Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 9 - Evidence, February 1, 2005
CHARLOTTETOWN, Tuesday, February 1, 2005
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 2 p.m. to examine and report on the national security policy for Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: This is the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Today, the committee will hear testimony relating to the review of Canadian defence policy.
For the record, to my right is the distinguished senator from Nova Scotia, Senator Michael Forrestall. He served the constituents of Dartmouth for 37 years, first as a member of the House of Commons, then as their senator. While in the House of Commons, he served in the official opposition as defence critic from 1966-76. He is also a member of our subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
I have on my left Senator Norm Atkins from Ontario. He came to the Senate with 27 years of experience in the field of communications. He served as a senior advisor to Mr. Robert Stanfield, Premier William Davis of Ontario and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. He is also a member of our subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
Beside him is Senator Jane Cordy, who is from Nova Scotia. Senator Cordy is an accomplished educator with an extensive record of community involvement, including serving as vice-chair of the Halifax/Dartmouth Port Development Commission. She is Chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association and a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology.
Beside her is Senator Tommy Banks, from Alberta. Senator Banks is Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, which recently released a report entitled the One Tonne Challenge. He is well-known to Canadians as a versatile musician and entertainer, and has provided musical direction for the ceremonies of the 1988 Olympic Winter Games. He is an Officer of the Order of Canada and has received a Juno Award.
On my right, beside Senator Forrestall is Senator Joseph Day from New Brunswick. He is Deputy Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance and also our subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. He is a member of the bar of New Brunswick, Ontario and Quebec and a Fellow of the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada. He is also a former President and CEO of the New Brunswick Forest Products Association.
Beside him is our host senator for today, Senator Percy Downe from Prince Edward Island. Senator Downe has served as senior advisor to a number of provincial and federal ministers. Mr. Downe was Chief of Staff in the Office of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien from 2001 to 2003. Before working at the federal level, he worked for the provincial government in Prince Edward Island where he was Executive Assistant to the Premier from 1986 to 1993. Senator Downe is a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance.
Beside Senator Downe is Senator Meighen, who is a lawyer by profession. He is Chancellor of the University of King's College and past Chair of the Stratford Festival. Currently, he is Chair of our subcommittee on Veterans Affairs and is also a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce.
We have a special guest with us today, sitting at the end of the table. Joining us we have a former senator, Archibald — better known to us as Archie — Johnstone. Senator Johnstone was a senator from Prince Edward Island from March 1998 to June 1999. During his term, he served as the Deputy Chair of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. He was co-author of Raising the Bar, which was largely adopted by the government and he is an advocate of improvement in the quality of life for veterans.
We are very pleased to be here in Charlottetown today, in a city with such a proud military tradition. Charlottetown is the home of HMCS Queen Charlotte, the P.E.I. Regiment and the 721st Communications Regiment. Thousands of young men and women from this region have served in two World Wars and Korea, and have continued to serve in peacekeeping and peacemaking missions ever since.
Our committee is the first Senate committee mandated to examine security and defence. The Senate asked our committee to examine the need for a national security policy. We began our review in 2002 with three reports: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness in February, Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility in September and an Update on Canada's Military Crisis: A Review from the Bottom Up, in November.
In 2003, the committee published two reports: The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports in January and Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-defended Borders in the World in October.
In 2004, we tabled two more reports: National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front-lines in March, and recently, the Canadian Security Guide Book, 2005 edition.
This committee is reviewing Canada's defence policy. During the next few months, the committee will hold hearings in every province and engage with Canadians to determine their national interest, what they see as Canada's principal threats, and how they would like the government to respond to those threats. The committee will attempt to generate debate on national security in Canada and forge a consensus on the need and type of military Canadians want.
This afternoon, our first witness is Mr. Peter Haydon. He is a Senior Research Fellow for the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University and an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, specializing in naval and maritime security issues and Canadian defence policy.
A former career officer in the Canadian navy, Mr. Haydon took early retirement in 1988, having attained the rank of Commander to pursue a second career as an academic.
During his 30-year naval career, he served in submarines, destroyers and on various naval international staffs. He is a widely published author, lecturer and panellist, and a frequent media commentator on Canadian and international defence and maritime security matters.
Mr. Haydon, we are very pleased to see you again. Thank you so much for making the trip to come and see us. We are looking forward to hearing from you. We understand you have a short statement, and the floor is yours, sir.
Mr. Peter Haydon, Senior Research Fellow for the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University: Honourable senators, it is a pleasure to be back. I think we spoke roughly two years ago and I think the topic was slightly narrower then. It was merely on the Maritime side of homeland security.
My efforts of late have been focussed more upon naval issues. I am trying to grapple with the most difficult of all questions and the one that I think Senator Kenny just alluded to, and that is trying to answer the question: Exactly what is it that Canadians expect the military, and thus the navy, to do for them?
It seems that the navy, unfortunately, is frequently out of sight, out of mind. This is an historic problem that once the navy sails over the horizon, people tend to forget about it. I do not think even the modern era of technology will change that very much. It is a fact of life.
I did a study at the end of last year that some of you may be aware of, but I will just bring out a couple of the key points of concern to me that are probably worth discussing. One of these is that in the last decade really, verging now on a decade and a half since the end of the Cold War, Canada, as a whole, has gained enormous benefits on the international stage from its navy, in various wars, in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. There is a general acceptance, I think, that the navy has served its country well. Unfortunately, though, the plans to maintain that so versatile capability, or box of capabilities, does not seem to be in place. It concerns me, and I think it concerns many other people, that the short-term considerations seem to rule out a comprehensive long-term plan to build new ships, to replace existing ships, and thereby confirm that the naval policy that is in place today is, in fact, a sound naval policy.
A natural dichotomy has emerged as a result of recent threats and concerns to homeland security as a result of the events of September 11, 2001. If we care to look at this, it is really, in naval terms, a dichotomy between the domestic role and the international role. This dichotomy is not being solved. As we talk about it publicly, as we talk about it privately, plans to replace key capabilities slide further and further to the right, with the result that some of them will not be there in a few years unless some interims steps or long-term steps are taken to ensure that they are.
If we look at the international role, this is where the focus has been of late on the traditional acceptance that the navy has had, all the way through the Cold War and on into the new era, that if you have a navy capable of ranging the world's oceans, you have a navy capable of doing whatever is necessary in their home waters. That philosophy has not been challenged, and maybe it should be. I think it is again something to talk about.
On the international scene, the navy really has carried out two large functions: One is general diplomacy, the maintaining of alliances and friendships and the participation in multinational training exercises, and the other one is crisis response in a range of places and areas, from East Timor to the former republic of Yugoslavia, to everywhere else you can think of, the Persian Gulf notwithstanding.
The national security requirement has been heightened of late, although it is very difficult to put your finger precisely on what the threat is, or what the threat is not. It is a general apprehension that things can go wrong rather more quickly than they could a few years ago, and therefore your general contingency capability has to be a little more finely tuned.
If we look at the naval requirement or the government requirement for security of the home waters, three requirements must be met if we are to do this completely and effectively: One, we must know who is using our waters and what they are doing there. Second, we must have an unequivocal government presence in those waters, that we are seen to be concerned. This is a deterrent to would-be law breakers, a deterrent to would-be perpetrators of evil and harm.
Third, we have to have the ability to intercept any vessel that as though it is intent on breaking the law or doing harm, and escort it quietly to a place where it can be arrested and the problem solved.
This calls up a wide range of capabilities, not least of which is, somehow, that we have to gather the information on what is happening at sea and on the coastlines, in a huge area that goes up from the top of Ellesmere Island all the way down on both coasts to the border with the United States. I forget the exact figures but I believe, on the Atlantic side, it is something in the vicinity of 3 million square kilometres, and on the Pacific side it is somewhat less, and then we have the Arctic borders. Canada has an offshore domain that is somewhere between 7 million and 8 million square kilometres. This is a huge land mass, and the ocean mass is almost as big as the land mass itself.
Yes, a lot of that water cannot be used all of the time, and therefore we do not need to keep it under surveillance. By the same token, we have to be able to go there if there is a problem, at any time of the year.
We used to be concerned about airplanes crashing in the Arctic and what we would do about it. We used to be concerned about a number of things in the Arctic that seem to have fallen slightly off the priority list at the moment. The point is that unless you have a box of very flexible capabilities to work at sea, over the sea and, I think, under the sea too, we will never be able to answer the first question: Who is using our waters and for what purpose? If we do not know who is using them and for what purpose, we cannot separate out the good from the bad. If we cannot do that then we have a huge problem. More important, we must be able to respond to those things that the bad do before they actually come to do them.
My concern is that, systematically, we are seeing an erosion of the naval capabilities at the moment. By not replacing destroyers, by being very slow in replacing the fleet support ships which enable destroyers and frigates to stay out at sea much longer than their normal endurance, the ability to keep the waters under effective surveillance and to have that presence in the Canadian waters is eroding. The point that is not clearly comprehended — and I think this became very evident in the media debate on the Chicoutimi incident — is that Canadian military policy or defence policy, Canadian naval policy in particular, simply is not understood on the street. Somewhere, it has been poorly explained. It needs to be explained properly. As I said in the beginning, I think those of us in the defence community need to go back and start answering the question effectively: What is it that the military does for Canada? I do not think we have answered that question yet, and I think many other questions may arise from that.
We have some good things. We have the ability to coordinate whatever goes on at sea and in the two oceans. I am sure that, in recent years, you have seen the operation centres in Halifax and the parallel one on the West Coast. These are now interdepartmental. They are fully coordinated. Information comes in and is reviewed and analysed by not just army, navy and air force people but by officers from the Coast Guard Border Services and the rest. A situation can be analysed very carefully and very fully. The disconnect at the moment is that although the information exists on the coast, the means of getting it through to a central government and having decisions made is not yet as refined as it should be, if there be a real threat.
I think I have talked enough, senators. If that is adequate, then maybe there are some questions I can answer.
Senator Atkins: Welcome, professor. You have had a very interesting career, and it is good of you to come here to meet with our panel.
Mr. Haydon: It is my pleasure.
Senator Atkins: How should the Canadian navy be structured in the future?
Mr. Haydon: That is a very good question. I happen to like the way it is structured at the moment. I think the ability to deploy a National Task Group is the foremost requirement. The ability to operate independently with other fleets, NATO, the United States, whatever, is another very useful capability.
We come then to the second question of really who should be patrolling the offshore zone. We have the small Maritime Coast Defence vessels but, as I have written in a number of places, I am very sceptical of their sea-keeping capability.
I spent my early formative years in the navy in an old World War II frigate, pounding up and down the Grand Banks. You are not affected when you get to a storm state, even in a ship that is 1,800 tonnes. A ship that is about two- thirds of that is not going to be affected in much above an eight-foot swell.
If we are to be out there monitoring the activities of other people using the waters, we have to have a ship that is useful rather than just a token. I would say, then, that the first thing for the fleet of the future is to begin looking at a new class of patrol vessels designed for the offshore area — not just for the coastal area, as the present ones have been, but for the offshore area. We need something that is able to be out there on the Grand Banks, to be able to get there, first of all, and to stay there for several days, perhaps even several weeks.
I also think it is time that the navy, in conjunction with the Coast Guard, make a slightly more concerted effort to begin looking at remote communities and being able to take a ship up into light ice-covered waters, and then even think more seriously about how we should keep the Arctic under surveillance and how we should be prepared to respond to incidents in the Arctic. I think this is a major deficiency. Thus, we should build on what is there now by filling in the last few pieces of capability by whatever means. I would be loathe to see the international world abandoned, and I would be loathe to see the navy not an taking interest in our domestic waters.
Senator Atkins: Our fleet is beginning to get a little long in the tooth. Have you any suggestions as to what type and what numbers, do you think, are required for restructuring the navy?
Mr. Haydon: I think the combined number of destroyers and frigates is about right. I think 16 to 18 is about the correct number for those. I am concerned that the long-range patrol aircraft fleet, in fact, is quietly being reduced in size when the indications are that fleet should be increased. I think there is probably a need to double the size of the Maritime Air Patrol fleet. The Aurora is the next generation.
I think we then need, as I said, some kind of general purpose ship designed to work in the Canadian waters and we probably need to have no less than six on each coast. It might be slightly more. That is a deficiency, and really we must go back and replace the fleet support ships to allow the other ships to stay on patrol longer. The importance of the multiplier effects of those fleet support ships is just simply overwhelming. It is the key to the whole effective operation of the fleet. We cannot keep the submarines, obviously.
Senator Atkins: Are we talking about ships that are larger or smaller than frigates?
Mr. Haydon: About the same size, I think, because we have to be able to operate a helicopter off that vessel. It has to be able to function in considerable seas, and it is to be able to stay at sea for at least two weeks. You will not get all of that capability pushed into anything less than about 4,000 tonnes. It just physically does not work.
Senator Atkins: How should defence policy change with respect to the navy?
Mr. Haydon: The immediate answer, sir, is money and commitment to acquiring the missing vessels in this total capability. If the government were to make a decision to replace the four Tribal class command and control destroyers today, you would not have an operational ship for 15 years.
This is the sad thing about the shipbuilding industry. I do not think we could acquire that type of ship second-hand from anyone. Although the British are selling some ships, I would not want to go down that road at the moment. We would have to build it. Where we would build it is a good question, and we can talk about that later. The main thing is the commitment of money to shipbuilding programs and a really firm, public statement that says: We need for you to maintain an effective multi-purpose navy.
Senator Atkins: Would you build them in Canada?
Mr. Haydon: Senator Kenny and I will disagree on this, I suspect, but I believe very firmly that we should be building our own national security assets in our own country. I think it is wrong to buy everything we need for our own national security offshore. However, in recent discussions with some people, and considering what is left of our shipbuilding industry, there are some interesting options about building hulls and fitting out here in the country. There are minds working on these things. The shipbuilding industry is a problem but if we have to build ships, we have to deal with that problem.
Senator Atkins: What is the average critical path for the design and production a ship?
Mr. Haydon: I will be very frank: We waste a lot of time in bureaucratic review of concepts. Trying to get excessive Canadian content into some aspects of a design, trying to look for perfection when we should perhaps accept 90 per cent of the concept instead of 100 per cent. The contracting process, in itself, is enormously lengthy. I forget the amount of time that the process on the patrol frigates went through, but I think it was a time wastage of in excess of two years while they dickered about the contract. We could move that faster.
Because we no longer have a national shipbuilding capability, there would be delay in any event while something was set up, be it an arrangement with an offshore yard or a sort of rebuilding of the Canadian shipyards. Again, this is something that could be done. The Americans were able to take a piece of empty shoreline and produce a major shipyard in a matter of a very short space of time. Modern shipbuilding techniques do not necessarily require the old launch concept. It can be done through a modular form that is much easier, and these such innovations, I think, would need to be employed.
The critical path, therefore, is the decision to go ahead with it, the design decision, the contract decision, and then we must allow probably five years to build. It will take five years, no matter what, because there are so many component parts that go into a warship of any form, and they have to be built in various places. Some of them are custom built. The computerization of the vessel is complex. The modular way in which the frigates were built was innovative, and very effective, but still they had teething troubles with it. You take on any major shipbuilding program and unless you can find somebody else's design that you like, and they will agree to sell it to you, it is a slow process, I fear.
In the interim, they will have to take — ``they'' being the military — the 12 frigates that exist now and somehow do some interim modifications to some of them to give them the command and control capability that is inherent in a Tribal class. This is not automatically in the frigates because they do not have that big picture, that big information management capability that you need if you are to be an area commander, as the ships were asked to do, and did very well, in the Arabian Sea.
Senator Atkins: What is the estimated life of a frigate?
Mr. Haydon: Today? We should be able to get 30 years out of them. I think sometimes you can push them to 35.
Senator Atkins: Then we are halfway there?
Mr. Haydon: Exactly. Essentially, it is a 1980 design, so the design itself is 25y ears old.
Senator Atkins: Was it a mistake to close the Saint John Shipyard?
Mr. Haydon: In my opinion, yes.
Senator Atkins: What are our national interests, and how does the navy fit into them?
Mr. Haydon: The navy is our first response to crisis. It is also the only means we have of diplomatic signalling to another region of the world when we are concerned that a problem may be brewing. We can dispatch our warship within a few days from home port and then whatever time it takes to sail to the area of concern, which is usually done quite quickly. It is a very small political footprint, so the dispatch of a ship, or a squadron of ships, into an area that is potentially dangerous or is becoming dangerous sends a very clear signal to the rest of the world that Canada is concerned.
The footprint is small because the ships can be withdrawn as quickly as they can be put in, unlike an army or an air force presence where you have to put in a huge infrastructure. A group of ships take their own infrastructure with them. They are self-contained. They have their own house with them. If you are putting an army in there, or armed forces into somebody else's country, you have to have their permission, otherwise, you are committing an act of war. Even then, you must move in a total support group, and they have to have all the cooks, all the supply systems. For instance, if you want 1,000 soldiers to do something useful, you will probably need to have 1,500 additional soldiers to keep them there.
We do not need that same multiplier effect with the naval force. It is our first reaction and we can move it in very quickly. That applies to distant waters as well as to home waters. If we are uncertain of something happening on the Labrador Coast, and we cannot tell from an airplane or from a surveillance during what is happening, we can send a warship to take a look at it. It is a very quick answer and it is a very effective answer, and then you have professionals on scene who can report back and tell you what is happening.
Senator Forrestall: I would like you to direct your mind to the North. While you mull that over in the back of your mind, I want to talk a little more about Senator Atkins' lead into some of the problems we are facing.
There is no doubt that you are absolutely correct: If we do not move very quickly in planning, we will have rust-outs before we can replace the Tribal class or the frigates or anything else that we have, for that matter. I am a little less charitable than you are about that. I am not at all sure that I like the present policy and the direction it seems to be forcing us into, and that is no money for the navy, perhaps until such time as the new army is really well established and up and running. While there is some merit in that, I think there is an overriding principle that you have alluded to and that, of course, is sovereignty, which brings me to the North.
I am one of those dreamers who believe in northern sovereignty although, relative to the time and relative to today, we had very expensive plans or dreams or hopes that we might locate what we used to call a class seven or eight vessel of significant tonnage in the North. It would be large enough to encompass law courts, and medical diagnostic capabilities, libraries, and an RCMP detachment. It would stay there until it had to come out of the water and have its bottom scraped, everything else being built into the design to make it self-sustaining in the Arctic. I think that if we had had that in place, and had it been the base for a small contingent of military people, we might have done much to tell the world that while we had no great objections to anybody using the waters as long as they were used properly, we did not want to lose the right of control of the passage, albeit in pursuit of their ``lawful business on the high seas,'' I suppose is the phrase.
Could I ask you what you think about that idea, some 25 years after it was wrapped? Is it something that we could look at that might, ironically, be relatively inexpensive in terms of assuring permanent presence and a permanent reminder?
Mr. Haydon: With all due respect, I think this is more than just a naval issue. There is a much broader issue. However, I think the same rule applies to the Arctic as applies to the ocean.
Senator Forrestall: I will put it in the military context. I should have said that, as opposed to it being a Department of Transport vessel, I would go the route of the Labrador. There would then be less question.
Mr. Haydon: That is accepted, senator. The point is, as I just said, that the basic rule is, as for the ocean so for the Arctic, we need to know what is going on there. We need to have an unequivocal government presence in that area and we need to be able to respond to a crisis. If we cannot get there by land and we cannot there by air, then we must get there by sea.
I think one of the important things about an icebreaker today is that there is a natural synergism between the icebreaker community and the scientific community, and in which, oddly enough, the submarine community is now beginning to play an increasing large role as well. An icebreaker is a very useful ship that can be sent to many places that no other ship can go. I think it would be a tragedy if we, as a country, as a whole, got out of the icebreaker business. Whether or not we want to see the navy back in the icebreaker business is a good question. If money is scarce, I think the navy would say they would rather spend their money on things other than icebreakers, but there is no earthly reason why there cannot be a joint management concept between the Department of Transport, or Fisheries and Oceans, I should say, and the navy, on how these icebreakers are manned. Why should the helicopter on the back end of the icebreaker not be a military helicopter?
Generally, I think the answer we are coming around to is that an increased military presence in the Arctic would be a good thing. If we are to see a reduction in the amount of ice up there and an opening up of some of those waters, then there will be concern for additional means of regulating those waters.
I talked to the Captain of the Louis St-Laurent several years ago when he and one of the U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers laboriously made their way up to the North Pole to find, over the horizon, a Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker, complete with kids on board, whose crew then put on a rock concert at the North Pole. They were not very happy with that and they said ``No, these are capabilities that we find embarrassing that we have to work this hard.'' Therefore, I think we need to get back into the icebreaker business with a little bit more assertiveness than we have had in the past. Does that answer your question?
Senator Forrestall: Yes, it does, and yes, it was a little embarrassing, there is no doubt about that.
The second part of this sort of general question is the fate of our four submarines. We watched this morning on television the arrival of the blackened remains of the fourth one, the final one. Can these vessels, these boats as they are referred to, be rehabilitated? Can we bring them to a state where we could dare to send one or two of them, at any given time, up and under the ice — not for an extended period, of course, but for a general period of time? What do you think about that?
Mr. Haydon: I read two questions in that. Can the submarines be rehabilitated or made functional or operational again? The answer to that is: Undoubtedly. We can certainly get another 15, and perhaps even 20 years of use out of those hulls. They are a fourth-generation submarine, which means they are incorporated with the latest designs and hull forms and all the modern technology. The old Oberon class that the navy had before were the second generation. One of the problems of activation at the moment is that the individual sailors in those submarines have had to skip a generation of submarines. It's a huge learning curve.
Senator Forrestall: To learn that, yes, exactly.
Mr. Haydon: It is a much more complex system to evolve. One of my colleagues, and not unreasonably, said that the modern submarines, such as the Victoria class, is about as complicated technologically as a space shuttle. There is a great deal of technology in those submarines that our people have never had to work with before.
Can we send them under the ice? The answer is you can send a diesel electric submarine under light ice. I spent about two and half weeks of my early life in a diesel electric submarine underneath the ice out here in the gulf. We were not effective. We spent more time being concerned for our own safety, even in that kind of ice. It is somewhat frightening when you find that the ice has closed in over the top of you, and you have about three feet of ice that you have to push through if you need to replenish the air in the submarine.
These submarines would have to be given some kind of enhanced propulsion system, such as either much better batteries or an air independent fuel cell system if we are to use them on anything more than just a token ``see, I can do it'' type of trip under the ice. They would have to be given that capability. Can they go to the Arctic? No, they cannot.
Senator Forrestall: Should we be giving quiet consideration — and a yes or no answer will suffice — to nuclear capability?
Mr. Haydon: If we want to go to the Arctic, we must look at nuclear power again, yes.
Senator Forrestall: Is it important?
Mr. Haydon: That is a good question. I think, downstream, we will be increasingly concerned with the Arctic, particularly if the present trend and cycle of global warming has any significance, and we may need to operate in those waters. If we are to operate in those waters, and under those waters, a nuclear submarine is the only answer.
Senator Forrestall: I have a final area to cover, with a couple quick questions. If we do not defend our coastlines, I have no doubt that our American friends will, and they will not do it for our benefit; they will do for their own.
Is there any merit in doing something with the Canadian Coast Guard, separating it from Oceans and Fisheries, allowing the Department of Transport, in a sense, to maintain its control and responsibility for aids of navigation and all that that implies, and the development of a series of cutters — say, 60 to a 100, 120, 140 foot, with somewhat ice- strengthened hulls, and with the capacity to operate in relatively shallow harbours? In other words, vessels with the ability to operate close in to land for interdiction purposes and for coastal survey, and passing to the Canadian Reserves a responsibility for the military security, first responders, in the military sense, to this coastline that embraces not just what we are familiar with there in the Atlantic but on the Pacific, on the Great Lakes and, increasingly, in the great rivers of the North and the St-Lawrence? In other words, it would give the Halifax Rifles something to do?
Mr. Haydon: That is an interesting question, senator. I have to be a little obtuse to answer, I think, fairly. A prior question that has to be asked is: How much is the government prepared to let happen without taking action? How many incidents of illegal fishing, how many incidents of illegal smuggling people or narcotics — and it has happened. How important is it to be a presence along the shore at all times? If the government requires us to have 100 per cent coverage of the ocean so that all crime is detected and stopped, then we must call on huge resources of people in the Coast Guard, in the militia and in the navy. They will probably all have to go to work to do something like that. Perhaps one of the things that must happen is to go back and answer that basic question: What is the risk factor that we are prepared to live with? Then, once we have defined an acceptable level of risk from contraband-running or from other things, then we can begin to see how many resources we would need, and what kind, to give us that threshold.
Senator Forrestall: Has the navy ever done a risk analysis?
Mr. Haydon: Not to my knowledge.
Senator Forrestall: What about any other government groups?
Mr. Haydon: It always comes down to the same question, which is defining what is acceptable risk.
Senator Forrestall: Yes.
Mr. Haydon: That is a political answer, and I do not think anybody has really found the need to wrestle with that one because it is an enormously difficult question.
Senator Forrestall: You are a good man, doing a good job.
The Chairman: Professor Haydon, you raised the question of building ships in Canada. What premium do you think we should be prepared to pay to build vessels in Canada? Perhaps we could start with what premium do you think we paid on the frigates?
Mr. Haydon: That is a good question; a tough question. I am not sure I can give you a numerical answer. Obviously there is a premium, but it is more than just the ship; it is all the long chain of related industries that come into play. The steel is made at various steel mills in Canada, so you would be supporting industries all over.
The Chairman: W understand that but if you purchase offshore, sir, you will get industrial offsets in any event as well, so that will be a wash, either way.
Mr. Haydon: I would need to go back, and I cannot answer you with a percentage because I simply do not know. Obviously they must be there, and one would have to go back and look at, for instance, what it cost when we bought the three Oberon class submarines in the 1960s, what additional premiums and taxes on that purchase were charged by the government. The net result was that that was much cheaper than trying to build those equivalent submarines in this country.
If your requirement is for, say, a dozen or more ships, you would have to work very carefully with some other state to determine what kind of deal we could get. Then you might have a political problem with that. If you were going out and buying a dozen ships elsewhere, you would have to explain to the Canadian people why you are sending $15 billion offshore and supporting the jobs of people in another country. That would be a difficult one. It has always been a difficult one. This is why I think some of the people that I know in the shipbuilding industry are trying to look at innovative ways of crossing this bridge, and perhaps consider that one of the options is to have the basic hull and propulsion system built offshore, then bring the component parts back here and put then together and fit out the ship itself with its various fighting systems and surveillance systems as a Canadian package. That way, you keep the Canadian electronics industries and the systems industries in being, and the relatively low cost, as it comes out, of just bending and welding steel can be done offshore.
The Chairman: There are a number of problems, sir, and perhaps you can address them for us. The first problem is the lack of competition right now, and if you rejuvenate a yard, or put a yard out, you do not have competition.
The second issue that you could address which would be helpful would be to discuss where shipbuilders actually make their money, and that is in change orders. Once the contract is let, the person putting out the contract is captive to virtually any price or change orders. For several decades now, we have seen yards in Canada indulge in low bidding, and then making their money on the change orders. With the frigates then being built in two yards, we saw that it was the political process that was driving it, not economics. Do you think the estimates we have heard, of a 30 to 40 per cent premium, are unrealistic?
Mr. Haydon: I think that is high, yes. The frigate contract is a lot more convoluted than that, with all due respect, senator. When the first decision was made by the government in what 1973 or 1974, to build those ships, there were, in fact, six shipyards in business in this country, I think. Systematically, those shipyards closed and all took themselves out of the construction area. You saw amalgamations of shipyards along the St. Lawrence, Vickers folded or went out of the main business, the yard in Sorel closed, and so you were left with only the one yard, the Davy shipyard, under which it became MIL as the one contractor. Then you had Saint John which always had three ships. Therefore, combinations of building a ship and a half in Sorel and a ship and a half somewhere else all of a sudden had to go. The industry was in a state of chaos itself at the time, so it was not fair.
Competition is enormously difficult, and I am not an economist but you talk about lack of competition. My simple sailor's mind says to me that if you go to South Korea, you will be giving them money to build a subsidized ship, because they subsidize their yards. Is it better to subsidize a Canadian yard or to subsidize a South Korean yard? These are political questions, sir. This is why I say that the shipbuilding issue is very difficult.
I know that there is only one possible shipyard open. It is likely that another yard might open up on the West Coast, and this is why my colleagues who are in the shipbuilding industry are trying to look at some innovative ideas at the moment to see how we can get around this one. Modularization is possibly the way that you get back at competition and away from — not the lack of competition, I should say, but rather to get the project completed. It is a national problem; we should solve it nationally.
The Chairman: Will there ever be a case where Canada will need a vessel that is unique to Canada, or will there always be other countries that will require similar vessels to those of Canada, and should we take advantage of the economies that would flow from that?
Mr. Haydon: Again, that is a very interesting question. Yes, we do need a vessel, in the long term, that is unique to our own areas because we have to have something that has some kind of ice capability. It is just simply not good enough to say ``I can only get into Hudson Bay for 46 days of the year.'' That is not an adequate answer. We must be able to send a vessel up there for more days than that.
The only other two countries that are really working in those types of vessels, in which there is a degree of ice- strengthening and endurance, are Finland and Sweden. The Finns have an international reputation for building superb icebreakers and superb ice-capable ships, so much so that the Russians even prefer to have their ships built in Finland.
The Chairman: So does the Canadian oil industry.
Mr. Haydon: The answer is yes. We should be talking to these people to see what designs they have, what innovation they have. I made the suggestion, as I was talking to Senator Atkins, that we do need this next generation of Canadian war ships that will be somewhere around 4,000 tonnes, but it will have to be ice-capable. Yes, we should be talking to the Swedes and to the Finns and looking at designs there, because what they are doing is interesting.
The Chairman: When you are talking about the Arctic, and submarines that are capable of operating in the Arctic, what exactly would a Canadian submarine do if it were sailing under the ice in the Arctic and came across a Russian, a French or an American submarine?
Mr. Haydon: If it were a French or an American submarine, we, or the submarine captain, would know to begin with that it was there, because of the Water Space Management Program. If it were a Russian submarine, that would be interesting. The Russians are still not very good about sharing information. I do not think that we could send somebody up there without a great deal of fanfare beforehand. A ship would not be going up there in a stealthy operation. It would be going up primarily for reasons of sovereignty, to patrol and to show the flag, saying ``Hey, we can do this if we have to.'' Second, we would almost certainly fill that submarine with some scientific equipment and take double advantage of the trip.
The Chairman: My point is: Are there not other ways of determining when a submarine enters the Arctic, and are we not capable of finding out who is entering and leaving the Arctic when we choose to?
Mr. Haydon: Through the Water Space Management Program, we have access.
The Chairman: Not through that program, sir. Perhaps by other means.
Mr. Haydon: If you want the details on the technology, I am not sure how much I am allowed to remember about this.
The Chairman: Is it enough to say that there are other ways of determining whether there is?
Mr. Haydon: But they were never proven effective.
The Chairman: Then you do not believe that we have the capacity to determine which submarines are active under the ice?
Mr. Haydon: No, not yet. There has been talk about all sorts of ideas, from radar satellites looking down through ice, but they proved invalid. There have been several attempts to put down underwater listening arrays in the Arctic, but there were some technological problems with that that were never resolved.
The other thing too, as people have noted, is that the underside of the Arctic ice is incredibly noisy. We worry about the jackhammers in the parking lot. The underside of the Arctic ice is incredibly noisy, and the ability to pick out the sound of a submarine from the background noise of the Arctic ice is found to be incredibly difficult. A couple of very good books have been written on under-ice ASW, or amorphous solid water.
Senator Downe: I want to ask you a question about procurement, and to get your views on what the problem is with procurement. We had the tragedy of the recent submarine purchased from the United Kingdom. We have ongoing Sea King helicopter problems. By the time we receive the matériel that the military require, it is usually dated, and in some cases by generations. What is your view on that, the procurement problem in the Canadian Armed Forces?
Mr. Haydon: To be blunt, it is over-politicized. What we need to do is go back several decades and get to the point where we say, ``I need a capability. What are my options for meeting that capability?'' and then going ahead and acquiring it. If that requires you to have your own shipyard to do it, so be it. If you can make an effective deal with another state to acquire it for you, so be it.
It takes so long to process a major military procurement through the political system that you lose four or five years in the process. How long has it taken us to get a replacement for the Sea King helicopter? I think I remember the original paper being written somewhere in about 1982 to replace that machine. The requirement to replace the Oberon submarines, to my knowledge, was written in 1981, when those submarines were beginning to get to the half-life point.
It is unfortunate that the ebb and flow of politics works completely contrary to the normal military procurement process through which one would like to see a normal transition, so ships, airplanes, tanks, trucks, and all the rest of it do not run into the rust-out phase before they are replaced. In other words, we do not seem to have the ability to meet that deadline, and to order in a timely fashion.
Senator Downe: Could it be argued that one of the reasons we are not meeting the deadline is that, for the last number of decades, the Government of Canada has not advanced the funds that are required? In the military, rather than giving the government a menu and saying ``For this amount of money, we can do A, B and C,'' the Canadian military is trying to do all things, and they are not focussed enough. If they came to the government with one agenda: ``We need just these items and we can do this?''
For example, from my limited readings, I understand that New Zealand has re-crafted their defence policy by determining that they could not do everything and deciding that they would focus on, and do very well in, a small number of areas. Maybe that should be a consideration here. What is your view on that?
Mr. Haydon: I do not really agree with the concept of going into niche roles, unless you are assured that you have partners who will cover off your deficiencies for you. I think the niche role concept worked relatively well during the NATO era when we had an integrated force planning structure. Then we did not have to have the full Canadian capability. At the end of the Cold War and at the dawn of this new, rather uncertain era, we must stand back and say to ourselves: What capabilities can we afford not to have? This goes back to what we talked of earlier, about risk management. Can we afford not to be able to do that? What are our national priorities? Is, for instance, getting the DART out of the country, in the air and into some other place in, say, four days a national priority? If so, then we need to buy the airplanes to make that happen. We cannot rely on renting them. Do we require to be able to sail a destroyer out of Halifax or Esquimalt in three days, with three days' notice, to go do some task or be somewhere? If so, we must then have the ship with that capability and the necessary infrastructure to support it.
With all due respect to all politicians, one of the problems is that we got into the very bad habit of trying to define defence policy in abstract terms. If we could learn to define defence policy in more precise terms, such as maintain total surveillance over all our oceans, with the ability to respond to all incidents within six hours or something — that is an arbitrary figure — then, we would give the military planners something to which they could plan at the moment. If you read our defence policy carefully, there is very little to which to plan.
I am on record as saying that I thought the naval portion of the 1994 Defence White Paper was sound policy for all time. It does not need to be changed and, in fact, based on that part of that white paper, it was perfectly adequate planning guidance for the naval staff to get on and say: ``We need this many ships of this type and at these levels of readiness to meet that objective.''
However, when you are faced with rather emphasized statements of government policy, such as ``We may from time to time want to deploy a battalion's worth or a battalion's equivalent of soldiers to some country,'' that is an impossible planning task for a military planner because your reply must be, ``Very well, I can work with a thousand soldiers, but how heavily will they be equipped? Will they be going with their own vehicles? If they are taking their own vehicles, then I need some kind of a sea lift. If I am to jump them in in the form of an airborne regiment, then I have to have the necessary airplanes.'' Therefore, in my view, the military and the politicians must get together and agree upon some more precise language as the basic framework of defence policy. This, I think, comes down to the procurement problem. You are trying to nail Jell-O to the wall, and it is not working.
Senator Downe: A critic might argue that DART is a perfect example, though, of a non-focussed military. We have this wonderful institution ready to go at a moment's notice, and then we find out when we need them that they do not have all of the infrastructure to do their job. We have them trained, we have the equipment for them, but I understand that we have no way of getting them to the site.
Would it not be better to have DART from the beginning to the end? In other words, that they have not only the training and equipment, they have the planes and everything they need to do their job on a moment's notice, rather than having half of DART and no way of getting them there; this part of the navy but not having this other part of the navy; that we simply have a more focussed military, funded to do what we are asking them to do. Should the military not come back to the government and say ``Here is what we can do for the amount of money you are giving us. We cannot do these other things. We do not meet these commitments because we do not have the resources.'' I would argue, over the last number of decades, that the Government of Canada has not advanced the resources to do all the jobs that they were asking the Canadian military to do. What are your views on that point?
Mr. Haydon: I agree, absolutely. If you are to have DART, have it all.
Senator Forrestall: Professor, could we go back for a minute or two — and not because you suggested it but because you repeated it on a number of occasions, that we should be looking at a vessel of about 4,000 tonnes. Why not 4,800 tonnes, or why not 3,600 tonnes? I am thinking specifically of what was added. When we created the Tribal class, we were looking to have the capacity to produce clean water from waste water. Then we took that out and derived an imbalance in the vessel, which was always a bit of a problem.
Why not 4,600 tonnes? My thumbnail calculation tells me that handles a machinery space, and two helicopters. It handles environment considerations and all of the trimmings that go with that, plus a slightly heavier hull.
Mr. Haydon: I agree, but until you define the specifications, you cannot put an actual figure on the tonnage.
Senator Forrestall: Very well.
Mr. Haydon: A helicopter capability adds roughly 1,000 tonnes of displacement to the ship. If you want to just keep the ship at sea for 14 days, that is another 1,500 tonnes of displacement, so we are up to 2,500 already. You then have the machinery and everything else. This is where an able architect should be sitting here, telling you that, but no, there are indeed rules of thumb.
Senator Forrestall: Yes.
Mr. Haydon: It is capability-driven. If you only wanted to stay out for three days, then it would be a smaller ship, but if you wanted to stay out at sea for a long time, it would be in the 4,000-5,000 bracket.
Senator Forrestall: Even with the fleet replenishment capability for fuel, which is a very heavy component?
Mr. Haydon: The point about the fleet replenishment ship is that it can service a group of ships, four or five ships.
Senator Forrestall: Yes.
Mr. Haydon: Therefore, you can keep a much larger area under watch than you can do with one ship, but you would not send a fleet replenishment ship with one sole ship. Each ship needs to have a certain amount of fuel to operate with a degree of freedom. Otherwise, you are tethering it too tightly.
Senator Cordy: Living in Halifax, you would understand that when the fire occurred aboard the Chicoutimi, which was a catastrophe, certainly, for the people of Nova Scotia, there were a number of articles in the newspapers saying that perhaps the Canadian Navy no longer needs submarines in the year 2005, or 2004 at the time. You said in response to an earlier questioner that, in fact, we do need the submarines. I wonder if you would just expand on that a little bit.
Mr. Haydon: A submarine gives you the ability to do things that no other ships can do, through stealth, through long endurance and its ability to duck below the storm. You can send a submarine out for 50 days to work for you and it does not have to come home for food, fuel or water for that period. You cannot do that with a surface ship.
A surface ship, when you get to a really rough sea state, its performance starts deteriorating. A submarine can duck underneath the water, underneath the waves, and still perform, although perhaps to a slightly limited amount or a slightly restricted amount, and you have the ability to employ stealth.
The other enormous advantage of the submarine is that it has the ability to go below the water structure and find the optimum listening areas so that it can give you advanced warning of probably 120-130 nautical miles of other ships headed your way, if, say, you have a sensitive operation ongoing and you do not want intruders to take you by surprise. There was a case recently during the operations in the Arabian Sea where a submarine, — and I forget which nationality — wandered into the operating area of the Americans, and they said ``We do not want this guy here.'' In fact, the Canadian warship was sent to find that submarine and track it out. That detection had been made by another submarine. Therefore the submarine has an enormous role to play in the overall defence of a larger group of people.
With the modern submarine, its primary role today is surveillance. It has so much sophisticated equipment that you can use below the water, or you can put a mast up and gain intelligence from other areas without being seen, the ideal being that you can use the submarine going in ahead of an operation to find out what is happening without tipping your hand that you are interested in something going on there.
The use of a submarine in a drug bust a few years ago, I think, was somewhat overplayed, but it was certainly very useful because the submarine stayed about half a mile from the ship the Coast Guard were intending to board and was able to radio back all the details of how high the freeboard was and what kind of a ladder they would need to get on board and everything else, and so it made the whole arrest process a lot simpler. They could not have accomplished that much with an airplane or another ship because it would have been detected, and that would have warned the perpetrators. That is just one of the many uses that can be madeof a submarine today.
One of the keys about submarines is that they are versatile. You can use them in so many different ways, and the fact that they are cheaper to operate than surface ships is a bonus.
Senator Cordy: Should we feel confident that the Victoria class submarines will be safe as well as being effective?
Mr. Haydon: I would go back to sea in them in a heartbeat. They are perfectly safe.
Senator Cordy: Just to change the topic a little, you spoke earlier about the 1994 White Paper on Defence being very valid with respect to the navy aspect of it. I am just wondering whether or not you would recommend any changes in 2005 in terms of the navy?
Mr. Haydon: I would indeed. I would put slightly heavier emphasis on the national security aspect, particularly the requirements for surveillance in our own waters. The other thing I would emphasize a little more strongly is the ability to integrate a single Canadian ship into either an American or a NATO formation, or an ad-hoc formation of multinationals. This, in my opinion, is probably the most useful way that a warship can be a contribution to diplomacy in the future. The frigates have worked remarkably well with American formations for a decade now and have given a very good account of themselves. They have 25 years of working with the NATO squadron, doing enormously useful work. It allows us to be there, and gives us access into the decision-making process. As far as the NATO squadron is concerned and, in fact, I gather this is likely to happen in the next year or so — that instead of putting a destroyer into the NATO squadron, we might put a submarine into it. It would work in that way.
Senator Cordy: We are currently very inter-operable with the United States navy, are we?
Mr. Haydon: Yes.
Senator Cordy: What about with the navies of other NATO countries?
Mr. Haydon: Yes, indeed.
Senator Meighen: Just to change subjects completely, Mr. Haydon, you are around university students a great deal, and they may not be totally reflective of the Canadian public as a whole, but one of the things that this committee has found to be a bedevilling issue is the continuing apparent lack of real commitment of the Canadian public with respect to our forces. I wondered whether, in past years, you have detected any discernible changes in the attitudes of the students with whom you have come into contact?
Mr. Haydon: At Dalhousie, we have always been very lucky that we have had a strategic studies think-tank presented in foreign policies studies and integrated right into the Department of Political Science. Through the self- conferences we put on, the seminars we put on, there is always a core of students that are interested in defence issues. A lot of them are MA students just in pure political science, but they have accepted the fact that defence policy is, in effect, an extension of international relations policy. If we tie that in there, we have always had 20 to 25 students at any given time who have shown interest in some aspect of defence. Many of them go on to work in the civil service, either in Foreign Affairs or DND. Several go into the military. They all move on.
That small core is probably deceptive. We have had a series of lunchtime seminars — I did one the week before last on submarines. There was one just before Christmas on ballistic missile defence. There are a couple more coming up. We will find anywhere from 60 to 75 students of all faculties and disciplines in there, listening. I would have said, if anything, that there is a thirst for knowledge because it is not being provided in the media. It is not being provided for completely on the Internet.
Sometimes these kids come along and just love to discuss contentious, defence-related issues. They just revel in it. About two years ago, I taught a course on civil-military relations. It started out with about 27 students. We got into some heavy stuff under the whole business of volunteer forces, all-volunteer forces, whether the military should be a social experiment — all of these sorts of things. We did not duck a single issue. After two hours of a seminar like that, you are exhausted, but it was good. I think there is a genuine thirst for knowledge and I think the reason for that is that that sort of information is not as readily available as it should be.
Senator Meighen: One of the purveyors of that information, it seems to me, could be, in a better fashion, the Department of National Defence. In other words, you can only ride with the pictures of soldiers giving candies to kids for so long. Where is the real meat on the bone of the necessity of effective forces to pursue national interest, to pursue foreign policy? The linkage is not apparent to most Canadians, and I do not see the department itself — and I stand to be corrected, of course — doing a heck of a lot to make the link.
Mr. Haydon: Unfortunately, I agree with you. I think they have lost the ability to communicate. You read some of the papers that come out of there and — I'll probably get shot for saying this [...]
Senator Meighen: Oh, I will be shot first.
Mr. Haydon: [...]the gobbledygook is incredible. You cannot understand what these DND papers are telling you. You have to examine them thoroughly and start to look for useful words, and then sort of say to yourself, ``Well, I think I understand what is being said.'' There was a time when the military reached out into the community far more. I do not think this happens. Ship visits were made to every small town in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and P.E.I. on a regular basis. This is one of the nice things about the old days, when we used to go and beat ourselves to death on the Grand Banks, looking at Soviet fishing vessels and intelligence-gathering vessels. We used to get to spend time in a different outport each weekend. That was great. That was our break. Then, the relationship between the navy and the community was far greater. In my opinion, it is this whole business of there being a crying need for a very much more sophisticated and effective public education program.
Senator Meighen: If you think they are not so visible in Maritime Canada, just think what it is like in Toronto or Winnipeg.
Mr. Haydon: I do not know how you would get a ship to Winnipeg.
Senator Meighen: Out of sight, out of mind.
The Chairman: Senator Meighen, I thought you were about to explain our system of fines to get the military to speak one of the two official languages.
Senator Meighen: No, I leave that to you, Chairman.
The Chairman: Thank you.
Senator Meighen: Jumping again, Mr. Hayden, while we have you here and benefitting from your experience, what about intelligence? What I mean is, interdiction is really luck. We cannot put a member of the Halifax Rifles along every mile of coastline.
The Chairman: He only says that when Senator Forrestall is not in the room.
Senator Meighen: I was hoping to get points from him. In any event, catching bad guys, to a significant extent, is the result of good intelligence. I do not know if your studies have incorporated a look at our intelligence-gathering capability, but what are your thoughts on expanding our gathering ability abroad and our existing ability in Canada?
Mr. Haydon: Can I do the Canada part first and I will stick with my knowledge base, which is sea-going stuff. Edmund McNeill, in Halifax, took me and a few of the other people from Dalhousie down to his operation centre two weeks ago, and we had a wonderful look at it. That is very impressive. When he said there were 550 ships at any one time in the Canadian area, I believed him. When he tells me that he knows the names of the masters of most of those ships, I still believe him. What he has there is a huge data compilation process that links in information from Britain, from Lloyds Registry, from all the other government departments of Fisheries and Oceans, and everything is drawn in. Where they do not know something, they will be able to task an aircraft or a ship to go and take a look and say, ``Tell me what that is.'' They have reached the level of sophistication where they know just about everything that is happening out there.
Senator Meighen: Plus the fact that there is now a requirement to report, is there not?
Mr. Haydon: It is a requirement to report, but there is still a surprising number of people, I gather, who do not. I think some of our nefarious friends do not report in. I am sure not all of the yachtsman report in. However, the facility has a much better ability to track that, the point being that that is a very multinational, joint, interdepartmental process. Information is pulled in from all over. In the same way, the Canadian input is being made into the other systems, so we are on the edge of a global maritime information-sharing basis. Do we need to have any more assets? No. The way in which it is going at the moment at sea is that, as long as we are happy with what is there, we can then fulfil our collection requirement.
Getting into more widely based information collection or intelligence, I believe that Revenue Canada, RCMP and so forth have people in place who report from afar, and I understand, from what I have been told, that a significant number of drug busts are made as a result of inside information at some stage.
Do we need to be into that outreach information process? I think the answer is yes. I think we must be. It all fits into the bigger puzzle. Somebody once described the naval intelligence picture to me as somebody who has mixed a jigsaw puzzle with a plate of spaghetti and taken away all of the edges. You then need to put it together little dot by little dot. I think we have made huge strides over the years, but that does not mean we have it all done yet.
Senator Atkins: Just a quick question. Would you re-establish the UNTDs or the COTC on campuses across the country?
Mr. Haydon: I was not one, but yes, I think it was a great program. It is sort of happening in an unofficial way at the moment. I think if we were to suddenly say in Dalhousie, ``Would everybody who is a member of the reserve come into classes on one day a week with their uniforms on,'' I think we would be surprised at just how many reservists do actually come to school on a full-time basis, and even on a part-time basis. Halifax, though, is not a good example because it is garrison city, and it has always been that way. In most other big cities, you have a significant number of students who are quite happy to be members of the reserve and do their training in summer, knowing full well that they get paid a reasonable amount, and that makes a huge contribution to their education.
However, if you are asking about a formalized program, yes, I think it made a lot of sense in those days. I think there are always problems with commitment afterwards. If you say to somebody, ``If we subsidize your education, you have to remain in the reserve or the militia for X years,'' I think there is a shard of concerns with doing that these days. However, if you look at it from a contractual basis, perhaps not. I do not know.
Senator Banks: My question is almost fanciful. Since you are in a think tank, I presume that you have, from time to time, projected things forward and looked at the far distant future. You talked about the fact that our navy, and to some lesser extent, perhaps, our other two services, are interoperable with NATO squadrons and the like. I am wondering how long we will be able to keep that up, because in particular the U.S. military, but American technology in general is leaping forward exponentially.
When we were in Washington, we met with a woman who runs a department that spends approximately our annual military budget on crazy, whacko things that may or may not come off. The equivalent of the guy with the gadgets in the James Bond movies, I would say. Some of them actually work. Will we be able to afford — and will anybody else in the world be able to afford — to continue to be interoperable with the Americans, or will they get so far ahead of everybody else that we will have to stop that?
Mr. Haydon: That is a fascinating question, sir. I think it is a problem for the Americans as much as it is for anybody else, because they depend, now, on coalition operations. Just on the naval part, they do not have a naval structure that has adequate destroyers or frigates within it, so they rely on our navy, on the British navy, on Germany or the other navies to provide some of those lighter forces — the escort forces, if you want to call them that, using an old term. Basically, what they are saying is that they need to create a two-tier system, and I believe that this is now happening. In other words, that they will have one very sophisticated tier of communications and data management systems, but they work between the high level U.S. commanders, and then they will have a secondary working level that is not so demanding. You would really need to ask one of the task group commanders from the Canadian Task Group in the Persian Gulf to explain that concept to you. I think they worked it this way, that you do, in fact, have two levels of operatin, and it works fine.
I was at a NATO conference a few years ago and your question was the major concern of the Spanish navy and some of the other smaller navies: How do they keep pace with the U.S. technology? However, technology is only one part of it. The more complex part of it, interoperability, sometimes is the intellectual interoperability; that you have to be able to think along parallel lines as to how you will conduct the operation; parallel lines as to how you manage the information and how you share the information. Therefore, it is more than just nuts and bolts, or computer chips. There is a whole training process that needs to go up through the complete military hierarchy and into the political structure, so that civil control of the military, in fact, can be carried out wisely, knowing that these problems with interoperability exist.
When you sit down and draw up the plans for a large, multinational operation, there are various politically difficult things that need to be addressed, such as where do we locate a support base? You have to locate a forward support base. Country A may not like one particular option for doing that, because of diplomatic concerns, so you have to reach a compromise. Your rules of engagement in a multinational force are enormously difficult to work.
It is very much a Canadian problem that the Americans take a very much freer approach to rules of engagement. Canadians have always managed their rules of engagement with enormous care, and very careful political control of the steps. The British are also very cautious in how they go about it. Their concept of political control of the military on a deployed operation is done in a slightly different way to ours. For instance, when the British task force sailed down to the Falklands in 1982, they had a predetermined ladder of escalation, of steps they could take in response to certain Argentinian moves that had 13 rungs to it. I do not know what the top rungs were, since they never reached them. But it was all very easy. If you read Admiral Woodword's book, you can see how those various levels went, and with each rung on the ladder of escalation, so the appropriate rules of engagement were changed. However, Admiral Woodword had to get political approval to move from, say, the second rung to the third rung.
Thus, when you are dealing with this whole matter of interoperability it is, as I said, both technical and intellectual. This is one of the reasons why it is so important to conduct these big, international exercises so that you can get to know how to work with the other people. It also gives the international planning staffs the ability to work together. Generally, you reach a better understanding of another person's political constraints.
For example if you talk to Admiral Madison from his time, when he was the commander of the standing naval force in the Adriatic, they were doing some work fairly close inshore. The German government would not allow the German ship in that standing naval force to work close inshore, so they had to rejig the concept under which the NATO force worked because of the political concerns of one particular government. Again, because they had worked together so well and so long before, it could be done. A new coalition or a new partnership does not have the advantages that NATO has. Its very structure allows people to work together and to solve problems quickly.
Interoperability is a big one, but I think, to answer your question, yes, there are limits on it. However, I think the Americans are as concerned about those limits as anybody else.
The Chairman: Professor Haydon, thank you. The committee is very grateful to you for making the trip over here. It has been an enlightening discussion. It is always interesting to hear from you. We have enjoyed it today. I think you have furthered our understanding of naval matters, and we are very grateful to you for your assistance. We hope that you will come and see us again in the future.
Mr. Haydon: Thank you. It has been a pleasure.
The Chairman: Senators, we now have before us our last panel of the afternoon. We have Lieutenant-Colonel D. B. McKinnon, a former regular force armoured officer who has served in a number of command and staff positions, both in Canada and abroad. He held the positions of Canadian Task Force Commander and Military Observer, Chief Operations Officer for the UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Lieutenant-Colonel McKinnon has been commanding officer of the Prince Edward Island Regiment since September of 2003.
We also have before us Lieutenant-Commander Phillip Mundy. Lieutenant-Commander Mundy attended Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario, and served in the Canadian navy as a MARS officer, both at sea and at the Naval Operations School, prior to his retirement in 2003. He then moved to Summerside, P.E.I., where he joined the Naval Reserve Division, HMCS Queen Charlotte, as the operations officer. Lieutenant-Commander Mundy assumed the position of executive officer of HMCS Queen Charlotte in July 2004.
Finally, we have with us Major A. G. Hynes. Major Hynes began his career in aviation physiology at the Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine in Toronto, Ontario. He joined the Air Reserve Flight at Shearwater in 1997 and was employed as a staff officer in the Wing Corporate Services section until 1998 when he accepted a civilian position as executive director of the Maritime Forces Atlantic Military Family Resource Centre in Halifax, Nova Scotia. In 2000, Major Hynes returned to the Air Reserve. In August of 2002, he was selected to fill the position of Deputy Air Reserve Coordinator for Eastern Canada, working in Halifax for 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters, A1 Reserves.
Gentleman, welcome to the Committee. We are pleased that you could appear before us. I understand you all have brief statements and perhaps we could hear from Colonel McKinnon first. You have the floor, sir.
Lietenant-Colonel D.B. McKinnon, P.E.I. Regiment: Honourable senators, the commanding officer of the Prince Edward Island Regiment, which includes a band. As requested, I have prepared an opening statement that will cover the following areas: personal introduction, the history of the regiment, our current mission, roles, organization, resources, personnel, training, impact on the local community and liaison with local responders, and some additional concerns.
As you have noted from my biography, I am a regular force officer, and still am, with over 29 years of service. I have been commander of the regiment for a bit over 18 months. It is a reserve regiment.
I was appointed to command this unit by the Chief of Land Staff to enable the young leaders of the unit to gain needed experience, prior to returning the unit back to reserve command. I am pleased to say that the leadership is ready for this transition and a reserve force commanding officer will replace me this coming summer.
In terms of history, our lineage consists of an amalgamation of cavalry, artillery and infantry units dating back over 125 years. Our official birth is June 25, 1875, less than two years after Canada joined P.E.I. in Confederation, whereby the Government of Canada authorized the 82nd Queen's County Provisional Battalion of Infantry. This infantry unit underwent a number of name changes and redesignations throughout its history. In 1946, it was amalgamated into 17th Prince Edward Island Reconnaissance Regiment of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps. The cavalry/armour portion of our lineage was formed in 1901, and was called L Squadron, the Prince Edward Island Mounted Rifles. It also went through a number of name changes, centred on the Prince Edward Island Light Horse, before the post-war amalgamation.
The third component of the regiment's lineage, the artillery, was authorized as the Prince Edward Island Brigade of Garrison Artillery in 1882. As with the other components, it underwent numerous name changes as it contributed contingents and soldiers to Canada's conflicts in the 20th century, with its final version being amalgamated into the Prince Edward Island Regiment, 17th Reconnaissance Regiment, in 1955. Our Regimental Museum, one of the finest small military museums in Canada, shows our inextricable link to this province and is a major pillar of our outreach program to the community.
Since 1946, the Prince Edward Island Regiment has been an armoured reconnaissance regiment, sending contingents and soldiers to train and operate in many locations throughout the world, whether it was a reconnaissance troop to 4th Canadian Mechanised Brigade Group in Germany in 1976, or a civil-military cooperation team to Bosnia in 2003. Domestically, we supplied over 40 soldiers to assist in the Swissair flight 111 recovery operation, and a reconnaissance troop of 28 personnel to Halifax to give the Halifax Regional Municipality information they needed about on-the- ground damage and power outages to make informed decisions in the aftermath of Hurricane Juan in September 2003.
Our current mission is to generate a combat-capable, multi-purpose armoured reconnaissance force, trained for war and ready to go into operations as directed. Since 1946, our role has been armoured reconnaissance, providing commanders with the information they need about the ground and the enemy that allows them to make informed decisions. We are currently tasked to provide one 21-person, seven-vehicle reconnaissance troop on 48 hours' notice to the Commander of 36 Canadian Brigade Group for domestic operations. In the last five years, we have supplied two personnel to the United Nations mission in the Golan Heights, one to the United Nations mission in Haiti for a brief time last summer, and eight to the NATO missions in the Balkans.
We are currently organized in accordance with the army reserve establishment for an armoured reconnaissance regiment of one mission element — reconnaissance squadron, which is supported by a command and support element. As well, we have the establishment for a brass/reed band. The total established strength is 130 for the regiment and 35 for the band. My current effective strength is 91 people in the regiment and 18 in the band.
I would like to talk about resources, specifically starting off with infrastructure. We operate from two armouries, one in Charlottetown and one in Summerside. We share these facilities with three cadet corps, a three-member civil- military cooperation team from Land Force Atlantic Area, and a contingency planning officer from 36 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters. The Summerside Armoury is located in the old base supply building from the days of CFB Summerside and meets most of our minimum requirements. The Queen Charlotte Armoury in Charlottetown limits our effectiveness and efficiency due to its age. The armoury was designed as a Naval Reserve Division building in 1953, for HMCS Queen Charlotte. In 2005, its major shortfalls include lack of protected vehicle storage and maintenance areas, inadequate training areas, lack of individual work spaces, poorly organized work spaces, and shortages of material handling and storage spaces. The band works in a separate building with no running water, no telecommunications access, and poor acoustics. These deficiencies are with the area engineers and are awaiting the necessary resources to fix the problem areas. The infrastructure costs, such as grants in lieu of taxes, utilities, rent to Slemon Park Corporation, and repairs are paid for by 3 Area Support Group, headquartered in Gagetown, and are not part of my funding allocation.
In terms of equipment, we currently hold 35 vehicles, which is more than any other unit in 36 Canadian Brigade Group. The majority are the Iltis jeeps, which are being replaced this year by 16 of the Light Utility Vehicle Wheeled, LUVW, command and reconnaissance variant. This change is quite welcome, even if it brings a number of training challenges.
Something that is a bit more daunting is the challenge of trying to operate with the limited level of tactical and garrison communications resources, and the tight distribution of mission essential surveillance equipment. Our lack of tactical communications equipment hinders our training. This also applies to surveillance equipment. As an armoured reconnaissance regiment, equipment such as night vision goggles, night observation devices, ground surveillance radars and other sensors is essential to the completion of our assigned tasks and training. We hold none of these essential equipment, and any attempts to borrow them are a constant uphill struggle. The problem is being examined as part of the Army Reserve Field Equipment Table initiative, and we look forward to some rationalisation.
On the garrison side of equipment, our communications problem results from our 50-year old building not being upgraded for the information age, resulting in few or jury-rigged network connections, and no connections available to the band. This means that as we continue to go towards computer-based learning and working, the few connections and computers available in the armoury will become even more overloaded on training nights. We will continue to make do, but it appears to us that the area has not been given enough funding to allow it to properly support our garrison information management requirements.
In terms of funding, based on 37.5 training days, the Prince Edward Island Regiment receives an annual allocation of over $740,000 for the regiment and the band. This does not include money for most individual training, which is held either at the brigade group or higher level. This funding allows me to meet my minimum training requirements, which my commander and I agree to before the beginning of the fiscal year through the operating plan or business planning process. I would like to do more training, and the soldiers could be more capable, if we had more unit funding.
In terms of personnel, first the full-time personnel: We are currently assigned four regular rorce personnel and three full-time reserve force personnel. The regular force numbers do not include me, as I am held on the strength of Land Force Command Holding List for Commanding Officers/Deputy Commanding Officers of Militia Units. However, the number of regular force personnel is a concern. My major focus during the year is training the soldiers of the unit. Today's training environment has changed significantly, even from ten years ago. The administrative requirement for everything from environmental assessments to the extra coordination effort required due to the greatly reduced number of training areas available to us, along with ensuring that maximum economy and accountability is achieved whenever training is conducted, has imposed heavier and heavier workloads on the full-time training support staff. At the unit level, that is the regular force cadre. Currently, my cadre cannot keep up with the training support workload and still provide training to the soldiers. Therefore, the quality of training suffers. I believe this was realized during the creation of the army reserve establishments, whereby additional regular force sergeant positions were placed in the reserve force unit establishments. The actual people have not yet materialized, but we hope this will be addressed as part of the 5,000-person increase to the Canadian Forces. The funding for the regular force personnel is centralized at the national level, so their salaries do not come from my unit allocation of funding.
With respect to recruiting, by and large the Prince Edward Island Regiment has met its recruiting objectives for this fiscal year. In fact, we have had our objectives increased by ten. For P.E.I., I believe that there is no secret to recruiting. It takes human resources to attract and follow up on applicants. I am funded for a sergeant at 120 days per year to conduct all the unit attraction activities, and to follow-up potential candidates through the recruiting process, right down to enrolment in the regiment. To be successful, the recruiting sergeant is required on a full-time basis. Therefore, I must take funds from my training budget to fund that difference. For most of the year, we have had a full-time recruiter, and our results speak to that. There may be a national problem at medical bottleneck at Borden, and we share in that problem in terms of increasing processing time, which is frustrating to those waiting to be enrolled. We have few enhanced reliability check problems. The education reimbursement program is a very popular incentive for attracting recruits in P.E.I.. As well, we look forward to the initiatives currently on trial by the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group, with the expectation that processing times will be reduced.
Retention of personnel is good in the Prince Edward Island Regiment. The major reasons for leaving are either a component transfer to the regular force or following full-time employment elsewhere in Canada. Living in a province with an unemployment rate of around 10 per cent, the latter reason is of some significance. In the last five years, we have had 32 of our people transfer directly to the regular force.
Dealing now with training, in order to fulfil our mission, the regiment is required to qualify as many personnel as possible on the army-wide individual battle task standards. We then progress to collective training at the crew, patrol and, finally, the troop level in a squadron context. During the Brigade Group and Area exercises, the training is done within a higher-level framework, but the evaluation and validation is at the troop level. At the beginning of the fiscal year, my commander and I establish what collective battle task standards we should achieve during that fiscal year, and my training plan is designed to do that. In addition, we also conduct one or two basic military qualification courses annually at the unit level. This year we are also conducting with the 8th Canadian Hussars Princess Louise's Regiment from Moncton an Armour Reconnaissance Soldier Development Period 2 course. The latter course started on December 27, and the current BMQ or basic military qualification course just started on Friday, January 28. We have the capacity to run one course at a time comfortably, and we can surge to two at a time for a month or two, which we are doing right now. The limiting factor is the availability of Reserve Force Class A part-time instructors.
In terms of local impact and liaison, the regiment is tasked to provide three gun salutes annually and support the opening at the legislative assembly. In addition, we participate in many community events such as Veterans' Week and Remembrance Day ceremonies. We also assist not-for-profit organizations with tents and other items if they are available, if they are not being used by us, and if their provision does not incur any cost to us. The band is engaged throughout the year across the Island in many events such as university, community college, high school graduations, community parades and a St. Valentine's Day charity ball.
In terms of liaison with the local first-responders, P.E.I. has a very highly integrated first-responders system, with the provincial Emergency Measures Organization and the federal Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada operations centres co-located. Therefore, there is a very quick handover for problems deemed to require a federal government response. I meet regularly with the operations centre staff, usually in conjunction with the land force commander's provincial liaison officer, who also happens to be my adjutant. During Hurricane Juan in September 2003 and the White Juan blizzard last February, regular updates were exchanged between us. Regular contact is also maintained with the provincial police force, L Division of the RCMP, and we have responded to their requests for assistance.
The only additional concern that has not been addressed is the support I receive from Health Services. As a commanding officer, I believe I should be able to tell my commander how many of my soldiers are available to respond to whatever the Government of Canada wants us to do. Knowing the medical deployability of my soldiers is critical to that readiness. The Canadian Forces Health Services are responsible for the medical health and records of the Canadian Forces personnel, including reserves. On November 30, 2004, of my 109 effective strength personnel, 31 of them did not have a current medical category. If called upon, I had no idea if they could do anything for Canada. By using our own unit's funding and our own unit's efforts, we have had eight of them partially updated and a further seven have been completely updated. We will continue to work around the problem using our own funds and efforts.
In conclusion, I am proud of having the honour of commanding such a fine regiment and such fine soldiers. There are challenges facing us now, just as there were challenges in the past. I am sure the regiment will overcome them with the same determination and professionalism that has marked its existence over the last 129 years.
Lieutenant-Commander Phil Mundy, Executive Officer, HMCS Queen Charlotte: Mr. Chairman, honourable senators and guests, I am Lieutenant-Commander Phillip Mundy, the executive officer of the naval reserve division, HMCS Queen Charlotte, and I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I will begin my remarks by providing you with an overview of my background so that you may better understand the experience on which my answers to your questions are based.
I embarked upon a military career at the age of 13, when I joined the Royal Canadian Air Cadets in the fall of 1977. I enjoyed six years in Air Cadets and, following my graduation from high school in 1983, I immediately joined the Canadian Forces as a Naval Cadet and embarked upon a four-year regular officer training program at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario.
Upon graduation in 1987 with a Bachelor of Arts in economics to my credit, I proceeded to Esquimalt, B.C., where I completed my maritime surface and subsurface classification training at Venture, the Naval Officer Training Centre.
During the following 15 years, I spent nine years at sea and carried out the duties of bridge watchkeeper, shipborne air controller, combat officer and Canadian Fleet Atlantic operations officer. I had the opportunity to participate during this period in two Standing Naval Force Atlantic and one Standing Naval Force Mediterranean deployment, as well as UNITAS, Operation Forward Action, MARCOT 97, fisheries patrols and RCMP coastal watch patrols. I retired from the regular force service in July 2003, having completed 20 years, and relocated to Summerside, P.E.I. where I reside with my wife, Susan, and our two children, Samuel, aged 12, and Rachel, aged 10. I elected to be placed on the supplementary holding reserve list during my release process from the regular force and, shortly thereafter, commenced parading with HMCS Queen Charlotte in August 2003 as the operations officer. In July 2004, I was appointed the executive officer and am currently employed on a class `B' contract, filling both my primary duty and those of the training officer.
In addition to my duties in Queen Charlotte, during the past 18 months as a naval reserve officer I have also had the opportunity to participate in two port security exercises conducted in Halifax, Port Guard 03 and Port Shield 04, as the operations officer to Port Security One, one of four non-standing port security units.
HMCS Queen Charlotte, one of 24 naval reserve divisions across Canada, has a long history of recruiting and training dating back to 1923. The current version of Queen Charlotte was officially re-commissioned in September 1994 and moved into a brand new facility specifically designed to support training in September 1997. Queen Charlotte currently has the strength of 132 officers and NCMs. This includes those currently serving on full-time service here in Queen Charlotte and elsewhere, as well as those who parade in the unit during our weekly training night and training Saturdays.
Queen Charlotte has had considerable success over the past several years in recruiting. We enrolled 25 NCMs and three officers last year, and were given a quota this year of 18 NCMs and two officers. To date, we have enrolled two NCMs and are ready to enrol four more. Additionally, there are eight active files at the recruiting centre and our recruiter is in the process of having 18 potential recruits complete the necessary paperwork. While there remain some challenges in processing recruiting applications, Queen Charlotte is confident that we will meet our quota again this year.
Queen Charlotte's primary mission is force generation, to recruit and train personnel to support the missions of the naval reserve. In order to accomplish our mission, Queen Charlotte has an annual operating budget of $290,085 for class ``A'' employment and $72,910 for overhead and maintenance and temporary duty travel.
Queen Charlotte remains prepared through completion of combat readiness requirements, on-the-job training and distributed training to support the naval reserves and the regular force. In the past two years, 11 officers and NCMs have left Queen Charlotte to join the regular force, and an additional 21 were employed in Kingston Class vessels.
Queen Charlotte's secondary mission of enhancing the navy's presence in P.E.I. is also extremely important. Queen Charlotte strives to maintain visibility within the community of Charlottetown and the rest of the province. Queen Charlotte participates in community parades during Remembrance Day, Battle of Atlantic Sunday, the opening of the legislature, the Santa Claus Parade, to name but a few. We continually look for opportunities to showcase our training establishment and highlight the opportunities for training, employment and service that the naval reserve can provide.
In summary, Queen Charlotte continues to strive to fulfil our raison d'etre of recruiting and training naval reservists for Maritime Command, while maintaining and developing closer ties within our community and province.
Major A.G. Hynes, Air Reserve Coordinator (East), 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters: Mr. Chairman, senators, I would like to thank you for the invitation to appear before the committee this afternoon. It is my understanding that this is the first opportunity that you have had to hear from the air reserves. Due to our unique nature and organization in comparison to the armoury reserves and the naval reserves, the real focus of my opening statement today will be on the organization, employment and function of the air reserves.
To begin with, I have been involved with the military for the past 36 years as a cadet, a member of the regular force, the reserves and a civilian employee. I retired from the regular force with 23 years of service and have been an air reservist for approximately five years. I am presently a full-time reservist serving as the acting air reserve coordinator for Eastern Canada. My office is located in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and I belong to 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters located in Winnipeg. My office is responsible for reserves located at St. John's, Gander and Goose Bay, Newfoundland and Labrador; Shearwater, Greenwood, Bridgewater and Pictou, Nova Scotia; Bagotville, Province of Quebec; Ottawa, Trenton, Borden and North Bay in Ontario.
Other units employ reserves within this geographical area. However, these are primarily tactical helicopter squadrons located in Gagetown, Valcartier, St. Hubert, Petawawa and Borden, and they fall under the purview of air reserve coordinator for 1 Wing, located in Kingston, Ontario.
It is important to note that I am not in the direct line of command for units at these locations. Rather, the role of the coordinator is more advisory in nature. We coordinate and facilitate communication and requirements between Winnipeg and locations employing air reservists within our area of responsibility. We also provide policy and administrative advice, interpretation and clarification to flight commanders, commanding officers and wing commanders. Additionally, we provide administrative and financial oversight of the air reserve support organizations through regularly scheduled staff assistance visits, which are essentially compliance monitoring checks. We also provide assistance with personnel issues, succession planning and career mentoring of air reserve majors and master warrant officers and chiefs.
The structure of the air reserves has changed significantly over the past 30 years, prompted by the evolving nature of total force and the force structure changes to the Canadian Forces as a whole. The principle thrust of these changes to the air reserve structure has been to increase the integration of air reservists into the concept of a total air force. The effect was a transition from a traditional structure of separate air reserve headquarters and operational units to integrated total force establishments in almost every air command unit. That is to say, the establishments of air command units are comprised of varying numbers of regular force, reserves and civilians.
As part of the path towards these integrated establishments, special types of air reserve units, called air reserve augmentation flights, or ARAFs, were created started in 1975. The ARAFs were eventually allocated to each air command wing and their mission was to recruit and manage air reserve augmentees who would serve in the regular force units allocated to that wing. The ARAF structure provided a flexible response to personnel shortages within air command. Personnel were members of the ARAF and leant to the establishments where they were employed. However, as the integrated total force establishments were created, it became apparent that the members of the air reserves properly belonged to the unit of employment and not the ARAF. The transition to fully integrated establishments was completed in 1997 and the last ARAF was disbanded.
The recruiting, reserve administration and local career management functions formally handled by the ARAF were assigned to air reserve flights, which are sections within the establishments of 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters, wing headquarters and operational units. These air reserve flights are not units in and of themselves but are part of their parent headquarters or operational unit.
The air reserves at present have an establishment of approximately 3,000 positions, allocated to over 100 air command units, and an effective strength of approximately 2,400. Air command units comprise regular force units and three reserve force units. The ratio of regular force to reserves varies depending upon a number of factors, including local demographics and operational need. Some units, including the three reserve units, are deemed to be ``reserve heavy.'' That is to say, a majority of positions are filled by reservists, while other units may only have a minority, or none at all.
A prime example of a ``reserve heavy'' regular force unit is 14 Airfield Engineering Squadron, headquartered out of Bridgewater, Nova Scotia, and belonging to 14 Wing Greenwood. This unit is comprised of three flights located in Gander, Newfoundland, Pictou, Nova Scotia, and one flight co-located with the headquarters in Bridgewater. At present, the combined establishment is 12 regular force members and 220 reserve positions. This is indeed a unique unit. In the mid-1990s, an initiative was undertaken to establish units in local communities somewhat distant from their parent or host wings. With local community support, the Canadian Forces would commit to establishing units in these areas, and did so based on the returns from the initial survey. These total force units would be economically beneficial to both parties and agreements were reached whereby municipalities would lease facilities to the unit and, during the initial set up, also provided support services such as vehicles and communications.
The benefits to the CF included cost-effectiveness, provision of the local recruiting base and strong community ties. From the local communities' perspective, this arrangement was considered to be a win-win situation, involving a high level of involvement in community events, assistance in not-for-profit community projects, utilization of local community colleges and training sources, employment of personnel in local industry to satisfy military apprenticeship requirements where possible, and allowing reservists to remain near their home town.
One of the many strengths that the air reservists bring to the air force team is that they are required to meet the same training and qualification standards as their regular force peers. Additionally, air reservists generally bring extensive experience and credibility to air force operations, as more than 70 per cent of our personnel have previous regular force time. This means that the air reserve is an older force, with an average individual age of between 44 and 45, and median air reserve years of service of approximately six and a half.
The traditional model of reserve employment consists of parading part-time, that is to say one evening a week and one or two weekends per month, with an annual training commitment of several weeks per summer, generally in concert with attending an educational institution or maintaining a career with a civilian employer. Reserve wide, this model has provided only a minimal standard of training and has been accompanied by high attrition rates. The air reserve approach, driven by the need for highly skilled technical reservists and the necessity of being employed side-by- side with their regular force counterparts, has tended to require a higher rate of part-time employment, and that is roughly eight to 12 days per month. This has been determined necessary to maintain minimal currencies. That is not to say that all air reservists work the same amount of time as there are some who still follow a traditional model of parading at nights and weekends. However, the main portion of work is done during the normal operation schedule of the unit, which for the majority is Monday to Friday, 0800 to 1630 hours. This higher number of days a month worked has tended to attract individuals with past military experience who may be annuitants, and who do not need to work more than in the reserves. This model has provided a stable attrition rate compared to those experienced by the naval and army reserves, and as compared to our ab initio recruits into the air reservists.
As previously mentioned, the training and employment concept of the air reserves is to train, work and perform to the same standard as regular force peers. Accordingly, personnel from either the regular or reserve components should be totally interchangeable. This high level of training has been one of the reasons why the air reserve has been used in greater reliance to offset manning shortfalls within the regular force.
Although the intent of the air reserve is to augment and support the air force through part-time employment to maintain occupational standards and currency, the increasing reliance has resulted, in past years, in more frequent full- time employment. In the past two years, as a result of operational taskings and diminished regular force trained effective strengths, we have seen approximately 40 per cent of the air reserves on full-time service. This capability to surge at home has helped to assist air command to deploy regular force personnel while sustaining operations in Canada, as well as allowing 444 air reservists to participate in deployed and domestic operations during fiscal year 2003-04. In fact, this increased reliance on the air reserves has necessitated the imposition of an authorized manning level, or cap, on the numbers of personnel in the air reserves. This presently stands at 2,467, and that number is necessary in order to remain within allocated funding.
With the imposition of an AML and with a strength of approximately 2,400 air reservists already enrolled, the recruiting effort is now oriented towards replacing attrition and not necessarily growing. The recent introduction of the new compulsory retirement age of 60 has also reduced the level of attrition and further stabilized manning levels. Another impact of stabilized manning levels has been a slight drop in the number of personnel attending training courses. The amount of training is impacted by both reduced recruiting levels and the fact that many of the people recruited into the air reserves already have the prerequisite training from the regular force service.
While it may appear that the air reserves has become a secondary full-time force, the reality of today's security environment, coupled with past defence budget cuts, have required frequent transition on the part of some air reservists between part-time and full-time employment in order to respond to an ever-demanding operational tempo. However, this high level of air reserve surge generation is not expected to be sustained, and the air reserve is presently returning to primarily a part-time organization with the capacity to surge for limited periods when required.
Ten years of experience with our integrated establishment has proven it to be a valuable model for the air force. The contribution made by the air reserve has been clearly valuable.
What of the future? The future roles and function of the air reserve are being addressed as part of an ongoing development of the air force. The air reserve development strategy foresees the continued improvement of the integrated structure through precise definition of the expectation of the reserves in each evolving air force operational and support capability.
Senator Cordy: Thank you very much to the three of you for being with us this afternoon in Charlottetown.
Major Hynes, I would like to start with you. You gave us a lot of information and, as you said, this is the first time we have received any information about air reservists. Sometimes you were talking faster than my brain was processing, so you will excuse me if I ask just for some clarification on some things. One of them was just what you were talking about, just the latter part of it. It is a little bit different in that your work time for your reservists is eight to 12 days a month, which is a fairly substantial amount of time. Thus you are getting many people who are already trained and who are retired ex-military. I should not say ``ex-military'' because you are still military.
Maj. Hynes: That is correct. They are people who have retired for whatever reason. They are still interested in the military, they still have the qualifications, they see it as, maybe, a supplement to their annuity, to keep their finger on things. They provide valuable service to us and I think there are some benefits to the individual as well. Primarily, however, that is the main source from which we get our people.
Senator Cordy: Thus an individual must be willing to commit that amount of time, in day hours rather than evening hours, before he or she can become an air reservist?
Maj. Hynes: Not necessarily. That would depend on the operational needs of the unit, and again, depending on the particular classification of the individual, as to how much time they would actually require to maintain currency. We have situations where air reservists will go into an agreement with the employing unit saying something like, ``I can only make it two days a month.'' However, as long as the unit is in agreement, that that is sufficient to meet their needs, then it is more than sufficient for the organization.
Senator Cordy: You mentioned that there are three dedicated air reserve units. Were all three in Nova Scotia?
Maj. Hynes: No ma'am.
Senator Cordy: Bridgewater —
Maj. Hynes: No, the three reserve units are located in St. Hubert, Borden and Winnipeg. They are designated as reserve units, or reserve squadrons, I should say. In reality, they are total force units as well. By that I mean that they are comprised of both regular force and reserve members.
Senator Cordy: What did you say was in Bridgewater, then? That is what I took as being a dedicated air reserve.
Maj. Hynes: Bridgewater is 14 Airfield Engineering Squadron. That is a regular force unit, but it is considered to be reserve heavy.
Senator Cordy: Very well.
Maj. Hynes: The vast majority of the positions are filled by reservists.
Senator Cordy: What would they do in Bridgewater, for example? They are tied in, you said, to Greenwood and I guess I looked at Bridgewater, and I thought that would be unusual. I would look at Bridgetown, not Bridgewater. You did say Bridgewater, did you not?
Maj. Hynes: Yes, I did.
Senator Cordy: Yes. I would look at something as being closer to Shearwater, or something being a little bit closer to Greenwood — and I am from Nova Scotia, so I know where they are — than Bridgewater. What exactly would the Bridgewater unit that is reserve heavy, what would they do?
Maj. Hynes: They would do the same things a regular force, airfield engineering squadron. I mean, they are comprised of construction/engineering trades, heavy equipment operators, carpenters, plumbers, whatever particular trade would be required to go into a location and set up an airfield. Thus, for all intents and purposes, they are there training to fulfil that role. As I alluded to earlier, they have become involved in a lot of local community not-for-profit projects. Basically, what is happening there is that they have local advisory boards who will recommend these projects as being worthwhile. There is no charge to the community. Basically, we provide the manpower, they provide the materials, and it provides us with an opportunity to increase the experience and training aspect for the people in the unit.
Senator Cordy: You also spoke about places such as Bridgewater or Pictou as the municipalities helping out financially, and that would be in what form?
Maj. Hynes: I wish they were. No, they were actually leasing facilities.
Senator Cordy: Very well, that makes more sense to me. Yes. I wonder, then, if you could explain the differences between how the air reservists are used as compared to the army and navy reservists.
Maj. Hynes: Commenting only from the air force perspective, we work side-by-side with our regular force counterparts. By that I mean that there is no difference in the job that we do and, as I mentioned earlier, there is no difference in the training. A lot of people have commented that ``I never realized that the individuals were reservists before,'' and these are now supervisors, so it is a seamless transition.
Senator Cordy: Are they deployed, as well?
Maj. Hynes: Yes. As I said, last fiscal year we had 444 air reservists who deployed, either domestically within Canada or through DCDS operations.
Senator Cordy: Colonel McKinnon, certainly in your presentation you talked about a lack of resources that you have for training. I am just wondering if the other branches also have difficulty in finding resources. Also, Colonel McKinnon, I am wondering, how do you get further funding? I think you spoke about your funding coming out of Gagetown, if I am not mistaken. Did you?
LCol. McKinnon: My normal funding, the usual funding, which I will call the ``training funding,'' actually comes from 36 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters in Halifax. My infrastructure is funded by 3 Area Support Group in Gagetown, which includes the armouries and any kind of infrastructure costs like that. That is where it comes from in terms of Gagetown.
Senator Cordy: You also talked about the resources in Charlottetown, the armoury being very old and, in terms of the band, you did not have the acoustics and there was a lack of training resources. Summerside would have closed in 1993, so are those facilities a little bit better?
LCol. McKinnon: In some ways, Summerside is better and we use it to run our courses because it allows us enough space there to operate a dormitory system and also a number of classrooms there. While the Charlottetown Armoury is relatively — well, it may not be smaller but it is a lot more used because of the number of cadet corps and other users of the building. It is an older building, and is not as well designed.
Senator Cordy: I think you used the term ``make do,'' when you ``make do'' does that not mean that you have to use a tremendous amount of your time reallocating and planning how you are to spend your resources?
LCol. McKinnon: That is correct.
Senator Cordy: So, what can we do about it?
LCol. McKinnon: The easiest answer would be to allocate more resources, which I do not think is new to anybody here. We try to make do. In a hierarchy system you know that the people who are looking after the resources above you, in terms of either 3 ASG Gagetown or the brigade headquarters in Halifax, have their priorities and we are just hoping we can move ourselves up higher on that priority list. There are only so many resources to go around and they try to find the greatest need first, and hopefully it will be our turn next year in terms of either improvements to the armoury or, perhaps, more appropriate allocation of training aids and resources like that. However, we are working through it, and as long we identify those problems and keep at them, and keep reminding people, then normally, after a while, we get heard. It is just sometimes slower than I would like.
Senator Cordy: What about the navy reservists? Do you have the same problem?
LCdr. Mundy: I think the building that we are in, as I said in my opening remarks, is extremely new, within five years old, and it actually supports, infrastructure-wise, the training extremely well. As well as the equipment that is there to support the regenerative training and the combat-readiness training, and individual training we do on Wednesdays and training Saturdays. Our challenge is a different one in that the naval reserve operational training schedule, which provides regenerative training opportunities for our naval reservists to go to Halifax, et cetera, to get some of the combat readiness requirements signed off that require larger resources such as, for example, an MCDV, or maritime coastal and defence vessel, which is time actually on the plates. There are limited opportunities to be able to get on to those vessels to go and train. There are only really about four opportunities in any training year. Some of them are lumped together in two-week periods, which can be very difficult for some of our naval reservists to get away from either their work and/or their education.
Senator Cordy: What about resources for the air reservists? Are you able to use their materials?
Maj. Hynes: Yes. Actually, the reservists do not have equipment. It belongs to the regular force.
Senator Cordy: All right. Major Hynes, you said that your personnel have been deployed, and I am just wondering, among the three of you, whether or not you have had personnel who have been deployed over the past two or three years and whether or not, first of all, they want to be deployed? Secondly, if they are deployed, what effect does that have on your units when they return?
LCol. McKinnon: I will start off. With respect to our last members who were in deployment, we had four over in Bosnia and they returned in October or November 2003 and, yes, they wanted to go. What they brought back to the unit was, I think, that they motivated other people. They came back and they had an operational deployment, an operational task. They saw the big, bad world out there. In some ways, for a lot of people, going to Bosnia was an eye- opener, and seeing the situation there makes you come back and certainly be proud to be a Canadian again. They came back with that kind of pride in Canada. They came back with that kind of pride in the Canadian Forces and they came back with that kind of pride in what they did there, under fairly rough circumstances. Therefore I would say that it was very much a positive benefit to have them back in the unit and sort of spreading out that expertise that they got and that positive response.
We also had two people over in the Golan Heights, which is a different mission. It is quite a static mission, but they are going through some rough times too because of the security situation in the Middle East over the last two or three years. Therefore, instead of being what used to be a bit of a joke called a ``suntan mission,'' it was certainly something a bit more than that. They came back again with those same kinds of feelings: pride and professionalism, in the case of both missions, along with the one in Haiti, they came back with very positive effects on the units. We want to send people away for those kinds of deployments and they want to go.
LCdr. Mundy: Senator, in the HMCS Queen Charlotte we have only had two individuals go on international deployments over the last two years: One in support of a naval reserve mission, which is naval control shipping, and another in support of HMCS Halifax to the Persian Gulf. The one individual who went to HMCS Halifax did not actually return to the unit. He continued on in Class B service, which is full-time service, in Halifax. Therefore we have not yet seen that individual return to Queen Charlotte. We would love to see him back. The naval control shipping officer is back with us and is now able to mentor his junior.
Maj. Hynes: From the air force perspective, we have had quite a few people who have deployed. One of the big complaints that we have is that it is voluntary and people are actually seeking opportunity to deploy, but the opportunities just are not there.
Senator Cordy: That is great, but when they return from a mission such as Bosnia, for example, then it could certainly be very stressful. I know, Major Hynes, that you worked for the family resource centre. Do the reservists have access to resources at the centres when they return?
Maj. Hynes: Speaking from my past life, in fact they do. It is a program that was not available initially when the MFRCs were set up. However, it was something that was recognized, especially when we had reservists coming back from deployments who would go off into smaller communities where there were no established Canadian Forces medical or social work people available to help them out. Thus it is an outreach program, making sure that people are followed up.
Senator Cordy: Are there family resource centres available, though, in small communities? How do you keep an eye on somebody that may, in fact, need the resources?
Maj. Hynes: At the time, originally, it was a matter of making sure that there was follow-up contact on a one-to-one basis and, again, maybe touching base with the individual's unit to ensure that, you know, any problems were being identified and were being addressed, and offering assistance. Again, I am not sure what is actually being done with the program today. I have been away from it for too many years to be able to speak knowlegeably about it.
Senator Cordy: Commander?
LCdr. Mundy: Senator, if I might, the major may not know, being from Halifax, but this past summer, the military family resource centre did, in fact, man and create a satellite centre here in Charlottetown. It is based at the services depot in the industrial park, so those services would now be available here from the satellite centre.
Senator Day: Are the military family resource centres available for reservists as well as regular forces?
LCdr. Mundy: That is affirmative. They are available for regular force and for Class B reservists, so that is full-time.
Senator Day: That is full-time?
LCdr. Mundy: That is correct, senator. However, having said that, they do make their services available on an availability level, I guess, to Class A reservists as well.
Senator Day: Very well, thank you.
LCol. McKinnon: Could I just add to that answer, though?
Senator Day: Yes, by all means.
LCol. McKinnon: If a reservist goes off on a deployment and, therefore, is Class C, I guess, and then comes back and reverts to Class A service, he or she is still eligible for and gets post-deployment follow-up. It is not just sort of cut off when they lose that status.
Senator Day: Good.
LCol. McKinnon: They follow them through.
Senator Day: Who decides when that follow-up service is no longer necessary? Is there a time limit?
LCol. McKinnon: Not really. Because of potential — post-traumatic stress disorder has always had a funny time to it, or there are no schedule to it. The health care providers and the member have to really decide, to both agree, that there is no further use for it before they will cut the strings, if I can use that phrase.
Senator Day: Each of you has some very extensive notes that could be very helpful to us. Would we be able to get a copy of those? Could you give a copy of your notes to the clerk at the end of this session? That would be very helpful because I, like my colleague Senator Cordy, had difficulty following the information you were giving us, and it sounded as though it could be very helpful to us.
When you used the term ``effective'' strength, you told us, and I will not use the numbers but let us say 130 regular allowed positions, and your effective strength is 91. Perhaps, colonel, you could explain to me what the term ``effective'' means.
LCol. McKinnon: Those would be Class B, certainly, because those are full timers. Those would be the Class A people who parade regularly enough that they maintain an effective status. If you miss five parades or training nights in a row, you are considered non-effective, and basically the release proceedings start. Thus, if a person is in good standing, ``effective'' is how we use the term. There are other categories, but that is the main one. If the person is parading regularly, he or she is considered effective.
Senator Day: Of those who are non-effective, the big percentage, then, are those who are just not coming out anymore. Are there others, such as those who are sick, those who are ill, those who are away? Do they all fit in there? What about positions you have not filled yet? Is that in there as well?
LCol. McKinnon: There are a few that are non-effective and, as you say, are just sort of in the process of getting out. We can grant what is called ``excused drill and training.'' If a person has a problem that they know will last a certain period of time, or if they are going to be away, even on some sort of a sabbatical, they are excused drill and training. The level depends upon how long it can be. That is another part of the non-effective status, but in a different way. After that, it is potentially people who are attached out, or something like that.
Senator Day: You referred a little bit later in your presentation to approved positions that were not filled. You had not been able to find a sergeant to do this. How does that fit into ``effective,'' in the numbers that you gave us?
LCol. McKinnon: As I said, I have an establishment of 130 and that is the maximum I should have in an organization this size, or there would just be extra people. I have 91 effective. I would like to get to 130 but — and perhaps General Romses alluded to this earlier yesterday, but the area is only funded for about 58 per cent or 60 per cent of its establishment anyway.
Senator Day: Yes.
LCol. McKinnon: Thus the more people we get, we run up against a monetary ceiling, just like everybody else does, which is less than our establishment. In a perfect world, I would like to have enough resources to recruit to my establishment and operate at my establishment level.
Senator Day: What I am trying to get to, then, is that in that establishment figure, and the difference between that and effective, you have some that you have not filled, as well as those who are not coming out. What would be the difference? What percentage are those who just are not parading, and those positions that you just have not filled because you do not have the money to fill them?
LCol. McKinnon: I do not have the figures. I would say that I would have five people that are either non-effective strength, or excused drill and training. The rest are people I have not recruited yet or do not have money for.
Senator Day: Could each of you analyse that for us; the difference between your approved establishment and your effective contingent, and then explain the difference and break it down for us? If you could provide that information, that would be helpful to us.
I want you to talk a little bit, each of you, about recruiting and transferring, because each of you mentioned — certainly, the navy and the army mentioned — that you had a certain number who had transferred from your reserve unit to the regular force. Could you talk about that first? Did you find that an easy transition? For those members who wanted to go regular force, was it quick and easy for them to do so? Lieutenant-Commander?
LCdr. Mundy: First of all, just a comment briefly about transferring from the regular force into the reserves, because I have done that most recently myself. I found that process to be quite simple. I simply selected to be on the supplementary holding reserve when I was conducting my release procedure.
Senator Day: Yes.
LCdr. Mundy: Shortly thereafter, I was contacted by the commanding officer here, Lieutenant-Commander Alan Dale, the CO at the time, and offered my services. When he made it known to naval reserve headquarters that I was available and willing, then I was transferred from the supplementary holding reserve on an attached posting into the unit to start parading. It was relatively seamless.
The only surprising factor in it, I will say, is that when I was given the offer to become a primary reserve, which was last summer, that required paperwork which was necessary to be put in, I had to resubmit all of the paperwork, such as my birth certificate, my marriage certificate, my kids' birth certificates, et cetera, to the naval reserve. I was quite surprised at that since there was already a file on me as a regular force officer, you would think that it would be simple for them just to hand that over to the reserves, but that was not the case. From a regular force to a reserve situation, it is quite simple.
The other way around is not as simple, and there are many different factors that go into how long it takes for a naval reserve to become a regular force individual. It is much simpler if they are going into either the MOC or the trade that they are currently in, so that they already have the training, et cetera, and their file can process a bit quicker, and if they are medically fit. The medical situation definitely does take a longer period of time. In our experience, it has taken anywhere between four and eight months for someone to transfer from the naval reserves into the regular force.
Senator Day: How does that compare for someone who is applying to get into the regular force or the reserve force out of high school or university? How long would that take?
LCdr. Mundy: I can only comment on how long it takes for an individual who is interested in joining the naval reserves from high school or university, for example.
Senator Day: Give me that figure, then.
LCdr. Mundy: With a clean medical file, as in not a lot of complications where additional medical documentation is required, it could be as quick as two months.
Senator Day: I understand each of your units has a recruiting person within the unit, but that recruiting person has to deal with the regular force recruiting officer?
LCdr. Mundy: That is correct, senator.
Senator Day: That is correct? Thus you do the attracting, you help them through it, but they all have to go through the recruiting system?
LCdr. Mundy: They do for my unit. Absolutely.
Senator Day: The same for the army, and for the air force?
LCol. McKinnon: That is correct, senator.
Senator Day: That was my understanding. Does that work well for you? Is that a logical way to do things? Does that seem to flow well?
LCol. McKinnon: I think it does. I remember — and perhaps I am dating myself — x-number of years ago when it was a totally separate system of enrolment and processing, and I do not think it worked as well as it does now. There is a lot of standardization, everything from medical categories to everything else.
Senator Day: It sounds to me like you do not have any complaints in that area. My final question: I would like to know if you have received separate funding to help you liaise with and work with the local first responders police and fire departments? If not, do you anticipate that coming?
LCol. McKinnon: I have not yet received any separate funding on that aspect, senator. The area is in the process of creating contingency planning officers, of which there is supposed to be one located here in Charlottetown, and I believe that officer might be working with the first responders. As I said in my remarks, our relationship with the first responders is good and close, and I do not envisage any requirement for any further funding.
There was a time in the fall when we were trying to work out a joint exercise with some first responders, but actually they were ahead of us because they had planned the exercise. We were trying to get involved with it, and it was too late for us to jump on board. However, if we could have done it, we were allocated a sum of money, I think it was $5,000 or $10,000 for our salaries to participate in that weekend exercise, which would have been good. Thus. I do not think there is any kind of institutional bias against that kind of thing.
Senator Day: You say that your relationship is good but you have not done any joint training. Do you know if you have interoperable equipment? Do you use the same acronyms and terms? Do you have the right kind of equipment to attend a chemical fire, biological fire, if there is something like that? Do you have any of that training done yet?
LCol. McKinnon: We just started out talking about it and trying to determine what they have and what we have, or could have, to respond to those situations. We would not be there in terms of trying to take over their job for them. Also because they have a mandate to respond to, either municipally or provincially — or even federally — which is not normally the mandate of the department, or certainly not my mandate. I am just trying to liaise with them to try to find out how we can help them, and to find out where there are any gaps in their response that we could possibly fill. We are just in the process now of instituting the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capability within the army, in terms of the Land Force Reserve Restructure Phase 2 capability. As I say, this is quite early on.
Senator Day: We are aware of the announcement and the role for the reserves. You say you are in the process. Does that mean thaat you are just starting to think about it?
LCol. McKinnon: I think they are doing a trial in Ottawa on it right now. How that trial works out will, I think, determine how it will be rolled out across the country, and how it will affect us in the Atlantic area.
Senator Banks: Did you say, lieutenant-commander, that it takes about two months for a civilian to join the full- time service, and between four and eight months for a reservist to join the full-time service?
LCdr. Mundy: That is true for the civilian joining the reserve. That is right.
Senator Downe: I am concerned about the small expenditure by the Canadian military in Prince Edward Island. As you know, during the wars Prince Edward Island had one of the highest participation rate in the conflicts and, I believe now — and perhaps the Chair of the Committee can find this out — I understand now that we have the lowest per capita expenditure of any province in Canada since the air force base closed at Summerside. Major, there is currently no air force reserve in Prince Edward Island, is that correct?
Maj. Hynes: No.
Senator Downe: None.
When we used to have one, obviously when we had Canadian Forces Base Summerside, we had air cadets, and going up to the air reserves at the time. That may predate you but, having been in the air cadets, I recall that. Then having decided that I like to keep my feet on the ground, I went to the Prince Edward Regiment and the Queen Charlotte Armouries. We are very original names. We have the Queen Charlotte Armouries and at the other end of the street we have the Queen Charlotte Naval Reserve.
The armouries, then, was outdated. The equipment was, I believe, left over from the Second World War, but there were some tremendous programs. There was a summer program you could join where you went off to Gagetown for a couple of weeks and did the rest of the training in Charlottetown. It took a large number of us off the streets of Charlottetown, which I am sure was one of the intentions. Do you still have that program, colonel?
LCol. McKinnon: Not organized as a program, as such. The basic military qualification courses normally run on a part-time or a weekend basis, and that is the course we just started on Friday. This last summer, we ran a four-week basic military qualification course on a full-time basis at Summerside, basically six days a week. It was quite successful. When you run it that way, it costs more money than it does running it on a weekend-only basis. It cost the unit about $10,000 that had to come out of some other funding level. It was a successful way of doing it, but it is not necessarily the best way.
Senator Downe: How many people would be enrolled in that four-week course?
LCol. McKinnon: On that course, we had 11 students and then a staff of four.
Senator Downe: Many years ago, in the program I am referring to, there was, I am guessing, 80 to 120 of us involved in that. That has now gone as well. We still have this armouries, which I have not been inside in years, but it would be in even worse condition. The Brighton Compound, does that come under your authority as well?
LCol. McKinnon: No, senator. That belongs to the 721 Communication Regiment of Communication Command.
Senator Downe: Following up on a question that Senator Day asked, I am not clear from the numbers you gave. My notes indicate that you are short 56 positions, including the band. It seems you only have half a band. I hope they all have instruments and you are not short there as well. But you are short 56 people and you indicated that five of those positions you did not intend to fill. Are you trying to recruit 50? Did I understand that correctly?
LCol. McKinnon: Just trying to think my way through the numbers here. I would like to recruit it up to my establishment.
Senator Downe: Which is 130.
LCol. McKinnon: A hundred and thirty, plus the band. I have been given an objective this year. It started out at 20 and then it went up to 30. I am at 22 right now.
Senator Downe: Twenty-two?
LCol. McKinnon: Yes, so we are getting there. I think, if the funding remains good, I could probably get closer to 130.
Senator Downe: Did I understand you correctly that if you recruit 130, then you do not have the budget for 130?
LCol. McKinnon: Right now, the area does not have 100 per cent of its establishment funded. That is why I said it is at about 50 per cent or 60 per cent.
Senator Downe: Right, so your allocation is not really 130, because you would have to go out and fundraise if you got 130. Is that correct?
LCol. McKinnon: Or we have to find the money somewhere else. We would have to cut down the training, or something like that.
Senator Downe: That is a further reduction in the expenditure in Prince Edward Island over the last number of decades. Commander, you have the Cadillac building in Prince Edward Island, but you do not seem to have much budget. What is your total budget? Did I understand correctly that it was a little less than $370,000 for the year?
LCdr. Mundy: That is correct, senator. It is $290,000 dedicated to Class ``A'' employment, and $72,000 for overhead and maintenance and temporary duty.
Senator Downe: It is a wonderful facility.
LCdr. Mundy: It is.
Senator Downe: But you need more money to get more people through it. This comes back, Mr. Chairman — and again I am giving a little harangue here about the gross under-funding in Prince Edward Island.
The Chairman: We are hearing you, Senator Downe, and we are listening.
Senator Downe: The colonel desperately needs infrastructure, the commander needs more money, as the colonel does, and the air force is not even here in any way, shape or form. We are glad that Major Hynes came in today, but we need more of the air force reserves.
The Chairman: Senator Downe, we have taken note of your inquiries. We will ensure that the staff of the committee make the appropriate inquiries in Ottawa, and endeavour to provide you with the answers as quickly as we can, particularly in relation to per capita spending.
Senator Atkins: Thank you. My first question is on the band again. How many members have you got in the band?
LCol. McKinnon: Right now, we have 18 in the band and we have one recruit undergoing basic military qualification training right now. A year ago, we had 22, so we have had a bit of a drop over the last year. That was a bit unexpected, so we are trying to recruit back up again. Because of the size of the band, we are looking for people who are already skilled musicians, to some degree, and also, in a perfect world, that they be able to play more than one instrument. Sometimes the band master is quite picky on who he gets. We have another two potential musicians in the application process now, but it is a bit longer and harder because it is a relatively smaller group to draw from than the armoured reconnaissance soldiers.
Senator Atkins: They are in addition to your allotment of 130?
LCol. McKinnon: That is correct. They have an establishment of 35, and the funding level for them is around $22,000 to $25,000.
Senator Atkins: When the community makes a request for the appearance of the band, when the band goes out, is that all free to the community, or do you charge for the use of the band?
LCol. McKinnon: I would say that, in all the cases I know of, it is free to the community. There are some places, and from my previous postings, I can say that in Alberta, for instance, the band ran out of money; the community still wanted it so they did pay an honorarium to the band. That can be done, but it is not usually done on P.E.I. because there is skilful negotiation or skilful monetary prudence on behalf of the band master.
Senator Atkins: In all the discussions we have had about reserves, there has been no mention of women. Do you recruit women, or how many women would you have in your regiment?
LCol. McKinnon: I would say, between the band and the regiment, the last number I saw was 24. There should be more, and we are working on that.
Senator Atkins: What would you say?
LCdr. Mundy: Senator, I do not have the exact number of women in the unit, but we have a fair number of women, and we find that a lot of the university students who are joining the unit are female.
Senator Atkins: Thus in terms of recruitment, you are making the effort to recruit women?
LCdr. Mundy: We do not specifically target women. We target anybody who is eligible to join.
Senator Atkins: Right.
LCdr. Mundy: But we definitely do get female recruits. In fact, last summer, I think the vast majority of the recruits we sent off were, in fact, women.
Senator Atkins: My final question: For those who are transferred to regular duty, do they maintain the rank that they have in the reserve when they go to a regular unit? What happens when they come back?
LCdr. Mundy: I will speak for myself first, senator. I maintained my rank from the regular force when I transferred into the reserve force. I cannot speak to all the instances, but in a couple of the instances, for the most part, they either retain their rank or they are reduced one rank when they go into the regular force from the reserve.
Senator Atkins: But you are an officer. I am thinking of non-commissioned personnel.
LCdr. Mundy: I cannot answer that question at this point, senator. I am not sure. Perhaps one of the other panelists could answer.
LCol. McKinnon: When you say go into the regular force, do you mean go in for a deployment?
Senator Atkins: For instance, if they were assigned to Bosnia or to the Golan Heights from the reserve force.
LCol. McKinnon: They would go over with their rank. By and large, they go over with their own rank, the rank that they leave with, because they are qualified as a reserve master corporal, sergeant, whatever. They would go over, serve their time in that rank, and come back and retain that rank.
Maj. Hynes: I might add to that. On certain occasions you will see individuals having to drop their rank, depending on what the deployed position is established for. A lot of times we try to keep people at their same rank, but if there are potential conflicts from a supervisory perspective, then they may have to take down one rank while they are deployed.
Senator Atkins: When they come back with the experience of being assigned to that kind of duty, would that enhance their opportunity for promotion?
LCol. McKinnon: Yes, it certainly does.
Senator Atkins: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Senator Atkins. Perhaps we could ask you, since you are providing us with information in any event, if we could have the information on women provided at the same time?
I would like to say, on behalf of the committee, how much we appreciate your coming here today. It has been a very instructive afternoon for us. I think it is fair to say that you have added, in a significant way, to the store of knowledge that the committee has, and we appreciate that very much.
We find that we have a great deal to learn still about how the reserves function in Canada, and this afternoon's session was very productive for us.
Thank you very much. We appreciate the work you are doing. We would be very grateful if you would convey to the men and women who serve with you how proud we are of the work they do, and how much we appreciate their efforts on behalf of Canadians. Thank you again for being here this afternoon.
The committee adjourned.