Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 19 - Evidence, April 11, 2005
OTTAWA, Monday, April 11, 2005
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 11:50 p.m. to examine and report on the national security policy for Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Today the committee will hear testimony in preparation for its upcoming visit to New York and Washington.
At the outset, I will introduce the members of our committee. The distinguished senator from Nova Scotia, Senator Michael Forrestall, has served the constituents of Dartmouth for 37 years, first as their member of the House of Commons and then as their senator. While in the House of Commons he served as the official opposition defence critic from 1966 to 1976. He is also a member of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
Senator Michael Meighen is a lawyer and a member of the bars of Quebec and Ontario. He is Chancellor of the University of King's College and past chair of the Stratford Festival. He has honorary doctorates in civil law from Mount Allison University and the University of New Brunswick. Currently, he is Chair of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs as well as a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce.
[Translation]
Senator Pierre Claude Nolin is originally from Quebec. He is a lawyer and has been a senator since 1993. He was the chairman of the Special Committee on Illicit Drugs and he is currently the vice-chair of the Senate Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration. Senator Nolin has worked internationally since 1994, he is the Canadian Parliament's delegate for NATO's Parliamentary Assembly. Senator Nolin is the vice-chairman of that organization. He is also the general spokesperson for the committee on science and technology.
[English]
Senator Norman Atkins is from Ontario. He came to the Senate with 27 years of experience in the field of communications. He served as senior advisor to former federal Conservative leader Robert Stanfield, to Premier William Davis of Ontario and to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. He is also a member of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
Senator Tommy Banks is from Alberta. He is the chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, which recently released a report entitled, The One-Tonne Challenge: Let's Get On With It! He is a versatile musician and entertainer, and he provided musical direction for ceremonies at the 1988 Olympic Winter Games. Senator Banks is an officer of the Order of Canada and has received a Juno Award.
Senator Jane Cordy is from Nova Scotia. She is an accomplished educator with an extensive record of community involvement, including serving as vice-chair of the Halifax Dartmouth Port Development Commission. She is Chair of the Canada NATO Parliamentary Association and a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology.
Senator Jim Munson is from Ontario. He was a trusted journalist and former Director of Communications for Prime Minister Chrétien before being called to the Senate in 2003. Senator Munson has been twice nominated for Gemini awards for recognition of excellence in journalism.
Our committee is the first Senate committee mandated to examine security and defence. The Senate asked our committee to examine the need for a national security policy. We began with a review in 2002 and in that year we wrote three reports: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, tabled in February; Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, tabled in September; and An Update on Canada's Military Crisis: A View from the Bottom Up, tabled in November. In 2003 the committee published two reports: The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports in January; and Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World in October. In 2004 we tabled two reports: National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines in March; and recently The Canadian Security Guide Book, 2005 edition.
The committee is reviewing defence policy. During the next few months the committee will be holding hearings in every province and engaging with Canadians to determine national interest, what they see as Canada's principal threats, and how they would like the government to respond to those threats. The committee would like to generate debate on national security in Canada and forge a consensus on the need and type of military Canadians want.
Today we have a panel that is assisting us in preparations for an upcoming visit to the United States. Before us is Mr. Bill Crosbie, Director General, North American Bureau, Foreign Affairs Canada. He has worked with the federal government since 1986, both as ministerial advisor in the portfolios of Transport, International Trade and Fisheries and Oceans, and as a trade negotiator. His experience in trade negotiations began with the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and continued with the North American Free Trade Agreement. In August 2000, he was named Minister-Counsellor, Economic and Trade Policy at the Canadian Embassy in Washington. In September 2004, he was appointed to his current position, where he is responsible for Canada's bilateral relations with the United States and Mexico, and for the trilateral Canada-U.S.-Mexico agenda.
Mr. Crosbie is having some voice problems today, so he will be assisted by Mr. John Kneale, Executive Coordinator of the Task Force on Enhanced Representation in the U.S., who will read Mr. Crosbie's opening statement.
We also have before us Ms. Barbara Martin, who has recently assumed responsibilities as Director of Security and Defence Relations Division, Foreign Affairs Canada. Until August 2004, she was Director of the Regional Security Peacekeeping Division. She joined the foreign service in 1982 and has served in the Canadian embassy in Manila and in the Canadian delegation to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Europe, as well as in the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat of the Privy Council Office. In headquarters, she has worked on human rights issues, economic relations with developing countries, NATO, Canada-U.S. security relations and relations with South Asia.
We also have Ms. Evelyn Puxley, who was named Director, International Crime and Terrorism Division, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada in September 2004. She was Canada's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe from 2000 to 2004. Ms. Puxley's previous postings over 20 years with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade include the Canadian embassy in Washington, the Canadian Delegation to NATO in Brussels, and the Canadian embassy in Moscow. In Ottawa she has worked in the Eastern Europe Division as Deputy Director responsible for central Europe and the Balkans; in the European Union Division as Departmental Assistant to then Secretary of State for External Affairs; and in the Defence Relations in the Middle East Divisions.
We will begin with Mr. Kneale, speaking on behalf of Mr. Crosbie.
Mr. John Kneale, Executive Coordinator, U.S. Enhanced Representation Initiative (ERI), Foreign Affairs Canada: Mr. Chairman and senators, thank you for the opportunity to meet with your committee. I would, first, call attention to the package of documents which has been provided to you and, in particular, a document called, "Key Messages," which covers a great many issues of the bilateral Canada-U.S. agenda. This is the latest version, hot off the press, and I believe you will find it a helpful document as you prepare for your trip to Washington.
The importance of regular collaboration with your U.S. counterparts cannot be overestimated. As you know, Canada has not had good press recently in the United States. The Wall Street Journal referred to us as "free riders" on defence, and the New York Times referred to the "porous northern border." There have also been numerous negative references to Canada on The O'Reilly Factor program and elsewhere in the U.S. media.
It is essential to counter this negative trend with facts. The facts tell a completely different story. Your audience is especially influential. In due course, our colleagues from DND and PCO will provide you with specific details on the defence and security and border issues.
[Translation]
This afternoon, my remarks will deal with the Canada-U.S. defence relationship. First off, I will be dealing with the political situation in the United States. Next, I will give you an overview of the current state of Canada-U.S. relations, and finally, in conclusion, I will focus on important questions for today and for the near future.
To start, the political situation in the United States. Three and a half years after September 11, the U.S. government remains focused on the issue of national security. Congress is deeply concerned by all aspects of American homeland security and of the war on terrorism.
[English]
Commissions continue to report on the failures of U.S. intelligence. Vast areas of the U.S. government have been reorganized to strengthen the security of the American homeland, and the intelligence community has been placed under a new head. Allies are now judged on their contributions to the Iraq war and campaigns against terrorism and proliferation. Their previous status in the Cold War era is not important. The closest of Cold War American allies — Germany, France and, at times, Canada — have suffered tense relations with Washington.
Countries previously estranged or hostile to the U.S., are now important partners, for instance, Russia and India. The U.S. administration has now focussed its attention on an ambitious domestic policy agenda, including social security reform and permanent tax cuts. President Bush will soon have an opportunity to make his first nomination to the Supreme Court, and this will stimulate huge internal debates on social issues, on the place of religious values in a secular society and other related issues.
We would be very much in error if we assumed that it was once more business as usual in the United States. Not since the early years of the Cold War has so much effort been expended in preparing the nation for what is freely admitted to be a prolonged struggle. The stakes are high. Despite the misjudgments about Iraq's weapons programs, there is a high degree of consensus that the U.S. is increasingly vulnerable to threats that used to be the plots of novels by Tom Clancy. Under President Bush's national strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction, a whole range of anti-proliferation and anti-terrorism initiatives are now leading items of contemporary U.S. foreign policy.
From 9/11 to today, Canada has been a wholehearted partner in strengthening the defences of North America and in pursuing terrorists using the full spectrum of national power — defence, diplomacy and development. The Government of Canada has committed in excess of $9.5 billion in security enhancements since 2001, as well as millions more on combat and stability operations, and in supporting democratic development in Iraq and Afghanistan. The government has reorganized its structure to reinforce coordination and decisions regarding national security, and to enable stronger cooperation with our American ally. The Government of Canada is also making a concerted effort to strengthen the Canadian Forces, most recently committing $12 billion in new money for defence over the next five years.
Yet, in an atmosphere of "You are either with us or against us," some issues, such as Iraq and DND, are touchstones for loyalty as an ally. Our other accomplishments are less well known. Therefore, the pressing challenge facing Canada is simply to ensure that our country does not become a victim of erroneous or distorted information, propagated by aggressive media commentators whose interests lie in a good story, not in the mundane facts of effective cooperation between Canada and United States.
To deal with this challenge, there have been far-reaching changes in the management of the relationship. One example of this is the greater energy for advocacy and public diplomacy activities throughout the United States. Through the Enhanced Representation Initiative, a whole-of-government partnership, we now have 22 missions in the United States — seven more than only two years ago — and we are appointing up to 20 honorary consuls in important cities.
In our Washington embassy, we have opened the new advocacy secretariat to serve the needs of parliamentarians and the provinces and territories. Leading our team is ambassador Frank McKenna. He has already made several forceful interventions, including a response to a recent editorial in the New York Times on Canada-U.S. border security that was factually wrong.
[Translation]
The second important aspect in the evolution of the Canada-U.S. relationship is the increased North American nature of this relationship. That was in fact the theme of a meeting that took place between the Prime Minister and presidents Bush and Fox in Waco, Texas.
In terms of important files, it is wise to remain flexible on trade irritants which only affect a minute part of our bilateral trade. There will always be disputes in a relationship as broad as this one. The competitiveness of North America versus the European Union and emerging economies in Asia remains a more important matter.
[English]
It is not about mercantilism or blocs. Our ideal of freer trade and investment is still global in scope, but we have to strengthen our own economic unit. This is a key goal of the new North American partnership, which builds upon the Smart Borders model in order to advance our economic and security objectives.
Security and defence issues will be with us for the indefinite future. Our colleagues from DND and PCO will provide you with a comprehensive picture. Defence and security issues comprise a pillar of the relationship equal in importance to the trade and economic issues. Their good management is fundamental to the overall health of the bilateral relationship. Our successes can be overshadowed by our relatively few disagreements. The challenge for Canada, therefore, is to advance our key messages on the positive aspects.
Ms. Barbara Martin, Director, Defence and Security Relations Division, Foreign Affairs Canada: I would apologize for the absence of Jim Wright, the assistant deputy minister responsible for this area of our relations. He is currently in Europe, India and Pakistan undertaking negotiations and discussions. He sends his profound apologies for not being here himself.
As has been made clear, security is a key issue in Canada-U.S. relations, and the concern in this particular area has been heightened since September 11. For the United States, homeland security is now a critical concern. For the first time, the U.S. was attacked by foreign forces on U.S. soil. It was a wakeup call to the United States, and it was a wakeup that ricocheted around the world.
For the United States, this plays out in what they call the "home game" and the "away game." You may hear them use this terminology when you are in Washington. The home game deals with the continent and with borders. From the U.S. perspective, it means both Canada and Mexico; their northern border and their southern border. The away game addresses preventing the threat from reaching their shores, and it addresses issues of failed states and weapons proliferation in particular.
Canada and the United States have had extensive cooperation in both these areas, and that has intensified since September 11. We are undertaking activities which are in both of our interests. This is not strictly in the interests of one country or the other. In the home game, the management of the borders and the maintenance of the flow of goods across the border are key.
From our point of view, we are looking at the defence of the continent. Our defence cooperation with the United States stems back to 1940 with the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and subsequently by the establishment of NORAD, the North America Aerospace Defence Organization, which was set up in 1958. NORAD is the concrete institutionalization of our binational cooperation for the defence of North America. It is a unique institution of binational command, meaning an American commander and a Canadian deputy commander work side by side in the same facility. Our defence cooperation is also elaborated through a myriad of agreements, MOUs and treaties.
NORAD has been adapted since 9/11. In particular, instead of only looking outward at the defence outside our borders coming into the national air spaces of both Canada and the United States, it is now looking at the management and surveillance of activity within our airspace, so it has an inward as much as an outward perspective. It is now connected to NAV CANADA and the FAA in the United States.
Since 9/11, our defence relations have been further adapted by the creation of the Binational Planning Group, or the BPG, which was created in 2002 to look at ways to enhance our binational military planning and surveillance, and the kinds of support our militaries can give to civil authorities. That group is co-located with NORAD in Colorado Springs, which is where NORTHCOM, the U.S. command responsible for their homeland defence, is located.
In August 2004, NORAD was amended to allow information from the missile warning function that it had been performing for more than 30 years to be shared with the U.S. commands responsible for missile defence. That did not entail a decision on Canada's part to participate in missile defence, it simply allowed the U.S. commands access to the information already being generated by NORAD.
We are now looking at NORAD renewal and how we can enhance our defence cooperation with the United States in the defence of North America. In particular, we are looking at how to enhance cooperation in the maritime area and also our support of civilian authorities. An enhanced NORAD is possible, but we are also looking at ways of doing this through means other than NORAD. Work and discussions in that respect are under way and I am therefore not able to elaborate further on that at this time.
It is in the interests of both our countries to explore how we can cooperate more closely in the defence of North America. The threat environment has changed, and we need to be prepared to address whatever threats we face.
On the away game, we also cooperate extensively with the United States in addressing concerns about weapons proliferation, on dealing with failed states such as Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan, and in promoting international norms and measures to increase global peace and security. The game is to prevent the threat from reaching our shores as much as to project our values and promote peace and security for others.
On non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, we have a long history of working closely with the United States across a broad range of NACD issues. Non-proliferation is one of the top priorities of the U.S. We work closely with the U.S. in the Global Partnership Program, a G8 initiative launched a few years ago to address proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear security, initially in Russia, but also in export control programs.
Canada has devoted $1 billion over 10 years to the Global Partnership Program and is currently focusing its efforts on the dismantlement of Soviet nuclear submarines and helping to store and secure radiological waste. We work closely with the United States on Iran and the DPRK in the International Atomic Energy Association dealing with their nuclear issues such as nuclear fuel cycle programs and activity in the nuclear realm that are disconcerting to the international community, as well as working with the United States in the Proliferation Security Initiative and in the launch of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
The upcoming review conference of the non-proliferation treaty starting at the beginning of May in New York is a critical event, and it will be important to reinforce the treaty's authority and effectiveness through this month-long discussion. Key issues that remain include the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
We also cooperate with the United States on land mines, even though the U.S. is not a party to the Ottawa treaty. Recent U.S. policy announcements have fallen short of the international ban but, at the same time, the U.S. is providing $70 million for humanitarian mine action, and we hope that the United States will keep the issue of participation in the treaty under review.
On failed states — Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan — the lessons of the risk that failed states pose to our security has been learned the hard way. We are devoting an enormous amount of resources to trying to stabilize Afghanistan and ensure the establishment of democratic government within that country. We currently have 700 members of the Canadian Forces present there and are examining how we might enhance our participation, including through the deployment of a provincial reconstruction team this summer.
In Haiti, we work closely with the United States in stabilizing the situation after the departure of Aristide and in setting the stage for the subsequent UN mission.
In Sudan, we are providing $20 million to help the African Union mount a monitoring force in Darfur and are cooperating closely with the United States in that effort.
On Iraq, while we did not participate in the coalition, Canada recognized that, in the aftermath of the intervention, it was in everyone's interests to ensure that Iraq become a stable and democratic state. Hence, we have invested $300 million in promoting the reconstruction and democratization of Iraq.
These are but some of the highlights of our cooperation with the United States in security and defence matters. We act together to promote shared interests. We do not always agree, but the depth and strength of our relationship is not diminished by those few areas where there are differences of view.
[Translation]
Ms. Evelyn Puxley, Director, International Crime and Terrorism Division, Foreign Affairs Canada: I would like to make a few introductory remarks. First, I would like to thank you for inviting us here this afternoon.
[English]
I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before the committee. I want to pick up on Mr. Kneale's comment that security and defence issues comprise a pillar of the relationship with the United States equal in importance to trade and economic issues. From our perspective, as regards asymmetric threats, that is, international terrorism and international organized crime, there is a direct relationship between the health of our bilateral economic relationship and our cooperation in addressing these threats. One can easily imagine the consequences for the openness of our bilateral border to trade and people were a threat analogous to 9/11 to be proven to have arrived in the United States from Canada. Cooperation is not only in our domestic interest but very much in our bilateral interest.
As Mr. Kneale said, we have a very good story to tell in Washington on counter-terrorism and international organized crime, including narcotics, as outlined in the material we have provided to you.
[Translation]
My sincerest apologies for the fact that some documents are still not available in French. We will be able to provide you with the French version later on this afternoon.
[English]
The latest U.S. State Department report, "Patterns of Global Terrorism" concludes, "Overall, anti-terrorism cooperation with Canada remains excellent and serves as a model for bilateral cooperation."
The 2004 United States-Canada Border Drug Threat Assessment, a document that is drawn up bilaterally, states:
The strong relationship between our two governments, and in particular, our respective law enforcement agencies on this issue is a model of international cooperation.
I look forward to answering your questions and to the outcome of your visit to New York and Washington.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: Mr. Crosbie, I would like some clarification as to what exactly happened in Waco between the Mexican President, the American President and the Prime Minister of Canada.
It is important for us to have a good understanding of what we had to do and of what we actually did for Canada.
[English]
Mr. William Crosbie, Director General, North America Bureau, Foreign Affairs Canada: I will respond as well as I can. I believe you will be hearing from several colleagues in the PCO.
[Translation]
As to the rest of the meeting that took place in Waco, the Privy Council Office, as lead, could provide you with clarification as to what happened.
In essence, it is an action plan which includes several items under security and prosperity; it includes specific files that we are discussing bilaterally with the United States, as well as trilaterally. It is good to have trilateral cooperation.
For a number of years, we have been working with the Americans on a bilateral agenda to improve the state of the Canada-U.S. common economy, in a number of areas.
[English]
In the area of prosperity, we are focusing on areas where there may be different standards and regulations and questioning whether that is necessary, or whether we can adopt mutual recognition or similar standards.
Senator Nolin: This relates to intelligent regulation.
Mr. Crosbie: That is right, "smart" regulation. We have our own national plan of smart regulation as does the United States. I am not sure what Mexico is doing. In the area of manufacturing, for example, we are assessing whether we can have the same standards and regulations rather than forcing manufacturers to comply with different standards. That applies as well in the area of cyto and phytosanitary standards that are so important to the agriculture and food sector. This builds on cooperation that has been ongoing for several years.
As to security, a vast area of cooperation is encompassed in the Smart Border Declaration. The declaration signed in Waco is intended to build on the work that is already under way. The principle is the same as the one under NAFTA, which is that two nations can agree to do something where it makes sense, and the third country can join in if it is ready and if it feels it is important for its own circumstances. It recognizes that the situation may not be the same for all three countries.
Senator Nolin: Do you have anything in writing or would PCO be the perfect witness to provide us with that information?
Mr. Crosbie: PCO is leading in both the key elements of the Waco agenda on security and prosperity.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: My second question is for everyone. Over the course of half an hour you explained to us something that all Canadians should be aware of. We definitely have an information dissemination problem.
Ms. Puxley, amongst other things, you spoke about what we are doing in Afghanistan. Senator Cordy and myself were in Kabul, some weeks ago, and Ambassador Alexander, despite small means and a small team, is doing things which deserve more visibility and recognition in Canada. I do not think it is Ambassador Alexander's fault. I am sure you understand exactly what I mean.
We definitely have a problem getting our efforts recognized and today all four of you have tried to convince us of that. I think it is obvious; anyone who can read knows it. We thought Canadians were better informed. Most Canadians should have access to this type of information.
Let's get back to the mind-set of Americans since September 2001. Ms. Martin, you referred to that mind-set. In fact, you all referred to a shift in attitude amongst Americans. Do you believe we are living up to our responsibilities given the new reality since September 2001? You are going to say yes, but how come the Americans don't think so?
Why is it that whenever we speak to them at international forums, Americans call our homeland defense efforts into question?
Ms. Martin: Indeed, I used to work for the division that was responsible for regional security and peace keeping — and, now, because of my responsibilities with NATO — Afghanistan was under my mandate. I can answer your question and then make some comments on the U.S.'s attitude. I think Mr. Puxley and Mr. Kneale could also tell you what they think.
[English]
As far as Afghanistan is concerned, we must make known to Canadians the contribution that Canada has made in that arena. There is no question that, in the eyes of many of our allies, our contribution has been stellar, particularly during 2004 when Canada had the largest contribution of all troops in Afghanistan as well as in the initial stages when we held the deputy commander position and then, in the final six months of our engagement, the commander position of the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, in Afghanistan.
That won Canada huge kudos and set the ISAF mission on a positive track with respect to its cooperation with other actors in situ and its focused engagement in dealing with some of the challenges of governance in Afghanistan and the support that the government required to be able to govern. That is the main purpose of the ISAF.
Senator Nolin: We are more involvement than our role in ISAF in Afghanistan. There is a segment of our effort that is not even known to our allies. They do not know that we are writing the budget with the minister. They do not know that we are creating or implementing a financial strategy. They are not even familiar with the phrase, "Treasury Board." If our allies do not know what we are doing, I can only imagine how little ordinary Canadians know.
Ms. Martin: There is no question that this has been a challenge for us. Canada is devoting $600 million to Afghanistan over the course of eight years, from 2001 to 2009. That is a huge financial contribution, and we are using it to make the kinds of interventions you describe. Our allies have difficulty understanding the size of Canada's contribution — the significant contribution that we are indeed making.
I would refer you to the departmental website that contains some good information about the full extent of Canada's engagement. I also think that the Canadian media were well seized of the extent of the Canadian engagement in Afghanistan during the time of the Canadian command of the ISAF. Indeed, they tracked it very well and gave considerable publicity to our involvement. Needless to say, more can always be done on that front.
Senator Nolin: Definitely.
Turning to the subject of the American perception, they perceive that we do not tackle the effort properly. Would you care to comment?
Ms. Martin: Perceptions are the most difficult to change.
Senator Nolin: We live in that world.
Ms. Martin: I am pleased to see that you recognize that. The challenge has been helping the Americans to understand the extent of the changes that have been put in place.
Predominantly, of course, the issues relate to the border security, on which I cannot speak. Those questions should be referred to other colleagues.
There is no question that our U.S. allies are appreciative of the contributions that we have been making in Afghanistan, Haiti and in Iraq, notwithstanding that we are not participating in the military coalition there. They also welcomed the announcement in the budget of $13 billion for the Canadian Forces. Colleagues in the room are better able to speak to that particular contribution.
I will leave it at that. Perhaps Mr. Kneale and Ms. Puxley would care to offer comments.
[Translation]
Mr. Kneale: Regarding advocating for our interests in the United States, you are right in saying that it is a constant challenge. Every day, there is an editorial or an influential person willing to criticize Canada, often without any facts to back up their allegations. So, we are called upon to do everything we can to fight off these attacks and criticisms.
The increased representation initiative Mr. Crosbie mentioned is essentially to have more resources in the United States. We have enhanced our network of missions — small, medium and large — as well the number of Canadians officers. We gave them facts and answers.
In Dallas, there is also the Consul General, who is able to issue an immediate response by mail or by phone to set the record straight and correct any false statements he sees in editorials or columns written in the city's leading newspaper, unjustly criticizing Canada on any question of the day. We have given the missions additional financial resources to correct this type of mistake. However, it is an ongoing battle.
I also would like to mention the existence of a new Secretariat in Washington which helps parliamentarians communicate with American counterparts in order to correct mistakes or misapprehensions regarding our relationship. It is difficult, but we have given our missions and parliamentarians adequate resources to do this.
[English]
Senator Munson: You are concerned about correcting the record throughout the United States and, to that end, we have opened 22 missions. Should we not be more proactive in setting the record straight? We have a collaborative policy with the United States. We should not sit back and wait to read something negative in the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times or the Miami Herald. These men and women in this advocacy secretariat could travel throughout the United States and set the record straight as it relates to our role in Afghanistan and in Iraq. We are the United States of America's best friend. It is not good communications to sit back and wait for somebody to whack us. I would suggest that we be more proactive.
Mr. Crosbie: We were picking up on the negative things to which we have to respond. Our missions are out there every day being very proactive. They try to engage parliamentarians, like yourselves, premiers and other Canadian leaders. That is important to what all of these missions do.
The problem is often one of getting the audience. For example, we are extremely disappointed that the New York Times wrote an editorial that contained so many wrong facts, even though our ambassador has met with the editorial board of the New York Times, as has our Consul General in New York. It is not that we are failing to get out there and talk to people; it is just that, quite often, they do not listen to us. Until the story is a negative one, they will print nothing. As a former journalist, you probably can appreciate that.
Senator Munson: I always sought balance.
Mr. Crosbie: The difficulty in the huge market in the United States is that the good news stories about Canada — the faithful ally, a reliable source of energy, et cetera — do not make the headlines. The headlines deal with issues that are contrary to their normal image of Canada. That is what we have found. We have to hit very quickly.
It is not that we are not out there. When the O'Reilly Factor or one of the other media outlets puts out a negative story, then we have an immediate problem. We are finding that we now have to react to more of those.
The Chairman: How much consideration has been given to paid media?
Mr. Crosbie: To paid advertising? The most recent experience we have had with that related to softwood lumber. As you may recall, in the past couple of years, the Canadian industry had an extensive campaign, including mass advertising in the United States, which was intended to turn around American attitudes toward softwood lumber. When they polled the American public, they quickly found that, while the Canadian industry wanted to talk about softwood lumber, most Americans were not ready to hear the message. Therefore, they developed a broad advertising campaign which was intended to send the message: "We are your most important trading partner. We are your most important supplier of energy. We are your secure and reliable partner in dealing with defence and homeland security." Those are basic messages about Canada and who we are. The advertising campaign was directed at that.
Studies were conducted to assess what impact that had on the American public. Perhaps our colleagues from the international trade side of our department will be able to help you on that subject. However, we have found that we must get those base messages out there first, before we get to the message about, say, softwood lumber.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: According to you, what are the political problems — we will be discussing them with your colleagues from the Department of Defense later on — on both sides of the border which may arise in the short term, on the issue of renewing NORAD? In fact, it raises the question: Will we renew NORAD?
Ms. Martin: Thank you for another very provocative question!
[English]
The negotiations on NORAD renewal have not yet begun. It is impossible to speculate on the outcome of those negotiations.
Senator Nolin: I am not speculating on the outcome, only on the political problems leading to the renewal. That is what we will discuss in three days.
Ms. Martin: Fair game. You did ask whether the renewal of NORAD was even at issue. There are strong signs on both sides of the border that NORAD has played an extremely valuable role over the 50-plus years of its existence.
There is little doubt of NORAD renewal. The question will be how far we are willing to go to enhance defence cooperation between our two countries. The signals were very strong during President Bush's visit to Ottawa in December that the United States is interested in looking at how they can enhance that cooperation. There is no question that they want to look at ways to enhance our ability to work together on certain issues affecting the continent, in the maritime domain, and with respect to support for civilian authorities.
The question at stake is how to do this. That is where we get into the details of the negotiation. Will we do this through NORAD or some other mechanism? The outcome of those negotiations is not yet know. I believe that you can be assured that both Canada and the United States will seek to find arrangements that work for the interests of both countries. In that respect, there is a positive drive to look for creative solutions and to enhance that cooperation.
The witnesses you will hear from National Defence will have input on that.
Senator Nolin: They will rely on you for the evaluation of the landscape.
Ms. Martin: As to political evaluation, there is interest on both sides of the border. Signals have been received from President Bush, the highest level on the American side. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister would themselves engage in the details of how this plays out, but they have signalled strongly that they want officials to find creative solutions to move this agenda forward.
Senator Forrestall: This is a vitally important matter. We know now that the United States has wasted billions of dollars in poor decision-making, poor thinking and acting too quickly.
How much thought have we given in Canada to the following: Why NORAD? What will NORAD do for us? What do we need NORAD for? What role will NORAD play for Canada, or is it just a chip on the poker table with our friends to the south?
Are we looking, as you have suggested, Ms. Martin, for a way of moving the agenda forward? Is that as far as we want to go now, or do we want to try to find a solution before we must make this decision? Do we not want a "best" binational product for Canada and the United States? Given what has happened, it does not seem to me that NORAD is comfortably behind us. There is no question that NORAD has served well, but I do not think it will serve for even the next five years.
Are we considering that? Are we taking further the basic question of how we pursue these things with the United States? I think we should be looking at the utility of NORAD as opposed to the utility of best bilateral, binational understanding, because it should embrace the broad aspects, like NATO. It must have a military aspect, but it must also have a trade aspect.
Ms. Martin: I would reassure honourable senators that we are looking at all issues with respect to how best to establish enhanced cooperation with the United States. All options are effectively on the table for consideration. Senator Nolin asked me for a sense of the political environment. As I indicated, the signals at the highest levels are very positive that we look for ways and means to enhance the cooperation that is in the interests of both our countries.
You are asking me, in a sense, to plunge into some of the gory details of some of the conclusions that might be drawn through the process of negotiation. I would be hard pressed to speak in any depth on that. You do touch on some interesting questions that need to be explored as we approach the negotiations. What best serves Canada's interests? Is it a bilateral relationship where there is a country-to-country agreement wherein we cooperate on a basis of protocols that have established procedures, information chains and such, or is it through a binational command as exists within NORAD? The uniqueness of NORAD is the fact of a Canadian and an American commander in charge of a single institution.
On September 11, a Canadian general was in charge of NORAD. That indicates the extent of the integration between our two countries. When you visit the command centre in Colorado Springs, you see Canadians and Americans sitting side by side dealing with information on incoming air threats, be they real or simply small airplanes that have forgotten to file a flight plan. Their activities are all undertaken jointly by Americans and Canadians, which is what the binational element of NORAD is all about. Bilateral means that you sit in your respective centres on either side of the border and share information to figure out how to address a matter. Binational means that you actually receive the information together, develop the analysis together and then act together.
The crux of the question is which model is the best one to use as we enhance that defence cooperation with the United States. Is the NORAD model suitable for all the new areas in which we would wish to proceed? If so, is NORAD the best model to build on or is it better to choose the bilateral route? There are pros and cons on all the elements that are being considered in the course of the negotiations that suggest some options are better than others, depending on what you want to address. That process of analysis is ongoing.
Once we have completed the process of analysis on the Canadian side, there comes the time that we sit down with the United States and determine where they think the best options lie, and we will have to find a marriage of the two through the course of the negotiations.
I hope that provides some clarity.
Senator Nolin: Your answer is very enlightening, but do you believe it is much more than air defence?
Ms. Martin: The question of enhanced defence cooperation deals with more than just air defence. The Prime Minister and the President mentioned, for example, maritime defence. It remains to be determined whether that is done through NORAD or some other mechanism.
Senator Forrestall: Have we looked at binational arrangements with respect to so-called border defence?
Ms. Martin: I regret that I am unable to answer that.
Mr. Crosbie: I believe that, later this week, you will be meeting with people from the Borders Task Force in PCO. They are taking the lead on the border, so you should ask them that because there are specific aspects of the Smart Border Action Plan that could be regarded as binational and some that are bilateral.
Senator Forrestall: My question is whether we are looking at it binationally. For the first couple of years these were all bilateral talks. We operated on rather flimsy arrangements based on goodwill and trust that had been built over a long period of time. For the next 25 years, are we looking at active partnership in these endeavours?
When I talk about borders, I include our ports. What is the situation regarding the movement of containers through our ports and checking cargo? Will this be done under bilateral arrangements, or is there some way that we can address continental defence? What are the Mexicans doing? How would they react to a trinational arrangement with respect to continental defence? Surely this is not a time to inch anywhere. It is time to take bold steps. Which is it? We can still be bold bilaterally. I am not suggesting we cannot. We can force positions to be fully considered by not just the United States, but also by Mexico and our European and eastern trading partners. Which is it? Do your various departments have any preferences? Will we just have to wait to see how we deal with port security?
Why do we not have police forces in all of our ports in North America that understand each other? Why do we not have the same kind of pursuit laws in place so that there is no advantage to anyone to go to one part of our great continent to get in? No matter where they would go, they would face the same set of well-trained individuals. Are we thinking boldly, or are we just meandering along? Surely there are lessons we can learn from the billions the Americans have wasted. I do not want to see the same thing happen in Canada. We are on the verge of doing that.
Mr. Crosbie: It is safe to say there is no one way to proceed. It will be a combination of moves. Part of it reflects the complexity of the various departments and agencies involved on all sides. For example, in some areas we may be doing things jointly; in others, we may be doing it separately but bringing them together at different points in time. There may be some areas where we can have much greater collaboration than in other areas. Specifically on borders and defence, I suggest you pose that question to our colleagues who will be participating in your next briefings.
On the border agenda, there is a tremendous challenge just within the United States to coordinate the many different agencies that have separate responsibilities. Traditionally, Canada has done a better job, in part because we are smaller.
Senator Forrestall: We must not be found wanting.
Mr. Crosbie: As to our ability to bring together a national position on something that crosses the responsibility of many different departments, we have a pretty good record of being able to address that.
Senator Forrestall: One of my colleagues asked earlier: "How do you attract the attention of the Americans?" Perhaps one of the ways you do that is by not sending $600 million out into the world. How do you get attention? I think if you were to take all of this and write a historical romance novel about it, you might get a million Canadians to read it. The last line is to write a letter to the New York Times and tell them this is what we are all about. Thank you very much. I wish you well. It is terribly important to all of us that we just do not walk.
Senator Atkins: Why do I get a sense that there is not the urgency that is required to develop the infrastructure on our borders? Why does it take so many years?
Mr. Crosbie: You will hear from Mr. Goatbe of the Border Task Force, so you can ask him this question too. We have been working hard with provincial and municipal governments in both Buffalo and Windsor-Detroit, because those are the key bottlenecks where the infrastructure problem is most important. Windsor-Detroit is at the top of the list. Our mission in Detroit plays an important role in bringing together those players on a regular basis. On both sides of the border, you have three levels of government involved. You have many agencies on both sides of the border. You have all kinds of legislative regimes, each of which has its own demands, and it has proven extremely difficult to get everyone to work in the same direction.
Most recently in Detroit-Windsor, they have come out with a report that proposes a far-reaching plan for infrastructure development. We have focused on that to try to bring the players together and say, "Let us all agree that that is what we are working toward, and let us start in various steps."
The federal government has allocated some money. The provincial government is willing to do so. We have to make sure the local communities are willing to adopt some of the proposals we put forward.
Senator Atkins: I accept what you are saying, but if there were an incident in the tunnel in Windsor, do you not think when those people are sitting around the table that they would move the schedule up if it impacted seriously on both sides? Why does it take a critical situation to move people to address a problem?
Mr. Crosbie: These decisions involve many people at different levels. I agree that it is frustrating. Once a decision is made as to which plan you will choose — another tunnel, another bridge, another highway — it will take several years for that to be built. I would hope that, with all the additional security measures we have on both sides now, the risk of something happening inside that tunnel or on that bridge is much reduced. I agree it is a real concern. We have to deal with the bottleneck at Windsor-Detroit which accounts for up to 40 per cent of the trade between our two countries.
Senator Atkins: The St. Lawrence Seaway was built with the cooperation of all the jurisdictions that were involved. They seemed to be able to do that more easily than fix the infrastructure at the borders. Apart from Windsor-Detroit, there is also St. Stephen-Calais, and it has taken them years to sort that one out.
Mr. Crosbie: The physical part of it is only one dimension. You can build all the infrastructure you want, but unless you have set up the legal and regulatory regimes on both sides, you have the people to man the booths, and you have the FAST and NEXUS programs to allow the traffic to move smoothly, the infrastructure will not solve the problem. A complex legal and regulatory agenda has to be married to the physical infrastructure agenda. It is not for want of effort. It is coming to fruition, and we have seen important advancements made on both sides.
I recommend that you put that question to Greg Goatbe and the Border Task Force people.
Senator Atkins: Since 9/11 there has been a significant increase in the budget for security in Canada. Do you think that the money allocated for security has been appropriately applied? To give you one example, we have put millions of dollars into CATSA. Has that been an effective investment?
Mr. Crosbie: You have gone beyond my competence to render judgement on the efficacy on the monies we have spent. As to our ability to continue to enjoy the support and trust of the American administration, and most of the American Congress, I think that the efforts we have undertaken and the money we have spent has led to evaluations such as the one referred to by Ms. Puxley and other documents where they hold up the Canada-U.S. relationship regarding the security agenda as a model example of what they would like to do with the rest of the world. One can question whether the money we have spend has all been spent in the right places. However, no one can question the Canadian government's desire to do all we can to create a truly secure environment for North America.
Senator Atkins: You might be interested in watching the 60 Minutes program that was on last Sunday.
What do you consider the major elements to improve harmonization between Canada and the U.S.?
Mr. Crosbie: Do you mean harmonization in a particular area?
Senator Atkins: Just getting along.
Mr. Crosbie: Are you talking about a particular sector or policy area?
Senator Atkins: Mainly in north lands security and security of North America.
Mr. Crosbie: I think it may well be the case that harmonization is not the way to achieve what we want to get because our systems are quite different. What we have to aim for is some level of equivalency of the system. Even though the Canadian way of bringing in immigrants is not the American way, it reflects all the difference of our society. The Americans can still feel confident that our system, albeit different, is achieving the same security objectives. That is a valid goal. Starting out from the premise that we have to harmonize everything may not be the best approach, but we do have to assure that, in terms of what is most important to the Americans, we satisfy that agenda with respect to security. We do not have to do everything exactly the same way. In some ways we may have a more efficient system, but their system reflects all the strengths and the weaknesses of the American body politic.
Senator Meighen: By way of editorial comment to start, Mr. Crosbie, I think you said that no one questions the willingness of the government to do whatever is necessary to secure North America. I question that primarily in terms of military security and I do not think there are many observers who would say we in Canada are spending our fair share of dollars in support of the military. According to recent polls the Canadian public agrees with that. I do not think the government is doing what it should be doing and this committee has come out with unanimous reports saying that not enough money is being spent on the military.
Conventional wisdom has it that defence policy should flow from Foreign Affairs policy. If that is so, to what extent is there an ongoing linkage, cooperation, discussion, adjustment made between Foreign Affairs Canada and the Department of National Defence, if any?
Ms. Martin: I would respond by talking about the nature of the cooperation that exists between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence because, indeed, the links are extremely close and very productive in actual fact. The links are such that, within Foreign Affairs we have at least one National Defence Lieutenant-Colonel who is assigned to a foreign policy job and one Canadian foreign service officer who is assigned to work within the Department of National Defence. It is one way of developing a much deeper knowledge of the working methodologies and thinking of both departments. The nature of the cooperation is close, the contacts are daily, the exchange and coordination of policy positions is extensive and, on almost any issue which concerns both departments, you will see officials consulting back and forth to ensure there is coherence between the positions of the two departments.
This kind of cooperation has been going on for years. It is nothing new, but it has reached a zenith with our engagement in Afghanistan where our government has talked about our "3D" approach, that is, defence, diplomacy and development. Foreign Affairs refers to diplomacy, defence and development and CIDA talks only of development. It indicates the extent to which interdepartmental cooperation, in fact, whole of government cooperation is necessary in dealing with situations such as Afghanistan or the aftermath in Haiti or Sudan. The cooperation is close and extensive.
In the process of developing the International Policy Statement, policy officials in both departments felt as if they had been living in each others sitting rooms over the past months as they developed the various elements of that policy statement. It indicates the extent to which the effort has been made to develop a coherent approach to assessing the way defence policy and foreign policy interrelate one with the other.
Senator Meighen: To follow along with the example of Afghanistan, it would seem to me that there are many immediate reasons for us to be in Afghanistan. One always cites the contribution to world stability, et cetera. However, you in Foreign Affairs Canada must have some other items on your agenda as well. We are not there just to bring stability. Does having our participation known to the Americans, and positioning Canada as a country that can effectively participate, lever our position to achieve other ends? Does that type of discussion ever go on between the Department of National Defence and you people, or does it stay at the level of liaison officer and official contact?
Ms. Martin: In actual fact you have described well the nature of engagement and the range of factors that come into play. In Afghanistan our principal objective is the stabilization of the country so that it is no longer a haven for terrorists.
Senator Meighen: If we had not gone in, the Americans or someone else would have done it, so it would have been done as well or badly as it is being done now. Our going in is for another reason surely, is it not?
Ms. Martin: I do not think it is fair to say that, if Canada had not gone in, others would have filled the breach.
Senator Meighen: Do you not? They are there.
Ms. Martin: Canada is there; others are there. Canada is among the top five troop contributors still in Afghanistan. When we were commanding ISAF, we were the top troop-contributing country to the ISAF mission.
NATO has experienced serious challenges in appealing to allies to send up the forces necessary to contribute to the ISAF mission. Currently, NATO is expanding the mission outside Kabul, which is where it started, into provincial reconstruction teams throughout the country. At the NATO submit in February, the Secretary-General was able to announce the completion of the second stage of that expansion. There are four stages.
It was a hard stage to complete because NATO allies were having difficulty putting up the required capabilities to enable those PRTs to deploy. Canada will be engaging in stage 3, involving a provincial reconstruction team in Kandahar. The Prime Minister and Minister Pettigrew have spoken of this.
Senator Meighen: With the same troop levels we have now?
Ms. Martin: With the same troop levels we have now, taking into account the recent announcements on the expansion of the Armed Forces in the budget. I am out of my turf on this one. Those questions need to be asked of our colleagues from National Defence.
Senator Cordy: Having just returned from Afghanistan, I know that Canadians are doing phenomenal things there, and not just the military. The military are working seven days a week and long hours while they are there. You are right in saying that NATO has problems in getting allies to come forward. Some allies there have such strict caveats that, while they may be there bodily, they are not always available to do the job that has to be done.
Earlier you mentioned the idea of getting across to the Americans the good things that Canadians are doing in Afghanistan and overseas. However, I think it is important that Canadians know what we are doing. Until I arrived in Afghanistan, I was unaware of what we are doing there. We have a young, energetic and dynamic ambassador. To say that the facilities that he is using are spartan would be an understatement.
The work that CIDA is doing in Afghanistan is wonderful. Canada purchased all the equipment, all the materials that were used for registering voters in the presidential elections. We are working with Italy to develop a judicial system for Afghanistan.
The feeling that I got in talking to governmental officials was how well trusted Canadians were. In fact, they are dealing with cabinet ministers one on one because Canadians do not go in and try to steamroll people; they try to work with the country as they are doing in Afghanistan. We heard that over and over again. This is my way of telling people of the great job Canadians are doing. I was proud to be a Canadian when Senator Nolin and I were in Afghanistan with NATO.
Canadians are very kind-hearted. Every time a country is in need, whether it is a failing state or a country in crisis, Canadians want to help, but how realistic is it for us to help every single country? If it is not, how do we prioritize the amounts of money, military troops and whatever is needed?
Ms. Martin: Thank you very much for the plug. I think you need to go on a speaking tour on behalf of the tremendous contributions being made by the Canadians in the field in Afghanistan. Certainly, from our optic inside the bureaucracy, we also think they are doing a tremendous job.
The conditions in Afghanistan are extremely difficult, there is no question. Kabul was a war-torn city and it is in the process of being reconstructed, which has limited the availability of standing buildings and such like. As the economy in Afghanistan progresses, one can only hope that things will improve on that front. Ms. Puxley has been to Afghanistan also and can speak first hand to an understanding of the very difficult conditions under which people operate there.
The question of how to prioritize is a difficult one, given the plethora of situations where Canada could be providing help and support — be it to situations like the tsunami, the appalling situation in Darfur, or the peace agreement between the north and south in Sudan — because so many situations tug on the heartstrings of Canadians, who are enormously generous and caring people. That has been demonstrated most particularly in the amazing response to the tsunami crisis in Asia. The challenge facing the government is always: How do you choose the ones in which to invest?
Last February, Haiti emerged on the horizon as a crisis country in which Canada has invested hugely, a country which has a significant representation of nationals who are now Canadians, a country where we have interests. That becomes a driving factor for being engaged in Haiti. We faced choices with East Timor, the Congo, with Cote d'Ivoire, with Liberia, with Sierra Leone. The list of international crisis situations is endless where Canadians could have something to offer. Working on the inside, it becomes an extremely challenging process to try to determine where Canada can best make a contribution.
Frankly speaking, those of us on the inside are eagerly awaiting the outcome of the International Policy Statement as a means of providing guidance on our approach to these situations in the future. In the budget, the government has given some strong signals about its intent to create the tools that we need to be able to respond to these situations. It has increased the budget of the Department of National Defence; it has added more money to the CIDA budget; it has rearranged the way the international assistance envelope will be managed; and it also has signalled that it will create a global peace and security fund within Foreign Affairs. These are welcome tools that will facilitate our ability to respond to the situations that do present themselves internationally.
The question of setting priorities becomes inherently a political decision in the end as to what is the size and the nature of the Canadian contribution to any one of these situations that might arise as nature and political events will determine.
The Chairman: We must now conclude our questions. The intention of this panel was to deal with preparations for our visit to the United States. We have a number of questions that we have not had an opportunity to put to you. If we can get them to you today, we would ask that you look at them. It is possible they may have been answered already in some of the material you have given us here. If that is the case, simply disregard them. We will be touch with you in writing in the hopes that you will be in touch with us in writing.
Thank you for appearing before the committee. Your evidence has been most helpful. You can tell by the interest the committee has that they wish this panel had been structured to be a two-and-a-half-hour panel instead of a one-and-a-half-hour panel. As it is, we have run 15 minutes longer than anticipated. On behalf of the senators here, I would thank you for your assistance. We look forward to your support as we continue to prepare ourselves for the visit to Washington.
For members of the public, you may address any questions or comments by visiting our website, www.sen-sec.ca. We post witness testimony, as well as confirmed hearing schedules. You may contact the clerk of the committee by calling 1-800-267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting members of the committee.
Our next witnesses are Rear-Admiral Drew Robertson, Director General, International Security Policy, and Colonel Mike Haché, Director, Western Hemisphere Policy.
RAdm. Robertson has extensive sea experience and assumed command of HMCS Annapolis in January 1995. On promotion to captain, he became director of NATO policy. Then, in 1999, he assumed command of HMCS Athabaskan, the flagship for the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic in 1999-2000. He commanded the Canadian task group during its six-month Operation Apollo deployment to Southwest Asia as part of Canada's contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom. He was promoted to Rear Admiral and took up his present duties in 2003.
RAdm. Robertson is a graduate of the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in Toronto and the National Security Studies course.
Col. Haché joined the Canadian Forces in 1972. Trained as a navigator, he has extensive maritime air experience. He attended the Royal Air Force Staff College at Bracknell, England and subsequently rose to command 404 Maritime Patrol and Training Squadron in 1993. In 1995, he was posted to Maritime Air Group Headquarters in Halifax as Senior Staff Officer Fixed Wing Aircraft where he served until 1997. He was subsequently posted to 19 Wing Comox as the Wing Operations Officer.
Promoted to his present rank in July 1999, Col. Haché was appointed as 1 Canadian Air Division Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) in Halifax. In July of 2003, Col. Haché took up his present duties at National Defence Headquarters.
Gentlemen, welcome to the committee. We are pleased to see you both. Please proceed.
Rear-Admiral Drew W. Robertson, Director General, International Security Policy, National Defence: Honourable senators, I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak to you before you go to Washington. I think that our comments will complement what you heard earlier from Ms. Martin. In fact, Mike Haché is Ms. Martin's counterpart and I am Paul Chapin's counterpart. We work in the policy group in NDHQ under Ken Calder, who is Jim Wright's counterpart. I think you will find that our messages will be quite consistent with what you have heard.
Our successful relationship with the United States on security and defence issues is based on mechanisms of varying levels of formality. The bi-national planning group characterizes the relationship as consisting of more than 80 treaty-level defence agreements, more than 250 memoranda of understanding between the two defence departments and approximately 145 bilateral fora in which defence matters are discussed. They are the foundation that supports all the rest of the activities we undertake.
The most formal relationship, as several of you will understand from personal experience, is the one we share as allies with the other NATO members. Participating in NATO's operations makes a direct contribution to our shared security by dealing with potential threats long before they come to the shores of North America.
Whether considering our current contribution to International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, in Kabul and the planned provincial reconstruction team in Kandahar or the upcoming employment of HMCS Winnipeg in the region, they should be thought of as being inextricably linked to continental security, whether under U.S. command in Operation Enduring Freedom or under NATO command in ISAF. That is certainly the way my American counterparts think.
Equally important and almost as long standing as NATO is the North American Aerospace Defence Agreement and the bi-national command structure of NORAD. A number of formal bilateral agreements provided the structure for a variety of plans that have their origins in the Cold War era. There are many other relationships based on a series of agreements at ever less formal levels.
I will quickly review a few of the mechanisms that support the relationship, beginning with those that were created about 60 years prior to 9/11 but are still with us and still very useful to us today. I will then turn to the steps taken to enhance our defence cooperation since 9/11.
The formal relationship began in 1940 at Ogdensburg, New York, where the Prime Minister and the President declared that Canada and the United States share responsibility for the defence of North America and that neither country would allow an attack on the other through their territory. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence, PJBD, an advisory body that reports directly to the Prime Minister and President, was established at Ogdensburg and continues to be our highest-level, routine bilateral engagement, providing a semi-annual forum for critical senior diplomatic, defence and military contact. The board met at the start of March to discuss a variety of issues such as maritime security, NORAD renewal, the U.S. quadrennial defence review and many others.
The Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee, a bi-national military forum charged with the oversight of issues of mutual concern, was formed in 1946 to support the PJBD. It continues to meet, and evolve to meet, our current requirements.
The first Basic Security Plan — which we would now refer to as the Basic Security Document — for the combined defence of North America was also prepared in 1946 and subsequently reviewed by the Military Cooperation Committee. It is one of the documents that is currently in the process of being updated.
NORAD evolved from PJBD discussions regarding the Soviet long-range aviation threat to North America, and it was established in 1958. The NORAD agreement is a treaty-based document that has a five-year renewal cycle. The agreement currently runs until May 12, 2006.
NORAD's flexibility and adaptability to evolving threats is long standing. It evolved to deal with changing weapon technologies and emerging threats throughout the Cold War. NORAD continued to evolve after 9/11 to deal with the new security challenges. Under Operation Noble Eagle, it has adopted and increased readiness postures, introduced new procedures, added domestic air surveillance methods and enhanced information sharing between our two countries.
The Americans adapted their approach to continental defence in a number of other ways including by changing their global command structure. While a review was already underway prior to 9/11, it was the 9/11 attacks that galvanized their efforts and led to the creation of the U.S. Northern Command, NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM, as Ms. Martin indicated earlier, is the combatant command that has been accorded a mission encompassing both homeland defence and civil support.
The commander of Northern Command, Admiral Timothy Keating, is also the commander of NORAD. In fact, several years ago we might have turned that around and said that he was the commander of NORAD and also happened to be the commander of NORTHCOM. The importance of NORTHCOM has steadily risen over the intervening years. We maintain steadily growing links with NORTHCOM where our senior presence is liaison officer with the rank of Rear Admiral.
The Bi-National Planning Group, BPG, evolved from American consultations with Canada on the creation of NORTHCOM, and was established with a two-year mandate in December 2002. The BPG was mandated to review existing Canada-U.S. defence plans and eventually validate them; prepare a binational military contingency plan to respond to threats and attacks or to provide support for other major emergencies; enhance maritime surveillance and intelligence sharing; and establish coordination mechanisms for providing military support to civil emergency management authorities. The desired outcome was to improve Canada-U.S. arrangements to respond to land-based threats or national disasters and defend against maritime threats.
Canada and the United States have both found the BPG to be very effective, to the point that both nations have agreed that the mandate should be extended to enable them to continue their work. Where their functions may reside in the future will be determined as we pursue the NORAD renewal discussions and discussions on enhanced North American security. The BPG mandate has been extended until May 12, 2006 as well.
Our work on enhancing defence cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defence is ongoing. Both countries have been clear about their intents to enhance defence cooperation in the areas of maritime defence and defence support to civil authorities. Both also value NORAD's current successes. The policy basis for our ongoing work in enhancing defence cooperation with the U.S. starts of course with the national security policy that identified Canada's intent to enhance Canada's cooperation in maritime defence and to improve our capacity for continent-wide emergency management.
The November 30 joint statement issued by Prime Minister Martin and President Bush stated, amongst other things, that we are committed to working toward renewing the NORAD agreement and investigating opportunities for greater cooperation on North American maritime surveillance and maritime defence.
The international policy statement and defence policy statement will reflect these commitments. Certainly Minister Graham has spoken about the need to explore new and innovative ways to work with the U.S. in defence of the continent. The government has consequently directed that we explore with American officials enhancements in continental security. While the timing of NORAD renewal might be the apparent cause for upcoming discussions and eventual negotiations, we will not limit our work to the renewal to this agreement alone. We expect to explore new mechanisms with our American counterparts. With that by way of background, Col. Haché and I would be pleased to take your questions and begin a discussion.
Senator Meighen: To get the discussion going — I think you may have touched on this RAdm. Robertson — how would you list the major bilateral defence issues between Canada and the U.S. today and what has been done since 9/ 11 to improve national security and defence and the strategic relationship we have or would like to have with the U.S.?
RAdm. Robertson: One of the first things that happened is the deployment of Canadian Forces abroad, principally to Afghanistan and the region that you heard Ms. Martin refer to as the "away game" earlier. People use that terminology the "away game" and "home game" but in reality they are inextricably linked. The United States, in their national defence strategy, talks about activities that are done in a forward-layered defence as being their first priority. They are not interested in waiting, obviously, until the threat arrives at their shores to take action at that point. The first activity we did was contribute to the campaign against terrorism. Then we, as part of NORAD, carried on with the enhancements to deal with the new threat that I referred to and stood up to a binational planning group.
The binational-planning-group work has been quite successful, as I said, and caused us to have a much greater engagement between our two nations in the post 9/11 scenarios than we otherwise would have. That is the start. Next would be the work that the binational planning group has done in updating and revising a variety of plans that, as I said earlier, had a Cold War heritage and needed to be updated to reflect the post 9/11 environment. That updating is underway in a number of areas.
In addition to that kind of activity of updating plans and procedures, there is a need to validate those plans, participate in exercises, update command and control relationships and so on. Last Friday was the last day of a U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense exercise called "top off" that we participated in. In the United States, it was a live exercise. In Canada, it was our first engagement. It was what we call a command-post exercise or headquarters-level exercise. Nevertheless, it caused us to engage with Northern Command as a participant in that exercise that featured terrorist-type scenarios. There is a whole range of enhancements that were made after 9/ 11 in the areas I described; command and control plans, exercises and so on. I believe there was a first part to the question that I have not addressed.
Senator Meighen: What are the major issues for negotiation, for discussion or of contention, perhaps. What has to be resolved that has not been resolved?
RAdm. Robertson: I do not think there are areas of contention and disagreement. There are areas where we want to work more closely. That is why you hear us refer to enhanced cooperation. Of course, that work is what we will do as part of the negotiations or discussions around NORAD renewal. I am not sure that I would say there are areas of friction at this point. Perhaps Col Haché would like to add something.
Colonel Mike Haché, Director, Western Hemisphere Policy, National Defence: I would not identify any true areas of friction. It is a matter of ensuring clarity and understanding what we do well together; the continuing dialogues through the forums, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and the Canada-U.S. Military Co-operation Committee. They continued throughout the ensuing months and years after 9/11. That provided the contact and the ability to have professional discussions on issues of mutual concern. Nothing glaring would have come out of those discussions. We were able to deal with whatever was an issue of concern at the time as we went along.
Senator Meighen: I had a look at the DND website on the binational planning group and there was a title of a progress with three bullets under it. The website continued to refer to the commanding officer of NORAD and NORTHCOM as being General Eberhardt and I think he has been gone for a year. Was the list of progress also a touch out of date? If you look at it, it talks in the first bullet of developing binational awareness of vessels of interest to both countries and sharing information on what assets are available to deal with these potential threats. Is that in place now? Is Canada in a position to make some contribution to that?
RAdm. Robertson: The change of command was in December.
Senator Meighen: That is not quite a year.
RAdm. Robertson: However, we should still update that. That is an area of ongoing work between both countries. It is an area where we both bring something to the merged product. It is not just one country providing and the other receiving. What matters is that the project is the merger of two countries understanding about maritime activities, so that we know more than each country did independently. That is one thing that we will look to in continuing any enhancement that we make to our cooperation. We will continue to bring common operating pictures as the standard parlance, but our understanding of what is happening on both coasts is a simpler way of putting it. We bring that together and we will each know more than we would have known independently.
The binational planning group has accomplished other things. One of the first things it had to do was catalogue all the products and agreements that exist between our two countries, and actually create a library of them. You heard me list a number of them at the start. That library continues to grow. It is an online library available to both our countries. They are also in the process, as I said, of updating the Basic Security Document, indeed refining the combined defence plan and drafting the civil assistance plan that is specifically aimed at allowing the military forces of the two countries to work together in support of the civil authority.
Senator Meighen: Is that to overcome a problem such as we had on the west coast? They had an exercise in Washington state and then discovered the border was closed, and they could not therefore have access to B.C. Civil Defence equipment and personnel.
RAdm. Robertson: I am not familiar with what happened in that circumstance, but we are aiming to make sure that if the Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, PSEPC, have a need for capabilities that are resident in the other country, we have a way of answering that call.
Senator Meighen: Where are we with that? For example, if there were an earthquake on either side of the border on the west coast, could Civil Defence equipment and personnel cross the border?
RAdm. Robertson: It is a matter of coming up with arrangements that are well thought through, well prepared and agreed to between the two countries. There have been such arrangements for years between the two countries. In Canada's case, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff is responsible for taking advantage of those. They are not as up to date as we would like them to be to face the new reality of potential terrorist attacks in both countries. That is why a special civil assistance plan is being drafted.
Senator Meighen: Is it a work in progress then?
RAdm. Robertson: It is, but it is building on those arrangements that already exist.
Senator Meighen: Why does one have the impression that everything is taking such a terribly long time? Everyone says these are matters of some urgency, yet maybe one has to come to the unfortunate conclusion that until there is a serious incident, there will not be dramatic progress. Is that an unfair statement?
RAdm. Robertson: We have not stopped all the other things we are doing to turn all priorities to those particular areas. The major effort over the past couple of years has been Afghanistan. Prior to that, it has been the campaign against terror quite broadly. We have an effort underway to update a variety of documents. We are matching the speed of work of our American counterparts. It is not as if they are outstripping us in their efforts to update and revise, and that we are lagging and holding up cooperation between our two countries.
Senator Meighen: I was interested in your other comment that the operational tempo you have been subjected to has had an inevitable impact on your ability to concentrate on other matters. Did I understand you correctly?
RAdm. Robertson: That would be fair. Indeed, that is the experience in the United States as well, although they are more likely to advance on all fronts at the same time.
Senator Meighen: I do not think they are quite as stretched as we are.
RAdm Robertson: That could be.
Senator Meighen: You referred to strategies that evolved in the Cold War, and NORAD certainly grew out of the Cold War. The principal objective of NORAD as I understood it was to deal with the threat of a manned bomber attack on North America. If that is no longer a serious threat, and I think most observers would agree with that, and we have opted out of the Ballistic Missile Defence Program, it would seem to me that cooperation with our American neighbours — whether it be in the maritime area, in the air or on the ground — could possibly be achieved just as well with joint naval agreement, joint army agreement, and joint air agreement. Why would we continue to need NORAD if we are not in the anti-missile business and we are not too worried about a manned bomber attack?
RAdm Robertson: To correct a misperception I might have left you with, the Cold War plans that I spoke of were actually plans developed in the Cold War era. Some of them date back perhaps 10 or 15 years, but I would not describe them as Cold War plans. On the maritime side, we had the sort of joint agreements that you are referring to. We had very good joint agreements that did not reach the level of a treaty or a binational command that allowed our navy and several other NATO navies to deal with the presence of Soviet ballistic missile submarines off our two coasts. Despite the fact that this was a series of bilateral agreements rather than a binational command, it was very effective for many years. In fact, that is exactly the world that Col Haché started off in and worked through, and that I participated in briefly. We have good experience with exactly those kinds of bilateral agreements, some of which date back many years.
Senator Meighen: Do we need a NORAD? I am not anti-NORAD. I am merely asking if we could not deal with the matters at hand just as well through another form of cooperation.
RAdm. Robertson: There are indeed many ways to go about achieving the cooperation that we would like. In some cases, what matters in determining the form of the cooperation is the function that one wants to achieve. In some cases, there is real value in having a binational command. The advantage in the case of NORAD is relatively obvious in terms of the speed of reaction that is required and the immediacy of some issues, especially when you look at the deployment of assets from Canada or the United States quickly across the border to deal with some kind of a security threat. That all argues in part for a binational command that has that speed of reaction.
This comes back to what Barbara Martin was talking about earlier. There are a number of ways that this can be done. What matters is determining the best way to achieve the functionality that one wants, the way that is most effective and efficient so that you can justify the cost of whatever the arrangement is.
Going back to your original point, I would not discount at all the utility of NORAD as it exists today for knowing what is going on in the approaches to North American air space and being able to react to that. The Americans value NORAD specifically for its ability to respond to what we would have called the traditional threat years ago. They still value it in that role. They also value it for its ability to respond to the asymmetric or the unconventional threat. They value it for both those reasons, and that is why we know they would want to see it continue in its present form.
Senator Meighen: If there was a drug run being undertaken in an aircraft that obviously did not report, it would be identified first by NORAD, would it? Then what happens?
RAdm. Robertson: I have been involved in sitting off the south coast of Nova Scotia in a ship working for NORAD, extending the radar coverage of NORAD. I should turn to Col Haché at this point. If you are wondering, my concern is getting into areas that are classified about our capability to detect narcotics.
Senator Meighen: I am sure our capability is second to none, but I just want to get at the principle of what happens. This unidentified plane is approaching the shore of Nova Scotia and is suspected to have drugs on board; who identifies it and what is done?
Col. Haché: This identifies the importance of the international cooperation between Canada and the United States and the various law enforcement agencies. The odds are good that this will be a law enforcement activity and we will be called in to support it. Consequently, with the appropriate information being passed, we will pick up and support whatever the law enforcement framework is that is dealing with that particular issue. The likelihood of a drug runner being identified as such on lift-off by NORAD is less likely than it being something developed through more interagency contacts.
Senator Atkins: On the subject of NORAD, they deal with passenger aircraft as well that are coming over from the north. Do they consider a passenger aircraft as a potential flying missile? How do you categorize that?
RAdm. Robertson: Absolutely, that potential is there after 9/11. We are obviously a participant, but the lead in the entire effort belongs to other government departments that are responsible for things such as who is in the aircraft and how is it that we came to know of a particular aircraft? Certainly, aircraft have been turned back from the United States. Aircraft have been turned back from Canada based on who is on board and sent back to Europe. At a certain point, if the aircraft is already in Canadian air space, do we have the capability to react to that? Yes, absolutely.
Senator Atkins: That would be an argument for keeping NORAD, would it not?
RAdm. Robertson: Very much so.
Senator Meighen: In its present form.
RAdm. Robertson: At least. If you consider that aircraft bound for the United States from Europe are passing through Canada on their way, and that the quickest response aircraft to deal with an aircraft coming from the United States could be an American fighter aircraft rather than Canadian fighter aircraft, yes.
Senator Atkins: Say one is coming from overseas and the manifest identifies two terrorists on it. Would it be NORAD that would pick that up and make sure that the aircraft turned around or was dealt with?
RAdm. Robertson: Is NORAD kept aware and well informed about these things? Yes. However, NORAD does not have the lead in determining who is on board aircraft and what action should be taken.
Senator Atkins: Do they have access to the manifest?
RAdm. Robertson: I cannot say whether they do or do not. The point is that it is not a defence issue to sort out who is on board, what kind of aircraft and what is the government's response to it. However, NORAD does have the ability to respond when called on.
Senator Meighen: We have all been quite intrigued by General Hillier's concept of a "CanadaCom." Can you tell me where that sits? Is it a trial balloon; or is it a concept that because it has been put forward by the chief of defence staff is now being actively examined and considered?
I was intrigued also by the name of teams within the Department of National Defence — the tiger teams that are allegedly put in place to examine various concepts for change and whatnot. Is either of you on a tiger team? If so, or even if not, can you tell me what the tiger teams do?
RAdm. Robertson: The minister spoke about a new command and control structure for the Canadian Forces. I think he did make reference to CanadaCom a couple of days back and referred to it as a concept rather than a concrete structure at this point.
The Chairman: Was it CanadaCom or TrueNorthCom?
Senator Meighen: The chair may be ill, but he still has not lost his powers to joke.
RAdm. Robertson: It is not already a wiring diagram posted on people's walls that members of the Canadian Forces are being posted to; it is a concept at this point. That concept of a better command and control structure for the employment of the Canadian Forces in Canada is indeed the subject of one of the teams that is looking at command and control for the Canadian Forces. It is an ongoing study, the results of which will be presented to the Chief of Defence Staff in the coming months.
Nevertheless, the idea of better command and control capability at home is designed to make us more effective in Canada. That has a collateral effect, which is that it will make us hopefully a more responsive partner to the United States Northern Command across a whole variety of issues.
Northern Command has been in existence now for over two years. It has gained capability, experience and confidence and become more and more a fact of the American homeland security scene. A command and control structure in Canada that allows us to work well with Northern Command is actually very important to the Americans. At this point, that relationship is between the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff in National Defence Headquarters and Northern Command.
Senator Meighen: Your remarks are so interesting that I have one final question. I asked you about defence issues. We will be in Washington, as you know. Is there nothing that either of you could say to us now, or perhaps in the form of a letter, that you would like us — if we have the opportunity in dealing with the right forum with the right people — to say, look, we are having trouble from the Canadian perspective in achieving such and such or in moving discussions along on such and such. We do not understand what the stumbling block is. Could you help to resolve the deadlock?
Is there nothing that is seemingly stalled? I do not say we could solve the problem, but maybe with the senior congressional people there is an opportunity to put in a word to see if we can make progress more quickly.
RAdm. Robertson: I would say that there is an irritant at this point that remains to be solved. The situation in Washington is an interesting one based on what is going on in the United States at the moment. In March, the Americans put out their first national defence strategy signed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that flows from their national security strategy. It is a simple and short document, quite readable.
Senator Meighen: Could we ask the witness for that?
RAdm. Robertson: I would be happy to leave this behind. The first sentence is, "America is a nation at war." That might explain why they are occupied with global war on terror: Iraq, Afghanistan, and so on.
It is a time of ongoing change for the Americans with this new national defence strategy and the degree to which the Department of Defense is involved in the quadrennial defence review of identifying what they need to do to respond to the national defence strategy. A presidential directive on a maritime strategy has also captured the attention of many folks. It is also a time of consolidation for the Departments of Homeland Security and Northern Command. They have been in existence for several years and continue to gain experience and competencies.
That was not exactly your question. It was about irritants between our two countries. I would not focus on those. Rather, I would look at the changes going on within the United States itself.
Senator Banks: When you responded to Senator Meighen, you mentioned that you thought we would find your answers were consistent with others that we have received from your counterparts in other government departments. I must say sometimes we wish that were not so.
This committee is going to Washington again, and we are seeking your full frank and professional military advice today to assist this committee when they are in Washington. In response to an earlier question from Senator Meighen, you said that there were no matters of contention or friction between our two countries, militarily speaking. In our previous visits to Washington, we have found that there are matters of great contention and friction, militarily speaking, between our countries.
We have met with Mr. Rumsfeld, General Richard Myers and senior security advisers in the White House, and we have heard about great matters of contention and friction. There is no criticism about the job that is being done by the Canadian military. In fact, the Canadian military is held in the highest possible regard. Comparisons of our national contribution have been made by us and other critics. Our country's contribution as a proportion of government spending, gross national product, et cetera and by odious comparison with other countries are matters of contention and friction within the United States specifically and with other countries as well that have an effect far beyond the military.
I would be grateful if you would tell us, or perhaps if we have the opportunity, if you do not know about them, to tell you, about those matters of contention and friction and how you think they are being addressed and resolved?
RAdm. Robertson: Let me take one practical example, which would be ballistic missile defence perhaps. Interaction with my American counterparts over the past month or so has not changed in any way by the decision the Government of Canada made on ballistic missile defence. My counterparts, who are mostly in uniform but some are civil servants in the Department of Defense, are all used to working in a democratically elected government where they take orders from the government of the day. They have acknowledged the decision made by the Government of Canada and look to the ways that we move forward and deal with enhancing security in North America, which is some of what we spoke about earlier.
The national contribution that the government chooses to make is a matter for the government of the day. We are about to have an international policy statement and a defence policy statement. It would be useful for those to be tabled and then you can enter into conversations with counterparts in Washington. Certainly, the recent budget has the attention of my American military counterparts who understand what an increase that makes and what additional contribution it will allow us to make in the future.
Senator Banks: It is fairly far in the future in terms of substance because this year I understand it is $500 million. I do not want to do a C.D. Howe and say, what is $500 million? It is a great deal, but in the scheme of things today, the majority of that spending comes later.
I do not think anyone will suggest that a civilian government ought to determine military policy, but in western democracies that is the way it works. Senior military officers have come to the table and said words such as, "Oh, here come the freeloaders." I am being colloquial here. I know there is respect between the two countries and that Canadian forces members and our past contributions are greatly respected, but surely from time to time you must have run into questions about the extent, the proportion, and the amount of the contribution that we are able to make. It is that friction to which I refer. Do you not find it when you meet with your counterparts in the United States? We do.
RAdm. Robertson: That would exist with your counterparts because it is a matter of politics as opposed to a matter of policy.
Senator Banks: Do soldiers, sailors and airmen not ask those questions?
RAdm. Robertson: It is not a point of friction between me and my counterparts, and I think that would be common across the forces.
Senator Banks: I have to say that I find that remarkable.
I will go on to another subject and refer to what was said by Senator Meighen. In addition to NORAD and CANUS, to which you referred, there are approximately 80 other bilateral agreements between Canada and United States regarding military agreements alone. We have 145 multilateral organizations and 250 or so memorandums of understanding having to do with military matters between the two countries. Do we still need all those? You talked about the pre-eminence of the joint board which has been in place since 1940. We now have the Bi-national Planning Group. Is that not enough? Can we dispense with the alphabet soup of those other 145 organizations, the 80 agreements and 250 memorandums of understanding and cut through the red tape and take care of it?
RAdm. Robertson: It is certainly worth considering. I know it is under consideration. The Bi-national Planning Group is doing a triage through all those documents to find out which exist but do not have a life because they have not been used for a considerable period of time. They may have origins in three separate services but today should be rolled into one document between the two departments of defence.
Senator Banks: Those agreements are in place and in effect, but is it not the case that sometimes they hold back or constrain progress which might be made otherwise?
RAdm. Robertson: It is more likely that there are some agreements in that list that might have outlived their usefulness and added to that long list. I would leave that to the Bi-national Planning Group to deal with and sort out the economies of value.
Senator Banks: I hope they do that.
In November, it was reported that the Bi-national Planning Group had talked about an international security and defence agreement between Canada and the United States that might supplant NORAD. What can you tell us about that?
RAdm. Robertson: They were merely examining the variety of ways in which we could go about enhancing North American defence cooperation. One can imagine a whole range of scenarios from an all-encompassing new binational command —
Senator Banks: Is that being talked about?
RAdm. Robertson: There is a whole range that needs to be looked at, but there are several factors that have pre-eminence. One is the strength of Northern Command, another is the success of NORAD today and the third is the developing concept of a new command and control structure of the Canadian Forces that was alluded to a few minutes ago. It is unlikely to be an all-into-one-agreement approach and I am not sure that form would provide the functionality we are looking for.
There is a range. We need to look at that range and be ready to respond to whatever the American interest is when we begin discussions with them.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: Admiral, colonel, both of you work in the international security field of public policy. One subject matter which unfortunately is not raised enough, according to me, is the issue of the far north, the Arctic.
In Calgary, in our study of Canadian defence policy, we heard from witnesses who gave us an extensive explanation as to why Canadian authorities needed to better understand and accept our responsibility to offer a much stronger defense of the far north.
[English]
To what extent would it affect the way we do business with the Americans if we tackle the plan of the Prime Minister for the North as found in the Speech from the Throne?
RAdm. Robertson: It is true that national defence plays a role in enforcing our sovereignty in the North, but that is only one part of the overall government effort to reinforce our sovereignty. Our exercise from last summer and the ranger patrols that have recently been in the media is but one part of the overall Government of Canada presence. The minister said that we are looking at ways that will increase our presence in the North as a way of ensuring our sovereignty. That will obviously feature in the defence policy statement, but it is not clear to me that it would be an area of enhancement that would actually catch the attention of the Americans. Activity that we undertake to reinforce our sovereignty would be respected by the Americans, but it would be taken as a given that we would go about enforcing our sovereignty.
Senator Nolin: Let us speak so that the Canadians watching will understand what we are talking about. Let us forget for a moment what could be written in a policy document. Who is looking after the North now? I am speaking of not only airspace but water and land. I presume the answer is that we are doing that. How are we performing that responsibility? Do the Americans understand that it is our responsibility?
RAdm. Robertson: I do not think they would question that it is our responsibility to watch what is happening in our claimed territory and waters.
Senator Nolin: You say we are watching. We were in Esquimalt and saw with our own eyes what it means to watch. I know we do not have facilities for the North similar to what we have for the Pacific Ocean, but do we intend to do that?
RAdm. Robertson: The sovereignty of Canadian territory and waters is an area on which I would defer to others in our department as to our current engagement and our plans for the future. Colonel Normand Couturier of Canadian Forces Northern Area might be the person to respond. Major-General Doug Dempster may speak to the plans for the future.
Senator Nolin: Col. Haché, you are responsible for western hemisphere policy. What is your understanding of our responsibility for watching the North?
Col. Haché: Our first responsibility is Canada from a Government of Canada approach, and DND is one of the many departments that responds in that area where we are able to. From a continental perspective, we are concerned about our sovereign territory. We look at the areas about which we have concerns, form opinions on them, and work with other government departments. We work with the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff on exercises, opportunities and whatever else is possible to increase our presence in the North at a time and for a reason that would be appropriate.
Senator Nolin: Can we assure the Americans that we are as concerned as we should be with the North, having in mind terrorist attacks? I am speaking only of maritime and land.
Col. Haché: I think we can. We are aware of the increasing access to the North by a variety of nations. The Government of Canada is responding to the foreigners who are coming to our territories. We are constantly looking at the challenges associated with large aircraft flying across the Arctic, with ships, and perhaps with cruise liners in the future, and understanding what that means in terms of safeguarding the passengers on board those ships.
From a security perspective, people are thinking about what it means to have more access and activity in the North. That is part and parcel of what Northern Area is doing. They would be able to speak to that better than I.
The American perspective is that it is a long way from the North for most vehicles but aircraft, so the NORAD piece does deal with the aircraft aspects of that.
Aside from any border issues associated with our proximity to Alaska, for example, in terms of being able to assist the populations of Alaska and the Yukon territory, and working in the same collaborative manner on security issues as we do across the 49th parallel, I believe the Americans would be comfortable that we are attending to that.
Senator Forrestall: A year ago, one of the three principal accomplishments of the Bi-national Planning Group was the development of eight consequent management scenarios focused on weapons of mass destruction, terrorists and natural disasters and the development of a binational civil assistance plan to deal with these and other scenarios.
Can you tell us the status of the civil assistance plan? Have there been any exercises held to validate it? Has it been distributed to local first responders here in Canada and elsewhere such as in the United States?
RAdm. Robertson: "Plan" may not be the best term for it, but the civil assistance document is designed to set, between ourselves and American authorities, the arrangements under which we would be able to use military forces from the other country to provide assistance to the civil authority. Such a document would be of use only at the national level. It is what would govern how the Department of National Defence, in response to PSEPC, and the U.S. Department of Defence, in response to the Department of Homeland Security, would go about providing civil assistance not just using their own nation's forces, but those from the opposite nation that had particular competencies of great value. That plan is in a draft form at this point, and is in the process of being revised. We would want it to be ready — and can you correct me, please — certainly before the next major exercise next spring conducted by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense in the United States. In Canada it will be called "Ardent Sentry 06". We are investigating having the defence support to civil authorities exercised and not just inside our two countries, but rather the defence aspect of cross-border activities to civil authorities.
Senator Forrestall: Had there been exercises?
RAdm. Robertson: There have indeed. The most recent was the exercise called "Topoff 3," a top-officials exercise in the United States that ended Friday. It was called "Ardent Sentry 05" in Canada and featured exercise interaction between the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff at National Defence Headquarters and U.S. Northcom Headquarters.
Senator Forrestall: How long will it be before we get an appreciation of that exercise? Is it successful? Does it give rise to questions?
RAdm. Robertson: As is always the case, that exercise would be analyzed extensively in the coming months. I am not involved in the validation process that would help us do the lessons learned out of that exercise. That is the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff. I am sure that will occur over the coming months.
Senator Forrestall: Have there been any discussions on changed roles for Canada within NORAD at the officials' level, at the binational level?
RAdm. Robertson: Changed roles in terms of an expansion to other areas?
Senator Forrestall: We are not in BMW or BWM, and all these initials that I am not sure of, all of which seem to do with things that fly through the air. Has there been any discussion with respect to a maritime role? Have there been any discussions about deployment of, for example, the Halifax Rifles in border defence activity? Let me throw the North in there, so that there may not be any misunderstanding; include that in your thought. Have there been any discussions in this line and if so what was the nature of them?
RAdm. Robertson: Let me start with —
Senator Forrestall: Halifax Rifles.
RAdm. Robertson: You may hear the expression in Washington of Maritime NORAD. It is not what you may think. It is actually a complement to NORAD. The Americans for the past year and a half or so have been looking at how to better tie together all their government capabilities to address the maritime security issues. When they say Maritime NORAD, what they have been referring to is a desire to bring together all their national capabilities in a manner that is as seamless nationally as the binational cooperation is on the air side between Canada and the United States. It is not actually a way of saying, "We wish we had a binational Maritime Northern Command." It is a way of talking about how they have their own internal problem to address. Part of the way of addressing that is through the ongoing work they are doing until probably June to address the tasks from the President of the United States to the Government of developing a maritime strategy. There is a Maritime NORAD that may not be what you think it would be.
We have not entered into discussions to modify NORAD, not discussions in a formal sense. We have not gotten to negotiations with our American counterparts on enhancing North American security. Ever since 9/11, when the Permanent Joint Board on Defence or the Military Cooperation Committee meet, or indeed when we have reciprocal visits, we talk about those things that we might want to do to enhance cooperation, some of which may be put into NORAD, and some of which may not. It is an ongoing discussion for us and has been for the past four years.
Senator Forrestall: Kind of slow, and dragging its feet. Get the Halifax Rifles to work and it will speed up.
The Chairman: You only mentioned them three times this panel, so well done.
Senator Atkins: There has been some debate as to whether we would allow a radar warning system in the northeast of the country. Can you give us any insight from a military point of view whether that is still something to be considered, or have we ruled out allowing them to put a system up in the northeast?
RAdm. Robertson: That is not my area of responsibility, particularly. I would have heard about it if the government of the United States had asked for us to base such a system on Canadian territory. There has been no such request of which I am aware. This is now the part where I am out of my area of expertise. Nor do I believe there is a need for such a system, but you may wish to check that with other folks. To my understanding, there has been no such request of Canada.
Senator Atkins: A second short question: You referred to melding. I talk about harmonization and you talk about melding the forces. Can you expand what you mean by that?
RAdm. Robertson: In terms of what?
Senator Atkins: Military cooperation between the Canadian Forces and the American forces.
RAdm. Robertson: I am not sure of the context of the sentence that I used it in, but it is not a question of complete integration of the two forces. It is a question of maintaining interoperability of the two forces of the countries so that when the government wants us to work together we can. Our navy is — and I will be parochial — highly interoperable with the United States navy, but we do not want to become the United States navy. That is not our goal and well beyond our aspirations.
If our navy spent all its time working only with the United States navy, we would, in due course, lose some of those capabilities that the Americans value when we arrive. We are proficient in a number of areas that the Americans have not paid as much attention to in recent years because they have other priorities.
A couple of practical areas would be in maritime surveillance, surface or subsurface, and in boarding operations. Those are two areas where we are, in some aspects, better than the United States' navy, so we represent real value-added.
We need to work with European and other navies from time to time. The idea of a complete integration of some kind in working only with the U.S. navy would not serve either of us terribly well. We do need to be able to work together closely when it comes to operations off our two coasts.
Senator Atkins: That is the navy. What about land forces?
RAdm. Robertson: Again, it is a question of maintaining interoperability that allows choices for the government.
Senator Atkins: Should we be more conscious about being interoperational with the Americans in terms of our assignments?
RAdm. Robertson: That is something that we strive to maintain because we recognize that it adds value; it gives the government choices that it can make. We have members of the army in the United States undergoing training on a regular basis. That is a value added for us but it also helps maintain interoperability.
For the alliance, I think the NATO response force is the tool that is being used to really help drive interoperability to ensure that all nations are able to contribute when the alliance has to respond. We have a ship today in the NATO response force, in one of the maritime task groups, conducting operations in the Mediterranean. We are looking to put other forces into the NATO response force on a six-month basis as the opportunity presents itself.
That is the way that NATO is using the NATO Response Force, NRF, to ensure that we enhance interoperability. Truly, it is NATO that builds across the western nations that interoperability that we use, whether we are on a NATO operation or even on a coalition operation.
I will use an example from my service. When we deploy ships to the Middle East to work for the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which is part of U.S. Central Command, the procedures that are used when coalition navies come together are NATO procedures, tactics and doctrine, not some special set of Fifth Fleet procedures.
Senator Atkins: Are we getting closer in terms of procurement to what the Americans are using? I am speaking especially in regard to land forces.
RAdm. Robertson: I cannot really speak to the land forces personally. It is not so much a case of whether we have the same equipment; it is whether the equipment is interoperable.
Senator Atkins: Fair enough.
RAdm. Robertson: That is certainly what we strive for. There are others who are better placed than me to talk about land force interoperability, other than as a goal that we seek to achieve through a number of methods.
Senator Atkins: You do not have to worry about it with the air force.
Senator Nolin: What do you think of the caveats that my colleague Senator Cordy mentioned? What do you think of the caveats and the concerns with regard to those ongoing and expanding viruses of modern warfare?
RAdm. Robertson: You can understand why governments would want to place enough control on their forces that they have a chance to veto something that they think is completely inappropriate.
Senator Nolin: What do you mean veto? The general is on the field looking at a book to see if he is going to send a Canadian, an Italian or a German to do the job.
RAdm. Robertson: One example is that the Canadian army is not trained in riot control — and I may be somewhat outdated here. Our land units are not trained to deal with the kind of riots that occurred in Kosovo last spring in a manner that you would see being used by a modern police force, for example.
We have a caveat on our forces, to my understanding, that they will not participate in riot control. That is not negotiable. If you try to use them in that kind of a role, they are not trained for it and things will not go well. That is one caveat.
Another caveat would place limits on the commander's ability to use troops under his command that deny him operational flexibility, that do not allow him to respond with what he would think are the best troops, best suited to be able to respond to something arising in his command.
We strive to eliminate those caveats. We work to give the commander the greatest freedom possible. Certainly, that is what we expected when General Hillier was commander of ISAF.
Senator Nolin: He was looking after the book.
RAdm. Robertson: There are some minor caveats that are important, but the broad concept, we think, is destructive.
Senator Nolin: Thank you very much, that is good to hear.
The Chairman: On behalf of the committee, admiral and colonel, I thank you both for appearing before us.
We have some questions that have not been answered because we have not had time to ask them. Would it be possible to convey them to you in writing later today, and if you could, provide answers for us before we leave for Washington on Thursday? If you could, we would be most grateful.
RAdm. Robertson: Please.
The Chairman: I cannot let you go before commenting. We understand that you are Captain Stewart's boss?
RAdm. Robertson: Indeed.
The Chairman: We wanted to tell you that we think he is an outstanding officer, and very professional. He did not pay for this announcement; he is blushing as we speak. I am sure that he thinks that anything I say about him is a career-limiting move. I just want you to know that the committee is grateful for the work that he does, and we are impressed with his quality. I hope that the rest of your staff are as good as he is.
On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank you both very much. Your assistance today has been very valuable for our work. We look forward to receiving answers to the questions that you will tell Captain Stewart to draft as soon as we adjourn.
For members of the public viewing this program, if you have questions or comments, please visit our website by going to www.sen-sec.ca. We post witness testimony as well as confirmed hearing schedules. Otherwise, you may contact the clerk of the committee by calling 1-800-267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting members of the committee.
We have before us today Major-General Doug Dempster. He has been Director General, Strategic Planning since July 2001. He is an experienced army signals officer by trade, who rose to command the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters and Signal Regiment in Kingston, Ontario during the Persian Gulf and Oka operations. He has a varied operational background serving across Canada, in Cyprus and in Germany.
From 1994 to 1998, he was project manager of the $1.9-billion Tactical Command, Control and Communications System, a major Crown project. From 1998 to 2000 he was Director, Force Planning and Program Coordination, where he facilitated the development of the Defence Strategy 2020 and synchronized the 2000 federal budget increase.
MGen. Dempster is a graduate of the army technical staff course at Shrivenham, United Kingdom and the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, and holds an executive Master's degree in business administration from the University of Ottawa.
MGen Dempster, we understand you have a brief statement. Please proceed.
[Translation]
Major-General Doug Dempster, Director General, Strategic Planning, National Defence: It is an honour to appear before you today. Before I address these specific issues of the Strategic Capability Investment Plan, let me make some general opening remarks.
[English]
I would like to make my comments in two phases. I will first talk generally about strategic planning and then more specifically on the Strategic Capability Investment Plan as such.
[Translation]
As Director General of Strategic Planning, I serve the Vice-Chief of Defense Staff, the Chief of Defense Staff and the Deputy Minister. My mission is to shape strategic direction, producing defense relevance and credibility. As a strategist, I have learned that strategy is about connecting the outside to the inside. It is less about getting it perfectly right than avoiding being terribly wrong.
[English]
To execute my planning mission, I have a highly professional and experienced staff of 95 people, 60 per cent civilian and 40 per cent military. This diverse group spans 15 different military and five civilian occupations and two-thirds of my professional staff have post-graduate degrees of one form or another. My division is extensively networked internally with 20 Level 1 organizations and externally with the central agencies of government, other government departments and our allies, especially the American, British, Canadian and Australian, ABCA, community. I understand you are visiting Washington shortly. We have very rich relationships with Washington and the subordinate level commands.
We work to three future horizons of roughly five, 15 and 30 years. This is one of the most sophisticated planning regimes in the federal government. We have four major lines of operation: First, to develop strategy, aligning ends, ways and means to an anticipated future environment; second, to synthesize concepts and capability requirements; third, and a non-inconsequential task, to allocate the department's budget, both capital and human resources and dollars; and finally, to develop and support the department's management framework, including production of reports for yourselves, the report on plans and priorities, the departmental performance report, and the annual Chief of Defence Staff, CDS, report to Parliament.
[Translation]
I have spent six of the past seven years in the National Defense headquarters central staff. During this time the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defense, the Standing Committee on National Defense and Veterans Affairs, several external organizations, various think tanks, academics and our allies have published numerous reports on the state of Canada's military. The media has improved its coverage of defense and security issues, and public support for Canada's military has grown. We have made considerable progress in these past seven years.
[English]
In the past seven years, we have built a long-term strategy that the chairman mentioned, Defence Strategy 2020, and rebuilt a strategic planning process with a capability outlook published in 2002, as well as emerging transformation road map issues. Commencing in 2000, we have had five successive budget increases, with the budget rising from $10.5 billion to $13.5 billion for this year and with the most recently announced budget ending at $16 billion in year four from now.
We have begun to recover our military personnel strength through the strategic intake plan and now have about 62,000 regular and 21,000 reserve personnel. We continue to innovate new solutions. We have begun to experiment with new concepts and emerging technologies, such as medium altitude, long endurance, and unmanned aerial vehicles, a major experiment which we ran last summer. We went up the east coast, as far away as Baffin Island, and across to Gagetown.
We have led in best management practices within government, from defence planning and performance management through to capability-based planning, with our planning products placed on the web to enhance openness and transparency to all Canadians.
[Translation]
While I am proud of these many accomplishments, you will understand that there are significant deficiencies. We consistently benchmark ourselves against our major allies. We strive to improve our operations, capabilities and institutional capacity.
[English]
Allow me to discuss the strategic capability investment plan, a major innovation we have accomplished in the last few years. The SCIP currently has a 15-year horizon and is linked increasingly to accrual accounting, budgeting and depreciation techniques. It provides an effective framework for requirement staffs and industry to plan effectively.
[Translation]
The Strategic Capability Investment Plan is a major output from the capability-based planning process. This document, which is resident on the Forces website, describes in some detail what capability investments are needed to establish new and sustain existing military capabilities for Canada, how these link to policy and vision, the expected scope of the investments, and, at a fairly high level, their relative priority.
[English]
The department's Joint Capability Requirement Board, modelled on the U.S. Joint Requirements Oversight Council, was invented about four and half years ago and provides direct oversight for the development of the SCIP. This ensures all investment proposals are constrained to the essential scope, are clearly linked through the capability-based planning process to policy and strategic guidance, and are sequenced to reflect agreed priorities. The Chief of Defence Staff and the deputy minister are directly involved and the minister is fully informed throughout the development effort. The first version of the SCIP was completed in 2003 and included a listing of planned capital investments.
One thing that was very important for us was that SCIP as an acronym was pronounceable. Its predecessor LTCP, Long Term Capital Plan, was not. When acronyms are produced, they should be pronounceable in one language or another.
The SCIP was released to the web in July of 2003 and the equipment annex was updated in the summer of 2004. We update it annually, and it will be significantly modified in the summer of 2005, given the announcements in the recent federal budget. We plan a major revision of the SCIP document following the release of the defence policy statement that is forthcoming. The SCIP reflects our agreed investment thrusts and the knowledge-based command and sense capability. It takes 14 per cent of our funding. Secondly, support sustained and mobility capabilities currently take 25 per cent of funding. This is a group of capabilities we allowed to rust out in the mid-1990s. Third, a force generation incorporate capability, which is our major simulation systems for training and our enterprise management systems, take 4 per cent of funding. Last, the effective engagement capability takes 57 per cent of funding.
[Translation]
The current SCIP reflects best portfolio management practices and effective overprogramming risk management. It contains projects at three development levels that I call boulders, rocks, and gravel with increasingly fulsome analysis and risk management techniques applied as project cost and risk increase.
[English]
Having now developed the equipment annex to the SCIP and refined the review process, we are now identifying the necessary investments to maintain and develop the defence infrastructure and will tie infrastructure to equipment and also the support to in-service systems that we call national procurement. These two annexes will be built this year. Next year, we intend to add the science and technology, experimentation, and human resources annex to put all components together. Full alignment of all these resource plans over a 15-year planning period will improve operational effectiveness and economy of effort.
I am ready to respond to your questions.
Senator Cordy: This is certainly an issue that we have been talking about for quite a while as a committee.
Could you explain the process for approval of projects? From a civilian perspective, it often seems to take a long time between the time when the project is first discussed and the project is actually on the ground. Indeed it seems to take a long time between when the project is discussed and the actual contract is given out. Could you explain how this takes place?
MGen. Dempster: In practical terms, projects have the first half of their life and the second half of their life. The two halves are divided with effective project approval. That is the decision of the government to move on that project. I will address the question in two components. The first half of the project life has three decision points, with each reducing risk. The first decision point is simple: It is, we have a problem. We write a document called the Synopsis Sheet Identification, SSID, which is a statement of the problem we are trying to solve. In any journey, if you do not know the problem you are trying to solve, when you get to the end, you do not know if you have solved it or not. These are mandated by the Treasury Board, so there is no difference from any other government department.
The second phase is preliminary project approval. We have done our homework at this stage to define some options. We define one, two or three options that need to be studied and examined in detail and we assign staff to work out the details of the options. The staff comes back, after they have worked out the options and made a recommendation, with effective project approval. By this time, the project is well defined. We know the risks, we have worked through the issues, worked through the components of the compliance definition and worked with our allies. This leads to effective project approval. There is departmental approval and finally Government of Canada approval.
Once we have effective project approval from the government, the second half of the process starts. This falls into ADM material for equipment projects, ADM information management for information projects, or ADM infrastructure and environment for those types of projects. My staff is primarily involved in the first phase of this work.
In the second phase — there are a number of phases that are also classic — normally there is a request for proposals that goes out to industry. Next, there is an evaluation and a contract award. Following that, the key dates are initial operating capability and final operating capability. That is the day we get the things in our hands. That process from the definition of a problem through to receipt of a piece of technology, a ship or a piece of information management software is a standard process in the Government of Canada. Also, most NATO countries do it in a similar way. It is a similar blueprint through the phases.
Senator Cordy: With technology changing so rapidly, are you allowed to change the parameters of what you are looking for? If it takes five years from start to finish, then by the fifth year any technology is virtually useless. Are there stages when you can change the parameters or is it cast in stone once you have gone before Treasury Board and gotten approval for a piece of equipment? Then, is that the piece of equipment you have to take?
MGen. Dempster: The technology cycles are going faster than our procurement cycles. I recall being a project manager for a contract let in 1991 for a computer. There were Pentium II computers with 20MB hard drives and six years later there were Pentium III computers with gigabytes of hard drive. This is a challenge and it is becoming a problem where we have to move increasingly to performance specifications and not technical specifications to avoid tying ourselves technically into dead ends.
Senator Cordy: What are the hurdles? We have heard people talking about making the system efficient. Are there hurdles that could be changed, so it is simplified? I understand have you to have the checks and balances in place, but sometimes it seems we could move a little faster.
MGen. Dempster: In the past decade or two decades, our experience in defence has been lots of time and not enough money. We are now physically facing a time with less and less time and probably an adequate supply of money. We do need to speed up our clock speed on the approval side so we can get the solutions in quickly. On the implementation side there are ways to acquire more quickly and I can discuss those in more detail if you like. The clock speed of the process needs to be accelerated to achieve the relevance we require.
Senator Cordy: Our committee realizes the tremendous job that military personnel are doing for Canadians and certainly in the past our recommendations have been substantial amounts of money for the military. A lot of it is being used to buy equipment, but we have heard if you were to give a huge influx of money at one time it would not be possible to use it quickly. Is that true?
MGen. Dempster: Effectively, yes. In the 1990s, we reduced our project management capacity by about half: that is to say, our expert staffs that can work the documents and do the analysis required. In the mid-1990s, we had 1600 project management person years of resources assigned to that task and today we have about 800. We have less staff to move a large number of projects.
Second, the approval capacity of government is limited to the committee time we have whether it be a large cabinet decision or Treasury Board decision. There are two constraints: our own staff capacity to generate the work and the capacity of government to process, handle and analyze the work.
I think the first one is amenable to putting in more resources. We can outsource and hire smart people, and reassign resources within the department to achieve the staffing levels.
In terms of the approval levels of government, we need to return to what specific approvals Treasury Board wants and whether they can delegate back to the minister or the department.
Currently, for example, the minister's approval level for construction projects is up to $60 million. That includes about 80 per cent of all construction projects. Those that are more expensive than that are generally very complex and justifiably require review at the Treasury Board level or higher.
However, on the equipment side the minister is limited to $30 million approval. I do not mean to sound trite, but these days $30 million does not go very far. I think we need to review the level of equipment approval of the Minister of National Defence. I believe it should go up to $100 million. That would allow us to do strategic projects, leaving major Crown projects for cabinet oversight or Treasury Board approval.
Senator Atkins: What happens if the military is moved into a theatre of conflict and the circumstances are such that it requires equipment that you do not have? How do you deal with that?
MGen. Dempster: That is an excellent question. We have a process called Urgent Operational Requirements, UORs. For example, in the deployment to Afghanistan we were able to acquire an unmanned aerial vehicle system in a relatively short time, and we were able to lease counter-bombardment radars from Sweden very quickly.
One might ask, if we can do it for emergencies, why can we not do it every day? There are two answers to that. First, in an emergency we need the broad support of government to do that, and we get it. Second, if we made everything an emergency, we would run out of staff capacity. When doing that, we off-load staff from other work to process it quickly, so part of the answer is that it is a capacity issue.
However, in emergencies we are able to move quickly. During the first Persian Gulf War, for example, we installed weapons systems destined for the Canadian patrol frigate on old steamers and sent them to the Persian Gulf. In emergencies, we can move remarkably quickly, as can our allies. The issue is to get the bulk of our procurement quickly. That is more challenging for us.
Senator Cordy: What roles do Public Works Canada, PWC, and Treasury Board play in getting everything together? When the military determines that they need a piece of equipment, do you contact Treasury Board or Public Works, and how do you work together?
MGen. Dempster: The Treasury Board conducts due diligence in government. For larger projects, they oversee submissions of either preliminary or project approval on behalf of the government. Treasury Board is, of course, a cabinet committee.
PWC does not play a significant role until just before effective project approval by the Senior Project Advisory Committee that deals with procurement and sourcing issues. During the contracting phase PWC comes to the fore.
Senator Cordy: Once the project has received approval Public Works comes into it?
MGen. Dempster: That is correct, although they provide advice prior to effective project approval on the procurement strategy, which is their mandate.
Senator Cordy: You spoke about your group dealing with anticipated future environments. How do you do that? Do you look at the inventory of the entire military and determine the wear-out period? How do you anticipate your future needs?
MGen. Dempster: We look at a number of different planning horizons. For our most distant horizon, the 20- to 30-year horizon, we have to use some relatively sophisticated forecasting techniques to determine what will be there. It is more important to be not terribly wrong than to be perfectly right. We use a technique called alternate futures. We posit two, three or four alternate futures and test our solutions against the range of long-term futures.
Senator Nolin: Can you give us an example of that so we can understand a complicated explanation?
[Translation]
Is it a ship, an aircraft?
Mr. Dempster: I am talking about the future. For instance, it is possible that 25 years from now the United States will still be the main superpower in the world. But we do not know that for the time being. It is possible alliances may be formed which may or may not work.
[English]
In alternate futures terms, we look at different future strategic scenarios. Of the current six scenarios that we have developed, four of them see the U.S. maintaining pre-eminence in the world and two see the U.S. not maintaining pre-eminence. One is a dramatic nightmare, because we have to plan for the worst case. Your Canadian Forces are your insurance policy, so one scenario envisions the U.S. having suffered a calamity of some kind.
We consider technological issues, the fight for oil and water, and whether the world is a happy or unhappy place. We have alternate scenarios to examine 25 years in the future. That requires brain work and we have some pretty bright people with Ph.D.s who work internationally to consider alternate futures, because we cannot predict that far in the future.
In the 10- to 15-year time frame we can start to predict some things, such as technology. Our science and technology people have developed two lists. One is a list of breakthrough technologies that will be available in the next 10 to 15 years, and the other is a list of battle-ready technologies that we should exploit in the next 10 to 15 years.
As well, we can forecast the depreciation of our own equipment, which is, I think, Senator Cordy's point. Clearly, we know that a ship that has a 30-year life span and is at the 15-year point will have to be replaced in 15 years. We need to ask whether we will need that capability in 15 years, or whether we can do it differently or more simply. We then start the definition process of our projects.
With the five-year view, we have a very good idea. We have fairly detailed assessments. We know the cost of things and we know the training issues. We know the state of the technological beast we are dealing with and so forth. The closer the time frame, the better the forecasting can be.
Senator Cordy: Do you forecast based on what would be the best equipment or on the amount of money we will have?
MGen. Dempster: We do both. We estimate what our procurement budgets will be out to 15 years, recognizing that the Government of Canada gives us a firm budget for only the first four years of that time. We extend linearly forward.
In terms of technology, in the Canadian Forces we do not need every technology or every capability, so we focus on those that are most relevant to the requirements of Canadian defence policy.
Senator Cordy: In the fall of 2003, Mr. John McCallum was the Minister of National Defence. He stated that the capital improvement process needed changes. Have major changes or any changes been made to the process since the fall of 2003?
MGen. Dempster: I will try to keep my remarks to the program level, which is the level I work at, rather than specific projects.
The single greatest program issue we put in place is a top-down process using the Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning, SCIP, process. The investment planning process, which is a very inclusive process in defence, starts with framing how much money we will have in the next 15 years and what our program already is. It then identifies the space left for new investments. Then, based upon our capability outlook, it identifies the things we must have in place in 10 to 15 years and where the major gaps are. We then start to invest in those areas and to do prioritization activities in order that we get the most important things in the budget.
It is what I call the boulders, rock and gravel problem. Minister McCallum participated in this process, and he quite liked it. It is the idea that if you have a big jar and you want to fill it up, you put the big boulders in first. Then you put the little rocks around the big rocks, and then you put the gravel in. Then, if you are at Dartmouth University, you still have room for beer. My point is that you have to get your big pieces sorted out first.
In our plan, there are currently 11 "boulder" projects. It is important that we get those right and scope how much money goes into one versus another. When those 11 projects have 80 per cent of your money, getting them right is important. It is the 20/80 role. Eighty per cent of the money is in 20 per cent of the projects.
Senator Munson: Your department has identified strategic mobility, essentially strategic lift, as a huge priority. Given that there is a platform available off the shelf — C-17s, for example — what would be necessary to fast-track the acquisition of this capability? In your full, frank and professional opinion, how long would it take realistically if the will was there?
MGen. Dempster: First of all, the question of strategic mobility and strategic deployability is absolutely a top-level issue for us. During the Cold War, we had forward-deployed forces in Europe, and our navy dealt with the North Atlantic. Since that time, since the Warm War and in the current situation, we are not forward-based. Our navy is deploying all over the world. Indeed, so is our army and air force, so getting there is half the fun. We recognize that deployability is an issue.
You asked a hypothetical question about acquiring a particular aircraft quickly. The answer is that there are two broad approaches the government could take. One is to go for a competitive acquisition of some kind: to run a competition and then pick one. Alternatively, if the aircraft is in production in the United States, the government could go through the foreign military sales route and acquire it quickly. We have used those two approaches in other project areas, and they are both available to us.
Senator Munson: What would be the time-frames on either hypothesis?
MGen. Dempster: To write up a request for proposals and put that out probably takes 12 to 24 months. We classically give people some months to respond and then some months to evaluate, so probably 24 to 36 months. Then it is a question of delivery time for the particular platform we are looking at.
For military sales, we are at the vagaries of the U.S. production line. In the case of aircraft that are in production, such as t he C-17, it would depend on the goodwill of the United States when it would make it off their line.
The U.S. C-17 production program is in its third tranche of 60. The U.S. has currently received about 140 or 150 of 180 aircraft they plan to acquire, and their production line is producing about 11 or 12 aircraft a year. It would be a question of making things available. I would say 12 to 24 months in that scenario.
Senator Munson: It has been some time since the budget. Now that the numbers have sunk in and you have had time to crunch some of these numbers, did the recent budget allocate enough money to national defence to pay for the capital equipment programs?
MGen. Dempster: The budget had two capital lines in it. The first was for the four announceables in the budget; what I call the big, honking helicopter, the JTF2, accommodation and so forth. There were four items that were funded, and there was certainly enough money for that. In addition, there was another line for defence policy statement items. Once the defence policy statement is out, it will assess whether or not there is enough for that component.
We have had a significant amount of interface with the developers of the defence policy statement in terms of the capital program. My belief is that they have used some of the numbers we developed to build their numbers. The need lines we have identified have been highly aligned with what we think is in the budget statement. Again, until the defence policy statement is out, I do not know that for sure.
Senator Munson: The first part of the question was whether you are satisfied after you have crunched all these numbers. There seems to be a significant amount of money for down the road. Upon reflection, many people are thinking perhaps there is not enough money for today. Is that correct?
MGen. Dempster: You are correct, senator, in the sense that in the first two years, there is no acquisition money in the new line of the budget. From my point of view, that is not a bad thing. We have to get the acquisition documents cranked up. We have to find the professional people to write up the requirements and get the risk analysis and front-end work and documentation done. We are starting that right now. It will still take time before we can actually spend money.
Senator Munson: I understand you are retiring soon.
MGen. Dempster: I plan to retire this summer.
Senator Munson: Is there anything you really want to get off your chest?
MGen. Dempster: I have been in the central staff for six of the last seven years. Many of you have been around for many years and understand what the Canadian Forces have gone through — not yourself, obviously, Senator Munson. The forces were at quite a low ebb in 1998. Things were difficult. In my time in the forces, I had trouble making ends meet to put a program together. We have come a long way in that time. We have further to go, but I am retiring in my view on a very high point.
I would also share with you I plan to stay in until my daughter graduates from the Royal Military College in May, and I wanted to see her in uniform doing that.
Senator Day: From your experience in the last six or seven years of observing procurement and the terrible delays that we have seen, have you told us all the items that you think would speed up that process?
MGen. Dempster: No, I have not.
Senator Day: Have you produced a document, a blueprint for speeding up the process that you might be able to make available to us?
MGen. Dempster: I am certainly not at that point, senator. The Chief of Defence Staff has appointed four action teams to implement the vision that he has ascribed. I am leading the action team on institutional alignment; those things in the institution that we have to change to ensure that the Canadian Forces vision can be realized.
As part of that, we are working to reform many components of the institution; its processes, governance, structure, and methods of procurement, as well as how we recruit and train. I have a wide mandate to review almost everything that we do in the institution. The chief has given me no constraints on that exercise. He wants to take a fresh look at what we need to do to make everything work.
In the context of that, we have been looking at procurement and acquisition reform. I do have some thoughts I could share with you at this time if you would like.
Senator Day: That would be helpful.
MGen. Dempster: I have three things I would like to share with you. The first is insights that we have gathered over the past 30 or 40 days.
Second, I would like to look at our internal processes inside the defence department and share some of those issues with you. Third, I would like to go through some of the external issues, issues that are outside the Department of National Defence and the rest of government, that perhaps we want to chat about and look at also.
I would like to start with those and go through them one at a time. I propose to go through each section and maybe at the end of each section you may wish to have a supplementary or go further.
The insights I have are sixfold. First, during the 1990s, we did not do many acquisitions. Many of the programs that we had kind of ran out. We did not do many new major acquisitions. As a result, we have declining internal capacity to manage projects; and the industrial base, in terms of responding to military projects, is not as great as it was in previous times.
Second, we are shifting from a time of not too much money and a lot of time to a period where we will have significant new funding coming in and not much time to move the projects.
The third point is that operations are us and operations have become very real for our soldiers in the field. These are not Cold War constant preparations; these are real deployments with real risk to real troops. One of the issues in terms of equipment acquisition is that we need to support those troops. The balance between support for the troops and support to our defence industry needs to be rebalanced. In my view, support to our troops needs to be job one.
There is an increasingly global defence marketplace driven by a small number of powerful firms who know how to influence governments. This issue of how we manage this group of large, corporate structures who are out there to sell their systems is an important issue for us.
The fifth point has already been alluded to by Senator Cordy, and that is disruptive technologies and version releases of software and systems are occurring much faster than the procurement cycle itself.
Sixth, increasingly in the things we acquire, we need to build in flexibility from the get-go. For example, the new maritime helicopter should be able to operate over land as well as over salt water. We have to handle mine strikes in our new soft-skin vehicles. We need to be able to deal with things we cannot anticipate today and operations we cannot envisage today. We need to build in flexibility from the get-go in our major systems.
Those six insights, if I may summarize, reflect a more turbulent and quicker world. Those are some of the issues that we are facing from a military point of view. I will stop there to see if there are questions on those points before I go further.
Senator Nolin: On that subject, because of the new NATO rapid response force, does that affect your thinking and how you would procure for the military? Obviously, you must consult more with our allies to see where we can fit in properly.
[Translation]
MGen Dempster: In my opinion, interoperability with our allies is of the utmost importance. Our software must be able to communicate despite technological changes in the command and control system. If they make changes every 24 months, we must do the same to ensure we are interconnected.
[English]
NATO Response Force, NRF, as such will not cause our procurement system to adapt but working with allies goes back to the question that Senator Munson asked, which is our ability to get there and self-deploy. That is an issue in the NATO Response Force. The requirements for deployment are to be able to go within five to 30 days. That is fairly quick, and we have to be ready, fully trained and equipped, and able to get there.
Those issues of NATO Response Force are aligned in NATO with what we call the Prague Capability Commitments. I had occasion to go to NATO many times on coordinating our Prague Capability Commitments, what we are going to commit to with NATO to provide. The answer is yes.
Senator Atkins: For the procurement of the Sikorsky Helicopter, did you apply all the rules you are suggesting in terms of making that decision, or did it come from the top down?
MGen. Dempster: The maritime helicopter was designed to be interoperable.
Senator Atkins: For land and sea?
MGen. Dempster: Yes. It has radios, for example, that can talk to army radios and so forth. I would say that at the time we conceived the maritime helicopter, the concept of working together jointly was not as advanced as it is today. We could have done even better if we had done it today. However, interoperability was designed into the Sikorsky.
Senator Atkins: Can you make the adjustments?
MGen. Dempster: Yes, I think so.
Senator Banks: I have a question of clarification. You talked about making a choice as to what is good for the troops and what is good for industry, and you said that you would opt for what is good for the troops. We hope so.
In the case of acquisition of equipment, would you have a comment on the choice between domestic supply and foreign supply? That is to say if you need a piece of equipment, an ABC piece of equipment, and it can be got off the shelf someplace else now or relatively easily — you are building 20 of those, build us five more — and you could get it from Holland as opposed to taking into account the Canadian domestic industrial considerations, what would your recommendation and your personal druthers be, in your best professional military advice to us?
MGen. Dempster: I was going to answer this later, but I will deal with it now, if I may. What we are talking about is Canada's industrial policy balanced with our military or defence policy. We are talking here about the relative importance in given situations. In our industrial policy in this country, we have adopted effectively a free market policy with a couple of specific exceptions; shipbuilding is one and there are others.
We have accepted globalization to deliver us the prosperity that we enjoy and the trade that we deal with. However, in military procurement, we do spend a lot of time on whether we need a domestic source of supply or whether we are satisfied to accept sources of supply from the global marketplace.
When we were dealing with the potential for symmetric threats, that is force on force, the old Cold War paradigm, it was very important to have the capacity in the country, or with our major allies, to build munitions and systems so that we could mobilize and build more in case the other guy built more.
We are now in a world of asymmetric threats. The adversaries we face, be they insurgents, terrorists, criminals or smugglers, are cunning and quick. If we need capability to deal with those cunning and quick people, we need to map our capacity to deal with those adjustments. We have to adjust faster than they do.
To give you a couple of examples at the extremes, if we wanted a particular new weapon for our joint task force in the counterterrorism role, which was made only in country "X" and we needed it, we would probably go and get it right now. On the other hand, if there was a capability where this country was pre-eminent in the world at producing this kind of widget and Canada was renowned for making this kind of widget, we would be foolish not to acquire that widget from our own country.
The issue is all the things in between. The issue is becoming, increasingly, one of clock speed and time. We need the capabilities to operate in the global defence arena where we are asked to operate and we cannot afford to wait forever.
In my view, the clock speed needs to come down. It was around 15 years for major procurement; we are aiming for about 11 with Strategy 2020, trying to cut the time by 30 per cent to about 11 years. I believe we need to bring that clock speed down to around five years for standard procurement.
None of you would wait more than five yeas to buy a car or an airplane. If I were Air Canada, I would not wait 10 years to buy something; I would need it for my business.
We have become much more time critical, and time is the critical factor for us. Within limits, industries in Canada can participate in procurement. We need to decide whether we want our procurement to be a domestic source, whereby it is essential to us for some security or industrial reason. The forces need to have the right equipment at the right time. To engage and bring our forces home safely is more important, from my point of view, than maintaining a defence industrial base. That is my personal and professional view.
Senator Day: As I understand, you had three general areas that you wanted to talk about. One of those was insight, on which you gave six good points. You also had two other categories that you have not touched on, internal and external. I would ask that you continue with the other two areas now.
MGen Dempster: I will go back to Senator Cordy's question on the internal piece. We need fundamental process change, and we need to move to output performance requirements with output specifications and output contracts that state what we want to do, and then let industry tell us how to do it. We do this in the military and call it "mission command." We tell our commanders that their mission is to take that hill, but we do not tell them how to do it. In industry, we not only tell them to give us an airplane but also what details we want. We over-specify in many ways. We need to move to a performance requirement rather than continue with the detailed technical specifications. We need to start with some of our higher profile and quicker reaction projects to pilot this idea of performance specifications and performance requirements. The United Kingdom's Project Watchkeeper, which ran about $1.0 billion for unmanned air vehicles, had a set of documentation of about 15 pages only. The documentation on Senator Forrestall's favourite Sea King replacement project took four CD-ROMs. If printed, there would be volumes and volumes in terms of specifications.
The second point is that we need to move to about a five-year norm for acquisition. The world's largest cruise ship went from idea to first revenue-paying customer in 68 months. It seems to me that if we are acquiring capability needed to support our defence policy, then we need to get it more quickly.
The third point deals with Canadianization. We often take a good system adopted by other nations and bring it to Canada and Canadianize it. We add many internal Canadian specifications that make it more complex and expensive, and more difficult to make interoperable and to support afterwards.
The fourth point is that we need a sufficient number of well-trained military and civilian project management experts in the department. They need to be employed efficiently on projects that do not drag out forever, and they need appropriate career motivation. We need people who will come back more than once in their career to deal with the acquisition domain. Our current training for project management people is ad hoc. The army has a school in Kingston with some training available; the air force has a systems course in Winnipeg; the navy has nothing; and none of it is synchronized. Our acquisition people are not well trained and career management is helter-skelter.
We need clear accountabilities for forecasting and comptrollership. Each of our three acquisition groups — materiel, infrastructure and information — needs to have an accountable acquisition operations person, who is accountable for the delivery of the program to its timelines, quality and needs. That does not exist.
The last point is that we need a robust performance management to track how we are doing at the program level, the sub-program level and the project level; and we need to see constant improvement in cycle time, quality level and responsiveness.
Those can be handled internally. They will require quite a bit of effort, although the talk is easy. We have a limited staff capacity so we need to move logically through the situation we currently face.
Senator Day: Before moving on to the external factors, could you tell me whether you envisage the individuals involved in the long-term acquisition in uniform or out of uniform?
MGen Dempster: I see both. When working large projects, there is the need for members of the operational community to participate actively. The design of airplanes requires pilots, and so forth. On the technical side, you need military people who understand the exigencies of the environment in which they live so they can interpret. We also require civilians who could build expertise from project to project in the areas of procurement, contracting and so on. Hence, I envisage people in uniform and civilians working on this. This is consistent with many other countries that have military and civilian members in the acquisition business. There is a deduction in that our training programs should be applied to both the military and civilian members of these teams.
Senator Day: Would a military person stay in that position for a long period of time, or for a short period of time and then move out to operations?
MGen Dempster: That question speaks to the crew motivation issue. I believe that for the large, high-risk projects you would want to keep your project management in place for three or four years to ensure continuity of effort. In the United States, for example, it is mandated that project managers of the large projects shall have a four-year tour and no less. My experience in running a major Crown project as a four-year tour is that it allows you to steer the project to success and see an end to the work you began.
On the issue of career management, many people move in and out of these jobs. It is important to select the right people for the jobs and give them the opportunity to move up to other things and then to return. There is a risk of creating a ghetto of project-management-acquisition people. Other countries have begun to face this problem with people who do not have careers outside the narrow acquisition business. I am not in favour of a solution that includes an acquisition corps that does nothing but that.
Externally there are six issues in which we could make progress. First, I believe we need stable, adequate, acquisition funding using the accrual accounting method and a rolling multi-year funding approval. Today, the department is given single-year cash approvals that we have to spend by the end of each fiscal year or lose them. We have the flexibility to carry forward up to 2 per cent only of our budget. We should move on our capital budget to a rolling multi-year approval. This would produce flexibility and less focus on annual spending.
Second, we need to raise the minister's limits for equipment approvals from $30 million to $100 million so as to reduce the number of approvals that we have to take to Treasury Board. Currently, Treasury Board has difficulty handling the number of approvals we request for the projects that we put forward. It has become a challenge but is no longer required in terms of accountability.
Third, we have begun work on, and plan to complete by 2006, the solid, top-down capability-based plan with clear priorities and targets that cover all the components from equipment, people, science and technology, and infrastructure, such that they are all aligned. In that way, we do not field a new helicopter without a hangar in which to store it or people to fly it. All the factors must be integrated so that all the components of capability, training, people, equipment and infrastructure are all aligned and connected.
The fourth issue — as both Australia and the U.K. have done — is produce a government-approved capability plan within about 12 months of a major policy review. Both the U.K. and Australia have found that following major policy reviews when they cannot deal with every capability and procurement acquisition issue within the policy statement within 12 months, they have issued a comprehensive set of planning guidance covering roughly a 10-year horizon that gets down to the specific capabilities that the government wants to have and coordinate. I think this approach might be helpful to ensure understanding of the capabilities we are trying to acquire and the "why" of those capabilities. Right now for Canadians it is opaque, unless they go on to our website and review the SCIP and understand our acronyms and jargon. It is not clear what the top level priorities are.
The fifth is the need to rebalance the military need lines against the industrial regional policy basis we have. The industrial policy should be encouraged to identify those specific areas where Canada wants to maintain specific industrial expertise and specific richness to be preserved. We need to identify key defence projects for rapid acquisitions that need to acquire those capabilities almost without reference to many industrial base requirements.
There is an option to use the national security exemption where that is appropriate. That is a heavy-handed tool. There may be more astute ways to do that.
My last point is we need to review our contracting policy that includes the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, CITT, legislation. In seeking proficiencies, we have put in place a set of processes that has almost no down side for a loser in a competition to appeal the process. This issue is causing consternation both in industry and in Public Works and Government Services Canada, PWGSC. I am not an expert in this area. There are others who are, but we need to look at it now to reform our contracting processes.
Senator Munson: There were things you wanted to get off your chest.
Briefly on the $30 million to $100 million, how does that work in other Western countries in terms of having that kind of ratio, having that kind of money, as opposed to going back to individual Treasury Boards for more money? Is it in Australia, for example?
MGen. Dempster: I do not know what the approval authorities in other countries are, in that regard. I do not think we have raised the minister's rate of approval on equipment for many years now. Part of it is that a dollar does not buy what a dollar used to buy. Also, when you examine the programs we have set in our planning, we call the projects below $100 million, gravel projects. Those above that are rocks and the billion-dollar-or-more projects we call the big boulders. In my view, the Government of Canada and Treasury Board should be focused on the boulders and rocks. In other government departments, $100 million is a lot of money. However, in terms of our overall programs, we have 156 projects that we are moving through in the SCIP and there is not a lot of value added, given that the Treasury Board sees the whole program to approve those projects that are of lower value.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: I greatly appreciate your recommendation on the use of performance appraisals. I think it is a major evolution in the management of public funds.
Are you the only one to endorse the idea or is it a concerted effort within the department? You are conscious of the effect it has on current management policies at Treasury Board; the idea is not revolutionary as such in the field of public administration, but it may seem unusual. Have you looked at how to make it work?
MGen Dempster: That is a very good question. We are seeing the United States and Great Britain start to use these techniques.
Senator Nolin: They agree on the objective and are working on it?
Mgen Dempster: It will become a best practice and in fact it is already an effective practice in the industry. It is about finding a way to use the private sector's techniques in the public sector. I think it is feasible.
Senator Nolin: Are you discussing with Treasury Board ways in which administrative rules could be amended so that these techniques can be put into practice?
Mgen Dempster: There have been no discussions with Treasury Board on the plan, but there could be.
[English]
Senator Meighen: It is fair to say as I have heard whispering agreement around the table that your testimony has been very helpful to us. Anyone might disagree with one or more of your suggestions. That is fair enough, but at least you have put forward concrete suggestions. You have recognized there is a problem. Why is it that in your profession, we have to persuade, cajole and drag to get any expression of opinion from people in uniform? It drives us around the bend. My understanding is that in other jurisdictions there is perhaps a different legal regime. I do not know whether you skated close to the line or not. You have stated a reasonable proposition that may be right or wrong. You are quitting and maybe that is why. At least you have given us ideas and material to chew on. This is more than what many others have and I thank you and congratulate you for doing so.
Procurement time has become something that even average Canadians are aware of as being a bit out of hand. When you wait 11 to 13 years to get a program through, if you were in private industry no one would stand for that. There are all kinds of difficulties, such as moving targets, changing technologies and all the rest of it but at least we can aspire to do better. Do you have any idea how we rank in comparison to other jurisdictions in terms of the procurement process and the time involved? Do you know anyone who takes as long as we do?
MGen. Dempster: To answer your first point, I think most military officers are focused on transformation, reform and improvement today. Many military officers want to see the Canadian Forces improved and I hope many would speak frankly to what those thoughts might be. We cannot speak out of our governmental lanes, it is appropriate we be seen as non-partisan and we try to work within the system. However, we also have to push the boundaries from time to time.
You asked me how we stack up on procurement with other nations. I am quite conscious that there are some very long cases. Senator Forrestall has mentioned the maritime helicopter. Another is the submarine journey from the Oberon Class to the present one. They all seem to drag. In my work with the Brits, we stack up pretty well. They have had some pretty bad messes over aircraft procurements. They have had some issues as well. The Australians have had major problems with their Collins Class submarines. The U.S. has spent billions of dollars on research and development, and cancelled a project. All procurement regimes are fraught with risk and delay. Starting today with the new post 9/11 asymmetric environment, we have to examine our clock speed and get with the way the world turns. The world is turning quicker. We cannot afford to wait long times for things anymore.
Senator Meighen: You drew the comparison to boulders, gravel and rocks. Would it be a different procurement time frame for boulders, gravel and rocks?
MGen Dempster: Yes, we do that now. We have a set of projects we call sand, projects less than $5 million, which we delegate out, and those can be delivered within months.
PWGSC does not review the procurement strategy of any project below $2 million. As the project value goes up, the number of people who look at it as an opportunity to help us grows. The top 10 or 12 projects go to cabinet for specific review so that all the national issues can be integrated into that project approval.
Senator Meighen: Let us hypothesize. Suppose cabinet were to decide that we must have General Hillier's idea of two or three army task forces. Who would make the decision that we need a San Antonio Class craft? Would it be the military, under your new scenario, and then it would work its way up to cabinet? What would be the advantage or disadvantage of the cabinet agreeing with General Hillier that, subject to military approval, we need the San Antonio Class vessel? If you were able to decide quickly that we want to buy a San Antonia Class vessel off the shelf, that would cut down the time quite considerably, would it not? What is left to decide other than a few modifications or add-ons?
MGen. Dempster: My recommendation is a defence capability plan, an overall programmatic idea that would have some of the major boulders stated as a government policy that the way we want to handle this particular capability is to buy a specific class. Then, send some people to talk to the Americans.
Senator Meighen: Would that be a political decision?
MGen Dempster: That would be a decision worked up and coordinated within the military, but it would go for governmental approval of that plan.
In terms of deployability, there are many different kinds of sea-lift vessels in existence today. I am not an expert in this area, but I do know that the San Antonio Class ship requires a crew of 400 to operate. I am also aware that it has taken the better part of 15 years for the procurement plan in the United States to get to the state of having five ships delivered.
Senator Meighen: I gather you put a great deal of importance on committed, long- or longer-term funding. If you do not have that, much of what you suggested falls away. How can you execute a plan if you do not know whether you will have the funding?
MGen Dempster: That was our problem in the 1990s. We had insufficient funding even to replace the things we had to replace. You can do that for a short period of time, but eventually you have to pay the piper. Things wear out and it becomes a crisis. Crisis is always more expensive to solve than managing things in a logical way.
Senator Meighen: Senator Atkins asked sotto voce whether we will ever catch up. Hopefully we will.
If I am not mistaken, when Mr. McCallum was Minister of National Defence he awarded a contract to an outside group to make suggestions for the improvement of the procurement process. Were some or all of the recommendations implemented?
MGen. Dempster: The group of four that was contracted to form the Minister's Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency made 49 recommendations. A number of those have been implemented; the rest are in train.
On the procurement issue, they only went a certain distance. I believe there was a requirement for more work and more thought to be put in. I believe that in concert with the post 9/11 issues we were facing, the group focused more on the administrative issues than the capability and the operational issues. There is more work required. We hope to have most of the minister's advisory committee recommendations implemented by the end of 2006. I do not believe that even implementing all of them would solve all the problems we face in procurement.
The Deputy Chairman: Some years ago, I had the opportunity to ask a couple of notable Canadians to devise, in the defence area, a split budget — one half for capital purposes and the other half for hygienic purposes. Capital purposes can be dealt with on a five- to 10-year basis whereas pay, allowances and goodwill have to be revisited annually.
In your experience, is there any merit in that as one possible way of making planning easier and a lot more certain?
MGen. Dempster: Today, Parliament votes us Vote 5 for capital and Vote 1 for operating budgets. You are asking whether we separate those. If we had not had the capacity to shift between capital and operating budgets in the 1990s, we probably would not have made it through the 1990s. We actually shifted money out of capital into operating budgets to meet our operating tempo. There is an argument to be made that it is good to have the flexibility when required to shift between the two forms.
That being said, it is appropriate that the management framework for the capital expenditures be multi-year rather than single-year; therefore, a rolling five-year plan would give more flexibility than annual procurement budgets.
I am giving you a two-sided answer, but I think there is room for a better regime for the management of our capital budgets.
Senator Day: I have a supplementary question with respect to the minister's advisory committee. With respect to procurement as well, are you aware of the review that was done by the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Public Works, Mr. Walt Lastewka? He brought forward a report on how to improve procurement from the point of view of the Department of Public Works. Have you read that report and, if so, does it have any applicability to the Department of National Defence?
MGen. Dempster: I have not seen it but I am aware of it. There have been probably a dozen reviews of defence procurement over the last 20 years. I look forward to seeing those recommendations. I am sure we can do better than we do now.
Senator Banks: My question is a confirmation, coming from another angle, to Senator Meighen's question. First, I agree with him; we thank you for your candour. It is the best I think we have heard, but you did not come to all these conclusions last Thursday.
Are there any systemic impediments that would have constrained putting some of these efficiencies in place earlier that you have so carefully explained to us? Are there things in the way of that other than simply the system itself?
MGen. Dempster: There is an inertia impediment. I also believe the greatest single impediment to implementing what I have talked about here is our ability to staff positions, military or civilian — to hire the right people both on the military and civilian side.
To hire a civilian professional who will be a procurement officer, for example, I think the average length to get a person into the doors to start working is about eight months. We have very prolonged staffing times. To run a competition to promote a person to a higher level takes a very long time. Our internal staffing process is probably the single biggest impediment to achieving some of the program management efficiencies I have talked about.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: Regarding the 30 to $100 million in new spending power allocated to the minister, do you know if it is a request the minister made of his Treasury Board Secretariat colleagues?
Mgen Dempster: No, I do not think he made the request. He has only been in office for the last few months and we have only started reviewing all these matters. In other words, I do not think he is aware of this.
Senator Nolin: It is a decision which could be taken quickly by his colleagues at Treasury Board Secretariat.
Mgen Dempster: Certainly.
[English]
The Chairman: General, I apologized to you earlier in private for not being here for your testimony. However, within moments of walking into the room, I got the high sign from my colleagues that you were a terrific witness, and were of remarkable assistance to the committee. The question is: Why are you retiring? We would like to hear more from you.
As we move forward writing our report, could we contact you again? There have been too many smiles and thumbs up from guys who normally sulk and grump that I have a feeling that you could be of great help to us. Thank you so much for coming today. We are grateful for your assistance to the committee.
Honourable senators, we now adjourn to a meeting in camera in the adjacent room.
The committee continued in camera.
The committee resumed in public.
The Chairman: Our next witness this evening is the Honourable Anne McLellan. Ms. McLellan was elected to her fourth term as member of Parliament for Edmonton Centre on June 28, 2004. First appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in December 2003, Ms. McLellan was reappointed to these positions on July 20, 2004.
In addition to her ministerial duties, Ms. McLellan chairs two cabinet committees, the Operations Committee and the Security, Public Health and Emergencies committee. She also sits on the Aboriginal Affairs committee and, as Deputy Prime Minister, is an ex officio member of all other cabinet committees.
Previously, Ms. McLellan was Minister of Health, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, and Minister of Natural Resources, as well as the federal interlocutor for the Metis and non-status Indians.
Accompanying the minister is Mr. Alain Jolicoeur, President of the Canadian Border Services Agency. Mr. Jolicoeur began his service in the public service of Canada in 1973 and until 1980 held various positions in the field of meteorology with Environment Canada and the Department of National Defence. From 1980 to 1992, Mr. Jolicoeur held management positions in engineering, technology transfer, technology development and the state of the environment. Subsequently, Mr. Jolicoeur joined the Treasury Board Secretariat as head of human resources for the Government of Canada. In July 1999, he became Associate Deputy Minister of National Revenue and Deputy Commissioner of the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency.
Later he was named Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. He occupied this position until December 12, 2003 when he assumed his new duties at the Canadian Border Services Agency, CSBA.
Minister, Mr. Jolicoeur, welcome to the committee. We are pleased to have you with us again so soon. We understand you have a brief statement. The floor is yours, please proceed.
The Honorable Anne McLellan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness: Honourable senators, it is a pleasure to be here again today.
[Translation]
Today I will be addressing the mandate of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, the measures taken by the government to strengthen our security infrastructure, the integrity of the Canada-U.S. border, and the critical role played by the Canada Border Services Agency and other agencies within the PSEP portfolio.
[English]
With me, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, is the President of the Canadian Border Services Agency, Mr. Alain Jolicoeur.
I would like to recognize this committee's careful scrutiny of matters that affect the safety and security of Canadians and the confidence of our American neighbours and global partners. Your valuable contributions have helped to produce tangible results.
As the minister responsible for public safety, I should begin by underscoring the significance of Canada's National Security Policy. This policy addresses our national security interests and is a blueprint for action to address new and emerging threats. It puts forward a long-term vision that builds on a chain of successive strengths in public safety and it makes significant progress to identify and close security gaps. The national security policy responds to changes in a complex threat environment, acknowledges global realities and safeguards our rights as Canadians.
I would like to focus for a moment on what I see as the culture change that has been brought to the practice of public safety and security. In December 2003, the Prime Minister brought the RCMP, CSIS, the Correctional Service of Canada, the Canada Firearms Centre, the National Parole Board and the CBSA into the public safety and emergency preparedness portfolio. This has allowed the government to share information at the right time with the right people to enhance partnerships.
Since signing the Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration, we have invested over $9 billion in new funds to ensure the safety of our citizens. We need to remember that this is an evolving process and there is still more work to do.
Honourable senators, this government believes we must secure our economic future as vigorously as we ensure public safety and national security. The CBSA was created to provide integrated border management to improve and accelerate protection initiatives already in place and to develop more strategic approaches to border security that anticipate new and emerging threats.
Building on the rich traditions of its legacy organizations, the CBSA has become a fully integrated agency dedicated to border management. It respects the rights of Canadians and meets our international obligations to provide border security and facilitate legitimate trade and travel.
In the recent federal budget the government dedicated over $400 million to respond to CBSA priorities and increased demands at key border locations. This funding also will be applied to additional measures to improve the health and safety of our frontline staff; the men and women who work at our ports of entry 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
Consistent with a multiple border strategy, we have worked to improve our ability to screen, identify and interdict high-risk persons and goods before they reach our country. We have come a long way in implementing the Canada-U.S. Smart Border Action Plan. We created and are now expanding the Nexus and Free and Secure Trade, FAST, programs designed to pre-approve low-risk travellers and commercial traffic. Over 75,000 participants currently benefit from the Nexus highway program. Nexus Air, introduced late last year as a pilot program in Vancouver, uses iris recognition technology to verify the identity and confirm admissibility of people entering Canada.
We also work closely with our international partners by deploying Migration Integrity Officers overseas. MIOs work closely with airline and local authorities all around the world to share intelligence, detect document fraud and interrupt the flow of illegal immigrants, criminals and persons with terrorist links before they get to Canada.
Advance passenger information and passenger name record programs alert us to high-risk persons travelling to Canada, before arrival. Canada's National Risk Assessment Centre has been in operation for over a year. The centre operates on a 24/7 basis and serves as the focal point for managing and coordinating national and international watch lists.
Our Advance Commercial Information, ACI, program gives us increased ability to identify and interdict dangerous goods and to speed up processing cargo moving legitimately across the border. ACI requires ocean carriers to submit cargo data electronically 24 hours before the container is loaded in foreign ports.
Budget 2005 provided us with $88 million over five years for Canada to work with the U.S. on the Container Security Initiative, CSI, and to increase the capability of our systems to target and share information on high-risk cargo destined for our shores. The budget also invests an additional $222 million for marine-security-related initiatives in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway and Canadian seaports to protect Canada and the U.S. from marine-based threats. Most of that $222 million goes to my colleague, Mr. Jean-C LaPierre, Minister of Transport, with a small amount to us.
Our co-operation with the United States is reflected in many ways, including the establishment of RCMP-led Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, IBETs. These multidisciplinary teams are made up of RCMP, CBSA and local police services working with American and other law enforcement personnel at 15 strategic locations along our shared border. Those are 15 regional locations. We have 23 IBETs but 15 regional locations across the country.
Developed in the mid-1990s, IBETs have produced impressive enforcement successes for both Canadian and American participants, particularly in the areas of contraband and human smuggling. We have recently collocated Canadian and U.S. intelligence analysts in four locations along the border. We are beginning the process of evaluating the IBET program and expect to have tangible, evidence-based results by the end of this fiscal year.
I know this committee is particularly interested in evaluation and results. Are we achieving the benchmarks we set for ourselves, whether in relation to IBETs or other programs? This is clearly something that we are doing more of, but we must do a better job in terms of determining whether we are actually achieving the objectives and hitting the benchmarks of the various agencies and units like IBETs that we have in place.
When I met with former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge last September in Detroit, we made a number of announcements, including a land pre-clearance pilot project at the Peace Bridge in Fort Erie and the expansion of U.S. pre-clearance facilities at Halifax International Airport. We also announced 30 additional CBSA officers to staff the Windsor-Detroit gateway and committed to reduce transit time across this vital trade link. I look forward to working with my new counterpart Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff in relation to these initiatives and carrying them forward.
Considerable work has already been done to develop a security plan to support the broader security and prosperity partnership for North America announced in Texas last month. These efforts will take leadership, and the scrutiny you have applied continues to be critical. You have demonstrated your willingness to work with the government, and let me say that I truly appreciate the fact that your committee has taken up very important work. I am the first to say, as you know, Mr. Chairman, that rigorous analysis and criticism are absolutely key in terms of achieving our shared objectives.
I underscore the fact that the department is still relatively new. I thank the Senate and Senator Banks for sponsoring the bill that created the department. I was sworn in just over a week ago as the first ever Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. It speaks to the newness of the portfolio. Clearly, the challenges have existed long before the creation of this new department. However, I think the new department reflects our government's commitment, and certainly my commitment, to working in new, more focused and more integrated ways, with key partners — your committee is one of those key partners — to ensure that we are able to do what is necessary to ensure the collective security and safety of Canadians, and to ensure that we are prepared to deal with any emergency, be it man-made or natural.
I look forward to our dialogue, as always.
The Chairman: Minister, you commented on constructive criticism being useful. We frequently praise your department as well. If you looked at our Canadian Security Guide Book, 2005 Edition, there were a great many instances where we spoke — dare I say — in glowing terms.
Ms. McLellan: I thank you for that.
The Chairman: The difficulty sometimes is that it seems less newsworthy when we say you are doing something well than when we say, "We wish you were doing something different." The media is sometimes like that.
Ms. McLellan: Mr. Chairman, to you and the members of this committee, it is important to acknowledge that our first-ever integrated National Security Policy was something that you took up and suggested it was absolutely key for us as a government and a country to do a better job around our collective security. It speaks to the work that your committee does. I know sometimes you may think that we do not respond, or respond with the alacrity expected, but I think we pay very careful attention. I would like to think that we have acted upon many of the recommendations you have made.
Senator Meighen: We keep a score card.
Ms. McLellan: That does not surprise me.
The Chairman: Senator Meighen is correct. We do keep a score card, and what is more, we make it public.
Ms. McLellan: You do indeed.
The Chairman: We do not think there is any point at all in saying there is something wrong if we are not equally prepared to say that something is right and things are working. We would welcome reciprocal criticism, if we have not.
Senator Meighen: Do not go too far now.
The Chairman: All of a sudden, I will be voted out of here. However, that is the case, and members of the committee would welcome your feedback. If there are times when you or your officials do not think we have got it right, we would like to hear about it, and we would appreciate that.
Ms. McLellan: Thank you.
Senator Banks: Welcome, minister and Mr. Jolicoeur. Thank you for being here.
Minister, I think you said you had received $400 million in the last budget. There is a little bit more from the $220 million and a little bit from the $55 million, but in respect to the $400 million, which is CBSA-specific, how will you spend that? What will you do with it?
Ms. McLellan: I can give you a fairly detailed idea of what we will do with it. Let me clarify. In the speech, I did say over $400 million.
Correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Jolicoeur, but I believe that over the next five years, we will receive some $567 million to support the agency's operations, for the container security initiative and for the more general marine initiatives. I know that you have heard a considerable amount about the safe work environment, in which we will invest $139 million over the next five years for training, tools and radio equipment to support employees who work alone, which has been an issue for discussion, as well as on various other kinds of facility design modifications to improve both the safety and quality of the work environment for our employees.
Border congestion and increased volumes will be addressed with $101 million dedicated to more staff at key locations. I mentioned that there will be 30 new officers at the Windsor-Detroit border point, which is our busiest crossing. There will be other increased volumes and thus the necessity for increased staff at Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Pierre Elliott Trudeau Airport, the Pacific Coast highway, Coutts, Emerson, Windsor, Sarnia, Fort Erie, Niagara Falls, Lansdowne and Lacolle. These border points will receive additional human resources over the next five years. An additional $48 million will be devoted to increased examination of high-risk travellers and goods at strategically determined locations across the country, and $13 million will go to addressing increased volumes in postal centres. Another $13 million will be slated for export checks, and $119 million will be invested over five years to develop and maintain information technology, IT, systems. Mr. Jolicoeur can provide you with more details in respect of the current status of our information technology systems and the necessity to upgrade them to ensure that we have integrated communications systems. Over five years, $88 million will be invested in the container security initiative and, of the $220 million for marine security, $46 million will come to PSEPC for portal radiation detection systems at 10 major marine terminals and for the CBSA's participation in the RCMP National Port Enforcement Team program.
That is the general outline of the new money that we have received, which totals approximately $567 million. However, I believe that we will ask for more money over the five years because we will identify additional requirements necessitating additional dollars within that five-year period. I do not want anyone to think, especially the Minister of Finance, that I will not be back to request additional dollars for the CBSA within that five-year period.
Senator Banks: Ms. McLellan, you mentioned the safe work environment, about which I will ask a question of Mr. Jolicoeur. In 2002, you commissioned a study by Moduspec Risk Management Services on safe work environments and job hazard analyses. We have seen two versions of that: a draft report and a final report. There was a significant difference in one segment of the report. The draft version includes the necessity of police presence at six specific locations and for MOUs specifically at airports. That section was absent in the final report given to you, the commissioner. Why was that inclusion from the draft report excluded in the final report? What were the arguments against it? We have been concerned about the issue of police presence for some time now.
Mr. Alain Jolicoeur, President, Canada Border Services Agency: Senator, this predates the creation of the CBSA. My understanding is that in the draft report of the consultant, there was a recommendation about the importance of having armed officers in some locations.
Senator Banks: I refer specifically to the mention of a police presence at these locations.
Mr. Jolicoeur: I believe that was a recommendation for the busiest locations. It would be easier, perhaps, to ask the consulting firm why that recommendation was dropped in the final report. I think that through additional interviews with people in the organization and a study of the concepts, needs and vulnerability they concluded that such a police presence was not required.
Senator Banks: Should we ask Moduspec that question?
Mr. Jolicoeur: I could do that for you.
The Chairman: Are you assuring us there was no request from the government to alter the report?
Mr. Jolicoeur: I am not aware of any request to alter the report. Again, this is pre-CBSA but my understanding is that it arose from a concern of the union about security in some areas. Labour Canada concluded that we needed to have an independent study, which was done and recommendations made. It is interesting to hear the minister announce that the money to implement the recommendations of the report is in the recent budget.
Senator Banks: Madam Minister, this committee will travel to Washington, D.C again soon. The members of the committee regard it as part of the job to meet with our counterparts in both House of Representatives committees and Senate committees in Washington. As you are aware, they operate under a different regime. To assist committee members in their deliberations, it helps if they speak the same kind of language and refer to the same kind of subjects when meeting with their counterparts. The last time you appeared before the committee in February, I believe, we mentioned that sometimes when we ask specific questions to obtain information that could help us in Washington and other places, a kind of veil comes over the answers that we hear from departmental officials. We understood that you would look at ways in which they might be more forthcoming in their responses to our questions to enable committee members to make best use of the information. It is not that we want to know how many people there are or how much money is being spent but rather we want to know general information about how things are working.
Ms. McLellan: I made the commitment, which I take seriously. While we do not want to reveal operational details or certain aspects of risk assessment that would provide information to those who might do harm, I agree that it would be useful for members of the committee and interested Canadians to know more about how we do what we do. The provision of appropriate information would dispel some of the concerns and myths around the activities of border services agents or others in the pursuit of the collective security of Canadians.
My goal, as I have told Mr. Jolicoeur, is that we are as forthcoming with information as we can be with the chair of the committee or other committee members where it is appropriate. In that way, members will have as much information as possible. In some cases, we would all have to agree that certain information was for the use of the committee only. It could help inform your inquiries but would not be made public. That is my goal and I would think it is Mr. Jolicoeur's goal as well.
Mr. Jolicoeur: Absolutely. Yes, Madam minister. To be fair to us, we have offered in-camera briefing recently on some elements. I am thinking about the series of questions you sent a few months ago. We offered a separate briefing as well. I firmly believe, as a public manager my whole career, that the most important way to improve public management is transparency. The area of security becomes trickier for obvious reasons. We should aim first for packaging the information in a way that does not make us vulnerable, at the higher level of aggregation. Basically, we need to do it in a way that does not give away any of our recipes. The best way to do that is to share information that is more focussed on results and improvement, or vulnerability from a result perspective, as opposed to from a system, methodology or risk assessment perspective. That is the challenge we are facing. Yes, we will definitely try to share as much as possible, and it is easier to share more in an in-camera fashion.
The Chairman: We understand why things are easier to share in an in-camera fashion. Having said that, we are firm believers in having things on the public record. We have not been inclined to take advantage of in-camera meetings. We do think, however, that public policy is improved with more transparency. For example, when systems are being tested, there can be a time lag between when the results are made public and when the testing actually took place. There can be a sufficient time lag that gives the department or the agency an opportunity to correct those mistakes. If there was knowledge that, say, every six months there would be a report on something that happened on a test that took place six months ago, then there would be an opportunity for the public to have a better understanding of whether their money was being well spent. They would be able to track improvements as time went on and greater confidence would build in the system. All too often we get a blanket, no, it is national security. As soon as someone says the words, they seem to expect us to hide under our desks and go away.
The other thing that concerns the committee greatly is when we are told something is secret, then we discover that tens of thousands of Canadians already know the answer and they are prepared to share that with us easily. We do not go around offering $10 bills for answers, free tours of the Senate or anything like that. We just say, can you help us out, what do you know about this and we discover that literally thousands of people know the answer. Yet officials come and look us in the eye and say, no, we will not tell members of Parliament the answer to that question. If you go to a bar near where these people work and just sit in a chair, someone will sit down and take you through the whole story. It does not make sense to us that your officials would come and say, 10,000 people know that, but I will not tell you. What Senator Banks is on to, we think, is something fundamental because we actually do believe you have good intentions. We do believe you have intelligent people who are working in the organization. We do believe that you have systems that sooner or later are going to do the job that was intended. As long as the answer is, if I tell you that I have to kill you, frankly we are a little offended because the questions are being asked in good faith. We think it is possible to devise ways to communicate the results of your systems to us without giving away the store.
We were just appalled when one of your officials appeared before us a few months ago and was not telling us stuff that other officials had already told us about elsewhere in the system. We were astonished because we knew that the results were a significant improvement over what we had asked before. Here was a good news story and it was not coming out. That is the dilemma we face. A department that comes before any committee and says, we have these problems and lists them, and then, we have a plan and over time we will start curing these problems; we will show you where we are now and where we will be six months from now; and you stick with us and watch us get better, a totally different response comes from the committee and a totally different report gets written.
Ms. McLellan: What you have said is completely legitimate. Mr. Jolicoeur mentioned the emphasis on results. One identifies problems; usually those problems are identified in public in quite a high profile way as we may have noticed today, for example. People are aware of some of the challenges. Some of them may be problems, some of them may be challenges, and some of them may be exaggerated. Having said that, it is fairly public what some of the challenges are. I see nothing wrong as long as it is not revealing certain kinds of operational detail in telling you there is a plan, what the key components are, and what results we expect in six months; a year from that plan. Absolutely, everyone has every right to expect that.
The Chairman: And tell us the results?
Ms. McLellan: Yes, absolutely.
The Chairman: This committee chose not to comment on those press reports.
Senator Banks: As Mr. Jolicoeur said, it is important. We do not want to know this for ourselves. Canadians read in the newspapers those sensational reports, many of which come from other than in Canada. Canadians wants to know the answers to these questions. Canadians want to know that we are taking care of business.
Ms. McLellan: They read about their borders. They cross the borders. It is something that is tangible to them. They are aware of September 11 and aware of other events that cause them to say quite legitimately we want to know what is happening at the border. Canadians are focusing on their borders, whether land, sea or air, in much more rigorous ways than before. They are more interested, as they should be, because we all have a collective responsibility in our safety and security. That includes the public, but ours is obviously transcendent at a certain level, in relation to our commitment to collective security.
Senator Banks: They are, and we would like to tell those good news stories when they are there. We meet with our American counterparts all the time, and we know that in many respects we are ahead of them in many ways. When people read about that in Canada, it is on page 34, not on page 1.
You mentioned the question of results and you said the words, risk assessment. I will not ask any questions, and please do not construe any questions I ask as being interested in any remote detail with respect to how it is done. Every time we ask a question of anyone or any agency about how we identify people who are known shippers and known travellers, the answer is, we do it on the basis of risk assessment. Risk assessment, as far as we have been able to determine, means that someone is deemed not to be a risk if they do not, as of noon today, have a criminal record. We would like to know the extent to which you and the department are involved in determining the methodology. We do not want to know what the methodology is. Who is determining, and how is it determined, what that risk assessment will be? How can we gain confidence in that respect?
Ms. McLellan: In determining what the methodology is, that is developed and determined by the CBSA, often working in partnership or sharing challenges around risk assessment with other countries. We were talking about this this morning. I hope I am not exaggerating, but it is my understanding that our risk-assessment tools as they relate to both cargo and humans — but certainly cargo — are probably right now the most sophisticated in the world. However, it is a constantly evolving process. Ours might be the most sophisticated risk-assessment methodology right now. The Americans may leapfrog over us; we may learn from them and leapfrog over them, and so on. I think it is fair to say, however, that there is generally a close working relationship in determining what the key risk factors would be, whether dealing with cargo or individuals, and then how you would create your matrix, if you like, to apply that methodology to, one hopes, identify high-risk goods and high-risk people.
Senator Banks: You said that CBSA devises those methodologies. Does the department look at them, assess them and decide that this is a good idea and to go further in this direction?
Ms. McLellan: It is fair to say that Mr. Jolicoeur has discussions with the deputy minister in relation to those kinds of operational decisions. Certainly, it is also fair to say that I would not be involved in signing off on a methodology or a matrix; however, certainly, at my end, when someone thinks the methodology has been applied inappropriately, that is when I hear and that is when I get involved, whether it is testimony at a committee like this or with regard to someone in the newspapers. I ask Mr. Jolicoeur, "How the heck did that happen? Tell me what happened here and why this person is saying this or that, and help me understand in relation to the concern that is being expressed." I do not sign off directly in relation to the matrix, for example, that is developed. However, I do have confidence in Mr. Jolicoeur and the CBSA working in partnership with global partners and working with my deputy.
Senator Banks: Any time you have risk assessment, whoever signs off on it, there is also risk tolerance, because risk assessment is not perfect. Who decides what the risk tolerance level is? Does the department decide that, or Mr. Jolicoeur?
Mr. Jolicoeur: Let me elaborate a bit on risk assessment. As you pointed out, we operate differently in two separate universes: the commercial container universe and the people universe. We have had different generations of tools to do risk assessment. As the minister was saying, on the container side, we have the ne plus ultra at the moment; we are at the top end. Because we discuss things every day with our U.S. colleagues, and because we trust each other in this field — it is very important that we work closely — we are aware of their plan to in fact leapfrog us and go farther in terms of the databases that are accessed in the process. In the last federal budget, some of the money on the system side, actually on the CSI initiative, will allow us to also get to the next generation. Our system is called Titan. We will now move to Titan II to make sure we stay at the top.
The approval of the methodology is not really something that needs to be raised at the ministerial level or even at my level. I am a technical person. I go into the bowels of the system. We are getting 4 million containers a year coming into Canada. For each one, there are 1 billion computations that are made, because we have 45 elements that we receive 24 hours before the container is loaded. A comparison is made to a large database and then to a table where we developed a different scenario that could lead to higher risks. It is very significant.
We do not have the equivalent analytical tools on the people side. We do have one, and we are working on another generation. We are and have been for a month now on a mode where we automatically compare with the U.S. the higher risk people that arrive at either the U.S. or Canada.
With regard to your point on tolerance, if we have someone coming to Canada that is close to reaching the level that would necessitate going to secondary, but not quite, in both countries we automatically share the information to determine whether the other country has additional risk elements that would raise that person above the bar and necessitate that secondary. Hence, we had to agree and develop in parallel risk assessments specifically for that, and that is in existence. We are now working on a wider model to do risk assessment in all cases.
Senator Banks: Am I correct in say that the determination as to the point at which a risk tolerance is acceptable is made in CBSA?
Mr. Jolicoeur: It has been negotiated with the Americans for the purpose of exchange of information. The whole system has been subjected to the privacy impact assessment; the Privacy Commissioner signed an agreement with the U.S. a month ago. It is operational now.
Senator Banks: You talked about the advance passenger information system. That is something that takes a very serious look at people who are coming into our country. There is an element of security that has to do with people who are leaving our country by air, and it seems to many of us that the information about people leaving the country and people coming into the country ought to be something that is in the same place and shared and of concern to the same people. However, the people who are mostly concerned about people leaving the country are CATSA, the organization that does security when people leave the country at airports. That is not, Madam minister, among the agencies you mentioned at the beginning that were folded into your present department.
When people of interest come into the country, they are just as likely to go out of the country; and when people of interest go out of the country, they are just as likely to come into the country. Would it not make sense if all of those things talked to each other and if that function were in your department, too, since it has to do with national security?
Ms. McLellan: I have to be very careful here, because I would not want to be seen in any way as either empire-building or poaching from my colleague the Minister of Transport.
It is absolutely essential that key elements of our security apparatus are pulling in the same direction, have a clarity of mandate and are sharing information in a real-time way where that is necessary.
Senator Banks: That does not happen now with CATSA and CBSA.
Ms. McLellan: I do not think that that has to be one's goal, where that is appropriate, relevant and necessary. That does not necessarily tell you that all these agencies have to be in the same department. What is key is that where information is to be shared, there are integrated systems that can do that in real time and, as I say, people understand a shared commitment to mandate. To me, that does not always direct me of necessity to say that they need to be in the same department.
I am always open, however. This is a new department, and we are learning, and clearly the aspects of homeland security are not identical. They are somewhat different from the component parts of my department. We are actually learning from each other, and my deputy and her counterpart in homeland security in fact have developed a work plan that helps us understand the complexity of making these departments work and what the components are. In some cases, they may decide something does not work as well as it could somewhere else; and we may decide that we need something that we do not have. I am not closing the door. The point you raise is a good one. The same issue could be raised in relation to the Coast Guard. That is all I will say about that.
Senator Banks: We have said a great deal more.
Ms. McLellan: Again, I do not want to be seen to be suggesting that all of these important aspects of safety and security need to be in one department. They must be looked at on a case-by-case basis and a determination must be made as to where they can best serve the collective purpose of safety and security. Perhaps Mr. Jolicoeur would like to expand on CBSA and CATSA.
Mr. Jolicoeur: We had a meeting about two months ago of the executive management committee of CBSA and the same committee of CATSA, to share methodology, to talk about technology, in particular, and to see whether there are areas where we can work together in airports or side by side, to improve the interrelation between the two.
On the business of structure, I will not comment on the Canadian structure, but I will say that the U.S. created the Department of Homeland Security before we created our new department and portfolio. In the United States at present, they are looking at doing with Customs and Border Protection what we did with CBSA, that is, to integrate in CBP a component called ICE, or Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In CBSA, we have responsibility for removal and detention and investigation of illegal migrants. They did not do that in the United States, but they are now starting the process to do that as we did.
The Chairman: This is a classic case, minister, of things that are secret that we wonder why they are secret. We can see no conceivable reason that your confidence level in something working well would be of assistance to the bad guys. However, we do not know and Canadians generally do not know what confidence level you consider appropriate. We all recognize that you cannot protect everything all the time. We all recognize that risk management means that there is a risk. Yet, there is a reluctance to say to this committee, or to say publicly, for example, the following: "We think an appropriate risk level on this is 80 per cent. If we have an 80 per cent confidence level that we are picking up the problems, we think that is worth the hundreds of millions of dollars that we are putting into the system. If we are scoring below that, we think we have a problem. If we score above that, we think we are doing well." What do you say to that?
Ms. McLellan: I will say what I think of that, and if Mr. Jolicoeur has a heart attack, we will deal with that later.
If you put it that way, it seems that you are probably not revealing a level of operational detail. You are talking about expectations, obviously, and whether they are being met.
Senator Banks: Results.
Ms. McLellan: If that is what you are focused on, I would think that that is information that could be shared. However, what is the key is also the context that Canadians — because I know you understand this — must understand that we do not live in a risk-free world. Hence, we do make those kinds of assessments. If we spent all the money in the world, I wish that we could guarantee Canadians 100 per cent risk-free existence. We cannot. It does not matter how much money we spend, how much fancy equipment we have or how many CBSA agents we hire. Risk-free is not the reality in which any of us live. You determine what level of risk you can live with and then assess the risk and hope you have the best tools. You heard about that from Mr. Jolicoeur.
If we can help to explain that broader context to Canadians, so that there is not an expectation that we live in a risk-free world, and then talk about the level of risk that we will accept is the following, then there is great value in that. You must do that other piece, too, which is help Canadians — and I know the committee's work has done that; and it is my obligation and others — to understand that the world is not risk-free. Therefore, we will accept a certain level of risk, and here is why we accept that level of risk. We think that is appropriate. That is important information for people to have.
The Chairman: We agree. We think people would come away with a much greater level of confidence in the systems if it were explained more or less like that. People live their lives by choosing risks every day. To put it in context, if someone asks, "Which is more dangerous — to drive between Montreal and Toronto or to fly between Montreal and Toronto," we all know it is safer to fly.
Ms. McLellan: If you indicate, "We are willing to accept the following level of risk" — say in container security — I do not know whether that information would embolden those who would do harm, to say, "That is a risk worth running," as opposed to, "If I knew it was 90 as opposed to 80 per cent, I might not run that risk." I do not know. I would be interested in hearing your views on that, in light of the work have you have done.
Senator Banks: The context in which we are asking is that it is hard to get this information sometimes, but we can find out and have found out — not this committee but on different committees — what the acceptable level of risk is for PCBs in the atmosphere. We know the acceptable limit of risk of exposure to nuclear radiation. That has been quantified. It may be more difficult in this circumstance, but if we had some grazing idea about what it was, what the goal is or what the standards are — there must be one — the issue would be easier to deal with.
Mr. Jolicoeur: My organization is tired of hearing me say that I want to turn this organization into a science and tech organization. The question you are raising was discussed 30 years ago in society when we were moving into the nuclear sector. The challenge of society was to put into understandable terms the mathematical risk link with the nuclear industry. It was finally done, and it was good for everybody that we went with that exercise.
I spent half of my career at Environment, looking at environmental risk and being transparent about it.
I do agree with your point on being transparent about risk. Where I disagree is that in this security field we have not yet reached the ability to put into meaningful numbers the risks we are facing in the different parts of the process. I want to do that, but I want to do it well, so that we can use numbers that make sense, so that we have a methodology that can back the numbers that we are using. We are not there yet; however, we are moving in that direction.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: Mr. Jolicoeur, you have just mentioned to us a meeting that took place between senior officers from your organization and those from CATSA. I simply want to make sure that you are conscious of the fact that you have a very specific legislative mandate, which they do not have. They can search people, but they are not interested in a person's identity, but in what they may be carrying.
We are going to make recommendations, but so long as legislative amendments are not in place, I would not want someone from CATSA asking me for my passport or where I am coming from or where I am going. It is none of their business. Having a person I do not know search me is one thing; I would not want things to go any further so long as measures are not in place to ensure the full respect of individuals. I simply wanted to be sure that you are aware of the fine line that exists. Since we live in a world of risk assessment, we should be conscious of the risks involved.
[English]
Senator Forrestall: I will create the first of the major juxtapositions tonight in terms of the flow of the questioning so far. I wish to ask about the gaps between points of entry on either side of our border. How will you police them? May I say that I can offer you the services of the Halifax Rifles or some other reserve unit.
Senator Munson: How old are those guys?
Senator Forrestall: Some of them are well over 100.
Ms. McLellan: Is that it?
Senator Forrestall: I wonder how you will police. Is the United States going to do it; will we do it jointly?
Ms. McLellan: Your latter point is an interesting one. Taking into account each other's sovereignty issues, if you look at the IBETs teams, you do it jointly. In my view, the more we work together in integrated enforcement teams the better it is.
Having said that, we have CBSA, which is at the border crossing. We then have the RCMP who does deal with issues between border crossings. However, if one is at a border crossing, there are CBSA agents present at the crossing. For example, if you are at Saint-Bernard-de-Lacolle in Quebec, which has received a fair bit of attention, if the CBSA agent at the station or post were to require police back up, that would, in most circumstances, be the Sûreté du Québec, because that is the police force of local jurisdiction. However, between border entry points, it is the RCMP. For example, as I say, our IBETs teams are in 15 regions now, 23 teams, and they are doing border enforcement.
Keep in mind that we were talking about risk. I do not think it make a lot of sense in terms of expenditure of resources to have every inch of that undefended border patrolled by RCMP, or whoever it might be, 24/7. I do not believe that is a rational use of our resources. For example, at some points along the border we have sensors. Again, there has been an assessment of risk and a decision around allocation of resources that makes the most sense.
Senator Meighen: That is what the Americans have.
Ms. McLellan: Yes. We have sensors in some locations. We have IBETs teams. We might have a locally stationed RCMP detachment; or, in some cases, we would have the police of local jurisdiction. Do you wish to add more, Mr. Jolicoeur?
Mr. Jolicoeur: I know sometimes you do not like the risk-assessment approach to things but it is really a question of zero risk and being everywhere. Does society want to do that? The answer is presumably no. It is a question of balance and having an approach that will give us the kind of results that we want to achieve. We will see the evaluation of the IBETs, but I would be interested to see if we are getting the results that we want to get out of that approach.
Senator Banks: I am sorry to jump in, but it is not that we do not like risk assessment. We do. We just want to have some confidence in the standard by which it is judged.
Senator Meighen: It makes sense that you have a system to check your system.
Ms. McLellan: That is key.
Senator Meighen: If you said, yes, we do have a system and we have checked it recently — the basic risk-assessment system — and we found it to be okay, but there is still lots of room for improvement, that would go a long way to making us feel better; but how do you know that your risk-assessment methodology is working?
Perhaps if you decided one day that you will destuff every single container coming into Halifax tomorrow, then you might be able to judge how your risk assessment is working or some better methodology. Tell us, if you can, that you have a methodology to check your methodology.
Mr. Jolicoeur: On that specific subject, you are absolutely right, that the only way to be sure that our system works would be to open all containers in, say, Halifax for a month and compare what our system would have asked to open with the random approach. We will stream in that fashion, not the whole thing but a subgroup of random and a subgroup of targeted containers.
At the moment, we are starting with our new system. We need to build the database of information, adjust and do that. We need that ourselves. We have developed the system in a way that it will improve every round that we do that. We will know basically what recipe in the system makes sense, what is useful and what is not. We need to do that to improve the system itself. With Titan, we have not gone through the first cycle. The answer is that we do not have what you want, but I want it as badly as do you.
Ms. McLellan: When we do the evaluation of our IBETs teams, we are evaluating those to determine whether or not they are achieving their objectives — whether it is in relation to identifying contraband, illegal people going across the border, whatever the case may be — or whether there is some more effective mechanism that we could use to patrol the borders.
The thing I like about IBETs is that it is integrated and one is working with one's American counterparts. My own view is that, respecting sovereignty issues, the more we do that, the better off we are on both sides of the border. We build mutual confidence in that way. From our perspective, it is important that the Americans have confidence in what we are doing and how we do it.
Senator Meighen: I have one final question, arising out of your response to Senator Banks, Madam minister. You said that you did not want to be seen as poaching from your colleagues. I would not want to leave the Canadian public with the view that the determination as to whether CATSA or the Canadian Coast Guard is better off with you or under the Department of Transport would depend on a question of poaching, if you will pardon the pun.
Ms. McLellan: I was trying to be polite.
Senator Meighen: Surely, there must be an assessment as to where this particular agency or department is best located.
Ms. McLellan: You are absolutely right.
Senator Meighen: Is that being done?
Ms. McLellan: It is fair to say at this point that there is no active assessment as to whether CATSA should be brought into public safety or perhaps other entities. Our department is still relatively new. We want to ensure that the pieces we have are working in the way they should.
My colleague, the Minister of Transport, has ministerial oversight for CATSA. He is responsible if they do not do their job. He and I work closely together — and as have you heard, Mr. Jolicoeur and his counterpart at CATSA have a dialogue. It is not to suggest that there is not both administrative and political responsibility for whether that entity is delivering on its mandate. However, in terms of whether at some point in the future that entity could better serve the public, either from an efficiency, effectiveness or cost point of view, whether it would be better in my department than somewhere else, those issues will be addressed, but it is too soon. We are busy trying to absorb, integrate and get up and running what we have. CATSA appears to be fulfilling its mandate in Transport right now with appropriate ministerial oversight. If at some point in the future it is thought to be appropriate, after the necessary evaluations, that CATSA could fulfil its mandate better being integrated somewhere else, then I am more than willing and open to take that up. I would not shy away from doing so. You are right. It is ultimately about whether it is more effective if it is somewhere else. Could it be more efficient if it is somewhere else? At this point, we are still busy trying to fit the pieces of our new department together and ensuring that they are working efficiently and effectively and dealing with the mandate that was given to us. That does not mean that there could not be additional pieces at some point in the future.
Senator Meighen: Maybe when your department was set up, CATSA and/or the Coast Guard could have been put under you, but, for whatever reason, it was decided not to. That is fair enough. I agree that you need a period of building up, assessment and all the rest of it. Then perhaps you can make up, as long as it is not determined by somebody's nose being put out of joint.
Turning to the subject of border infrastructure with the example Detroit-Windsor, if I may, that is probably the most important crossing. It is probably one of the most vulnerable crossings. It has peculiar challenges, including private ownership of the land on either side, including the bridge — though that is not unique.
We have been told, and it is in the public consciousness now, that there will not be another crossing at Detroit-Windsor, whatever form it may take, tunnel, bridge, whatever, until 2013. I know it is easy for us to sit here and say that that is too long, but it is too long. That is eight years from now.
Given the importance of the Detroit-Windsor crossing, are there not things that could be done to speed this up? Could we not speed up the five — if I am not mistaken — environmental reviews that need to be completed? I realize this is expensive, but could we not run the design phase of the commencing design on all five possible outcomes now, so that when one is chosen we have the design all ready to go? We would only have to push the button and away we go — rather than choosing the tunnel and then starting to design it. Under that scenario, a number of years will pass before the design is completed and construction starts.
If somebody intentionally or unintentionally were part of an explosion in the middle of the bridge, since we do not have pre-clearance now on opposite sides, that would be a pretty serious blow to our economy. It is a high priority, in my view. I wonder if the construction of something new in 2013 satisfies that.
Ms. McLellan: I agree that it is a high priority for us, and for my colleague, the Minister of Transport, the Minister of State for Infrastructure and Communities, Minister Godfrey, and others. That is why we are working as hard as we are. We have a phase-1 agreement with the province and the city. We are working hard on what we hope is phase 2 on our side of the border that will put in place important infrastructure, which, regardless of which new crossing is chosen, is necessary, important and useful. None of us wants to proceed with infrastructure that all of a sudden goes nowhere, depending on the choice made, but that phase 2 work is very advanced. I look forward, along with my colleague Mr. Lapierre, to being able to finalize that phase 2 with the province and the city in the near future.
The binational process to which you refer is just that, a binational process. There are five EAPs being done right now on five possible crossings.
Senator Meighen: Perhaps you could explain "EAP" for people watching at home.
Ms. McLellan: EAP stands for environmental assessment process.
Therefore, that work needs to be done, and we are looking at expediting it to the greatest extent possible. I am not sure how much more quickly the process can move forward. I know you are not suggesting that we take any kind of legal shortcuts here, because that could end up with lawsuits, and part of what we are trying to do is to ensure that the process is respected so that everybody believes that he or she has been treated fairly, and the prospect of any kind of legal action against whomever is reduced, one would hope, to almost nil.
It is my understanding that those environmental assessments will take a period of up to two years, although we are pushing hard to shorten that period of time while still respecting all of the legal requirements.
I agree that we need to do everything we can to expedite the process, as long as the costs of that expedition are reasonable and justifiable. As long as that is the case, we need to expedite the process to the greatest extent possible, so that we have a new crossing as soon as possible.
The bridge will reach capacity, as I understand it, around 2011-12. We are doing some short-term things, namely, some infrastructure changes in phase 1 and phase 2 and the 25 per cent challenge. That reduces transit times, but there are also FAST, NEXUS, plaza changes and, perhaps, additional officers on both sides of the borders, and more booths. We have a pre-clearance pilot at Buffalo-Fort Erie, but if pre-clearance proved itself, which we anticipate it will, there may also be other possibilities we could put in place at Windsor-Detroit to move the traffic faster in a safe and secure way.
At the end of the day, there is one bridge. That capacity will be reached in 2011-12, I believe.
Mr. Jolicoeur: We are now seeing numbers that make us comfortable so that we could go somewhat beyond the 2013 date, but we do not want to.
Ms. McLellan: We do not want to do that.
Mr. Jolicoeur: We do not want to do that, but we are working hard on our part to advance the building of the bridge. The feeling from all professionals on both sides is that if we try to cut a corner, we will not advance. We will delay it by 10 years because of the legal ramifications. We are really taking the fast track.
Ms. McLellan: Many people have an interest in this and we are trying to ensure that everyone is treated fairly in the various processes. We would not want someone to feel that they had been treated unfairly such that they would seek an interim injunction against us or the binational process or some other legal remedy. If that were to be done, we would all be in the soup.
Senator Meighen: You mentioned Buffalo-Fort Erie. What is the state of that pre-clearance pilot project? Has the site been chosen?
Ms. McLellan: Rob Wright negotiated this pre-clearance agreement with his then counterpart Asa Hutchinson. We see this as key. Tom Ridge and I entered an agreement to move forward with a pilot. I raised this with Michael Chertoff when he was here and I believe that I have his commitment to move forward aggressively on a pre-clearance pilot.
Perhaps Mr. Jolicoeur can update you on the latest discussions.
Mr. Jolicoeur: We have started the treaty negotiations. After that, we will need legislation. We believe that within six months all the discussions will be finished and we will have a final product. It will be two years before we have U.S. officers on the ground on the Canadian side.
Senator Di Nino: Why is that? We already have them on the ground in seven airports. Why is it so complicated to have them on a piece of ground?
Mr. Jolicoeur: That was also our position at the beginning of the discussion.
Ms. McLellan: That position did not happen to be shared by some on the other side.
Mr. Jolicoeur: They had some security concerns. They wanted to have the exact same powers on the Canadian side as they have on the American side.
Senator Meighen: Does that include guns?
Ms. McLellan: Yes, but that was not the biggest problem. The biggest problems had to do with search and seizure, including strip searches. Taking someone automatically from the Canadian side to the American side for criminal purposes is a big problem.
Senator Meighen: I can see the problem with that, although if the territory is proclaimed U.S. territory for that purpose, presumably they would be allowed to do a strip search there if they are allowed to do it in the U.S.
Ms. McLellan: That approach would have required a series of legal interventions. As well, how politically palatable would that be?
Senator Meighen: Not very.
Ms. McLellan: That was our conclusion as well. A number of detailed options were worked on by both sides and it was determined that full powers were not possible for various constitutional reasons. If we did a pilot project on the U.S. side, we would have some of the same legal problems in terms of the U.S. Constitution and how it is interpreted.
A very detailed analysis and much legal work was done. I think we are close to providing the U.S. with 90 per cent of the full powers. The 10 per cent is problematic. On a pilot basis, I think it is fair to say that Secretary Ridge and Secretary Chertoff probably feel comfortable with it and are willing to see how it works. If it does not work, we will have learned something on both sides. If it does work, so be it.
We would like one pilot on our side and one on their side in different locations to see how this works.
Senator Meighen: Is there not a pre-clearance site on each side of the border?
Mr. Jolicoeur: No. They called that concept reverse. We could have done that. However, depending on the site, sometimes there is more space on one side than the other. The agreement would also allow for just switching sides, but it is very site-specific.
Ms. McLellan: At Fort Erie, the U.S. side is very keen, as are commercial traffic interests, et cetera, to bring it to the Canadian side because there is no room on the U.S. side.
Senator Meighen: Perhaps we would like to have one only on the American side.
Ms. McLellan: Perhaps. That is what we would try to do, again as a pilot project.
Senator Meighen: Whether it was rolled out to all crossings or only crossings with bridges would depend on how it works?
Ms. McLellan: Exactly. It may look different from place to place, depending on the geographic challenges or opportunities.
Senator Meighen: Is pre-clearance now in effect at the Halifax International Airport? If not, when will it be?
Ms. McLellan: It is not in effect at this time because the U.S. has to expend some resources to reconfigure. It is a relatively small amount of money in the context of the Homeland Security budget, as you might imagine, but their dollars are allocated. They need to find the resources in this budget year to do the configuration. We hope it will be very soon. It is all agreed to and signed off; it is simply a case of them finding the dollars to do the reconfiguration.
Senator Meighen: Do you have a contingency plan if one of the major crossings from south-western Ontario to the United States were inoperable for whatever reason?
Mr. Jolicoeur: That is more a question for the Transport perspective than for the border/immigration perspective. My organization would not be dealing with that challenge. We would simply not operate where the crossing was closed.
There are emergency plans for most of the risk areas in the country, but that is not a question for CBSA.
Ms. McLellan: There is already regular diversion of traffic in that part of Ontario on the basis of a particular problem or a backup. That is the purpose of the smart highway initiative. People are given information on what is happening at Windsor-Detroit. If the wait is 35 or 40 minutes, they might want to go Bluewater.
Senator Meighen: Thirty-five or 40 minutes is chicken feed. Try 10 to 15 hours.
Ms. McLellan: No, senator.
Senator Meighen: On 9/11.
Ms. McLellan: Oh, yes, and we have worked very hard to ensure that that will not happen again.
Senator Meighen: Are you referring to 9/11 or the delay?
Ms. McLellan: Both, obviously. We have initiated NEXUS and FAST, increased the level of integration between our countries, shared knowledge and threat assessments, and increased our ability to move low-risk goods and cargo. We never want another September 11. However, there are plans to divert to other crossings in the case of a natural or man-made disaster that makes a bridge impassable. Depending on the nature, severity and duration of the event, those other crossings would experience delays, but there are plans in place.
Mr. Jolicoeur is right that that is not a CBSA issue as such, but it is an emergency preparedness issue, which I am happy to discuss with you.
The Chairman: The legislation will be omnibus. Are you looking for several laws to be passed, or will the law that you are asking for give the authority to do this in the future?
Ms. McLellan: Do you mean on pre-clearance?
The Chairman: Yes. Is it one-spot specific?
Ms. McLellan: No. We want to set up the legislation so that it permits pre-clearance in other locations. It will set the legal framework.
The Chairman: In terms of the push back from the Americans, reverse inspection or pre-clearance still gives them a second kick at the can. Once the person of interest crosses the border, they can do whatever they like to that individual, so perhaps we do not understand the problem of their objections.
Ms. McLellan: It is true, I suppose, that if someone were identified as a high-risk individual on the U.S. side and they wanted to arrest that person, they could call ahead.
The Chairman: On the Canadian side, if they did not like that person and our laws prevented them from doing a strip search or whatever, they could say, "Fine," and carry on, but on the other side, whoa.
Ms. McLellan: They would like to deal with them once, for efficiency's sake.
The Chairman: The last point about this last round of questioning is that the issue at Detroit is not quite so much capacity as redundancy and, from a security point of view, this committee is concerned about redundancy.
Senator Cordy: I would like to talk about staffing. Certainly, tourism and trade have increased wonderfully from the Canadian perspective. Trade has doubled in the past 10 years. Are we keeping up with staffing at the borders?
Ms. McLellan: We certainly have additional resources, as I outlined, to hire more staff at key locations. If you talk to Mr. Jolicoeur here, as you can, or perhaps those who work on the front lines, my guess is you never really have enough staff. If you talk to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, you never really have enough staff because there are always more things you can be doing. The threats continue to be more sophisticated and more complex. The tools needed to identify threats and risks become more technologically advanced, more training is required and so on.
If I am honest, I would probably never want to say the CBSA and the RCMP have enough personnel: exactly the right amount, and I will never ask for any more? No, because there is always more you can do. It is an assessment of the resources we have and the pressures. Are you deploying those resources in the right places to the best effect? There are times, which is why we have additional resources now, when you have deployed them the most efficient way you can and you simply need more. That is why we will deploy 30 more officers at the Windsor-Detroit border and other key points across the country. We have done an assessment and the demand justifies additional staff. Bottom line is, if you are asking me would I like more money for more staff, absolutely.
Senator Cordy: Mr. Jolicoeur, in an effort to save time this evening, could we have a table where you could give us the number of officers over the past 10 years? Would that be possible?
Mr. Jolicoeur: Yes, we will do that. We will have to, in a sense, compile it from three different organizations, but that can easily be done.
Senator Nolin: Give us the entry in each location.
Ms. McLellan: The numbers coming and going?
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: In other words, in the same column, the number of staff and the number of visitors, including Canadians.
Mr. Jolicoeur: All right. You do not mean for each port of entry, but overall.
[English]
Senator Nolin: She was asking for each port of entry.
Senator Cordy: I was asking globally. I was being much kinder.
Senator Nolin: I am sure you can get that.
Mr. Jolicoeur: We can do it globally. Each port of entry would be a bigger task. We will do that and compare it with the size of the business so that you can see the two lines.
Senator Cordy: When we were in Windsor and Pacific Highway, we heard there were full-time positions that were not filled.
Ms. McLellan: At the Pacific Highway?
Senator Cordy: Both Windsor and Pacific Highway. Are we looking at attrition and people retiring? Are we planning for hiring? We all know the public service can take forever-and-a-day to hire staff. Is this a problem, is there advanced planning, or is there difficulty in hiring in the public service?
Mr. Jolicoeur: First, you are right that there is a lag. We do human resources planning, but in our business we need to train people before we put them on the line. They have to be recruited, go through a course and then be deployed. I know many employees look at it that way, but counting a position is actually meaningless in the organization. We are not managing by position; we are managing by budget. Each location has a budget, and there is a lag in some locations when someone is replaced. Some of the departures are planned. Some are retirements, so that is a bit easier. You can do it in advance. In other cases, it does not work that way. We always have problems in southern Ontario in having bilingual employees there. They go and then quickly leave, which leaves us vulnerable. The turnover is a bit bigger. However, you will see from the table that you requested in your previous question that we have been tracking the business fairly well.
Senator Cordy: If you know someone is retiring, can you hire and train a replacement before that person retires, or must you wait until the position is vacant?
Mr. Jolicoeur: We can do it before. It is a question of budget. The change announced following the last budget in the terms and conditions for people entering as trainees in the organization will allow us to do more of what you suggest, because it would be less costly during the training period. We will be able to use them to fulfil the job faster.
Senator Cordy: How well could CBSA function if you were not able to hire so many temporary workers each year?
Mr. Jolicoeur: We need the flexibility. It is a business that requires that flexibility.
Senator Cordy: The minister mentioned earlier that from time to time CBSA performs exit checks. Madam Minister, you said that there is money in the budget coming up that is identified for exit checks, but maybe I misinterpreted. Are we moving to a more systematic program of exit checking or screening?
Ms. McLellan: If you are asking, are we going to a program like US-Visit, which is a system of exit, we have no intention of moving in that direction at this time. One needs to be open to assessing all reasonable possibilities in terms of understanding who is in your country, who you are letting in and who leaves.
However, we have not had a history of exit checks, nor has the U.S. until US-Visit. We are the only people other than U.S. citizens who are exempt from US-Visit, which I think speaks to our special status with the United States. At this point we do not intend to implement the same kind of program that you see reflected in US-Visit as it relates to exit.
Mr. Jolicoeur: The question could also be related to two things we are doing at the exit. We are regularly called by our U.S. colleagues when they have a concern in one area, or when their level of concern is raised one notch. They ask us to check cars and trucks before they go to the U.S. However, that is specific and very different. It is for specific security concerns in specific locations. We do that regularly for them. As well, in our base program, we are responsible for commercial goods that leave the country. Certain specific ones cause concern for strategic reasons, so we require verification. There is money for that in the budget.
Senator Cordy: Is our money well spent? This committee has advocated spending increases on border security. Has the government determined that those increases are well spent?
Ms. McLellan: Yes.
Senator Cordy: Last week, certain people told me that public perception of security to create assurances is not enough; the public must also know that government money is being well spent.
Ms. McLellan: Absolutely. It is our challenge each day to ensure that the resources are being spent effectively and efficiently to provide good results in the collective security of the country. It is a constant challenge to determine whether we have the right resources in the right places. That speaks to the risk assessment. What are the risks as we go through that process? Where are the risks? What is the extent of the risks? We must ensure that we have the resources and the tools to deal with those risks. That is all about effectiveness, and Canadians have every right to expect that, always with the caveat that we do not live in a risk-free world. We cannot guarantee a 100 per cent-risk-free world. Within that context, we have to ensure that Canadians' tax dollars are being well spent on security.
However, there is always more to do. I have learned that the process is ever evolving. Just when you think you have dealt with one challenge, it either morphs into something else or a new challenge comes along or the bad guys get smarter than we thought they were. As you learn, you build that into the system, so it is an evolutionary process. It is not static, which can be frustrating for some people who would prefer a system that, once built, would be good for all time. A system could be put in place but, the day after, something like the events of September 11 could happen and the deficiencies surface. It is an evolutionary process that is dynamic and ever-changing in terms of the technology used by the good guys and the bad guys, the training required, and a host of other things. Security is a dynamic environment that is so challenging.
Not to be presumptuous, I think that part of the role of this committee is to determine whether Canadians are getting good value for their tax dollars and how the dollars are spent.
Senator Day: Coming from New Brunswick, I think it is important for us not to forget the crossing at St. Stephen-Calais. Relatively speaking, it is as important to the Maritimes and Atlantic Canada as the Windsor-Detroit crossing is to Ontario. It is my understanding that there had been approval on the Canadian side to build a bridge but that the delays are the result of the U.S. side. I thought we would be ahead of the curve on all the other bridges. Five environmental impact assessments have been done and the funding has been approved. If you are looking for pre-clearance on the U.S. side, it would be a perfect spot. I would suggest that.
Mr. Jolicoeur: You are right about the scenario. I understand that we are ready, the money is in place and the organization is ready, but there are concerns about readiness on the other side. The Canadian pilot for pre-clearance has not yet been determined. We have been looking at a few locations and St. Stephen was one of them.
Senator Day: Do not strike it off your list.
Mr. Jolicoeur: We have a list of criteria and St. Stephen has been considered, but I do not know whether it will be selected.
Senator Day: I have one other point for clarification: Mr. Jolicoeur, you will recall the discussion we had about the results, and you said it was too early to do results testing on your targeting system. We talked about Titan and Titan II. When can we expect you to introduce streaming as a way of creating a test against targeting? When can we expect to see the results?
Mr. Jolicoeur: You should give us about one year to show significant results that make sense with Titan. We do not want to announce anecdotal results, which would not be useful. Next fall we will probably have a testing mode and be able to report on the result. I like Senator Kenny's idea of waiting a bit before we show the results, but surely it will be less than one year.
Senator Day: Do you anticipate that your movement into Titan II will cause further delays?
Mr. Jolicoeur: No.
Senator Day: My last question is in respect of a comment made in 2003 when Border Services Agency representatives appeared before the committee and talked about connecting those border offices that were not connected to your mainframe so that the officers in place could have access to the same information. It seems a little strange to me that you said you had to develop a business case before you could determine whether to connect them. That was more than two years ago. Is that political talk which means, "We need to get the money for these jobs?" If a border warrants a security office and staff to check people crossing, then surely the business case is clear.
Mr. Jolicoeur: That was pre-CBSA but I know that about 100 offices were not connected at the time. We now have between 60 and 65. Unfortunately, the ones that remain to be connected are the most difficult to do. We began with the easy ones. It is a matter of infrastructure, but it has to be done.
Senator Day: You and I are both high-tech people and understand wireless and satellite communication.
Mr. Jolicoeur: We can do that, and it would be easy, but it is not wide enough. The channel cannot carry the kind of information that we require.
Senator Day: It is a matter of band width.
Mr. Jolicoeur: That is our challenge with those locations. If it were only that reason, it would have been resolved. We are working on it and it will be resolved. We are finding other ways for these offices to function. In other cases, people raised that as an embarrassing situation. We have six offices built on borders, but they were built for one purpose only: so that our people in the American office could work together and share information. They do that and it is useful.
Senator Day: Are any of those offices not connected?
Mr. Jolicoeur: Yes.
Senator Day: The U.S. is content as well to wait for the technology to catch up.
Ms. McLellan: The U.S. is connected.
Senator Day: That was my understanding. They had to walk cross the living room floor to talk to their U.S. colleagues. We were told about that in the past.
Ms. McLellan: That is not necessarily. While no one would suggest that that is ideal, if you are really doing integration, if you are building a facility that serves the purposes of both sets of agents — again, you probably want redundancy, our system up and connected there and their system up and connected, for a number of reasons, for example, Canadian officers having access to their information — in that context, it makes some sense because the working relationship is close, if the infrastructure is not there at present, they do have access to the U.S. information.
Mr. Jolicoeur: They also have access to the same information, but through the phone to other offices. Nobody is left without information.
Senator Day: You can get broadband through phone wires now.
Mr. Jolicoeur: In some places, no.
Senator Day: That is right. It is a switching circuit. Having in mind that you have that $119 million for information technology — and you talked about a number of things like developing Titan II and the IT systems you want to improve — I am assuming that some of the $119 million will go to connect the 60-some-odd offices that have not been connected. Could you give us a time frame, so we can ask you when what is happening when that time frame has passed?
Mr. Jolicoeur: Within a month, I will be able to tell you how many of the 60 we can do in the short term.
Senator Day: Can you tell us what "short term" is?
Mr. Jolicoeur: This fiscal year.
Senator Day: I take your undertaking in that regard. When you tell us that, will the impediment to not doing the others be technology or money?
Mr. Jolicoeur: I will tell you exactly what they are.
The Chairman: When Ms. Caplan had your job, she told us that building on the border was a bad thing. She said it was hugely expensive because two sets of building codes had to be met and that, therefore, the cost was significantly higher than otherwise. I take it that that problem has been solved?
Ms. McLellan: I would think you should build to the higher code, do you not?
The Chairman: I do not know. She just said she would never do it again.
Senator Nolin: They probably do not have smart regulations.
Ms. McLellan: The answer should be to build to the higher code, whichever country's code that is. Mr. Jolicoeur is probably not glad to hear me say that.
Mr. Jolicoeur: Minister Caplan was right; it is somewhat nightmarish from that perspective. They had done three at the time. We have done three others, and we believe it was worth the effort to do the additional three. Whether or not we do more will depend on our capital plan — when buildings need to be replaced and things of that nature.
Senator Munson: It is our understanding that the U.S. has a plan to VACIS or X-ray all cargo trains entering from Canada. Have they told you anything we should know in terms of suspecting Canadian rail cargo shipments?
Ms. McLellan: Do you mean in terms of high risk?
Senator Munson: Yes.
Mr. Jolicoeur: They are concerned with weapons, and right now they are "VACISing" everything in every location except two, where their VACIS machine will be on the Canadian side. One is already operating already in Sarnia. The next one will be in Windsor.
At present, there is a concern from the industry — I will not put words in their mouth, but they are looking at somewhat too many trains, not from the perspective of VACISing them but stopping them and looking into each one of them.
I have had many discussions with our colleagues in the U.S. on that question and with the industry. I believe what we are seeing now is being in a training mode from the perspective of the U.S. agent, where they have to become familiar with the technology, know what is what when they see an image, and the checking and stopping of trains will reduce over time.
Senator Munson: Are we considering a similar program?
Mr. Jolicoeur: No, we are not.
Senator Munson: I have an observation to make. This is not part of the designated questions, but, minister, you spoke about being special friends with the United States. Recently, there is the notion of passports being phased in with special friends, and that is all part of security. I would like to know your initial reaction when you heard about that, being that we are such special friends.
Ms. McLellan: I am glad you raised that issue. I want to have the opportunity to explain to people what the motivation is for what the Department of Homeland Security is doing and the fact that it again does speak to the fact that we are treated like citizens of the United States of America. I firmly believe we have no right to expect to be treated better than their own citizens. That would be a staggering suggestion.
You can understand how politically unpalatable it would be in this country if we suggested that U.S. citizens should be preferenced over Canadian citizens in ID documents, for example, that somehow they would be treated better than our own citizens. That is an argument that is a non-starter.
As you probably know, Senator Munson, there was a lot of criticism coming out of 9/11 and in the 9/11 commission and elsewhere, that many American citizens re-entering their country or entering their country — I suppose most often re-entering — had a collection of identity documents, as a great many Canadians do, a licence, a birth certificate, whatever the case may be — in terms of the realm of the possible, those are the two most obvious. There was grave concern around the security surrounding those documents — for example, the basis, the identity checks that are done to issue them in the first place, and then protections against forgeries and so on.
The recommendation was made — and Congress accepted it and the law was passed in December 2004, which is why this has all come to a head right now — that U.S. citizens would be expected to have either a passport or an acceptable identity document — acceptable to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Therefore, it may not have to be a passport. For example, it is quite clear that they will accept FAST and NEXUS. It is not clear what else they will accept — for example, our new permanent resident card that everyone who is a permanent resident has just gone through getting.
I talked to Secretary Chertoff last week, and he agrees that we need to sit down and have our officials work through what identity documents, over and above the passport, NEXUS and FAST, would be acceptable.
It is quite clear that this issue will be a big one of implementation for the United States in relation to its own citizens. It will probably be a bigger hardship for them to implement in relation to their own citizens than it will be for us to comply.
That was the motivation. It was not because they were striking out at us or anything like that. It was simply that they had a concern about their own citizens re-entering the U.S. and the ID documents that they came in with. When they changed their law to change the requirement for their own citizens, we, along with others in the western hemisphere, are part and parcel of that. You could not possibly make a claim that we would be privileged over their own citizens.
The Chairman: As a footnote to that, minister, we have heard from numerous Canadian customs officers who comment that with the scanning system, they know who owns the car but they have great difficulty knowing who is in the car, given the plethora of documentation available. This is a Canadian problem that is just as real as an American one in terms of being sure who is coming our way.
Ms. McLellan: This is part of the new reality in which we live. I have told Secretary Chertoff that our system of entry and re-entry into our respective countries has been on the basis of reciprocity.
The Chairman: We promise not to characterize it as retaliation when you bring in the regulations.
Ms. McLellan: No, no. We will look at their requirements and determine what we think is appropriate here as people come and go.
Senator Nolin: Madam Minister, you appeared in front of the House of Commons Justice Committee considering the Great Lakes security, in February. You mentioned shiprider as a U.S. proposal. Can you explain to the committee what that proposal is, exactly?
Ms. McLellan: Shiprider is an American program. They are interested in having a pilot project or projects with Canada as it relates to the Great Lakes. Clearly, on both sides of the border, there is a concern in relation to security on the Great Lakes. One can simply think of the geography and understand why.
My Ontario counterpart, Mr. Monte Kwinter, has raised this with me a number of times. I understand he is a yachtsman. He has told me of a number of possible vulnerabilities that he has identified as he sails in his yacht around the Great Lakes.
I do not mean that in any kind of frivolous way. He is quite right to point out, just as we know on our side and the Americans know on their side, that there are vulnerabilities in the Great Lakes. We must take up that challenge. Shiprider would be one approach to how we police the Great Lakes together.
We are looking at a pilot project where we would put, say, one of our RCMP officers on one of their patrol boats. They would have one of their people on one of our patrol boats in the Great Lakes. It is my understanding as well that the RCMP has received additional resources to beef up their flotilla — I am looking at my RCMP adviser back there — in concert with the Canadian Coast Guard. It was indelicate of me not to mention that partnership.
The Chairman: That is yet to join your department.
Ms. McLellan: Seriously, just as with pre-clearance, there are legal issues on both sides that must be sorted out. Let us be candid. If we have a Canadian patrol boat on the Great Lakes and you have an American police officer, there could be a situation where someone is shot by that American or vice versa. You have a Canadian RCMP officer on the American patrol boat, an incident arises and he shoots an American drug runner or whatever in self-defence. Potentially, there are questions raised about the sovereignty of each country.
We want to ensure that we are comfortable with the legal arrangements and that Canadians and Americans are informed about shiprider and the nature of the program — not operational details, but the nature of the program — so that Canadians and Americans feel comfortable that this is another aspect of sharing and integration. I suppose I should not use the word "integration," but an opportunity to work together in a way that makes sense in an area where there are quite clearly vulnerabilities that have been identified. That is the Great Lakes.
The Chairman: Separate but equal is what you were looking for.
Ms. McLellan: Yes, although that is not politically correct in any context, Mr. Chairman. I think I have described what shiprider could be.
We are looking at the prospect of pilot projects in relation to that program. It is something that is very important to my American counterparts. Both Secretary Ridge and Secretary Chertoff have raised with me their desire to be able to move forward with our involvement in shiprider.
Senator Banks: On that point exactly, you say that in this case the arming of officers on both sides could be a problem. How has that been solved with IBET? IBET has exactly that, armed Canadian and American officers on the border, and they might be 10 feet from one another.
Ms. McLellan: There is no question that there are issues around the use of force on either side of the border. In some cases, as I understand it, it is worked out by agreement. If you wanted to pursue that, the RCMP officer back there could probably come up here and provide you with more detail, or maybe he could talk to you after.
Those are legitimate issues. One does try to observe the integrity of the border to the greatest extent possible. At the end of the day, geography being what it is in places such as Cornwall and around the Great Lakes, agreements and protocols must be entered into to permit armed police officers to do their job.
The Chairman: In the interests of time, could the superintendent speak to the inspector and could we leave it like that?
Senator Munson: Our man will talk to your man.
Ms. McLellan: Whatever.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: Mr. Jolicoeur, Senator Cordy asked you a quantitative question regarding your customs officers. I have a qualitative question for you. I am aware of the sensitive nature of this question given working relationships and union relationships you have to maintain with your employees.
That being said, given the increasing number of visitors — not only Canadians coming home but also Americans entering the country, and European and Asian tourists — do you assess the quality of the work done by your customs officers? I saw you smile twice this evening and I have to say that you are one of the first customs officers I have seen smile over the last several months. You know exactly what I mean.
Mr. Jolicoeur: I understand exactly what you mean. Obviously, in a climate of collective agreements and union elections —
Senator Nolin: It is good to have a sour look on your face for the tourists, is that it?
Mr. Jolicoeur: We carry out regular employee evaluations. We also have a system to manage complaints. It is a standardized process, in government, and each year, employees are assessed on a regular basis. It also allows us to determine our training plans for the coming year. We gather the results of these discussions. It is a normal process you will find in any public organization.
Senator Nolin: Have you been spreading the word from country to country to ensure all customs officers have that same sour look on their faces?
Mr. Jolicoeur: I see what you mean by the sensitive nature of your question.
Senator Nolin: I assume people do not complain because they are afraid things may get worse. That is why I am speaking so freely about this tonight.
Mr. Jolicoeur: I travel, like many other people. I have also heard comments regarding the situation. We strongly encourage our officers to welcome visitors with a smile. We strongly insist on it.
I must say we have made progress. Ninety-seven million people enter the country each year. I doubt all of these people are going to write to me to tell me they are satisfied.
Senator Nolin: All they have to do is say the word "Welcome!" I am taking you at your word, because you will be back here in a year's time, and we still have many questions to put to you.
Mr. Jolicoeur: Very well.
[English]
Ms. McLellan: Mr. Chairman, in relation to the front-line agents, I do not think there is any question, as with some others involved with security and safety, that since September 11 their world has become a more difficult and stressful one. Before, they were dealing with — and it speaks more about us — people who might try to come into the country and return home without declaring things that they should declare. That was a normal part of agents' work. They were seized with the obligation of ensuring that persons in front of them were who they said they were, and that they were not bringing anything dangerous or harmful, or something they should declare, into the country. Since September 11, this job has become so much more important on the front lines of the collective security of the country, where I am sure agents and others every day live with the reality of, "Who is this person and am I asking the right questions? I hope this person is not someone who wants to harm innocent Canadians."
My experience with customs agents long before I got this job was that I, too often, took for granted what they did. We could say that somehow they were not friendly, or this or that, but I have actually come to appreciate that the job they do is an important one. People like us do not always treat them well. They are dealing with people who, in some cases, have set about to deceive or to dissemble, for whatever reasons. Maybe it is just bringing a new pair of shoes into the country and not wanting to declare them. By the way, I have never done that.
Senator Nolin: You are allowed to, if you want.
Ms. McLellan: No, no. I am saying that these men and women face difficult situations. They deal with thousands of people a day, depending on where they are. Sometimes they are not always as happy as you would like them to be.
Senator Nolin: Only once.
Ms. McLellan: I ask you to think about the job they do and some of the people who are not very nice to them on a daily basis, and also the pressure they are under now in the world in which we live, where at the back of their mind must be the fact that they are literally on the front lines of identifying high-risk people who would do harm to innocent Canadians.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: I appreciate the minister's response and I have not forgotten Mr. Jolicoeur's testimony. I am delighted that the big boss at customs smiled several times this evening and I will make sure to tell his staff at Dorval airport.
[English]
The Chairman: Madam Minister, on behalf of the committee, you have done really well.
Ms. McLellan: It is my pleasure to be here.
The Chairman: It is a testament not just to your dedication but your passion and stamina that you have been here so long with Mr. Jolicoeur. We know that we have really pressed our luck with the time you have given us. You have, however, provided the committee with great assistance in developing material for its forthcoming report, and we are most grateful to you for taking the time.
Ms. McLellan: It has been a pleasure.
The Chairman: On behalf of the committee, thank you so much.
Ms. McLellan: Thank you.
The Chairman: For the members of the public who have been viewing this, if you have questions or comments, visit our website by going to www.sen-sec.ca. We post witness testimony as well as confirmed hearing schedules. Otherwise, you may contact the clerk of the committee by calling 1-800-267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting members of the committee.
The committee adjourned.