Security Council, has brought back the resolution of the Kosovo conflict within the boundaries of the United Nations.
The conflict has been of a short duration. The UN has certainly lost some feathers in this crisis, but it can do more. The real question is whether we should have gone to the UN, whether we should have even tried to consult the Russians and the Chinese on this particular question to save at least a legitimate point of view. I think this is right. Maybe we should have tried it, but the United States and other allies felt that time did not permit us to do so.
Will it have other effects on the potential role of the UN and regional conflicts? That is a more difficult question. The Russians will tell you in private that what we did in Kosovo has been a very good example for what they are doing in Chechnya. This unilateral intervention has made things more difficult, but regional conflicts already existed there. The United States is the only superpower that exists, militarily speaking, and the UN has very limited ability to act even in a preventive situation, as I said in my opening statement. This should be reinforced.
My basic feeling is that the UN still has a role. If it did not exist, we would need to reinvent it. The problem is that crises, by definition, are unpredictable. We must start anew for each operation. We seem to learn nothing from the past. This makes it very difficult for the United Nations to function as an international institution with a budget. The UN can only do what its member states want it to do. Therefore, it would always depend on regional powers, or on the superpowers, or on the countries that are really interested to see that there is a settlement of a given regional conflict.
I do not think things have changed substantially since 1945 in terms of what the UN can do. What has changed is that it is possible for some countries to take decisive military action under the basis of a consensus within some type of democratic country. That has changed, but the UN is still composed of a majority of member states that do not necessarily support the western point of view of intervening on the basis of democracy or intervening for humanitarian actions. We are left where we were a few years ago. I do not see any particular change that will either kill or reinforce the UN dramatically over the next five or ten years.
Senator Di Nino: My other question dealt with Canada's role in NATO. I think you said that NATO is defined as a group of allies with common values. That certainly was the case a number of years ago. However, Canada's face is changing because of the immigration of Europeans to Canada. In the last two or three decades, we have seen tremendous change in the immigration flows to Canada, and they have come principally from the Pacific. Do you think that this may impact on the kind of role that Canada should be playing in organizations such as NATO? For example, should we be looking at some sort of alliance on the Pacific side to reflect today's reality in Canada?
Mr. Legault: I have heard that question many times over the last 20 years. The problem in Asia is that there is no common enemy. How far do we go?
What we are doing now in East Timor is a good indication that we are willing to work with the British and the Australians. There has always been informal cooperation, at least on the intelligence level, and especially on naval exercises, with Australia and New Zealand. We are beginning with the Japanese. Formal military alliances have not been very successful in certain areas, especially in the Middle East. They have all died out. The only one that has succeeded is NATO. The only one that is still likely to intervene anywhere if there is a major threat to the international situation is NATO.
What are we left with? Do we follow the Americans or not? If the UN delegates some responsibility to an informal type of alliance -- what I call an ad hoc coalition led by a major military countries -- do we participate or not? The question remains. If a decision has been undertaken based on chapter 7, it is mandatory. You can consult your government or parliament and ask them if they want to go, but those decisions taken by the Security Council based on chapter 7 are mandatory for the member states. We are always turning this around, and I do not think there is any escape to this particular situation.
In answer specifically to your question, I would say, no, I do not see the necessity of establishing a military alliance in Asia. I cannot think of any reason for which we should want to do so or why it should be set up. Do we participate with our allies? Yes. Do we answer some calls if we are called upon? Yes, if we have the resources. However, where you want to go is a question of your internal resources and a question of internal conflicts within Canada itself.
[Translation]
Senator Bolduc: I asked the witnesses who appeared before you to explain why we are in Timor. Is it because our Minister plays an eminent role in the Security Council? Is it because the Australians are our friends and Timor is not far from them? Is it related to our membership in the Commonwealth? All sorts of reasons were mentioned but I still have trouble with them.
As for the new concept of humanitarian aid, as George Kennan, an American himself said, it is very unrealistic to believe that Americans can rule the rest of the world. If the Americans do not have sufficient resources to do so, how can we imagine that it is possible? East Timor is pretty far away from us. If we go there, why would we decide not to go to Pakistan or Mongolia someday? Where do we draw the line?
Mr. Legault: I cannot say that I have any specific answers. You are quite right, the Americans do not want to go there because their interests are not being threatened.
I have never belonged to any political party either in Quebec or at the federal level. So I can say with a pure soul that I am a liberal internationalist. That means that if you allow decisions relating to security matters to be taken by the members of the Security Council, then you will have nothing more to say. If you want to be entitled to vote, if you want to change international standards and be taken seriously, then you must act and have the necessary resources to be able to intervene if it is asked of you. Otherwise it can turn into a tragedy.
I think people should look at history and the failure of the League of Nations along with the inability of both small and medium states to take a decision. They should join together to accomplish things and to force people, particularly the large powers, to admit that they alone are not able to set the rules of the game.
That said, in East Timor we are taking part in an international effort. I have nothing to say on the substance of the matter. It could be that all the people in Valcartier are taking part in training in Europe and that a PPCNI infantry company will have to train in Asia. All sorts of reasons could be given.
I think it is unfortunate that our diplomats did not do anything earlier in an attempt to settle this conflict. Several signals indicated that the situation was escaping the control of political authorities and still we did nothing.
In my initial presentation I asked that there be at least a committee to follow up on the problem of minorities. That is the problem we will have to focus on in the future. We see what is happening with minorities in the former USSR. In India and in Pakistan, it is hard to tell how things will turn out. I am less worried about China because of its age-old traditions, which go back hundreds and thousands of years. But it is the problem of the 21st century.
Let us not kid ourselves: The problem will only be solved by creating an architecture for preventive diplomacy on these issues by seriously considering the peaceful resolution of conflicts and by organizing better management of these problems with the organizations in charge.
The problem is that everyone is acting independently and nothing is happening. This is serious and it will have to be dealt with seriously. That does not mean that I feel like addressing the problem of East Timor or that I could do it.
Perhaps the great powers do not like others to get involved in their affairs, but there remains a lot to be done on the diplomatic front, perhaps more than what we ask of our military when we send them to put out brushfires. That is the most rational, the most logical and the most efficient use of our resources.
I believe that Canadians and Canadian diplomats can do much more than what is asked of them presently. The domestic situation in Canada must also be considered.
[English]
Senator Grafstein: Mr. Pearson, as an architect of NATO, presented it to the Canadian public founded on two pillars, the first being peace and security in Europe through armed alliance, and the second being economic cooperation.
In your written statement you made a very interesting comment. You said that under these conditions, Canada should perhaps link its participation in European peacekeeping operations more to greater economic concessions from its European partners.
You were speaking, in other words, of economic linkage. We discovered, somewhat to our amazement, that in particular our oldest ally in Europe, Britain, dismissed that idea, and as a matter of fact warned us in very strong terms to keep the two separate. They said that Canada should play "ready-aye-ready" to Europe by participating in peacekeeping whenever called upon but should never raise the issue of economic linkage. That was the statement of the chairman of the foreign affairs committee off the lower house of Parliament. That was echoed by others in Europe -- in France and, to a lesser extent, in Germany.
What is Canada's economic interest in expanding NATO or increasing our peacekeeping activities in greater Europe if there is total de-linkage under the Atlantic Charter?
Mr. Legault: As I said to Senator Bolduc, I would not like to be in the position of having to ask Europeans for something in exchange for our contribution. This is a very difficult issue. I think you are right. I think the European Union will become a very large market. Last week, the former vice-president of the European Parliament said that we have reached the point where the European allies may ask the U.S. to move the International Monetary Fund from Washington to Europe because the European currency may be the major issuing currency within the fund in the future.
I think a major European economic zone will develop, and therefore the question is whether we will still have access and whether the negotiations on the North Atlantic free zone will reach a significant conclusion. We have never been very lucky in linking issues and I do not know why. You are right that in the past the British did not like that.
We tried in the 1950s to sell NORAD as a contribution to the security of NATO but that was not accepted. When I was special advisor to the minister of National Defence from 1980 to 1982, Mr. Weinberger came to see the minister and told him very bluntly that we had to put our troops where the enemy was, and that was it.
Even if we do provide something to Europe, it seems that we are recognized purely as an annex of the U.S. military and we cannot seem to get political and economic benefits in exchange for our contribution.
I do not know how to settle that issue. I do think that we have more to lose than Europe, and this is important. In the history of Europe, we had World War I and World War II. Canada did participate and NATO was established. It is still a very vital area, even though economically speaking it is not our major partner. I do not have the statistics on our trade with Europe, but I think it is between 7 and 10 per cent. It is still important, but what is more important is what we have to lose if we do not cooperate with our ally.
Even though the immigration statistics may be quite different, the difficulty is that if we de-link Europe from international security, we will lose many things. We will lose the stability of the international system that we have had during the last 50 years. This de-linking is a source of anxiety for me. I do not trust those people at times. They are marvellous, but sometimes you do not know how they will behave and it gets you into a lot of trouble.
My European friends are not here and I am caricaturing a bit, but we have common interests in maintaining both economic and military linkage between Europe and North America. The problem for Canadians is how to get something in return, and I have never been able to answer that question.
Senator Grafstein: You seem to be saying that expansion of NATO, particularly to Romania, Slovenia and the Baltics, is inevitable. NATO has announced that they are on a fast track, in effect, without any sensitivity to the reaction within the former Russian empire and Russia itself. Where should Canada stand on that expansion, given the fact that there appears to be no economic benefit to it and that it will dilute Canada's voice even further by adding five new members?
Mr. Legault: You are absolutely right about that. We have no economic interests with Bulgaria. We did sell some nuclear reactors to Romania, and I think we are negotiating on another one.
I did not realize that Romania and Bulgaria were on the fast track. I believe that the NATO statement in April was to the effect that the door is largely open.
Senator Grafstein: I thought Romania, yes; Bulgaria, no; and of course the Baltics are all ready to go.
Mr. Legault: There are other countries that are almost de facto members of NATO that have never been invited to join, such as Albania and Kosovo. For all practical purposes, economically and politically speaking, those are NATO members.
You are absolutely right that in Eastern Europe we are trying to get rid of the Soviet influence, open up those regimes, and ensure that they partake in democratic institutions and run them as we try to run them in the West.
We do not have any economic interests in those regions as far as I am aware. We certainly have more with Poland than we do with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and other Eastern European countries.
However, in terms of multilateral diplomacy, it is important to maintain contact with those regions and those peoples. Whether it will be an additional burden on our diplomatic efforts is difficult to answer. It may turn out that way. It may turn out that we will have to pay more than we receive in exchange. However, I think this is the last remnant of the Cold War that has to be settled. I do not see any alternative for the Canadians except to say yes to this future enlargement.
If you talk to people in the European Union, they will say that this enlargement of NATO will mark the geographical boundaries of Europe as they want them. That is to say, without Russia. At the same time, we will have to keep in place a damage limitation strategy with the Russians. Partnership agreements and so forth will have to be cultivated.
There is no way out. As far as Russia is concerned, the only thing we can do is try to minimize the effects of this disruption or disintegration of their empire.
[Translation]
Senator De Bané: I am aware of your considerable reputation in the field of defence. I would like to ask your opinion of the European Union's new defence organization. When we were in Europe, we met the new Secretary-General, Mr. Solana, who up until recently was head of NATO's general secretariat. From my discussions with Europeans, I got the impression that, on the one hand, the French in particular realized that Europe did not have the necessary tools to deal with the conflict such as the one in Yugoslavia, that was their doorstep, and on the other hand, in the opinion of many of those we met, if the Europeans were to undertake a military action without the United States, it would mean the end of NATO.
They now admit that they were missing a few important links to be totally autonomous, for example, integrated command, self-transportation capacity for heavy equipment and an intelligence service. But, more important, some are saying that if you were to undertake any mission without the participation of the Americans, that would lead sooner or later to the disintegration of NATO.
You do not deal with that topic in the documents that you submitted. I sensed that the Germans in particular thought that it would be very awkward for them to undertake anything without American involvement.
As you know, at first it was said that action would be taken only if the United States decided not to intervene. Later, in Cologne, this condition was withdrawn: If the United States does not want to intervene, if there is a conflict in Europe some day, we should be able to deal with it ourselves and to use the equipment we have in NATO to do so. What is your feeling on this issue?
Mr. Legault: In terms of psychological perceptions, you're absolutely right. The Europeans would like to take their destiny in their own hands and politely thank the Americans by telling them: You were very helpful, but from now on we will take care of our own affairs. The official American position is simple. It firmly supports the creation of a second European State. That is the official position and it is not very different from that of President Kennedy, in 1960, who liked to put forth the theory of the two dumbbells, meaning that security is based essentially on two military powers, the NATO-European power and the American power. That is more or less what President Kennedy was offering Britain with the Polaris rocket, that Britain accepted. General de Gaulle refused, saying that he would not barter his European birthright for a plate of Polaris. This theory is interesting from a rational or logical point of view. In actual fact, would it translate into the disintegration of European and American cooperation in the field of defence? It may be that the Europeans are right, but the opposite may also be true, they may not have the means to back up their decisions. It is a fairly theoretical debate since someone has to decide these matters of life and death. Someone must take responsibility. When it is the strongest and the biggest, we have no choice, there is nothing we can do. How can the British, the Germans or the French ensure a democratic decision-making process when the European Union might go from 15 to 27 members in the next few years? Twelve new applicants have just been accepted in the negotiations on expanding of the European Union. Can we seriously believe that in a case of life or death, 25 countries will delegate that responsibility? I am very skeptical.
This is what I was talking about previously. In the case of a British, German and French decision to intervene, the Americans will be very grateful, and say that those countries are finally looking after their own business. There will not be anything beyond that. The European paranoia about the Middle East is a good example. Whenever the United States decided on a way to solve the conflict in Israel, the Europeans protested that their point of view had not been taken into account. Conversely, when the Americans do not take any initiative, the Europeans accuse them of shirking their responsibility as a global leader.
That dichotomy in the European perception is not easy to understand. Assuming that the Europeans are right, and that that could mean the demise of NATO, I would be very flexible, being sure that the United States would remain. How would things change?
Senator De Bané: I would like to bring a qualification to Senator Bolduc's comment. I do not agree with him on East Timor.
Knowing that Canada is one of the participants in the G8, I wonder if it can be allowed to sit at that table where important economic decisions are taken without in turn taking some responsibility for the stability of our planet.
We cannot assume that we can sit at a table where great decisions are taken while we wash our hands of a conflict that does not affect us directly. To belong to the G8 is a privilege for Canada and we should accept the duty that goes along with it.
On the other hand, as far as Asia is concerned, I wonder if countries in the region, such as Japan, should not themselves take on the responsibility of peacekeeping in their area as NATO has done in Western Europe. Until that happens, Canada cannot take part in the decision-making and then expect to sit back and do nothing.
Mr. Legault: Concerning Japan, in the past the Government of Japan, as well as the Government of the German Republic, have invoked their constitution as an alibi in order not to take part in or contribute to any peacekeeping mission.
You are absolutely right. The membership of the Security Council the balance of power at Yalta. But it would probably be time to consider giving Germany and Japan a permanent seat at the Security Council, with or without a veto. But I will leave that decision to the diplomats.
The Americans cannot give a veto to a powerful European state and to an Asian state without alienating India and Pakistan. The matter of the veto thus remains unsettled. The same for the reform of the Security Council, which has been discussed for five years now.
In Kosovo, the Germans are slowly starting to face up to their responsibilities, increasing their participation and paying a little more. The Japanese have made an effort in Cambodia since they have paid a large part of the bill. In Cambodia, they were not very clever in terms of the relationship between the Secretary General and their organization. The Supreme National Council was under the trusteeship of the United Nations and it has been hard to get it to do something, but there has been some movement.
Obviously, at that level, Canada would have a much less influential role that it currently has. Is such a change desirable? I think so, personally. I think that the great economic powers have to become more involved and that the smaller ones, such as Canada, can do their share independently.
We do not need others to tell us how useful we can be in the peaceful settlement of a conflict, that we have good negotiators and good diplomates, or that we can play a very useful role, with the Scandinavian countries, in redefining the concept of personal security.
Canada can still find a niche and carry on its work with countries of like size. Since we are a so close geographically to the United States, we will often be called upon.
These things should not change in the future. If more and more powers deal with these issues, the security of the international system will be better managed and more balanced, as compared with the current situation.
[English]
The Chairman: I have a question, which would appear to be the last one. In the April statement issued in Washington by the leaders of states and governments, it was recognized that events well outside the NATO area could have serious implications for member countries. I have read that, as the Europeans seem to want to assume more and more responsibility for the European scene, the Americans are thinking that NATO should widen its focus to include other parts of the world. That indeed may be, as far as they are concerned, the real rationale for NATO nowadays.
What position should Canada take with regard to an American view that NATO should focus on out-of-area problems? Let me put it this way: Are our real interests in, let us say, a secure oil supply so similar to the American real interests that we ought to accept the American view that the alliance should concern itself with faraway places?
Mr. Legault: It is a very important question but it is not a new one. I used to say to my students that in fact Japan is a member of NATO, precisely because of all the security problems. The Japanese are frequently consulted within NATO circles about the security of the Gulf and how we transport oil from the Middle East through the Strait of Malacca. Those are valuable and important questions. If you are talking about oil or other important resources, that alliance does exist and there is a lot of consultation undertaken.
The Chairman: Yes, but surely there are some European countries that would not be prepared to participate in those out-of-area operations.
Mr. Legault: If I were to put myself in the mind of an American leader, I would tend to say, "We won the Cold War. We have put so many resources into the Mediterranean area over the last 50 years, it is now your turn." What the Americans want from the European countries is better burden-sharing. Europe does not want to do that, of course. I understand them. Similarly, Canada does not necessarily want to help the Americans build huge military forces that we do not control.
Canada's attitude to out-of-area issues should be to maintain the existing policy, which is major consultation for out-of-area questions that may arise.
We cannot make any formal commitment in advance. If a crisis erupts, it must be decided on an ad hoc basis and we would much prefer that international organizations intervene, or the UN, rather than the U.S. However, if push comes to shove and the Americans do intervene, I believe our past history will show where Canada would stand.
The Chairman: Let me ask you this question: You say that each incident should be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. The implication is that, at least in some instances, we might say we will go along with the American view. That, I assume, has implications for our armed forces; that is to say, they must be constructed and trained so that they can become an adjunct of the U.S. forces, does it not?
Mr. Legault: I believe you are absolutely right if you are talking about the air force and the navy. This is actually what we are doing. In Kosovo, we were the only major ally who could, in fact, carry out air missions in a very compatible way with the Americans. Other allies had great difficulties. In fact we are trained and equipped to help the Americans on some issues, especially within the two most important sectors of our armed forces, the air force and the navy.
The question of the land element is minor in my mind. Land forces consist of approximately 35,000 people. It is the equivalent of the New York Police Department. How can we make a difference with the Americans? We can make a difference in some instances, in integrated situations with the British, with the Americans on some minor issues, for logistical purposes. The role of reserves, which we have played in NATO for 25 years, is usually to be put behind just to make sure that some area is secured. However, it is not and never will be a major contribution.
Senator Bolduc: In other words, there is no possibility of developing within the Department of Foreign Affairs some criteria as a framework for decisions on international intervention? You are saying that the government should have the entire discretion to decide case by case?
Mr. Legault: Yes, be it only to respect the democratic functioning of our society, at least the Parliament and the cabinet have something to say. The criteria, technically speaking, were fairly well defined in the white paper of 1994, page 30; you need a multinational force, a mandate that is clear. Those are technical elements. However, if you are talking about the political positioning of Canada on whether or not to participate in a given mission, I believe you are absolutely right.
Senator Bolduc: We do that for defence and for foreign aid. Yet, in terms of Foreign Affairs, we are still in the 18th century. The king decides.
Mr. Legault: I know of no country that would commit itself automatically to any given situation. The Nordic countries do not do it, the Swiss do not do it, the Australians do not do it; why should we? We are not different from any other country. We can commit troops to the Secretary General of the United Nations, which we have done. We have two or three battalions committed in case of emergency; however, it is like an American Express cheque. You sign at the top and there is your cheque, but if you wish to cash it you must sign at the bottom, and then the government decides. It will always be that way.
Senator Grafstein: In terms of the next century, under our system, once a decision has been executed by NATO to expand to, say, the Baltic borders, then it is no longer a matter of juridical legitimacy. Parliament no longer has a role, the executive has a decision-making function, and the only thing that the government must do is give it some political credibility.
Mr. Legault: I am not sure I understand your question. Are you talking about Article V of NATO?
Senator Grafstein: Let me put it this way: We expand. Under your scenario we go along with the Americans, or the Europeans, because we do not wish to be left out. We automatically extend the boundaries of NATO right up to the Russian border, with the Baltic states as an example, very close to Romania. Belarus would be in between, or the Ukraine. Once we sign on to that, we are called upon automatically to come to the defence of those borders if there is a dislocation within those parameters. We no longer have a decision-making process; Parliament is out.
The role of the executive is only to decide if they have the manpower at a particular moment to fulfil a particular mission. Then there is the political legitimacy -- attempting to convince the Canadian public that this is a good thing for Canada. However, there is no juridical requirement or responsibility under the Constitution or under parliamentary practice to involve Parliament.
Mr. Legault: If you are talking about NATO procedure, formally speaking, you are right. Article V commits us automatically to the goals of the alliance. However, there is still the possibility of saying that we are not going, we do not have enough resources, we do not wish to send the navy, or we do not wish to send the air force. You still have a margin of freedom to manoeuvre there.
It could be worse. If Russia joins NATO, you may be automatically committed to a war against the Chinese, so we are not doing too badly.
Legally speaking, as the treaty is enlarged, its boundaries are being legitimized and recognized, and you do have some question of a legally binding provision for collective defence in the case of aggression. However, I do not believe that this is the most likely scenario for the next 20, 25 years. It is more internal instabilities.
The Baltic may be more stable than people think. Just to add an optimistic note to this debate, there is a tendency among the Nordic countries, and especially the Baltic states, to come up with a zone of cooperation as an alternative to joining NATO. I believe the Baltic states are far ahead in terms of enlargement. I am more tempted to believe that the expansion to the Baltic frontiers will not continue; however, I may be wrong.
As Senator Andreychuk said, professors can be proven wrong.
The Chairman: Honourable senators, we are to have a short in camera meeting; however, we cannot go directly to that because it takes a couple of minutes to turn off the equipment. We will, therefore, have a brief recess and when we resume we will be in camera.
The committee continued in camera.