Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 1 - Evidence, October 25, 2004
OTTAWA, Monday, October 25, 2004
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 7:10 p.m. to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Good evening. It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Today the committee will hear testimony relating to the review of Canadian defence policy. My name is Colin Kenny. I am a senator from Ontario and I chair the committee.
On my immediate right is the distinguished Senator Michael Forrestall from Nova Scotia. Senator Forrestall has served the constituents of Dartmouth for the past 37 years, first as their member of the House of Commons and then as their senator. At my far right is Senator Jim Munson from Ontario, who was a trusted journalist and former director of communications for the Prime Minister before he was called to the Senate in 2003. Beside him is Senator Tommy Banks from Alberta, well-known to Canadians as one of our most versatile musicians and entertainers. He has received a Juneau Award and is an Officer of the Order of Canada. On my extreme left is Senator Pierre Claude Nolin, who chaired the Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs that issued a comprehensive report calling for the reform and regulation of cannabis in Canada.
Our committee is the first permanent Senate committee mandated to examine security and defence. During the last Parliament, we completed a number of reports, beginning with ``Canadian Security and Military Preparedness.'' This study, tabled in February 2002, examined the major defence and security issues facing Canada. The Senate then asked our committee to examine the need for a national security policy. To date we have released five reports on various aspects of national security: ``Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility,'' in September 2002; ``For an Extra $130 Bucks...Update on Canada's Military Financial Crisis, A View from the Bottom UP,'' in November 2002; ``The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports,'' in January 2003; ``Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World,'' in October 2003; and ``National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines,'' in March 2004.
The committee is now turning its attention to a review of Canadian defence policy. During the next year, we will hold hearings in every province and engage Canadians to determine their national interests, what they see as Canada's principal threats, and how they would like the government to respond. The committee will attempt to generate a debate on national security in Canada and to forge a public consensus on the need for the military.
This evening's witness is well-known to the committee. Dr. Ken Calder was appointed Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), Department of National Defence, in 1991. He is the principal source of defence policy advice to the deputy minister and to the Chief of Defence Staff. Dr. Calder, welcome back to the committee. I understand you have a short opening statement; please proceed.
Mr. Kenneth J. Calder, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), Department of National Defence: Senators, it is a pleasure to be back with you. I do not have an elaborate presentation because of the short notice to appear before the committee, but I do have some opening remarks to set the context. When I was here in April, I spoke about the international policy review and the defence policy review. I thought it would be useful if I were to pick up where we left off in that discussion.
As you know, the government is conducting a comprehensive review of Canada's place in the world. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, in conjunction with the Minister of National Defence, the Minister of International Trade, the Minister of International Cooperation and the Minister of Finance, is leading the international policy review. The review is aimed at developing an integrated and coherent international policy framework for diplomacy, defence, development and trade.
This international policy review focuses on a wide range of issues including Canada-U.S. relations, international security, prosperity, human rights and multilateralism. Work on the review is closely coordinated through cabinet committees, other meetings of ministers, meetings of deputy ministers and interdepartmental meetings at my level. While things slowed down a bit during the election campaign and the subsequent ministerial transition, the pace has picked up over the last few months. Work is progressing steadily, and I will come back at the end of my remarks to the issues of public consultations and the release of reports.
At the same time, we are continuing our own defence policy review, which will be consistent with and which will flow directly from the international policy review. It will also build on the principles and initiatives of the national security policy. The policy group works closely within national defence with the military, in particular with the vice- chief of the defence staff, in developing a draft policy. As well, the minister is heavily engaged and is providing us with the direction that we need.
We have made significant headway since I last appeared before this committee. Obviously, I cannot tell you what we are recommending to ministers, what direction they are giving us or what will be in the final product — the final policy consult — because that has not yet been determined. However, I can give you some idea of the types of issues that we are addressing. The defence policy review will identify our key defence priorities. It will assess changes in the international security environment including threats such as global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed and failing states, and regional hot spots. It will also take into account the Canadian Forces recent operational experience, with a view to setting out the type of military forces Canada will need in the future. It will reaffirm the need outlined in the national security policy for Canada to have armed forces that are flexible, responsive, combat capable for a wide range of operations and that are able to work with our allies. It will outline the government's commitment to increase the size of the Canadian Forces by 5,000 regular and 3,000 reserve personnel.
The new policy will re-examine the Canadian Forces three roles: Defending Canada and Canadians; contributing to North American security; and contributing to international peace and security. It will specify specific military tasks in each one of these roles. It will also address the need to find an appropriate balance between our continental and our overseas responsibilities. There may well be greater emphasis on domestic defence, which is only natural in a world after 9/11. This reflects the fundamental premise of the national security policy, which is that there can be no greater role, no more important obligation for a government, than the protection and safety of its citizens.
We are examining how the Canadian Forces can focus more of their efforts at home on conducting surveillance and responding to asymmetric threats, especially with respect to air and maritime security. We are exploring practical measures beyond the national security policy to enhance the protection of Canadians at home. These include, among other things, identifying and possibly enhancing specific capabilities to respond to terrorist and asymmetric threats, increasing the size and capabilities of the reserves to deal with domestic crises, and looking at ways to expand our military presence and capabilities in the North.
For the defence of North America, we will be looking at working with the United States in new and innovative ways to protect our continent against emerging threats. As such, I expect the new policy to address the issue of the binational planning group, whose mandate expires at the end of this year. This will also tie in with the future of the NORAD agreement, which is up for renewal in 2006. As you know, the NORAD agreement was amended this year to make its missile warning function available to U.S. commands responsible for ballistic missile defence.
There have also been discussions about expanding our bilateral cooperation to include other aspects of North American defence such as maritime security. In short, we will need to think about how we want NORAD to evolve in the coming years.
With respect to international operations, we must continue to have a capability to address threats as far away from our shore as is possible, as stated in the national security policy. We must be able to meet our treaty commitments and we must support our foreign policy with hard military assets. The Canadian Forces are likely, therefore, to continue to participate in a wide range of international operations from humanitarian assistance to combat. We may also play an increased role in peace building in failed and failing states, especially as part of the government's 3-D approach. The commitment in the Speech from the Throne to increase the regular force by 5,000 personnel, the bulk of which will go into the army, will be critical in this respect.
Finally, we will need to discuss the importance of NATO and the United Nations to deal with the complex threats we are facing today.
We expect both the international and defence policy reviews to be completed later this fall. As indicated in the Speech from the Throne, parliamentarians and Canadians will have the opportunity to debate the analyses and proposed directions of the international security statement.
Our minister has also indicated recently that he ``intends to seek the views of Parliament through the committee process,'' and that he is, ``committed to working with ...fellow parliamentarians in charting the way ahead for defence.''
We do not at this point have an absolutely clear vision of how the parliamentary consultations will be conducted, and a great deal of that is, of course, up to the two parliamentary committees, but we are committed to working with both in the development of defence policy. Since his appointment, Mr. Graham has been consulting with key defence experts, and I expect he will continue to do so in the coming months.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would invite questions.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Calder. Since we began, we have been joined by Senator Jane Cordy from Nova Scotia. She is an accomplished educator with an extensive record in community involvement. She is also the chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association. We have also been joined by Senator Norm Atkins from Ontario. Senator Atkins came to the Senate in 1986 with a strong background in the field of communications and with experience as an adviser to former Premier Davis of Ontario. Welcome to you both.
Our first questioner today is Senator Forrestall, followed by Senator Munson.
Senator Forrestall: Good evening, Dr Calder. It is good to have you back for your third visit since 9/11.
I want you to tell us — and you have already taken some steps in that direction — what should go into a new defence policy. It has been more than 10 years since the last major review. There is no question that the world has changed. When you were with us shortly after the tragic events of 9/11, you indicated to us that, if we wrote a new defence policy today, and that is back then, of course, it would in fact retain many, if not all, of the main elements of the current policy. Indeed, if you look at it, September 11 proved we were right when we said the world was unstable, unpredictable and dangerous. We were also right when we concluded, I would suggest, that we needed multipurpose combat-capable forces, and that we had to maintain the capability to respond to terrorist incidents. You went on to say that, when the next policy is drafted, while we will have many of these same elements, we will probably see changes in emphasis and priority.
I would ask you to elaborate on changes in emphasis and priority. What did you have in mind then, and is that still true today?
Mr. Calder: Senator, you will appreciate that I can only go so far in terms of saying what might be in the next policy because that is for ministers to deal with.
I am relieved that the statement you quoted still sounds to me like a good statement. When you talk about the changes, it is what I alluded to in my opening remarks. Post-9/11 there is the issue of domestic security, security of Canada and Canadians with respect to global terrorism, asymmetric threats and so forth, reflected in the work this committee has done on national security. Without going to the point of saying what the government will decide at the end to do about that, that is obviously something that has to be quite seriously addressed, more so than we traditionally did in Cold War defence policies which focussed on Moscow and the Soviet Union.
There is also the issue with respect to the binational planning group in NORAD, and there is the issue of North American continental defence. Clearly, this is a much more complex and difficult business than it was during the Cold War. It was not easy during the Cold War, but it was reasonably well focused on the Soviet Union. We have to develop mechanisms to work more effectively with the Americans in our defence and in their defence, and the defence of the continent as a whole.
Those are the areas I was alluding to in terms of where I would see greater emphasis, and I think those still apply.
Senator Forrestall: Many people have suggested, indeed continue to suggest, that the new defence policy should have as a requirement a clean sheet, there should be a new start. In previous testimony you indicated that the first principles of a defence policy should remain — as you to a degree suggested — the same as those of the 1994 paper.
You have suggested on a number of occasions when you have been pursued by the press that this is an ongoing process that you are working at. At one point you said that the policy has been an ongoing process and that it is virtually completed.
How do you respond to the criticisms in the press in this particular regard? It seems to many of us that you are being somewhat unfairly attacked, given the very rapid changes that have taken place over this last 18 months or two years. How do you respond to these comments that the policy is virtually completed, when in fact you have said that there is a clear indication from the external policy of this country where it wants to go, making it a little bit easier to construct a defence policy that would support that external policy? How do you respond to the criticisms?
Mr. Calder: I am not sure, senator, that I have ever said that the policy is virtually completed. Others may have said that.
Senator Forrestall: Perhaps I said it on your behalf.
Mr. Calder: I assure you that it is not completed because it is never completed until ministers have made their decisions, and we are not at that point. You mentioned the foreign policy aspect. It is our intention to have a defence policy after or simultaneous with the international policy reviews so that there will be a seamless connection between foreign and defence policy.
You said at the very beginning of your remarks that some people suggested that one should start with a blank piece of paper or at the very beginning and, as an intellectual exercise, I agree with that. Whenever you examine a policy you should go right back and satisfy yourself from square one that it is sound. I would still maintain that, if you do that in the case of Canadian defence policy, if you do start back at square one, I you would end up with the fundamental principles that have been enunciated in the past, which are that our key missions are the defence of Canada, the defence of North America and contributing to international peace and security. To accomplish those missions, we need combat-capable and flexible forces. Even if you started back at the beginning you would still arrive at that conclusion.
Senator Forrestall: Should there be emphasis on the blue beret or on the steel helmet? I am not trying to probe your ongoing work, but I am anxious that we in this committee are able to do credible work on the development of a defence policy. We have a year to do it and we would like to do a good job. Are we still in the blue beret mode? Is the role still peacekeeping?
Mr. Calder: The distinction between blue beret and steel helmet is no longer valid. It was essentially a Cold War formulation where there was peacekeeping in Cyprus, for example, and then there was the prospect of a major war on the central front in Europe with two quite separate roles for the Canadian Forces. Everything we have done over the last decade, internationally, such as in Afghanistan, Kandahar, in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia and so forth, demonstrates that the distinction is no longer real. When people are sent abroad they may be wearing a blue beret, and it may be a blue-beret mission, but you had better be certain that your people have the capabilities that are needed by combat forces because you can never be absolutely certain about what will happen after troops are deployed. What may start off as a reasonably benign peacekeeping operation can turn very sour and you really do need combat capability. We saw that happen in Bosnia with the Medak pocket. The operations we have seen, particularly in places like Afghanistan, show that you must have well-equipped combat-capable forces. That capability is not only required for ongoing missions, but the men and women of the Canadian Forces deserve to have that capability.
Senator Forrestall: Is this not a time for us to be considering whether there is an appropriate role for combat-ready, trained, capable forces in the three elements?
Mr. Calder: I would certainly argue that we still need to have combat capability in all three elements of the Canadian Forces and that is what is called for in the missions we are undertaking.
Senator Forrestall: May I commend to you the capabilities of the Halifax Rifles? I believe that in that body of men and women lies a coastal defence capability that is sufficient, knowledgeable, on the scene, totally capable, and can be reconstructed or reconstituted at minimal expense to the people of Canada. I will not ask you that question again for years.
The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Forrestall. It has been a fine tradition to mention the Halifax Rifles at every meeting. Perhaps we could do it once a month instead of once a week. The committee has got the point, for sure, and we will send letters to the government on your behalf.
Senator Munson: I would like a reality check. In your estimation, how far do you think we have come since the white paper and the sweeping recommendations by the Senate? How far has our military improved since all of these recommendations? Ten years has gone by. Are you satisfied that anything has come out of that white paper?
Mr. Calder: Are you referring to the 1994 white paper?
Senator Munson: Yes.
Mr. Calder: A great deal has been achieved since 1994 in terms of modernization of the capabilities of the Canadian Forces. I am not sure I could list all of the things we have done over the decade. Just recently, for example, we launched a project for the joint support ship. We are also replacing tanks with the mobile gun system, and we are acquiring fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft. We are updating the CF-18s and the Aurora aircraft. We have acquired the Coyote reconnaissance vehicle and so forth. A great many improvements have been made in the Canadian Forces since 1994.
Most of the actual equipment projects in the 1994 white paper, I think all of them in fact, were achieved some time ago, so that is in a sense outdated. However, the world has changed. The world is different now and I think we all recognize that the 1994 white paper, although it was valid for a long period of time, needs to be re-examined. The forces need new direction, and the government needs new direction with respect to defence policy. That is what we hope to see out of this current exercise.
Senator Munson: You talked about the 5,000 troops and you talked about the troops being combat ready. The Prime Minister talked about that during the campaign, yet many people believe that these troops would more aptly be described as peacekeepers. Will the 5,000 new troops be special troops performing special tasks or will they be lumped in with the reserves as part of the overall military?
Mr. Calder: That has yet to be decided. At the moment, the army is considering options for, primarily, the 5,000, but also the 3,000 with respect to how they will be integrated into the Canadian Forces. It is generally understood that the bulk of those will go into the army. Clearly, the challenge for military planners is to ensure that those personnel are incorporated into the Canadian Forces in a fashion that maximizes our ability to deploy abroad. You need not put them into parts of the organization that are not deploying. One will seek to get the maximum capability out of them.
Returning to whether or not they are peacekeepers goes back to Senator Forrestall's question. Everyone in the Canadian Forces is a peacekeeper. When we have Hercules aircraft flying into Kabul, they are on a peacekeeping mission. When we have ships in the Indian Ocean intercepting potential terrorists and so forth, those are also peacekeeping missions, broadly writ. In a sense, I do not think the distinction between soldier and peacekeeper is valid. As I was saying to your colleague, I think that we are all in the peacekeeping business and we must be combat capable while we do that business.
Senator Munson: Do you worry at all that the government's expenditure review might get in the way of these new announcements of expansion? Obviously, the Department of Defence must find ways of eliminating some programs. Is there a balance?
Mr. Calder: I hope there is a balance. The policy review is ongoing. Part of that policy review must be a consideration of defence funding, the size of the defence budget and so forth. At the same time, the expenditure review process is ongoing, but it has not been going on as long. They must come together. One would hope there will be a balance, but it is too early to say. The subject of expenditure review gets people's attention.
Senator Munson: It has our attention.
You referred to the binational planning group dealing with NORAD. Do you perceive NORAD being enhanced to encompass sea and land operations?
Mr. Calder: That is being discussed in Ottawa. It is being discussed in Colorado Springs, at NORAD headquarters. I believe it is being discussed by our colleagues in Washington. I am referring to the whole question of how to make NORAD more effective. The discussion may not be in the context of NORAD. It may be in some other context, such as: How do we make Canada-U.S. cooperation, security and defence more effective?
Clearly, the area of prime interest and concern is maritime security, security on the east and west coast, the Great Lakes, the seaway and so forth. Without prejudging the outcome, that is an area under active consideration. It is not for us alone to make decisions. We would have to negotiate any changes with our friends in Washington. That subject is under active consideration.
Senator Munson: In your estimation, what is the most crucial threat facing this country?
Mr. Calder: I am not sure that I would like to list an item as being more important than another. One can fall into the trap of trying to make predictions. There are a number of threats. We have no direct traditional military threat against Canada. We do have the threat of global terrorism, not only terrorism against Canadian interests and Canadians abroad, but also a threat to Canada.
There are also threats with respect to failed and failing states and the problems they generate for the international system. There are threats out there of regional conflict between various countries in the world that may destabilize the international system and are detrimental to Canadian interests.
The situation on the Korean Peninsula is always of concern, given the heavy armaments on both sides of the parallel. There is also the situation with Taiwan, which must be a concern to anyone who watches the international security equation. There is the relationship between India and Pakistan. Both countries have nuclear weapons, which is also a concern. We live in an uncertain environment which generates concerns with which we have to deal.
To go back to your question, the most serious, direct threat would be that of terrorism.
Senator Atkins: My first question is: How is the recruitment going?
Mr. Calder: It is not my field, but I am under the impression that we are doing well on the recruiting side. I could not give you specific numbers on that.
Senator Atkins: Are there incentives to encourage young people to join the Armed Forces?
Senator Banks: There are if you are a doctor.
Mr. Calder: I cannot answer the question. We can get back to you on details on recruiting. It is my understanding that the recruiting efforts are being successful.
Senator Atkins: Some of us have been on this committee since it was first put together. We have always had a sense, at least I have, that we are spread pretty thin as an armed force. That first came to light when we went to Camp Borden. We saw many members of all services waiting for courses. It was explained to us that the reason they were sitting around cooling their heels was that there was insufficient training personnel.
Is the infrastructure in place to train another 5,000 recruits? Before you answer that question, let me give you another example. We went to Gagetown and met with the training schools for the infantry, the artillery and the army. The biggest complaint we heard had to do with the shuffling of the NCOs. If they were there, they were being reassigned to overseas assignments. How will we deal with this if these circumstances prevail?
Mr. Calder: Senator, you are absolutely right. My impression on the recruiting side, and from what I am told by my military colleagues, is that there is no difficulty in getting people to join the Canadian Forces, sign up; it is in the training process and in fully training those people so that they can be deployed. That is a problem.
You said that we are spread thin. There is no doubt that the Canadian Forces, particularly the army, is spread thin. During the spring we deployed 14 per cent of the army overseas. With the exception of the United States, that was the highest percentage of all NATO nations. When you have that many people abroad, you are spread thin back at home.
The recruiting of 5,000 people and training them to the extent that they can be deployed is a real challenge. It will be done, but it will be a challenge.
Senator Atkins: Since our committee was formed, we have been watching closely the budgets. As I recall, we started off with around $12 billion. I believe that we might now be at $13.5 billion.
Mr. Calder: Something like that, yes.
Senator Atkins: Is that enough money to do all the things that have to be done by way of expanding the force and providing them with equipment?
Mr. Calder: If I recall correctly, the defence budget has increased every year since 1999. Some of that has been year- end funding, of course, but I believe that has amounted to an increase in the base budget of $1.7 billion, which has taken us up to around $13 billion. Therefore, the budget has been moving upward.
Whether that is enough depends on what you want to do. There is no magic number that should be put into defence. It depends on what kind of forces you want to have, how many forces you want to have, what quality of personnel you want to have and the roles you want them to play. You have to work out what you want the forces to do, and from that you can work out what amount of money should be put in.
I hope we will see that in the defence policy that will come out.
Senator Atkins: Are we not yet at that stage?
Mr. Calder: I hope that any policy will not only lay out what the forces will look like in the future and what capabilities they should have, but also that it will be explicit on the funding necessary for that. I would expect a committee like this, which will look at whatever we put out, to point out any deficiencies in that respect.
Senator Atkins: Senator Weibe would want me to ask about reserves. How will they fit into this new plan?
Mr. Calder: When you asked me that in the spring, I was less certain because the government had not yet made a decision. Since then, during the campaign, the government has undertaken that, in addition to the 5,000 regulars that they will put into the Canadian Forces, they will increase the militia by 3,000, so there will be an expansion of the militia. Also under consideration is the roles of the militia and the reserves in Canada with respect to domestic security, response to terrorist attacks, and so forth.
I am hopeful that we will see some solid comment on this in the next policy.
Senator Atkins: When we travelled to meet with some reserve units, we picked up on two problems. One was the problem of recruiting for reserves and the other was the funding that the reserve units received for training. How will we address that to make it relevant?
Mr. Calder: We will have to see what comes out in the policy. I can assure you that the authorities in the department who are dealing with the reserves are looking at the 3,000 and how the reserves will fit in, but in the end it depends on the decisions the ministers make in that respect.
Senator Atkins: As an aside, in the presidential debate there has been discussion of the draft. A back-door draft is being carried out through the National Guard. They are not letting them fulfill their function but keeping them on, which is interesting.
As my last question, how many CF18s do we have now? You said that we are refurbishing them.
Mr. Calder: I am not particularly numerate on these things, but I think we have 80 operational CF18s. There would be more than that if we consider those in the process of being renewed, but I think the operational number is 80.
I will have my people check on that to make sure. In policy I am not always terribly numerate.
Senator Nolin: Thank you, Dr. Calder, for accepting our invitation. I am new around this table, but I am interested in military and defence matters. At various stages my colleague Senator Cordy, our chair and I have been involved in the NATO parliamentary assembly. My questions will deal with that treaty of which we have been a part since the beginning of NATO.
At the outset, let us talk about European foreign policy and security. To what extent will it or is it already influencing the thinking within the department on the review?
Mr. Calder: We follow this issue closely. We have always supported European efforts to bring their defence into a more coherent and cohesive whole, which is what is happening in the European security and defence policy.
We deal with this issue through NATO and also directly with the European Community. We wish to ensure that there is no overlap between the efforts of the European Community and NATO so that resources are not wasted.
We are concerned to see a close relationship between the European military structures and NATO so that they can be mutually supportive. As you probably know from your NATO discussions, NATO has agreed to make various capabilities available to the Europeans.
In addition to that, we have made it known to the Europeans that should they deploy military forces outside of NATO, but on their own missions. In many cases we might be willing to participate and cooperate with them. For example, when the European Community sent a mission to the eastern Congo, we provided Hercules aircraft to support them.
The European Community is taking over the peacekeeping functions from NATO in Bosnia at the end of this year. It has not been decided yet, but we may have a small number of Canadians serving with that European force there. This obviously influences our NATO involvement and influences our policy, by and large in a positive fashion.
Senator Nolin: You say ``in a positive fashion.'' It is a review and you therefore must forecast. Are you assuming that the Europeans will get together and build their own military capability and use the NATO assets?
Mr. Calder: We are assuming that this development is entirely natural and, in many respects, inevitable. In an organization like the European Community, which is working toward a common foreign policy, it makes sense that they would have a common defence effort. There is a certain inevitably about that.
It is also positive in this sense. With the Europeans working together, they may be able to do even better at improving their military capabilities within that framework, something which is good for us.
We also work on the assumption that the relationship between the European endeavours and the NATO endeavours will be mutually supportive and will be positive. In that issues in the past in NATO have been resolved in a positive sense, we see this as an entirely beneficial endeavour.
Senator Nolin: I wish to ask about the NATO rapid response force which Canada, along with the other members of the NAC, have accepted. We are talking about a force which numbers between 22,000 and 25,000 and which is rapidly deployable. What is our pledge in that regard? In terms of forces, what have we agreed to?
Mr. Calder: We are looking at contributions on land, sea and in the air over a number of years. I am not certain about this, but I think their first engagement is to start at the beginning of 2006. It will start with naval and air assets, with army contributions later on.
We also have to look at that in relation to other deployments that the army may be making, for example, in Afghanistan or elsewhere during that period of time.
Senator Nolin: I understand the latter part of your answer. Like the other 26 nations sitting around that table, we have agreed to create, collectively, a rapid response force. We have said that Canada will be part of it. We cannot — and I am sure you will say yes — say ``yes'' for now and then, later, if we have other missions, perhaps say ``maybe.'' Is that part of your review? To what extent is it an important aspect of our international undertakings?
Mr. Calder: We have an undertaking in that sense. As well, we have an undertaking to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Obviously, one has to decide which mission is the most useful and appropriate for us to contribute to. The same applies to NATO. It is a matter of balancing the available assets.
Senator Nolin: My last question does not have to do with NATO but with the UN. Since you have a role to play in the defence operations of Canada, you will know that we play a lesser role in UN-led missions and a greater one in NATO-led missions. My question is blunt. To what extent in your review process is the UN review important? To what extent is what we want to see happen as a renaissance in the UN important to the review that you have undertaken in defence?
Mr. Calder: Certainly, the UN and our commitments to it are fundamentally important. The UN is the premier international organization to which we belong. Canada has been a stalwart supporter not only of the UN but also of its reform. In the past, we have made suggestions as to how the UN could be more effective, respond more rapidly, et cetera.
As the world has evolved, the bulk of the significant international peacekeeping missions tend to be done by coalitions, desirably under the auspices of the UN, but they are often done by NATO as is the case with ISAF in Afghanistan, for example. The result is that much of our effort appears of to have shifted away from the UN to organizations like NATO. That happens to be simply a reflection of the evolution of international peacekeeping, with the UN doing a certain amount of peacekeeping but many of the toughest missions being done separate from the UN, although under its umbrella. When we were in ISAF we were still serving the United Nations, although we were not in a UN peacekeeping operation.
Senator Nolin: Do I read in your answer that it is easier to come up with a consensus around the NAC table in Brussels than it is to come up with a consensus in Washington or New York?
Mr. Calder: That is a difficult question. From one crisis to another it depends on which organization can come to a faster decision. The advantage NATO has is that it has a large and sophisticated military machine, something which the United Nations never developed and, therefore, does not have. Although it was envisaged in the original charter, it was never fully developed.
For a sophisticated military operation, such as what we are doing in Afghanistan, for example, NATO is more effective. I believe NATO has recognized that and has undertaken to expand its responsibilities. The UN has recognized that and, to some extent, is relying upon NATO to carry out these missions under its umbrella and mandate.
Senator Cordy: Thank you for appearing before us once again to help us kick off our season.
I want to reiterate what Senator Atkins said. I am sure all of us sitting around this table were pleased with what we heard in the Speech from the Throne about recruiting 5,000 new members for our Armed Forces. One of the great concerns that those of us around the table who have travelled to military bases have concerns the training of new personnel. It was not only in Gagetown where we saw those involved in the training being deployed. As a result, there appeared to be little or no continuity.
On some bases, we also saw new military personnel who were excited and buoyant at the prospect of belonging to our military but who were twiddling their thumbs for long periods of time. That was not a good experience. It was a major concern. I hope that when the 5,000 new recruits come in they will be incorporated into our military and trained quickly.
My next question relates to the Canadian public. Shortly after 9/11, the public was greatly engrossed in the idea of security of our continent. Terrorism was certainly in the minds of Canadians. However, during the last election campaign, I do not think security and defence were top issues. Health care, child care and education were some of the top issues.
How do you bring forward to Canadians the importance of security and defence without fear mongering? You do not want to be saying every second day that there is a red alert or an orange alert. However, it is important that Canadians realize that security is not just important to the U.S. but that we are part of North America and that there should be a North American defence policy in place.
Mr. Calder: That is a very good question, senator, but I am not sure I know the answer. You are right. There is a requirement to discuss security and the threat of terrorism and so forth. However, you do not want to do so to the extent to which you are seen to be fear mongering and causing panic. I have no easy solution on how to do that.
There is a requirement for the political leaders in this country to address these issues. There is a requirement for government officials and so forth, when they have an opportunity, to do the same. One hopes that this is picked up and reported well by the media and that people get the message without getting into too much of a panic at the same time. One must have a balance. I am not sure we have the balance at the moment.
Senator Cordy: Politics being what it is, when you are preparing a budget, particularly in a minority government situation, you want to react to what the public wants, and it certainly is a challenge to get the public tuned into the importance of defence and security.
In speaking earlier in response to a question, you said we should have combat-capable forces in all three elements of our Canadian Forces. As a follow-up to that question, how do you feel about niche capabilities and whether we should be specializing? Some would say that we specialized in peacekeeping. How do you feel about specialization within the Canadian Forces?
Mr. Calder: I get nervous about specialization. I am nervous about niche forces because I am nervous about our ability to predict the future. Professor Desmond Morton, for whom I have great respect, says that, with a certain basis of fact, we always get our predictions wrong. I am mindful of that. I worry that if we go into niche forces because we predict this is an area where we will be able to make a real contribution, we may end up with something that is totally unusable because we have made an incorrect prediction. I have been asked that question many times, and often by some of my bosses, and my response to it is that you can have specialization as long as you specialize in the thing that is highest utility. You specialize in the thing that you will use in any circumstance whatsoever, not the thing that is the least likely to be used. For example, as a simple civilian, the thing that is clearly the most used in the navy is the frigates, and in the army it is the infantry. Those are what you look at. I would hesitate to get into specialization in more esoteric capabilities because you may find you are wasting your money.
Senator Cordy: You believe in not specialized specialization. Thank you very much.
Senator Banks: It is nice to see you again, Dr. Calder. We had to go to a couple of defence establishments to see a capability called DART, with which I think you are familiar. This is a hospital setup that can be sent anywhere in the world on fairly short notice and it does a lot of good. When things were bad and getting worse in Haiti, it was believed by some that it would be very useful to send DART there, but that we would not do so because it would cost too much. What would it take for us to send DART to a place where it would be helpful?
Mr. Calder: I was out of the country when those decisions were made, so I am not absolutely up to speed on that particular decision. The DART is a capability which is useful in some circumstances, and there are other circumstances where in fact what it has to offer is certainly less capable. It is not cheap. It costs a fair amount of money to deploy. In some circumstances, it is very useful to deploy it. In other circumstances, it is far better to give aid in some other form. Sometimes the best way you can give aid in an emergency is to send a cheque. In other circumstances, you are far better off sending medical supplies, or you may actually want to simply send part of the DART capability and not the whole capability because it may not be needed.
It is a judgment call in any particular crisis, and it is not a judgment, by and large, which we in National Defence tend to make. It is a judgment that is made to some extent by the first responders in the area of the crisis about what is required. We take advice from CIDA directly as to what is the appropriate aid we can provide. The DART is sometimes not the right solution, depending on the nature of the particular problem.
Senator Banks: You were not here, so I cannot pursue it, but I understand that the CIDA people and others were saying that they needed a hospital. I was worried about that.
We know that to move DART completely anywhere would take, if I recall the number correctly, 26 loads on Hercules aircraft. I think that my colleagues would agree with me that we would be hard pressed to mount 26 consecutive loads of Hercules anywhere at any time in a week, at the moment. I presume we are talking about replacing those airplanes. In the last Parliament, we learned, when we were talking about the question of strategic heavy airlift, to move DART or soldiers or whatever to other places, the philosophical concept of strategic heavy airlift was not in the government's plans. The government had decided not to do that. This is a new Parliament. Is it back in the realm of possibility, or is it still off the table policy-wise?
Mr. Calder: Obviously, in doing a policy review, in effect, everything is on the table. The decision at the time was that it was a matter of the Canadian Forces needing a strategic lift in some form or other. That does not mean you have to buy strategic lift, but you have to have it to get there for exactly the reason you mention. We have in the past tended to use leased Ukrainian Antonovs to ship a lot of that equipment. There is no doubt that there is a requirement.
The question is: What is the best and most cost-effective way to satisfy that requirement? One solution, of course, is to go out and buy a number of aircraft, but when you do that, if you do not dispose of other aircraft, you are significantly increasing your PO&M costs, and you are putting a drain on the capital budget, so then you have to ask, ``What am I giving up to achieve that capability?''
The Chairman: Would you explain what PO&M is?
Mr. Calder: Personnel operation and maintenance cost. Having strategic lift capability is good, but if we have that is it worth what we have to give up or displace, for example, if we have to move some other projects out? The previous government decided that it was sufficient to lease the Antonovs for the number of times we would use them, and that seemed to make sense in light of the budget.
We now have a new government, a new Parliament, and we are working on a defence policy. In a sense, everything is on the table, though a lot of those considerations would still apply. You have to look at it in terms of what you can afford.
Senator Banks: We had to stand in line waiting for some of those big planes to arrive, for our purposes. A fairly long list of people wanted access to them.
Mr. Calder: I am not aware of operations where we have tried to acquire strategic lift and it has not been available, or that we have been unduly delayed. That may have happened, but I do not recall that.
Senator Banks: Other senators asked you about the clean sheet of paper concept. If I understand correctly, you had a great deal to do with the 1994 white paper. I am not entirely cynical yet, but it is rather like the Russian Constitution in that if you look at it on paper it is absolutely terrific. If we had ever been able to do what the 1994 white paper said that we should have been able to do, and please correct me if I am wrong, we would all be much less unhappy, in some respects, than we are. The 1994 white paper said, for example, that we would be able to put a brigade in place and sustain it for a while. However, we have been unable to do that for a long time. I am told that we have even been unable to conduct exercises at the brigade level. How much faith can we have in a white paper or a green paper that states policy when we know that, in the past, we had a very good policy paper that was never implemented?
Mr. Calder: As you know, senator, from our previous discussions, I tend to be a little more optimistic or more positive than some of the critics. In many respects, the white paper was implemented and it was effective. However, even those of us involved in writing that paper recognize that we did not get it entirely right. We did not anticipate the number of operations that we would conduct abroad, their geographic scope and the need to put parcels of troops in a variety of different places, thus putting particular strain on the logistics. Our analysis of the problems that would arise in the 1990s was not entirely perfect, and it certainly underestimated the strain on individuals in the Canadian Forces and the degree to which that would push us to the thinness that Senator Atkins talked about.
In some respects policies become outdated simply because the circumstances change. Obviously, one hopes that we will get the analysis reasonably correct in the next paper. Of course, we also work on the assumption that the policy will be appropriately and properly funded.
Senator Banks: We all know the old saying about trying to plan the next war in the context of the last one because it is the only one we know. I have a terrible fear that is shared by others that we are not paying enough attention to the North and that a lot will happen in the North. Just by way of example, we have some boundary disputes in the North.
A great deal of international law, as I understand, is based on possession, occupation — how long people have been there. We cannot be there in a short time, but others can. Some have the capability of going, in the worst possible conditions, into areas that will fairly soon be in hot dispute because they are loaded with all kinds of resources. If someone else puts people there and builds a permanent establishment there and is able to justify it legally on the basis of possession by saying that they have been there for 10 years while Canadians have not — whether this is precisely military or not — we ignore that at our peril. If money were no object and we had enough to put ships, planes and people, not only military but also civilian, in the North, we could not do it for 10 years because of the time required to purchase, build and transport, as well as train the people.
I am asking for a response. In the paper that you are working on, I am hopeful that a critical and careful view will be taken of our surveillance capability, our presence, our enforcement of our sovereignty in the North and the questions of access to those waterways that we cannot currently contest, let alone protect.
Mr. Calder: You are absolutely right, senator. I would add to the considerations the issue of commercial air traffic over the North Pole, which is a new development. There is also the prospect of the Northwest Passage being opened up to shipping for a longer period of time, which could serve as an important route between Europe and China. Things are happening in the North that we have to consider.
I am not a lawyer, but my understanding is that our sovereignty over the land in the North is not contested, but it is contested over the passageways and so forth. That aside, one does have to be alert to this possibility.
Senator Banks: The contest I referred to was over the shelf that extends out from the north slope of Alaska and the question of the angle of the Alaska-Yukon border. You are right, that is not land, but there needs to be a presence in place.
Mr. Calder: We are talking about very large land, ocean and air areas. Quite frankly, you could put the entire Canadian Forces into the North and probably lose them, given the magnitude of the area. The challenge is to figure out the best and most effective way of pursuing our interests in the North that is affordable under the defence budget. Obviously, one wants to look at better techniques for surveillance.
Senator Banks: If we doubled the surveillance, we might be able to make as many as four surveillance flights per year.
Mr. Calder: Hopefully, technology will be of some assistance in that respect. Allow me to assure you that we are looking at this in the defence policy. I am not sure how it will come out, but that issue is on the table for consideration. Your concerns are shared by others who speak to me on these matters.
The Chairman: As a follow-up to Senator Banks' question, how closely do you work with the Coast Guard in respect of these issues? I realize the responsibility is split between the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Department of Transport. Their fleet is significantly older than the navy's fleet. Are they part of an ongoing review? Are you in consultation with them?
Mr. Calder: The Coast Guard is outside our bailiwick with respect to defence policy. However, work was done under the national security policy on marine security, which involves not only the navy but also the Coast Guard and the Department of Transport. There is an interdepartmental working group to deal with how those measures from the national security policy perspective are implemented.
The appropriate naval staff in the Department of Defence is, I understand, in intimate contact with both the Coast Guard and Transport Canada.
The Chairman: Earlier you were asked a question about threats and you said that global terrorism was the overarching one. You then gave examples of China, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, and North and South Korea. Could you describe how the Canadian Forces can have an impact on those areas of threat?
Mr. Calder: In those particular hot spots, if something were to go wrong, Canada, and probably the Canadian Forces, would be affected. I am not sure that the Canadian Forces can do anything at this time. It is possible that the foreign office may well be able to play a role in some of those areas, and obviously they do in working with the Indians and the Pakistanis. I am not sure there is a role for the Canadian Forces.
When dealing with failed and failing states there is a role for those states. What we are doing in Afghanistan is trying to help recreate a failed state.
The Chairman: Relate that to how someone living in Moose Jaw would understand how dealing with those threats that you listed or dealing with a failed state is a threat to that individual. How do you expect the average Canadian to perceive these as threats to their security and their safety?
Mr. Calder: Certainly before 9/11 it would have been impossible or a great challenge to argue to an average Canadian that the internal situation in Afghanistan was a direct threat to him or her. Post-9/11, where we have seen how al-Qaeda used Afghanistan and was in fact nurtured in Afghanistan, one can see that there is a direct relationship between Afghanistan as a failing state and what happened in 9/11, and what happened in 9/11 of course killed Canadians, as well as Americans and many other people. We have all learned a lesson.
A decade ago we dealt with failing or failed states, such as Somalia, for humanitarian purposes. I think we now have a new understanding that we cannot stand by and allow states to fail and do nothing about it, because they become breeding grounds for even greater difficulties.
The Chairman: With another colleague you talked about the European defence initiative. Do you believe that it will in fact increase European defence capabilities or are we seeing people just ``double hatting'' and not seeing any more boots on the ground?
Mr. Calder: The evidence does not support me particularly well in the sense that, over the life of the ESDP, with the exception of probably France and maybe the United Kingdom, defence expenditures in many European countries have been decreasing, but that does not necessarily mean they will continue to do that. I have been told by my European colleagues that, in most of the NATO European countries, it is much easier to get political support for a defence project or spending if it is put in a European context rather than in a NATO context. In that sense, my opposite numbers in Berlin, Paris or elsewhere would say this will improve European capabilities because it has more popular support in their countries.
The Chairman: Can you name an initiative where the European countries have managed to move forward without American leadership?
Mr. Calder: They have made progress in cooperating on lift, I believe, and some other areas.
The Chairman: Could you explain what you mean by ``lift?'' Could you be more precise?
Mr. Calder: The European Community is coming together and coordinating their air assets more effectively. They have also undertaken, as you know, to take over the peace support mission in Bosnia at the end of this year, so they will have the leadership there. They also had missions in the eastern Congo and Macedonia. They are in fact slowly but steadily proving that they can act without the Americans.
The Chairman: After Senator Nolin`s question you talked to us about NATO. Do you have concerns about the governance of NATO now that we have an enlarged organization? Can we expect to have the same set of rules, the same requirement for consensus or unanimity on NATO decisions in the future, or will we see an inner and outer NATO?
Mr. Calder: NATO is evolving. At NATO meetings there are now 26 representatives in attendance. That is having an impact on NATO, but it is too early to say what that impact will be because expansion was recent. The consensus rule does exist, that is, the formal rule inside NATO. However, only on rare occasions is it exercised. I would hope that with 26 countries it is not exercised often. There is an issue about how NATO is governed and will be governed in the future. From what I have seen from attending NATO meetings, particularly at the ministerial level, it is working effectively, but it is still a work-in-progress.
The Chairman: You spoke to the committee about a shift from Canada's historical expeditionary posture in terms of its defence capabilities, and you have talked about a need for some rebalancing towards the defence of North America. Could you talk to us a little more about that and what sort of rebalancing you see?
Mr. Calder: I should caveat that by saying that one would hope that this will not be at the expense of international operations which will remain important, although those decisions have yet to be made. There are areas, for example, follow-on actions in the national security policy with respect to marine security that may be worth pursuing within the defence context.
Other contributions could be made to make us more effective against terrorist attacks. I do not think I can go much beyond that because I would then get into dealing with the proposals that are on the table for the decisions of ministers.
The Chairman: Thank you. Senator Nolin, did you have a follow-up?
Senator Nolin: I will start on a note of optimism. You talked about the North, and my colleague Senator Banks raised a very important question about the North. Perhaps you have been in contact with your Norwegian colleague, but you will be interested to know that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, at a recent conference, talked about the sensitivity of the North, that the North is opening up and warming up, so that the route to Asia will be much more open for business. It will be interesting for you to be in touch with those people to see how they are dealing with that, in light of their own military forecasting.
My follow-up question deals with Afghanistan and the continuing conflict. Do you think that the training of our infantry and the equipment that we are providing to our infantry needs to be adapted, taking into consideration the lessons of Afghanistan?
Mr. Calder: This is not my field but, if you were to ask LGen. Hillier, for example, who has just returned, or MGen. Leslie, who was there, I think they would say yes to that question. In other words, as in any sort of operation like this, you do learn things that you did not know before. You encounter new experiences. As LGen. Hillier was explaining to us just a couple of days ago, in Afghanistan you are in an environment where you are operating in the midst of people, some of whom are your supporters and some of whom are your enemies and you cannot tell them apart. On one street corner you can be providing humanitarian assistance; on another street corner two blocks away you can be fighting someone.
I think that the army would tell you that, indeed, they have learned lessons in Afghanistan which they will incorporate and, as a result, they will be more effective.
Senator Nolin: The departments have undertaken a review in Europe. My underlying question is: To what extent are those lessons part of your thinking for the future?
Mr. Calder: A lot of those lessons are at a level of detail that we would be unlikely to get into in a policy paper, except at the highest level. However, that will not stop the army from going ahead and incorporating those lessons into their standard way of doing things.
Senator Nolin: Terrorism being the ultimate concern, is that the theatre of the future that we should be ready for? In proposing to your political masters a new framework, do you focus on the fact that that kind of theatre is the war of the future and that we should be prepared for that?
Mr. Calder: That is right, although you make me nervous when you put it quite that way. It relates to niche and specialization.
Senator Nolin: I tried not to use those words.
Mr. Calder: We have to be prepared to deal with future Afghanistan-type situations. We probably have to be prepared to be in Afghanistan for a significant number of years. I hesitate to say that is what we have to prepare for, because as soon as you say that, something else will come along. That is why we have always stressed, in defence policy, the requirement for general capabilities, for flexibility, for multi-purpose combat capability. You must be able to adapt.
For example, the situation we encountered in Afghanistan was different from the one we had in East Timor, and that was different from the one we encountered in Bosnia. You must ensure that your general principles are correct. You need to maintain flexibility, and then you hope the members of the Canadian Forces are smart enough to adapt. Quite frankly, so far they have demonstrated that they are pretty good at doing precisely that.
Senator Banks: My question has to do with the policy review you are now undertaking. In one of our reports we strongly questioned the wisdom of trying to devise a military policy in the absence of a clear foreign policy. To put it simply, if a country decides, as a long and distinguished list of countries has from time to time, whether by osmosis or the accidents of time and geography or whatever, that it is going to have an empire, then it must have a military force and make a commitment to it. Alternatively, a country may decide that it will be like Costa Rica and have no military force at all. Many choices can be made between those two extremes.
How much sense does it make to you to be undertaking military planning for expenditures, acquisitions, design, the very nature of what we do, in a vacuum as far as a clear policy is concerned? I am exaggerating slightly but not by much. This is not a chicken-and-egg question. Defence policy must, per force, follow on national foreign policy, must it not?
Mr. Calder: In part, I agree. What you say is true with respect to the international operations of the Canadian Forces. We are doing the international policy review in order to set an international framework.
Senator Banks: Will it come first?
Mr. Calder: It will either come out and it will be followed immediately by a defence paper, or it will come out and a defence paper will come later. It will not be the other way around. The idea is certainly that what we produce will derive from the international policy review, the principles therein, and the two should fit together in a seamless fashion.
I said that I agree with you in part because the Canadian Forces do have roles to play inside Canada. They provide aid to the civil power, humanitarian assistance, and so forth regardless of their foreign policy. We must always keep in mind the domestic requirements of the Canadian Forces as well as the international requirements. We must keep both in mind.
Senator Banks: I agree, but when you are designing the forces, and that is a given, aspects of it have to be guided by a clear foreign policy. Will we be peacemakers, peacekeepers or humanitarians, or will we make war?
Mr. Calder: One would hope that a foreign policy would give a sense of where in the world the Canadian Forces should operate, what kind of missions they should operate, for what purposes they should operate, because that makes it much easier for us to plan if those things are clear.
Senator Banks: It also makes it easier to plan the means by which we will get there.
The Chairman: On behalf of the committee, thank you Dr. Calder. Your testimony, as always, has been helpful. Our committee is off to a good start in its effort to review the role and activities of the Canadian Forces. We look forward to having you before us again.
Mr. Calder: Thank you.
The Chairman: If you have questions or comments, please visit our Web site by going to www.sen-sec.ca. We post witness testimony as well as confirmed hearing schedules. You may also contact the clerk of the committee at 1-800- 267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting members of the committee. This meeting is suspended and we will reconvene in the next room in camera in three minutes.
The committee continued in camera.