Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 20 - Evidence
OTTAWA, Monday, May 2, 2005
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 8:30 a.m. to examine and report on the national security policy for Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: I call the meeting to order. My name is Colin Kenny. I chair the committee. This is a meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence.
I would like to introduce the committee members. On my immediate right is Senator Jim Munson from Ontario. He was a trusted journalist and former Director of Communications for Prime Minister Chrétien before he was called to the Senate in 2003. Senator Munson has been twice nominated for Gemini awards in recognition of excellence in journalism.
Beside him is Senator Tommy Banks from Alberta. He is Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, which recently released a report entitled The One-Tonne Challenge. He is well known to Canadians as a versatile musician and entertainer, and provided direction for the ceremonies of the 1988 Olympic Winter Games. He is an Officer of the Order of Canada and has received a Juno Award.
On my left is Senator Donald Oliver from Nova Scotia. He is a barrister and businessman, and has been a Senator since 1990. Senator Oliver is strongly committed to human rights and equity for Canadians, which is reflected both in his community service and frequent public-speaking engagements. He is currently Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, and is also a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry and the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights.
Our committee has been mandated to examine security and defence and the need for a national security policy. We have produced the following reports since 2002: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness; Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility; Update on Canada's Military Financial Crisis, A View From the Bottom Up; The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports; Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World; National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines; and most recently the Canadian Security Guide Book, 2005 edition.
We are in the midst of a detailed review of the Canadian defence policy and have been holding hearings in every province, engaging with Canadians to determine their national interest and what they see as Canada's principal threats and how they would like the government to respond to those threats. Canadians have been forthright in expressing their views on national security in Canada. We will continue working on this review throughout the summer to forge a consensus on the type of military Canadians envision in the future.
The purpose of this hearing is to prepare the committee for a trip later this week to Belgium, where we can visit the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO, in Brussels and the Supreme Allied Headquarters, SHAPE, in Mons.
We have before us today Colonel Anderson, who is Director of NATO Policy. Colonel Anderson graduated from the Royal Military College with a bachelor of engineering in 1976. In 1980 he was selected for flight test engineering training at the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School in Maryland. He worked as a Flight Test Engineer in the Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment in Cold Lake from 1981 to 1984 and was promoted to major and posted to National Defence Headquarters in 1984.
Upon graduation from Canadian Forces Command and Staff Course in Toronto, he was posted to CFB Edmonton in 1988 as Base Aircraft Maintenance and Engineering Officer. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July of 1993 and was posted to the Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Technology and Engineering at Camp Borden. He was promoted to colonel in July 2000, and was appointed Director, Aerospace Equipment Program Management. In March 2004, Colonel Anderson was appointed Director of NATO Policy at National Defence Headquarters, NDHQ. He is a graduate of Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in Toronto.
Colonel Anderson, you have the floor.
Colonel N.J. Anderson, Director of NATO Policy, National Defence: Honourable senators, thank you for this opportunity to testify before this committee on the topic of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, prior to your travels to Brussels and Afghanistan.
I am the Director of NATO Policy at the Department of National Defence. My staff of eight persons provides information and advice to operational planners. We liaise and coordinate activities with other government departments, notably Foreign Affairs Canada and the Privy Council Office. We also support senior Canadian Forces commanders, department executives and the minister as they attend NATO-related meetings, as they receive visits from counterparts, and as they develop policy. As such, although we are a point of coordination within NDHQ, within government, and with our joint mission at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, we are not automatically the subject matter experts for all subjects. Any country's interaction with the alliance spans most of its headquarters' functions. For that reason, with respect, there may be topics where I am not the ideal source of information, and I will endeavour to identify these areas during my testimony. Additionally, foreign policy questions dealing with, for example, NATO governance and NATO political transformation would be better addressed by Foreign Affairs Canada.
I would like to start my testimony with an excerpt from Canada's new defence policy statement embedded in the defence chapter of Canada's international policy statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. It reads:
NATO is an essential collective defence structure and embodies the transatlantic link that continues to be critical to the security of our country. It remains a strong political institution where allies with shared values and interests can address issues that threaten regional and international stability.
Indeed, NATO is repeatedly referenced in the overview of the new policy statement and in the ``Diplomacy'' and ``Defence'' chapters. Further acknowledgement of the value Canada ascribes to NATO, and the value NATO ascribes to its Canadian partner was the election last November of General Ray Henault as chairman of NATO's military committee. His experience as Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff during the Kosovo campaign, then as Chief of the Defence Staff during Canada's response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, was key to the foundation he set for transformation of the Canadian Forces. That he was elected by his military committee peers is testament to various aspects of credibility for him personally, for the kind and type of contributions to NATO that Canada makes and for the respect that NATO nations have for what we do in the world. For the next three years, a Canadian will be in a key NATO position, assisting it to build its own transformation efforts. This is a significant manifestation of pride and influence in the world for Canadians.
As you know, NATO's roots are in military alliance but history has taken it to new roles and regions. At its core is a substantial military competence like no other alliance, with the full political legitimacy of multilateralism. The potential use of force is groomed through standards, exercises and doctrine to permit allies to enter seamlessly into high-intensity conflict. As a result, NATO units communicate with each other, recognize each other and follow established and complex command and control arrangements. Even the non-NATO coalitions operating today often owe their interoperability to NATO. This interoperability clearly serves our security interests.
Despite the voices that proclaimed NATO redundant after 1991, NATO members continue to invest significant military and political capital in the alliance, signifying its enduring value to the member states. However, they have demanded that NATO adapt to the new international security environment, mainly in three areas — politics, operations and transformation.
You can imagine the complexity of mounting NATO missions with contributions from many nations in which certain resources and personnel are required. Standard operating procedures must be common and forces must be highly interoperable. It is routine to have missions in which some countries provide land forces, others provide logistical and communications support and yet others provide the command and control element.
As an example of efficiency in leadership, you will soon observe how Canada is providing the camp infrastructure at Camp Julian in Kabul for several of our NATO allies. It is the strength of NATO to comprehensively prepare its security missions in little time that has made it the security organization of first resort. I thank you again senators for the opportunity to appear and hope it assists you in your study of NATO.
Senator Munson: Good morning, colonel. When I was a reporter, I used to go to NATO a lot in the 1980s. There were so many labyrinths, hallways and meetings, I walked in with great ideas of learning something and came out trying to understand the complex nature of NATO. It was always an interesting experience to go there. Thank you for your report.
What is Canada's current commitment to the NATO response?
Col. Anderson: The NATO response force is a cornerstone for NATO, as you found out when you travelled to Allied Command Transformation. It is a cornerstone because of the interoperability aspects and the technical aspects. When it is fully operational in October 2006, it will have approximately 25,000 soldiers, sailors and air personnel, and they will be able to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice and stay operational for one month without resupply.
Canada will contribute to the NATO Response Force, NRF, when possible. We have a world-class chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear, CBRN, training facility at Suffield, Alberta, which is on offer to NATO, as the capability is developed for NATO.
For the maritime forces, Canada intends to have HMCS Halifax work with the standing NRF maritime group in the last six months of this year. It will be followed by a destroyer and the majority of the fleet command staff for all of calendar year 2006.
Canadian contributions to the land and air components are still under consideration.
Senator Munson: In the future, beyond what you just talked about, is there another role that we should be contemplating?
Col. Anderson: There are routine force generation conferences within NATO. They try to set places, in some cases short-term requirements and in other cases long-term requirements. Canadian planning is typically on a 24-month window. For the 24 months from now or from this summer, that is about the extent of Canadian NRF participation.
Senator Munson: What is the impact on NATO of the European Union's desire to field military forces? How does NATO intend to ensure that EU military capabilities are complementary and not in competition with NATO military forces?
Col. Anderson: We have staff talks with our allies frequently, for example, with our counterparts in the Austrian and French forces. We are always driving home the message of complementarity. We also try to remind them that Canada is a very important part of the transatlantic link because often, from the European perspective, it is focused on the United States, not the United States and Canada.
The EU says that they have other capabilities to bear: for example, humanitarian or police capabilities that are unique and that give them special purpose or special roles as they develop their own strategic footprint in the world.
NATO will need to develop some of these capabilities as well. For example, in Afghanistan, as we set up provincial reconstruction teams, there will be developmental, economic and governance aspects to NATO's participation as well.
Senator Munson: The committee was in Norfolk discussing some of the issues. Since we are going to NATO, can you bring us up to speed on the growing pains of the two new entities.
Col. Anderson: Is that NATO and EU, senator?
Senator Munson: Yes, Colonel.
Col. Anderson: The initial intent for the EU was what they term the Petersburg tasks. The Petersburg tasks were primarily humanitarian and peacekeeping, but it also mentions conflict as well — the right-hand side of the spectrum of conflict.
More recently, the EU has broadcast what they call headline goals with standing battle groups. That could be interpreted as competing.
For example, the shift from more military roles to police roles in the area of humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks is exactly what has happened in Bosnia. NATO at Istanbul declared our NATO stabilization force in Bosnia to be successful and handed the role off to the European Union because of the shifting role.
Canada is still participating in that European operation called UFOR. We are doing that to establish protocols for future Canadian operations with the European Union if it is required.
We are very hopeful there will not be contention or rivalry between NATO and the EU. They are allies. We have common security threats. We only have so many resources, so there is a hard requirement for efficiency.
Senator Munson: Although we have many scripted questions for you this morning, I will ask you about our new man in NATO.
Col. Anderson: General Henault.
Senator Munson: As a reporter, I met him often and asked him many questions. How does his personality fit his new role? I ask that because the Canadian military has been accused, at times, of not pulling its weight. Yet, you and others give us the impression that the military does pull its weight in terms of finances, personnel and so on. Does his personality carry much weight? How does that affect the operations of NATO?
Col. Anderson: I am sure you are aware that the military committee is comprised of the military chiefs of defence of the 26 member nations. Three times per year they meet to discuss topics of interest to NATO. General Henault, as he has done in Canada, will be able to keep the military committee focused. As one of the absolute top officers in NATO, he will be a key adviser to the Secretary General of NATO, which means that we will have a Canadian at the uppermost strategic level.
I would need to defer to General Henault as to his specific strategy but I know that he must have some impartiality as a NATO chairman, as opposed to being the ex-Canadian Chief of Defence Staff. It will be up to him to balance that, of course.
Senator Munson: Has the recent NATO command restructure resulted in the desired efficiency? Are the allied command operations better able to conduct operations in the new format?
Col. Anderson: Senator, I am not in a good position to report on that in part because I am not that close to the actual metrics and in part because it is still early in the transformation. As you know, the allied command operations have moved to three operational level commands. Single operational command is very important for military operations, rather then the way it was before with an Atlantic operational command and a European operational command.
There have been significant reductions. We have gone from those two operational commands to one; from five operational regional commands to two joint force command headquarters and one joint headquarters; from 13 subordinate commands to six component commands; and from ten combined air operation centres, CAOCs, to six, with two of those six being deployable.
Theoretically, there has been a great deal of streamlining to create more efficiencies. As I said, I am not close enough to report on their ability to conduct operations, although I have not noticed any difficulties.
The Chairman: Colonel Anderson, you implied that General Henault, as chair of the committee, would have an influential role. My experience as chair of a committee is such that I am the servant of the committee and I speak only when the committee empowers me. The reality is that chairs of committees cannot go beyond where the committee wants to go. Is that not true?
Col. Anderson: My experience at the ministerial meetings that occur three times per year for NATO, when all the defence ministers are in place, is that the chairman of the military committee is a key adviser to the secretary general. He reports at the outset of the meeting and is consulted during the meeting. I would say that it is quite a formal staffing process of recommendations from the operational headquarters up to the military committee to the North Atlantic committee. I would say that the military committee of NATO has a highly influential role.
The Chairman: I understand that but he would speak on behalf of the committee and the consensus of the committee.
Col. Anderson: Yes, that is right.
Senator Oliver: Colonel Anderson, the role of Canada and NATO has been hotly debated in the Parliament of Canada for decades, particularly in the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. Could you tell us what value Canada receives from remaining in NATO? What are some of the positive things that Canada can gain from that? Could you also give us an overview as to how many people the Department of National Defence has serving in NATO now?
Col. Anderson: For the value of NATO, I would say that Canada has a seat and therefore a voice in the world's premier security alliance, which is highly capable militarily. It is also multilateral. NATO's focus is defence of security, so Canada receives that blanket of insurance from a very strong alliance.
Professionally for military people and for the interoperability aspects, the command opportunities in large formations are very important. Our current chief of the defence staff was the commander of the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, in Afghanistan for six months. Lieutenant-General J.O. Michel Maisonneuve is Chief of Staff at Supreme Allied Commander Transformation. We have the opportunity to place senior Canadian officers in large organizations, certainly larger than we would have in Canada, operationally. The officers bring new knowledge from those experiences back to the Canadian Forces.
As a member nation of NATO, we are able to leverage information and technology. As part of an alliance of nations, we gain the benefits or efficiencies of cooperation and have access to logistics and intelligence that have a much broader and more comprehensive capability.
Senator Oliver: You used the word ``interoperability'' to describe some of the advantages. Can you explain what that means in the context of what Canada is getting from NATO?
Col. Anderson: In general terms, it is the ability to work in a combined format with other nations, to have common technology for communications and to have common planning processes — the steps of the planning process from identification of the problem to the various options. It is a science and a lengthy doctrine to conduct military operations, and NATO has the book on that. All contributing members of NATO are experienced in conducting operations and all of them follow the same procedures. Exercises and actual operations are complex undertakings, and having a framework of doctrine and technology makes it that much easier to conduct.
Senator Oliver: How, on the ground, would that interoperability be effective today in provinces such as British Columbia and Nova Scotia — two coastal provinces? In what way would we see that in effect?
Col. Anderson: Are you referring to domestic operations?
Senator Oliver: Yes, and I refer to international operations as well in terms of the transfer of technology.
Col. Anderson: For sharing intelligence and for access to information, as well as network-enabled operations and information, common formats make it that much easier. That applies to broadcasting and transmitting information as well. For example, information on ships and airplanes approaching Canada can be transmitted quickly from one coast to the other.
The Chairman: Colonel, could you describe in more detail how NATO assists in developing interoperability? You mentioned a communications doctrine in another area. What is the process? You have a number of countries that have their own methods of operating. How is a standard determined? Is it the American standard to which other countries need to adapt?
Col. Anderson: You were probably briefed at Allied Command Transformation, senator. ACT is largely responsible for interoperability. They are responsible for schools, such as the Joint Warfare Centre at Stavanger, Norway, where they conduct courses on the conduct of operations in a joint format. All member countries send their students to these NATO schools. There is another one at Oberammergau, Germany. The substance of these courses is the conduct of operations. NATO doctrine and standards are used, of which the Americans are the backbone.
I cannot speak further to that senator. I am not that familiar with it.
The Chairman: We are all aware that the Americans spend more on defence than the rest of the NATO countries combined. A good example is the calibre of a rifle. It used to be .30 caliber but, when it became NATO, it became 7.62 mm, which works out to .30 calibre.
Is NATO really a device for other countries to accommodate the extraordinary military capabilities of the United States and to try to stay abreast, where they can, of the Americans' capabilities? If that is not the case, describe to us the process to develop a common doctrine where each member has an equal voice.
Col. Anderson: I think it is the former, senator. With the Americans being a superpower with their equipment and influence, it would not be equal voices all around. If the Americans have already done it, why reinvent it? Why build again? Why be redundant. Often the Americans are bigger in quantities.
The Chairman: With regard to the evolution of NATO doctrine, is it really a question of adapting ways for other members of NATO to adjust their doctrine to fit with that of the Americans?
Col. Anderson: Again, senator, I am not that familiar with this. There are American staffs and American military officers playing key roles in the NATO headquarters, representing their contribution to NATO as well. However, there is not necessarily a separate book from the Americans that has just been relabelled. The procedures and documentation we have is owned and developed by NATO. It could be similar to corresponding books in the American forces, but, to my knowledge, it is not simply relabelled.
The Chairman: Can you think of a time when the commander of SHAPE has not been an American?
Col. Anderson: No, I cannot, senator.
The Chairman: Does that not speak volumes?
Col. Anderson: The U.S. is a superpower. Perhaps you can ask our representatives in NATO about the influence of that. I understand that it is because U.S. is the biggest contributor to the forces in NATO that their representatives have key positions there.
The Chairman: On a more technical level, how does one achieve interoperability in terms of communications? Can you describe the process that NATO goes through to facilitate that?
Col. Anderson: I cannot. I am not that close to the technological problem. In overview, as I have described, it is achieved through the management of the frequencies, the types of radios and different types of modulation or radio signals themselves.
The Chairman: Is there a committee that addresses this?
Col. Anderson: Throughout NATO, there are specialist committees. I will have to get back to you on the exact communications committee that would handle that.
The Chairman: Are you in a position to speak to the NATO committee on the Partners for Peace program?
Col. Anderson: Partners for Peace is typical of other NATO initiatives. NATO is reaching out and encouraging military and political cooperation with other countries. The Partners for Peace program was one of the key programs for NATO expansion. The fact that NATO has come to 26 countries now is a result of the Partners for Peace program. There are still some countries that are less developed in the PFP program, or perhaps that do not have NATO aspirations, such as Austria, that are happy to be part of the PFP. The PFP countries that participate in operations, such as the Balkans, use NATO procedures. Austrians working in the Balkans in Kosovo have the benefit of interoperability.
Canada has played a role in the PFP program with our Military Training Assistance Program, MTAP. That consists of staff training at our staff colleges and peace support training. As well, language training is a key part of it. As the PFP program and some NATO aspirants were developing and working toward succession, many officers came to Canada for language training. Many of them still refer back to their exposure to Canadian values and the goodwill of Canadians during their language training here.
The Chairman: Members of this committee think of the Partners for Peace program more in a civilian context. We think of the requirements to have a free press, to be able to change government democratically at least once, to resolve border disputes, to remove problems that relate to ethnic groups within the country and, finally, to move closer to a free-market economy.
Can you describe how NATO monitors these processes and fosters them?
Col. Anderson: I am sorry, senator, but I am not close to those political aspects of the PFP program. I would defer to the Department of Foreign Affairs on that.
The Chairman: Can you describe, from a military perspective, the major issues facing NATO right now? Many members of this committee believe that NATO was the best investment we could ever make in terms of peace for Europe. It is an insurance policy that has brought us 60 years of peace, but it was designed to deal with the Warsaw Pact, and the Warsaw Pact is gone.
What are the major challenges for NATO now that its raison d'être no longer exists?
Col. Anderson: The conduct of operations, specifically force generation and nations providing the necessary resources and sustainment of those forces is a major issue facing NATO.
The member countries all seem to be short of specific capabilities. These capabilities could be signals, communications, medical support, or logistical support. For example, as NATO expands force generation in Afghanistan, there have been shortages and it has taken time to get the resources necessary for Afghanistan. I would say operations or the force generation process is a challenge.
Afghanistan itself, the convergence of the ISAF mission with the coalition mission, Operation Enduring Freedom, will be a challenge. It is an objective of the coalition and ISAF to eventually end up as a single mission under a single operational command. The convergence of getting political concurrence on some of the missions and the stability aspects will be a challenge for the alliance.
Is the European Union a rivalry or complementary? I think that is something for Canadians to watch and monitor and be concerned about, that it is not a rivalry and actions are complementary.
Senator Munson: Who is the enemy in Europe? Who are we facing? We agree with your analysis about Afghanistan, but who are we fighting? What are we watching out for?
The Chairman: We see the purpose of NATO as a collective defence that stretches from the eastern tip of Turkey to Vancouver Island, or perhaps the western tip of Alaska, where each country has promised to defend each other if attacked. Who are we defending against?
Col. Anderson: NATO's Strategic Concept was rewritten and devised in 1999, and it is still held up as being applicable and pertinent. One chapter of the Strategic Concept says:
The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi- directional risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts.
That is one reference there that says we have shifted and the threat has shifted from the Cold War superpower attack against another to indirect instability.
Another article of that Strategic Concept would be
Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for the security and stability affecting the Alliance.
The Chairman: Does the Department of National Defence play any role in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative?
Col. Anderson: I would say not, senator. We have access to the results of the meetings they have, but DND itself does not play an active part in those committees.
The Chairman: What about in the NATO-Russia Council?
Col. Anderson: There are routine meetings when the chiefs of defence get together at the NATO meetings. One of the submeetings is with the Russian counterparts. We have participation that way. As far as Canada's particular involvement or leadership, we are part of the committee itself, part of the broader NATO membership.
The Chairman: How about in the NATO-Ukraine Commission?
Col. Anderson: Same thing, senator.
The Chairman: What about the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative?
Col. Anderson: I am not familiar with that, senator. I am sorry.
Senator Atkins: Is NATO becoming a big elephant?
Col. Anderson: I strongly do not believe so, senator. My introductory comments did speak to that a bit with references to Canada's defence policy and the statements in Canada's defence policy on NATO's importance. It is very important as a military alliance for defence of the country, for threats to the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, including North America and Canada, and also the transatlantic link and keeping Europe and North America together.
Senator Atkins: We were down in Norfolk, and when we had lunch with the flag officers I had a sense that even with that group it was hard to come to a consensus on different issues. With so many people coming to the table, will this make it very difficult for NATO to operate as it was accustomed to in previous times?
Col. Anderson: With 26 voices at the table there is more risk of differing views. I would say it is healthy. I would say there is a process for resolving that. Eventually, it comes out in an arrived political solution between sovereign states participating in an alliance.
Senator Atkins: The influence of the Americans will ultimately carry a lot of weight in what happens.
Col. Anderson: There is no doubt they are influential, senator. The consensus basis of the North Atlantic Council itself and the decisions made also ensure the multilateralism that Canada values very greatly as well.
Senator Atkins: Is Canada currently involved in any way in negotiations concerning an Allied approach to strategic airlift?
Col. Anderson: There are two initiatives for strategic airlift, senator. There is sealift and there is airlift. There are two initiatives for strategic lift. The initiatives themselves are largely focused on the NATO Response Force and future deployability of the NRF itself. The strategic lift is a pooled approach with several countries participating. They hope to get a transport ship on retainer with assured access. A Canadian actually chairs that committee, and it has not been used yet by Canadians. I think this is the second year of trial for it. Our Canadians are watching that. We are engaged and intend to use that in a residual capacity, when it is not needed for the NRF.
The second thing is airlift. There is a project called the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution, SALIS. NATO is trying to tender a contract for that, but as you know, the supply of strategic airplanes is very short. For example, the An-124, is a small pool of available airplanes, in the order of 20 airplanes. For the countries that control them, it is supply and demand, and again, the supply is very short. At times, it is difficult to negotiate that assured airlift with an effective cost as well. That is being worked on right now in NATO.
Senator Atkins: With the introduction of the new airplane that the consortium tested last week, it will be interesting if any military interests —
Col. Anderson: It is interesting, but I have not seen any military or transport applications of the double-decker passenger jet.
Senator Atkins: The size of the Airbus A-380 is incredible.
Col. Anderson: The European Union is making a lot of its plans on the Airbus A400, which is a turbo prop airplane larger than our Hercules.
Senator Atkins: Has the recent NATO command restructuring resulted in a desired efficiency?
Col. Anderson: Again, senator, either I am not that close to it, or it is hard to measure, because it is still in the early days of the reform command structure. There have been reductions. A common criticism of NATO before was the number of headquarters they had, the number of fixed static installations. Theoretically there has been a big improvement on that.
Senator Atkins: The fact that there is NATO in Brussels and Norfolk, do you see any problems in terms of coordination of command operations?
Col. Anderson: I have not witnessed it in the documents that I have seen or the meetings I have attended. The delineation of the different responsibilities, for example, it is clear that allied command operations in SHAPE Headquarters are responsible for operations anywhere. It would be unlikely that there would be contention between Norfolk and Mons about who is responsible for this operation or with Allied Command Operations.
Senator Atkins: What impact does the new defence policy have on Canada's role in NATO?
Col. Anderson: NATO is mentioned several times in Canada's defence policy. Also, an aspect of Canada and NATO is transformation. Is the transformation that Canada is undergoing in step with what NATO is doing? I would say it is. It is very comparable. We have similar threats and similar strategies. The key words for the Canadian policy are relevant, responsive and effective. These are common themes also with the NATO desires for improved capabilities and response. Examples in both sets of documents are the full spectrum of conflict, what they call the three-block war. Also, I would say the emphasis on joint operations of the army, navy and air force, and the emphasis on deployability are absolutely in step. We are looking forward to transformation on both sides.
Senator Atkins: How long will the training take to adopt the three-block concept?
Col. Anderson: I do not know that we are short of meeting that now. The training will be a refinement. The Canadian Forces have always had combat capability as a role to be preserved. The actual implementation of the defence policy is being worked on now. I am not in a position to give timings or speculate on the way it will unfold.
Senator Atkins: It is really a new approach?
Col. Anderson: The structure and the idea of consecutive operations, stability, peacekeeping and conflict in the same close geographical region are new ideas. That is where the focus will be, and it is new.
Senator Atkins: It is really to address the terrorist threat, where you cannot really identify the enemy?
Col. Anderson: Yes, an example is Afghanistan, where we have insurgency. We have political instability because of the war lords. We also have a humanitarian crisis as well, with very poor economies. That is correct, senator. We have all those aspects to worry about.
Senator Munson: To follow up, Senator Atkins and you talked about the impact of the new defence policy vis-à-vis NATO. Have you had any feedback from NATO on our new defence policy?
Col. Anderson: No, I have not seen any. It is still so fresh. It would be interesting. Could I suggest that perhaps when you visit Brussels you could ask our representatives in Brussels. I know our permanent representative, Ambassador Jean-Pierre Juneau, mentioned the new defence policy in some of the meetings he has been to. He might be in a better position to give you NATO's reaction. From the capital here, it is still in the early days. It is certainly encouraged and a common theme.
The Chairman: What is the process of peer review of defence policies?
Col. Anderson: I am sorry senator, peer review?
The Chairman: Yes, is there a formal process in NATO to review new defence policy statements as they are put forward by different countries?
Col. Anderson: I do not believe there is an actual review and concurrence as such. NATO is certainly interested in exposure to defence policies in tabulating capacities, the contributions of member states to the alliance and changes to that. It is more of an annual process called the Defence Planning Questionnaire, DPQ. It is an annual input signed by the Minister of National Defence around August. Throughout the year, it is a series of meetings and reports. We have representatives go to that from the capital. Quite often, it is the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, VCDS, that represents Canada at those, and it is an ongoing process.
Senator Munson: I am curious about the NATO Response Force. I do not know if you got to that in your opening statement. On October 2004, there were 17,000 troops and then in 2006, a force of 25,000 soldiers. We hear a lot about rapid response forces in Canada these days. In fact, there was a headline today about helping out our undercover folks. Do we have soldiers in this rapid response force? If we do not, should we have soldiers in this rapid response force?
Col. Anderson: We do not have soldiers in the response force at this time. As I mentioned, it has been primarily a navy contribution. Typically, the NATO Response Force requests large formations. That debate within NATO has been resolved such that the land component would be a brigade-sized force of 4,000 to 5,000 people. Countries could participate through that land component with, for example, battle-group-sized forces of 1,000 or 1,200 soldiers. With Canada's current contributions and the operational pause, Canada has not been in a position to offer forces for the NRF. This is reviewed frequently and has not been ruled out for a future contribution of a land component, probably with one of our closer allies such as the British or the Americans.
Senator Munson: I would like to know your point of view on the idea that Canada seems to be such an invisible force. When I was reporting a few years back, there were Canadians in Lahr, Germany. Canada had a physical presence with military personnel on the ground, unlike today. Any criticism of Canada then was not warranted because we had that physical presence. General Henault is NATO's chief military adviser and Canada is part of the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control System and yet we seem to be on the periphery. We do not seem to carry a presence in Europe. I would like your reaction to that.
Col. Anderson: Thank you, senator. That reminds me, I did not answer all of Senator Oliver's question. We have 335 Canadians in NATO positions spread out between the Allied Command Operations, ACOs.
Canada has approximately 121 personnel associated with NATO's Airborne Warning and Control System, AWACS. At SHAPE headquarters, we have 44. At the various headquarters of Allied Command Operations, ACO, we have 87. At Allied Commander Transformation, ACT, we have 35. There are 335 Canadians in NATO positions. That number is capped by the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, VCDS, and managed by a senior review board twice per year. As well, the priorities are controlled with policy input by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, DCDS. The vice chief is primarily occupied with resources, roles and capabilities; and the deputy chief of the defence staff is primarily occupied with operations, including the employment of Canadians abroad.
As well, we have 120 Canadians in national positions. That is not against NATO-established positions. For example, we have the support unit in Galenkirchen in the Balkans a CMC. Canada's financial contributions, in addition to the personnel placed in NATO establishments, are in the order of Can. $165 million for next year.
Senator Munson: In your statement you said that Canada will contribute to the NATO Response Force when possible. What does that mean?
Col. Anderson: The emphasis would be on the land forces, when we have soldiers in the NRF, and when we have air forces in the NRF. We need to balance competing requirements within NATO. There is no intention to contribute to the NRF for the next 24 months. After that, some of the considerations will be Canada's other activities in NATO, whether there are competing obligations in NATO, Canada's global activities and whether we have the personnel to offer.
Senator Munson: Do we have the forces to offer or do we have to wait for the 5,000 new personnel, as outlined in the budget?
Col. Anderson: The timing of the capability of the additional 3,000 to 5,000 is not my responsibility, but I do not believe it will be in the next 24 months. Likely it will be outside that time period.
Senator Oliver: My question follows on questions asked by Senator Atkins in respect of the defence policy statement. In your opening remarks you quoted from the defence policy statement and gave a description of part of the relationship between Canada and NATO. You spoke to institutions where allies with shared values and interests can address issues that threaten regional and international stability. After 9/11, I think you would agree, there has been a great proliferation of new laws, strategies and initiatives to try to combat terrorism and to ensure that security is in place. What initiatives has NATO taken following 9/11 to add to the support for Canada and its allies in NATO to help fight terrorism in the threatened regional and international stability?
Col. Anderson: The two most evident aspects of that, senator, are the operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. The Balkans are often referred to as Europe's back door, where there are criminal aspects, such as trafficking in human beings, and governance issues, which create instability — crime and drugs threaten stability. It is significant that NATO went outside its sovereignty to the Balkans to establish a stable environment.
The situation is similar for Afghanistan, where the 9/11 attacks were planned and organized. NATO has gone there out of theatre to force stability and to assist the Government of Afghanistan as it re-establishes itself in a better manner. That is a direct, overt reaction to the new stability environment.
Senator Oliver: Has there been strengthened support for North America?
Col. Anderson: I cannot think of specific examples of NATO's strengthening support for North America primarily because Americans and Canadians are working together on that.
The Chairman: After 9/11, did NATO not send its AWACS capability over?
Col. Anderson: Yes, NATO deployed the AWACS immediately.
Senator Atkins: I have a general question. Why are these member states so determined to become members of NATO? Some of them do not have much to contribute and, yet, NATO seems to put a priority on their membership.
Col. Anderson: There are one or two things that come to mind, senator. One is the idea of democracy and democratic leadership of the military. Perhaps some of those aspirants to NATO have not experienced that before and want to because it is critical to their development.
The motivation of some countries was to shed the threat from the Soviet Union. Countries in the Baltics may even consider it an occupation by the Soviet Union. They were very anxious to join NATO for that freedom and insurance against recurrence.
Senator Atkins: You described the United States as a superpower. Does the original membership of that alliance feel threatened by virtue of their involvement in NATO, by the fact that these countries are so economically and militarily powerful?
Col. Anderson: I do not think they feel threatened. I think they are anxious to gain access to NATO for security reasons and, through interaction and communications, for any side benefits that come with that, such as economic benefits.
The Chairman: Colonel, on behalf of the committee I would like to thank you very much for your contribution. This has been of great assistance to us in preparing for our visit to both Brussels and Afghanistan.
Our next witness this morning is Colonel Guy Laroche. Col. Laroche enrolled in the Canadian Forces in 1979 and began his career as an infantry officer with the Royal 22nd Regiment. He served twice under the auspices of the United Nations in Cyprus and also served on two occasions in Bosnia-Herzegovina as chief of staff of the 5th Canadian Multinational Brigade and as Battle Group Commander. He took part in the 1990 Native American crisis in Kahnawake as commander and at the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in April, 2001 as Land component commander. He was promoted to colonel in July 2004 and assumed duties of J3 International.
Col. Laroche is a graduate of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College in Kingston, the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in Toronto and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington.
Colonel, welcome to the committee. We are pleased to have you before us.
[Translation]
Colonel J.R.M.G. Laroche, J3 International, National Defence: Thank you for your invitation to appear before the committee today to discuss operations in Afghanistan prior to your upcoming visit. I will begin with a brief presentation, and then I will be available to answer your questions.
[English]
I will start with an overview of our different operations in Afghanistan. Canada's participation in Afghanistan started in 2001 with the provision of a light infantry battalion fighting with the U.S. in Kandahar under Operation Apollo. Since then, our contribution has involved an even more significant role with the UN with a battle group and a leadership role in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, in Kabul under Operation Athena.
Starting from its base in Kabul, ISAF has gradually expanding into regions where Afghanistan is ready for re- development, starting with the north and now to the west and soon to the south.
Op Athena has remained our umbrella structure for all operations in the region. It includes our activities at Camp Mirage in the Gulf region, from which we transition into the area of operations. It also supports a separate operation, Operation Accius, in which the CF provides a military adviser directly to the UN's special representative to the Secretary-General.
Under Op Athena, we also maintain liaison with the US-led combined forces command to promote cooperation in intelligence and other activities, such as reform and rebuilding of security institutions. The Afghan National Army is one example.
At the end of last year, we established a new operation, Operation Archer, which better defines our work with the U.S.-led combined forces command, especially with the training of the Afghan National Army.
Looking at our primary effort, participation in ISAF, some background on the mandate and objectives may be useful.
ISAF is a UN operation, mandated to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in maintaining security within the force's assigned area of operations under successive UN Security Council Resolutions, since December 2001. The United Kingdom was the first country to serve as lead nation, as ISAF-1, in Kabul until June 2002. They were followed in turn by other nations.
NATO took over command and coordination of ISAF in August 2003. This was the first mission outside the Euro- Atlantic area in NATO's history. Initially restricted to providing security in and around Kabul, the alliance is now in the process of expanding to develop national presence and capability in other parts of the country.
[Translation]
The ISAF mission involves maintaining security in Kabul and the surrounding areas so that the government of Afghanistan and UN agencies can operate. ISAF supports the transitional government by extending its authority to the rest of the country, creating a favourable security environment for the holding of free and fair elections, enforcing the law and reconstructing the country.
ISAF currently has around 8,000 troops from over 36 nations. ISAF headquarters is located in the centre of Kabul. Reporting to ISAF is the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB) headquarters at Camp Warehouse, located 15 kilometres east of Kabul. KMNB covers the tactical side of the mission and commands three battalion groups: one Norwegian and two others under French and German leadership. KMNB also includes troops from other nations. In addition, ISAF has taken control of the Kabul airport until such time as the Afghan government is able to take over its control.
[English]
ISAF expansion was agreed in principle in November 2003. The plan for ISAF expansion comprises four stages. Stage one, in the north, is now fully subscribed. Stage two, in western Afghanistan, is being carried out mainly by U.S., Italian and Spanish forces. Stage three, which is anticipated to begin in spring/summer 2006, will cover the six southern provinces. Stage four, in the east, will be established afterwards, under U.S. leadership.
The expansion is primarily in the form of provincial reconstruction teams, PRTs, delivered into the different regions with appropriate logistics support and security to allow them to assist the development of Afghanistan's civil and government capabilities and their projection across the country.
Canada, with our allies, continues to make a major contribution to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. At its largest, this was a commitment of about 2,100 personnel with leadership of ISAF, a full battle group and the largest NATO camp in Kabul. Last year, on completion of our period in command of ISAF, and in support of our need to reconstitute our land forces in general, we did a drawdown of our forces in Op Athena to its current strength. Operation Athena currently has a total of about 900 people in theatre, including the strategic bridge at Camp Mirage in Southwest Asia. Of the 900 troops deployed on Operation Athena, about 700 are deployed in Kabul and the rest are deployed elsewhere in Southwest Asia in support of the mission.
In particular, the following forces are deployed within this region — I will not go into all the details. Suffice to say, we have an armoured surveillance squadron group, an engineer squadron, a health support services unit, an intelligence support cell, an infantry company for force protection at Camp Julien, a tactical airlift element, another infantry element in Camp Mirage for force protection, a national command element, and a national support element.
I will go directly to the future of Op Athena. The fourth deployment of CF troops to Op Athena is currently in theatre and due to rotate in August. That rotation will form the basis of our next transformation as we move from security operations in Kabul in support of the Afghan elections, to reconstruction efforts possibly in Kandahar. It is intended this summer that a Canadian interdepartmental provincial reconstruction team will be deployed. This PRT will be a 3-D endeavour which will involve personnel from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian International Development Agency and the Department of National Defence.
[Translation]
Now let us talk about the future. Insurgencies in the south and southeast, the growth of the drug trade, the very limited capacity of government institutions and the pressing development needs require a substantial and sustained international commitment, including a military presence. We expect the ISAF area of operations to gradually expand and replace US efforts in every region. In short, life has not yet returned to normal and there is still a lot to be done. However, we can now say that the future is bright and Afghanistan is on the right track.
Thanks again for the opportunity to talk to you about CF operations in Afghanistan. I hope the overview I gave you was helpful. I would now be pleased to answer your questions.
The Chairman: Thank you, Colonel.
[English]
Senator Munson: Can you give us a picture of Afghanistan today: the mood, how our military feels, and the mood on the ground with the people? Is it as tense as it was a year ago; that sort of thing?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: It all depends on the region. In Kabul, for example, I believe the situation is better than it was a few years ago. The progress has been remarkable. We have done a lot of work in cooperation with other international agencies and our allies to improve the situation.
In some regions where government influence is beginning to be felt, I would say that the situation remains critical in some respects. The economy is feeble. There is a serious shortage of work, for example, for farmers. There is very little industry. So there is still a lot to be done. It is not just a military mission, it is an economic and diplomatic mission too.
Our troops understand the importance of this mission. They are very dedicated to their tasks. I recently went to Afghanistan to meet with our troops and I must say that they are performing very professionally. These men and women are proud of what they are doing for Canada and for the international community.
[English]
Senator Munson: In your opening remarks you talk about the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority. There is a government now.
Col. Laroche: Yes, sir.
Senator Munson: Is it no longer transitional?
Col. Laroche: It is still transitional because the elections have not been completed. They still have an election coming up September 18 unless it is pushed back. That is the next election and in that sense still transitional because all the levels have not been elected at this stage.
Senator Munson: When I was there with the former Prime Minister it was pretty tense, even around the airport, when we arrived and left. A few senators will defy everything and be there from May 15 to May 18. I would like to get from you what is the biggest operational issue facing our forces in Afghanistan. Is it the airport? Is it going out into the mountains surrounding Kabul and on the streets of Kabul?
Col. Laroche: It is outside Kabul. There are civilian police and many security agencies presently working in Kabul. The difficulty is in reaching the population outside of Kabul, and that is what ISAF is focussing on. ISAF is trying to expand its area of operation, as I mentioned before. Stage one is completed and stage two is about to be completed, which is in the western part of Afghanistan. The next steps will be in the south and then in the north.
Senator Munson: You spoke of the other forces that are there. Is there a Canadian approach to keeping the peace on the streets of Kabul such as we have used in our peacemaking approach in other parts of the world?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: You know that the Canadian approach has always been different, and I think that with all of the missions we have done and experience we have gained on various peacekeeping missions, the work our people do on the ground is different in terms of approach, if you compare it, for example, to our American colleagues. We are closer to the people. We try to get closer to the people. That is ultimately what makes the difference, because it is their country. We have an approach that is perhaps friendlier than some other nations.
[English]
Senator Munson: On a practical question, how effective are the G-Wagons that replaced the Iltis vehicles? Much was made in this country of the fact that we were not protected well enough with them.
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: The comments from soldiers using the GWagons on the ground are very positive. Our soldiers greatly appreciate this new vehicle. It is a vehicle that is far superior to the Iltis and is incomparable as a patrol vehicle, for working on terrain that is at times difficult. As mentioned, the comments are very positive across the board when it comes to the GWagons. It is definitely a great addition to our land vehicle fleet.
[English]
Senator Munson: Are you satisfied that we have the tools to do the job? In my previous life, and with this committee sometimes, I heard the line from people like you and then went behind a tent and heard another line from the people on the ground. Somewhere between the two is probably the truth, or balance.
You can tell us now because a number of senators will be there and will see for themselves what is there. Are you satisfied that we have the equipment, tools, management teams and personnel to do our share in Afghanistan?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: Had you asked me that question five to eight years ago, I would have said no, we do not have the necessary equipment. Today, I have to say that yes, we do have the necessary equipment. The vehicles we have, for example, the Coyotes that are part of the surveillance squad, are unique vehicles, top-notch, high performance, very well equipped vehicles. In terms of land vehicles, there is no comparison. The other nations do not have vehicles of this kind. In that respect, I must say that we are spoiled. We have had a lot of improvements in the past few years. It is very positive in terms of the repercussions on the ground, and again, our troops are quite satisfied, I think, with the equipment they are provided today. You will have a chance to ask them that question directly, but within the military and when I ask the troops that question when I am visiting them, I have to admit that the comments are very positive, on the whole.
[English]
Senator Mercer: Colonel, thank you for being here and thank you for the work you do on behalf of all Canadians. We do appreciate it.
You have talked about the expansion of the provincial reconstruction teams and delivery into different regions with appropriate logistical support and security to assist the development of Afghan civil and government capabilities and protect them across the country. You also told us that there is supposed to be an election on September 18. Are they ready? Can they pull this off? Do they have the necessary support?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: As far as the elections are concerned, and whether they are ready for the elections in September, I saw a report this morning and there were some very positive signs this week. Among other things, a law was passed so that elections will take place on September 18, as scheduled. That said, there is still a lot to be done. One of the major difficulties the Afghan government will have to deal with is the lack of money. There is a significant shortage of money for holding elections. Apparently, there is currently a shortage of about 100 million for holding these elections. Where is that 100 million going to come from? That remains unknown. However, the plan is to actually hold elections as scheduled, and the odds of that happening are probably 80 to 20 per cent.
[English]
Senator Mercer: The fourth deployment of Canadian Forces troops will be in theatre in August, and that rotation will form the basis for the next transformation before the election period. I am concerned because, as we have seen in many other countries, elections tend to be lightning rods for civil unrest, et cetera. I am somewhat preoccupied with the preparation for the election. Also, I know a bit about elections.
You say there is a lack of money but that there are positive signs that they will pull this off. I am aware that the National Democratic Institute, which is an international organization in support of the development of democratic process, has been active in Afghanistan for a number of years. Are you aware of whether support is being provided to the Afghan infrastructure for holding the election? Have our own election experts, through Elections Canada, been engaged by the Canadian Forces to give advice to both the armed forces there and the Afghan election mechanism to help in the development of a free and open election?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: I do not know whether Canadian experts were contacted to support the Afghan government in holding their elections in the fall of 2005.
On our side, as far as the Canadian Forces are concerned, I do not think, to my knowledge, that we made any approach on that level. At the mission level, that was not done. More strategically, was any approach made? I could not give you an answer to that.
[English]
Senator Mercer: Are you aware of what the role of the Canadian Forces would be on the day of the election and the days leading up to it with regard to the protection of election workers and ensuring that voting places are secure and free of harassment for the people of Afghanistan?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: Our recognizance squad will be adding its support to the multinational brigade in September.
The role of the recognizance squad is superimposed on the troops already on the ground. The squad provides information and anticipates potential difficulties in connection with the election.
That was the role of our troops in the last election and we expect that our troops will play that role again in the next election.
[English]
Senator Banks: Colonel Laroche, you are aware that this committee will travel to Afghanistan and other places soon. I will ask the same question that you have already been asked twice. You have been to Afghanistan and have had hands-on, direct, observational experience. Canada and her allies are trying to impose a different kind of government in Afghanistan than they have had for centuries; and many have tried that before. The Moguls tried to do that in the 15th century, the British Empire tried it and failed; and the USSR tried it and failed. Is it the right thing to do? Will it work? How long will we have to be there? Will it require a ten-year commitment or longer?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: I will begin with the last part of your question.
I think we will be there for around 10 or 20 years. There is much to be done in Afghanistan. It is a bit like in Bosnia, where we still have troops on the ground today. We deployed our first troops in 1992, if I recall correctly. It has already been 13 years. We still have a commitment in Bosnia. I think the same scenario will play out in Afghanistan. We have at least another 10 years there, but probably longer.
As for the current government, the situation is encouraging in terms of what has been accomplished and the exchanges between the international community and the current government team in Afghanistan.
I believe the election in Afghanistan is welcomed. Thinking back to the election last November, the election was relatively calm. It went well. There was no national crisis. Clearly, there are always incidents, but that all suggests to me that it is positive.
The government system being established in Afghanistan probably satisfies most of the population and meets people's needs.
[English]
Senator Banks: In that respect, Afghans have had a history that is vastly different from neighbouring peoples. To exercise national power, in any sense, President Hamid Karzai or his successor will have to have control of an effective armed force. Provide the committee with a thumbnail sketch of the creation of an effective national army in Afghanistan.
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: A lot of progress has been made in that area. We are talking about a force of around 20,000 to 23,000 people today. It is an army in training. The Americans have worked hard at creating this army, and it is taking shape. The Canadians are also taking part in this initiative. We currently have 14 individuals working at the Afghan National Training Centre to validate the training.
At the army level, everything is going well. Can we do more? Yes, we can do more. It is important to continue supporting the Afghan army. For us, that is part of the exit strategy. An army that is professional and able to do the work it has to do will make it possible to withdraw from Afghanistan and make way for the Afghans, so that they can take control of their country.
[English]
Senator Banks: We ardently hope that. We had a hand in chasing the Taliban out of power in Afghanistan, and that virtually ended the export by that country of the worst kind of narcotics. We understand that the current government has turned a blind eye to it or, for whatever reason, the supply of narcotics from Afghanistan has increased. The pendulum has swung the other way and the export of narcotics is on the rise. Are we supporting a government that is turning a blind eye to that, or that encourages and accepts the fact that Afghanistan will continue to grow opium in large quantities? Is it such an important economic factor that Afghanistan cannot do without it?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: I think that will take time. I do not think we are supporting a government that encourages growing drugs or trafficking in drugs in Afghanistan. It is going to take a long time to solve this problem, since drugs are a part of Afghanistan.
Efforts have been made in this area but once again, there is still a lot to be done. One of the difficulties the international community encounters is providing an alternative means of survival to Afghans. Farming is difficult. There are not many alternatives for Afghans, and that is why there has to be some investment in this area.
The PRT concept is designed to help solve this problem. Everyone knows that more needs to be done in terms of drugs and stopping the trafficking that is currently occurring in Afghanistan.
[English]
The Chairman: Colonel, could you describe for the committee the kind of communications that the commander of the Canadian Forces would have in Afghanistan, the directions he would receive from NATO and from Canada, where the two might conflict, and how he would address the kind of constraints or caveats that might be placed upon him?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: The commander of the force in Afghanistan reports to the CDS currently. It is a direct line. The Deputy Chief of Staff directs daily operations.
[English]
The Chairman: When you said, ``to the Chief of Defence Staff,'' is that the case or does he respond to the Deputy Chief, in reality?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: He reports to the Deputy Chief daily, but he can use the direct line to communicate with him about anything. The commander of the force in the theatre does so irregularly.
He is not expected to report to the chief of staff every day, but he can do so on a regular basis if he wishes.
Daily affairs are controlled and coordinated by the Deputy Chief of Staff. He is in contact by telephone on a weekly basis with the commander of the force in the theatre of operations. Even when the situation is calm, that call is made. When things are happening, the commander of the force in the theatre of operations calls the deputy chief to inform him of the situation. Personally, I speak to the commander in the theatre of operations virtually every day. So we have exchanges on a regular basis.
Coming back to your question about NATO, the commander in the theatre of operations was given certain powers before leaving. Those powers enable him to make the decisions necessary to conduct operations. When those powers are insufficient to conduct a specific mission, he has to refer to Ottawa. So he has to contact, depending on the situation, the chief or Deputy Chief of Staff for authorization.
[English]
The Chairman: Can you give us a sense of how often that would be the case, how often he would go beyond his national mandate?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: Some movements outside of a given area can take place over an extended period of time. Other deployments may happen on a more temporary basis, for example over a few weeks, outside of the immediate area of Kabul. The immediate region of Kabul is the area of operations.
As soon as they leave the zone for a temporary deployment, they must request the authority of the Deputy Chief of Defense Staff. This is quite common practice, and it was particularly the case at election time. During an election period, the multinational brigade wanted to use our Coyote vehicles in order to obtain information from outside the Canadian boundary area. The commander therefore has to go to Ottawa quite regularly in order to ask for authority.
[English]
The Chairman: Describe for the committee as best you can the challenges that face the ISAF commander who is dealing with a number of countries all of whom have their own caveats and their own lines back to their own chiefs of defence staff. What challenges face that individual?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: Let us take the case of Camp Julien. Camp Julien is home to 700 Canadians at the moment. However, there are also Americans, Turks and troops from other countries in the camp. These countries do not have the same rules of engagement as ours. For these troops, a threat or the response to one may be different, as the case may be.
It is important that the theatre commander understand what limits these other soldiers may have if ever they were faced with a threat. This is one of the challenges he must face.
[English]
The Chairman: It strikes us, as civilians, that it is a huge challenge. Can you give us examples of how the commander might get bent out of shape with a hypothetical caveat that one country might have and how he would have to ask another country to perform the task? One country may have a caveat that says it cannot be done this way while another country has no problem with it. Describe for the committee how you have seen this problem dealt with and how an overall commander shuffles his cards around.
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: It is enough to understand the limits the other contingents may have. Take the example of a protest demonstration. Some countries have different rules of engagement and different responses if they are faced with a civilian demonstration. Once again, this is one challenge that a commander might face.
Let us take another example. Sometimes foreign troops are responsible for the camp's safety. At one point, the Belgians were given the job of insuring the safety of the camp. Therefore, the contingent shares the burden of defending the camp. The Belgian contingent had rules of engagement and means of communication that were different from ours, and we did not speak the same language. The on-scene commander must cope with these kinds of challenges when he is faced with an emergency.
[English]
The Chairman: You were talking about crowd control or riots. Canadians who are stationed there now do not have that sort of training. What happens if there is a riot and the commander tells the Belgians, or whoever has that training, to deal with the riot, but it gets out of hand?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: In such situations, the multinational brigade may react. The immediate reaction forces are always ready to deal with this kind of situation. Immediate measures or SOP are already in place with the forces on hand to deal with these kinds of situations.
[English]
The Chairman: SOP is standard operating procedure?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: That is correct.
[English]
The Chairman: There are lots of people from Canada there in different departments. Could you describe to the committee what different departments are represented in Kabul? How do they relate one to another? Is there a 3D approach — development, diplomacy and defence — and who is in charge?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: On a military level, the approach is quite simple. We have the usual chain of command. The ISAF is in Kabul. The multinational brigade operates with forces from the tactical side. At that level, the multinational brigade is responsible for dealing with situations that could develop.
As to who is in charge, the political and military connections are made at a high level in order to find solutions to the problems that could crop up in Kabul or elsewhere. The political/military relationship is very close. For example, we have very close ties to our ambassador in Kabul, Mr. Alexander. The force commander and ground troops have regular exchanges with our ambassador. There is also a CIDA representative at the embassy. The liaison or ``3D relationship'' is in place, in Kabul, with our ground troops as well as on the political side as such.
[English]
The Chairman: What will the situation be like on the ground when we are there? What operations will be ongoing? What should we anticipate when we are there?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: Currently, I must admit the situation is calm. I would be surprised if we were to experience a landmark event, however one never knows.
Sometimes, there are vehicle explosions, sometimes mines, traps that are set in certain areas, but that is not the norm. As far as Canada is concerned, the most recent incident was an embassy vehicle that was ambushed, and one person was wounded. It is the exception rather than the rule.
What you will find, I think, is that Kabul is a very lively city, if you have ever been there. Moving around in the actual city of Kabul is rather chaotic, but generally speaking it is fairly calm.
[English]
Senator Oliver: I would like to ask some questions about what might be considered a good news story, an international dimension. I understand that when the withdrawal took place, Canada had some extra capacity and decided to use that extra capacity to be of service to the Belgian, Hungarian, Norwegian, Slovenian, and even the U.S. troops. What are some of those extraordinary services that were used to assist those countries? What was actually done?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: Camp Julien can offer support to other countries. Within Camp Julien, we have a medical clinic, a field ambulance with a doctor, a limited centre for surgery, but I must admit that it is a surgical centre for emergency procedures.
This system or this clinic are available to other countries should the need arise.
[English]
Senator Oliver: Does that mean the Belgians and the other countries did not have their own doctor or their own clinic, or was this additional?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: Yes, in some cases they had no clinic and we provided this service.
For example, when the elections near — as was the case last November, and as will be the case again in September — reinforcements usually arrive and different countries deploy extra battalions to the permanent force in Afghanistan. They must be sheltered somewhere. We search for opportunities, and Camp Julien did indeed offer the possibility of accommodating more people.
Medical care is one example, but there are other services such as cooking, laundry, all kinds of services that can be offered for payment, I must admit, but they are offered to the different countries.
[English]
Senator Oliver: I understand it was done on a cost-shared basis, so Canada would be paid in full for those services?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: Absolutely, senator. That is the intention.
[English]
Senator Oliver: How many troops would have been involved in working for these other countries?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: In total, we have approximately 700 Canadians in camp and civilian personnel working there as well, from the CANCAP initiative, which you are probably aware of. In total, approximately 400 to 500 people could be accommodated at the camp, on top of the staff who are already there. For example, we are currently studying a request from Romania with a view to next September's election. We are discussing accommodating perhaps 400 to 450 people.
[English]
Senator Munson: Colonel, when you talked about 10 to 20 years, it sounds like Cyprus. Were we aware that we would be in for that long? How would that affect our troop rotation over a period of time like that?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: I do not know if we Canadians will be there for 10 to 20 years.
What I do know is that to solve the problem, we need to have a military presence there for 10 to 20 years. The government will decide whether or not we should maintain our presence in Afghanistan for the duration, or look elsewhere and respect the national priorities that will be determined at that time.
[English]
Senator Munson: Our commitment now is yearly, is that how it works?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: That depends. Sometimes we have two-year mandates, sometimes only one. Currently, we are looking to the next stage which begins in the summer of 2005 and takes us to February 2006 and beyond. We are still awaiting the government's approval for this.
[English]
Senator Munson: I am not that familiar with the pay and allowances. What do the people who are actually there get? Are there any variations; and if so, why?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: The people in Kabul proper receive more or less the same thing. The level of risk is a level that allows for exemption from taxation. On that level, all those who are in Kabul at Camp Julien with the TFK force, the Kabul operational force, receive the same exemptions. A committee considers these different aspects and determines, in the end, what allowances we should give to our staff.
[English]
Senator Munson: I ask this because of my own experience as a reporter. Has any thought ever been given to an increased insurance policy? It is not the nicest thing you would like to hear about. The company I worked for would say, you are not worth a million dollars; you are worth about 50 cents. It is a comforting thing to family to know that in a dangerous part of the world, there is an insurance policy on you. Has that ever been considered in the armed forces?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: Not to my knowledge. I believe it is up to the individual to take out the insurance he feels he will need. There is no policy or insurance properly speaking that is specifically offered or given to individuals.
[English]
Senator Munson: Stress is a big issue with a lot of soldiers. What is happening with people who come back from Afghanistan? Is there an automatic process that they go through?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: Yes, there is disembarkation leave as well as the usual administrative procedures that are done following the return. Generally speaking, five vacation days are allocated, and approximately two days for administrative procedures are also added to the vacation at that time, but this is with a view to carrying out certain administrative procedures, yes, but also in order to allow the person to take a break and to re-establish contact with his family, which is obviously very important.
[English]
Senator Munson: Has there been a big caseload of that after every rotation? What is the percentage?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: I do not have the actual statistics as far as operational stress is concerned in Afghanistan. I do not believe that it is higher than in other missions. Even though the risk level is fairly high, it is not at such a point that we have people who are more affected than in the other missions.
[English]
Senator Munson: Do we have reservists there?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: Absolutely.
[English]
Senator Munson: At Camp Mirage as well?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: We have reservists in Kabul, at Mirage. The reservists are an important part of Canada's contribution and they contribute an incredible service to the Canadian armed forces. They are an important part of the forces that we cannot consider separate. We have a fair percentage of reservists in the other missions, not only in Afghanistan, but in the other missions that are abroad.
[English]
Senator Munson: Do they have the same kind of training that ordinary men and women in the armed forces have, to go to a dangerous spot like that?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: They must undergo the same training. The training happens over roughly a three-month period before deployment. The exercises, the tests and the preparation are the same as those for regular troops.
[English]
Senator Banks: Colonel, I will refer back to the question that Senator Munson asked about different rules of engagement that apply. Canadians have perhaps more understanding of the frustration that can arise from rules of engagement than many other countries because we have had called to our national attention what happened in Rwanda and particularly General Roméo Dallaire's frustration with rules of engagement.
When most of us see a situation which clearly, on basic humanitarian grounds, requires a given response and it is not given by someone elsewhere, it is very frustrating.
Without asking you to describe the rules of engagement for countries other than Afghanistan, what constraints would a Canadian commander face that would be put in place by rules of engagement given him by the Government of Canada to respond to a bad situation? What may Canadian Forces not do in a bad situation?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: Allow me to go back in time. During the 1990s, the rules of engagement were not in place. The procedures for rules of engagement were slowly developed, over the years. Today, I must admit that the procedure in place for the rules of engagement is very efficient.
The rules of engagement set out for our commanders are sufficient to meet the needs. A commander who does not have adequate rules of engagement to deal with his situation goes to Ottawa to have them amended.
However, I am not aware of the procedure for other nations. Do they have rules of engagement that are more liberal? That may be the case for certain situations. However, for the missions in which I have served and those that I am currently coordinating, I can state that Canadian rules of engagement pose no problem.
[English]
Senator Banks: If this afternoon a Canadian field commander — not a high commander but a field commander — came across a situation of something bad happening, would he have the authority to respond to it on the spot based upon his best judgment?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: Absolutely. I see no problem at that level. The commander has all of the necessary rules of engagement in order to respond to a critical situation.
[English]
Senator Banks: Most Canadians know that we have significant forces in Afghanistan. However, most Canadians do not know very much about Camp Mirage, which you described earlier as a strategic bridge. We know that if a force strains its lines of supply, that can be a disaster. I presume that is what you meant when you said ``strategic bridge.''
Would you tell us briefly about Camp Mirage?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: Camp Mirage is an air base that allows for the transfer of our personnel to the theatre of operations. We use tactical planes, contrary to the strategic type of air bus — this kind of plane cannot be used in the theatre of operations for troop deployment. We can therefore use our Hercules-type aircraft, from this base, to bring the personnel and the materiel into the area of operations. Camp Mirage is a base near the theatre of operations. It is indeed intended to bridge the gap.
[English]
Senator Banks: Where is it?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: It is situated in the Middle East.
[English]
Senator Banks: Can you be more specific, or it is genuinely a mirage?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: It is not a mirage, but it is in the Middle East. I cannot be any more specific on that point.
[English]
Senator Banks: I gather it is a place to which we can fly our people on an airliner and that they at that point change planes from an airliner, with all the creature comforts with which we are all familiar, to something more stubby that will take them into the field of operations?
[Translation]
Col. Laroche: That is correct.
[English]
Senator Banks: I guess we will find out where Camp Mirage is when the committee lands there, or maybe they will not tell us.
The Chairman: I think, like most Senate trips, we will be in the dark the whole way through.
Colonel, this has been most instructive. We appreciate you appearing before us. We are grateful for your contribution and assistance to the committee.
For members of the public who are viewing this program, if you have questions or comments, please visit our website at www.sen-sec.ca where we post witness testimony as well as confirmed hearing schedules. Otherwise, you may contact the clerk of the committee by calling 1-800-267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting members of the committee.
The committee was suspended and then resume in camera.