Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 3 - Evidence, November 22, 2004
OTTAWA, Monday, November 22, 2004
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 12:40 p.m. to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Good afternoon and welcome to the committee. My name is Colin Kenny; I am a senator from Ontario; and I chair the committee.
On my immediate right is the distinguished Senator Michael Forrestall from Nova Scotia. Senator Forrestall served the constituents of Dartmouth for the past 37 years, first as their member of the House of Commons, then as their senator. During his tenure in the House he served as parliamentary secretary to several cabinet ministers, including the Minister of Transport and the Minister of Regional Industrial Expansion.
On my far right is Senator Norman Atkins from Ontario. Senator Atkins came to the Senate in 1986 with more than 27 years in the field of communications. He is a former President of Camp Associates Advertising Limited and also served as an advisor to former Premier Davis of Ontario.
Beside him is Senator David Tkachuk from Saskatchewan. Senator Tkachuk was first appointed to the Senate in 1993 and is Deputy Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications. He has also served as Deputy Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, which tabled its important report on bank mergers, competition in the public interest and large bank mergers in Canada.
Beside him is Senator Tommy Banks. Senator Banks is well known to Canadians as one of our most versatile musicians and entertainers whose musical career spans over 50 years. He has received a Juno Award and is an Officer of the Order of Canada. He is the Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources and is the Chair of the Alberta Liberal caucus.
On my left is Senator Jane Cordy from Nova Scotia. Senator Cordy is an accomplished educator with an extensive record in community involvement, which includes serving as Vice-chair of the Halifax-Dartmouth Port Development Commission. She is also the Chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association.
Beside her is Senator Ione Christensen from Yukon. Senator Christensen is currently a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources.
During the last session of Parliament, this committee completed a number of reports beginning with Canadian Security and Military Preparedness. This study, tabled in February 2002, examined the major defence and security issues facing Canada. Then the Senate asked our committee to examine the need for a national security policy. To date, we have released five reports on various aspects of national security. First, the Defence of North America: a Canadian Responsibility tabled in September 2002; second, For an Extra $130 Bucks....Update on Canada's Military Financial Crisis, A View from the Bottom Up, tabled in November 2002; third, The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports, tabled in January 2003; fourth, Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, tabled in October 2003; and fifth, and most recently, National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines, tabled in March 2004.
The committee now turns its attention to a review of Canadian defence policy. During the next year, the committee will hold meetings in every province and engage with Canadians to determine their natural interests, what they see as Canada's principal threats and how they would like the government to respond. The committee will attempt to generate debate on national security in Canada and to forge a public consensus on the need for the military.
This afternoon's first witness is Mr. Patrick O'Donnell. Retired Lieutenant-General O'Donnell is currently the President of the Canadian Defence Industries Association, CDIA. In his last posting, he was Vice-chief of Defence Staff. Welcome to the committee, Mr. O'Donnell; please proceed.
Mr. Patrick J. (Paddy) O'Donnell, President, Canadian Defence Industries Association: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you as you begin to evolve your plans for the defence review. I am currently President of the Canadian Defence Industries Association and a business consultant in the security and defence sectors. I am also a former Vice-chief of the Defence Staff and, in fact, was serving in that capacity during the development and initial implementation of the 1994 White Paper on Defence. Thus, I am intensely interested in security and defence issues, both domestic and international. May I emphasize at the outset of this discussion how important I believe it is to get this review right, and how valuable a role this committee can play in achieving that objective.
Our defence association represents companies that generate about $7 billion annually on the sale of defence-related products and services, of which $2 billion is in exports, one-half of which go to the U.S. The association's mandate is to promote the interests and advancement of our domestic and industrial base. We do that through interactions with government agencies and the sponsoring of exhibitions and information forums. By definition, we are strong advocates for an increased national focus on security and defence.
As an introductory point of clarification, while much of our discussion today will apply to specifics of defence issues and of defence policy, all this detail is best framed in the broader context of national interests and the security derivatives of these national interests, within which the Canadian Forces have national and international roles. The importance of this flow-down construct cannot be overemphasized. An effective defence policy must be derived from clearly defined national and international security objectives and commitments. The essentials are clarity of defence objectives and commitment of adequate resources. That is, clarity in what the government wants the Canadian Forces to do in form and scale and assured funding to accomplish the mandate. Neither essential is currently being satisfied. Most crucially, the Canadian Forces is in constant financial crisis such that even the present modest scale of operational capability is not sustainable.
This is the current reality. To redress the situation, the Canadian Forces requires an immediate injection of operating funding of not less than $1 billion annually to forestall further erosion of current capacity. The defence policy review process must be accelerated to enable identification of, and transition to, a redefined force model. I would emphasize that the $1-billion increase that I have cited would be supplementary to the promised funding for the additional 5,000 regulars and 3,000 reservists proposed by the government.
I have a few points related to the framing of the defence review. First, the key elements of the review framework or process are: defining national interests in foreign affairs, economics, security, et cetera — the panoply of national engagement; assessing, or more accurately risk analyzing, the future global security environment; and deriving the corresponding defence priorities and policies for domestic security and for contributing to international peace and stability. Second, the federal government must own the review's outcome. That is, defence policy and its application are not solely or uniquely Department of National Defence issues. Third, while we may have unique national issues to deal with, in general, security is a globally shared pursuit. Our domestic security framework must recognize that we share continental security challenges with the United States. In parallel, we must dramatically increase our contribution to international peace and stability if we wish to contribute our fair share, and have global influence.
Fourth, the review must principally focus on the “what” of future defence capability rather than the details of “how.” The debate on specific equipment solutions will divert focus from the crucial larger framing issues of “what.”
Fifth, the quality of our defence solutions would be significantly enhanced by the fuller integration of defence capabilities with complementary national capacities. I make specific reference to the capabilities of Canada's industrial sector, which should be more directly incorporated into security and defence planning.
As you begin the review, and in the absence of any further government clarification or direction, I recommend that the review be framed by the following assumptions and principles:
First, domestic security should be markedly improved, and policy and solutions should be closely coordinated with the United States; the Canadian Forces roles in domestic security should be specifically defined and incrementally funded.
Second, Canada's international intervention capability will be increased commensurate with our relative wealth and our ambition that Canada has a recognized influence in international affairs. For the Canadian Forces, this translates into adequately sized, combat-capable, interdependent — that is land, sea and air — capabilities for stabilization and post-stabilization operations.
Third, interoperability with allies, especially with the U.S. and the United Kingdom, should be the governing criterion for operational capability.
Finally, prioritization and risk management should be the dominating criteria for defence decision-makers, to forestall further capability erosion and to efficiently transition to the future force structure.
In closing, CDIA will remain an aggressive proponent of increased priority for security and defence. In the defence review, we have a rare opportunity to re-establish the capabilities and international credibility of the Canadian Forces, and we and our association look forward to providing whatever assistance we can to your committee.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, general. Our first questioner is Senator Forrestall.
Senator Forrestall: There is something about the mid-90s that clicks back into my mind; it was another point in history when we were embarking upon somewhat similar work to that which we are endeavouring to get underway here today.
It started with that 1994 effort, probably one of the first in-depth opportunities that Canadians and a joint committee had to participate in the development policy, other than the floor of the House of Commons and some very articulate speeches made in the Senate and elsewhere. It was an opportunity, I think you would agree, for Canadians of all walks of life to participate.
Having said that, most people would tend to agree that as useful a white paper as that was, it certainly was underfunded and did not allow the full development of the policy's recommendations.
Do you agree with that generally? If so, what kind of policy should we pursue now and how do you reconcile it with the availability of resources?
Mr. O'Donnell: I agree with your overall assessment of the process for the 1994 white paper, and the reality that we did not fund the paper in order to enable us to actually deliver the capabilities against the model that we described in the document. I think the process was a sound one.
It is one of the reasons that it is so important at the outset of this review that we actually frame the process adequately from the beginning. That is, base the final defence solution on clarification of our national interest and analysis of the security environment, and then drill down into the specifics of what that should be translated into by way of security and defence capabilities.
It must be a process that is owned by government. I think what happened in the 1994 white paper, it was a period of tremendous transition in military requirements in the intelligence environment. We were also going through some dramatic changes nationally in trying to reconcile them and balancing the budget. All of that to say that we early on lost focus on the actual implementation of the paper. Clearly, the most significant detrimental factor was the reality that we did not fund it from virtually day one. This time, what we have to do is get government ownership, buy-in to whatever the solution will be, and force the reality of payment for the implementation.
Senator Forrestall: Should we pursue this until such time as we have a public look at external policy?
Mr. O'Donnell: I think we must. I do not think that we can do otherwise.
Senator Forrestall: There is no point in delaying?
Mr. O'Donnell: I do not believe there is. We can make an adequate assessment to the degree that we need what the future environment will look like across this security spectrum that we used to call, the “conflict spectrum.” In the event that Canada has stated an ambition to play a larger role internationally, we can define the parameters with sufficient accuracy that we can get on with the job. The most urgent requirement is for us to legitimize the defence solutions that the government wants the Canadian Forces to be able to conduct.
Senator Forrestall: Would that include, for example, the maintenance of combat-capable forces, or is it perhaps time that we should rethink that and look more at a soft array?
Mr. O'Donnell: If I take you through in large blocks, these are the elements of the future capability that have to be addressed. First, looking through the prism of the spectrum of security, where at one end you have peace and stability, and then with degrees of unrest we roll through an era of deterrence, and should that fail you get into combat, combat capability, post-combat operations and stabilization, this is the general background that you make your security assessments against.
Then there are two major components of the defence solution. The first is the homeland defence, the domestic defence piece. As I indicated earlier, to me that is a continental problem as opposed to strictly a national Canadian program. You have the homeland defence piece which, through the national security policy and the formation of the new public security and emergency preparedness department, we have the beginnings of structure to be able to do that more effectively. This is the cannot-fail part of the security and defence solution. You have to be able to provide that homeland defence capability.
The second major element is the contribution to international peace and stability; the form and scale of what Canada can contribute to global stability and should that fail, to global combat capability, post-war reconstruction, et cetera. We have the two pieces; the homeland defence and the international intervention capability.
We have those two theatres if you will, homeland and abroad intervention, and then there are two major activity pieces that will govern your capability. The first of those is the surveillance and monitoring of what is going on domestically and across the planet. This is intelligence-gathering, monitoring, interaction with allies, and ensuring that you have an understanding of the global security environment. The second phase is the actual response capability to what you are monitoring.
We have the homeland defence and the international intervention capability in two different domains, one being the monitoring and the second being responding to whatever is happening.
In the homeland defence the combat capability, except in certain specialized fields, does not play a large factor. It is much more striking in the international intervention capability where you have the full continuum of operations; at the low end of conflict, other government departments policing that type of activity and, at the far end of that, you have the heavy combat operations.
We have to select the place on that continuum that Canada can add value to these international issues as they arise. In my own view, that does demand robust combat-capable forces, with interdependence amongst the land, sea and air elements. I do not think it is realistic to forecast that we would be capable of doing all the activities at the high end of the heavy-war capabilities, and that capability is best epitomized or identified by the capability of the United States forces, but somewhere slightly below that, where we can integrate and provide value-added combat capability, I remain committed to that requirement.
Senator Forrestall: There is $1.5 billion earmarked by government for capital expenditures over the next few years. Would you care to comment, against your background of work with defence industries, on whether that will cope with our need for destroyer replacement and F18 replacement? Incidentally, just this past couple of days, we saw the capabilities of a new aircraft. It was unimaginable really. Whether that is a game we can play in until we have 150 million or 200 million people to pay for it, I really do not know, but in the practical sense, what we must recommend must be consistent with our understanding of what the country can afford, and what in fact will do a credible job for us.
I welcome your comments as to whether we can cope with a Sea King replacement, whether we can cope with a replacement for the Athabasca and whether we can cope with a new long-range heavy lift. You know what we want and need better than I. Do you have any comments about that?
Mr. O'Donnell: Clearly, that level of recapitalization is not adequate to actually transition the forces to the new environment.
Senator Forrestall: How far short?
Mr. O'Donnell: Without defining specific equipment sets or solutions, it will vary depending on where we decide we will be on this continuum of capability. If we plan to replace our current general capability, which is to a medium-high level of combat value-added and interoperable with our allies, it is multibillions more spread over time.
There is not any set number that you want to offer up for next year or the year after, but if we are to sustain the current level of capability that we would have if we were adequately funding the current naval capability, air capability and land capability, and to recapitalize and maintain the quality and value of those contributions, you are looking at an increase in the overall budget in the area of 30 to 40 per cent over five to six years. It would take you at least that long to make the transition.
Senator Forrestall: Short of deploying the Halifax Rifles to take on a costly aspect of homeland defence, I share your concern about the inadequacy of funding. Thank you for being with us.
Senator Banks: I want to go back to what Senator Forrestall asked. We have had misgivings about this. In fact one of our recommendations in a previous report was that before we should start looking at defence capabilities, and a review, that there should be first a review of our foreign policy. You suggest in your remarks today that we should undertake defining national interests, including foreign affairs and economic security, et cetera. That does not fall within our purview.
This is the same question in a way that Senator Forrestall asked, but I am asking for some comfort in that you think we know enough about what Canada's foreign policy either is or ought to be for us to devise recommendations now on what our defence capabilities ought to be. Am I getting you correctly there?
Mr. O'Donnell: In the best of all possible worlds, the sequencing would be exactly as you define it and as I indicated earlier on, the clarification and identification of national interests, which then leads to a structured approach to defining the security dimension and thereby the Canadian Forces' capability. The urgency of the requirement to begin the transition demands that in the absence of that type of formulation we ought to be moving out in advance.
I am satisfied you can reach the eightieth percentile of confidence that you can forecast the capabilities that will provide value-added. That is predicated on an assessment that we are going to do the homeland security piece to the level that it needs to be done, and that we will contribute to international capabilities with a force of enough value in their operating capability, enough size that we can operate and be identified as owning a particular capability, much as we did in Afghanistan.
If you make the assumption, as certainly all recent indications are, that the government wants to increase our role and the recognition of Canada as a country of influence in international affairs, then that, by itself, defines a certain scale of contribution to be made. Whether it is a robust combat-capable force as opposed to a policing type of institution, is the only discriminator. That is a challenge.
Senator Banks: Is that not a fairly significant question?
Mr. O'Donnell: It is, but my response is that a better course for us to take is the provision of combat capable value-added operational capability. There certainly will be arguments built for the other type of capability, that Canada can contribute by being a post-stabilization policing force and focus on democratization and reconstruction. There certainly is international value in that.
Senator Banks: It cannot realistically be the kind of force you are talking about if you do not have hard, pointy-edge combat capability. Is that not true?
Mr. O'Donnell: That is true if you accept the scenario that you can be part of the force that does the stabilizing, as opposed to the post-stabilizing, absolutely. In my view we would want to retain the capability to participate in the stabilizing solution, and that does require a robust combat-capable force. That is, by the way, what we do and what our historical traditions have enabled us to do.
Senator Banks: You are right. We have to rush in to fill the gap. We must do that because it is long past due, but I am terribly concerned that we do not go; ready, fire, aim. That is backwards.
My second question has to do with your later interest and the objectivity that you bring to this question as a result of your involvement now with defence industries. In the past, this committee has made visits to respective aspects of the Canadian Forces and has been given reasons for concern about the acquisition process, the procurement process. We have heard both ends of the stick; that it is important for economic and other reasons that we should design and build the things that the forces need in Canada. We have done some of that with great success.
We have also heard that we would obtain great efficiencies by buying “off the shelf” from people who are much bigger than we are and, therefore, taking advantage of huge economies of scale. What should we do?
Mr. O'Donnell: First of all, if at some time I am making an observation that is reflecting the defence industries' view I will state that. Primarily, I am giving you my professional opinion on the future requirements, et cetera.
Senator Banks: We rely heavily on your objectivity.
Mr. O'Donnell: Thank you for that. You have asked several sub-questions inside this larger one. As an association, and, indeed in my own professional capacity and as a consultant, I do not think you would find our industry driving the government towards uneconomic proposals for acquisition. We would never argue that we have to build everything here in Canada because there is a factor of scale, and if you are not producing enough, the economic case is not there.
We would argue for, and have been supportive of, offshore procurements that have an economic benefit returned to Canada. We do that through what we call the Industrial and Regional Benefit (IRB) Programs. We do not want to distort natural economic business cases. We would argue that you should have this benefits package and, in addition to that, you should be able to support the capabilities that you are buying.
Our support and arguments are all predicated on business cases, the economics of it. If we are on the margin and we think we can sustain a certain long-term capability industrially, then we would argue that you do it internally. However, we would not distort the normal marketplace to do that.
Senator Banks: All things being equal we should buy Canadian but if not, it is all right, in the view of your association, to go outside?
Mr. O'Donnell: Yes. When it does not make economic sense, we would go outside.
Senator Cordy: Mr. O'Donnell, I was interested in your answer to the procurement. In fact, that was going to be one of my first questions because certainly we have heard both sides of the issue from people who have appeared before us.
You mentioned that the federal government must own the review's outcome. You touched on this when you were speaking with Senator Forrestall and you said that whatever agreements we come to it must be funded from the beginning. Could you expand on what you mean?
Mr. O'Donnell: The consequence of the process in all of the dynamics related to the immediate aftermath of the 1994 White Paper on Defence meant that it was rather stillborn. We had a reasoned process to define the capability. Circumstances were changing so rapidly that we never did actually accept that as the capability model, if you will. Certainly, we would not have developed the model we did, had we been aware that we would see the massive reductions in funding that were going to occur. Some of that we forecast because it was let known to us that there would be reductions. We partially tried to compensate for that by making reference to the opportunities for the off-the-shelf, accepting the good-enough as opposed to the perfect, and a substantial increase in commercial support but even all of those activities were not enough. We lost the focus on the paper and the funding was never adequate to actually deliver it.
This time I am suggesting that you are better not to go through the process if you are going to put it on a shelf or lob it across to DND and say, that is your problem now. If we are saying that the Canadian Forces have to be capable of providing this type of value-added capability for international operations, then the Canadian Forces comes back and defines this is what it takes by way of land, sea, air capabilities, surveillance and all of the interaction of intelligence agencies. This is what it takes; this is what it will cost. In fact, this has all been done up front. You present the government with options, hopefully, and it picks one that it believes is consistent with the national interest and that it is willing to pay for.
Senator Cordy: When we look back, the reality is that when these things were not being carried through and when the funding was cut from the military, aside from the people directly involved in the military, the general public really did not raise a hue and cry about that. The reality is that since 9/11, people are indeed becoming, I believe, more complacent and saying it is over and done with and do we really have to spend that much money on military? The priorities in the last election were issues like health care, child care, and education. The military was not in the forefront and minds of the general public.
If we are to take hold of a review and carry through on the recommendations of a review, politics being what it is, if you have the population behind you and pushing that agenda, then in fact politicians will react to that. How do we get the public to get rid of the complacency and say that, indeed, defence issues should be a priority among Canadians?
Mr. O'Donnell: I would state a very personal opinion here. Fundamentally, I believe that security and defence are really leadership issues. I do appreciate it makes it much easier for a government to take a stance if they have the massive groundswell of public opinion behind it. Because peace, stability, economic development, and social ease are all subsets to security, security is a primordial responsibility of government. It is up to the government to actually lead the debate as opposed to responding to what they perceive as the public mood.
If I were to offer a criticism of the Canadian public, it is simply that if we all understand how urgent security and defence are, as part of government policies and priorities, then why do we not insist on very explicit, defined, explained, approaches to security and defence by governments, particularly during elections? The population is influenced by a whole variety of other factors. They also, I believe, make the assumption that because the government keeps telling me they understand that security is a primordial function of government, that somehow or other it is being looked after. Fundamentally, they are doing what they really believe basically they have to do, and so we can deal with these, we can pressure for these other issues.
The expectation is the government will be looking after my security, because that is what they say is their primordial function. I keep turning this back on to the government. They are in the position to do the global assessments of national interest. They are in the position to acquire the intelligence forecasts, the estimates on the future options for China, for Russia, how the international global blocks will be forming, how an asymmetrical conflict could be developing. In my view, it is the government that should be leading, as opposed to following, the whole debate on what the security capability has to be.
The Chairman: Your suggestion is that political leadership is lacking and that it is the responsibility of political leaders on this particular issue to get out in front and say, “Follow me.” Clearly, that has not been happening.
What advice do you have to the political leaders when they are getting out front in terms of how they should explain it to the average Canadian? How do you explain to the baker in Winnipeg or to the automaker in Windsor what they should be concerned about? The average Canadian, if I may, seems to sit there and say, “We have a big ocean in the west, a big ocean in the east, a lot of snow in the north, and a friend in the south. So what is my problem?” Average Canadians are pretty intelligent about this, do not appear to see much vulnerability right now and do not necessarily see how their involvement or additional expenditures would result in having a better life.
How would you advise these political leaders that have been missing the boat? In your response to Senator Cordy, you suggested we could solve it all if we got a few politicians off the dime and doing their job; help these guys out or gals out. What would you have them say?
Mr. O'Donnell: I am being very careful with my language. I am not trying to isolate any particular government or period of time.
The Chairman: It has been a problem for a long time.
Mr. O'Donnell: Yes, it has, and it is not unique to Canada. The reality is that the population is intelligent enough to make assessments and to make judgments, but it must be an informed public. The difficulties associated with all of the analysis that must go on and then the trade-off in the national-interest matrix that has to happen, in my view, are analyses, discussions and decisions to be taken by the government leadership and explained. Perhaps you can offer options, if you will.
I am suggesting that the cabinet, the Prime Minister and the government leadership have to seize the initiative, identify the various scenarios and then explain their rationale for the particular course of action they take. The Canadian public will understand that. Frequently, the Canadian public becomes confused because of the different messages that different associations and parties might present. There is such an enormity of difference in the types of approaches that are taken, that, without that overall architecture as to what the actual situation is and how that decision will be undertaken, it is understandable that the population would rather focus on other aspects.
Let me go back to what I said earlier. There is an innate assumption that the government will look after my security as a baseline, so if the government is not demanding additions, we probably do not need them. I do not think there is a magic answer. We have to raise the level of information that is available to the Canadian public, but clearly, when we are at the stage in our assessment of what Canada's role will be internationally over the next decades, the initiative has to come from the centre.
Senator Forrestall: Speaking with your industry hat, do we have the capability to build in this country those technological advances that we have identified as being the wherewithal that we need to be helpful and useful? Can we do it here in Canada, or are we in a position now, where, in order to enjoy Canadian benefit, we have to import foreign technology?
Mr. O'Donnell: It is a combination. We have some excellent capabilities, for example, communication systems and integration. We are probably world leaders in underwater acoustics. In some areas, we have international leadership and renowned expertise. In other areas, there are things we do not do. We do not build tanks or radars. There is not enough volume of activity to sustain an industrial base activity.
Senator Forrestall: Does that include shipbuilding?
The Chairman: Senator Forrestall, these are not supplementary questions. It is a second round you are after. The question was how to motivate the public from Senator Cordy, but we have you down for the second round.
Senator Forrestall: Sneak the answer in!
The Chairman: Senator Cordy, you have the floor.
Senator Cordy: What do you think about removing combat capabilities from the military, for example, CF-18s? I have heard recently that for future military needs, perhaps, we do not need submarines. Should we continue to have everything we have currently?
Mr. O'Donnell: You have heard me argue the case earlier on. We have to maintain robust combat-capable forces. Looking to the future, certainly, we will see many differences in how we deliver specific effects. We may not have the same technologies engaged in the future as we do now to deliver a weapon to a site with a certain degree of precision. One has to focus on the final effect of that combat capability, defensive and offensive, and look to the future technologies to determine how those could be achieved, and how that capability fits into the overall recapitalization and force modelling.
Starting with the assumption that combat-capable forces are something that Canada should maintain, because they provide added value to the stabilization capability and deterrence, it then becomes a matter of the capabilities and the technologies that are evolving that fit our model, which would be a modest but capable future force. It then has to be bound with the realities of the budget, so it will be all about prioritization.
If we accept that Canada will have a higher profile in international intervention operations, and we will be capable of sustaining 2,500 to 3,000 soldiers abroad with the required air and naval capabilities to sustain them, we have to determine which comes first, and then build the funding priorities on that priority model.
First, we define what it is, and I would argue that we want to maintain combat capability. Then we look to what will provide the best capability, and it will be modest still, but it will be value-added; work the model as to how to get there, and then prioritize the funding to get the high-value capabilities first.
Senator Atkins: I will follow along on Senator Forrestall's question. Can you give me examples of military equipment we can manufacture in this country economically that we could not get elsewhere for less cost?
Mr. O'Donnell: Part of that answer is related to the type of industrial relationships that you are working with. If, for example, we have determined that in the future we will need a certain capability in a vehicle or in a truck, by way of illustration, which we do, whether or not we produce that truck in Canada is based on the pure economics of the business case. If it will cost us twice as much to establish a factory to go into a limited production, which is not sustainable, then we would not do it.
If, however, your buy becomes part of a larger international buy and you strike a relationship with a U.S. or U.K. producer, for example, and in order to provide a global capability the producer is willing to set up production in Canada, which then makes it economic because you have a higher volume, you go ahead and make that decision. The decision is made on pure business-case merits, which is what businessmen do.
We have had a great influx of European countries coming to Canada to establish footprints. Boeing, L-3 and Raytheon are looking at expanding operations in Canada, predicated on either production or support capabilities in Canada. The market is not just domestic; it is continental and global. When these decisions are taken, it is a simple numbers exercise as to how many and how much and whether we can produce it at a competitive price.
Some things we do and others we do not. We do extremely well in some products and services that we can sell internationally. In others, we do not even attempt to do the actual production but we do the support.
Senator Atkins: Do we sell them internationally?
Mr. O'Donnell: Yes, we do. One of our general success stories is General Dynamics, which builds radio systems that they just sold through Bowman to the United Kingdom. We are certainly experts at integration. General Dynamics Land Systems produces the light armoured vehicle in London, which is a central production point for an international market.
There are many of these and there are niche sectors. Oerlikon, for example, does massive exercises in systems integration, as does Lockheed. There are a wide variety of capabilities.
I would focus on the fact that we do not do this to force distortions in the procurement process. Those business decisions are taken on the pure economics of the competitive marketplace.
Senator Atkins: Since the white paper in 1994, the government has basically flat-lined its budget for national defence. It has only been in the last year or so that there has seemed to be some increase in addressing the demand for upgrading equipment.
Do you think it is possible that we can catch up from 1994 to provide the kind of equipment necessary for a general capability? Do you think we could ever do that?
Mr. O'Donnell: I think we can, but it will take commitment and dollars. I would not go back to the 1994 model. We are attempting to look to the future and come up with a forecast of how we will get to this new force structure that I have been talking about.
I think the government would argue in absolute terms that they have over the last two or three budgets provided incremental funding to the Department of National Defence, and there is a promise that there will be more coming, certainly at a minimum to fund the additional 5,000 regulars and 3,000 reservists in the near term.
However, it has not been enough to forestall the deterioration in the capability of the executives in the department who are trying to manage in this rather desperate cash flow situation, and certainly of the field troops who are still delivering extremely effectively what we are tasking them to do.
Yes, it is recoverable. I am not one of those who believes it is hopeless. It will require an injection of sustainment money and then a period, based on the outcome of the review process and the determination of what we will do, of substantial injection of ramp-up money to get into the next cycle.
It is doable. I am not one of those who would suggest that the air force and the army will be gone in X number of years and the whole situation is irredeemable. I do not agree with that at all. It will take a massive injection of funding, but primordially it must be based on an assessment of what we want the Canadian Forces to do for us in the longer term.
Senator Atkins: The problem is persuading the Canadian public that they should support the injection of funds required to bring the military up to the level it should be at.
Mr. O'Donnell: We have to make it clear to the Canadian public that the Canadian Forces has to be capable of contributing to international operations at the same time as improving our domestic defence capability. We will concede that we have let the capability erode, but we have to make it clear to the Canadian public that we cannot let it deteriorate further. We have to take it back to, at minimum, the level at which we were able to operate a decade ago, and perhaps even move forward. I think the Canadian public would accept that reality if it were articulated with the right focus.
Our security is dependent on global security. Our domestic security is dependent on continental security. We can do one of two things. We can withdraw and hope that disaster does not strike; rely on someone else to look after us; or we can, as a relatively wealthy nation, have the ambition to play a role in the world as a moderating force, as a proponent of international solutions to democratization, et cetera. If we are to achieve that ambition, it will cost money. We see turmoil every day on the television, and the full likelihood is that this will continue. What will the defence and security environment be in the next 20 or 30 years? Will we be passive, sit back and wait to see what happens, or will we aggressively participate in ensuring that we can control the future environment?
If it is expressed in those terms, I think that the Canadian public will accept that we have to take a substantial slice off the top before we get into the social programs and the other funding priorities that governments have. We need this insurance policy, but it is more than that. I believe it is a national obligation to do more. We are a major beneficiary of stability. We are a trading nation, and we ought to be doing more to provide the global stability that our own security depends on.
I think you can articulate that argument to the Canadian public and I think they would accept it, but it cannot be presented as it frequently is, as a trade-off between defence and daycare, between defence and health services. It is not. The defence and security slice comes right off the top. This is the precondition for all those other activities, and that is the way it must be forcefully expressed.
Senator Atkins: I agree with that, but when we published our first report with the recommendation of increasing our military to 75,000 personnel and injecting $4 billion, the reaction was interesting. In my perception, not only was the military establishment somewhat reluctant to give us any support on this but also the public thought it was outrageous.
Mr. O'Donnell: That is why I deliberately avoided talking about specific capabilities or equipment sets. The argument is best framed as: If A, then B; if B, then C. It must begin with the appreciation by the Canadian public that this is important and that the government realizes it is important, rather than leaping into the middle and saying that the number is $4 billion with 75,000 personnel and 15 of these and 47 of those. It is more a necessity to clarify the options that are out there by way of the capability and the effects that you want to deliver. Then, if we agree that Canada is to have a combat-capable force that is capable of providing value-added solutions to international operations, we can build into the models the different options for the various capabilities that the force must have and then walk through the logic flow.
I am not one of those that believe there is any magic in the figures of 60,000 or 75,000 or 102,000 regular-force people uniformed. Rather, we have to look at what capabilities we want to deliver and what methodologies we have to deliver. In fact, looking ahead one or two decades, perhaps the number might be fewer than 50,000 but you could deliver more capability. I digress but I think that it was as much in how we presented it as the content that was presented. There is always much friction if specific figures are put in at the outset of an argument.
The Chairman: Mr. O'Donnell, the report to which Senator Atkins refers did not put specific numbers at the outset. Rather, it said that if you wanted to meet the obligations set out in the white paper, then you needed funding that was $4 billion greater than that and you needed to have 75,000 effectives. The issue was that if the government wanted to proceed with that tempo, then it would have to think in those numbers. The government was proceeding with the tempo but it was not funding appropriately to do that. The committee described what it believed was appropriate funding if the government chose to remain that adamant.
Mr. O'Donnell, the issue was not that we were trying to pick a figure. Rather it was that the committee was addressing both the white paper of 1994 and the tempo of operations that the government had insisted on by sending out Canadian Forces to a number of places. The committee examined the tempo of operations in light of the white paper and concluded that if the government were to take that direction then it would need to increase its spending by $4 billion and it would need to increase its personnel to 75,000 effective from the low-50,000 effective. Do you have a comment on that?
Mr. O'Donnell: In the earlier question, you referred to the lack of support that was generated in response to your committee report.
The Chairman: Our message was either cut back or fund up.
Mr. O'Donnell: I think the general message was understood. What happened is that people like to focus on numbers; they like to drill down into what they think they know. My recommendation would be to take advantage of the fact that we did not get the take-up from the previous reports. This time, we should do it in a very structured fashion with the definition of the “what” and the costing for those, and if that is what it is, these are the estimates of what it will take to do it.
The crucial thing is the identification of what it is we will be doing. A number of $4 billion, which is a 30-per-cent increase in the budget, would be the amount. There is a lot of disagreement regarding what the forces number actually would have to be in order to continue or improve capability. Without the framing of the rationale for the $4 billion, and why it is 75,000 as opposed to 92,000 or 65,000, just degenerated into a lot of discussion about the specifics of elements of the proposal.
I am suggesting that as well as the actual message itself, we need a communications plan that will ensure that we control the messages and the explanations for how it was derived and what we are attempting to attain with it.
Senator Christensen: To develop a defence policy, we have to know and to have a view of the defence needs that we have. Certainly, to determine that, we have to know what the threats are that we must defend against.
In your view, what would be the most critical defence threat that Canada would face today that would have to justify our policy and our policy development?
Mr. O'Donnell: Certainly, the most dramatic change from the period that we developed the white paper in is the evolution of what they refer to as the “asymmetrical threat,” where you have a disproportionate capability relative to the resources you are putting to it. The likelihood is, that type of warfare or conflict or tension situation will continue. In addition to that, where we had over decades evolved forces capable of massive field operations and deployments, we are now into areas of urban conflict. You put your finger on absolutely the $1 million question, namely, what is the future threat environment? It is extremely difficult to predict with a high degree of accuracy. You can only go with your best, 70- to 80-per-cent forecast of what it would likely be. There is always the danger that you guessed wrong, and so you have committed to the wrong solutions.
The anti-terrorism operational scenarios that we are going through now will continue for the near term. At the same time, we will have to wrestle with the significance of the future global blocks that will evolve and what their national interest might define by way of security threats. Then you build a model that, given your resource base, provides the maximum, the optimum you can in defence in those scenarios.
You have the asymmetrical threats, that anti-terrorism scenario will continue in the near term; you have this myriad of international hot spots wherein we will be called upon to conduct stabilization operations, et cetera. There is nothing magic in what I am saying; you will see somewhat a continuation of what we have been experiencing over the past few years. The difference is in the evolution of the solutions to actually be successful in those operations.
Senator Christensen: In the third point in your presentation, you mention the shared continental security challenges with the United States. Given our present-day capabilities, what role could Canada foreseeably play if a decision is made to participate with the United States in the missile defence program?
Mr. O'Donnell: We could spend a whole separate session on ballistic missile defence. On a commercial level, there are industrial opportunities that you would undertake as a consequence of economic benefits and unique capabilities that Canada would have. There are opportunities for ground installations; there are data fusion centres; there is a wide variety of capabilities that will be required in this overall solution.
However, right now there still is not the finalization of what this Ballistic Missile Defence System, BMDS, solution will look like, so it is not practical to try to anticipate with a high degree of accuracy the precise roles, functions and missions that you could be performing. I think the step-by-step approach to identification, and then what it is we will be doing, what BMDS actually comprises and what Canada's roles ought to be in it, is what we must be focusing on — and we are now.
It is clear that there will have to be ground installations, data centres, distribution — that brings in a whole panoply of different types of technologies for data-gathering transmission, intelligence assessments and that type of thing. That is in addition to more hardware solutions that will have to evolve. We have niche industrial capabilities that can contribute to those final solutions. Much of our opportunity will be predicated on whether or not we are actually participating in the program, and to some degree, to what extent.
Senator Christensen: Do you see those on Canadian soil?
Mr. O'Donnell: I think we could; if you look at the larger construct of what BMDS is, there would be advantages to having capabilities on Canadian soil. There are different types of capabilities; some relatively passive while others could be more active. There are alternatives to virtually all these options. We will be able, as a nation, to pick those types of activities that would be consistent with how we want to participate.
Senator Tkachuk: I will follow up a bit on Senator Christensen's questions and then I have a couple of my own.
I understand terrorist threats. What are asymmetrical threats?
Mr. O'Donnell: The traditional conflict scenarios would have you looking at forces of equal capabilities, for example, offensive and defensive operations — brigade, battalion, division-size forces opposing one another in various operational scenarios. Asymmetrical means that you could have, with a very limited offensive capability, extremely disruptive capability disproportional to the actual resources you will have to spend on your offensive capability. There is no symmetry between the offensive capability that you can launch and the defensive capability needed to forestall it.
Senator Tkachuk: Would that be a rogue nation such as North Korea planting a small bomb in the CN Tower and blowing it up?
Mr. O'Donnell: That kind of thing, or what we call a minor surface vessel with a launch capability that could create havoc; and that is a consequence of the technology in the munitions capabilities today. You do not need the same scale of resource commitment to the offence that you had to previously.
Senator Tkachuk: Are we concerned, then, more with countries that just want to destroy a particular culture or society? With the Russians it was always either predicated on the fact that we thought they wanted world domination. They were slowly inching their way, we had a policy of containment and we had NATO and later the United Nations. Now is it just because, for whatever reason — I have no idea any more than al-Qaeda — countries would behave the same way as these rogue organizations?
Mr. O'Donnell: It is for individuals and groups rather than the countries per se, but it is all of that for which we are building future defence capability to control. We do have these asymmetrical threats that are focused on the terrorism scenarios and the amount of damage that can be done by small groups with munitions of extremely potent capability.
While that is a major factor, particularly in how we approach homeland defence, we do have the more traditional conflict situations in these various regions, the destabilization that is occurring by nation. There are different scenarios that you will actually have to build defence capabilities for which to make a contribution.
Senator Tkachuk: If we formed NATO to protect ourselves from what was perceived as the threat of the Soviet Union, how do we fit our policy goals and our defence build-up into that? Do we have general agreement on who are our enemies, in NATO and the United Nations? Even though Canada and the United States may have a difference of opinion on where to take on the terrorists, we both agree that they are coming to get us and, therefore, we have to prepare and be organized. How do we fit in with NATO and the United Nations on that?
Mr. O'Donnell: You are right in that we would have agreement on the types of threats that we are facing. We have to come up with integrated solutions to containing or forestalling. The first issue happens to be the gathering of intelligence data, what I referred to earlier on as the monitoring and surveillance. You would want to ensure that — we call them in military terms the C4ISR; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, command and control, et cetera — we have created systems that are actually interoperable and that we have the political will to exchange the kind of data that we need. This is step one in your defence against these asymmetrical threats and the terrorism risk.
As we build this future-forces model, and we as Canadians, when a decision is made about the scale of participation in the forum, we will have to ensure that we understand how much of this we will acquire that Canada will actually fund independently, and second, but probably on a larger scale, what we will buy into to share internationally. We want to ensure we have intelligence systems that are interactive and interoperable with the U.S., the United Kingdom, NATO, et cetera.
That is at the heart of controlling these situations; the emphasis on intelligence gathering, distribution, all of the data fusion, and probably the most awkward part is the interpretation of all of this, timely interpretation. There is a tremendous amount of energy and resource commitment to resolving that problem.
Senator Tkachuk: Should we still spend money on peacekeeping? Should we see that as part of this or should we just get rid of it?
Mr. O'Donnell: There is a definitional issue here. People look at peacekeeping from various perspectives and it means different things to different people. In the forces we refer more to peace making if what we are talking about is making a contribution to stabilizing a situation and then, after it is stabilized, to help in the reconstruction, rebuilding and democratization. Clearly there is a role for that.
Senator Tkachuk: Such as Afghanistan.
Mr. O'Donnell: Such as Afghanistan, which we did superbly and it is a recommendable model for the near-term as we come to grips with what our priorities should be for the international intervention piece I have talked about. There is huge demand, there is never enough of this capability and we do it superbly. That is exactly a working model to base an analysis of what it takes, what resources will have to be committed in order to be able to do those jobs well.
However, I would not refer to that under the classic definition of “peacekeeping” which is more, I think, in the minds of people related to the 20 or 30 years we spent in Cyprus as opposed to what we are now actually achieving.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: Thank you for accepting our invitation to appear before our committee. You are the President of the Canadian Defence Industries Association. In your opening remarks, you stated that this industry's generates revenues in the order of $7 billion. Nearly 30 per cent of its production is exported, a not insignificant proportion.
For our benefit and for the benefit of those tuning in, could you give us a geographical overview of this industry's operations? The committee would also appreciate receiving additional information on this subject at a later date, if you do not mind. For now, however, I would like to know if this industry is concentrated mainly in Ontario and in Quebec. How many jobs does this industry generate? What is the rate of growth of employment in this sector?
[English]
Mr. O'Donnell: The revenue we have been generating on an annual basis is about $7 billion and it is relatively stable. It will fluctuate to $500 million year by year. Part of our job has been to get it to grow but it has been relatively stable for the past few years.
As for geographic distribution, we employ plus or minus 50,000 people in defence and defence-related activities. There are in excess about 1500 companies that make in excess of $100,000 a year from these activities and there is a great difference in the scale of operation. Regarding the actual regional distribution, Quebec and Ontario have the lion's share. There is a substantial component in the Maritimes. The western component is probably less than the population distribution would lead you to believe. I can provide the specifics.
In fact, it is a timely question because within two weeks our annual report should be coming out with the statistics on the past two years.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: You can also provide a written answer to my next question, if you prefer. I am curious as to the type of job generated by this industry and the rate of growth of employment in this sector.
Those listening in will certainly be interested in knowing what the prospects are for young Canadians who are thinking about a career in our defence industries which, as we all know, do not always get good press.
[English]
Mr. O'Donnell: There are a variety of jobs. At one end of the spectrum there are individuals who are actually pumping gasoline into airplanes. At the other end of the spectrum, we have very sensitive technologies, research and development, in space activities. We do a lot of engineering-and-systems integration. By way of job opportunities, I would say most of our technologies — and I would say the same for the aerospace industry — are in the higher end of the technology and employment spectrum. There is a lot of production work, servicing of airplanes, working in ships repair centres and that type of thing, but the product dimensions are in the higher, the newer technologies. It must be that way in order to actually be able to retain a domestic and global market share.
Interestingly as well, as of about two weeks ago, we will change the title from Canadian Defence Industries Association to Canadian Defence and Securities Industries Association because we will broaden the mandate. There is so much overlap in the generalized security sector with our traditional defence sector that we will broaden and encompass it.
To your point with respect to job opportunities, we have been asked to undertake the formation of a woman-in-defence component of our CDIA so that we can advertise the job opportunities that exist for females because they are very much underrepresented in our industry. It is not something that women naturally would be inclined to undertake.
When you look at the sophistication of the engineering and the higher technologies, there is a lot of opportunity and we believe we would benefit greatly from a higher level of women in the business.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: I would now like to explore the whole issue of research and development. In terms of overall business revenues generated by the industry, how much effort do the businesses belonging to your association devote to research?
[English]
Mr. O'Donnell: Probably lower overall than we would like it to be because we look at the need for R&D. I will have to give you the specific figures. They will come out in this report. Generally, it is something we spend a lot of time encouraging our industry to do.
There are some companies that dedicate a substantial portion of their pre-tax revenue to research and development. The defence department itself has a science and technology budget in excess of $300 million a year. A good deal of that, probably 50 per cent, is worked with our Canadian industrial base. It is not as strong as we would like it to be so we are constantly promoting an increase. I will give you the statistics. I think it is generally comparable. We may be a bit better than Canadian industry on the average.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: Several weeks ago, Mr. Williams, the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for procurement, spoke in glowing terms about one of his directors general, whose name escapes me at the moment, who was in charge of liaising with the Canadian defence industry, on the domestic as well as on the international front. Now that we have heard the ADM praise one of his directors general, we would like to get your opinion. I am asking you to be open and honest with your views.
[English]
Mr. O'Donnell: Ms. Evelyn Lavigne, who is Director General International and Industry Programs, DGIIP, working for Mr. Alan Williams, is our senior principle point of interaction with the Department of National Defence. Our association has a standing executive committee and a board of directors, and we interact with that particular component of Mr. Alan Williams' operations to help define the scale and type of industrial engagement on specific projects.
I will give you probably the clearest example. It was that particular section in the Department of National Defence, the DGIIP, industry and international — those are the two I's — that lead the way to Canada's participation in the Joint Strike Fighter program whereby we made an investment of dollars and in kind of slightly in excess of $100 million. Our currently targeted industrial return is about three times that.
It was a combination of that cell within Mr. Williams' office taking the initiative to interact with us that actually led us to the types of interactions with Lockheed Martin, the U.S. firm that actually enabled us to gain this industrial spin off. They are important to us. We will continue and probably increase the level of interaction.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: In view of your $2 billion in exports and the $1 billion that goes to the US, do you consider the job of liaising with the Defence Department to be important? You have used the same example as Mr. Williams. What return to you get, if I can phrase it this way, on your investment, that is on your having a certain director general in the position? Does this individual play a significant role, in terms of these $2 billion in exports?
[English]
Mr. O'Donnell: Yes, I would be extremely disappointed if that organization did not exist because they provide facilitation that would be awkward without it. Particularly on the U.S. projects, the staff from Mr. Williams' office is known to the United States procurement officials so they can facilitate and ease our entrance.
In the same fashion, when we deal with some of these very sensitive export control issues, we need their engagement to help us get industry onside in the United States in support of our arguments that we are providing the right types of controls and we should be able to bid on contracts. They are helpful.
The Chairman: We would welcome advice on how to structure the report. Some of us served on the last committee that was a precursor to the 1994 report. I believe we felt blind-sided principally by the Department of Finance, which did not proceed with the level of funding that it assured the committee would be there.
After doing the usual preliminary work on vulnerabilities and national interests and level of activity that we thought we should be participating at, the committee felt it would make sense to provide the government with certain sensitivities that if it wanted to provide full funding, here were the capabilities that we saw being available. If they wanted to fund at a 75-per-cent level of what they thought was appropriate, these capabilities fell off the table and we would name them. If they wanted to fund it at a 50-per-cent level, then certain other capabilities would fall off the table. Would a report like that have the desired results?
Mr. O'Donnell: It is essential for discussion where you are able to lay out what you can do for what level of support government will provide.
By way of an observation on the future conduct and process, my own view is that the actual quality of your interactions and your community engagement is probably more important than the volume you do, appreciating that there is a certain positive optic in visiting each of the provinces. My own guess would be that the range of responses to the solutions will be predictable. If you are limited in resources, I would spend more time on the quality of the analysis and try to bulk up by region, perhaps, rather than by province. If you get the resources you need and you have the time to do this expanded nation-to-nation interactive process, that is perhaps slightly more beneficial than the alternative.
My own view is that many of the responses will be quite predictable. You will get arguments at this end of the continuum and more down here, and they will not be much different from what you have seen previously. If I had to take my money, I would develop a formula that focused on the quality of the evaluation as opposed to the volume of input.
The Chairman: We will look for a list of the provinces we should cut out.
Thank you for appearing before the committee. You have insights that are helpful to the committee, given your extensive experience in the military, and now your experience in industry.
The Chairman: This afternoon's witness is Mr. Joel Sokolsky, Dean of Arts at Royal Military College of Canada and a professor of political science.
He earned his honours B.A. from the University of Toronto, a master's degree from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and a Ph.D. in government from Harvard University.
Welcome to the committee. We understand you have a short opening statement.
Mr. Joel Sokolsky, Dean of Arts and Professor of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada: Thank you for the opportunity to appear. In my opening statement, I would like to talk briefly about the need for, and the history of, white papers; look at the 1994 White Paper on Defence; look at where we have been in terms of defence since the end of the Cold War; talk about the impact of the 9/11 attacks; and then to propose a certain approach to defence policy.
Generally, in the past, white papers have been not particularly good guides to what came after in terms of foreign policy. Some of them, particularly the 1987 White Paper on Defence, were rather short-lived. As the committee well knows, it is policy decisions, spending decisions and deployment decisions that very much define where we are and what we do in the area of defence policy.
During the Cold War, there was a certain static approach, and afterwards, this became more fluid. Nevertheless, it is decisions often made between white papers that very much define where we go in terms of defence policies, but the ongoing review process, particularly public involvement, is important in terms of public information and to establish legitimacy.
Unlike many, I do not believe the 1994 White Paper was particularly bad. In fact, given what came after, it predicted we would be involved in a range of peacekeeping operations. We would be involved, in fact, in combat on a global scale. It did emphasize the importance of non-military threats, although it did not predict the tempo of operations. However, after 1994 there were other policy statements, particularly the military strategy 2020, with its emphasis on interoperability, which did conform to what the military was doing.
Also, although more money could have been spent on defence, I think Canada has made a real and positive contribution to its own security and to international security since 1994.
One must have a comparative approach: What do countries of similar size contribute? The Canadian record since 1994 has been very good, beginning in Yugoslavia, then in Africa, and most recently in Afghanistan. I do not begin from the premise that Canadians have anything to apologize for in terms of their contribution to international security over the last 10 years.
Since 9/11, in addition, Canadians and the government have rightly pointed out that the response to terrorism in fact includes non-military responses not related to the Department of National Defence. We have put much money into security, where it was needed, with regard to intelligence and to the borders, things that directly affect our interest, and, in particular, North American security. As we look into the future, it may not be that the bulk of our security spending will go to the Department of National Defence, although more funds are needed.
If I was to propose where we should go from here in terms of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, I would say that in light of the evolving security environment, the emphasis should be placed on military capabilities relevant to domestic and North American security; and that we should follow the recommendation contained in the national security policy, to be selective and strategic in overseas operations. I would also assume that defence budgets will remain more or less constant, that they will not increase dramatically.
The international security environment, as far as military power, will continue to be dominated by the United States, in particular what Mr. Barry Posen of Massachusetts Institute of Technology has called, dominating the commons. American military power will dominate the seas, the air, and space. The ability of the West, therefore, to project power across the globe will be largely unhampered in terms of its need. Where the United States has looked for assistance and where it will face opposition is in what Posen has called the contested zones. Where it seeks to either restore order or deal with terrorism, I think there will be a need for Canadian contributions.
In order for the Canadian Forces to be effective overseas, as mentioned, the government must adhere to a selective and strategic approach to international deployments. In terms of structuring where we will go with regard to the armed forces, again assuming no great increases in defence policy, I think the army will maintain an overseas capability. Given the recent purchases, it has, as indicated in Afghanistan, a capability there.
In terms of the air force, we may have to forego an overseas fighter and power projection capability in favour of a lift capability, improving our tactical lift in theatres of operations. The air force, therefore, in terms of fighters may well see its primary role, and a not unimportant one, of continuing in North American air defence.
Turning to the navy, we have a very good — as the navy argues — medium world-class projection navy, which supports Canadian foreign policy across the globe. However, unlike the United States, we cannot afford two navies. The U.S. has the navy and the Coast Guard. In terms of future capabilities for our navy, we may have to look at acquiring some of the armed capabilities that the U.S. Coast Guard has and is developing, given its deep water project.
In general, the major threat will continue to be terrorism, failing states and rogue states; but not all failing states and not all terrorist groups threaten Canada. We will have to be strategic and selective in where we deploy.
In addition, although it is often argued that the best way to deal with terrorism is at the source — hence, we have Afghanistan — the fact remains that you can deal with terrorism at its source and you still remain vulnerable at home. Indeed, as the experience with Spain notes, dealing with terrorism at its source may well increase vulnerability at home. For this reason, we must achieve a greater balance between homeland security and overseas projection capabilities. Again, the Canadian Forces are well suited to this.
Moreover, we may have to be somewhat proactive in terms of our relations with the United States. Certainly, it is more in the American interest for Canada to contribute to its own and North American security than to place additional forces overseas where their relative impact may not be as great as it is in the North American context. From the U.S. standpoint, Canadian homeland security efforts are more directly related to vital U.S. interests. We will always have to project a certain amount of force overseas because for most American administrations the litmus test of loyalty to the United States is what you do overseas, not in terms of North America. Nevertheless, we can make a case that it is in American interests for Canada to do more on homeland security.
There is much talk and speculation about maritime NORADs and new structures for North American defence. Institutions matter less than capabilities. Unless we have the capabilities to contribute in North America, the institutions will not be as effective.
Overall, within reasonable increases in defence expenditure and with the very realistic approach to overseas operations, the Canadian Forces can contribute to national security both at home and abroad. It will require some tradeoffs in terms of equipment, which the government must make, but we have more options than we suspect we have. In particular, overseas, the United States is looking for partners but in fact, as Secretary Rumsfeld and others have noted, it will accept contributions in a wide variety of modes.
We happen to be one of the better contributors, even given our small numbers. I do not believe that massive increases in Canadian overseas contributions will significantly affect U.S. policy and calculations, given not just the Bush administration but the bi-partisan unilateralism which is the basis of U.S. national security policy now. On the other hand, I believe that solid contributions to North American security, not only militarily but in other security areas, will be taken seriously in Washington because it directly deals with American interests.
With that, I welcome your questions.
Senator Banks: I hardly know where to start. You have given a very broad canvas. Did I understand you to say that, with respect to our relations with the United States, that institutions do not matter as much as capabilities, or have I got that backwards?
Mr. Sokolsky: No. For example, if we were to go to a maritime NORAD, that would work, and it only works because we have a maritime surveillance capability. In the U.S., as you know, the lead agency in homeland security is the Coast Guard. Moving to a maritime NORAD is something we should do, but we cannot do it unless we are able to increase and improve our maritime surveillance capabilities.
Senator Banks: That is certainly true at the operational level, but it ignores certain political facts. For example, with respect to the war in Iraq, it is my impression, and I think we learned it when we went to Washington, that they did not much care if we sent three soldiers to Iraq. What they wanted was our flag. They wanted the institution. They did not need any capability.
Mr. Sokolsky: I think overseas that is the case. In North America, it is a real problem. If we do not have the capability, let us say, on the Great Lakes, they cannot cross the line, and that means the border is not necessarily covered, if they believe we do not have monitoring of our ocean approaches, which we do. Imagine if we had NORAD and no CF-18 fighters. It is not the command structure, because you can work in a number of ways. It is, we have that capability to monitor our airspace and we had the radar when we needed it. I agree with you entirely. Oversees, it is not as important as here. Here, it is. The trouble we have is that for most administrations, security on Lake Huron is not at the top of the defence priority, unless they find someone coming across, and then it rockets to the top. I think you interpreted me correctly.
Senator Banks: You also said that not all terrorists and not all rogue states find Canada to be a target. We are not a likely target. I suppose it would be equally true to say that, so far, none have targeted us, but do you have some information about who is and who is not regarding us as a target? How do we know that someone does not regard us as a target?
Mr. Sokolsky: I would say the same thing for the United States. If you look at a study done by Jeffrey Record of the U.S. Army War College, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, the approach he takes is that the world is full of terrorists — for example, Chechens, Basques, and terrorists in Africa. Not all of them have a beef with the United States of America. If you declare terrorism your enemy, then are these people your adversaries?
Senator Banks: Are Chechen terrorists not our enemy?
Mr. Sokolsky: They do not directly threaten Canada.
Senator Banks: That was not the question, though. Do we not have umbilical connections that are sort of universal? Do we not agree that terrorism per se is wrong, regardless of whether we are the target?
Mr. Sokolsky: We agree that terrorism per se is wrong, but given finite resources, we have to put our effort against terrorists who directly threaten us. The other problem is that governments will define legitimate opposition as terrorism and link it to this general threat. Yes, the Chechens may be threatening, but we have finite resources, so we direct it to where it deals directly with Canadian interests.
Senator Banks: I will get crass now and talk about dollars, because you have some strong opinions about that. You look at it often as an interest of yours.
We have heard interesting proposals, and we are about to hear more interesting proposals, about what we should do. You talked about finite resources. You talked about the fact that the U.S. is going to dominate the air and the U.S. will dominate the land. We all know that we cannot play at present the kind of role proportionately that we played last time around, or at least we could not without some new, clear-and-present danger. You also mentioned that we cannot do the extra-continental air stuff any more, and we do not, by the way. We have foregone that.
Tell me how you would respond to the argument that we have this many dollars and we are trying to play a game this big, and we cannot play a bigger game because we have only enough dollars to play the smaller game. We can play it better if we reduce the purview, so it would be logical for us to say that, since we are a maritime nation, we cannot get rid of the navy, and we have to expand its capabilities. We need an army, because we have a lot of land. Why do we not get out of the air business entirely — because the U.S. will dominate that entirely anyway — and really improve our navy and army and make a deal with the Americans to look after our air defence? If I were running a business, that would not be a bad deal.
Mr. Sokolsky: Active air defence is now through NORAD, mainly looking internally. If we wanted American aircraft to patrol Canadian skies, then you could go for that. I do not think that would be acceptable, and I think the cost of maintaining the CF-18s to provide NORAD is something we can afford. In terms of the navy, in fact, the navy is amongst the three services that emerged out of the 1990s in good shape and does have a projection capability. For that reason, we would not get rid of the air force. In terms of overseas projection, we have already made that decision. In terms of the army, we might well make the case that we will not send units any larger than 2,000 overseas. That is the most we can sustain.
Senator Banks: When was last time we could send 2,000 and sustain them?
Mr. Sokolsky: We sent over 2,000 to Afghanistan.
Senator Banks: And sustain them?
Mr. Sokolsky: Well, as to sustainment, all countries rotate in. These sorts of operations are such that you rotate. If we wanted to sustain 2,000, we would have to do as we are doing — reduce commitments. We may have to reduce commitments elsewhere.
Senator Banks: Your view generally is that we need to continue to maintain workable, however-they-are-designed forces in each of the three traditional areas and not give up any of them, but maybe specialize them a bit.
Mr. Sokolsky: Yes, I think you can specialize within each unit. You also need air, sea and land for domestic operations. Even for, as you well know, domestic emergency operations, we need an internal military transport, we need the reserves in the case of emergency preparedness, and we need to maintain maritime forces for sovereignty protection, so we are not going to give up the three services. We have already come down in terms of what they can do, and that may be something to consider. In terms of naval forces, do we want to replace the existing destroyers with another generation specifically or very much geared to overseas, or start building something like the U.S. Coast Guard has? That would get us out of certain operations overseas, but with the frigates we would still be able to participate.
Senator Banks: Talking about the oceans and security, our committee recommends that, at the very least, the Canadian Coast Guard needs to have a constabulary function, which it now does not have. I have the feeling you think we should go further than that.
Mr. Sokolsky: Yes, I think we should look at whether it should be an armed service of the navy. The U.S. Coast Guard looks more like our navy in certain ways than our Coast Guard looks like their Coast Guard. They do overlapping functions, but it is an armed service. If homeland security is important, then I think it should have that capability more than necessarily a constabulary. I know this is something that the navy would prefer not to do, or it would need more resources.
I know that the committee has looked into this and I am suggesting that it look further to make that determination. If we had unlimited funds I would agree that we need an armed coast guard and a navy. However, we cannot afford two armed forces or two navies. The U.S. Coast Guard is the eighth largest navy in the world.
Senator Cordy: Are you suggesting that our Coast Guard be more focused on security and watching our borders?
Mr. Sokolsky: I am suggesting that in addition to maritime safety and other things, the navy adopt a more coastal defence approach. Other issues about maritime safety would be left with the Coast Guard.
Senator Cordy: When we talk about who is tending our boat safety, who would it be?
Mr. Sokolsky: It would be the Coast Guard.
Senator Cordy: The navy could take over some.
Mr. Sokolsky: You would have a greater armed naval presence on the Great Lakes and, particularly, on the ocean approaches to Canada.
Senator Cordy: When we look at things like navigational aids and boat safety, in your mind they would continue to fall under the Department of Fisheries and Oceans while the navy would fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of National Defence.
Mr. Sokolsky: I am suggesting that the navy look into buying smaller, armed boats. They would remain part of the navy and the Coast Guard would maintain its other traditional roles.
Senator Cordy: The Coast Guard would not become involved with security issues?
Mr. Sokolsky: Currently, there is a joint interagency approach. I am suggesting that the Canadian Navy do more in respect of the inshore waters as part of its contribution to this joint approach.
Senator Cordy: So we would have smaller, faster boats in the navy to this end.
Mr. Sokolsky: Yes, that is the suggestion so that part of the Canadian Navy begins to resemble the U.S. Coast Guard. The deep-water project will be NATO and the United States and interoperable. These are highly potent craft that I am suggesting for the navy. This will be an interagency approach, as it is currently. I am suggesting that the navy, in the long run, might make a contribution in this way.
Senator Cordy: The lines would be more clearly defined. Is that what you are suggesting?
Mr. Sokolsky: An armed presence would be more of a naval responsibility.
The Chairman: Professor, the Rush-Bagot Treaty prohibits the navy on the Great Lakes so unless we amend or change that agreement, we could not do that.
The committee has heard testimony that if you are to have a brown water navy, as it were, you would still need to have a vessel the size of a frigate. Otherwise, you cannot stay out long enough and deal with a sea state. This committee's recommendation had to do with arming the Coast Guard as we went through a replenishment of the fleet. There are various functions such as ice-breaking, the buoy-tending aids to navigation, search and rescue, and fisheries pollution or environmental. You are recommending that all of those functions remain under the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard, rebuild the Coast Guard fleet so that it can continue to carry on all of those functions and then build a separate and additional brown water fleet for the navy. Is that correct?
Mr. Sokolsky: Yes. I think that the navy would look into patrol boats off the ocean.
In terms of the Rush-Bagot Treaty, the U.S. Coast Guard is on the Great Lakes.
The Chairman: Yes, but it is not a military force.
Mr. Sokolsky: Yes, it can be an armed force under United States law.
The Chairman: That can only be when they declare war and, as part of U.S. homeland security, it does not qualify.
Mr. Sokolsky: In that sense and given the importance of maritime homeland security, we can make other arrangements with the U.S. regarding that treaty.
Senator Banks: I am confused by an answer but I will wait for Senator Christensen's question.
Senator Christensen: Over the last ten years, the navy has introduced the 12 new Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels, MCDVs. Do you see that number increasing?
Mr. Sokolsky: No, I think the MCDVs are used for reserve training. They move in that direction but they do not have the level of capability that we would want in our coastal waters.
Senator Christensen: Those are the kinds of vessels that you are recommending?
Mr. Sokolsky: Something like that and I am also suggesting a look at the U.S. Coast Guard and what it is doing in terms of its recapitalization.
The Chairman: On those vessels, we have heard testimony from Admiral Ron Buck that they do not work well inshore, are suitable for training and that they would not perform the role of coastal defence.
Mr. Sokolsky: Yes. That is why I suggest we need something else.
Senator Banks: I am confused, Mr. Sokolsky. I asked you whether we should arm the Coast Guard and I thought you said, yes. Then, in response to Senator Cordy's question, you said that we should leave the Coast Guard to do aids to navigation and maritime safety, and that the navy should step in and fill the breach. Which is true?
Mr. Sokolsky: The second.
Senator Banks: The second is true?
Mr. Sokolsky: Yes.
Senator Banks: Should we not arm the Coast Guard?
Mr. Sokolsky: No. I would not make it resemble the U.S. Coast Guard.
Senator Forrestall: Until a few moments ago, no distinguished senator had ever given another senator such a diving board to leap from. He left me poised to get into the reserves, a cutter up to 160 feet capable of carrying 100 crew, slightly reinforced, perhaps three or maybe smaller, sufficient to get in and out of early-freeze harbours. We have some 7,000 kilometres of coast line and we have an enormous, underused resource — put on the self — the Canadian Naval Reserves in Atlantic Canada.
Do you see any useful role for exploring a combination of coastal defence comprised of a Coast Guard with a new series of vessels capable of shallow water, and new shallow-ice capability along Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and up around the North shore to the tidal reaches of the St. Lawrence?
Mr. Sokolsky: You are asking about a role for the reserves in coastal defence. They are already using them on the MCDVs but I think you could make ready use of the reserves in this capability, just as the U.S. Coast Guard is making greater use of its reserves under the current circumstances.
Senator Forrestall: How do they use them?
Mr. Sokolsky: They are called up to service and put on boats for homeland defence and they use their smaller boats for port defence overseas. Members of the U.S. Coast Guard reserve have been called into service since 9/11 on their boats, including their boats sent overseas. It is certainly an opportunity for the reserve to be used in respect of homeland maritime security.
Senator Forrestall: Do you know of anyone that has taken a look at this as a possible scenario? I do not want to start this, and I do not think the committee wants to start with a clean sheet of paper.
Mr. Sokolsky: I do not think anyone looks at the importance of the Naval Reserves in terms of homeland security. Generally, that would be a good role for the army for the same reason that, in the absence of a national guard, we would rely on reserve units in Canada as the first military support in the event of emergency.
Senator Forrestall: I appreciate and understand where you are coming from. In terms of the navy being a naval presence in the Great Lakes, we have no infrastructure to house them, secure them, train them, tie them up, document them and lift them out of the water. God forbid there will be a dockyard on the Great Lakes that I forgot about. Generally, the navy is not an operational force, traditionally or otherwise and hence, no infrastructure is in place on the lakes. Rather, the infrastructure is on the coast.
There are problems with training and the difficulties of all of that. It seems to me that a more efficient use of the Canadian Coast Guard, which has had taken away from it all except its very mundane but very necessary task — the Coast Guard in Canada is a civilian structure of government — is the mixture of the Coast Guard with the defence establishment, such as the reserves, a possibility?
Mr. Sokolsky: The approach of homeland security, as I suggested before, is interagency. You can have maritime operation security centres. I am suggesting that looking at more of the contribution of the navy, which has surveillance capabilities and which is an armed force, is something that we might want to look at if we look in terms of where the navy is going in the future.
Again, it is because of the different force structures between the two countries.
Senator Forrestall: I appreciate those comments because I have been bugging the committee about the Halifax Rifles. Most of the committee, including myself, are not absolutely certain about what I mean. The committee is less certain. However, it seems to me that there is a role with respect to coastal defence that could very well be served with a highly mobile force — not just water, but land as well. There are a number of reserve units, as you know, on the shelf, and they have been retired.
I have an additional question and I appreciate your thoughts there.
How else would you like to see the reserves use in home defence?
Mr. Sokolsky: Overall, the reserves in terms of what?
Senator Forrestall: Generally.
Mr. Sokolsky: You may hear differently from others, but generally, using the army reserve because, as apart from the military, they are tied to more communities. It is good to have your first responders for people who are in the community. In terms of the army, that is useful.
In terms of using the air reserve in case of emergency, we would want to move people and things around the country. We may have to call people from the air reserve to help with that.
Generally, because in Canada we do rely on the military — without a National Guard unit, we look to the military — I think this makes sense for us. When we had the high tempo of operations in the 1990s, we called many reservists for overseas operations. This may be a reason to limit overseas operations.
Senator Forrestall: Then we get into training and capacity, and so on?
Mr. Sokolsky: Yes.
Senator Nolin: I want to move on and use your expertise and talk about the North. Senator Forrestall mentioned the length of our sea border. My first question is, what is your evaluation of our military capability in the North?
Mr. Sokolsky: It is very limited.
Senator Nolin: What do you mean by “very limited?”
Mr. Sokolsky: We do not have an under-ice capability; we have some surveillance capability. There are few units up there. It is better in the air, in terms of NORAD, given the improvements that were made in the 1980s. It is probably commensurate with the nature of the perceived threat in the North. If we assume that the major threat to Canada now comes from terrorism, possible use of weapons of mass destruction and asymmetric responses in the event of overseas operations, the North is not as vulnerable as other parts of the country to be either an avenue of an attack or a target of an attack.
Senator Nolin: What about maintaining our sovereignty on the huge land mass and the water, the Northwest Passage?
Mr. Sokolsky: In terms of the Northwest Passage, we will have to rely on pressing our international case that the Northwest Passage is internal Canadian waters. We did have an agreement with the United States about dealing with the transit of U.S. Coast Guard vessels through there, but largely that will be a political and legal question. In terms of using things like the Rangers, we need a level of activity there to demonstrate our sovereignty, but in the absence of a major challenge by a hostile power, the use of defence resources may not be the best way to deal with the North.
Senator Nolin: In your understanding of what we should do, who should do that?
Mr. Sokolsky: Internationally, Foreign Affairs Canada should press the claim of the Northwest Passage as internal Canadian waters. We do have international recognition for the application of Canadian environmental laws there. I think we should also continue the program of the Rangers in the North, and encourage development there. However, I do not think it is necessarily a military response.
Senator Nolin: I am sure you are aware of the problem of global warming.
Mr. Sokolsky: Yes.
Senator Nolin: Who should be preoccupied by environmental disasters, new mining, and new oil, in the North?
Mr. Sokolsky: You will have the environmental agency of the Canadian government primarily involved in dealing with any environmental impact of global warming.
Senator Nolin: I agree. That is on paper, but imagine the worst. No one is there to police and to watch. What do you think they will do? Look what happened yesterday just off the coast in Newfoundland.
Mr. Sokolsky: There is a role for surveillance for the Coast Guard and for the Armed Forces there.
Senator Nolin: Are we properly equipped to do that?
Mr. Sokolsky: At the moment, no. You would have to put resources there. Also, since you could not maintain resources there permanently, you would have to have almost a rapid reaction response within Canada in the event of an emergency. That may be a role for the Armed Forces in terms of lifting other responders into that part of the world.
Senator Tkachuk: I want to follow up on Senator Banks' question regarding terrorism.
How would we define what terrorists were our enemies, and who were not?
Mr. Sokolsky: We should be concerned with those terrorists who threaten Canada directly, who threaten our allies in ways that would hurt our security or our economic interest, and who threaten Canadians abroad.
Senator Tkachuk: Would it be built around more uplifting values like democratic ideals or democratic countries? While we all worried about the Russians, or the Soviet Union at that time, and communism, if there had been a leader in East Germany who wanted to unite Germany and had invaded West Germany, we or NATO might have entered the fray. With Vietnam, we said, “No, let the Americans deal with it.” If some terrorists would target Japan, for example, would they be our enemy?
Mr. Sokolsky: To the extent that there could be economic reverberations internationally, that would be of concern to us, yes.
Senator Tkachuk: What about Israel?
Mr. Sokolsky: The Palestinians that are launching against Israel now, to the extent that Israel or the United States would respond in a way that might involve us in a larger conflict, there is a concern with that. There have been attacks against Israeli targets since the beginning of the Israeli state. How have we responded? We have gone in where peacekeeping missions were negotiated to try and maintain the peace. We have offered support for the Palestinians in terms of aid, but not as much as we are doing in terms of the terrorist attack on the United States.
Senator Tkachuk: Should Hamas be on our anti-terrorist list?
Mr. Sokolsky: If we have evidence that it is carrying out terrorist actions and using Canada for some reason, perhaps collecting funds and sending them there, yes, it should be on our list. It is a concern to the United States; it is a concern to stability in the region.
The problem is also arriving at the proper instrument to deal with it. Hamas may be on our list, but we will not send Canadian Forces against them, as we did in the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Other instruments may be more appropriate. For example, if we believe Hamas is a threat, then we can provide monitoring here of Canadians, but we can also help support the peace process in the Middle East as a means of responding to what we believe are legitimate Palestinian concerns.
In the case of the Taliban and Afghanistan after 9/11, we sent Canadian Armed Forces to get them. The response is different. In the case of the Chechens, of course we understand the Russian reaction. On the other hand, we may not want to encourage wholesale Russian actions in that region if it will simply escalate.
As Professor Record of the U.S. Army War College noted, you have to unbound the war on terrorism, you have to differentiate. He was talking about the United States. In the past, as you know, during the Cold War era, many governments who were not themselves particularly democratic or interested in human rights labelled opposition as terrorists and used harsh measures against them, as in some Latin American countries. We have to be clear about which terrorists, directly or indirectly, threaten Canadian interests. The United States differentiates. It calls for war on terrorism, but it is more interested in terrorism in the Middle East than it is in Africa. If they can follow a realistic, differentiated approach to terrorism, then so can we. It is not as President Bush says: You are either with us or you are with the terrorists. He really means: You are either with us or you are with some terrorists whom we have identified as threats to the United States, but not all terrorist groups in all parts of the world, as disreputable as their actions may be, are of immediate concern to us.
Senator Atkins: We talk about a general capability force. Do you think that the military that we sent to Afghanistan was trained to address the kind of mission they were given? Would that same training apply to the military we sent to, say, Haiti?
Mr. Sokolsky: In both cases the military performed well and the forces we did send to Afghanistan, given what they did, were trained to do the mission. You want to train to the highest level you can because all missions are different.
Generally — and it is no news to this committee — we should train for combat capability; we should be training warriors. When you have achieved that level, then you can deal with other missions, but we should assume that they will be engaged in some sort of combat.
I think you will hear from General Andrew Leslie that the missions in Afghanistan even under International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, although not the search-and-rescue of the earlier missions, are dangerous enough that you need a highly trained, highly skilled military. Moreover, reliance on technology that can apply in combat situations is equally applicable and less intensive.
The other point is you do not know when it is going to turn. You could be sent to one mission and find yourself in another. We may not be able to do the armour-to-armour high intensity combat that one saw in the past, but the goal should be a highly trained military, trained to apply force on behalf of the Government of Canada.
Senator Atkins: Were we trained to do the mission in Haiti?
Mr. Sokolsky: I believe we were trained, yes. I believe that we had the capability.
It is not who we send as much as, was the mission doable? Restoration of government involves more than the Armed Forces. If the back up is not there in terms of aid, if the back up is not there in terms of non-military support, then you cannot rely on the Armed Forces to cover the gaps.
It is not just the Canadians. You cannot rely on Canada to cover the gaps if other countries will not come forward as well.
Senator Atkins: When we talk about homeland security and surveillance, there are new technologies coming on the market such as unmanned aircraft, even more sophisticated helicopters. How do you see them fitting into either the navy or the Coast Guard? Do you think they should have a greater role in our homeland defence?
Mr. Sokolsky: We are already relying on surface radar in terms of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, UAVs, that can be used to substitute for armed patrols. NORAD has always made use of wide surveillance, satellite surveillance. If we can move into space-based air surveillance, that would enhance our capabilities; capabilities to monitor ships at sea, and the new X-rays that are looking into containers. You can leverage technology, as well, in homeland security.
Senator Atkins: Under what command should they be?
Mr. Sokolsky: This is another reason why they should belong to the navy and share that information simply because, as an armed service, it has that capability.
Senator Atkins: That would not be true, though, of unmanned aircraft?
Mr. Sokolsky: We use UAVs in Afghanistan. That would be the type of technology that you would want some part of the armed force to operate on behalf of other agencies in Canada.
The Chairman: Thank you very much for appearing before us today. It has been useful. We have particularly enjoyed the material that you sent ahead. It provided for stimulating reading and thought for the work of the committee. Perhaps we will see you again in the coming week.
The committee will begin cross-country hearings next week with meetings in Kingston, Windsor and Toronto. To obtain more information on the committee's schedule, please visit the committee's website by at www.sen-sec.ca. We also post witness testimony, as well as other confirmed hearing schedules. In the alternative, you may contact the Clerk of the Committee by calling 1-800-267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting the members of the committee.
The committee continued in camera.