Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 1 - Evidence, February 23, 2004 - Afternoon session
OTTAWA, Monday, February 23, 2004
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 2:00 p.m. to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honourable senators, it is my pleasure to welcome you to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Today, the committee will hear testimony in preparation for its third annual visit to Washington, D.C. My name is Colin Kenny, I am a senator from Ontario and I chair the committee.
On my immediate right is a distinguished senator with a sore shin, Michael Forrestall from Nova Scotia. After an early career as a journalist with the Halifax Chronicle-Herald, and as an airline executive, he entered politics and was first elected to the House of Commons in 1965. He has served the constituents of Dartmouth for more than 37 years. He has followed defence matters throughout his parliamentary career and has served on various parliamentary committees.
Also on my right, beside him, is Senator Jane Cordy, also from Nova Scotia. She is an accomplished educator who has an extensive record of community involvement. She has served as Vice-Chair of the Halifax-Dartmouth Port Development Commission, and as chair of the board of referees for the Halifax region of Human Resources Development Canada. Senator Cordy is also a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, and she is Vice-Chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association.
On my immediate left is Senator Joseph Day from New Brunswick. He holds a Bachelor of Electrical Engineering from Royal Military College in Kingston, an LL.B. from Queens University and a Master of Laws from Osgoode Hall. Prior to his appointment to the Senate in 2001, he had a successful career as a private-practice attorney. His legal interests include patent and trademark law and intellectual property issues. Also, he is Deputy Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance and our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, and is an active member of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association.
Beside him is Senator Jim Munson from Ontario. He is best known to Canadians as a trusted journalist and a public affairs specialist. He was nominated twice for a Gemini for excellence in journalism. He reported news for close to 30 years, most recently as television correspondent for the CTV network. After a brief period of consulting with the Minister of Indian Affairs, he joined the Prime Minister's Office, first as special communications adviser, then as director of communications. Also, Senator Munson is a member of the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration, and the Standing Senate Committee on Official Languages.
On my far right, at the end of the table, is Senator Tommy Banks from Alberta. He is well known to Canadians as one of our most accomplished and versatile entertainers and an international standard-bearer for Canadian culture. A Juno Award-winning musician, he has achieved national and international renown as a conductor and music director for many signature events, such as the opening ceremonies for the 1988 Winter Olympics. In 2003, he was appointed Co-Chair of the Prime Minister's Task Force on Urban Issues. In addition to serving on this committee, Senator Banks is the Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources and the Chair of the Alberta Liberal caucus.
Our committee is the first permanent Senate committee mandated to examine security and defence. Since the committee's inception in mid-2001, we have completed a number of reports, beginning with "Canadian Security and Military Preparedness." This study, which was tabled in February 2002, examined the major defence and security issues facing Canada. Then the Senate asked our committee to examine the need for a national security policy. So far, we have released four reports on various aspects of national security. First, "The Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility," which was tabled in September 2002; second, "Update on Canada's Military Crisis: The View From the Bottom Up," which was tabled in November 2002; third, "The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports," in January 2003; and fourth, "Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World," in October 2003. The committee is continuing its long-term evaluation of Canadian security and defence policy. However, it has interrupted its work for the moment in order to hear witnesses and prepare for an upcoming visit to Washington, D.C.
We have before us today Mr. James R. Wright, Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Mr. Wright attended McGill University before joining the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1976. He has served in Moscow, Washington and London. In Ottawa, he worked in the Office of the Prime Minister as Director of Personnel and as Director General for the Central, East and South Europe Bureau. That was not all he did in the Prime Minister's Office.
He assumed his current post in September 2000. Mr. Paul Chapin, Director General, International Security Bureau, accompanies Mr. Wright and I welcome you both to the committee.
Mr. James R. Wright, Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, for inviting us to appear before the committee to discuss key issues on the Canadian-U.S. defence and security agenda in advance of your visit to Washington in March. Your work in examining defence issues, in fostering new thinking and, ultimately, in protecting and promoting key Canadian security interests, is critical to those who work on these issues on a day-to-day basis.
I hope that my comments here today will be helpful to committee members in preparation for the forthcoming trip to Washington.
In recent months, there has been a great deal of public attention on possible Canadian participation in ballistic missile defence. I know that many members of the committee have a particular interest in this topic. On January 15 of this year, the Minister of National Defence and the U.S. Secretary of Defence exchanged letters of intent on BMD.
Pursuant to this exchange of letters, we are now engaged in discussion with the United States, gathering the information we need to make a decision on Canadian participation.
Before addressing BMD in greater detail, allow me to place the possibility of Canadian participation into what I believe is the proper context. Though this particular issue will likely continue to garner public attention, it is just one element of the overall Canada-U.S. defence and security relationship — a relationship that can best be described as the most extensive and deeply interconnected of any two countries in the world today.
[Translation]
It is not overstating the fact that the U.S. is our most important ally and partner. Beyond our economic interdependence, we share important political values — democracy, the rule of law and good governance. We also have a long-standing and shared responsibility to protect the security of the North American continent.
It was our commitment to this responsibility that formed the basis of the Ogdensburg Declaration of August 18 1940, which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.
For over 60 years, this board has been a critical component of the Canada/U.S. defence and security relationship. It meets twice a year, and the next meeting is in Washington in March.
[English]
Since the establishment of the board, Canada and the United States have signed a great many agreements on joint defence. Currently, there are some 80 treaty level defence agreements and more than 250 memoranda of understanding between the two countries. The most important of these is undoubtedly the one that established the North American Aerospace Defence Command. NORAD has been the foundation of defence cooperation between Canada and the United States since 1958.
NORAD not only provides the framework for cooperation in the aerospace defence of North America, but it is the most visible symbol of Canada-U.S. defence cooperation. Canadians and Americans work side by side in this integrated, binational command.
At NORAD, there is unrivalled interoperability of Canadian and American North American defence assets, including personnel, radars and aircraft. Not only is there shared strategic vision for defence of the continent, there is shared decision-making in implementing this vision. At the highest levels of NORAD, both Canadians and Americans take command decisions.
[Translation]
The terrible events of September 11, 2001 brought about significant changes in terms of how the U.S. addresses continental security. In addition to the U.S. government creating the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Defense established Northern Command or NORTHCOM, in 2002. NORTHCOM, which is collocated with NORAD at Colorado Springs, has been accorded a comprehensive mission encompassing both homeland defence and civil support. NORTHCOM's mandate is to deter, prevent and defeat threats directed against the United States, its territories and interests. NORTHCOM can also provide military assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management operations, that is, assistance after an attack has occurred.
The NORTHCOM area of operations includes air, land and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles.
Because Canada falls within the NORTHCOM area of interest, it is vital that we maintain effective communication with this command. There is already a good deal of cooperation between Canada and NORTHCOM. With both organizations working towards similar ends — the protection of our citizens — working relationships are already being developed to ensure productive bi-national collaboration. Not only is the commander of NORTHCOM also the commander of NORAD, but Canada has assigned a liaison officer at the rank of rear-admiral to NORTHCOM.
[English]
Since September 11, our defence alliance with the United States has deepened in other ways as well. Committee members will know of our joint response to terrorism, both at home in enhancing border security, and abroad in such places as Afghanistan. Less well known is the work being done on maritime and territorial defence of North America.
Just over a year ago, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, signed the Canada-U.S. Enhanced Security Cooperation Agreement. A key component of this agreement was the creation of the Bi-National Planning Group, also located alongside NORAD at Colorado Springs. This group is looking at ways to better facilitate Canadian and U.S. responses to maritime attacks, terrorist attacks in North America and transborder threats, including natural disasters.
Overseas, U.S. and Canadian troops are fighting alongside each other to combat terrorism and help build stable societies able to deny terrorists the refuge they seek. Today, approximately 1,900 Canadian military personnel in Afghanistan serve in the NATO-led and U.N.-authorized International Security Assistance Force. The current commander of ISAF is Canadian LGen. Hillier. In addition, a Canadian frigate, the HMCS Toronto, is en route to the Gulf with a U.S. navy carrier strike group as part of our ongoing contribution to the campaign against terrorism.
All of these examples lead to the same conclusion. Our two countries share unprecedented levels of interoperability, coupled with a common objective of fostering both continental security and greater international peace and stability.
[Translation]
This brings me back to the question of ballistic missile defence.
Let me begin by making it clear that the letters of intent signed on January 15, 2004 do not constitute an agreement for Canadian participation in missile defence. The exchange was undertaken to facilitate talks to help Canada gain all of the information needed to make an informed decision. No decision on Canadian participation in BMD will be taken until after negotiations have concluded. We will then assess whether or not participation in BMD is in the Canadian interest, and make a decision accordingly.
As we continue to engage the U.S. on this issue, it is important to keep a number of facts in mind. First, the proliferation of ballistic missiles represents a growing threat to peace and international security. This was recognized by NATO heads of State and government at the NATO summit in Prague in 2002.
[English]
Second, ballistic missile defence will be an operational reality in the U.S. in the very near future. The president has been unequivocal on this issue. The U.S. will deploy an initial operating system by the fall of 2004. Hence, the United States will move forward on its BMD plans, with or without Canadian participation.
A number of nations have declared that they will co-operate with the United States on BMD, including the United Kingdom, Australia and Japan. The U.S. has a dialogue ongoing with other countries, including Russia and China. That list also includes Denmark, Greenland, Israel, India and several Central and East European countries. NATO is also involved through its study of the threat assessment of missile proliferation.
Third, the government's decision of May 29, 2003 to enter into discussions with the United States on possible Canadian participation was made after years of consideration of this issue. The primary aim of the discussions is to explore whether and how participation in BMD could enhance Canadian security.
Certainly it is in Canada's national and strategic interest to be involved in any decisions concerning the defence of North America, and hence, the security of Canadian citizens. We have been making decisions on continental defence with the U.S. for over 60 years. When it comes to the future security of Canadians, it is incumbent on us to leave no option unexamined.
[Translation]
Fourth, if a decision is made to participate in BMD, there are a variety of ways in which Canada could contribute to the joint effort. One would be to use our already existing infrastructure and personnel at NORAD.
Annually, Canada spends some $300 million on North American defence with more than 700 Canadians working in support of NORAD, both at Colorado Springs and in other locations.
NORAD, as you know, already tracks ballistic missiles through its integrated tactical warning/attack assessment (ITW/AA) mission. The U.S. government has acknowledged that this existing function, in which Canadian personnel are full participants, would be very useful in support of the BMD system.
Indeed, we need to ask ourselves what the consequences would be for NORAD if, by not participating in BMD, we pushed the U.S. to develop its own U.S.-only missile warning system.
[English]
Fifth, it is important to recall that the BMD system to be put in place this year is grounded-based and sea-based only, starting with up to 10 missile interceptors in 2004, and increasing to up to 40 by 2005. This is hardly the Strategic Defence Initiative of the 1980s, which envisioned large numbers of space-based interceptors capable of neutralizing the entire Soviet arsenal. The BMD program envisaged today is far more limited in scope.
It is true that U.S. military planners have drafted so-called "vision" documents on the question of space weaponization. However, these are not policy. Furthermore, there are strong scientific, political and financial arguments against weaponizing space. These are part of an ongoing debate in the United States.
As the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence have all clearly stated, Canada remains opposed to the weaponization of space.
It is a longstanding Canadian policy that has not changed. As well, it is a position that we have communicated to the U.S. from day one in our discussions.
[Translation]
Finally, the government sees its discussions with the U.S. in the context of a comprehensive approach to ballistic missile proliferation. Our approach focuses on diplomatic engagement with proliferators and strong national export controls on missile-related technology. We promote membership in the missile technology control regime (MTCR), and support for the Hague Code of Conduct on ballistic missiles, as well as examination of potential defensive capabilities.
BMD would complement, not compete with, Canada's non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament efforts.
Our approach is comprehensive in nature, and respects and fulfils our international non-proliferation obligations.
[English]
Mr. Chair, it is not mere semantics to talk of the new security environment in which we live today. We need to constantly ensure that our continental security and defence arrangements are up to date.
The Canada-U.S. defence and security relationship is dynamic and responsive to new challenges. We have seen this relationship evolve through the Permanent Joint Board of Defence, the PJBD, the creation of NORAD, the establishment of the Bi-National Planning Group and the joint campaign against terrorism.
I would ask you to look on Canada-U.S. discussions on the ballistic missile defence of North America as part of a much broader and comprehensive defence and security relationship.
When it comes to the defence of North America — to the protection of Canadian and American lives — Canada and the United States should be constantly looking at ways in which we can work together to our common benefit, as we have done so often in the past.
The threats of today may be different from those of 1940, when Prime Minister Mackenzie King and President Roosevelt announced the historic Ogdensburg agreement. It is clear, however, that Canada's commitment to working together with the U.S. for our mutual defence and security remains unwavering.
Binational co-operation — two sovereign partners working together to achieve a common goal — remains the best means to truly serve Canada's national and strategic interests.
Senator Day: Mr. Wright and Mr. Chapin, are we talking about ballistic missiles that have nuclear warheads?
Mr. Wright: They have the potential for nuclear warheads. The expression "ballistic missile" implies the range in which the missile can fly. The distinctions are, short range, medium range and long range. Ballistic missiles are long- range missiles that can reach from Asia into North America, for example.
Senator Day: They could potentially have nuclear warheads.
Mr. Wright: Yes, they could have a nuclear or biological warhead.
Senator Day: Does ballistic missile defence necessarily include a device that has a nuclear armament capability?
Mr. Wright: No. In fact the current U.S. plan, limited to a land- and sea-based defensive system, involves what the Americans refer to as "kinetic kill capacity." They do not have a nuclear warhead in their ballistic missile defence. The objective of the American plan is to go ahead and capture the incoming ballistic missile in space — to hit it in space — where the incoming missile implodes and the space debris burns up upon re-entry into the atmosphere.
Senator Day: Can we tell the Canadian public that there is no plan at this stage, in the current discussions on the land- and sea-based interceptors, for the ballistic missiles to be nuclear armed?
Mr. Wright: My understanding, senator, is that that is exactly what the Americans have in mind. Their program is an interception program aimed at capturing these missiles in space, where they would be destroyed without using a nuclear weapon on board.
Senator Day: During your discussion, you talked about the role that NORAD is playing now in terms of tracking of ballistic missiles. You seem to imply in your comments that if we do not go along with the rest of this plan, that that part of the program cannot continue. Is it not possible to have NORAD continue its current tracking function and then provide that information to any group or any country that is involved with the interception?
Mr. Wright: Perhaps it would be helpful for the committee, Mr. Chair, if I could read for you a portion of the extension of the NORAD agreement in 1996, which spells out fairly clearly the current responsibilities of NORAD in this respect.
The Chairman: If you think it would be useful, go ahead.
Mr. Wright: I am quoting from page 6 of the NORAD extension. I can leave this text with the committee if you do not have it already.
In consideration of the foregoing circumstances, the primary missions of NORAD in the future will be:
a. aerospace warning for North America; and
b. aerospace control for North America.
It is understood that "aerospace warning" currently consists of the monitoring of man-made objects in space and the detection, validation, and warning of attacks against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles, utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands. An integral part of the aerospace warning will continue to entail monitoring of global aerospace activities and related developments.
It is understood that "aerospace control", currently includes providing surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the United States. The expansion of binational cooperation in other aspects of the aforementioned missions should be examined and could evolve if both nations agree. Both Governments undertake to ensure that full and meaningful consultations on aerospace defense cooperation take place when requested by either party.
I read this, senator, to try to demonstrate to the committee that in fact the role with respect to threat assessment, early warning of missiles, is already a function that is being met by the binational NORAD in Colorado Springs. The change here is that the United States government has taken a decision to go ahead and put in place a ballistic missile defence program. That is what is different here.
Our judgment is that the role that NORAD is currently playing with respect to early warning and threat assessment is one that could be helpful in terms of that U.S. mission that President Bush would like to stand up by the fall of 2004.
It is in that light that we are looking at the possibility of NORAD playing a part in the U.S. missile defence system. NORAD will not play the exclusive role in terms of the management of the missile defence mission.
The United States has made very clear that that role will be played by both NORTHCOM and STRATCOM. However, as you have seen from the exchange of letters of intent between Minister Pratt and Secretary Rumsfeld, the United States agrees that NORAD can play a significant role in terms of the standing up of the missile defence system.
The question that the government is looking at now is can NORAD play this helpful role in terms of an early warning threat assessment in respect of the missile defence mission? Is that important to us? We think it is, because if NORAD does not perform this particular function, a function that they are already undertaking right now, the risk, senator, is that NORAD as an institution could be diminished. It could be bypassed as the United States puts in place a U.S.-only command structure to deal with this particular issue, and so over time, we may find that what was once a hallmark of Canada-U.S. security and defence relations, NORAD, becomes a somewhat diminished institution.
Senator Day: We agreed that NORAD is already tracking or has the potential to track.
Mr. Wright: Already is.
Senator Day: Already there. All right. Does Canada participates in this?
Mr. Wright: Correct.
Senator Day: If Canada decided not to go the next step and participate in the missile defence, is there any reason why Canada's participation in tracking could not continue with respect to NORAD?
Mr. Wright: The challenge, senator, would be that the U.S. wants in place by the fall of 2004 a command structure that it can count on 100 per cent with respect to the missile defence system. If Canada turns around and says that we are not participating in missile defence, since we are an equal partner in NORAD, which is carrying out this early warning and threat assessment function, the likely decision of the United States government would be to remove that current responsibility from NORAD and give it to another command centre in the U.S. military command structure, NORTHCOM or STRATCOM. As I mentioned before, the risk would be a diminished NORAD, and since this is one of the hallmark institutions of the Canada-U.S. security and defence relationship, we want to try to ensure that NORAD can play a meaningful role in this mission, as long as the Canadian government can be satisfied that, across the board, Canadian interests are in fact being protected and enhanced by our participation. That final decision will rest with the Government of Canada after negotiations with the United States are concluded, and we still have a number of months to go before completing those.
Senator Day: You lead me to my next question. Do you have a projected date for the conclusion of those discussions?
Mr. Wright: There is no formal deadline for conclusion of these negotiations, but it would be helpful, since the United States will be standing up the missile defence system by the fall, to conclude in early October 2004. They will be standing up their system. We would want to go ahead and reach an understanding with the U.S. administration on missile defence in advance of that, and certainly that is the preference of the U.S. government as well. However, the final decision on this, on timing, will be taken by the Canadian government once the negotiations are finished, and we have presented a package to the Canadian government so it can be reassured that on a variety of different factors, Canadian interests are being looked after. Those considerations could include a number of different elements. It would include the protection of Canada and Canadians. It would include the role of NORAD. It would include opportunities for industrial co-operation between the two countries. It would involve, clearly, the issue of cost and burden-sharing. These discussions with our American colleagues are continuing. Finally, the Canadian government would want to be assured that our position on non-weaponization of outer space remained very much part of Canadian policy. These would be some areas that the Canadian government would be looking at before taking a final decision on whether to sign a framework agreement between Canada and the United States on missile defence. There is no formal deadline, but clearly, a preferred timing would be in advance of the stand-up of the missile defence system.
Senator Day: Is the technology developed to the stage where it is realistic to say that this fall, George W. Bush and his administration would be able to stand up a missile defence?
Mr. Wright: Certainly, all indications are that there will be a limited missile defence system in place by October 2004. There is every reason to believe that that will be the case. That is the basis on which we are proceeding right now. The Americans have done a number of tests of their current missile defence system. It is an evolutionary process. Research and development will continue for years to come. The other point that the Americans will make to you, when you go to Washington in March, is that this system could possibly change over time. However, what the Canadian government is negotiating with the U.S. government on right now is the current U.S. missile defence program, which is land and sea based. It is limited and defensive, with 10 interceptors this year and possibly up to 40 interceptors next year. This is not a program that is intended to overwhelm the Russian or Chinese nuclear deterrent. The objective of this program is to address a missile coming from a so-called "rogue" state, a country of concern or an accidental launch. It is not intended to be a nuclear deterrent to the Russian or Chinese program. I know the U.S. government has worked very hard with our Russian and Chinese colleagues to ensure that those countries, those governments, have a proper appreciation of exactly what it is that the United States has in mind here.
Senator Day: For clarification, in the current plan, you emphasized land- and sea-based intercepting defensive missiles. Does the current discussion not involve space-based intercepting missiles?
Mr. Wright: Absolutely not. From day one — I led the discussions for the Canadian side with our U.S. counterparts — we have been very clear with our colleagues at the Pentagon, at the State Department and at the National Security Council, that longstanding Canadian government policy with respect to non-weaponization of outer space remains. That policy will not change and the co-operation we are talking about right now relates only to the current limited land- and sea-based defensive system aimed at the protection of North America. That is the nature of the discussions we are having with our U.S. counterparts. There are some in the administration who continue to talk about a possible program down the road to place weapons in space. This is not U.S. government policy. There are divisions within the administration on this issue. There are divisions, frankly, within the Pentagon on this issue and you will hear all this when you are in Washington. There are certainly very strong views within the Congress and the Senate on this issue, so it is very important when looking at this particular program that you differentiate between the vision and the policy. Also, you need to differentiate between research and programs.
Even in the area of research, it is important that you differentiate between monies being sought by the administration and monies appropriated by Congress, because these are all different things.
The Chairman: As a follow-up, Mr. Wright, what is so sacred about weapons in space? Why are you dancing on that? Why is the government so keenly worried about weapons in space? We already know there are military satellites in space. We know that the land-based and sea-based systems may not be capable of picking up the 60-to-90-second burn, and that for the system to be effective you will need to have weapons in space. What is so sacred about weapons in space that you are making a big deal of it?
Mr. Wright: I hope I am not dancing on this particular issue.
The Chairman: I apologize if I made it sound bad, but you seem to be trying to emphasize, so that we understood clearly, that no one likes weapons in space. I would like you to make the case for why it would be so bad to have a defensive weapon in space designed to protect the North American continent from a rogue missile. That defensive weapon could save Canadian lives.
Mr. Wright: I suppose the answer, senator, is that we and other countries make a clear distinction between militarization of outer space and weaponization of outer space. You are absolutely right to say that there are already military assets in outer space. Satellites and other assets perform an extremely important function for all governments. The difference is that there are no weapons in outer space right now — none. It is a pristine environment and the strong, longstanding preference of the Canadian government is to ensure that that remains the case. As soon as one country introduces weapons into outer space, then other countries will be tempted to go ahead and similarly place items there. Space is already a fairly crowded environment because of satellites. If you had a system involving forms of interceptors up there, you would run the risk of space debris that could cause harm to commercial and military satellites. Canada and other countries around the world rely extensively on the safe use of outer space. Canada is not alone in saying that it strongly prefers to see no weapons in outer space.
The United States government is looking at what they call a "layered approach" to missile defence. Currently, their focus is on land- and sea-based systems. There is also talk about air assets and the possibility of firing lasers from planes to capture missiles at the boost phase. You referred to that in your introductory comments. All of these technologies are many years away from realization, and so at the present time, the focus of the Canadian government, and most other governments, in negotiations with the United States is very much on the current limited and defensive programs being put in place on land and sea. The Canadian government will continue to talk to our American colleagues, making clear our opposition to weaponization of outer space. We will continue to work with the international community at the Conference on Disarmament, with bilateral partners, to see whether we can achieve, down the road, a new international convention to prevent the weaponization of outer space. It is a pristine environment; there are no weapons there right now and we would greatly prefer to see it stay that way.
The Chairman: If you really believed that there was a threat from rogue missiles and it was proved that you could not stop them with land-based or sea-based defensive weapons, would the policy still be against having defensive weapons in space?
Mr. Wright: That is an important question, although hypothetical.
The Chairman: We all know we are going there.
Mr. Wright: Yes. The fact is that we will have to see how effective the current land- and sea-based program will be in the years to come. The technologies being funded and researched to a limited degree right now in the United States are many years from completion. The Canadian government has taken a practical decision here to take into account the realities of proliferation of missiles and of weapons of mass destruction and to work with our American partners to see whether we can arrive at a co-operative understanding that would facilitate an enhanced role for NORAD in assisting in the missile defence mission, but only the current mission — meaning "land- and sea-based defensive system."
Senator Atkins: How satisfied are we that the Americans have perfected the land- and sea-based systems? I do not know whether you saw 60 Minutes last night.
Mr. Wright: I did not see it.
Senator Atkins: Well, they blew a hole in the Patriot system. They talked about how it was developed in 1991 and they still have not got it working properly. It was quite an interesting 20 minutes in which one learned that the most success they had with the system was the shooting down of a friendly aircraft. They may have had one success out of the 40 missiles fired against the enemy.
Mr. Wright: The Patriot is a short-range system used by the United States on some of their Aegis-class cruisers. Israel has a similar system in place called the Arrow missile, I believe. There is a difference between the Patriot system and the ballistic missile defence program that is being discussed with the United States.
Senator Atkins: We are talking about technology.
Mr. Wright: We are, and you are absolutely right, the United States continues to research, to test and to develop. The system is evolutionary. The Patriot system that was developed in the early 1990s and used in the Gulf War, you will remember well had a mixed track record. That system has evolved considerably since then. The ballistic missile defence program has had, I believe, eight tests, five of which have been successful. Each time the U.S. tests their system, they introduce more variables and make the tests more complex, and the missiles are performing to a greater degree than on previous tests.
The fact is, however, we are talking about technology that is only as good as the human mind that works on it. It has evolved tremendously and is much more effective than it was. Will it continue to improve and be perfected? Yes it will, and if the Americans have been successful in five of eight tests to date, I think we can assume that our U.S. colleagues will be striving to improve the quality of the marksmanship to bring it to 100 per cent.
However, it is technology, and I think what you will hear from your American counterparts when you are in Washington is that the initial, limited land- and sea-based system that they will be putting in place starting this fall will give much greater protection to the United States than exists currently.
Is it a 100 per cent guarantee for the United States? No. Are they offering a 100 per cent guarantee to Canadians and Canada? No, because they cannot give it to themselves. However, is it expected that this land- and sea-based system will continue to evolve — to be perfected, to get better? Absolutely.
Senator Atkins: You predict the critical path will occur by this fall.
Mr. Wright: I predict that there will be an operational missile defence system in place this fall that will continue to evolve over time.
Senator Forrestall: Based on the Patriot?
Mr. Wright: That is a slightly different technology. The Patriot is very short range. It is theatre missile defence, short range. A number of countries are in the process of trying to acquire similar technology. Israel uses it as a mechanism to defend itself against missile threats from some of its neighbours.
Senator Banks: What we have heard in the past when we have been in Washington — and it is more true the closer we get to the administration in the White House, and certainly true in the White House itself, but we have heard it also from people who could not easily be characterized as right wing hawks — that they are nonplussed that we would demur over participating in a North American defence system, since we have been in one since 1958 and it is demonstrably possible that some people will try to shoot things at us. Nonplussed is the answer, even among those folks who are perhaps opposed to the weaponization of space. When it comes to the defence of North America, they are, without being angry, necessarily, genuinely at a loss to understand why we would not want to be involved in such a program — in the same sense there are Canadians who think anything that shoots anything is wrong and we ought not be involved in those things.
Does the government think that there are actually any Canadians who believe that the tap dance of sophistry that is presently going on with respect to these negotiations will lead other than to Canadian participation in North American defence?
Mr. Wright: Let me answer it this way. The debate in Canada in the 1980s was very different from the debate in Canada in 2004. You are absolutely right. I think most Canadians recognize that post-9/11, and given the proliferation in missiles and weapons of mass destruction — they read about it every day in Iran, Libya, North Korea and Pakistan — they are looking at the development of missile technology. There is, and I think quite rightly, an assumption that over time, the threat to Canada can only increase. Canada may not be a major target right now, but the unpredictability of the security environment that we are operating in suggests that it would only be prudent for the Canadian government to do everything in its power to protect Canada and Canadians.
I do not think what the government is engaged in now is a tap dance. I think the Canadian government is doing its very best to ensure that it understands exactly what it is buying into, and that we can reassure ourselves that our interests are being protected and enhanced through this cooperative program. Every effort is being made to undertake and complete these talks as quickly as possible, bearing in mind some of the factors I mentioned to you earlier — protection of Canada and Canadians, using the NORAD binational command structure that has worked very effectively until now, looking at the opportunities for industrial cooperation between the two countries and at the issue of cost. Again, the United States has made clear to us, and to other allies as well, that the United States will be paying for this program, whether we participate or not.
Will they be looking for an in-kind contribution? Yes, no question about it. The administration comes under pressure from the U.S. Congress on a regular basis to ensure that allies are pulling their weight. However, the kind of in-kind contribution we have been talking about with our U.S. colleagues relates to the assets that we are making available to the U.S. in the form of our NORAD contribution — $300 million a year, 700 personnel. We will have to see how the role of NORAD will evolve over time if it takes on this particular mission. The final issue is on the weaponization of space.
This is a very important security and defence issue for Canada and Canadians, and the Canadian government is trying to take these discussions with the U.S. very seriously; but your point is 100 per cent correct. Attitudes in Canada have changed dramatically. All you need do is read the editorials and the op-ed pieces in newspapers across the country to recognize that for most Canadians, this makes perfectly good sense.
Senator Banks: To pursue the chairman's point about weaponization of space, you said when you were speaking to us earlier that it is Canada's policy that we are opposed to that, and that will not change. We have changed Canadian policies in the past with respect to things having to do with national security. We changed our policy with respect to Bomarc missiles, for example. We changed in one way and we can change in another way; but let me give you the context for my question.
I am a big fan of Pax Britannica. I liked Rule Britannia, because if you look back on that time — the tail end of the 18th century — it actually did some good. It did well, but it also did some good. It came about because that country happened to have technological and military capability that by accident of time, geography and history, and maybe some planning, was better than everyone else's. They woke up one day and said, "Here are the rules with respect to the seas, the oceans, and if you do not abide by them, you will have to suffer the consequences. We will either, in some cases, blow you out of the water or, in other cases, take your vessels, and their crews and contents will all be forfeit."
I do not think this is a bad analogy, because there was no multilateral undertaking by anyone to permit that. There was no United Nations or League of Nations. They simply had the capability, and they were human, so they did it.
Everyone squawked. The French, the Spanish, the Americans said, "You cannot do that," and the British said, "As a matter of fact, we can," and they did. It is someone else's turn now. Does anyone actually believe that when it comes down to it and as soon as capability exists, that the United States — or, if we were sitting in that seat, that we — on the basis of moral compunction would turn down the opportunity to do what they think is right by putting weapons into the oceans or into space?
Does anyone actually believe that?
Mr. Wright: Senator, I think that is a very good question. I look forward to hearing the answer that you get from some of your American colleagues when you talk to them about it.
I am speaking to current and past Canadian government policy. I have been doing this for a long time now, and the Canadian approach on non-weaponization of outer space has not changed.
Senator Banks: Before you proceed, let me interject. Is not objecting to the weaponization of outer space like objecting to the fact that next fall will follow next summer?
Mr. Wright: I do not think so.
Senator Banks: Do you think we can convince the United States not to weaponize outer space?
Mr. Wright: I acknowledge that there is an important debate in some circles in the United States pushing for this. If you speak with some of those individuals, they may agree with you that there is inevitability here.
I would argue this remains a divisive issue within the administration and within the Pentagon. This is hugely expensive technology. If you are pursuing that technology, which will not be operational, even if you were lucky, for another 15 or 20 years, you will be doing it at the expense of something else.
Do not assume that it is absolutely inevitable that this will happen. Do not assume that everyone in the U.S. government is onside. There certainly are strong views within Congress. The Pentagon chiefs will turn around and say, "If you give all that money to the air force or the Missile Defence Agency, what will that mean in terms of the capacity of the fighting forces to deal with the kind of conflicts in failed states that the international community has been confronted with in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq in the past 10 years?" You will be doing it at the expense of all of those conventional threats that, frankly, are much more real than weaponization of space.
No other country is putting pressure on the United States to weaponize outer space. I would argue that the technology, politics and finances of doing that would cause some in the administration and Congress to think twice before they proceed.
I do not accept it as inevitable. The current policy of the Canadian government, which I strongly support, is to try to discourage our American friends from doing this and work with the international community to try to arrive at a consensus — a convention, if possible — to prevent the weaponization of outer space.
I look forward to hearing the results of your discussions in Washington on this matter.
Senator Banks: I very much hope that you succeed in that respect.
Senator Forrestall: Why do we have no military personnel with us today?
The Chairman: The next witness is from the military.
Mr. Wright: On that score, senator, I can reassure you that the Canadian team negotiating with our American counterparts works together as a partnership. There is LGen. Macdonald, Dr. Calder and me. We are in regular touch with our U.S. counterparts.
Positions developed by the Canadian government are worked up by both the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence. I hope that you hear a seamless message from Canadian officials, even though we were not sitting at this table at the same time today.
Senator Forrestall: That is my problem. I hear it, but I do not see it. I must ask you, who is first among equals in Canada?
Mr. Wright: The lead on the negotiations has been with the Department of Foreign Affairs, in full partnership with our colleagues at the Department of National Defence. For all intents and purposes, senator, it is a shared lead.
However, someone must carry the file forward. We have been doing that, senator, because this is first and foremost a foreign policy issue. If and when it becomes operationalized, it will become a defence issue.
I want to reassure committee members here that this is a full and shared partnership between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence.
Senator Forrestall: Could you tell me who the lead official is from DND?
Mr. Wright: LGen. George Macdonald and Dr. Ken Calder are my two principal counterparts. Ken Calder is the Assistant Deputy Minister for policy at the Department of National Defence. Vice Chief of Defence Staff, LGen. Macdonald, the former deputy at NORAD, is the other colleague.
The Chairman: We asked you that question because we were advised prior to the meeting that LGen. Macdonald was not active on this file.
Senator Forrestall: This is very important.
Mr. Wright: You could speak with Department of National Defence on this. I know that Gen. Pierre Daigle is very much involved in the file, and Dr. Calder also, as I said. Daniel Bon, Director General responsible for policy at DND, is also involved.
I should not speak for the Department of National Defence. They can speak for themselves.
Senator Forrestall: I have forgotten them already.
Who is the lead in the United States?
Mr. Wright: The lead department on this is the Pentagon, working very closely with the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Missile Defence Agency, NORAD, NORTHCOM and, to some extent, STRATCOM. There are a host of players on the U.S. side.
The Chairman: Did you say the Department of State?
Mr. Wright: Absolutely. The Department of State is very much a player in this process. It is a critical component, together with the Pentagon.
Senator Forrestall: Who is the lead military spokesman?
Mr. Wright: It would be the Pentagon. Do you mean the individual? The names sometimes change; my counterparts are at the Pentagon.
Senator Forrestall: Your counterpart is at the Pentagon, but does change from time to time?
Mr. Wright: There have been some personnel changes at the Pentagon in the last six months.
Senator Forrestall: Is there flux there?
Mr. Wright: No, there are a number of principal interlocutors. I talk with Marc Grossman, the U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs, from time to time.
Senator Forrestall: That seems to me to be rather loose.
Mr. Wright: Then I have not done justice to the issue, because on the U.S. side very good interagency work has been done to pull together the U.S. position. The only hesitation I offered, senator, is the fact that within the last six months there has been one particular change in the Pentagon. The gentleman's name was Dr. J. D. Crouch. I am trying to remember his title.
I am sure I will get it wrong. Associate Deputy Secretary of State? Associate Deputy Secretary at the Pentagon? We can get the title to you in due course. Dr. Crouch completed his assignment with the Pentagon and returned to teaching, and he has been succeeded on this file by a gentleman by the name of John Ruud.
Senator Forrestall: We have heard that name before. For our edification, and for the clerk, could you give us a little schematic that tracks us through the current U.S.?
Mr. Wright: The players on the two sides? I would be happy to.
Senator Forrestall: Include the linkage from the President and from the Prime Minister.
The Chairman: Do you mean in the form of a note after the meeting, Senator Forestall?
Senator Forrestall: Yes.
Mr. Wright: I would be delighted to.
Senator Forrestall: Let us come back to NORAD. I have always been pretty much of the same opinion that you have expressed here today. We are already involved, and there is no question that nukes do not work. If any technology will eventually work, it will probably be exactly this. The closer we can get to the offending vehicle, the quicker and the better it will work. In that regard, can I come to the whole question of Canada's participation? One thing we do have is all kinds of territory. So long as we are talking in terms of rogue states, that Canadian territory becomes even more attractive to our friends to the south.
Could you tell me what Canada's position is with respect to availability for tracking purposes?
Mr. Wright: I can.
Senator Forrestall: Perhaps, when are you finished with that, you could also tell us about launching purposes?
Mr. Wright: Yes. The current U.S. missile defence system, their land- and sea-based system that is planned for deployment in 2004, will involve assets in Alaska and California only. The United States has not requested any territorial assets in Canada. In fact, the United States has made clear that for the current plan, they do not require any geographic assets in Canada. They are looked after with the system that they currently have in place and are looking to put in place — the combination of the launch beds that are planned for California and Alaska. They are upgrading a radar system in the United Kingdom, they are in discussions with the Danish government and the Greenland authorities on the radar station in Thule, and they are not looking for any geographic assets in Canada for their currently planned missile defence system.
Senator Forrestall: Would we have greater potential or capability with respect to tracking systems?
Mr. Wright: NORAD will do the tracking work at Cheyenne Mountain, but the Americans are not looking for additional radar or interceptor facilities based on Canadian soil.
Senator Forrestall: And we are not offering any?
Mr. Wright: We are not. The United States made it clear right from the outset that they were proceeding with this program whether Canada participated or not. They also made clear that the system would be paid for by the U.S. administration. What they were looking for — and what we said we would continue to provide — was in-kind contributions. We have indicated to our U.S. counterparts that we saw our in-kind contributions being met through our contributions via NORAD, our $300 million annually, our 700 personnel, and we would look at future requests that might come from the U.S. administration in this respect, but do not anticipate any in relation to the current program. As regards the future as the system evolves, that is something on which it is not possible to speculate at this time.
However, it is important that the committee understands that the administration does not need Canada's territory to stand up the current system that is being planned.
Senator Forrestall: That is good. We do not have much more time. Do we plan some very active periods of negotiation or discussion with our American counterparts, say before October, or have we pretty well got to the point where you will be able to advise the principals — the secretary, Minister Graham, the Prime Minister and Minister Pratt and his people?
Mr. Wright: I think there will be an active period of consultation and negotiation with our American partners in the months to come, and certainly the hope would be that we would be able to present a package to the Canadian government for final consideration in advance of the formal standing-up of the missile defence system in October.
Senator Forrestall: What type of things will we be discussing as we lead up to this? What are the items?
Mr. Wright: I indicated a number, senator, to which the Canadian negotiators and the Canadian government will be paying particular attention. First and foremost is can we reassure ministers that the proposed program enhances the security of Canada and Canadians? That is number one. Number two is can we reassure them that there continues to be a meaningful role for NORAD to play? That is important to Canada. I think it is also of importance to the United States. Third, we need better definition of some of the industrial opportunities for Canadian companies in respect of the missile defence mission. Fourth, we need to have further discussions with our U.S. colleagues on the issue of cost and burden sharing, and we will need to also reassure ministers and the government on the whole issue of space.
Senator Forrestall: The bulk of the costs would continue to be our contribution to NORAD?
Mr. Wright: That is the discussion that we have had to date with our American counterparts, yes.
Senator Forrestall: We do not have a file of burning questions to which we must receive positive answers before we move on?
Mr. Wright: Each of those issues poses specific challenges, and the government will want to be reassured on each one of them, starting with the protection of Canada and Canadians.
Senator Forrestall: Good luck with it.
Mr. Wright: And with your mission.
The Chairman: If I understand what has just been said, you have told us that the Americans are going ahead notwithstanding, that there is no incremental cost to Canada, no ground assets or territory is expected, and that if we do not go ahead there is a possibility that our participation in NORAD may be marginalized.
Mr. Wright: There is a possibility that NORAD may be marginalized. Currently, on the question of cost, it is important to say the discussions will have to proceed further than they have until now with our American partners. We have made clear to them that we are looking principally at in-kind contributions via our current contributions to NORAD, but we will have to see how those discussions develop in the weeks and months to come.
The Chairman: There has been no suggestion to date that there would be incremental costs?
Mr. Wright: We have not been presented with a bill. We have not been presented with a wish list for Canadian territory.
The Chairman: Do you think the main concern that people have is that as we look at risks and threats facing the United States, most people think it is rather odd that they are spending so much money on a anti-missile system when the real threats are likely to come in a barge entering Oakland harbour?
Mr. Wright: I am sure debate on that issue is taking place in the United States, and in Canada. You met with Rob Wright this morning to talk about how both governments are working together to deal with some of these shared, more conventional or asymmetrical threats.
The American public and the Canadian public will be hoping that if governments want to proceed here, it will not be at the expense of some of those efforts.
Senator Cordy: Many of the issues I wanted to bring up have already been touched on. One of them has to do with the negotiations that are currently ongoing. How long can we continue to have those discussions before we have to make a decision? As we all know, and as you have stated today, the Americans are going ahead with BMD whether or not Canada participates. Realistically speaking, will it be the fall, which is when the Americans would like to put things in place, or can we continue past that point?
Mr. Wright: It would make it more problematic if an understanding had not been reached by the formal stand-up of the missile defence system in early October. I say "more problematic" in the sense that it might encourage U.S. authorities to develop their own U.S.-only capability, to go ahead on developing the system. Once they have done that, were the Canadian government to elect in a year's time to participate, then you are asking to participate in a system of command and control that has already been stood up — a U.S.-only system in which all of a sudden Canadians want to be actively involved.
The short answer is this: There is a preference for trying to reach an understanding with our U.S. colleagues before the system is stood up in October. Is it an absolute, drop-dead deadline? No.
Senator Cordy: If we were to decide by this fall that we will join, then in fact we could be part of the process to develop the framework for how it would be set up; is that right?
Mr. Wright: Senator, you are absolutely right. In fact, that is exactly the purpose of the exchange of letters of intent between Minister Pratt and Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld. I think wanting us to participate in this mission was an important expression of political support for Canada from the United States government. It was a very strong signal from the Secretary of Defence to all the different American defence departments and agencies involved in the missile defence mission that Canada needs to be involved in the planning and development, in training and information sharing, to ensure that the decisions that the Canadian government takes in this respect are as informed as possible. That is the process that is playing out right now.
Senator Cordy: You mention items that were up for discussion. They seem like items that could require some give and take on both sides. However, is there a deal breaker? Is there something that would cause Canada to say that we cannot go ahead with it?
Mr. Wright: That is a judgment call that ministers and the government will need to make under the circumstances. I identified the issues on an indicative list — which is not necessarily all-inclusive — of some of the more important issues out there.
Ministers will need to look at each of those issues to reassure themselves that the Canadian interest is being served on protection, on NORAD, on industrial cooperation and on cost. We must be able to reassure them that our longstanding policy on non-weaponization of outer space has not been affected by this decision.
Senator Cordy: One of the things that you and committee members have talked about is that if Canada were to decide not to join in, the role of NATO will change. Earlier in your comments, you said that of all the agreements and MOUs we have in terms of defence with the United States, this is, to use your word, a "hallmark," or a cornerstone agreement, and has worked very well. I think that most Canadians would agree.
If Canada chooses not to join the United States on BMD, then the role of NORAD will likely change. What would the ramifications of that change be for Canadians?
Mr. Wright: As I indicated earlier, the risk is that the current role that NORAD is playing in respect of missile threat assessment and attack warning would gravitate to a U.S.-only command. If you assume that the problem of proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction will only get worse in years to come, then you would want to ensure that NORAD, which is a very important binational institution, is playing an important role in this process.
By extension, the risk would be that NORAD would be diminished. That particular organization would no longer be performing a critical function; it would be performed by another. The net result is that a significant binational institution would be less important, which would be of concern to the Canadian government.
Senator Cordy: Would we be out of the loop?
Mr. Wright: We certainly would not be as direct a player in the process as we are now, in terms of that function currently being carried out by NORAD.
Senator Cordy: When you were telling us earlier about some of the issues for discussion, you mentioned a role for Canadian industry. If we were to join the United States in the BMD program, what role would you see for Canadian industry? Or would there be participation by Canadian industry? If there were, of what type would it be?
Mr. Wright: R&D and industrial opportunities may flow. I think it is important not to oversell this particular component of the Canadian government's consideration. This is a program that will be funded almost exclusively by the United States government. Therefore, we have to assume that many — and possibly most — of the contracts would go to American companies.
At the same time, there are many Canadian companies that have been actively involved in the aerospace industry. They have cutting-edge technology. They can contribute in a very meaningful way. They have good partnerships with their American counterparts and may be able to play an important role in contributing to the missile defence mission.
One of the areas that we are working on with our American colleagues is trying to come to an understanding to determine how that industrial cooperation would take place, because we are dealing with very sensitive technologies and process know-how, and the Americans will want to, understandably, ensure that these processes are handled very carefully. That issue is being worked through right now.
Senator Cordy: You have been most helpful.
Senator Munson: You talked about a shared partnership with the Department of National Defence and you said that the United States has not asked for access to Canada's land. However, yesterday the defence minister would not rule that out. Why not rule it out?
Mr. Wright: That is probably a question best directed at a political level rather than to officials. What I have reported on is that the U.S. system right now does not require access to Canadian territory at all. Those interests are looked after by the architecture that is in the process of being put in place. It is a hypothetical question, one that a future government, possibly many years down the road, might have to address, but it is not an issue that needs to be addressed at the present time.
Senator Munson: Has the option been ruled out?
Mr. Wright: It absolutely has not been ruled out, senator, but it was the Americans themselves who made clear to us at the outset that it was not needed for the current limited land- and sea-based system that they are looking to begin putting in place in the fall of 2004. The Americans have made it clear that they are not looking for territorial assets in Canada.
Senator Munson: On page 5 of your statement you said BMD would complement, not compete with, Canada's non- proliferation, arms control and disarmament efforts. Could you explain that?
Mr. Wright: The Canadian government has been active in trying to deal with the issue of proliferation on a range of fronts. We are one of the founding members of the Missile Technology Control Regime. We played a leadership role in devising The Hague code of conduct dealing with missile proliferation. We have in place a number of important export control regimes and we are members of supplier groups that ensure that sensitive technology does not fall into the wrong hands. We are making attempts in the context of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which is the institution that in a perfect world should be dealing with all of these non-proliferation and arms control issues. This is an institution that has been fairly moribund in the past few years, in large part due to an impasse among a number of countries on a few issues: the fissile material cut-off treaty, of which we are strong supporters, and the weaponization of outer space. There was a disagreement among some of the principals — China, Russia, the United States — about a program of work on weaponization of outer space. We are working with our American, Russian and Chinese colleagues, and others at the Conference on Disarmament, to see whether we can resuscitate those particular discussions and breathe some life into the arms control and disarmament debate.
We also have the NPT review conference on the horizon and will be trying to use that particular event to ensure that the principles that underpin the non-proliferation treaty are respected and carried forward in the international community.
What we are doing in respect of missile defence does absolutely complement what we are trying to do on a multilateral track, and, I would add, the good work we are doing in a G8 context through the global partnership on weapons and materials of mass destruction. This is a $20-billion program that the G8 committed to at Kananaskis when Canada was in the chair, and Canada's contribution to that program is up to $1 billion. We are looking to destroy and safeguard chemical weapons, fissile materials, and to retrain Soviet Russian scientists who have been working in the military industrial complex to work in more peaceful areas.
The range of these initiatives that Canada continues to promote bilaterally and multilaterally is the context in which I made the remarks.
Senator Munson: The phrase "industrial benefits" has been used a lot this afternoon. There are certainly industrial benefits to war. I would imagine the lobbying is quite extensive, both in the United States and Canada, when it comes to industrial benefits. Is there an extensive lobby to reap the rewards of a BMD program in Canada?
Mr. Wright: This is a question you can also put to my colleagues from the Department of Defence this afternoon. There is certainly interest on the part of the aerospace industry in Canada in the final decision of the Canadian government on the missile defence mission. Yes, there is a strong interest on the part of Canadian industry that has developed cutting-edge technology and strong partnerships with their American colleagues. There is an interest in trying to participate in this program, but it is at a level you would expect, given the longstanding commitment of these companies to this particular sector.
Senator Banks: My question is based on Senator Munson's question. You have told us today that the defence system will be stood up in the fall, by which I presume that something more than scribbles on the back of an envelope exist in terms of where things will go, both with respect to radar systems and launch systems — the "architecture," as you referred to it. Canadian participation with respect to the granting of access to Canadian land — one assumes in northern islands, or wherever — for either radar or launch capacities must have been taken into account if that architecture exists to the extent that it will be stood up. I accept that maybe the Secretary of State has not asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and maybe Gen. Meyers has not asked Gen. MacDonald, but either the question of the use of Canadian territory in that system is so insignificant as to be unimportant, and it would be therefore easy to say no to, or it has been talked about. Someone will know by now whether we need to place a radar system on Somerset Island, given that we are talking about this fall. Which of those is true?
Mr. Wright: The short answer is that U.S. authorities have given careful consideration to the required architecture to stand up the missile defence system. That architecture will include some interceptors in California and some in Alaska.
They will also be looking to use, if possible, NORAD and the early warning and threat assessment function that is performed there. They will be looking to use some of the radar facilities that they already have in place, and which may be upgraded over time, in the U.K., Denmark, Greenland, and possibly in Australia as well.
The answer to your question is that the United States has done an enormous amount of work on exactly what they need to reassure themselves that the plan comes together. On the basis of that careful analysis, they were able to say right at the outset that for the current plan that they are looking to go ahead and implement, there is no requirement for Canadian territorial assets.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Wright and Mr. Chapin. We have been looking forward to having you before the committee for some time. It is a privilege and pleasure to have you here. I did not expect the questioning to be so entirely focused on ballistic missile defence, but we have given it due ventilation and the committee is better informed for having heard your views.
I should like also to thank you for the work your people do in assisting us on visits like the one upcoming. The briefing notes are extremely valuable and we have come to rely on them a great deal. For that, I would like to publicly say "thank you" again.
Mr. Wright: Honourable senators, I wish to thank the committee for the invitation and the opportunity to speak with you today. We look forward to learning the results of your visit to Washington. Your questions, thoughts and concerns inform us in terms of the advice and counsel that we give to ministers.
The Chairman: Honourable senators, our next witness today will be LGen. George Macdonald, Vice-Chief of Defence Staff, Department of National Defence.
LGen. Macdonald joined the Royal Canadian Air Force in 1966 and trained as a pilot. After a succession of postings, he was named Commander of 1 Air Division, Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters in Winnipeg, on July 31, 1997. In April 1998, on promotion to his current rank, he became Deputy Commander-in-Chief of NORAD in Colorado Springs. In September 2001, he was made Vice Chief of Defence Staff.
LGen. Macdonald is accompanied by MGen. Daigle, Special Advisor to the Chief of Defence Staff (Homeland Security Issues); and RAdm. Robertson, Director General, International Security Policy.
LGen. Macdonald, welcome to the committee; we are most pleased to have you before us again. I understand you have a brief statement.
Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence: Honourable senators, Gen. Daigle, Adm. Robertson and I are delighted to be here this afternoon.
Defence and security relations between Canada and the United States are longstanding, well entrenched and highly successful. Since the attacks of September 11, Canada and the U.S. have cooperated intensively on a wide range of defence issues.
The broader context for this is the U.S. drive to counter the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and to reform the existing structures of cooperation between us to achieve this.
In North America, we are modernizing the structures of continental defence. We continue to value the contribution of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the PJBD. We have created the Bi-National Planning Group to address homeland security contingencies that could affect both countries and to form a bilateral link to Northern Command, or NORTHCOM.
Arguably, the September 11 attacks represented the beginning of a new era for Canada-U.S. security and defence relations. Let me address two of these issues in more detail. I would like to spend a few minutes on each of NORAD and the Bi-National Planning Group.
From a defence perspective, NORAD clearly remains the cornerstone of our relationship with the United States. It has proven to be a highly flexible arrangement, one that can keep pace with changing weapons, new technologies and emerging threats. NORAD has continued to evolve since its beginnings in 1958 to respond to the mutual needs of Canada and the United States, and it has changed since September 11.
More than two years after the terrorist attacks, Canadian pilots, surveillance personnel and command centres continue to work closely with the Americans in what is known as Operation NOBLE EAGLE to protect our shared airspace against air terrorism and air piracy.
CF-18s remain on alert in Canada 24/7 to respond to this need. We work together to share information, consult on appropriate reaction to a potential threat and to take the necessary steps.
An example of this ongoing cooperation is the activity that took place over the Christmas period, when the U.S. declared an increased state of alert due to intelligence regarding threats involving some European flights coming to specific American cities. We worked with the United States, through NORAD, by adjusting our readiness and vigilance accordingly.
Through NORAD, Canada has privileged access to U.S. military intelligence and expertise and it gives us a crucial framework for aerospace planning and operations. The arrangement also helps us to maintain our interoperability with the U.S., which is important not just domestically, but for overseas operations as well.
Let me move on to address the Bi-National Planning Group. Clearly, our two countries have recognized the need to cooperate more closely in safeguarding our airspace. However, we are also working more closely on safeguarding our borders and maritime approaches.
We took a significant step forward in this regard in December 2002 with the creation of the Bi-National Planning Group, which is located in Colorado Springs. This group of about 50 personnel, Canadian and American, has worked to improve current Canada-U.S. arrangements to defend against maritime threats to the continent and to respond to land-based threats or natural disasters, should they occur.
Canada had three main objectives in establishing the Bi-National Planning Group with the U.S.: first, to enhance the safety and security of Canadians; second, to enhance Canada-U.S. military cooperation and thereby strengthen our respective abilities to prevent and respond to threats and natural disasters; third, to maintain a dynamic and positive relationship with our neighbour and most important economic and military ally.
The initial aim of the group is both to improve coordination of maritime surveillance, intelligence sharing and threat assessments to help prevent terrorist attacks, and to improve contingency planning in the event of a terrorist attack or a major natural disaster.
More specifically, the Bi-National Planning Group's activities include: preparing contingency plans to ensure a cooperative and well-coordinated response to a national request for military assistance in the event of a threat, attack or civil emergency in the U.S. or in Canada; coordinating maritime surveillance and intelligence sharing to enhance our overall awareness of potential maritime threats; assessing maritime threats, incidents and emergencies and advising the two governments; establishing appropriate planning and liaison mechanisms with civilian authorities involved in crisis response, such as police, firefighters and other first responders; designing and participating in exercises; conducting joint training programs; and validating the practicality and effectiveness of plans prior to their approval.
The group has already made significant progress in several key areas. During the 14 months of its existence, its accomplishments and current projects include: work among officials from the navy, the coast guard and intelligence agencies to build a common, binational maritime awareness picture focusing on vessels of interest that represent a possible threat; the development of consequence management scenarios to assess our ability to coordinate a binational response to terrorist attacks and/or natural disasters and the development of a civil assistance plan to deal with these and other scenarios; review of the current binational agreements and development of recommendations to resolve/ identify conflicts or outdated information; development of a comprehensive database or electronic library for binational agreements and documents; review and recommend revisions to documents that form the core of our binational security cooperation, a basic security document in the combined defence plan; and perhaps most importantly, working to transform information sharing between our two nations from a need-to-know to a need-to- share paradigm.
The Bi-National Planning Group is about Canada and the U.S. working together to save lives when minutes and hours count. We do not want to be looking in the phone book when a crisis occurs. We need to know whom to talk to and how to reach them. Canada and the U.S. have cooperated on defence for more than 60 years. The Bi-National Planning Group is simply a way of adapting to the new security environment in the post-9/11 world. The group is an effective arrangement that makes sense for both countries. It takes advantage of existing infrastructure and expertise in Colorado Springs, with NORAD and NORTHCOM headquarters, and in the event of a crisis, will save lives.
With those brief remarks, specifically on NORAD and the Bi-National Planning Group, we will be happy to answer any questions senators may have.
The Chairman: Thank you, LGen. Macdonald.
Senator Cordy: One item that the Bi-National Planning Group is looking at is improving the contingency planning in the event of terrorist attacks or major natural disasters. Is there a Canadian representative from OCIPEP on the planning group?
LGen. Macdonald: The main thrust of the planning group is a military-to-military arrangement, so it is predominantly military personnel. There is a Canadian OCIPEP representative in Colorado Springs with the Bi- National Planning Group to explore opportunities, if you will. The significant feature of the collectivity of expertise in Colorado Springs is that traditionally, we had NORAD, but now have the new NORTHCOM headquarters, which is responsible for homeland defence of the "northern areas," as the Americans define it, and which has a number of agents or liaison personnel from U.S. agencies who are counterparts to citizenship, immigration and emergency planning people in Canada. The OCIPEP representative has an opportunity not only to liaise with Canadians and people involved with the binational work, but also with these other liaison people from other agencies in the United States. It becomes quite a focus of activity in this regard.
Senator Cordy: You do joint training in terms of dealing with events such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters? Canadians and Americans get together for joint training and learn how to deal with situations. Is that right?
LGen. Macdonald: That is the intent. There has been some exercising, but we would hope that it would continue to accelerate and become more intense and broader in its scope. We have had some tremendous training experience for the army, navy and air force in the past with military-to-military cooperation. We would hope to build on that experience in this new field of counterterrorism and natural disasters. The training for these two contingencies is much the same, although a natural disaster is obviously a different event from a terrorist attack, in respect of the coordination and the stakeholders involved. It is similar training for two quite different eventualities.
Senator Cordy: I am from Nova Scotia, where we have hurricanes and 90-centimetre snowfalls, so I want to ensure that we are well prepared for natural disasters. Thank you for the work that was done during Hurricane Juan. You helped the province a great deal.
You said that you shifted the paradigm from need-to-know to need-to-share. Are you finding that since September 11 and the setting up of the planning group, there is more sharing of information?
LGen. Macdonald: Yes, there is, and that is predominantly because of the benefit that we gain from Canadians and Americans working face to face in the Bi-National Planning Group, with a common goal of developing contingency plans and not only sharing that information, but also analyzing it and garnering the results from it.
We have always enjoyed an extremely close relationship with the United States and our other close allies in sharing intelligence information that is available to all of us. We strive to ensure that we find the potential synergy through note comparison and, in areas where only one country has some unique intelligence, that the data can be shared with others. It is also important to sit down and to actually analyze and work with that information. The Bi-National Planning Group is endeavouring to do that by maintaining that specific focus on virtually all the information at hand from both countries. They are sharing information much more freely, perhaps, than they would have in another context.
Senator Cordy: Has this paradigm shift from need-to-know to need-to-share also affected Canadian government departments? Are we sharing more information among CSIS, RCMP and the military? Have you noticed a change within Canada?
LGen. Macdonald: Yes, I would say that I have. I would not say there was reluctance to share information in the past, but perhaps there were fewer opportunities or there was less motivation to share because we were not as closely coordinated as we should be or could be in dealing with these kinds of issues. Over the last few years, we have begun to recognize that there is quite a lot of coordination, consultation and co-operation that can be done interdepartmentally to advance the planning and the thinking on dealing with any number of these contingencies that come up.
The sharing of information in that context has become much more meaningful, I would suggest. We did not necessarily resist it before, but now we have the motivation and the momentum. We are beginning to recognize that national security is not only defending the country, but also security of the water supply, the physical safety of citizens of Canada, the safety of our power supply and of our borders. National defence is part of national security and people are thinking of it more holistically.
Senator Cordy: Intelligence gathering or knowledge is certainly a fundamental part of security for our country.
How has the formation of Northern Command affected the Canadian Forces personnel who are currently working in Colorado Springs at NORAD? Has it changed what they do? Are they as included as they were before the formation of Northern Command?
LGen. Macdonald: It is difficult to answer that because the previous arrangement with Space Command, which was co-located with NORAD in Colorado Springs in the past, was very much focused on this base command and the NORAD mission, in which there was quite a significant overlap. The NORTHCOM and NORAD also have an overlap, but because NORTHCOM is a fairly new command and still finding its feet, if you will, the synergy to determine its precise role and how it will carry out that role, and getting people to fill the positions in the command headquarters itself, is still ongoing.
There is no hint of indication that there is any reluctance to include Canadians in NORAD duties, as we have in the past. Indeed, the Bi-National Planning Group forms that cell of people that is truly binational and working on these common issues.
NORTHCOM has an extremely wide list of responsibilities and matters they are working on. I think it will take some time before they come to any sort of what we might call a steady state, and even that will be an ever-changing steady state. However, I would not characterize the formation of NORTHCOM as debilitating, or negative in any way, for Canadians performing their job in Colorado Springs. In fact, for the purposes of focusing on binational security, and the planning and the contingency plans and the sharing of information and intelligence that goes with that, it is a very positive development.
Senator Cordy: That is good to hear. Has NORAD changed, or perhaps I should say, how has it changed since September 11?
LGen. Macdonald: The most dramatic change in NORAD in the last couple of years stemmed from the change in paradigm that had to take place in needing to react to a potential attack from inside the United States and Canada. I think you are aware that prior to September 11, NORAD's mission was to defend against attacks, potential air attacks or aerospace threats, from outside the perimeter of the continent. A threat from inside that perimeter, such as the 9/11 airborne attacks that originated from domestic airports, was something that NORAD had always assumed was not its mission. It was not something that was assigned to NORAD, and it was essentially a new concept for NORAD to adapt to.
NORAD has since then developed a very comprehensive relationship with the FAA in the United States, and with NAV CANADA — not that they did not have that before — in monitoring, more specifically, domestic traffic. This is a huge problem. There are thousands of flights every day within Canada and the United States, and they have developed certain protocols such that, as certain aircraft on a flight plan deviate in any particular degree, the threshold for noticing that and reacting to it is much lower than it was prior to September 11.
Of course, the intelligence gathering and monitoring of people who board flights headed for North America — the airport security itself and so on — all contribute to the intelligence that NORAD, Canadians and Americans, can react to and then single out particular flights that might be of concern or interest, and to which they provide additional attention.
Most notably in the United States, but also in Canada, we have increased the number of aircraft that are on alert. The United States frequently flies fighter aircraft to provide protective support or cover. For instance, there would be additional security put in place during the State of the Union speech in Washington, including NORAD resources.
The attention to the air traffic, domestic and international, and the level of readiness to deal with that, is much heightened and more rigorous. We have defined different levels of readiness and how we would respond to each one. We have new ways of dealing with intelligence that relates to these flights, as opposed to just assuming the threat was only from outside the United States and Canada.
The Chairman: LGen. Macdonald, you answered a question in relation to NORTHCOM and NORAD. Would you say the concomitant is true with the moving of Space Command out of Colorado Springs? Has that had a negative effect on our relations with the American military?
LGen. Macdonald: The effect is probably not as noticeable to most. The relationship that NORAD had with Space Command in Colorado Springs — and this is United States Space Command, which was the overarching command — was one in which a number of Canadians actually worked very closely with their colleagues in Space Command, doing Space Command jobs that were related to NORAD. With the withdrawal of Space Command headquarters from Colorado Springs, we essentially lost those people and those positions and reassigned them to other NORAD positions. Therefore, the level of everyday contact with Space Command functions is certainly lower. Our relationship with Air Force Space Command, which continues to be headquartered in Colorado Springs and is most closely connected to the NORAD mission, still remains one of close co-operation between NORAD Canadians and their American colleagues.
However, the move of U.S. Space Command functions from Colorado Springs certainly resulted in us losing some contact with that area, and not having as close a relationship with the U.S. Space Command functions as we had in the past. Those functions have been moved to the home of STRATCOM, in Omaha, Nebraska.
Senator Banks: Why?
LGen. Macdonald: That was a decision of the United States. They felt that the United States Space Command function was more closely related to Strategic Command, in the event they were going to establish a Northern Command. I think it was also precipitated by a desire not to increase the number of commands that the United States had. They essentially consolidated Space Command with Strategic Command. Again, we are just talking about the U.S. Space Command, not the air force, army or naval space command function that still exists independently.
The Chairman: The bottom line is if you are not co-located, you lose something in terms of ongoing contacts and information that you might have had otherwise?
LGen. Macdonald: I think that in any type of contact we have, we always benefit from having people directly involved in that command. One of the possibilities for the future would be to locate Canadians with Strategic Command in Nebraska, to give us that opportunity to maintain a greater familiarity with the activities in the U.S. that were done by the former Space Command.
The Chairman: Are discussions underway to that effect?
LGen. Macdonald: Only preliminary discussions, yes.
Senator Forrestall: Could I ask where North Bay fits, now that things have settled out?
LGen. Macdonald: The role of North Bay is not expected to change. North Bay has been the centre of air defence operations in Canada for several years now. We are moving from the underground facility to an above-ground building in the next few years, simply because the cost of maintaining the underground facility and the need for rejuvenation or modernization is fairly acute; and the threat to an above-ground building is not what it was during the Cold War. However, the intent is for the function in North Bay to remain much the way it is.
Having said that, as I explained previously to Senator Cordy, the intensity of NORAD operations, especially dealing with domestic flights, is very much higher than it was prior to September 11, and that kind of activity impacts on the North Bay operation as well. They are busier, but doing the same sort of thing they were before.
Senator Forrestall: I do not really have much reason to believe that any of the three of you are going to pan missile defence, or at least looking at it, carrying on with our discussions and working toward it, but there are a number of things that bother me very much. One of them was the Aurora that had a propeller take off on it. Can you tell us what happened there?
LGen. Macdonald: I am a pilot but not a maritime patrol pilot. I only have 20 hours with anything that had a propeller on it. My understanding is that the propeller over-sped, which is quite a serious event, and an emergency was declared. As a matter of precaution, any time they are well out over water and required to land as quickly as they can under emergency situations, the crew would normally prepare for the worst and to bail out if necessary. However, the aircraft was safely recovered. Although there is still a problem with the engine that they will have to fix, it certainly was ultimately not a serious situation from a point of view of the consequences, although it could have been, I understand.
However, I am afraid I am not technically qualified to —
Senator Forrestall: Nothing endemic to the fleet?
LGen. Macdonald: No, this was a single incident.
Senator Forrestall: I get concerned because that overhaul —
LGen. Macdonald: We have an Aurora improvement program.
Senator Forrestall: It seems to me to be having a pretty rough ride in terms of constant funding. It is spread over a much longer time period than had originally been anticipated. I was just wondering if that might not have been a cause. These planes are not youngsters any longer.
LGen. Macdonald: No, the Aurora was introduced in about 1980, so it is time for a mid-life update. A mid-life update is a series of incremental changes. One of the compounding problems in doing that is if you take the Aurora out of service, do part of the update and then bring it back a few years later, that will go on for a number of years. This particular incident was totally unrelated to the update itself.
Senator Forrestall: Was it an isolated incident?
LGen. Macdonald: Our safety record with Aurora has been essentially perfect from the point of view of the number of aircraft we have.
Senator Forrestall: How is the planning office for the Sea King replacement? It did not get an awful lot of money in Supplementary Estimates. Is it functioning?
LGen. Macdonald: Yes.
Senator Forrestall: What is it doing? When can we expect an order?
LGen. Macdonald: I understand that the replies from the request for proposal are due about the end of April, with a view to having a contract within two or three months following. That would be the best timing. There is the possibility that we could have a contract by midsummer.
To my knowledge there are no impediments on the Maritime Helicopter Project office itself in respect of the capability to deal with the work that they have or, indeed, to assess the bids as they come back and establish the contract.
Senator Forrestall: I was a little alarmed to hear government officials suggest that groups going into Afghanistan would be there for the long haul. They would not be coming home. I did not take that literally. However, I wondered whether or not what we are looking at and talking about is not another Cyprus operation, which, as you know, kept us there for almost 30 years.
What is the intention with respect to Canadian Forces in Afghanistan? Will there be a rotation basis, or will we keep them there for 10, 15 years?
LGen. Macdonald: It is difficult to predict how long it will take a NATO force to achieve security and stability in Afghanistan. Certainly, for the short term, we have identified we will be there for a year, that is, two six-month rotations, ending this August. We will then reduce to a much smaller force but maintain a presence in Kabul to continue to support the International Security Assistance Force. Subsequently, we will have to look at the need from a NATO perspective and what options we can fulfil that need with.
It is difficult to identify how long that will go for, but I think most of us recognize that Afghanistan is not a very safe place these days. The International Security Assistance Force is contained to the capital city. As well, there are provincial reconstruction teams t around the country that are increasing quite frequently in number.
Ultimately, I think it will be a fairly long-term undertaking. I am not sure whether the Canadian Forces will be involved in that long term. Certainly, we will have to consider that.
Admiral Robertson, who is our Director General, International Security Policy, has been involved with this and other international files.
Rear-Admiral Drew W. Robertson, Director General, International Security Policy, Department of National Defence: It is difficult to forecast how long it might take. However, I will use Bosnia as an example and say that it has been eight years since NATO brought its collective will to bear in Bosnia. The implementation force accounts for 60,000 troops. Eventually, the stabilization force, which is now at 12,000 troops, will drop down to 6,000 troops in the spring. We expect that NATO will terminate that sometime in the fall as it turns over to an EU mission. There is a time scale in a country that was, perhaps, in better circumstances overall than was Afghanistan at the end of the Taliban regime.
Nevertheless, it is still a long undertaking. Eight years of effort by the international community, led by NATO, has brought us to a point where we can see the end of the NATO mission. We can turn it over to the EU, and those NATO troops can be freed up and used elsewhere.
Senator Forrestall: That will not leave Canada and one or two other countries holding a 20-year bag?
RAdm. Robertson: Yes.
The example, perhaps, could be to go in in great force and push for success, not just militarily but also in respect of the international community. That means you will actually be out earlier than was the case in Cyprus or other missions.
Senator Banks: Are all of the NATO troops in the Balkans EU troops?
RAdm. Robertson: Many of the partnership-for-peace countries are also contributing forces in Bosnia at the moment. However, both in Bosnia and in Kosovo, the bulk after the U.S. and Canada is EU.
Senator Banks: Then they might not be freed up.
RAdm. Robertson: The hope would be that that draw down would continue, and because the greatest threat to stability in Bosnia now is criminality rather than the three entities, we would get to the point where that mission could change to a policing mission.
Senator Banks: With respect to staffing and resources, sometimes it is awful to be right. However, I cannot help but point out that one of our reports a while back recommended that Canadian Forces had to come home, regroup, retrain and get organized again. At the time it was pretty well pooh-poohed everywhere. Yet, in fact, it has almost come to pass in some respects. We have had to do that. That is a comment, not a question.
On a previous trip to Washington, we met with Secretary Rumsfeld. He had some critical things to say. However, he also had some complimentary things to say about what we have been doing in Bosnia. He was very complimentary and happy about the degree of interoperability between Canadian naval capabilities and U.S. and other North Atlantic naval capabilities. I notice that, in respect of the binational planning group, a lot of attention is being paid to maritime security.
We heard previously in this committee about the possibility of a maritime arrangement that might be a sort of mirror of NORAD, since we already take part in a lot of international exercises and undertakings. Do you think there is something like that in the offing?
LGen. Macdonald: RAdm. Robertson has recent experience and can certainly speak to the interoperability aspects of your question, senator.
The binational planning group's mandate is not like a NORAD mandate. It does not have any troops assigned to it. NORAD has standing forces that are there, here and now —
Senator Banks: I understand that. What I mean is in the planning might a maritime NORAD kind of thing be in people's minds?
LGen. Macdonald: I think that is a real possibility. It is something that Canada and the United States would want to examine carefully. Initially, of course, we are focusing on the sharing of information, planning, contingency work and exercises and to be in a position where we can use the forces.
If a vessel of interest that is identified several hundred miles off the coast, we can now decide who will send a ship out to prosecute it, how we will coordinate it and so on. It does not necessarily have to be standing forces assigned to the binational planning group to provide the information to allow us to coordinate binationally to do what is necessary in a particular case. How that will evolve remains to be seen.
Certainly, the fact that we are working together, sharing the information and developing what we call the "common operating picture" to the point where we understand where the threats potentially are and agree to react to them in a coordinated fashion is the fundamental achievement we are starting to realize.
RAdm. Robertson: We have agreed that I & W — indications and warning — and threat assessment on the maritime side is of value, however, the key difference is one of speed, time and distance in the two environments. The air forces have to deal with things quickly. In the case of navies, there is have typically much more time to send whatever forces will be sent to react to react. Having said that, we are certainly interoperable not only abroad in international operations but also domestically. In the build-up to the Iraq war, Canadian ships were operating on the East Coast in an exercise with American ships. The American ships were at very short notice to redeploy off their seaboard at the start of the Iraq war, if it had been thought necessary to extend the radar coverage to seaward. The Canadian ships were also ready to join Operation Noble Eagle quickly and go off our East Coast or off the American East Coast — wherever the Canadian command would have thought it appropriate.
Senator Banks: Do you not think it would be useful if the navy were also able to communicate in an interoperable way with the Coast Guard? We were told they do not and can not now.
RAdam. Robertson: Do you mean with the Canadian Coast Guard?
Senator Banks: Yes.
RAdam. Robertson: I am not personally involved.
Senator Banks: We can communicate with the American Coast Guard but not with the Canadian Coast Guard. Does that not strike you as strange?
RAdam. Robertson: I believe you heard from Captain Hickey on that point earlier. We can certainly communicate for search and rescue purposes instantly. We can communicate on marine radio. However, I think Captain Hickey was alluding to classified communications.
Senator Banks: Yes, secure communications. Would not that be a good idea?
RAdam. Robertson: It depends on the mission assigned. I can think of some Coast Guard vessels that would not need any such capability.
Senator Banks: They have 100 ships or so that are around that could be the eyes and ears at least from time to time, if not anything else.
RAdam. Robertson: There is certainly some value in us being able to talk together.
Senator Banks: Finally, General, you talked about exercise a minute all. Last week, I believe NORTHCOM was operating some defence exercises in several states that involved NORAD. Do you know about those exercises?
LGen. Macdonald: I am not personally aware of them. NORTHCOM has the responsibility to coordinate with a number of agencies in the United States, all of which include the state national guard organizations, so that they would be involved with many states is not surprising. I am not sure what the NORAD linkage would be there though.
Senator Banks: I think it was involved, but that might have been on some purely U.S. domestic basis.
In light of the fact that NORTHCOM, in their new homeland security regime, is conducting the kinds of exercises that involve defence situations and since we have a new department here that is concerned with national security and defence — which sometimes will bump into DND — do you anticipate our doing any kind of major exercises on that level to see what our reactive capability is to defence, or even accidental threats of one kind or another?
LGen. Macdonald: There is always a tremendous value in doing these exercises, especially if they are based on realistic scenarios for which you can draw in the stakeholders that are involved. NORTHCOM is a military organization, so it would be focused on military type of issues and exercising. The homeland security department will, I am sure, do exercises that incorporate more than just military stakeholders. The public safety and emergency preparedness organization in Canada will presumably do that as well to ensure they get the benefit of dealing with a wide range of scenarios, but most importantly get all the government representatives and stakeholders talking and working together to share information.
Senator Banks: I know we do tabletop exercises and virtual exercises. I suppose my question is whether there are any plans for us to do field exercises, in the same sense that the army used to do brigade level exercises and does not now because there is not any money? Is that the impediment for us doing those kinds of exercises, which would test the functionality of the respective things we would need to react to that kind of situation?
LGen. Macdonald: I am not completely aware of exercising that we do in Canada. We have cooperated with the United States for what we call "command post" exercises, or tabletop exercises with their top-off series of exercises, and those have proved to be fairly useful so far. It is a walk before you run scenario as well. It is important to get the contingency planning and the protocol and the stakeholders identified and working together before you carry it to an actual scenario in a large scale.
We in the military often refer to strategic operational and tactical levels of operations. You can contact a tactical exercise with a small group of people in a city, for example, responding to a threat in a subway or something. If you do an operational level, maybe you are involving the whole province or a larger entity. A strategic level would be a national level exercise.
They are expensive to run, but it is not just a military problem. It is a matter of gathering together the Solicitor General, Health Canada, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, and all the people who would be involved in dealing with the potential consequences for an attack in a reasoned combined way. Often the real challenge is not the first responders treating an individual at an accident site, the challenge is to know how to coordinate the overall response to ensure the resources are properly positioned and available in the first place. We also need to ensure that people communicate the information and the contribution they can make, and that there is a reasonable coordinated fashion of delivering whatever relief is required.
Senator Banks: That is precisely my point. There are members of this committee who have misgivings about precisely that coordinative capacity. It is a new regime now because the Deputy Prime Minister has a new set of responsibilities, which include all of those things. We had misgivings prior to that about the capability of anyone actually coordinating those things, and we had evidence in the past where national events have happened that required coordination and the coordination was not there.
I am hopeful at least, and I believe we all are, that at some point fairly soon we will have a demonstration that that has been rectified and there is the capability of coordinating your efforts and the efforts of other responders to various situations. Are you aware of anything like that coming off in the near future?
LGen. Macdonald: I mentioned the top-off series of exercises, and I am not sure when the next one is, but those have been useful. To coordinate something like that requires, first of all, the clear understanding of what everyone's involvement is and what they will do in certain scenarios and to design it.
We have had some successes in real-life cases. The British Columbia forest fires this last summer — while maybe not of national scale — certainly brought together a significant number of stakeholders. Of course, the military was a large player in a relatively unexpected disaster that occurred over a long period of time and with some significant consequences.
Senator Banks: That was of national significance and the people involved were very appreciative of the military involvement.
Senator Atkins: I was interested in your response to Senator Cordy's question of what has changed in NORAD in terms of its mission since 9/11. You talked about things that never occurred to me, such as you are now tracking commercial airlines routes and covering certain events. That tells me that regardless of what other debates are taking place about NORAD there is always a role for it in the scheme of things. Are there any other activities that NORAD does that are similar to tracking and this sort of thing?
LGen. Macdonald: I am not sure if I said tracking, I probably meant to say monitoring. That is what we are doing.
Senator Atkins: That is fair.
LGen. Macdonald: We do not have the full radar coverage of the complete interior of Canada and the United States to actually track with what we call "primary radar" or raw radar for all those domestic tracks. However, we take the feeds of the information from the federal aviation authority and NAVCAN in Canada to present a composite real-time picture of where those all are.
NORAD'S role has been aerospace control, that is, ability to detect an air threat and to prosecute it with a fighter. Aerospace warning, the other major NORAD responsibility, is the warning of an attack through the air, but also from space. That would be either a ballistic missile attack or an attack from an object in orbit in space, such as a re-entering satellite.
Aerospace warning continues to be a NORAD mission. Those have not changed dramatically since September 11. We have other responsibilities in NORAD to cooperate with binational agencies to deal with airborne interdiction of drug traffickers, that being an ongoing mission that has been around for quite a long time.
There are other ways in which NORAD assists or communicates that may not be obvious to everyone, but it has not changed from September 11. For example, the same satellites that can pick up a ballistic missile launch can also detect a large explosion, a forest fire or a heat source on the surface of the earth that might be a catastrophe of some kind, which can often be the first indication of the occurrence to the authorities that can deal with it. That is a corollary capability that exists.
There are ancillary things like that, but I would not say that they have dramatically changed since the September 11 attacks.
Senator Atkins: Some of the things they do are best kept secrets.
LGen. Macdonald: The reality is that NORAD has not been well understood by most people throughout the decades. NORAD was recognized as the Cold War defence of North America against the Soviet bomber threat and warning of ICBM attacks later. Through the 1990s, many people felt that post-Cold War NORAD did not have a place in the world. The 9/11 attacks demonstrated quite the opposite.
Senator Atkins: We have put out four reports. Would your binational planning group have read our fourth report on coastal defence?
LGen. Macdonald: I am sure they would have. They are in the business of collecting all the information they can and using it to whatever advantage they can. I would be very surprised if they have not read it from cover to cover.
Senator Atkins: Would you know what their reaction is?
LGen. Macdonald: I am afraid I cannot tell you directly. I have not talked to them specifically about that. Their primary focus currently is maritime surveillance and defence, and any suggestions they can get on how to better do that is useful to them. Simply the fact that we are working so closely binationally, and that you and other parliamentarians are interested in what we are doing, will help to raise the level of awareness about the need for this and the way in which we can deal with it through cooperation in the binational planning group and beyond.
Senator Forrestall: One of the principal roles and the fantastic job that has been done in this respect has been that of augmentation for our forces overseas by the militia reserves. From St. John's through to Victoria, and particularly along our southern border, we have a lot of reserve units. Some have been stood down; some are retired; some are looking constantly for things to do other than going to Bosnia. It seems to me that if the border becomes a problem, an answer might be the reactivation, for example, of the Halifax Rifles.
The Chairman: Let the record show this is the seventy-third time the Halifax Rifles have been mentioned in this committee.
Senator Forrestall: Let the respondent say what a shame that a fellow has to mention it 73 times.
If the border is so important to us and to the Americans, why could militia units not be given the role of keeping an eye on our coasts and on the forty-ninth parallel? It seems to me that would be relatively inexpensive. It could be a permanent tasking. It does not have to be seven days a week, but it is a role that they could fulfil.
Has anyone ever given any thought to that?
LGen. Macdonald: I think you are well aware that we are expanding the size of our militia. The Land Forces Reserve Restructuring Program is gradually increasing by recruiting additional militia members. In the context of doing that, we have also established some broadened roles for the army reserve. We are focusing predominantly on civil and military affairs by creating teams that can deal with civilian authorities from a military perspective. There is also our response to nuclear, bacteriological and chemical attacks.
The militia, as you suggest, can also have broader roles, such as protection of critical infrastructure in the event of an attack of some kind or the need to secure a particular area. The militia is quite different from the naval reserve and the air force reserve. The naval reserve has an ongoing, everyday job of coastal patrol with our maritime coastal defence vessels. The air reserve is single-person augmentation of regular force units or small units of reservists that perform specific roles. However, the militia is always the one that people come back to because they are the ones that are visible in the community footprint across Canada. They are the ones that one would expect would do the kind of job that you suggest.
I know that these sorts of roles are being considered. The question that always comes to mind is whether there is a good rationale for training reservists, who should be able to do things like go to Bosnia and perform a properly trained role there with the appropriate equipment, and then employ them with something like border patrol. Certainly there is a role, if there is an attack or a specific need for security in a specific area, for the militia to be marshalled to that area, but is it something that we would want to employ them with every day? That is ultimately the question. Is this a militia of properly trained people for augmentation and support of the regular force with a fully operational role, or does the militia have the responsibility for a home-guard type function at the exclusion of the more operational role? That is a question of the best use we can make of the militia.
Senator Atkins: In our second report we recommended that our military strength be increased to 75,000. Where are we at the moment in terms of military strength, and how is the recruiting going?
LGen. Macdonald: The current reserve strength overall is about 22,000 to 23,000. I mentioned that the militia is growing from 15,500 to 17,000 at a rate of 750 per year for two years. The regular force is currently about 62,000.
Recruiting is generally going well. We are meeting our targets in terms of numbers, but about one-third of our trades and occupations are still distressed or in some way deficient in the numbers of people we have or the training they need to gain to be operationally capable. These are mostly technical trades, medical personnel, and so forth — the people that are scarce in the community at large. We continue to work with some modest success in addressing those deficiencies.
There is nothing wrong with our recruiting program per se. We are meeting our goals. We are tempering the number of people we actually have in regular force to a level that we feel is in balance with the other demands we have on our budget. It would be folly for us to spend an inordinate amount on recruiting and training people at the expense of our capital program, for example, or the expansion of operations, so we need a balance, and that balance we feel is about 62,000 people.
Another consideration is that it is fine to recruit someone, but there is a significant training role that goes with that. We have a capacity issue with basic training, and then follow-on trades training or whatever. For people that are highly skilled, technical officers or pilots, for example, who have a longer training yet, there is a need to ensure that we provide the wherewithal to put them through the entire system so they get to an operational aircraft, in the case of a pilot, within a reasonably good time. Recruiting too many at the front end makes that problem worse. We need to have a measured input of these occupation and trades that demand a higher training.
We feel we are at about an appropriate level of recruiting and training, and the total number of about 62,000 will be the amount that we feel we can ultimately get to meet our operational jobs, of which we are about 1,700 people short right now in the trained effective establishment, as we call it.
Senator Atkins: We hear that in Afghanistan, the Van Doos are over there with the strength of 1,900, but in August we will be reducing our presence there to 500.
LGen. Macdonald: Approximately.
Senator Atkins: Is this because of a lack of military personnel for replacement purposes, or is this based on other considerations?
LGen. Macdonald: It is a combination. The most acute issue here is the operational tempo to which Senator Banks referred. We have had a high demand for personnel in the last two or three: for the army with Bosnia; support to the G8; sending people to Kandahar and now to Kabul; the navy deploying 16 vessels to Southwest Asia in a two-year period; the air force deploying fleets of Aurora aircraft; transport aircraft still there; helicopters on board ship. A combination of all those things has put us in a situation where we can sustain, after August of this year, only a much smaller number of internationally deployed forces.
We will have to reduce the number that we could deploy to Afghanistan when the government makes a decision on what that is, and, at the same time, reduce our commitment to Bosnia, as Admiral Robertson indicated before. It will be a period of recuperation — a strategic pause, as you would say — to ensure that we can ultimately return to a steady-state level of deployment in the subsequent year.
Senator Atkins: So considering our international obligations, we are just stretched too thin?
LGen. Macdonald: We have been over the last few years, yes.
Senator Atkins: What do you think it would take to increase our military personnel to the point where we could fulfil our obligations on a regular basis?
LGen. Macdonald: It will take time. The reality is that adding more personnel to the equation is not a total solution because the demands placed on our training system to make them operational would be quite significant. We have a through-put problem, if you will. We need to recruit them and train them and make them operationally ready. Clearly we can always do with additional funding and spend it on our balance of our capital spending, personnel, our infrastructure, our operations and so on to ensure that we spend it most effectively, but simply increasing the number of people is not the silver bullet to resolve this problem. It will take time to do this.
The army, over the last few years, has had a significant number of people in Bosnia, for several years now. The commander of the army was looking forward to re-instituting the brigade training exercises to get larger training events to try to increase the readiness of the army. Then 2001 came along, and he was suddenly committed to send troops to Afghanistan. There were increasing demands through the G8 Summit period, where there was a significant army presence in Kananaskis.
At the same time, we were trying to recruit more and more people, recognizing the personnel shortage we have, so the experienced people in the army are often tapped to go to schools to increase the staff there so they can take more recruits in. They have to create separate basic training operations because our other infrastructure is not big enough to incorporate all the people. The summer is predominantly the best time to train in the army, so people get squeezed taking leave in the summer, and the most experienced people are often the ones in the highest demand during the summer. Now we have this deployment to Afghanistan.
The army has been under a perpetual demand and pressure to produce operational forces, and they have done it splendidly for the last several years, but they are now at a time when they really do need to attend to the housekeeping and tend to the training required and make sure they can rejuvenate for the future.
Senator Atkins: In reference to the strength of 62,000, there is an attrition factor in there, is there not, of people who, for other reasons, are not part of the total that you require for your commitments?
LGen. Macdonald: We talked about the "trained effective establishment" and "trained effective strength." The trained effective establishment is about 54,500 people, and that is the amount of operational jobs that we have. The difference between that and 62,000 are all those people who are medically unfit, are being recruited, being released, or undergoing that training that you talk about. We are short about 1,700, so our trained effective strength, actual people we have for those 54,500 jobs, is about 1,700 short.
Additionally, we are dealing with this balloon of recruits in a training mill that is over and above that 54,500, between that and the 62,000. There is an overhead that we must deal with of something like 10 per cent or 12 per cent. Our attrition rate now is about 6 per cent, which is the envy of most militaries in the world. It is fairly low, and that is because young people in the forces see the promise, see the things that we are doing, recognize that the Canadian forces is a truly professional organization, a quality operation, and it is a good place to work. It is exciting, and there are lots of challenges and opportunities for young people. I think our attrition rate is reflective of that.
Senator Atkins: I think it is true that you are treating your military personnel very well.
LGen. Macdonald: We have invested heavily in quality of life over the last several years. Now we need to address perhaps the operational quality of life issues to ensure they have the best equipment that we can get them and the training that is necessary and so on, and that the operational tempo is at a sustainable rate.
Senator Munson: I have a comment on a different subject. Mr. Wright talked this afternoon about BMD. If we do not participate in BMD, does Canada lose its influence in NORAD?
LGen. Macdonald: They already have assigned the mission for BMD to Northern Command. If we Canadians do not participate in BMD in any way, then the NORAD contribution to the mission will have to be done by Americans. Therefore, the simple answer is yes, we will not have the same influence or breadth of the mission that NORAD has traditionally had.
Senator Munson: If that decision was made not to participate, how would you feel?
LGen. Macdonald: I think this committee knows, from my former experience in NORAD, that I feel NORAD is a very important alliance — perhaps the most successful alliance between any two countries ever. It is something that is mutually important for both of us. Any denigration or deterioration of the value of that alliance would be a negative event.
Senator Munson: Yesterday the defence minister would not rule out the possibility one day of rocket launchers or radar stations on Canadian soil. Can you, as a military person, see a day like that happening somewhere down road? Is that possible?
LGen. Macdonald: We have to recognize that the ballistic missile system being developed now is very limited. To expand that to include a wider arc of defence with better probability of defending, there would be advantage in some cases to positioning some of the system on Canadian soil. That has not been a point of discussion between Canada and the United States yet. It may be in the future.
One should not assume what that would be, though. There are many elements to the system, and the positioning of a communications station to relay information to an interceptor or the locating of some sort of support aspect of the system is as much a possibility as the possibility of locating a radar on Canadian soil.
Senator Munson: I have just one small thing. In your statement you left out: "And lastly, membership in NORAD also benefits the Canadian aerospace and defence industry." Did you just skip that by accident?
LGen. Macdonald: I do not purport to be an expert on the defence industry. Certainly, Canada has an incredibly strong aerospace defence industry that presumably would benefit from partnership in ballistic missile defence due to the contracts that would be available.
The Chairman: We will be going to the United States next month. I would like to touch on a couple of points, if I could, before we wrap up.
It is still not clear in my mind after Senator Banks' questioning about the binational planning group. Senator Banks talked about the possibility of the equivalent of a naval NORAD, if you will. The response that came back was, "Yes, we see something like that but there are no dedicated assets to deal with it."
What exactly are the 65 folk doing there? Do they currently have a consolidated maritime picture of both coasts? Is that in existence now? We talked about that in one report happening at Trinity and Athena. Could someone on the panel describe to the committee exactly what the 65 people are doing and what you expect them to be doing over the next 12 months?
LGen. Macdonald: I will give you an initial answer. Perhaps one of my colleagues would like to add to it.
There are about 50 people overall, half Canadians and half Americans.
The Chairman: That means 25 Canadians.
LGen. Macdonald: We sent down 25 to 30, with an equivalent number of Americans. They have developed a common operating picture and they do share information on that. One should not underestimate the degree of effort to do just that. That is a significant undertaking.
The Chairman: Could I ask you to define "a common operating picture"? How does that differ from a consolidated one where all of the intelligence you have is fused into a single picture?
LGen. Macdonald: I suppose I would consider them to be essentially the same thing.
The Chairman: For example, the information that is coming in from provincial airways together with the information that is coming from other vessels and so on is all put together in real-time now and is available at NORAD for someone to look at. It is all there in Colorado Springs — kaboom?
LGen. Macdonald: I am not sure of that. Do either of one of you have an answer to that?
Major-General Pierre Daigle, Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff (Homeland Security Issues), Department of National Defence: They are developing this. As you know, the binational planning group is coming under review at the end of this year, after two years of existence. They are still very much thinking of all the multiple hundreds of plans and MOUs that we have with the Americans. They are developing this common planning. Eighty per cent of their work is towards the maritime awareness picture: surveillance, intelligence-sharing and so on.
LGen. Macdonald: One of the obvious developments that would help us prosecute maritime targets is to ensure that Canada and the U.S. share the information that is relevant to vessels of interest, and that is the target here. However, the binational planning group is not an operation centre per se. It is not there to command operations. It is there to facilitate the sharing of information so that Canadians and Americans can take the appropriate action.
It may become the NORAD of the sea, but it is not given that mandate at this time. It is there to facilitate.
The Chairman: I do not understand the word "facilitate" in this context.
LGen. Macdonald: It is to make sure the Canadian and American maritime surveillance information is properly shared, that there is some sort of consultation in areas where there is mutual concern about a particular track or target they have to address, and that some mutually agreeable action is taken where that is felt to be necessary.
In the NORAD context, it is very regimented because of the time involved. If an aircraft enters radar coverage and not identified within two minutes, it is identified as an unknown and fighters are put on alert and scrambled if necessary to intercept that target. In a naval context, the time is more liberal and you do not have to react that quickly, but you certainly need to identify ships or vessels of interest to know what the intelligence is about them and where they are.
The Chairman: How far does the picture go, sir?
LGen. Macdonald: I do not know.
MGen. Daigle: NORTHCOM covers up to 500 nautical miles, but they have the means to know a bit more outside of this connected to the other regional commanders. If you have a ship, for instance, that leaves a port in another area, they might get information of what is coming up and pick it up as it crosses through all those different layers of coverage.
The Chairman: NORTHCOM covering 500 miles is not relevant. Surely, that is an arbitrary figure that they have chosen to have for their commands. The question that is relevant is: How far does your radar go? How far does the radar coverage extend out so you can see vessels?
LGen. Macdonald: Overhead satellite coverage is also useful for this.
The Chairman: Yes, and satellite coverage; I do not understand your comment about 500 miles, Major-General.
MGen. Daigle: That is their area of responsibility. NORTHCOM covers up to 500 nautical miles outside of the continent.
The Chairman: If it is 600 miles, they are not looking at the vessel?
MGen. Daigle: If they have the means, obviously, as I said, they need to take into account the ship or whatever traffic is coming up as far as possible. Their responsibility is delineated into these 500 nautical miles, but there are other regional combatant commanders in other areas. If a ship has left another part of the world and is heading towards the continent, they will get this information through other means.
The Chairman: Is someone going to pick up a phone and phone Colorado Springs?
LGen. Macdonald: That is one of the challenges. If Pacific Command or European Command or Southern Command has intelligence that would be useful to Northern Command, that is one of the key elements of Northern Command's mission, to liase with all of the potential sources of information of relevance for them, for not just maritime targets but others.
The Chairman: What does the binational planning group do then?
LGen. Macdonald: The binational planning group is focused on Canada-U.S. cooperation in this area. Its role is to ensure that, in the case of maritime surveillance, if there is a vessel that we have identified as one of interest — be it through intelligence from a foreign port, from a neighbouring command, the U.S. north command, or through our own radar or censor information — we can collectively and cooperatively decide what we will do about it, if anything. The planning group is also involved in sharing of intelligence information in other areas that relate to terrorist attacks or threats, sharing of the necessary coordination, and the identification of the stakeholders for coordination of the contingency planning that is necessary.
Imagine — heaven forbid — a nuclear attack on Detroit. In such a scenario, the binational planning group can work together in order to identify what responsibilities Canadian and American authorities would have in responding to such an event. They would exercise it in a realistic way so that they can make sure that the coordination is there, that the people understand what their role and mission is, and how they would respond to it, and what information will be required and all the things that go with that. Ultimately, they would be prepared in a significant event — not necessarily a nuclear event — to have the plan and understanding in place binationally so that we could react to it immediately.
The Chairman: We are short on time. Lieutenant-General MacDonald, I wonder if I could ask you to get back to the committee in writing on this matter. The last time we discussed it, there was not a real-time coordination of information coming in to either Trinity or Athena. I would be interested in having an update on that. I would also be interested in getting a better understanding of the geographic reach in a maritime sense. If you could give us a description in writing, I would be most grateful.
LGen. Macdonald: Senator, to be clear, you are specifically interested in the electronic coordination of what we call a common operating picture, how that is being done now, what the expectations are for the future and the coverage?
The Chairman: Yes. That also includes the Great Lakes.
If I could turn to a general question, are there other issues that relate to the United States military that we should be aware of or conscious of for our trip to Washington?
MGen. Daigle: If I may, I heard you talk about the NORAD maritime and the planning group and so on.
The Chairman: Are you coming back to the question we were on above?
MGen. Daigle: It is not a different topic.
The Chairman: If we could have a note on that, we would appreciate that.
My last question is: Are there training facilities that we have in Canada that are not fully utilized that we would like to see Americans using?
LGen. Macdonald: The army, navy and air force represented here. From an air force perspective, our most capable training area is that at Cold Lake. We use the weapons range there for Maple Flag exercises. We have considerable cooperation with the Americans and, indeed, other allies for the use of that on a regular basis, it is valuable and useful training.
The Chairman: Is there anything that Goose Bay does that Cold Lake cannot do?
LGen. Macdonald: No. Cold Lake is not used to capacity, perhaps, but it is certainly exploited extensively at certain times during the year. I am not sure if it is an area where increased training could occur from the American-Canadian connection, but certainly it is an area we must continue to exploit.
The Chairman: Army facilities?
LGen. Macdonald: Wainwright is being developed as the home of army training, if you will, in the future. There are extensive improvements being made to Wainwright. Certainly, the British train in Alberta. I am not sure that the Americans view training in Canada as a requirement for them. I know that there are exchanges and exercises that go on, on both sides of the border.
Senator Forrestall: We do have clean air for calibration and so forth.
The Chairman: When we met with the American ambassador and their defence attaché, they raised the issue that they did not have the capacity to enter into joint training with the army in the United States because all of the facilities were fully occupied. We got the impression that they would welcome other places to conduct exercises. Do you have that impression?
LGen. Macdonald: No, I do not have that impression, but I do not really know.
The Chairman: Could someone look into it and let us know?
LGen. Macdonald: Specifically army, yes.
The Chairman: If there are naval facilities, obviously we have a torpedo range that has some interest. I presume it is fully occupied.
The generic question is: Could you get back to us with a piece of paper that could indicate what opportunities there might be for Americans to train in Canada that the department would welcome?
LGen. Macdonald: Yes.
The Chairman: On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank you very much for appearing before us. I am sorry we could not continue the discussion. We have a vote coming up shortly, which has caused us to ask for things in writing instead of hearing things verbally. However, I am grateful to the three of you for appearing before us and assisting us in our preparations for the trip to Washington.
To those of you who are following on television, if you have questions, you may go to our Web site at www.sen- sec.ca. We post witness testimony as well as confirmed hearing schedules. Otherwise, you may contact the clerk of the committee at 1-800-267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting members of the committee.
The committee adjourned.