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REPORT OF FACT-FINDING VISIT: 5-6 NOVEMBER 2001 MONTREAL

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

November 5-6, 2001

MONTREAL DORVAL AIRPORT

            Staff Sergeant Charles Castonguay demonstrated an ion scanner, a small portable piece of equipment which can be used to detect the presence of explosives or drugs inside closed containers, such as packages or luggage.  While ion scanners are heavily used by Customs officers, the RCMP is the first police force to begin to use them.

            Racial or ethnic profiling is not used to screen travellers at airports; instead, travellers are evaluated on the basis of their responses to questions, their body language, etc.

 

ORGANIZED CRIME  

            The RCMP mandate at airports is focused on the activities of organized crime and enforcement of the federal laws dealing with contraband, drugs, illegal migrants, Agriculture Canada, the proceeds of crime, copyright and patents, controlled substances, etc.  There are RCMP organized crime units at the largest international airports.  The largest, with staffs of 40 police officers, are based on Toronto and Montreal, while a 20-person unit is based on Vancouver.

            The organized crime units include officials from other federal government departments.  The Montreal unit includes:

·        40 police

·        1 criminal intelligence analyst

·        1 prosecutor

·        1 food inspector

·        1 Customs intelligence officer

·        1 immigration officer

·        Special equipment includes an X-ray truck and the ion scanner.

 

            The most common illegal drug intercepted at the airport is marijuana, followed by cocaine and ecstasy.  

 

            According to the Staff Sergeant, the unit could use another 20 members 

Mr. Pierre-Paul Pharand, Acting Vice-President, Airport Authority

 

Mr. Pharand began by noting that not much had changed following the 1999 report on airport security by the Senate Transport Committee; this was precipitated by 11 September attacks in the United States.  Despite tightened security, two major problems remained:

·        Control of restricted area passes – while employees needing a pass are subject to a background check, a pass could be obtained even by those with a criminal record;

·        Screening of passengers and baggage.  

            According to Mr. Pharand, the Airport Authority is responsible for all security except screening passengers and baggage, a task which the airlines contract out to a private security firm.  The best and quickest way of improving airport security would be to make the Airport Authority responsible for screening.

·        Under the Airport Authority security officers could do screening one day, traffic control the next and then inside work.  Rotation would ensure that the staff on screening duty was more alert;

·        In Quebec the pay for security officers is $11.00/hr, a lot more than the $7.00 paid in Ontario

·        More interesting work and better pay should help reduce staff turnover.  

            Mr. Pharand believed that Transport Canada should not be responsible for both regulating air safety and screening passenger and baggage screening.  The airport Authority would find it much easier to discipline or fire security officers who fell down on the job.  Any extra costs of increased security should be incorporated into the price of the ticket.

 

ISSUING AND CONTROL OF PASSES 

            According to Mr. Pharand, security screening of all workers on the air side of the barriers is carried out by the RCMP and the Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) at the request of Transport Canada.  The RCMP and CSIS report back to Transport Canada which then decides whether or not to issue a pass.  All told about 40-50 people are involved in the control of passes of which there are two kinds:  blue for access to restricted areas inside; and, red for access to outside security areas.  At any one time there are about 15,000 –17,000 passes in circulation, including some that have been lost by employees, or that have not been surrendered by employees when they left their jobs. 

·        The chip in the pass that allows the holder to pass through locked doors can be de-activated;

·        Employees of employers with high rates of employee turnover can be given a pass good for only 1-3 years instead of the usual 5 year;

·        Flight crew must now pass through security.  

 

            Control of those who work in, or in the vicinity of aircraft, is still too weak. 

·        Conditions for these passes should be made more strict; and,

·        Passes should only be given to these workers if they agree to be subjected to random searches on entering or leaving the restricted area.

 

PHYSICAL SECURITY  

            NAVCANADA is responsible for security in the control tower.

            The Airport Authority is responsible for 1st Response in the event of an incident.  The response would be controlled from a special room.

·        Emergency Response Room

·        Airport Authority

·        Representatives of police forces with separate communications

·        Health official

·        Public relations official  

            Mobile Command Post – a special truck has been outfitted as a mobile command post complete with small kitchen and bathroom and desks/communications for essential staff.  

            The airport security/intelligence bureau works to identify weak points in airport security and to evaluate potential threats.

            A special committee on safety/security meets regularly to co-ordinate the work of police, NAVCAN, airport authority, airlines, etc., to exchange ideas about security weaknesses and possible threats, etc.

 

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MONTREAL URBAN AND QUEBEC PROVINCIAL POLICE  

            The representatives of both the Montreal Urban police and the Sûreté du Québec praised the level of co-operation and co-ordination which existed between the three police forces.  A RCMP Joint Task Force provided co-ordination and established the responsibility of each of the three forces in the event of different incidents/emergencies.

·        The local district of the Montreal Urban Police had assigned officers to patrol inside and outside the terminal when the RCMP withdrew from policing in 1996.  They enforced non-federal laws; the most common offences were possession of forbidden items and for making threats.  (The costs of this policing and the costs of the additional policing made necessary by the attacks of 11 September, apparently absorbed by the Montreal Urban Community, seemed to be something of a sore point with the local police.)

·        The role of the Sûreté du Québec was quite limited.  It attached 6 officers to the RCMP Organized Crime Task Forces at the Dorval and Mirabel Airports and at the Port of Montreal.  It also was responsible for patrolling the local highways leading to the airports and docks.

 

THE PORT OF MONTREAL  

            The breakfast briefing was given by Assistant Superintendent Mr. Pierre Droz of the RCMP with the assistance of criminal intelligence officers from the RCMP, Canadian Customs and the Montreal Urban Community police.

            According to Superintendent Droz the most important policing was done by the small Organized Crime Task Force staffed by officers of the RCMP, the Sûreté du Québec and the Montreal Urban police.

·        Very little was being done to control crime since the Port Police were disbanded.  Only Customs officers are now actively trying to prevent crime;

·        Most criminal offences – theft of containers, theft of contents - were not being reported by companies, hence there are no statistics.

·        Security guards provided by company hired by Port Authority unarmed, no power of arrest and no intelligence capability.  Probably easy for organized crime to penetrate (previous company with the contract had links to the Hell’s Angels).

 

SOLUTIONS  

·        Develop a better understanding of crime in the Port

·        Exchange information-intelligence nationally and internationally;

·        Make an in-depth study of Crime and the Port

·        Arrest and charge the leaders (i.e., the dominant crime family, many of whom work as checkers, or as inspectors, and even in security.)

·        End union control over hiring, firing and assigning dock workers – stevedores and checkers.  Checkers should not decide who unloads container.  The union is “closed” to outsiders; applicants must be sponsored by insiders i.e., the dominant crime family and their friends, hence it is very difficult to infiltrate.  At present about 15% of stevedores have criminal records, 36.3% of checkers and fully 54% of the employees of Urgence Marine, the company with the contract to pick up garbage, do minor repairs and to operate the tenders servicing ships moored in open water outside the harbour. 

·        Improve control at exits from the Port by having Port Authority re-establish check points to control truckers.  At present it is too easy for Matticks family checkers to crowd a terminal in the early morning as a screen for the pick-up of contraband.

 

SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES  

·        Customs and police have tried inspecting a greater percentage of containers.  By itself this does not necessarily work because criminals can re-route containers, and then conceal them until they have arranged to remove the contents or move the containers off Port property.  All that is required is the complicity of two checkers – one to “loose” the container when it is un-loaded from the ship and before it is sent to the customs shed, and another to help get the “hot” or “targeted” container out of the Port before its disappearance is noticed.

·        Must develop better intelligence – network of contacts – which takes time and which requires a regular police force with an intelligence capacity;

·        Customs receives manifests 72 hours before ship docks.  Customs targets about 15-20 containers for detailed checking per day, based on the profile of the shipping company, the exporter and importer, and the stated contents of the container.

·        Must give smugglers longer prison sentences – at present, men sentenced for smuggling contraband are back on the docks within a few months.  (This goes back to the problem of union control of hiring and assignment of stevedores and promotion to checker– those with serious criminal records or who associate with known criminals or criminal organizations should be banned from Port property.)

 

THE LAND FORCE RESERVES (MILITIA)

            There was no formal briefing session with the officers and-non commissioned officers of the 3rd Battalion of the Black Watch, but members of the Committee were able to speak to a number of them.  Some of the points raised were the following:

·        The local Militia is increasingly short of instructors, and consequently cannot quickly increase its numbers;

·        Sending large numbers of a Militia unit to serve with regulars compromises the ability to train recruits and others;

·        Reservists are not guaranteed jobs when they return from serving on missions because employers are not required by law to hold the job open;

·        Why does it take longer to take on strength someone with previous experience in the Militia than a new recruit?

·        Recruiting of officers and men impeded by centralization, generally inadequate promotional budgets and material.  Very little effort is made to appeal to the idealism of young people or to attract young women to the infantry; it is also very difficult for local units to get permission to recruit on their own at local secondary schools, colleges and universities.

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