Summary of the Meetings Held in Washington, D.C.
by the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence
Monday 24 March - Thursday 28 March 2003
Monday 24 March 2003
Christopher Sands, Senior
Associate, Canada Project, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Mr. André Belelieu, Research
Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Senator
Kenny opened the meeting by asking why Canada had not been included in the list
of countries helping the United States – the list of the willing - despite its
contributions in the Persian Gulf and its promise to supply troops for
Afghanistan.
Mr.
Sands suggested a number of reasons, most notably that the US was currently
completely focussed on Iraq and that Canada was “off the public radar”.
Then there was the reality that the Bush Administration in particular and
the Republican Party in general do not like the Liberal Party – an attitude
going back at least as far as the time Lloyd Axworthy was Minister of Foreign
Affairs. This attitude is unlikely to change until the leadership of
the Liberal Parry does. (Sands incidentally does not believe this attitude is
beneficial to the United States.) What
attention was being paid to Canada by those outside the “Canada beat” was
concentrated on the media reports about the comments of the anti-American wing
of the Liberal Party.
The
US Administration and American public opinion saw the war on Iraq as an
extension of the War on Terrorism and Administration officials in the United
States and Canada had expressed their disappointment that Canada did not see the
war on Iraq as part of the War on Terrorism.
In
response to a question from Senator Banks concerning the US “loyalty card”
i.e. loyalty to who or what, Mr Sands said
that the United States frequently played the “loyalty” card (against its
domestic opponents and Canada and Mexico, for example) and the “gratitude”
card (against France, for example and against Canada for its easy access to the
US market) to dragoon reluctant internal and external allies.
Mr.
Sands told the Committee that the US has lost faith in the UN; this
Administration has always been sceptical about the UN and after the debacle over
the second Security Council declaration, most had given up on the UN and were
even suggesting that the US consider giving up its permanent seat on the
Security Council.
Sen.
Kenny noted that the United States must realize that it is not enough to win the
support of democratic governments, public opinion must also be won over.
Mr. Sands replied that the Administration knew that the Canadian Forces
were overextended and did not expect much more than diplomatic support.
Senator
Cordy asked a question about “what damage had been done to the UN by the
unilateral action on Iraq by the US”. Sands replied that, in his opinion, the Bush administration
had started their tenure “sceptical of the UN” and now seemed to have lost
faith in the UN. It was suggested that the United Nations required
“reworking” of its institutions, particularly the make-up of the Security
Council.
The
closeness of Great Britain and the United States made Canada an “outsider”
in the coalition. Prime Minister
Blair was looking toward the post-war period.
He saw the chance to use the coalition to reshape multilateral
institutions and the United States’ attitude toward them, particularly the
United Nations.
Mr
Sands suggested that Canada was not proactive enough when listing her support
and accomplishments in the world arena. He suggested that Canada needed to “pound her chest” more
often in getting the good news out. He
has recently told Macleans magazine that “the US Administration is noting the
personal attacks on it (and Mr. Bush) and the comments are fuelling the view
that Canada is no longer a trustworthy friend”
Major General Michael Dunn, Acting J-5, Department of
Defence
Sen
Kenny opened the meeting by saying that the members of the Committee had come to
Washington as friends of the United States and as allies in the war on
terrorism. The Committee had two
major interests: the War and Northern Command.
General
Dunn told the Committee that the United States war strategy in Iraq was based on
the assumption that they would be responsible for re-building after the war.
As a result, extraordinary steps were being taken to avoid civilian
causalities and un-necessary damage to the non-military economy. This explained the lack of a massive air offensive prior to
the commencement of ground operations.
Although
the population had been issued food and supplies by the Iraq regime just before
the war began, lack of fresh water would quickly become critical if the supply
of electricity was interrupted. The
Coalition priority would be to re-establish the supply of fresh water –
electric grid must be preserved/restored on a priority basis.
Consideration was being given to hiring Iraqi soldiers and paying them
from the frozen assets of Iraq and Hussein.
One of the big issues facing the “post war” administration was what
currency to use in Iraq. General
Dunn foresaw a “Baghdad Conference” after hostilities ended in Iraq to
discuss the “rebuilding of Iraq”. He
suggested that there would likely be a UN Resolution passed to provide the UN
with the mechanism to get involved in the rebuilding efforts.
It was the position of the US that the Iraqis will rebuild their nation
with substantial support from Non Government Organizations.
Asked
why Canada had not been listed among the willing, given the continued Canadian
support to the war on terrorism, General Dunn replied that Canada was not
included among the coalition of the willing because the Government of Canada did
not want to be included. This led some members of the Committee to note that the
Liberal critics of the US had been marginalized within the party.
General
Dunn admitted that the United States and Europe had very different perceptions
about the nature and extent of the terrorist threat.
The US had been caught by surprise by 11 September.
Since then it had identified more than 30,000 critical targets in its
infrastructure, an impossible number to fully protect.
As a result, it had decided that terrorist states had to be attacked in
order to head off a future attack by weapons of mass destruction.
He also suggested that North Korea was a problem and could add to the
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction unless addressed;
Sen
Kenny drew attention to the Canadian preference for multi-lateralism as opposed
to uni-lateralism in dealing with international crises.
Following 11 September Canada had adopted draconian legislation to
tighten up the immigration/refugee process, had invested billions in enhanced
border security and had made large increases in the budgets for intelligence and
for the military.
In
response General Dunn told the Committee that disarmament by inspection could
only work in cases such as the South African where the government wanted to rid
itself of weapons of mass destruction; Iraq had refused to cooperate from the
beginning and the United Nations had frequently had failed to contact the United
States. The US could not wait for
multi-lateralism to work because left unchecked for 10 years,
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction would reshape bilateral
relations.
With
regard to Northern Command, Gen Dunn told the Committee that it now had about
30% of its staff. Once fully “up
and running” it would help to put the whole problem of North American Defence
in perspective. Canadian assistance
was important if for no other reason that the United States was prohibited by
law from spying on her northern neighbour.
Among the major problems facing Northern Command are to ensure that
various agencies share intelligence and to develop the means of getting
intelligence down to the level of the local police, customs/immigration
inspectors, etc.
Gen
Dunn suggested that Canada needed to “get the good news out” and be more
proactive in bragging about our support to the US. Sen Kenny noted that the US
had not made a compelling argument for the war on Iraq to the Canadian public.
Nevertheless, Canada remained strongly committed to the war on terrorism
and had announced its intention of once again sending a large contingent of
troops to Afghanistan.
Dr. Michael O’Hanlon, Senior
Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution
In
his opening remarks Sen. Kenny admitted to puzzlement about the absence of
Canada from the list of friends of the United States, given her contribution to
the war against terrorism and decision to re-deploy combat forces to
Afghanistan. He said that the US
strategy for the war involved more than military planning: there were plans for
democracy in Iraq and perhaps the hope of a democratic “domino” effect
throughout the Middle East. But he
also expressed concern about the impact of the war on bilateral trade and the
impact of the list of “friends” of the US on Congressmen.
In
response Mr. O’Hanlon told the Committee that by refusing to contribute to the
war on Iraq, or even to support it diplomatically, Canada had missed an
opportunity to be rated as a “top tier” ally like Great Britain and
Australia. The damage would be
greater if “Joe six pack” noticed the lack of Canadian support and
Congressmen decided to exploit this. Even
the deployment of Canadian forces to Afghanistan might give the US public the
impression that Canada was not prepared to help in Iraq.
He suggested that Canada should reconsider its decision not to
participate in the war in Iraq and decline to join ISAF in Afghanistan.
As it stood, the Administration faced little or no effective domestic
pressure to settle outstanding economic issues such as the softwood dispute and
Canada had given it no reason to use its influence.
On
the other hand, the US would need all the help it could get to stabilize Iraq
after the war (even from France and Germany) as the United States would be
unable to provide the number of troops required for a “Stabilization Force”.
The extent of this problem was the subject of an ongoing dispute about
the number of troops needed after the war – the Pentagon had argued for
500,000, while the Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld believed that 100,000 would be
enough.
In
Mr. O’Hanlon’s opinion the Administration had not established the existence
of a link between the Government of Iraq and al Queda at the present time.
Evaluating the members of the “axis of evil” he told the Committee
that Iraq was 10 years away from a nuclear bomb, hence the
chemical/bacteriological threat was the most important.
North Korea’s nuclear capability presented a special challenge.
The policy of threats and attempts at economic strangulation had only
driven the regime into a nationalist corner, but the Bush Administration had
alienated the South Koreans, making the possibility of a pre-emptive strike
unlikely. A “carrot and stick”
approach would probably work, provided the carrot was kept in the foreground and
the stick in the background. While
some analysts believed that Syria would be the next target, he did not believe a
good argument had been made for this. The
Iranian regime had shown signs of moderation, going out of its way not to offend
the US and even to offer covert support for the attack on the Hussein regime in
Iraq.
Turning
to the Patriot Act, Mr O’Hanlon said that it sacrificed civil liberties for
security. Nevertheless, in future,
travel documents would have to incorporate biometric identifiers and the US
would give clearance priority to countries with high security travel documents.
The interests of the US border States would limit the impact of the Act
on Canada because while the border States wanted the border to be tightened up,
so long as there was no adverse impact on Canada-United States trade.
Although
the First Gulf War had been unexpectedly easy, George Bush Senior lost the
ensuing election because the economy had done poorly.
There was a good chance that history would repeat itself and that the
son, despite an easy Second Gulf War, would go the way of his father for the
same reason.
Toward the end of the meeting, members of the Committee raised the question of Canadian energy exports of gas, oil and hydro, remarking that Canada was the largest supplier to the US, that its reserves were huge and located in North America.
Tuesday, 25 March 2003
Michael Kergin, Canadian Ambassador
to the United States
Ambassador Kergin gave the Committee
an overview of Canadian-United States relations.
He began by comparing Canada’s relationship with the United States to
the Great Lakes. Both were so vast
that no one incident could seriously damage them, but an accumulation of events
could. Like the Lakes, the
relationship was basically placid with the calm disturbed by occasional squalls,
such as the softwood lumber dispute or the war on Iraq, which could be
devastating to those caught up in them.
The Ambassador suggested that the
problems Canada had in political Washington relate to a number of myths and
realities. The myth continues that some of the 9/11 terrorists entered the US
from Canada and there is the mistaken perception that the Canadian border was
“porous”. There was also a real
disappointment that Canada was not a member of the “coalition of the
willing” and continuing irritation over the size of our military and defence
budget.
The White House had expressed its
disappointment about the Canadian refusal to participate in the war, but was
fully aware of the contribution to the war on terrorism.
Members of Congress know Canada less well but generally have a benign
view that could be changed for the worse by media comments about the strong
views against the Iraq war expressed by some supporters/members of the
government. The progress of the war
would determine the ultimate Congressional attitude toward Canada as well as to
France and Germany for their opposition in the Security Council.
While Congress is critical of Canadian spending on her military, there is
good awareness of the quality of the Canadian Forces and the problem of
sustainment.
Turning to homeland security,
Ambassador Kergin noted that the Administration was confident of Canadian
co-operation and knew that its own agencies and departments frequently had less
problems co-operating with their Canadian opposite numbers - the Canadian
Security Intelligence Agency, the R.C.M. Police, Customs, Immigration, etc. –
than with their sister organizations.
Congress, however, remained a problem.
Myths about 11 September persisted and played into the assumption that
the attack must have come from abroad. In
its reporting, the media could emphasise the threat from Canada connection when
the actual point of the story was the lack of adequate resources on the United
States side of the border. Nevertheless,
Congress, like the US public, was jumpy, very fearful of a new attack, and
preferred to think it would come from abroad rather than from within the US.
A number of issues separated the
Republicans and Democrats. The most
important was the budget for Homeland Defence which the Democrats thought was
$10 billion too little – New York Democrats like Sen. Clinton are particularly
fearful about another attack on Manhattan and hence worried about the lack of
resources allocated to the northern border.
The creation of the new Department of
Homeland Defence had added to the sense of vulnerability.
Normal channels of planning, communication and decision-making among the
constituent agencies had been completely disrupted.
The Embassy has encountered difficulty “getting to know” the new
homeland security personnel as there is a new cast of players.
The Embassy plans to bring down a number of Deputy Ministers and
Assistant Deputy Ministers from critical Canadian departments to “start the
ball rolling” on cooperation with the new Department.
Canada could help in the implementation of the Patriot Act by registering
exits as part of its customs/immigration controls.
The problem was the chaos in the new Department which was expected to
take years to fully get its act in
order.
The Ambassador was returning to Ottawa
to “precipitate” Canadian planning for the post-war re-construction of Iraq.
The United States was prepared to go it alone, but would appreciate help
from its friends. The Administration had quietly praised Germany’s non-public
support for the war and expressed initial disappointment over Canada’s
decision not to participate or support it.
Admiral
Brian Peterman, Senior Director Border and Transportation Security, Homeland
Security Council
Mr.
John Maisto, Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs, National Security
Council
Chris
Hornbarger, Director Homeland Security Council
Una
Brien, Director Homeland Security Council
Lisa
Bobbie Schreiber Hughes, Director Homeland Security Council
Mr.
John McGowan, Director Homeland Security Council
Mr.
Sam Brock, Director, Western Hemisphere Affairs, National Security Council
Sen Kenny opened the meeting by noting
that, in the view of Canadians, 11 September was an attack on Canada as well as
the US, hence the Canadian participation in the war on terrorism.
The Committee had already prepared one report on defence of the North
American coasts and intended to pursue the subject in a follow-up report.
Admiral
Peterman noted that the Patriot Act was just one of 4-5 pieces of legislation
that would take 4-5 years to fully implement.
At the end of this time, travel documents would be computerized and
incorporate a biometric identifier. Talks
had already begun with Canada about implementation of the provision of the
Patriot Act requiring an exit document and possibility that Canadian customs
could collect it for the US.
Mr.
Hornbarger characterized the Canadian - United States relationship as very
pragmatic and expressed his opinion that a way would be found to implement the
legislative requirements of the Patriot Act cooperatively.
He was convinced of this because it was not true to say that the US
interest was strictly security and the Canadian, strictly trade.
In reality, both countries had a strong interest in trade and security.
Canadian
cooperation for Operation Liberty Shield to protect the United States during the
war on Iraq was considered excellent. Canada
had reinforced its border control. The
R.C.M. Police had intensified its helicopter patrols of the border and its
helicopters had been authorized to refuel in the United States.
At the time he spoke, however, there was no specific intelligence
indicating an imminent terrorist
attack.
Admiral
Peterman said of Northern Command that it had two missions:
-
To defend the US
-
To provide military assets to the Department of Homeland Defence and First Responders
In
the discussion with Committee members, Admiral Peterman agreed that both the US
and Canada had a problem of communications within the civil and military
authorities and between them. Cell
phones were frequently the most effective means of communication and were often
used by members of the IBETS to talk to each other.
NORAD gave both countries a model of excellent cooperation that could be
applied to Northern Command
In
response to a comment about the problem posed to the Canadian Government by the
split in Canadian public opinion about the war in Iraq,
Ambassador Maisto argued that the US believes that it faces a genuine
security threat and is disappointed some of its closest friends do not see the
problem the same way. While
sympathetic to the political problems Canada might face in Quebec, he noted that
other countries had stood on principal and showed leadership and political
courage. In his opinion, the issue
of Iraq is not Canadian military support, but political support. He said that had 9/11 not occurred, the US Administration
felt that the Iraq situation would still have had to be addressed due to their
concern about a more “expansive occurrence” in the future (due to
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction).
In
the Ambassador’s opinion, it is because Canada and the US are such good
friends, that the US cannot understand why Canada is not supporting the US in
its “time of need”. He
emphasized that the Iraq war is not Kyoto, landmines, or other issues of
principle; rather, it is an issue that is critical to the “family”; These
words were similar to the ones used by Ambassador Cellucci in a presentation in
Canada at about the same time.
Sen
Kenny and members of the Committee replied that the United States had failed to
convince Canadian public opinion that the threat posed by Iraq was so imminent
that unilateral action was required rather than multi-lateral action under the
United Nations. Sen Kenny drew
attention to the Canadian preference for multi-lateralism as opposed to
uni-lateralism in dealing with international crises.
Following 11 September Canada had adopted draconian legislation to
tighten up her immigration/refugee process, had invested billions in enhanced
border security and had made large increases in the budgets for intelligence and
for the military. All these policies and the recent decision to deploy combat
troops to Afghanistan underscored Canada’s commitment to the war on terrorism.
Mr.
Hornbarger argued that without 11 September, Hussein and the government of Iraq
would have continued to develop weapons of mass destruction; eventually the US
would have had to deal with him at a far higher cost than 11 September.
As it was, the US was simply not prepared to wait and risk 30,000 or
300,000 casualties in another attack.
Senator Kenny replied by reminding the meeting of the Canadian commitment and support to the War on Terrorism which included a continuing presence of Canadian ships and aircraft operating in the Gulf region.
Mr. Stephen McHale, Deputy
Undersecretary for Transportation Security, Office of Homeland Security
In
his opening remarks Sen Kenny drew attention to the reports of the Committee on
Coastal Defence, on maritime and air ports and its intention to review the role
of the Canadian coast guard.
Mr.
McHale noted that the Transportation Security Administration was the largest
part of the new Department of Homeland Defence.
The idea of uniting all the agencies dedicated to transportation security
arose in the wake of 11 September. The
objective was to improve their capacity to prevent another successful attack due
to their mistakes. The national
transportation security plan which led to action plans for sea, land, air,
railroads, trucking etc had been developed using the principles in the Homeland
Security plan. The Transportation
Security Administration would have to work closely with the regulators to
“harden” the transportation system against attack
He
told the Committee that the United States had about 350 ports and that the 50
major ports had security committees. The United States Coast Guard had been mandated by Congress
to establish a security standard for ports and ships. At the present time the United States ports, like their
Canadian counterparts were subject to a number of authorities; among them, the
police of local jurisdiction, the Coast Guard, the local port authority, etc.
The US was investing $195 million in port security over 2 years.
The ports were independent and background checks on port workers were not
uniform across the country. As a
result, a two level system of background checks had been proposed: an
intelligence-based check and a criminal record check.
While organized crime represented a problem, conviction for certain
crimes would automatically bar people from certain parts of ports. None of the United States ports had effective fencing around
their perimeter.
McHale
discussed the problems with containers arriving from overseas.
He stated that the US had no “target” of the percentage of containers
“destuffed”; rather the US was working on “intelligent targeting” of
individual containers. He indicated that the US had launched an initiative to put US
customs agents at approximately 20 mega ports to ensure better knowledge of the
contents of containers heading to the US. They
were also looking into a better system of tracking individual containers through
enhanced technology. When queried
about “hardening” of containers, he indicated that he had encountered severe
industry resistance to this option.
Cruise
vessels had been subjected to more thorough screening of passengers and cargo.
With regard to cargo, every effort was being made to avoid duplication.
Checked baggage would be checked at the airport and then move by secure means to
the cruise ship. Baggage screened
on being unloaded from the cruise ship would then be sent by secure means to the
airport.
The move to screening 100% of the baggage being put in the holds of passenger aircraft, at least in some way, had been difficult. Some airports simply were not designed to accommodate the bulky machines necessary and some equipment had to be installed in lobbies. Mail was not being screened, but this problem was made less serious by the rule that prevented passenger aircraft from accepting mail weighing more than 16 oz. Workers in airports would be subjected to background checks (intelligence plus criminal), but there are no plans to subject them to search on entering or leaving restricted areas.
Makan
Delrahim – Chief Counsel and Staff Director US Senate Committee on the
Judiciary
Senator Kenny, K. McDonald and M.
LaRocco met with Mr. Delrahim.
Mr. Delrahim stated that the committee
had just completed hearings on “technology to secure borders” (all borders,
not specifically the northern border) relating to the number of security acts
passed recently. (Enhanced Border Security Act, Patriot Act, Department of
Homeland Security Act etc) He
stated that the US is attempting to develop a comprehensive “data base” on
all persons who enter the US.
In discussing the “entry/exit”
procedures, and the potential effect on US/Canadian commerce, Delrahim stated
that the present House may be attempting to “score political points” rather
than doing something that is “good and logical”.
He stated that the US is NOT
contemplating any new legislation except, perhaps, something relating to
“guest workers” unless there was a compelling need for an individual area to
be addressed.
The Judiciary committee does not focus
on “implementation of an act” unless they are “lobbied” by an agency
with a vested interest.
Delrahim does not see any near term
legislation on “ports”. He stated that the Senate needs to reorganize its
committee system prior to any more legislation on security.
The Senate does NOT have a Homeland Security committee similar to the
newly formed committee in the House and thus must reorganize to form such a
committee and/or subcommittee on Homeland Security.
Presently there are too many individual senate committees that have a
“small part” of the pie.
There was a short discussion of the new powers of the FBI to “wiretap” agents of foreign governments, including “lone wolfs” who are involved in computer hacking of networks – a definition which now includes military personnel on “exchange” duties etc.
Wednesday, 26 March 2003-04-08
The
House Select Committee on Intelligence
Eleven members of the House Select
Committee on Intelligence attended the breakfast meeting with the Committee.
The Chair, Porter Goss (Republican, Florida) and Robert Cramer (Democrat
Alabama) led the discussion for the Representatives, Senator Kenny led the
discussion for the Committee.
Porter
Goss began be noting that intelligence sharing among the Five Powers (Canada,
the US, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand) was very good.
Internally, however, the US intelligence organizations were “not
working seamlessly” together, an objective that would take “generations”
to bring about.
Peter
Hoekstra noted that 11 September had highlighted the fact that the FBI faced
major problems with information sharing and technology.
The attacks had raised the whole question of whether the FBI should
continue to be responsible for both enforcement and domestic
security/intelligence. The US was
seriously considering separating the two functions.
The question Congress and the Administration had to answer is: “Can the
FBI culture change from its enforcement mentality to a culture based on sharing
information?”
In
response to a question about how intelligence sharing could be verified, Porter
Goss replied that the staff of the House Committee had sources within the
intelligence communities and could pick up the signs of non-cooperation.
This led to the conclusion that it was important for committees to have
staff with prior experience as members of intelligence organizations and
continuing contacts within them.
The
Counter Terrorism Centre had the responsibility of filtering foreign
intelligence and forwarding the relevant information to the Department of
Homeland Defence. However, it had
been found to be less “robust” than expected in the fusion of
information/intelligence.
This
raised the question of Canada’s lack of a foreign intelligence service and the
reliance on her allies. Porter Goss
noted that Australia and New Zealand had a better intelligence capacity in Asia
than the United States. Canada did not have to be represented everywhere, but should
choose the areas most vital to its interests.
As he said: “Does Canada want to continue to rely on her allies for
foreign intelligence in areas essential to her security?”
Sen
Kenny noted that the Director of CSIS had told the Committee on numerous
occasions that he had an overseas capacity.
Speaking
of border security Peter Hoekstra told the Committee that US Canadian
cooperation during the past six months had speeded up the movement of travellers
and goods. Sen Kenny noted
the importance of improving the infrastructure on both sides of the border –
NEXUS and FAST lanes were being blocked by normal crossers.
This raised the question of the Patriot Act and the requirement that exit
as well as entry records be kept. Sen
Kenny noted that solutions could involve exempting Canadian citizens from the
requirement and having Canadian officials collect the exit information and
relaying it to the US.
Discussion
then turned to the desirability of improving the infrastructure on both sides of
the border and the foolishness of spending extra billions duplicating facilities
on the border rather than building and sharing a single building.
Jane Harmon, the Ranking Democrat, commented that common sense dictated
that the Smart Border eventually lead to common facilities on the border.
Peter
Hoekstra, however, raised the issue of the fallout from the Canadian decision
not to publicly support the US war on Iraq.
In response to a comment that Canadians had had difficulty connecting
Iraq to international terrorism on the basis of the intelligence made public, he
said that he had noted a bitter attitude toward Canada among his Michigan
constituents. As a result, it would
be very hard to sell a unified approach to border security –at the moment many
constituents would rather ignore Canada and go it alone.
Members of the Committee replied by
pointing to the Canadian preference for multi-lateralism as opposed to
uni-lateralism in dealing with international crises. The United States had failed to convince the Canadian public
that the threat from Iraq was immediate. Since
11 September Canada has been a willing and significant contributor to the war on
terrorism. She had adopted
draconian legislation to tighten up the immigration/refugee process, had
invested billions in enhanced border security and had made large increases in
the budgets for intelligence and for the military. Most recently Canada had announced the intention of deploying
combat troops to Afghanistan.
Kelly Ryan, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, US State Department
Nan Kennelly, Migration Policy
Officer, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, US State Department
Kelly
Ryan began by saying appreciatively that the Canadian Department of Justice had
been the first to contact United States counterparts in the aftermath of 11
September. She told the Committee
that the Safe Third Country Agreement was being held up by the re-organization
of the Department of Homeland Defence, i.e. there continued to be problems with
“jurisdiction”. The Regulations
to the Agreement were almost drafted. Once finished, they would have to be made available for
public comment. The process was
moving “quickly” for government, but would take months rather than weeks to
run its course.
Ms
Ryan told the Committee that some of those refugee claimants turned back at the
Canadian border would be detained in the United States.
They would be treated as they would be at any port of entry – they were
not in the United States. If they
had no documents they could be subjected to expedited removal but if they
claimed refugee status they would be sent to an asylum officer to have their
case reviewed. The refugee would be
allowed to rest for 48 hours and to contact the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees before the hearing. Under
United States law a refugee claimant has to be detained until the validity of
their claim to refugee status was established.
However, exceptions to the detention rule are made on a case-by-case
basis. They would be detained in
open air service detention areas, jails and contract jails.
In
response to a comment about how Canadians viewed false refugee claimants as
immigration “queue” jumpers, she said that the US public was not really
bothered by queue jumping. Otherwise,
the Canadian and US systems were very alike – the US being more careful about
designating a refugee and the Canadian including more final resorts before
deportation. The US had learned
from Canada, however, the importance of having up-to-date intelligence available
when conducting the refugee interviews. In the United States removal and criminal proceedings could
be co-ordinated so that after serving the sentence, a prisoner was removed
rather than being released and then re-arrested.
The
surge of refugee applicants at the Canadian border was being fuelled by fears of
a crack down in the United States on those who were subject to removal for
overstaying their visas and by inaccurate information about the Safe 3rd
Country Agreement. Many of these
refugee claimants had family in Canada and so would be eligible to have their
claim adjudicated in Canada rather than the United States.
In any event, these people were neither terrorists nor criminals and did
not constitute a security risk to either country.
Ms.
Ryan noted that the US applauded the Canadian process of developing files on
potential refugees. However, she
felt that the Canadian process took too long, sometimes to the detriment of the
individual seeking asylum. She used
the example of an individual in Columbia who had been identified by the Canadian
authorities as a potential refugee who had been killed prior to completion of
the Canadian process.
CATO
Institute
Gene Healy, Senior Editor
Daniel T. Griswold, Associate Director, Center for Trade Policy Studies
Patrick Basham, Senior Fellow, Center for Representative Government
Reviewing
probable future developments the CATO representatives told the Committee that
the call to militarize the United States borders with Canada and Mexico by
permanently stationing National Guards there, supposedly to stop the movement of
terrorists, was a stalking horse for reducing the number of illegal immigrants.
They
considered that various pieces of legislation like the Patriot Act and the Entry
Reform Act would tighten up the border by imposing information sharing on US
agencies, getting better intelligence to border points, adopting a biometric
identifier and generally resorting to electronic data rather than paper
documents as a means of clearing travellers and goods.
But the bottom line would still be the fact that more trade crosses the
Ambassador Bridge that the whole of US trade with Japan.
In
many respects the idea of a common North American security perimeter –
anticipated in part by NORAD and by the European Union, made a lot of sense.
To which Sen Kenny replied that a whole lot of harmonization was coming,
but would take place step-by-step.
Members
of the Committee discussed ways of alerting the US public to the fact that
Canada was a willing participant in the war on terrorism and had done a great
deal to tighten up the border since 11 September.
Canada in fact had an advantage in that its police and intelligence work
was much better coordinated than the US. The
CATO representatives responded that the United States had made it much more
difficult for males 16-25 years of age to get into the country from Muslim
countries – a policy which Canada could not adopt.
It was noted that while Canada had done the right things since 11
September, it kept much too quiet about its contributions to the security of the
United States. In response, Sen Kenny noted that the US had also done a poor
job of justifying both the “Axis of Evil” and the war on Iraq to the
Canadian public.
With
regard to immigration/refugee policy the CATO representatives argued that Canada
should not be seen to accept as refugees/immigrants groups and individuals
considered to pose a terrorist threat to the US.
It is much easier to keep out undesirables that it is to track them down
and monitor their activities once they are inside the country.
They noted, however, that 16 of the 19 terrorists who participated in the
attacks of 11 September had no criminal or security records pointing toward
their potential to commit an act of terrorism.
How can you screen for hatred and bad intentions?
Hence the resort to other characteristics such as ethnicity, religion,
nationality, etc.
The
CATO representatives remarked that traditionally the White House is more
sympathetic to Canada and Canadian interests than is Congress.
The outburst of unflattering rhetoric about the Administration was
dissipating this capital. Sen Banks replied that while the “moron”, and
“bastard” comments received coverage in the US media, a major speech by
Prime Minister Chrétien in Chicago had been ignored.
Northern Border Caucus
Hon
George Nethercutt (R-Washington), Hon Bart Stupak (D-Michigan), Hon Mark Souder
(R-Indiana)
The
Committee had an all too brief meeting with members of the Northern Border
Caucus, a group of more than 50 members of the House of Representatives with an
interest in the free flow of people and goods across the border.
George Nethercutt, Jr began by noting that there were excellent grounds
for developing the Canada-US relationship despite current problems.
He saw two major sources of current tension
-
The Canadian refusal to support the war on Iraq
-
Ambassador Cellucci’s remarks about Canada’s defence spending
In
response Sen Kenny spoke of the Canadian contribution in the Persian Gulf and
Afghanistan and her efforts to find a solution to the Iraq crisis, noting as
well intelligence sharing and enhanced security in Ports.
The Canadian public was simply not yet prepared to support the war: the
United States had failed to make a sufficiently compelling case for immediate
unilateral action, as opposed to the Canadian preference for continued
multilateral action under the United Nations.
All
sides supported implementation of the Smart Border agreement.
A US Representative noted that the Canadian side was much more advanced
in computerization and that the strength of US officials had just recently been
raised from 350 personnel to 750 while 9,000 watched the southern border.
The
United States Representatives were very concerned about some Canadian
activities, most notably the recent broadcast by Canadian media of film showing
US soldiers captured or executed in the war against Iraq (it was admitted that
some US media had showed the same film) and intemperate remarks made by
prominent politicians and officials. They
strongly believed that leaders must quickly disassociate themselves from such
remarks. The Canadian delegation
responded that those who had made the remarks had either resigned or had been
marginalized within the Liberal Party.
Toward
the end of the time available for the meeting a Representative spoke candidly
about opposition to the United States over Iraq.
In his opinion opposition to the US over Iraq was much more explosive
than opposition over Vietnam because the US felt directly threatened by
terrorism. His major concern was
that anti-Canadian sentiment could explode the way anti-French sentiment had.
Because
of the present anti-French sentiment, anti- Canada sentiment is negligible. BUT
if Canada continues to annoy the US by doing something stupid (such as more anti
US statements by our politicians), Canada could become an issue with anti-Canada
sentiment on the rise. There
continues to be some Canada bashing on some US talk and investigative TV shows.
(As an example, on Sunday 30 March 2003, the newsmagazine show NBC Dateline
opened a story on the leaky Canada/US border by stating that “two days after
9/11, it was reported that two of the terrorists had entered the US through the
leaky Canadian border).
The
discussion concluded on “good news” items with a commitment by the US
Committee to visit Canada to continue “bilateral discussions” in the near
future.
Thursday, 27 March 2003
The
House Judiciary Committee
James
Sensenbrenner, Jr (Rep-Wisconsin) Chair
Howard Coble, Chair, Subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security (Rep-North Carolina)
John
N. Hostettler, Chair, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Crime
(Rep-Indiana)
Sheila Jackson Lee (Dem. Texas),
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Crime
The
Committee had a very fruitful meeting with a three of the Judiciary Committee.
Chair Sensenbrenner began by saying that the Safe Third Country
agreement, once implemented, would remove a major irritant and that he was
“not adverse” to giving Canadian and US citizens exemption from the
entry-exit provisions of the Patriot Act. In his remarks he said that Canada had
fully cooperated with efforts to make travellers and goods moving through
Canadian ports and airports more secure, a level of cooperation that set a
pattern for the rest of the world. When
questioned, he also said he had heard of no criticisms of the level of
protection afforded US officials working without their side arms at Canadian
ports and airports.
The
close co-operation of Canada and the United States to pre-clear travelers and
goods in each others’ ports and airports , in his opinion, set a pattern for
the rest of the world. Port
security remained a major threat, but airport security had been improved since
11 September. Sen. Kenny made a
number of points about the most recent report of the Committee, most notably the
recommendations that ground crew be searched like passengers and crew, and that
the cockpit be protected by double doors, thus reducing the need for air
marshals.
Mr.
Sensenbrenner replied that the United States had no immediate plans either to
screen ground crew or double the cockpit doors.
When it was necessary to open the cockpit door, the cabin crew blocked
the corridor with a cart. Screening
at United States airports had been improved substantially by federalization.
There was much greater confidence in the professionalism of the screeners
and their backgrounds. Previously
almost 60% had been undocumented aliens.
According
to Mr. Sensenbrenner, the United States was up-grading and inter-linking its
data bases. He had personally gone
overseas to check the databases at US customs offices.
Much more of this information was now appearing on screens at US ports of
entry. Tracking entry-exit would
have to be handled by technology. Most
of the 30 million “illegals” had simply overstayed their visas.
He favoured coordination with Canada to track the movement of
non-Canadians across the border.
He
believed that travel identity cards would have to be biometric.
He was very impressed by the new Canadian permanent resident cards with
their “security” and “anti-forging” features, but thought travel
documents should incorporate two biometric identifiers- perhaps a thumb print
and a retina scan and that there must be a common international standard.
In
passing he noted that US practice alerted other countries to the fact that an
individual had been denied a US Visa. On application, the applicant’s Passport is stamped “Visa
Applied for”. If the Visa was
granted, it is applied over this stamp- hence if the phrase is visible, the visa
has been denied.
The
Committee had a very interesting discussion with Sheila Jackson Lee about the US
treatment of Arab Canadians, Commonwealth travelers and respect for civil
liberties. She was interested in
improving the treatment of non-European Canadians at the border and elsewhere.
Only landed immigrants and permanent residents, not citizens of Canada,
were subject to fingerprinting at the border.
She was interested in finding out whether US practice respected this
limitation at border points.
Senator
Kenny noted that 11 September had had a huge impact on civil liberties in
Canada, but efforts to attach a “sunset clause” to the most onerous
legislation had failed. The
treatment of some Canadians at the border was a major problem.
An Arab-Canadian parliamentarian, despite his special passport, regularly
complained about his treatment at the border.
The
meeting concluded, as had the meetings with the other committees, with plans to
set up a more extensive series of meetings in the future.
The Honourable Paul McHale, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security, Department of Defence
Peter F. Verga, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defence
Mr.
McHale began by saying that the destructive capability of a nation could now be
wielded by terrorists and even individuals.
He
illustrated the relationship between the Department of Defence and the
Department of Homeland Defence by following the chain-of-command from the county
to the federal level. A crisis
began to interface with the federal government at the State level with the
involvement of the local Federal Emergency Management Area.
Its head would evaluate the situation and, if necessary, contact the
military through the Defence Coordinating Officer.
A
parallel process could begin with the State Governor who found that the
emergency was too much for the capabilities of the National Guard.
While under Title 32 status the National Guard could remain under State
control while the federal government paid its expenses, the federal military
represented “the capability of last resort”
Despite
the chain-of-command, local commanders could respond to an emergency to help
save life, etc.
In
response to a question he said that if an incident took place on the border or
involved both countries, the political leaders would have to consult to work out
a coordinated response. Talks have
taken place, but there is no memorandum of understanding covering situations
such as these as yet.
With
regard to missile defence, Mr. McHale told the Committee that the US will take
every step necessary to protect itself from attack.
The US is open to discussion with Canada about a shared system, but this
is not essential. He said that the final relationship between Northern Command
and Missile Defence has not been decided despite assignment of the latter to
Strategic Command: as a mature system, missile defence will have both local and
strategic elements
The emphasis of Northern Command is on maritime and land defence, but it has few military resources. Mr. McHale believed that there was an opportunity to build a maritime association with Canada based on the NORAD model. There is a need to establish an integrated maritime defence in depth and as far off shore as possible. There is also a need for better intelligence and analysis as well as a need for better technology. Finally, the various resources available for coastal defence must be better integrated.
The Honourable Michael P. Jackson,
Deputy Secretary of Transportation
Jeffrey N. Shane, Associate Deputy
Secretary
David G. DeCarme, Chief, Surface,
Maritime and Facilitation Division
Mr.
Jackson applauded Canada for her support to the United States on September 11,
2001 and thereafter. He stated that
Canada and the United States were very close neighbours; all problems between
the two nations should be “able to be resolved” as members of a family. He
used as an example of early resolution, the issue of movement of “explosives
and hazardous materials” into the United States from Canada.
Mr.
Jackson discussed some of the problems the US had faced in meeting the
requirement that all checked baggage be checked for explosives.
The US had spent several billion dollars equipping its airports.
Some airports will require major re-construction to accommodate new
machines. He told the Committee
that the new equipment is expected to be good for about 3 years.
There will always be a trade off between the volume of explosives that
can be detected and the rate of false readings. If set to detect very small quantities, false positives will
increase, but this is a more acceptable result than the opposite.
The false positives are checked by trace detection.
Continuing
tests have highlighted people problems on the screening line, in particular the
issue of how to maintain the alertness of the staff manning the machines.
This is only partially solved by having them move from one kind of
machine to another.
With
regard to maritime containers, Mr. Jackson admitted that the US had no current
objective, i.e. to inspect a certain percentage of containers.
He stated that the US was working on a method of “information
profiling” of sea containers. Some steps had been taken to enhance the
security of containers as they were loaded and handled, but port security
remained poor. $100 million had
been spent on Operation Safe Commerce and another $100 million on port security
A
number of steps would have to be taken to make ports more secure.
These included providing better fencing, the development of integrated
intelligence which fuses information about the shipment, the shipper, the
adoption of passenger profiling to identify high risks, adoption of a
Transportation Worker Identity Card based on intelligence and police screening
and incorporating a biometric identifier, and establishment of a centralized
data bank to prevent unreliable workers from just changing their location.
The
US has developed a system of Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling system. While
this system is presently a “blunt instrument” in profiling, it is being
enhanced and will ultimately result in a system which will colour code all
passengers under a red, yellow, green system. Red coded passengers will be similar to “no fly”
passengers and will not be permitted entry into the US.