MONDAY, 24 JUNE	Meeting with:	Witness 1
		Witness 2
		Witness 3

Witness 1 noted that airport security presented a huge problem because 200 g (less than ½ pound) of Symtex could bring down the largest aircraft. Almost as much damage could be done on the ground, Witness 2 had noted that a loaded fuel truck had been left unattended on the North side of the airport. 

There was a very real concern that organized crime, the Hells Angels in particular, were infiltrating Toronto International Airport and that eventually there would be a merger between organized crime and terrorist organizations. Witness 2 referred to an incident in which a baggage handler had changed the tags on luggage containing a shipment of hash so that they went through the domestic baggage system which is not checked rather than the international.

Witness 2 said that the Greater Toronto Airports Authority was very co-operative when police asked for assistance as were the investigators, but that Air Canada on occasion refused to let police work undercover in their organization. Witness 2 was 100% certain that organized crime had infiltrated the baggage handling at the airport. The Hells Angels have also targeted the cargo areas and can move contraband in and out of the country through the airport.

Many areas of the airport do not require employees to wear badges. On the airside employees working in the hangers and private businesses such as forwarders and customs brokerage houses have access to the ramps and aircraft; the logistics chain which supplies the airport and the planes extends far beyond the airport perimeter.

Sen. Lapierre suggested that the Airport Authority be made legally responsible for security because it was in a position to force its tenants to enforce security measures. There was also a need to improve the sharing of information among the various enforcement agencies present at the airport.


A. 11AM Air Canada

The Air Canada officials claimed that section 4.8(1) of the Aeronautics Act prevented them from discussing security in public. They did acknowledge that Air Canada was responsible for screening mail and other cargo before loading. They co-operated with police, customs, etc. on a day-to-day basis. They assess requests to provide cover for undercover police on a case-by-case basis- some are turned down.

A simple criminal record does not automatically bar someone from employment with Air Canada - the airline must abide by the Labour Code.

At Air Canada two persons are responsible for the security at 30-35 airports in Canada, the US and the Carribean. About 26,000-35,000 passengers are handled per day at Toronto International. Airside Air Canada has about 3,500 employees, about 2,500 of whom are at work on any given day.

B. Witness 4
Witness 5
According to Witness 4, about 147 Customs Inspectors began to compile an internet registry of threats to Inspectors until management ordered them to stop collecting the information. Witness 4 argued that temporary workers and students are not as good as permanent workers at selecting those for secondary inspection. They have about a minute to decide based on profiling, and the evaluation of the person in front of them. A check of available data systems will only bring up prior immigration and customs violations. More useful would be the ability to run a check on the number of the identification document those entering Canada presented to ensure they matched the description of the person to whom it had been issued.
The data bases are not sophisticated or interlinked. The lookouts are frequently stale dated and the information incomplete. The information posted should be consistent, timely, etc.
Witness 4 claimed the new resident card could by duplicated for about $2.50.


C. Transport Canada, Paul Kavanagh, Security and Emergency Preparedness Ontario Region

There are a number of participants in the Canadian Civil Aviation Security System, including:

• Transport Canada
• The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority
• Air Carriers
• Airport Operators
• Police Forces
• Foreign Affairs
• Solicitor General

At Toronto International as of June 2002 security responsibilities were shared as follows:

1. Air Carriers

• Security of checked baggage, cargo and mail;
• Security of the aircraft and Air Carrier facilities;
• Procedures for bomb threats;\
• Security Awareness Program;
• Incident Reporting;
• Screening of persons, their carry on posessions and checked baggage, personnel recruitment, training, supervision and quality management.

2. Air Transport Authority

• Acquisition, deployment, maintenance of pre-board screening equipment including explosives detection systems.

3. Airport Operators

• Property protection and designation of restricted areas;
• Security fencing, access control system and restricted area passes;
• Security signeage, contingency planning for incidents, passenger isolation areas;
• Policing and protective security; 
• Security Committees and records of incidents;
• Security Awareness program;
• Explosives Detection Dogs and trace detection equipment.
  

4. Transport Canada

• Inspection of Canadian and foreign air carriers;
• Inspection of 15 large and 29 commercial airports;
• Passenger baggage reconciliation and cargo facilities;
• Airside access control;
• Certification and designation of security officers;
• Security equipment performance;
• Monitoring the performance of the Air Transport Security Authority.

At an airport even persons with an identity card who do not seem to belong should be challenged, but it is very rare to discover a forged pass. Unknowns are used to carry out infiltration audits because the 12 Ontario region inspectors are too well known. Screeners who fail are replaced or retrained. Unlike the United States, results of the tests are not revealed.
Transport Canada audits the checking of invalid passes at gates, and it also audits the Airports Authority's control of passes and restricted keys. It monitors the activities of the charter and business jet businesses whose passengers and baggage do not have to be screened - they operate on the principle of know your passengers.
Cara and other caterers are responsible for searching the trays and trucks and then sealing them before they are sent to the aircraft. Transport Canada has checked their operation within the last month. Known shippers can bypass security.
There is no check on what airside workers bring to work with them.

D. RCM Police: Inspector Sam Landry
Immigration Services: Ms Wilma Jenkins and Steve Millman
Customs and Revenue: Norman Sheridan and Ernest Spraggett

Inspector Landry noted that the police presence at the airport had been drastically reduced from the 1995 squad of 250 uniformed and 40 plainclothes RCMPolice. It now consists of 59 RCM Police, 93 Peel Regional officers and 10 officers from other Toronto area police forces. Some of the RCM Police special units are:

• TASS or the Toronto Airport Special Squad an intelligence led unit with 4 RCM Police and 5 officers representing the Peel Regional force, the Toronto Police Services and the Ontario Provincial Police;
  
• Toronto Airport Drug Enforcement Unit

• The Integrated National Security Enforcement team, a five person intelligence unit.

The RCM Police had an excellent relationship with both the Peel Regional force and its management. The Customs and Revenue Agency supplied one person to cooperate on drug enforcement.

The RCM Police and the Airports Authority worked together to prevent infiltration by the criminal element. Nevertheless, he admitted there was significant organized criminal activity at the airport, but no known link between organized crime and terrorists.

According to Wilma Jenkins the immigration service has 163 full-time equivalents at the airport, including 118 Senior Immigration Officers as well as managers, clerks, information technology officers, etc.

In 2001-2002 there were almost 504,000 referrals to examine and 98,000 immigrants landed at the airport.

The new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act had:

• Simplified the grounds of inadmissibility;
• Improved procedures to arrest criminals and security threats;
• Eliminated appeal rights in cases involving security, organized crime and war crimes;
• Simplified removal of security threats;
• Barred access to the refugee determination process to security threats, organized criminals or human rights violators.

Norman Sheridan noted that the Toronto International Airport Passenger Operations of Customs and Revenue was also responsible for the City Centre Airport and for the Buttonville Airport in Markham and for smaller airports and some 32 marinas along the shore of Lake Ontario. Last year about 8.2 million passengers were processed by 380 employees with a seasonal increase of about 80. At the airport, a Passenger Targeting Unit working with the airlines, Customs and Immigration officials identified high risk passengers. Primary Inspection Line Inspectors also have access to customs and immigration enforcement databases. Work is underway on an Advanced Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record in co-operation with Canadian and US Customs, Immigration, Intelligence and police forces as part of the emphasis on risk management. In the aftermath of 11 September, secondary inspections increased from about 6.71% to 11.69% before falling back to the current 8.25%. The rate for overseas passengers remains at about 13%.

Ernest Spraggett noted that the airport is part of the Greater Toronto Area Division of Commercial Operations for Customs. About 100,000 international and transborder flights carrying freight land at the airport each year. The Targeting and Analysis Unit consists of 8 officers and a Superintendent which passes information about high risk shipments or shippers to the Flexible Response Team, the Secondary Unit which carries out the cargo examinations. The Secondary Unit also contributes to the Low Value Shipment Courier Program which provides a paperless release system for the 5.8 million courriered packages, 200,000 of which are examined. 11 September resulted in more intensive examination of cargo and greater emphasis on identifying low risk shipments and shippers through programs such as the Customs Self Assessment, CANPASS and Advance Commercial Information.

While only customs and immigration data is available at the primary line, criminal information is available at the secondary line.

Although there are about 150-200 automated fingerprint machines installed across the country, including 4 at Toronto International, staff must be trained to use them. First expected to be in use this fall.

TUESDAY, 25 JUNE

A. Canadian Forces Recruiting Group Headquarters, CFB Borden

Major Ken Orr told the Committee that the Recruiting Group Structure had 950 personnel, 31% of whom are reservists. 553 work in the 33 recruiting centres and detachments across the country, 307 are involved in training about 5,000 recruits each year at St-Jean, Quebec, and about 90 are attached to headquarters, CFB Borden.

The Recruiting Group is responsible for:

• attracting potential recruits, both officers and men, to all three services through advertising and face-to-face encounters at recruiting centres, career fairs and visits to universities and colleges;
• selecting recruits; and
• basic training of recruits.

For routine enrollments the Recruiting Group expects the whole process to take about 59 days from the time a completed application is recieved. 21 days of this period is spent administering the Canadian Forces Aptitude Test, arranging for medical examinations, an interview, and an enhanced reliability check and a physical fitness screening. It then takes about 31 days to evaluate the results, make a job offer and to complete the enrollment procedures.

The success of the current recruiting drive is stretching resources to their limit. The 10,000 planned had already been exceeded by 1,000 by the end of March. Recruiting of Reservists had reached 150% of planned intake. The paid strength of the Canadian Forces is already over 61,000 and is expected to rise to 63,000 by 31 March 2003. At just over 52,000 the trained effective strength of the Forces is still well below the minimum requirement of 54,700.

Providing the necessary training is a bottleneck - the capacity to train new recruits is limited as is the capacity to give introductory courses in the 100 different trades the Forces need. This explains why it would take a long time to bring the strength of the Forces up to 75,000 as the Committee recommended. The necessary training infrastructure was downsized in the mid 1990's.

The main attractions of the Forces to recruits are the sense of adventure, career stability, and the benefits offered. As a result, those being recruited are well above the minimum standards. They interview more than two candidates for every one they accept and make an offer to. For example, about 1,200 candidates met the standards for the 254 positions available in officers school and about 50% of the soldiers being recruited have college education rather than high school leaving. Reservists go through the same process as regulars and must meet the same standards. The enrollment of Reservists in the Regulars can be delayed by lost/mislaid dossiers at the local unit level. To be medically acceptable, recruits must not have a condition requiring specialized care within 5 days. The cost in Canada to recruit and give basic training to a service man or woman is about $8,400. This compares to $54,000US in the United States.

B. Lunch

Members of the Committee had an informal lunch with junior non-commissioned officers. While they could all use more pay and/or signing bonuses on re-enlistment, their major complaints were about the difficulty getting on training courses, their lack of opportunity to do enough of the things they had joined the Forces to do - take part in field exercises, fire weapons, etc. This and the tempo of operations would cause a good number to decide against re-enlisting when their time was up. The attitude toward bonuses was ambivalent - their appeal was to those who would re-enlist anyway.

C. The Canadian Forces Support Training Group

Lt.Col. Mark Lilienthal briefed the Committee on the work of the Canadian Forces Support Training Group which is responsible for delivering a wide range of specialized courses both at CFB Borden and at other locations. On base there are schools of Administration and Logistics, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, Dental Services, Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Warfare as well as the Fire Academy and the Military Police Academy, a Training Development Centre and a Chaplin School. Schools of Military Engineering, Military Intelligence, Communications and Electronics, and Languages are located elsewhere.

The Operational Capabilities of CFB Borden include:

• the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Response Team (NBCRT) and
• 12 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre

The Support Training Group faces a number of Challenges, including:

• the influx of new recruits;
• the need to rationalize and consolidate training;
• the need to develop Distance Education.

The courses offered tend to de-emphasise theoretical knowledge and so can be completed in 9 months rather than the 2 years a college would take to teach the same skills. The courses are generic rather than service specific. Instructors are regularly rotated back to operational units to ensure students are exposed to recent operational training and experience. Reservists are generally trained by the 10% reservists on staff.

While the Support Training Group expects to be able to handle its share of the current recruiting bulge, a move to a strength of 75,000 would leave it very hard pressed.

D. Canadian Forces Fire Academy

Major James Murray outlined the training offered by the academy and the use of its sophisticated indoor mock up of a military base complete with airfield to exercise firefighters in the management of fire fighting teams. This was followed by a demonstration of fighting an aircraft fire and the use of the jaws of life to force open the doors of a car and cut off its roof.

WEDNESDAY, 26 JUNE

8 Wing CFB Trenton. The briefing was given by Major Georgie Henderson who told the Committee that 8 Wing provides flexible airlift forces, Search and Rescue and deployable support for Canadian Forces. There are 2,300 military personnel and 350 civilian personnel attached to the base (Another 500 military personnel serve with loger units).

8 Wing is home to a number of flying squadrons such as 424 Transport and Rescue Squadron which is responsible for search and rescue in the whole country including the Arctic except for the east and west coasts. Airlift is provided by 429/436 Transport Squadrons, and by 437 Transport Squadron. Their work is supported by 2 Air Movements Squadron, 8 Air Communications and Control Squadron and by 8 Maintenance Squadron.

Major Henderson explained that forecast airlift needs had to be determined 18 months in advance to allow for the fact that 25% or more of the aircraft could be unavailable at any one time due to maintenance/overhaul. Requests setting out the details of when the airlift is needed, what kind is needed and what it is needed for are routed through Winnipeg where it is assigned a priority depending on whether it fits into the schedule, or can be re-scheduled or cancelled. As a result, the training of pilots is at high risk of being cancelled even though they require a minimum number of hours to maintain their qualifications, and more to develop them.

In a round table discussion it became clear that the issue of salary and bonuses was just one part of a pilot's decision to re-enlist - only about 65% accepted the bonus and re-enlisted. There was no longer any compensation for lower pay in terms of the quality of the equipment available, flying hours, training possibilities, etc. While pay was part of the equation, issues like quality of life, career choices, reduced flying hours training/promotion opportunities and the frequency of deployment were just as important. The change from frequent but short deployments to six months deployments was causing some morale problems.

The fleet of Hercules transports is aging - most were acquired between 1964-1967 and only a few date from the mid 1980's. Together there are 5 different models with two different engines to service and repair. A lack of spare parts keeps planes on the ground un-necessarily- there should be no more than a wait of 2 days to get a spare part. The shortage of aircraft has an impact on training- only one aircraft can be allocated to training instead of the two that are required.

There is a looming crisis in the supply of aircraft technicians. About 54% will soon become eligible for retirement. The biggest disencentive for keeping them on beyond this point is the lack of spare parts and proper equipment. At present the squadrons have about 80% of their establishment of technicians. It takes about 2-3 years of on-job training to fully train a technician. The amalgamation of the trades was poorly planned and has led to the development of "jacks of all trades, master of none." 


A. Lunch

At the lunch with the junior ranks the members of the Committee continued to explore the reasons why highly trained personnel were not re-enlisting. Pilots cannot fly and airlift missions must be turned down because aircraft are not available; mechanics and technicians are frustrated because they must wait for spare parts or do not have the equipment necessary to carry out the maintenance/repair. The frustration is frequently compounded because what they need could by purchased locally (this is particularly true of electronic components).


B. Canadian Parachute Centre

Lt. Col. Blanchette briefed the Committee on the necessity of maintaining the parachute capability of the Canadian Forces. There are currently 3 light infantry companies that are parachute capable.

Prior to 11 September there was some discussion about eliminating the parachute companies and restricting parachute training to the Air Force and for maintaining a Major Air Disaster capability in remote and hostile terrain. Since then the campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan has re-emphasised the value of light infantry and the value of parachute capable forces to support units such as the Joint Task Force 2. Transports can move many more paratroopers much greater distances than helicopters can move infantry, and modern parachute forces can be dropped up to 8km from the target and glide to it.

THURSDAY, 27 JUNE

A. 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group

The Committee was briefed about the components of the Brigade Group whose order of battle includes forces of:

1. Manoeuver

• Royal Canadian Dragoons (Armoured Corps)
• 1st and 3rd Battalions of the Royal Canadian Regiment (Infantry)
• A reconnaissance unit

2. Combat Support

• 2 CER
• 2 Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
• 1 Air Defence Regiment
• 2 Headquarters and Signals

3. Combat Service Support

• 2 Service Battalion
• 2 Military Police Platoon
• 2 Field Ambulance

The Brigade has many Standing Operational Tasks:

• Canadian Forces Alert - requires 4-8 persons per rotation in Northern Canada;
  
• Operation Hurricane, a three month rotation involving 6-8 personnel posted to Alert to maintain infrastructure;
  
• Operation DANACA, a rotation of 4-8 personnel to support the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights;
  
• MAJAID (Major Air Disaster) requires the allocation of 63 personnel in the event of a major air disaster to help stabilize the crash scene and evacuate survivors as soon as possible;
  
• DART (Disaster Assistance Response Team) on short notice the Brigade must be ready to deploy a company headquarters and four platoons (medical, defence and security, engineer and logistics) to a disaster site anywhere in the world. The unit can provide primary patient care, potable water, and local security etc. for up to 60 days. (It has been deployed to Honduras and Turkey.) The air transportable equipment is stored at 8 Wing Trenton. Every 6 months the standby troops go there to unpack the equipment, service it, and conduct training exercises. The members of the team are double assigned to the Major Air Disaster - thus both cannot be deployed at the same time;
  
• Support to Correctional Services Canada requires allocation of forces to patrol the perimeter of Ontario Correctional Institutions in the event of a labour dispute; and
  
• COP AGILE requires the provision of forces to assist in the event of a major earthquake disaster in British Columbia. The Brigade would augment the Headquarters of Land Forces Central Area with a Movement Control Centre, and be responsible for establishing up to three Advance Holding Zones and up to 7 Distribution Points in the vicinity of the earthquake to look after those who have been forced to abandon their homes.

The above are the Standing Operational Tasks that must be covered regardless of overseas deployments.

The round table discussion with a group of senior officers of the Brigade made it clear that it is woefully undermanned to meet its day-to-day operational tasks. Officially, for example, with about 575 personnel the 1st Battalion is at 80% of its strength; in reality, most days it can only parade 300-400, about half its established strength. The rest are lost to postings and sick leave. The sick can account for about 10% of Battalion effectives, in part because there is a reluctance to remove them from the Battalion roster while there is any hope of a return to duty. 

The result of the manpower shortage is double tasking - assigning the same forces to cover more than one operation, or, in the case of the COP AGILE operation, doing some planning work but assigning no specific units. It also leads to the ad hoc assembly of the forces necessary for a deployment. Since the Brigade must prepare one Battalion of infantry for deployment, the latter must be given priority on personnel, equipment and training funds. This has a serious impact on both Battalions. It has become increasingly evident that ad hoc forces put together from disparate units suffer higher casualities in action and from post-traumatic stress disorder, etc than forces that are cohesive. The capabilities of the remaining Battalion also suffer as it has been stripped of some of its personnel and units, has been left with inferior equipment and, for financial reasons, has less access to training and exercises - in the aftermath of 11 September, the 1st Battalion was put on 1 hour deployment notice although it was not fully trained. 

If the officers had more money at their disposal, how would they spend it? Unlike National Defence Headquarters, local commanding officers would have no trouble spending additional funds. Their first priority would be to spend much more money on field exercises and on ammunition for live fire training, both of which have been severely restricted. Base Petawawa itself is too small to allow infantry, tanks and artillery to manoeuver together in realistic exercises. Their second priority would be to build up the strength of the units to their full establishment, allowing in addition for those on extended sick leave. The third priority would be improvements to the base infrastructure. For example, the Battalions have been ordered not to keep their Light Armoured Vehicles outdoors, but there are no funds available to build indoor storage. Nor is there a proper building to house the computers necessary for training. There are continuing problems with the new communications equipment - frequency hopping and data transfer - which has to be used constantly for personnel to retain their skills. But it does not work well in buildings so soldiers, at their own expense, have supplemented it with Radio Shack walkabouts which do work over short distances indoors. 

The tempo of operations continues to be a problem. Soldiers frequently go from a course, to a posting, and then to summer training without enough of a break. Members of the 1st Battalion have also indicated a great deal of enthusiasm for high risk missions like the campaign in Afghanistan, as opposed to Bosnia which is considered boring, routine exercises and training because Afghanistan represents what attracted them to the army in the first place. In fact, lack of resources (the chance to fire live ammunition, missiles, etc) and the feeling they were not being as challenged in the Army as they had expected are felt to be major reasons why many trained soldiers fail to sign up for a second 3 year engagement. The reasons why 20 year veterans give up on the Canadian Forces has more to do with feeling that their contribution is not sufficiently valued, career paths and promotions and their marketable skills. Additional funding could address many of these non-monetary issues.
The officers found that more could be done to challenge the soldiers with the most initiative, such as develop a school of reconnaissance skills, create special units that, like the Airborne Regiment, would offer more challenge than the ordinary infantry unit while being less demanding than the JTF2. To encourage interoperability among the western allies, platoons could be exchanged with countries like the United States, the U.K., etc.

Some skepticism was expressed about the degree of knowledge that DND Headquarters had about the day-to-day problems and frustrations of middle ranking officers faced with being understaffed, over-extended and underfunded.


B. Lunch

The other ranks with whom the members of the Committee lunched raised many of the same issues as their officers. Pay, bonuses, quality of life issues remained important (permanent married quarters are overpriced and out-of-date, there are shortages of some items of clothing and boots.) There was a well developed feeling that conditions in the Army no longer allow soldiers to sufficiently practice their profession whether as infantry (lack of exercises, live ammunition, etc.), armoured corps/artillery (obsolescent equipment, lack of opportunity to exercise, practice gunnery, etc), or mechanics/technicians (lack of spare parts, insufficient training, etc.). Members of the artillery, armoured corps, and air defence were also uncertain about how much of a future their trade had in the Canadian Forces. 


C. Army Simulation Centre

After lunch the Committee received short briefings on the role and function of the major weapons systems in the Brigade. Some of these might not have a future with the Brigade. An option under study would withdraw weapons systems acquired for the central front in Europe and not deployed since Canada closed its bases in Germany - the Leopard tanks, the light and medium artillery, and the air defence artillery. The latter is badly undermanned because trained gunners are leaving and no new recruits are joining. No officers will volunteer, but must be assigned. Although the Royal Canadian Dragoons has an establishment of 18 Leopard tanks, only about half are operational - in one troop only one in four works. The hulls of two are too weak for them to be used. At any one time about 4 will be being repaired while another 4 are waiting for parts. If the parts do not arrive quickly, the latter risk being cannibalized for the parts necessary to keep as many operational as possible.

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