Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs
Issue 4 - Evidence, November 30, 1999
OTTAWA, Tuesday, November 30, 1999
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs met this day at 4:30 p.m. to examine the ramifications to Canada of the changed mandate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Canada's role in NATO since the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the end of the Cold War and the recent addition to membership in NATO of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic; and of peacekeeping, with particular reference to Canada's ability to participate in it under the auspices of any international body of which Canada is a member.
Senator Peter A. Stollery (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honourable senators, today will be our last meeting to hear testimony on our reference regarding Canada's future role in NATO and peacekeeping. We have heard much in the way of very interesting testimony and have had the opportunity to explore the views of not only Canadian experts and authorities, but also those of our European and American allies.
Our journey has been both fascinating and lengthy, and it is only fitting that, as we prepare to consider our conclusions, we hear from the two ministers who are most involved in determining the future of Canadian foreign and defence policy.
Our committee has come to have great admiration for the way in which Canada's Armed Forces have done their duty in the Balkans. We had remarkable testimony from Colonel Calvin and his men about their crucial role in the Medak Pocket. Our forces were involved in 10 per cent of the strike missions over Kosovo. We will be interested to hear what the ministers have to say, having had many meetings with so many people over the last few months.
As your new chairman, it is with great pleasure and anticipation that I welcome, on behalf of the committee, our distinguished guests, the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Honourable Arthur Eggleton, Minister of National Defence.
Before I invite the ministers to make some brief opening remarks, after which I will open the floor to questions, we have with us Senator John Stewart, my predecessor.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: If I may, Mr. Chairman, I move that Senator Stewart join us at the table.
The Chairman: Senator Stewart, would you like to come to the table? We have a place prepared for you.
Hon. Senators: Hear, hear!
The Chairman: Minister Eggleton, please proceed with your opening remarks.
Hon. Arthur C. Eggleton, Minister of National Defence: Mr. Chairman, I offer my congratulations to you as you assume the chairmanship of this committee. I am delighted to know that the senator who stylizes himself as being from Bloor and Yonge, my favourite neighbourhood, is now in the chair of this prestigious committee.
I am joined today by two people in uniform: Vice-Chief of Defence Staff, Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett, and the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Lieutenant-General Ray Henault.
I am pleased, together with my colleague Lloyd Axworthy, to have the opportunity to be part of your study on Canada, NATO and peacekeeping. It is certainly a timely subject, this being NATO's fiftieth year, and it is has been marked by very significant operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.
We have developed a new Strategic Concept shaped by the unique challenges that flow from the post-Cold War world, the post-bipolar world. This new concept reflects NATO's thinking about the role it feels it can play in this new world.
[Translation]
My comments today fall into two categories -- first, Canada and NATO, and second, NATO and peacekeeping.
[English]
The North Atlantic alliance has been a pillar of Canadian defence policy since the Washington Treaty was signed in 1949. Fifty years on, Canada remains fully committed to NATO and takes its alliance obligations seriously. Our military, like those of the other countries in the alliance, is fewer in number today, but it remains active in NATO in headquarters, exercises and operational units.
Let me give you some examples. We have maintained a steady presence in the Standing Naval Force Atlantic -- a force currently commanded by a Canadian -- and we make a significant contribution to NATO's Airborne Warning and Control Squadron.
Canada contributes to the NATO Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, and our battalion earmarked, as a result of our 1994 white paper, for the Immediate Reaction Force is prepared to deploy anywhere in the alliance. A Canadian is about to take command of that Allied Command Europe Mobile Force.
As that demonstrates, the Canadian Forces are ready to participate in alliance operations, and there is no better example of this than our participation in the air campaign in Kosovo. Canadian pilots flew 682 combat sorties. As the chairman pointed out, that is nearly 10 per cent of the missions flown against fixed ground targets, and they led about half of the strike missions in which they took part. They took part in a proportionately higher number of missions than the size of the Canadian force present. In fact, Canada was among only five countries that used precision-guided munitions, something we could not have done at the time of the Gulf War. Our capabilities have improved since that period of time.
Canada could make this contribution because our CF-18s are combat-capable, our pilots are first rate, and because the forces we field are interoperable with our allies.
The other area where NATO has been active, which is a rather new role for the alliance in recent years, is peacekeeping. Here, too, Canada is well placed to make a contribution. We have been in Bosnia, for example, since 1991. When NATO mounted its first peace support operation in 1995, Canadian Forces took their place alongside NATO allies. Again, we have done it this year on the ground in Kosovo. These operations, I might add, are complex and dangerous.
Let me put to rest any idea that Canadian Forces are not properly trained or equipped for the kinds of peace support missions NATO is now doing. We have been arguing for years that the best peacekeepers are well-trained combat soldiers.
[Translation]
This is what we have in the Canadian Forces.
[English]
From a skill perspective, they are among the best soldiers that the alliance can field. Although our modernization program is not complete, as you well know, the Canadian Forces are properly equipped for the kind of peacekeeping that they are carrying out with the alliance. We have ordered new armoured personnel carriers. The Coyote recognizance vehicle now deployed in Kosovo is amongst the best of its type in the NATO inventory. I have had generals of other countries tell me that.
Our frigates, which have been part of the NATO standing force in the Atlantic and were deployed close to the former Yugoslavia at one point during the conflict, are first class. They are state of the art. In addition, our jet fighters have performed extremely well.
If the Canadian Forces face a challenge in the area of peace support operations, Mr. Chairman, it is the extremely demanding operational tempo they have been asked to shoulder. The recent announcement that Canada will concentrate its efforts in Bosnia is in part a response to these operational demands. By focusing on Bosnia, we avoid duplicating headquarters, logistics and combat support units. We also regain some flexibility to respond to another crisis, should one occur.
No less important, this redeployment reduces strain on the men and women of the Canadian Forces and on their families. Quality of life amounts to more than just pay, benefits and housing. Being abroad too often is as much a stress on family life as anything else.
The other question I know your committee has addressed is NATO's long-term future in peace support operations and how this relates to the role of the United Nations. These issues are on the minds of many, particularly in the aftermath of Kosovo, but I fear that some of the conclusions being drawn are misconceived.
In 1994, when the government announced its defence policy, we argued that NATO could make a greater contribution to collective and cooperative security than it had in the past. We believed this could include new roles. The new Strategic Concept adopted by the alliance at the Washington Summit in April recognizes that NATO can play a military role beyond the territory of its members, but not on every occasion or under every circumstance. We cannot do everything and be everywhere. It would be folly to think otherwise. NATO is not transforming itself into the world's policeman.
I also do not believe that it would be wise to assume that there can be set criteria about when the alliance should act. International crises do not follow a predictable pattern, so there is little sense in trying to construct a checklist that will methodically determine NATO's -- and for that matter Canada's -- response.
As NATO's Strategic Concept suggests, each crisis must be viewed on a case-by-case basis. When there is a consensus that action by the alliance would be appropriate and effective, NATO is in a position to respond.
This point brings to mind another post-Kosovo misconception. NATO may overtake the United Nations as the lead organization for responding to security and humanitarian crises. Such an argument is not consistent with NATO policy; neither does it reflect Canada's position. We continue to believe that the United Nations is the most appropriate multilateral body with the political authority to deal with international security and humanitarian issues.
This outlook is generally shared by our allies, and I believe that recent events are a good measure of what the future holds. NATO's current operations in Kosovo are being conducted under a UN mandate at this point. The international force currently deployed in East Timor is a coalition effort operating under UN resolution. However, Kosovo demonstrated that under very pressing circumstances, gridlock in the UN must not thwart the will of the international community to avert humanitarian tragedies. It was not a signal that the UN is out of business, but there is no doubt that we need to strengthen and reform the capacity of the United Nations to deal with crises that threaten international security or humanitarian principles.
My final point deals with the role of the Canadian forces in advancing Canada's international interests and values. In the Speech from the Throne, the government indicated its intention to emphasize human security. No other arm of government does more to promote this goal than the Canadian Forces. Of course, our skilled diplomats at Foreign Affairs and our dedicated officials at CIDA are vital to putting Canada's goals into action. However, when problems are beyond the reach of aid and diplomacy, the only tool Canada has left to restore human security is the Canadian Forces. Where would the Kosovars be now without the efforts of the Canadian Forces and their allies?
If Canadians want to promote human security, Canada must be able to make a contribution on all fronts -- development, diplomacy and Canadian Forces peace support operations. It is a matter of balancing soft power and military capabilities -- soft power when the situation is right for this approach and stronger means when soft power cannot prevail alone.
[Translation]
Simply put, promoting human security will require capable military forces.
[English]
In closing, I welcome again your interest in Canada, NATO and peacekeeping. It certainly is a subject worthy of the attention that you have given it, and I look forward to further dialogue on this matter after my colleague, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, makes his remarks.
Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs: Mr. Chairman, let me add my words of congratulations to you on assuming the chair of this committee. I wish you well in the very comprehensive and extensive work ahead.
Let me also welcome the presence of Senator Stewart, who has committed himself for so long to the study of these matters in the Senate and in this Parliament. It is encouraging to see him around the table to add his views to these matters.
[Translation]
When Canadians think about our engagement with the world, our tradition of peacekeeping and peacemaking is undoubtedly among the first things that come to mind. I therefore welcome the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee consideration of the subject and the opportunity, with Minister Eggleton, to respond to your questions. This is a very important and timely message.
[English]
Mr. Chairman, I should like to refer to your opening statement, where you said you have had the occasion to visit and examine a number of the important considerations.
Just recently I returned from Kosovo, where I spent a period of time talking to the United Nations and NGO communities about the implementation and application of Canada's commitment to help rebuild, reform and revitalize the society. I also used that occasion to engage actively with the political leadership, both Serb and Albanian, in Kosovo. I spent a good part of an afternoon in direct dialogue with the political leaders in that area. The basic message was that it is important that reconciliation be the foremost objective and that security and stability must be assured for all people in Kosovo, not just one group or another. I would be glad to report to members of this committee more extensively on some of those discussions and some of the reactions we experienced during that period of time.
Contrary to initial expectations, virtually all Kosovar refugees have now returned home. However, at the same time -- and I say this sadly -- there is continued violence against minority groups, both Serb and Roma. As part of the mandate that has been assumed by KFOR, the United Nations and the OSCE, it is important that we put every effort into ensuring that there is equal, appropriate and proportional treatment for everyone.
One of the most important considerations that struck me while I was there was the important and sometimes highly dangerous role played by the media. Some of you will recall a report issued a couple of years back on the causes of the genocide in Rwanda. It pointed out that one of the most unhealthy causes of what took place was the way in which the media promoted the ethnic hatred, violence and hostility of one group against the other.
That is certainly a continuing case in Kosovo itself. As part of our $100 million contribution approved by cabinet just a few weeks ago, we are examining how we can substantially support and improve the independence of the media in an attempt to create more cultural tolerance in that society. It is not easy and will take a long time, but it is one of the important objectives we have set for ourselves.
This issue brings to mind -- because it is pertinent to the examination by this committee -- the recent report tabled in the United Nations on the massacre in Srebrenica. It was a strong condemnation of those who were involved, notably Karadzic and Mladic, who were indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal, and points out that war crimes and crimes against humanity are being committed. International war crimes are very much a matter of holding people accountable.
The report also lays significant responsibility on the United Nations and the international community for their failure to take adequate measures to protect civilians in this conflict. War has not disappeared. It has just grown inwards, and the victims of war are civilians. Ninety per cent of the victims of war in the Balkans are civilians, mainly innocent people.
It is the important responsibility of the international community to try to protect those innocent, vulnerable people against atrocities, massacres, ethnic cleansing and the new pantheon of standards that this world is trying to resurrect and to promote. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, the UN experience in Bosnia was as much a moral cause as a military conflict. The tragedy of Srebrenica will haunt our history forever. In the attempt to promote safe areas, the international community failed to take adequate actions in support of humanitarian law, with horrific results.
Those are lessons we cannot forget. We cannot simply put them on the shelf of history and say that they have no importance to us, because the examples of Rwanda and Srebrenica were in our minds when we came to deal with the question of Kosovo.
There is no doubt that undertaking an armed intervention on behalf of humanitarian means is one of the most difficult decisions one can take in the international arena, and no one takes it lightly. However, at the same time, it is understood that if we are to have a rule of law and if we are to have standards that protect civilians against war crimes, then we must be prepared to enforce that law at some point. We must be prepared to provide that protection.
It is true that the vast majority of international crises should be handled through negotiation, targeted sanctions and various kinds of persuasion and pressure. This committee knows better than most, because of its study, how long that took to happen in the case of Kosovo. It took almost two years of active effort to provide diplomatic and political solutions to the matter in a wide variety of fora, in a wide variety of methods and by a wide variety of actors. Yet, ultimately it failed.
There are times -- and this is one of the key questions of our era as we change centuries -- when you have to go beyond the traditional notion of peacekeeping in order to protect the lives of innocent people caught up in these conflicts. There are rare occasions when military force needs to be used to stop grievous human rights abuses.
I would remind you that this is consistent with our own government's commitment to human security as enunciated in the recent Throne Speech. Over the last two or three years, my colleagues and I have been slowly working out an approach to our international responsibilities that increasingly see individuals and the security risks they face as important as national security risks. I am not saying that national security risks are not there and are not still part of our environment, but the risk to people, to individuals, increasingly becomes a priority agenda. Whether it is a risk from terrorists, a risk from warlords, a risk created by governments committing atrocities on their own people, or a risk by organized criminals or drug traders, the reality is that we must begin reformulating standards, practices and institutions to take into account the individual insecurity faced by some people. Without that protection, all the other objectives we face, whether it is to help in development or to create stable societies or to create any sense of a future, become undermined and eroded. Therefore, it is very imperative that we put our minds -- parliament, government and civil societies -- together in finding an effective and appropriate means by which we can implement and activate a human security agenda. We must think about how Canada can contribute in these efforts.
Secretary-General Annan, at the opening of the General Assembly this fall, put the question of humanitarian intervention at the very centre of the international agenda and challenged countries such as ours and all others to come back with answers and responses. It is also one of the important initiatives that we are taking at the United Nations, as I will describe later. The forms of intervention that we are talking about and that you are studying must be founded and based upon a legitimate rationale of human security, but, in addition, they must be commensurate with the political will and the capacity to respond.
This humanitarian imperative to uphold security and to protect the safety of people is clearly challenging traditional concepts about the nature of peacekeeping, the nature of military responsibilities and the nature of security itself. It is changing the nature of peacekeeping, which has evolved dramatically from the mid-1950s when Lester Pearson helped create the concept. At that time, peacekeepers simply monitored a ceasefire line between opposing armies. Today, peacekeeping is a complex, integrated, sophisticated effort of combined actions between military personnel, NGOs and international organizations, all combining their efforts to create a new framework in which people can have a sense of their own security against risk. I can give you the best examples from the time I spent in Kosovo a week ago.
At the end of the day, I was flown to the Canadian sector just outside of Pristina, where Colonel Ward and his associates, as part of their project in securing the zone, had taken on responsibility for beginning to rehabilitate schools and housing in certain parts of that sector. It was fascinating, heartwarming and encouraging to see a partnership develop. The departing Serb forces had put some 400 land mines in the vicinity of a school so as to make it unusable. The Armed Forces provided a security rim in which Canadian deminers from the Wolf Flats group in Alberta and a group from Cape Breton were brought in to remove land mines so that the school could be reopened. They worked in combination with a construction group from Montreal, who were helping to rebuild the walls, ceilings and roofs so the kids could come back in and continue their education.
If we want to talk about the new face of intervention, the new face of peacekeeping, the new aspect of peace building, it was there in that one small microcosm of our peacekeepers, working in combination with the international community, with NGOs and with the private sector to create a new environment for that community and village just south of Pristina. That is exactly the kind of model and pilot project that we are beginning to expand and develop around the globe as a way of making a Canadian contribution. In other words, the increasingly human dimension of armed conflicts require a much more complex and demanding response than the old textbooks would require.
Let me relate that to the work we are doing at the United Nations itself, where we took our seat at the Security Council in January. In February, we initiated an open debate in the council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. This was based on the recommendation that civilians are the targets and are not just inadvertent victims. They are the specific objective of direct military action. Civilians become the pawns. They are used to achieve the ends of those responsible for the conflict.
We had a very active and open debate. As a result of this initiative, Secretary-General Kofi Annan tabled a report this fall on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Among his recommendations, several related to peacemaking and peacekeeping, such as: improving the UN's capacity to plan and deploy missions rapidly; deploying military observers early to ensure the security of refugee camps; considering preventive peacekeeping deployments; and considering appropriate enforcement actions in the face of massive and ongoing human rights abuses.
Based upon that report, we are now using our time on the council to push for much more effective missions, to broaden the notion of security itself to include that human dimension, and to ensure that the mandate of peacekeeping established by the United Nations and others will also incorporate the mandate to protect civilians.
As a result, in the last month, peacekeeping missions for East Timor and Sierra Leone have been set up in a precedent-setting fashion. Both of those resolutions clearly establish that UN peacekeepers have the right to use all necessary means in order to protect civilians. This is a council first. It demonstrates that the sequence of events, beginning with our initiative of last February, has led to the kind of peacekeeping force that would have prevented the atrocities in Srebrenica and Rwanda. It would have allowed the UN to apply and to use its peacekeepers appropriately to protect against those abuses.
We recognize -- as the Minister of National Defence just talked about -- that in order to enhance its capacity, the United Nations must be strengthened. It needs standby arrangements and rapid response arrangements. Again, Canada has very much taken the lead in this regard.
As much as we need the military rapid response, we also need the civilian rapid response. We need the blue elements and the white elements working together, as was described earlier in relation to Kosovo.
One of the key questions is this: How do we mobilize our resources and integrate ourselves? The Minister of National Defence, the Minister of International Cooperation, the Solicitor General and myself work together as an international team to ensure that we can provide the necessary resources as quickly as possible in these demanding circumstances. What we are doing now in Kosovo is a prime example of that new team or partnership approach.
We are finding -- and this is equally important and goes back to the issue that Mr. Eggleton was raising -- that we do not always have to be on the ground to demonstrate our commitment. One of the most important demands we receive is to apply the skills and experience Canadians have acquired over the last 40 years of peacekeeping to help train countries that are prepared to get involved. The Department of National Defence is actively involved through its military training program and through the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Nova Scotia and Montreal in the training of peacekeeping officers from armies, air forces and navies around the world. We are probably the foremost experts in this fundamental question of civil-military relations.
How do we combine that new integration of military and civilian actions? We are imparting, transferring and sharing that knowledge with other countries. We are very much in demand in terms of specialized skills. We were the only non-African country to participate in a peacekeeping mission in a central African republic. Why? The Department of National Defence has a highly competent bilingual communications team. No country other than Canada could provide that service. One reason there is such a demand is because we have unique skills and expertise to bring to bear.
We are going through some fundamental, dramatic and fascinating changes. Canada is very much at the centre of those changes, helping to shape them, formulate them and supply them. It is a work-in-progress. No one has complete answers yet. However, the work of this committee and the examination that we can do as parliamentarians -- thus creating a broader debate in our own country and with other countries -- will give us not only the tools we need but the concepts we need to help create a new world based upon the humanitarian human principles I outlined earlier.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: Mr. Eggleton, you pointed out that Canada, in its own discretion, can go beyond its territory. It cannot go everywhere, however. Each emergency situation must be examined case by case. Any intervention is done after a consensus is achieved.
What is a consensus in NATO? There are 19 member countries. I gather the word "consensus" was chosen deliberately. It does not mean unanimity. What do you mean by "consensus"?
Mr. Eggleton: They are not formal votes. Consensus is generally unanimity or at least no one expressing a strong objection to a matter. Countries may not completely subscribe to what is being proposed, but unless they indicate a formal objection, the consensus stands.
A consensus was well demonstrated throughout the Kosovo air campaign. Throughout that crisis, NATO was able to maintain a consensus.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: I do not want to get into that because if we had to relive Kosovo, it may not be the same script.
Let us say the five or six major powers, led by NATO, decide on a course of action and that two or three of the minor players disagree. Would that stop the action from taking place?
Mr. Eggleton: In my time, I have not seen that particular circumstance arise.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: It is a hypothetical question.
Mr. Eggleton: The Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was also there -- we were both there, although not at the same time -- may have further thoughts. However, in the time that I was there, a general consensus was reached on items.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: Minister Axworthy, let me talk about the very eloquent appeal you made supporting human security and the protection of civilians in armed conflict.
We have had these types of cases in Tibet and Northern Ireland, although hopefully they are coming to an end, and of course in Chechnya. Chechnya can be compared to Kosovo -- civilians, refugees and a destruction of property. Yet NATO, as far as I know, has never considered Chechnya a territory where military intervention to stop the bloodshed would be essential. What is the difference in the approach of disinterest taken in Chechnya? Why is there disinterest in Chechnya on behalf of NATO and the UN and such a commitment to Kosovo, where the two situations are comparable?
Mr. Axworthy: First, senator, I would not say there is disinterest. In fact, there has been a widespread interest.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: I know you have made statements, but the Security Council has not been seized with the Chechnya situation.
Mr. Axworthy: That goes back to what Mr. Eggleton said earlier. There are times where issues cannot go on the agenda because of the veto power of certain of the permanent five. We have tried unsuccessfully as an elected member of the council to bring the Chechnya issue forward, but we have been stymied for obvious reasons.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: You could move a resolution.
Mr. Axworthy: We could move a resolution only on the agreement, if we get it on the agenda. We have raised it through our permanent representative, but we have not been able to get the debate or discussion engaged.
Certain reports have come back, which also happened in the case of Kosovo. In the buildup to the March campaign, again we tried a variety of ways to have the issue considered by the Security Council and were not, as an elected member, able to override the veto powers of the permanent five, which may be a topic for another discussion with the committee. There are some structural defects in the United Nations.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: The Security Council has the veto power. When Kosovo was not brought to the Security Council, NATO immediately acted on its own. Why not in this situation?
Mr. Axworthy: In this sense, again, circumstances were judged. We had been through a two-year period of attempting to find ways of coming to grips with the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and were not able to find a satisfactory answer. We could not get a stoppage of the actions of the Milosevic regime at that point in time.
I had my original meeting with the Russian Foreign Minister earlier this year. The Russians made the case that they were subjected to a variety of terrorist attacks from Chechnya, a province within their country, and they were simply attempting to interdict those attacks.
Clearly they have expanded their operations, a matter very forcefully addressed at the recent OSCE meeting. It also will be a topic of active exchange at the G8 Foreign Ministers meeting in two-weeks' time.
It does not always have to be one or the other. A number of international vehicles can be used to apply the test. Certainly the OSCE made its best efforts and is still making them. Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek, the Chairman-in-Office, was in Moscow yesterday on the basis of agreements we arrived at in Turkey. Our own interest, following the policy we have outlined, has been to have the intercession of humanitarian organizations to help the civilian populations in Chechnya, both displaced persons inside the province and those coming out. We have not been successful, partly because we cannot engage the council through the power of the veto.
Senator Lynch-Staunton: Is it just coincidence or is it not a fact that when the national interests of the five permanent members of the Security Council is at stake, the rest of the world tends to back off under the pressure of one or more of those five, but when their national interests are less at stake, then the UN and NATO seems more free to move ahead?
Why are we in East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone, where the big five do not have a great interest? In Tibet, Northern Ireland, Chechnya and other places, where the massacres, destruction, rapes and refugee problem is as great, if not greater, we are in effect silent.
Mr. Axworthy: There is no question that is part of one of the realities we face. That goes back to the institutional arrangements that came out of the Second World War. I would not consider all of the permanent five to be great powers. Some acquire great power simply because they have a veto, and that is why they fight so hard to retain it.
The reality is that when those interests are challenged -- and sometimes they are -- it is difficult to get international agreement, but that is not to say it is impossible. For example, we challenged the national interest of our neighbour to the south on the land mines issue. They did not like it and rejected it, so we went outside the United Nations and got a treaty anyway.
You raised the issue of Tibet. I had a report last week from a group of Canadian religious leaders that we were able to negotiate with the Chinese to visit their country to look at the question of religious freedom. It is part of the engagement we have with China. We have moved that perimeter back a bit, and for the first time, an international group <#0107> and, again, they are Canadians -- is beginning to examine those questions in a more direct fashion.
In other words, there is a way we can tackle these issues. In every circumstance, we have to use the tools and the influence available to us.
Senator Stewart: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the courtesy of the committee, and I do have a question. The question should not be regarded as hostile or critical. I ask it with respect to clarification on what I regard as an important point. It relates to interventions by NATO without Security Council authorization. I have three very short quotations. The first is from Mr. Javier Solana, former NATO secretary-general:
For the first time, a defensive alliance launched a military complain to avoid a humanitarian tragedy outside its own borders.
Mr. Solana, as well as the ministers now with our committee, emphasize humanitarian considerations.
Mr. Arthur Eggleton addressed an audience at Harvard University on October 4 of this year. There he made the connection between the fact that NATO had acted without Security Council authorization and the determination to prevent humanitarian disasters. He put forward the same idea here this afternoon. At Harvard he said:
Gridlock in the UN will not be allowed to thwart the determination of the international community to avert humanitarian tragedies.
I congratulate the minister on his consistency. I have been impressed by the way the Minister of Foreign Affairs shares the view of his colleague, and my evidence is what he has stated here this afternoon.
I should like to put another quotation before the committee. It is from Mr. James B. Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs. He wrote:
In fact, 19 NATO allies, with all the diversity of their political cultures and historical relationships with the Balkans, felt they had a compelling interest in ending the violence in Kosovo. A prolonged conflict there would have had no natural boundaries.
In other words, Mr. Steinberg is emphasizing the fear of spreading conflict.
Those quotations prompt a major question and perhaps one or two subordinate questions.
What was the basic reason for NATO's intervention in Kosovo? Was it indeed humanitarian, as one would gather from what we have heard here this afternoon, or was it a fear of infectious turmoil in the Balkans, as Mr. Steinberg stated?
Mr. Eggleton: You could argue that it was perhaps a bit of both. Most of the discussion that I was engaged in at NATO and in Canada in the development of our policy was relevant to the humanitarian crisis. People were being removed from their homes and expelled from their country under threat of death or harm. Canadians cannot stand idly by while that happens. Those are not our values. Those are not the kinds of things we would do.
Our allies felt the same way. There is no doubt that the conflict spilling over the borders of Kosovo into the Balkans in general and into neighbouring countries was of great concern. The destabilization of Macedonia, Albania and other countries on the border was of great concern to NATO and the European countries. Yes, this conflict was outside the borders of NATO and its direct countries of interest, but it was in the regional community of NATO's interest. More than anything else in the discussions, I heard the need to take action to avoid a humanitarian crisis.
There were certainly a lot of terrible things happening at the time. It took some time for NATO, through its air campaign, to get control on the ground, as we ultimately did. There are still many challenges to be dealt with there, but if we had not taken action, the situation would have been enormously greater and worse than it was.
Mr. Axworthy: Senator Stewart, I would like to supplement what Mr. Eggleton said. First, the Security Council had passed resolutions 1199 and 1203, which made a direct call upon the Serb regime and government to desist and stop its actions against civilian populations, which they rejected. Second, they also rejected the Security Council call that an international tribunal be given access to investigate these matters. Discussions then took place outside of the Security Council because we could not come to decisions due to the pre-emptive use or the threat of pre-emptive use of the veto by certain of the permanent five. It was not easy to take, and that is why it took a long time to find the answers.
We went through enormous efforts to negotiate a settlement. We went through the OSCE mission that sent observers into Kosovo to prevent and stop what was happening by means of having an international presence. Again, that did not work. As a result, negotiations broke down.
I am not saying it was all one-sided. There was equal obduracy on the side of many of the Albanian Kosovars in terms of finding the right settlement because they were intent on finding independence.
I do not think any of us sitting around the table at that time and who had lived through the experiences of Srebrenica or Rwanda wanted to see it happen again. Therefore, we took the step that we did based on the fact that there is a Charter of Human Rights. There is a genocide convention. There is basic law going all the way back to the war crimes trials of Nuremberg. That gave us some precedent for saying that if the Security Council was jammed, we had to find someone prepared to step in.
Senator Stewart: The emphasis in both responses has been on humanitarian considerations. Quite aside from such considerations, would the fear of spreading conflict in the Balkans have been enough to justify NATO's intervention, including Canada's participation, without Security Council authorization?
Mr. Axworthy: I do not think we can solve it at this point in time. The compelling motivation was to save lives.
Senator Stewart: Obviously you anticipated the question and a reply.
When it is said that humanitarian considerations such as the attempt to stop ethnic cleansing were emphasized in order to help justify NATO's unauthorized intervention, your reply is that you would dismiss that as nonsense.
Mr. Axworthy: More than nonsense, Senator Stewart. It is really a travesty of the truth.
Senator Grafstein: Welcome to both ministers.
Mr. Chairman, if you would allow, I will ask Minister Eggleton a question, then perhaps defer to the other committee members. I would reserve my right to come back and ask a question of Minister Axworthy.
In Europe, I heard some excellent news about the Canadian Forces. When we were in London, Paris, Bonn and Mons, in Belgium, I asked the following question of the most senior military advisors in those countries and at NATO: If there were to be a robust engagement on the ground, an aerial dog fight or a robust battle on the sea, of all of the NATO partners, who would you prefer to have on your flank? In every instance -- in England, in France, in Germany and at the Belgian headquarters -- I was told by senior military advisors that their personal view was that they would prefer the Canadians on the ground, in the air and on the sea.
I also found to my great surprise that within a mile of my home we have the staff college in Toronto, considered one of the greatest staff colleges in the world by recognized military experts. That is the good news, but let me give you the other side of the equation.
Notwithstanding this wonderful accolade by military experts, when we came to the prestigious Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Commons in England, a colleague of mine, Mr. George -- we served together at the OSCE -- was highly critical of Canada by saying that Canada, from the military aspect, was not pulling its weight in NATO. Then we returned to Canada to discover that the NATO Secretary-General came here and criticized Canada for not pulling its weight.
At the NATO conference in Toronto in September 1999, it was reported that Canada had only fulfilled 51 per cent of NATO's 129 force targets in 1999. I understand -- and this may not be correct -- that Canada accepted only 48 of the 129 force goals established for it by NATO in 1998. Is Canada pulling its weight in the alliance?
Mr. Eggleton: Yes, it is. Before I go into a detailed answer, thank you for all of the good news you gave because from what one views in the daily media, the other side of the coin seems to be more dominant. Let me now support what I just said about Canada pulling its weight.
One can look at statistics and make a determination as to whether we are pulling our weight. I prefer instead to look at results and the actions we take.
What you have just said about the Kosovo air campaign demonstrates that we do pull our weight. We were fourth in the list of countries in terms of that air campaign. Given the equipment we had there, we were pulling more than our weight.
As the chairman mentioned, we were involved in 10 per cent of the sorties flown. Of 682 sorties, we were the leader in half of them, which involved several different countries, including the United States, which had most of the equipment. We were put in the lead position. I talked with the general in charge of the team effort, and he said that Canada was clearly on his first team, that we had dedicated professional people who knew their job and knew what to do.
I talked with our people and I was very impressed with their dedication to the entire effort and their belief in the entire effort.
George Robertson, when he was in the NATO meeting in Toronto that I hosted in September, did talk about spending more money, but he said that about everyone. He wants everyone to spend more money on defence. If you are a former defence minister and become the Secretary-General of NATO, and you want to increase NATO's capacity, of course you say that you want everyone to spend more on defence. There is a concern amongst a number of NATO allies that in the post-Cold War period there has been too much of a reduction, but Mr. Robertson was speaking in general terms. He was not speaking just about Canada.
When he did speak about Canada, Mr. Robertson said that we are a key ally, a good ally and a reliable ally. When he looked at the budget of Canada in terms of defence, he did not say it was enough. He would like to see more, as would I. He did say that Canada uses its defence budget better than most.
You mentioned another statistic -- the 51 per cent figure as it relates to NATO's force goals, as they are called. That figure is relevant to the completion of 100 per cent of all the force goals. The force goals are not something that you can compare one country to another because they are different for each country.
Frequently, we may be able to complete 90 per cent of a force goal, which does not appear in that 51 per cent statistic. Yet, all the other countries have the same situation, including the United States. They do not totally agree with every force goal or totally comply with every force goal. However, our percentage, if you look at it in terms of either complete or partial, is much higher than 51 per cent. Actually, we rejected only a handful of force goals out of the total number of 129, so we are pulling our weight.
If you look at the statistic indicating how much countries spend as a percentage of GDP, we are second from the bottom. Only Luxembourg is worse off. Another statistic indicates that we are the sixth largest military spender of the 19 countries in NATO. It all depends on what statistic one looks at.
The proof is in the results of what we are able to produce. Our record, going back to the Second World War, the First World War, the Korean War, all of the peacekeeping missions with which we have been involved, and most recently the Kosovo campaign, demonstrates that we do pull our weight.
Senator Andreychuk: I wish to add my thanks to the ministers for coming to our committee. We will write a report and hopefully have some sound recommendations for the Canadian government, particularly to do with NATO. While our study was to look at the changed mandate of NATO, we are closer to saying that Kosovo changed the mandate and the perceptions about NATO.
If I heard Minister Eggleton correctly, he said there is no set criteria as to when NATO should act, but there seems to be some consensus that NATO can act on humanitarian grounds without the involvement of the United Nations. If I read correctly the human security agenda you laid out, you pointed to taking individual human beings in their communities rather than states as a point of reference. You use the safety and well-being of individuals and their communities as a measure of security. You recognize that the security of states is essential but not sufficient to ensure individual safety and well-being.
I should like to deal with Kosovo. Canada has always put a high price on life. One life is as important and as sacred as another. In the run-up to Kosovo, with the Rambouillet Accord and the actions we were taking, we knew what Milosevic would do. He would up the ante against the Albanians. We also knew or should have known that if we provided assurances for the Albanians, the Serbs would then be the target of attack -- and they have been, as have the Romas.
How do we justify the use force in the area of human security if we do not have a set of criteria, when we know there will be civilian deaths caused by our intervention and the spillover of more and more deaths?
Mr. Axworthy: Senator, that is part of the ongoing dialogue. If we want to take Kosovo as a landmark, it is very important that we have a "lessons learned" exercise, which is what the Secretary-General called for and what I called for in my General Assembly speech this fall. I said that this should be a serious wake-up call and that we must look at the grounds for intervention. We made it very clear that there are Security Council resolutions. There is a grounding in the legal framework of the United Nations, genocide conventions, the charter and previous actions on war crimes to basically say that national sovereignty is not an absolute. Governments cannot hide behind the concept of national sovereignty to commit atrocities against their own citizens. We must begin to set a framework -- whether it is NATO, the Security Council or other organizations such as ECOWAS in Africa -- that can be used as a basis for that. We have been working towards augmenting and reformulating the concept of security at the Security Council. I would find a way in which the regional organizations that fall under section 51 of the charter could relate back to the Security Council in terms of establishing those criteria.
Honourable senators, the paradigm is changing. We are shifting our lens on how to work in the international environment, which is a very different environment. At the G8 foreign ministers meeting in Berlin in two weeks, the key questions will be the following: What are the grounds for humanitarian intervention? How do we begin to establish the rules and where are they applied? What are the areas of accountability between different international organizations?
It is important that the process be multilateral. As we demonstrated in this case, if there had been a clear Security Council mandate, then we would have simply fulfilled it, as we are doing in several other places around the world. It was a judgment call based upon basic human rights law under the United Nations system.
To ensure that the lesson of Kosovo is a good one, we must be much more effective in ensuring that the rights of all Kosovars are recognized and protected, including those of the Serb minority. That was the message I took when I was in Kosovo 10 days ago, and it is one that we will be pursuing actively in the NATO council meetings Mr. Eggleton and I will be attending.
Senator Andreychuk: Am I correct that there were no criteria for humanitarian intervention within the confines of NATO? At best, it was to look at what the UN might have done had there been a resolution.
Mr. Axworthy: Quite the opposite. There were clear criteria. There were genocide conventions. There were Security Council resolutions at the UN. There were legal precedents set through the various war crimes trials. There was the clear need to respond when the Security Council had not been able to get its act together. That was grounded, as far as we were concerned, in a clear legal framework.
Senator Andreychuk: It seems to me that in the definition of "human security," we are really looking to the civil and political covenant under the universal declaration. Would it be your opinion that the violation of the economic, social and cultural covenant, which can lead to genocide, is equally important?
Mr. Axworthy: In looking at the human security requirement, about seven different conventions of the United Nations -- torture, genocide, atrocities, and I could give you the list of them all -- form the corpus of the law one has to examine.
We are trying to make new law. I do not think that the humanitarian law we have right now is sufficient to cover the risks that civilians face. For example, we are working actively on a protocol for child soldiers. Approximately 2 million children have been killed in various conflicts in the last several years. There is not sufficient protection for children in times of conflict. We need a protocol that would become part of the United Nations arrangement, and Canada is taking a lead in that area. I announced last week that we will be holding an international conference -- somewhat like the conference on land mines -- in Canada next year to bring together NGOs, like-minded governments and international organizations to work toward a protocol for the protection of children in conflict.
We must begin to use the standards that we have and to build upon them. The nature of conflict and of war has dramatically changed and shifted the focus and the victims and the results.
I do not pretend that there are easy answers to this issue, but in the United Nations system encompasses the charter, the genocide conventions and the seven conventions for the protection of women and protection against torture. On the other hand, Article 27 states that national sovereignty is the basis for decision-making. Reconciling those two concepts is the blueprint or the road map that we have to work on. No one has a final answer, but I am glad to say that Canada is attempting to find answers, unlike other countries.
Senator Andreychuk: When the UN failed, NATO appeared to have the capacity, in your interpretation, to move on humanitarian grounds, and that is because NATO has strength and military force. Does this not set a separate standard for Europe and North America as opposed to regional groupings of countries that do not have the same strength and force?
Mr. Axworthy: Not necessarily. At the time of the action in Kosovo, an organization of West African states, ECOWAS, wanted to undertake a military action to stop the slaughter in Sierra Leone, as long as what they saw taking place was as equally horrendous as what was happening in the Balkans. They did not have a UN mandate either, but they now have one. We have worked very actively to get a peacekeeping mission into Sierra Leone, which is now UN mandated. Here was a case where the African states had seen horrendous actions taking place -- children being killed and limbs being lopped off. Millions of displaced persons and refugees were coming out of Sierra Leone, and the international community could not get the council to act until now.
This phenomenon is not just happening in the NATO context. Increasingly we find that regional organizations are taking on more of the operative capacity. East Timor is another good example of that.
I wish that we could have clear UN mandates in many of these cases, but because of the financial restrictions caused by certain countries not paying their bills, there has been a reluctance of the Security Council to give full UN mandates. The council is saying, "We will give you the flag, but you must get like-minded countries to come together to make it happen so that they pay their own bills." That is one of the other things that needs fixing.
Senator Kenny: Mr. Axworthy, NATO's role is inevitably intertwined with the effectiveness of the United Nations. You commented earlier on the need for fundamental reform of the United Nations. I presume you were referring to the veto of the permanent members of the Security Council, the make-up of the Security Council so that it better reflects the United Nations as a whole, issues dealing with internal management and bureaucratic waste, a capacity for UN a rapid response force, together with effective command and control. What are your views on which reforms are required? How likely are they to happen soon?
Mr. Axworthy: I think you gave a pretty good inventory, senator. They will take place at differing stages.
It will be very difficult to change the veto power, which is an entrenched right. It is very important that we not broaden that right to give more veto powers to more countries.
Of equal importance to the Security Council -- and this has been our strategy -- is to slowly and surely, by a variety of means, change the definition of "security." That definition must be broadened to take into account the human security dimension, which would allow the council to deal with issues such as the drug trade, child soldiers and small arms. We have had some success in terms of the two recent peacekeeping missions.
On the financial side, Senator Kenny, the UN is doing its best. It has cut back and has had zero budgeting for the last two or three years. The more profound question is the continued reluctance of certain countries to pay their bills. That has had an enormously inhibiting effect upon the capacity of the UN to undertake actions, particularly in the peacekeeping area.
Even now in terms of the transfer in East Timor from the coalition of like-minded countries, in which Canada is playing a prominent part, to UN blue helmets, there is real reluctance because everyone is assessed and some do not want to pay. We must come to grips with that financial issue.
I agree, in part, with the American position on the necessity of redoing the formulas, but they also have to pay all of their bills, not just some of them.
A third area of concern is to use other organs and agencies of the UN more effectively. The General Assembly has not been used as effectively as it should be in some of these security-type issues. It has to be more transparent and more involved in these matters.
We need new tools. The senator described some, such as the rapid deployment force. That initiative has been inhibited mainly for financial reasons. Our diplomats at the United Nations are working actively on redefining the concept of sanctions to get to a much more targeted approach. We want to move away from the blunt instruments we now apply and use the sanctions appropriately and proportionately to the kinds of issues or difficulties the UN faces. There are a number of fronts on which the reformulation will take place.
Frankly, I am encouraged by the statement of Kofi Annan of the General Assembly. We saw the tabling of 40 recommendations in the document that dealt with civilians in conflict. With those 40 recommendations, we now have a blueprint for UN reform. If we are able to accomplish even 50 per cent of them, we will have a new UN in the millennium.
Senator Kenny: Timing?
Mr. Axworthy: We have another good year to go in the Security Council, so we will give it our best shot.
Senator Kenny: Mr. Eggleton, there is a broad sense of concern that our military is atrophying and that it is past the point where it can carry out the missions assigned to it by the government. Perhaps you could comment on that. In particular, could you underline the areas where deficiencies exist, in your view?
Mr. Eggleton: As I indicated in my response to Senator Grafstein, we are pulling our weight with respect to NATO. We are under some financial stress, and that will come to bear on being able to pull our weight somewhere down the road.
Right now, we have about 4,400 peacekeepers in 22 countries, one of the highest levels since the Korean War; yet, we are dealing with a third fewer troops than we were a decade ago. This means that the operational tempo is very high. For every thousand troops we commit, we have really committed 4,000 because of the six-month rotation. We have a policy of having our troops back here for a year. This means that during the last two rotations, we have had a couple of thousand here, a thousand in the theatre of operation, and another thousand who are getting ready to go. Therefore, you can multiply the 4,000 to 16,000.
As we indicated at the time we sent our ground troops to Kosovo, we could not sustain them there for a long period of time. Many of these peacekeeping missions go on for years and years, such as in Cyprus and in the Golan Heights. We just commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Golan Heights mission, and we are still there.
Sustainment is not possible for part of the Kosovo operation and we are drawing down 1,000 from there. Sustainment is not possible in East Timor. We brought back our Hercules crew. We have sailors in the area and we will bring them back by the spring. We will go from the current 4,400 down to 3,000, which we are much better able to sustain.
We still have a financial stress. We may be able to sustain that now, but it will become more problematic in the future.
Going to 4,400 can be done on a surge basis, as we have done now, but we cannot sustain it for a long period of time. By the spring, we will be down to a more manageable level, but we are facing multiple challenges, particularly in terms of the financial stress.
The Chairman: Our mandate has been to look at the ramifications to Canada of the changed mandate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which has turned out to be a moving target because they seem to have changed the terms of reference at least twice in this decade. The committee got into the Kosovo issue because Kosovo took place while we were embarking on our study.
My question regards the Kosovo business and I think it is a question many Canadians are asking. Were the number of atrocities magnified for public relations purposes or as a result of biased sources? Everyone in the country seems to be asking this question in the last couple of weeks.
Mr. Axworthy: I do not think it is either of those options. We knew atrocities were taking place. There was no access to international organizations inside Kosovo. As you know, the international tribunal was not given access, so one could only estimate by getting reports from refugees coming across the border.
When I was in Kosovo nine days ago, the international tribunal had only exhumed about 150 out of the prospective 600 sites that were suspected genocide centres or sites where body graves were thought to be located. They had only completed about 20 per cent of their examination and had uncovered about 2,500 corpses at that point.
You will have to wait until the international tribunal completes its examination. They will go back in the spring, again with the help of Canada, to do more forensic examination. To make those quick judgment calls, Senator Stollery, is much too soon.
Let me make this case to you, and I think Mr. Eggleton made it before. How many more deaths would there have been if we had not gone in? I go back to the Srebrenica example. Do we really want to wait until we have had the full massacre case in order to justify going in, or do we want to do some preventive action and stop it so it does not take place, as we have seen in other circumstances around the world?
Nevertheless, serious atrocities took place and are being examined by the war crimes tribunal. We shall let them do their work and not second guess.
The Chairman: I am giving you the testimony of a Spanish forensic scientist who went back to Spain with his team and told us that in fact there were far fewer atrocities than we had been told about.
[Translation]
Senator Bolduc: My question is for the Minister of National Defence. You said that we have an efficient army even if the deputy and chairman of the British Standing Committee said that we are not pulling our own weight. During the Kosovo war, we did pull our weight. On the other hand, you said that we need more resources and we should do more. You are going to fight for that. Are you going for a 10 per cent or 20 per cent increase?
[English]
Are you going for $1 million or $2 million? We have to be concrete in this respect.
Mr. Eggleton: Are you able to give me the money?
Senator Bolduc: No, but the Minister of Finance has a lot of money, apparently.
Mr. Eggleton: Yes, I am going to bat for additional resources. At the same time, it is incumbent upon us, since we are talking about taxpayers' money, to make the most of the resources we have already. We are doing that.
Our troops are quite effective. They do an excellent job. Sometimes they have to do it with equipment that is not quite up to modern standards, but we are replacing most of that equipment. We either have new equipment on its way or we are upgrading and modernizing other pieces of equipment.
There is no doubt that there is a financial stress. While we do this now, unless we can sort out this resource problem, we may have trouble doing it in the future.
As was pointed out -- and you reiterated the comment from the gentleman in England -- if you look at one chart, the percentage of GDP, you would not be impressed. If that is what you make your judgment on, I can see people saying that we are not pulling our weight.
There are all sorts of statistics out there. The proof is in the action that is taken and the results. Everyone has found that the Canadians pulled their weight in Kosovo.
[Translation]
Senator Bolduc: An old tradition in the British system gives certain prerogatives to the Crown. It is the government that decides foreign policy. It has the means to establish and implement that policy without too much legislative constraints. For instance, the Department for Foreign Affairs legislation means that the Department is not constrained and that the Minister has much discretion. It is one of the last ministers who can do that in our parliamentary system.
Would you agree with me that in the future Parliament might be invited to get involved in some way in order to legitimize its political responsibility? Before sending troops in Kosovo, should there not be a resolution from Parliament, at least from the elected House? You can see that I do not speak of any self interest. We are well aware in the Senate that we do not enjoy the same legitimacy as the House of Commons.
[English]
Do you believe that we should have the backing of the representatives of the people before sending troops there? No one was killed but some might have been.
We should get out of the old system of what I would call a wide mountain of discretionary powers to the minister. Your civil servants are very good. I will not discuss the quality of your people because I know they are good officers --
[Translation]
-- like in the court of Louis XIV or the agents of Napoleon.
[English]
Would it not be possible to have some framework within which you could act? We do not have any criteria for spending money when it comes to foreign aid, except perhaps the information you gave us here this afternoon with respect to the convention.
My feeling is that we should have some kind of framework within which the Department of Foreign Affairs and the ministers can act. What do you think of that?
Mr. Axworthy: We have had debates in the House of Commons. We had all-party support for the actions that were taken. There were extensive hearings in front of the committee. During the time of the conflict, Mr. Eggleton and I appeared on a regular basis before the joint committee, where we answered questions and responded to inquiries. We put a very high stock on maintaining parliamentary involvement.
The ultimate judgment call under the parliamentary system, as you said, is a cabinet decision. It is not just ministerial. It is a cabinet decision, but it is based on active consultation, not just with parliament itself. We have an active program of public consultations. Every year, a national forum goes across the country and solicits views. We have an annual human rights forum that goes on for 10 days here in Ottawa where all the human rights groups come and talk about what we should do at the Human Rights Commission meetings in Geneva, as well as virtually anything else they want to discuss. We have a series of round table discussions. We are actively consulting. We are also doing it on an international basis.
I agree with you that times have changed. There must be more open transparency to the matter, and we are doing the best we can in that regard. If you want a good example of that, go to the Department of Foreign Affairs web site where all speeches, statements, declarations and policies are put forward, responses are made, and interaction and dialogue takes place.
As well, we have an active program with young people in schools, engaging them in discussions surrounding human security and human rights to get their response. We have a very active program in the province of Quebec taking place right now in the CGEPs, setting up United Nations clubs where young people can become involved in discussing the matters of the United Nations and responding. I meet with them periodically to find out what they are doing. We are extending that program across the country. As resources allow, we are trying to outreach as much as we can.
Senator Bolduc: Do you feel that you should be bound by a framework that would be more precise? For example in international financial commitments, we know that suddenly Mr. Martin goes to Washington, he comes back and we have to pay $200 million for here and there. When things go bad in south east Asia, then we have to put some money there. All of that is outside of parliament. It is the same thing not only for foreign aid but also in other matters relating to foreign relations.
Mr. Axworthy: Senator, that is not true. All ministers appear before committees on estimates where they are accountable for their expenditures.
The Chairman: Mr. Minister, the committee could deal with this matter when we look at the estimates of the foreign affairs department.
[Translation]
Senator Bolduc: This is not new. When our Prime Minister was travelling around the world, it would cost us $25 million here and there in each country where he was going and was forgiving debts. It was done again this week and it will be done again in the next budget. In the next Supplementary Estimates, close to $200 million in debt forgiveness will be given to different African countries, but we have no criteria.
[English]
Mr. Eggleton: Mr. Chairman, we were scheduled to depart at 5 o'clock and indeed we have to appear before a cabinet committee. We are overdue now.
The Chairman: I apologize because I was told that you would be here until 5:30. The problem for us -- I just want to make it clear -- is that we are working on our report and you are our last witnesses. This is an important meeting for us. We have spent hundreds of hours trying to deal with this issue.
Mr. Axworthy: Both Minister Eggleton and I have items in cabinet that deal directly with the issues we are discussing.
The Chairman: Mr. Ministers, if you must leave, we will have to live with that, but we will have you back. We thank you for taking time out of what is obviously a busy schedule.
The committee continued in camera.