Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 25 - Evidence - Morning session
OTTAWA, Monday, June 27, 2005
The Standing Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 11:10 a.m. to examine and report on the national security policy for Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: My name is Colin Kenny and I am a senator from Ontario. I welcome all to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence.
First, I will introduce the members of the committee. Sitting on my right is Senator Michael Forrestall from Nova Scotia. The distinguished senator has served his constituents for 37 years, first as a member of the House of Commons and then as their senator. While in the House of Commons, he served as the official opposition defence critic. Senator Forrestall is also a member of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
Next to Senator Forrestall is Senator Norm Atkins, from Ontario, who came to the Senate with 27 years of experience in the field of communications. He served as a senior adviser to former federal Conservative Leader Robert Stanfield, former Premier William Davis of Ontario and former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. He is also a member of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
On my left is Senator Terry Mercer, from Nova Scotia, who has served as National Director of the Liberal Party of Canada. Prior to that, he held a wide variety of positions with various charitable institutions including the Canadian Diabetes Association, the Y.M.C.A, the Nova Scotia Lung Association, St. John Ambulance and the Kidney Foundation of Canada. Senator Mercer is very active in the Association of Fundraising Professionals. He is a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry and the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs.
Our committee has the mandate to examine and report on the national security policy for Canada. The following reports have been produced since 2002: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness; Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility; Update on Canada's Military Financial Crisis, a View from the Bottom Up; The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports; Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World; National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines; Canadian Security Guidebook 2005 EDITION, and An Update of Security Problems in Search of Solutions; and, most recently, a book on border security.
We are in the midst of a detailed review of Canadian defence policy. We have been holding hearings in every province to engage with Canadians to determine their national interests, what they see as Canada principal threats and how they would like the government to respond to those threats. Canadians have been forthright in expressing their views on national security in Canada. The work of the committee will continue throughout the summer in order to forge a consensus on the kind of military that Canadians envision for the future.
We have before us today, LGen. Marc Dumais. After receiving his wings in 1976, he was posted to 435(T) Squadron where he flew the CC130 Hercules. LGen. Dumais has had a long and distinguished career with the Canadian Forces, having served in numerous positions including Commanding Officer of 436(T) Squadron; Wing Operations Officer at 8Wing, CFB Trenton; J3 Plans and Requirements; Director General Joint Force Development; Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division and the Canadian NORAD region. In July 2004 he was appointed Assistant Chief of the Air Staff at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. In April 2005 he was promoted to Lieutenant-General and appointed Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff.
Lieutenant-General Marc J. Dumais, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, National Defence: Honourable senators, I welcome this opportunity to give you an update on the operational developments since the appearance of my predecessor, Vice-Admiral Greg Maddison, in February of this year.
I am pleased to appear before you as the Canadian Forces Chief Operations Officer responsible for coordinating, controlling and supporting our many military missions around the world. Before we go to specific questions, I would like to update senators on the general operational challenges that we face and on the state of the Canadian Forces in dealing with these demands.
Well over one year ago, the Minister of National Defence supported the Chief of the Defence Staff in calling for an operational pause. The government has indeed reduced our commitments so that we stand at fewer than 1,600 Canadian Forces sailors, soldiers, airwomen and airmen deployed on 17 missions. One year ago that number was approximately 4,000 on roughly the same number of missions. Note that this number does not include the nearly 1,200 Canadian Forces members posted outside of Canada and working side by side with alliance partners, a small number of whom are on deployed operations.
[Translation]
Our people continue to respond magnificently to many challenges and to significant personal hardships with all ranks invariably rising to the challenges.
My focus, and that of the Canadian Forces operations staff, is to offer them a 24/7 connection to their country's Headquarters and once connected, to provide them with no less than the best staff and moral support we can provide, whenever they call for it.
Moreover, we intend to continue to provide this around-the-clock access through the period of transformation of the command structure that is described in the policy statement.
[English]
We expect over the next months to draw down our forces committed to Kabul and the UN mission in the Golan. Over the same time we will maintain naval and air bridge forces in support of the campaign against terrorism.
In addition, we have our current commitment in the Sudan and we will deploy the government commitments to the Kandahar region of Afghanistan. In the next year or so, Canada assumes the mantle of command for the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic for one year beginning April 2006.
While undertaking these commitments, we will maintain other high readiness capabilities, such as search and rescue, humanitarian relief for the disaster assistance response team and the nuclear-biological-chemical defence company, should they be required. We will maintain surveillance of our air and sea approaches, through NORAD, through the binational planning organizations of the United States, or on our own.
[Translation]
We expect to completely change our forces and posture in Afghanistan, from the situation you saw not long ago. We plan to be a major contributing nation as the forces in the south of Afghanistan transfer from being United States-led to NATO-led. In February 2006, we expect to have an infantry taskforce and a brigade Headquarters. A PRT or provincial reconstruction team, which will include CIDA, FAC and the RCMP, will already be deployed to that country this fall. These would all be working together to offer a visibly Canadian presence improving our chances of realizing a Team Canada contribution to diplomacy, defence and development. As with all major operations, firmly establishing ourselves on this new mission commitment will take several more months.
[English]
Beyond our current commitments to the UN's multinational standing high readiness brigade, known as SHRBRIG, and the African mission in Sudan (AMIS), additional support to the African Union mission to the Sudan, often incorrectly labelled simply as ``Darfur,'' is under way. Our mission will support the African Union forces to stabilize the region. We will pay particular attention to the desires of the African Union, who we are there to support.
One of the early steps we took to better protect the North American continent after September 11, 2001 was to join with the United States in a binational planning group. This planning and coordination group, based alongside NORAD in Colorado Springs, examines options to improve surveillance of the sea approaches to North America.
The mandate of this group is extended until 2006 and we will benefit from the open door it provides to the U.S. northern command and border security developments in the public security and emergency preparedness domain.
[Translation]
The Defence Policy Statement reports that we intend to adopt fully integrated and unified approach to operations by transforming the command structure. Much of the design for the future command structure is yet to be decided upon. However, we are confident that we can show progress by continuing our enhancement of intelligence management, by moving ahead with the idea of integrating our information sources and systems through the C4ISR program, and by aggressively developing our ability to fuse information and intelligence for use by the strategic decision makers and the operational commanders.
[English]
You met with Major-General Gauthier in December to discuss the state of our intelligence function. To summarize, we are in the early stages of implementing our defence intelligence review (DIR), to strengthen the management of the intelligence function and associated processes to serve commanders and decision-makers across the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence. Planning for this program is integrated with the work we are doing in the realm of C4ISR, which stands for command control communications and computers, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, and information and intelligence fusion. It will take several years before this complex program reaches its full realization of its capability goals.
The new defence policy has caused us to review all of our capabilities in accordance with that policy and more specifically, to determine if each program and project would result in integrated capabilities. We are planning, where appropriate, to build in consideration of the inter-agency and multinational aspects.
The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff is the lead for these capability development efforts. We have experience with fully integrated mission-specific structures. The CF transformation team will assist the Chief of the Defence Staff to lead integration earlier in the mission preparation cycle. Until the transformation process is more mature, the National Defence Command Centre and the joint staff will continue to manage existing missions. We have some way to go to bring all operational command and intelligence networks together efficiently, but that is what our C4ISR campaign plan is intended to deliver.
[Translation]
At this point we are well on the way to completing the enhancement of the Joint Task Force 2 addressed in the December 2001 federal budget. We plan to further enlarge this increasingly capable unit and expand the Joint Nuclear Biological Chemical Defence Organization.
As indicated in the policy, our special forces would give Canada a rapid response capability both for domestic protection and for engagement alongside similar forces elsewhere in the world.
[English]
I have touched on a number of operations-related issues.
I would like to thank you for your knowledgeable support of the Canadian Forces and its members and I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have.
Senator Atkins: Welcome and thank you for the overview.
I would like to start with one question. What has been your biggest challenge since taking over as the deputy chief?
LGen. Dumais: It is a similar challenge to the one I faced when working on the air staff. It is a challenge of capacity, the capacity to manage our current affairs while at the same time dealing with the changes in our system. I am sure you have heard that we ``one-deep.'' Everyone is working extremely hard to deliver the capability and more than anything else, it is a capacity issue.
Senator Atkins: In your role as the chief operating officer, what major military capabilities can you call on right now?
LGen. Dumais: We have several units at high readiness. We have the immediate readiness unit, the IRU, company at each of the land forces areas across the country. We have the ready duty ships on both coasts that are at high readiness for whatever may come up. We have our search and rescue forces at high readiness. The NBC Defence Company and JTF2 are at high readiness. We have an entire weapons system in the context of the Canadian NORAD region that is at high alert status at all times and we have other units as well.
Depending on the situation, we can call on any resources we have, particularly if we are dealing with a domestic event such as a natural disaster. We can bring up several forces fairly quickly if required.
Senator Atkins: What about our airlift capabilities?
LGen. Dumais: Airlift is a challenge because, as I am sure you are aware, we have had difficulties maintaining that fleet at the required levels. That is an ongoing challenge. We support search and rescue with our Hercules fleet right now, as well as Operation Athena in Afghanistan. There is some residual airlift capability that is available and it varies from day to day.
Senator Atkins: You mentioned operational tempo. How do you measure it, keep track of it and at what point does it cause concern among senior Canadian Forces leaders?
LGen. Dumais: I think an appropriate level of operational tempo is one that can be sustained. Operational tempo has various dimensions to it; at the strategic level, it has to do with the ability to maintain and sustain a certain level of operations. You can surge beyond that but when you surge, you have to take a pause to regroup the forces and get them back up to the necessary state to get back to that sustainable operational tempo.
At the individual level, operational tempo is exceeded when stress levels cause people to leave the forces at an excessive rate.
We have seen quite a few spikes in operational tempo since 1990. We have provided you with a chart of operations that shows that we have gone from a baseline of about 2,000 to peaks that have exceeded 4,000 on the international scene. That is not currently sustainable, so we have to go back to the lower level from time to time to renew our ability to surge. The question is what level can we sustain on an ongoing basis. The defence policy statement attempts to address that in terms of defining the standing contingency task force and the mission specific task force constructs.
Senator Atkins: At what point do you declare the operational pause over?
LGen. Dumais: In this case it has been determined in concert with the chief of the land staff that by February of next year they will be a position to increase our commitment levels. That works hand in glove with our deployment to Afghanistan. We have been in an operational pause for a bit more than a year. In February, we will be in a position to increase our commitments as per government direction.
The Chairman: You said you did that in consultation with the chief of the land staff. That sounds like the army is more stressed than the air force or the navy. Why did you phrase it that way?
LGen. Dumais: I did so because we are talking primarily of the land portion of the commitment, which is fairly large. On the operational tempo issue, you are quite right that it is not equal across the board. The land staff was heavily committed in the past and land forces required a bit of a respite. Similarly, the navy ships have reduced their operational tempo, although they continue to have a few ships committed internationally. For the air force it is not as straightforward, because each component of the air force has a different operational tempo. For example, the C-130 community has maintained a fairly high operational tempo. Some of our specialty areas maintain a high operational tempo. Certain key trades that do not have the depth they require to sustain operations have more pressure on them to support our operations.
We have come to realize that operational tempo is more than just international commitments. We are defining it more broadly now in terms of overall tasking levels for our personnel. As you can appreciate, even though they may not be deployed, training often takes them away from home as well.
We need to look more broadly at the overall package of demands that we put on our personnel for training, for professional development and for deploying on operations. It is that combined level of activity that has an impact at the individual level.
Ideally, we would like to set up our force structure so that we can sustain an appropriate level of operational tempo while allowing people to take time off to do the training necessary to deploy on their next mission. That is where we would like to go with respect to the defence policy statement.
Senator Atkins: What is the current status of planning for further deployments into Sudan and Darfur? Will Canadian troops in Sudan be armed?
LGen. Dumais: There are two separate efforts in Sudan. One is through the United Nations Mission in Sudan, UNMIS. As well, our personnel are engaged primarily through the SHIRBRIG commitment in response to UN Security Council resolution 1590. Up to 19 personnel will be committed as part of the headquarters structure of SHIRBRIG and a dozen or so military observers will deploy as part of that UN mission. I think the Prime Minister has committed us to 40 personnel to the United Nations Mission in Sudan.
The second effort is the African Union Mission in Sudan, AMIS. The government has committed the Canadian Forces to support that as requested by the African Union in key areas where they want support. I think the Prime Minister has committed up to 60 personnel for that mission. We are still determining the shape of that commitment and it will depend on the African Union requirements. We sent a reconnaissance team to the region recently to assess and make recommendations on how we can best support that mission. That support will not be strictly in Darfur. Some of that support could be in headquarters, in Khartoum, or in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
With respect to them being armed, the intent is to ensure our personnel are armed for self-protection in the context of that mission in the context of the current mandate.
Senator Atkins: Would you care to comment on which of them are sufficiently vital to require risking the lives of Canadian service personnel?
LGen. Dumais: That is not something on which I am in a position to comment; that is a question of government policy. When we receive direction to carry out a mission, we will do so. Our responsibility is to ensure that we bring all issues of concern to the higher level and to train and equip our personnel to do the best possible job in the most secure fashion.
The Chairman: When the policy comes forward, do you advise the politicians involved what casualties you anticipate if that policy is carried out in the way the government has requested? Does the government know in advance what risks are involved in the mission? Do you make a casualty estimate for the government prior to people leaving?
LGen. Dumais: I expect that we will inform the government of all the ratifications and implications of being involved in the particular commitment.
The Chairman: Is that a ``yes''?
LGen. Dumais: Yes.
Senator Atkins: Have you conducted any formal assessments or intelligence review of the operational capabilities of the various armies comprising the African Union force in Darfur?
LGen. Dumais: We have not done a formal assessment. The chief of the defence staff visited that region personally and made his own assessment. The Canadian delegation has contributed to the overall assessment of the situation. As I mentioned, our reconnaissance team's directive was to assess how we can contribute to the region.
I believe there is ample information available to help us shape our commitment to AMIS.
Senator Atkins: Do we know that our military contribution will help?
LGen. Dumais: That is certainly the intent. While we do not always deploy in large numbers, our personnel is valued because of the professionalism, experience and expertise that we bring to the table regardless of what the mission. I could cite several examples where our people are indeed making a difference.
They assist in training other forces, preparing them to take on those responsibilities themselves. They are doing that in Kabul, Afghanistan with the Afghan National Army and in Sierra Leone with the IMAT assistance teams. There are several examples where Canadian Forces personnel in small numbers can bring to bear significant impact on a group they are training, such as in assisting with planning or providing advice.
The contribution is not necessarily measured by strict numbers. I think it is broader than that.
The Chairman: Could you just elaborate on that statement? Take Sudan or Darfur as examples. What does the chain of command say to the troops who are going there? What sort of instructions do they receive? Do they receive an explanation as to why they are going and how worthwhile their tour might be for the host country? Could you describe to us what the commander says to his or her subordinates going to either of those places?
LGen. Dumais: Certainly, senator.
In the case of UNMIS, in support of the United Nations, we are deploying our personnel as part of the SHIRBRIG commitment. We have people committed to SHIRBRIG on an ongoing basis for whatever mission comes up. In this particular case it is in response to the UNSCR resolution 1590.
It is important to be able to draw a link between the UN mandate and Canada's commitment to that mandate for the troops that are deploying and, therefore, their contribution to that mission.
The Chairman: How many troops understand resolution 1590?
LGen. Dumais: When we put out an operation order, we spell out the intent of the mission, its mandate and our intended contribution. Obviously, this is done in accordance with government direction.
I would say it is the same for the missions in support of AMIS, although we have not finalized the operational order for that mission, as we are involved in a reconnaissance mission in shaping that commitment.
We clearly spell out that the mission is in line with Canadian government direction and part of the mandate of the African Union. We clearly set out the Canadian contribution to the mission.
The Chairman: Would a soldier have a clear understanding of the goal and the expected accomplishment of the mission?
LGen. Dumais: Absolutely, we have come a long way since the early 1990s in terms of how we staff these missions. We endeavour to have as much clarity as possible on the mandate, the mission, the tasks, and the rules of engagement. All those things are very clearly spelled out. It starts with a government letter of strategic objectives that spells out the nature of that mission.
As you say, senator, it is important that there is a very clear link to the broader government objectives and the mandate of the deployed CF troops.
The Chairman: How do you satisfy yourself that a master corporal has the message and understands the mission? How do you get feedback from that master corporal?
LGen. Dumais: That is a function of leadership. It is incumbent upon the leaders of that particular deployment to ensure their personnel understands why they are deploying and what they can and cannot do when they are there.
We have a very robust pre-deployment training program for our personnel. They go through some basics in terms of mission tasks and how to carry them out. As part of that, they receive briefings to prepare them for their deployment.
Ostensibly, everyone involved in a mission should have a very clear understanding of why they are going there and what they are expected to accomplish.
The Chairman: My question was really this: Inasmuch as you are the one who will be called to account at the end of the day, how do you satisfy yourself that the orders are clear, that they have been understood and that things will go ahead in a satisfactory manner?
LGen. Dumais: I have been in this position for almost two months and during that time, we have not started any new missions.
The Chairman: You have been around the shop for quite a while, have you not?
LGen. Dumais: I have not finished my answer.
Whenever we have a rotation and the new commander designate is preparing to deploy, he has a personal interview with me with the Chief of Defence staff in attendance. At that time, we issue him written direction, that is, intent from the CDS and guides from me, as to how they are supposed to conduct themselves, their mission, their responsibilities and accountabilities and their reporting chain of command. The CDS and I deliver them so they understand clearly their mission and their parameters.
When you put that together with the operation order and the rules of engagement under which they are working, they have a clear understanding of their expectations.
The Chairman: Do those two meetings and the written instructions close the loop for you?
LGen. Dumais: No, we are in continuous contact with our missions. If any operational or administrative problems occur, the commanders call the desk officers responsible for their particular mission. This communication takes place in some cases weekly, or certainly as required. There is that ongoing dialogue.
In addition, I speak to the commanders of those missions on a regular basis. I would not necessarily say that I speak with them weekly. However, for the major missions, for example, in Afghanistan, I speak to the commander weekly. In the time I have been there, I have attempted to speak to each of them at least once, and several of them more than once. Just this morning I spoke with Commander Greenwood who is in charge of HMCS Winnipeg in the Gulf, to get an update on how things are going and whether we are providing adequate administrative support to his mission. It is an opportunity to have direct contact and to raise any issues or concerns.
In addition, we have travelled to the theatres to visit with the troops to get a personal assessment and a sense of how the mission is going, much as you have travelled and visited the Chief of Defence Staff.
I am very comfortable that we have a fairly hands-on approach to the missions. In addition, the commanders submit daily reports to the chain of command, to my staff. They have an appropriate distribution so that the Chief of the Defence Staff, myself and other interested parties read those reports. Thus, we have a good sense of how things are going with our missions.
The Chairman: Could you return to your comment about the airlift challenge with which we are now faced? You were talking about the difficulties with the airlift.
You work with three platforms, the Hercules, the Airbus and the leasing of Antinovs.
LGen. Dumais: Yes, we do use them for strategic deployments.
The Chairman: How many Hercules are there?
LGen. Dumais: We have 32 Hercules.
The Chairman: Of the 32, how many are committed to search and rescue?
LGen. Dumais: On any given day, three aircraft, because we have the Buffalo on the West Coast. There is one in Winnipeg, one in Trenton and one in Greenwood.
The Chairman: How many are committed to Afghanistan?
LGen. Dumais: We normally have two in Afghanistan. We are looking at increasing the number to three, if we have not done so already, for the surge when the rotations come up.
The Chairman: How many aircraft are set aside for training?
LGen. Dumais: That is a residual. The air force certainly needs to have aircraft available for local training and continuation training on an ongoing basis and for courses given at the operational training unit. That has been the challenge. As the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, that is not my responsibility; however, I can speak from my former position as Commander, 1 Canadian Air Division. It is an ongoing challenge for that particular fleet to meet the mandates, also provide the adequate training, and force generation.
The Chairman: Given the numbers that are unserviceable at any given point in time, if one-half of them are unavailable, that does not leave very many left given the ones that are committed on an ongoing basis.
LGen. Dumais: You are correct.
The Chairman: What is the story with the Airbuses?
LGen. Dumais: The Airbuses are actually performing in an outstanding fashion, but we pulled two out for upgrades for the air-to-air refuelling mission — not both at the same time but sequentially — so that has had an impact on the availability of the fleet. Overall it is a fleet that maintains a very high serviceability rate.
The Chairman: How many do we have?
LGen. Dumais: We have five Airbuses.
The Chairman: Do you have a dedicated Airbus for political or governmental flights?
LGen. Dumais: No.
The Chairman: You just take one out as required.
LGen. Dumais: We obviously try to schedule a VIP flight far in advance, and when we have an aircraft that is scheduled for that specific flight, we can use it before and after the pre-scheduled flight. It obviously has to be protected when there is a VIP commitment that comes up, but failing that it is used on a daily basis. It works as hard as the other aircraft.
The Chairman: Are we spending about $50 million a year on leased strategic lift?
LGen. Dumais: I do not have that number readily available. The ADM(Mat) would probably have more on the specifics of that figure.
The Chairman: Am I in the right order of magnitude?
LGen. Dumais: I would be guessing. I have not actually heard the number lately so I cannot make a comment on the amount.
The Chairman: With the high number of aircraft unserviceable, particularly Hercules, why is there a high operations tempo? If the planes are not flying, you have an inactive crew.
LGen. Dumais: Certainly, there is a high operational tempo for those serviceable aircraft; they are going non-stop. That affects some crews more than others because certain crews are qualified to fly in the Afghanistan environment and some of the less experienced are not. It puts more burdens on the crews who are specifically trained for that tactical mission, to go into the theatre and do that mission. Therefore, some of the other crews do not participate.
The Chairman: Why are Canadians pilots landing and taking off in such spectacular ways?
LGen. Dumais: Well, you are talking about tactics here, and that is strictly the purview of the commander and the technical airlift community. They have the threat assessments and they choose how they want to fly in and out based on their threat assessment.
The Chairman: Did Ottawa send instructions as to how they should land or take off?
LGen. Dumais: No, that is strictly the purview of the aircraft commander who bases his decision on the threat. We have doctrines as to whether to come in at low or high altitude. It depends on the weather, the threat, and several other factors.
When I was Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division, we looked at the tactics and assessed whether they were appropriate for the circumstances and the assessment was that they were indeed appropriate. They are always reviewing and revising those responsible for flying the aircraft and we trust their judgment. They are the professionals on the ground.
The Chairman: It seemed to us that all the other countries were landing their aircraft as though they were at Pearson Airport and our folks were doing it in a pretty dramatic fashion.
LGen. Dumais: Yes, and again, each contingent can determine what kind of doctrine they want to use in terms of flying in and out. It is the prerogative of each nation as to how they want to fly their aircraft.
The Chairman: Are you telling us this is a local decision, not a decision made in headquarters?
LGen. Dumais: When I was in Winnipeg as the Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division, we assessed that flying profile in concert with Eight Wing, which is the home of that capability, and perhaps that is going on now, I do not know. However, the chain is engaged as necessary and as required on that issue.
The Chairman: If the landings were different, would you be able to use more pilots to go in?
LGen. Dumais: You are mixing two different things now. We are not talking about the procedures they are using; we are talking about threat assessments now. The threat level is assessed at a certain level, and that requires crews with certain capabilities. As you may appreciate, one day things are benign but that situation can change in a heartbeat. Therefore, we cannot afford to treat that mission as an administrative flying mission, and have to turn around and change all our crews. We would have to stop an operation to do that if we assessed the threat daily.
We have a general threat assessment for that particular theatre, and we fly in accordance with that assessment.
The Chairman: The threat assessment drives the different way that they land, and presumably it takes additional skills to fly that way.
LGen. Dumais: Yes, senator it does take additional skills to fly that way.
The Chairman: It would appear that we have pilots of Hercules with different levels of skill or different levels of experience, and because only some of them have acquired that level of experience they are the ones who are working harder and there are others not getting many flying hours at all. Is that fair to say?
LGen. Dumais: They are getting flying hours but I could not say how many. Clearly there is more flying when you have deployed to Camp Mirage. Flying out of there is fairly intense flying. That period of deployment was 56 days. Unless that has changed, they are still getting more flying time than the people who are back home.
The Chairman: What does it take to bring all of the pilots of the Hercules up to the same level so that they could all be used for this sort of flying?
LGen. Dumais: They would have to take certain courses and have some training opportunities.
I am only able to answer these questions because of my previous job. I am starting to feel uncomfortable.
The Chairman: Am I moving out of your specialty?
LGen. Dumais: That is right, out of my own area of responsibility. I would not want for one minute to answer questions on behalf of the Chief of the Air Staff.
The Chairman: As deputy chief, are these not areas that you address?
LGen. Dumais: In terms of the force generation aspect, that is the responsibility of the Chief of the Air Staff. What they do in theatre is of concern to me, but it is their responsibility in terms of what kind of tactics and doctrine they develop to deal with those kinds of theatres. That is the responsibility of the air force because that is their expertise. I employ forces; I do not tell them how to drive their ships or fly their aircraft or drive their tanks. They presumably come with those skill sets when we employ them.
The Chairman: I expect the same would apply, for example, to the army. Would you or your office be responsible for an order that limited whether or not Canadian Forces deployed in the field with Afghans?
LGen. Dumais: Now you are getting into another realm in terms of the mandate. Clearly, we have a mandate to train Afghanistan National Army personnel.
The Chairman: That is not our understanding. Our understanding from the major who briefed was that he had 14 individuals, they were evaluating training, and they could not train because they could not go into the field.
LGen. Dumais: Okay, you are correct, they are not actually in the field doing training exercises with the Afghan National Army, but they are involved in the training process in some fashion, supporting that training program.
The Chairman: Our impression was that the reason they were not training, and instead evaluating, was that they had received instructions that they could not go into the field. Is that correct?
LGen. Dumais: Yes. The concern is that when they are training in the field they do exercises in support of their mission, so you can quickly go from training into actual operations in that context. The point is that we do not want to have Canadian Forces personnel leading Afghan National Army personnel in the execution of an operation. That was not the mandate. The mandate is primarily to assist with the training, to facilitate the training. We have drawn a line between the two, in terms of ensuring we do not spill over into operations.
The Chairman: Do the French, Americans and British who train officers, enlisted personnel, and privates have the same policy?
LGen. Dumais: I cannot speak for them. I know that every nation has different policies. Each policy concerns the national caveat and national determination of the mandate, notwithstanding the fact that we are all contributing to the same mission. Each nation has the purview and preserves the right to put certain caveats on what their personnel will and will not be mandated to do. That is why there are always differences in approach between nations in terms of a particular mission.
The Chairman: With this particular caveat, did it originate in your office or with your predecessor?
LGen. Dumais: I cannot answer that question. We would have to come back to the committee with an answer.
The Chairman: Please do that. Are caveats internally generated by your office before people go on operations or are they matters that are considered at the political level?
LGen. Dumais: I would suspect it is the latter. I do not expect the caveats would originate from my office.
The Chairman: Could you clarify that for us as well?
LGen. Dumais: Certainly.
Senator Atkins: Returning to the airlift question and the Hercules, while the concern about maintenance and the technical staffs is not your direct responsibility, are you worried about the fact that the military is having some difficulty getting the personnel to keep those planes in the air?
LGen. Dumais: It is a concern for the Chief of the Air Staff in terms of his force generation responsibilities and it is of concern to us because it has an impact on the availability of the Hercules.
In my previous position, it was of great concern. We have put in a significant amount of effort to help to improve the serviceability rate of the Hercules fleet. Again, I am getting into the Chief of the Air Staff area, but the lack of availability of spare parts affected the fleet. Several of the aircraft in the Hercules fleet are getting on in age, almost as old as the Sea King, so it is a challenge to keep them serviceable.
We have a shortage of trained technicians, the MOC-500 trade, and with the demands of operations some of them are deployed in theatre and that leaves fewer behind to train the new cadre. We have a number of new recruits and we have many privates who need to be trained up on all our fleets, but certainly in the Hercules fleet as well.
All of those areas are having an impact on the serviceability rate of the Hercules. There has been a good effort to address all of those issues. We have put heat and light on improving the availability of spare parts and procuring more. There has been increased investment in the national procurement budget in general as a result of the budget. We have seen a vast improvement in the allocation of procurement and that should help all of the fleets across the three services.
The air force is enhancing the training and shortening the training time for technicians. We are attacking the problem on many fronts to improve it.
Senator Atkins: There is some impact in terms of your responsibilities because of the operational tempo; is that correct?
LGen. Dumais: Absolutely.
Senator Forrestall: LGen. Dumais, about policy for approaches at Kabul, I do not know about policy or anything like that, but I do know two things about that landing: The pilot sure as hell enjoyed it, and so did I. I do not get to fly too often like that. I enjoyed it and it was an excellent job. Thank God, nobody in the back could see out to see where we were flying, but, on the other hand, it was a super five-minute experience. The craft was well handled and we did land, which says everything for the crew, nothing for the aircraft except it held together, which is enough.
I must confess that I was surprised and disappointed to hear the government's decision to continue lowest cost rather than most effective cost for the replacement of Hercules search and rescue and fixed wing acquisitions that you have to make. Does this give you any concern? Do you just simply tailor what you can do to what equipment you have?
LGen. Dumais: Again, I do not want to step outside my lanes. I am involved in force deployment. Search and rescue capabilities are delivered by the Chief of the Air Staff and are responsible for the statement of operational requirement.
There is intent on the part of the CF to maintain the level of service we provide. That is the minimum standard against which we are working in terms of search and rescue.
Senator Forrestall: How many Hercules are flying or are in some form of deployment today?
LGen. Dumais: I did not look at it for today. On any given day, on average, we have three. On a very high level of readiness for search and rescue, we would have the two in camp mirage. We often would have maybe six or more aircraft available on a day-to-day basis. That is ballpark. I do not track that information right now.
Senator Forrestall: I was not asking for specifics. You never know what can happen in the run of a day's work. Do the three on standby search and rescue, do they engage in normal freighting activity, if you will?
LGen. Dumais: No, those three aircraft are on very short notice. They can be used by the search and rescue crews for local training. If they are called on a mission, they carry on. They bring everything they need to carry on the mission, if they are called airborne. Other than that, they are totally dedicated to search and rescue.
Senator Forrestall: There are nine or ten planes at the manager's fingertips, more or less.
LGen. Dumais: I do not have the latest numbers, but I would say that is a minimum on a daily basis.
Senator Forrestall: That is not very many, is it?
LGen. Dumais: I explained why the Hercules is in that situation.
Senator Forrestall: We all know why it is. I wish to return to a question that Senator Atkins asked. I am curious about whether or not the military has done an assessment of the African military structure with respect to its capability to engage in what is ongoing and will be for some considerable time. If so, could you give us an indication as to how we will deploy Canadian Forces keeping that type of an assessment in the back of your mind?
LGen. Dumais: Are you speaking about an assessment about the African Union?
Senator Forrestall: Yes, I am.
LGen. Dumais: We have had the CDS and other government appointed officials who have deployed to the region to make assessments on behalf of the government and the Canadian Forces. We do have a reconnaissance team there to determine how we can contribute.
I do not see it as our place to do an assessment of the African Union's capabilities in terms of whether they can meet their mandate. It is important to understand that the intent is to find a regional solution to the problem in Sudan, and the African Union is engaged for that reason.
Senator Forrestall: It would seem to be important with respect to our attitude with the deployment of Canadian Forces.
LGen. Dumais: To the extent that we can assess how best we can assist them.
Senator Forrestall: I was thinking of our maintenance.
The Chairman: General Dumais, if you do not have an assessment of what the African Union armies can do, how can you come forward with a plan for how Canadians can help them?
LGen. Dumais: We have done those assessments at a broad level, but if we are talking about specific capabilities of their forces, we will send some planners to help them manage their mission.
Senator Forrestall: Mobility?
LGen. Dumais: Exactly. The government has committed 100 APCs to assist them.
Senator Forrestall: Intelligence?
LGen. Dumais: That is part of the potential contribution.
Senator Forrestall: We will not pursue it. It is a sensitive area.
I would like to come back to Kabul. We understood that perhaps August would be the target date to start transition. Is that still on track?
LGen. Dumais: With respect to the provincial reconstruction teams, yes. We are deploying the advance theatre activation teams now. We have 90 personnel either there or in the process of deploying to Kandahar to prepare the terrain for that mission. That is unfolding.
Senator Forrestall: They will be the first? They will be the lead group?
LGen. Dumais: That is correct.
Senator Forrestall: Having been beneficiary of the hospital at Camp Julien and its team, I can only suggest to you, sir, it is of the highest calibre and dedication. They were wonderful.
LGen. Dumais: I appreciate that comment.
Senator Forrestall: They were superbly professional and prepared to work the 16 hour day that for some strange reason we require of our Canadian Forces. I love them all.
LGen. Dumais: I appreciate your comments and I will pass them on. One of the messages there is that we do the best we can to provide a high level of service and support to our troops when they deploy.
Senator Forrestall: In the race between Camp Julien and the German military hospital, that extraordinary head of services in whose care I had been placed, and the good doctors at the Ottawa Civic, I struck out. There is nothing wrong with me.
Is there any consideration being given to moving the JTF2 to Goose Bay? I hope not but I just wondered.
LGen. Dumais: The budget has directed us to find an adequate training location. We have the funding. However, there is no plan right now to consider Goose Bay as a possible training site for the JTF2.
Senator Forrestall: Whatever the training site, should it be in the approximation of Ottawa?
LGen. Dumais: I would say there are two primary criteria. One is proximity to our large population centres so they can respond, and that is always a challenge. The other is finding a space where they can congregate to do complex training and not bother their neighbours.
Senator Forrestall: How is the upgrading of the strength of the crew?
LGen. Dumais: Their numbers are adequate right now. We may be facing a challenge in terms of retention if we are not careful because the skill sets they have are very attractive and there are some high paying contracts that some of them are being offered.
The challenge will be in retaining the personnel that we have. We will have to see how it evolves, but for now things are good.
Senator Mercer: I would like to follow up on the location of JTF2. Retired Brigadier General O'Connor, who is the opposition defence critic in the Commons, does not want the JTF2 in his constituency. I find that amazing because those of us who grew up next to military establishments know the value of having them as neighbours, friends and allies.
I am disappointed to hear you say that you think that JTF2 needs to be located in a big city. I am from Halifax and I hope that Halifax meets your definition of a big city because I would be happy to have the JTF2 in Nova Scotia.
While Senator Forrestall is not in favour of Goose Bay, all parts of the country should be considered, but I encourage consideration of Nova Scotia with its deep-rooted commitment to the military and their long history of the community supporting efforts of the military, even if they can be noisy at night when they are on exercise.
LGen. Dumais: I did not say they needed to be in a big city, just near to our major population centres because response time is critical. It has to be a location where there is adequate training space but also ready access to airlift and the ability to move by road as well and get to the key places quickly, within a matter of a few hours.
Senator Mercer: Would CFB Greenwood fill those criteria?
LGen. Dumais: If you were thinking in terms of the Ottawa-Toronto triangle this area would not be the best choice.
The Chairman: I chalk that up to a good try, senator.
Senator Mercer: I still scratch my head as to what why Brigadier General O'Connor does not want a base in his constituency.
Senator Forrestall: I hope you find a place for them soon and get them settled, and get them up to their required strength.
How do you see the new command force structure fitting in with individual force training and preparation for deployment?
Is it a goal that sooner or later we will have a common formula towards deployment that will apply to the army, the navy and the air force, or will they be allowed to continue on with their own regimes with respect to training?
LGen. Dumais: That is a very good question. Those are exactly the issues that we have begun to explore, starting with our seminar in Cornwall last week headed by the Chief of Defence Staff. As we implement the vision and move towards increased integrated operations, we need to engage the army, air force and navy assets to train together sooner rather than later.
This speaks to several issues. It is recognized that they certainly have to develop their areas of expertise by training on their own. Then we must create training and exercise opportunities where they are brought together and trained together so they can act as an integrated force. We do have a means of scheduling joint exercises, but we will take advantage of that and create opportunities so that they can train together more often.
Those forces have to be held at a certain high readiness level to be able to deploy as a standing contingency task force, SCTF, or a mission-specific task force. That speaks to another element, which is defining what the SCTF will look like and devising standards for that organization so that the land, maritime, and air components of the SCTF know the required level of interoperability. We need to refine doctrines so they know how to interact with each other.
There are several dimensions that include integrated training opportunities, doctrines, and standards. We must define the composition of the SCTF and MSTF.
Senator Forrestall: This is not just a question of various military units training together for militarization purposes, but it is bringing together the three elements. Where would they do training?
LGen. Dumais: We just received a briefing this morning on Maple Flag, where fighter forces gather each year in Cold Lake. That location presents great opportunities for land forces to perform their training.
We are looking at the possibility of having some of the fighters in Cold Lake come down to Wainwright and train with the land forces at that base. When I say the fighters from Cold Lake, we can also bring in the Hercules aircraft to train as well as the Griffin helicopters. We are looking at integrating the maritime planning elements into that training. They obviously could not deploy resources, but this is in terms of the planning and all the considerations that go along with that exercise.
We used to have a joint exercise on the coast called MARCOT. It involved participation of army, air force, and navy elements as well as binationally with U.S. forces and others. This is a great training opportunity of the kind that we need to undertake. We will be looking at scheduling that or something similar to that in the future.
Senator Forrestall: Do you see NORAD continuing as an agreement between our two countries, or do you see that evolving into the same high level of exchange but evolving into something different?
LGen. Dumais: That is a good and timely question. The NORAD renewal discussions are underway. We have had discussions at the senior levels, military to military, about how this might evolve. There is a common understanding that NORAD is an invaluable binational organization. It is unique. We do not want to dismantle that at all. The outstanding question is how it will fit into the Canada Command and Northern Command, the counterpart in the United States.
However, the mission of NORAD as a minimum will continue to be around outer space surveillance and control.
Senator Forrestall: Is there any room for the Halifax Rifles in your planning? Is there any room for reserves?
LGen. Dumais: Absolutely. Reserves are an integral part of the solution as we move down the road on several fronts. One is in terms of them contributing specialized elements to the SCTF and MSTF constructs. They can contribute areas of expertise that we are short of; for example, in support areas. In terms of domestic response, as we have seen in the defence policy statement, the emphasis will be more on Canada now. We see a role for the reserves in assisting. The reserves have been an integral part of our deployments up until now. They have been a significant portion of various deployments.
If you look at some of the domestic scenarios such as the ice storm, we had upwards of 18,000 personnel deployed in response to that emergency of which here was a large contingency of reserves.
There is no doubt that reserves have had a role and will continue to have a key role in the evolution of the division.
Senator Mercer: What is the current status of the implementation of the Defence Intelligence Review?
LGen. Dumais: It is progressing well. We are on target to meet the recommendations by next year. We have increased the establishment on the military side, and we are in the process of hiring civilians in accordance with the recommended numbers.
Senator Mercer: You are getting the staff you need?
LGen. Dumais: Absolutely.
Senator Mercer: Secondly, we have heard of the intention of establishing a Canada Command. First of all, can you explain this concept of operation, its responsibilities, and its relationship to NDHQ?
LGen. Dumais: The prime reason behind the concept of Canada Command, as with the Canadian Expeditionary Forces command, is to bring a command and control structure to the Canadian Forces.
Canada Command will be an operational headquarters responsible for commanding and running all training and operations related to the Canadian area. Their statistics will be augmented compared to the number of personnel we have devoted within the organization for dealing with domestic situations. That will allow them to do more planning to coordinate with other government departments, to coordinate with Northern Command in the United States, and to have a direct command and control relationship with the regional structures that will be modified. They will become joint task forces.
We will have a very clear operational link from the region to the operational level Canada Command headquarters to CDS at National Defence headquarters. It will be an operational chain, and it will provide a clear focal point for planning and domestic coordination.
Senator Mercer: Will that change your role and responsibilities?
LGen. Dumais: It will. The Canadian Expeditionary Forces command headquarters and the Canada Command headquarters will be forged from structures that I have in my organization. My domestic and international responsibilities will be devolved to those two operational level headquarters.
Senator Mercer: What role does the binational planning group play in this situation?
LGen. Dumais: It has been indispensable in facilitating the dialogue between National Defence headquarters and Northern Command.
In recent discussions with the Americans, we both see value in continuing that dialogue. Its shape might change and we are hoping it will become a more formal link between Canada Command and Northern Command. Therefore, its chain of responsibility might evolve as we stand up Canada Command, but we have seen the value in having that structure there, and we are hoping to preserve it in some fashion.
Senator Mercer: The new defence policy states that the defence of Canada and North America is the Canadian Forces' first priority and maritime and air forces are to place much greater emphasis on protecting Canada.
What more do you expect them to do in addition to what they have already done?
LGen. Dumais: We are certainly looking towards enhancing some of the capabilities. In the budget there is an item of providing utility aircraft for the North and replacing it with the Otter, so that will enhance that dimension.
We are looking at different ways to enhance our surveillance of the country. We think there is a role for UAVs in the surveillance. We are upgrading our Aurora fleet so it will have more capability in terms of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, ISR, which will contribute significantly to the surveillance of the country.
One of the primary areas in the command control structure, Canada Command, will significantly streamline and enhance from a CF perspective our contribution to domestic security and working with other government departments.
Senator Mercer: What specific arrangements have been accomplished to advance the degree of integration of DND with other government departments?
What level of DND representation or liaison is found in other government departments?
LGen. Dumais: I do not have specific numbers but we have established or are in the process of establishing liaison with several other organizations. We have good liaisons with the RCMP and PSEPC. We have or are putting members in the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, ITAC. We have a representative in Foreign Affairs. We have links and we need to assess whether they need to be enhanced, whether those departments can contribute to our headquarters, primarily Canada Command, which will provide a good focal point for enhancing this further. We have good coordination and it is improving steadily.
For example, recently Exercise Triple Play was held, which is a binational, higher level exercise in terms of a domestic security scenario. We played on our side right up to the ministerial level and the Americans did so through Northern Command. Those opportunities help us to establish better links with key government departments. We are going down the right road, and things will only improve.
Senator Mercer: What role do the provinces play?
LGen. Dumais: The provinces play a big role. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were involved at the provincial level in Exercise Triple Play. Pure provincial jurisdiction occurs in most natural disasters or other scenarios. Our military regional headquarters have good links with the provincial emergency measures offices. In some cases, we already have contingency plans in place, such as the scenario of an earthquake on the West Coast. All of this will be enhanced further with the establishment of the Canada Command and having more personnel devoted to that specific domestic security agenda.
The Chairman: One group you did not mention as having close integration with was CSIS. Was that an inadvertent omission?
LGen. Dumais: It was inadvertent because we have good links with CSIS as well.
The Chairman: With respect to special operations in the Canadian context, what do they do? What specific elements are included in the Special Operations Forces within the Canadian Forces? What specific elements will be included in the future special operations group?
LGen. Dumais: Clearly, I cannot speak to the specifics but special forces are in place to assist with domestic security events and to contribute to our international commitments. There defence policy statement intends to stand up a specialist operations group. Currently, our special forces include JTF2, and the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Company. Those will be enhanced and, under the special operations group construct, other assets would be enhanced in terms of the relationship with the special forces, such as the tactical aviation organization. The structure will be set up so that it is larger and even more capable in terms of its overall capacity.
The Chairman: It sounds like you are talking about a number under 1,000, one company plus JTF2 plus your tactical aviation.
LGen. Dumais: We are in discussions as to what will be incorporated in that structure. It could be fairly sizeable, once it is complete.
The Chairman: You were asked about the success in expanding JTF2. Rumours persist that the CF is having difficulty recruiting.
LGen. Dumais: Are you asking in a general sense?
The Chairman: For JTF2.
LGen. Dumais: It is a challenge to find personnel for that unit. Such a problem is not unique to Joint Task Force 2.
The Chairman: You talked about the difficulty of retention of members, which we understand. One could earn a great deal of money as a contractor these days. We also understand that, in addition to their going out the door quickly, they are coming in the door slowly.
LGen. Dumais: It is complex. One facet is that units do not want to give up their personnel to postings at JTF2. Everyone is short of experienced personnel but I do not think there is a shortage of personnel who are interested in joining JTF2, although their requirements are exacting. We will sort this out.
The increase in 5,000 regular force members and 3,000 reservists will take some pressure off and allow the land forces to increase their numbers. That should help the entire process, I would hope.
Senator Mercer: How aggressively are we recruiting? Most of us spend time around high schools and universities in our jobs. I do not see much evidence of Armed Forces recruiters. I recall seeing such people when I was a student in the 1960s.
LGen. Dumais: Based on what I have been told, currently we are having some specific challenges recruiting. I would suggest that question be asked of the Assistant Deputy (Human Resources-Military), ADM(HR-Mil), because that is not my area of expertise.
Senator Mercer: We have heard certain public criticism of the American style of recruiting, and I would not suggest we do that. However, I think that the military provides a great opportunity for young Canadians to contribute not just to the defence of the country but to the betterment of themselves and the development of their careers.
LGen. Dumais: Certainly, I would agree with that statement.
The Chairman: I come back to JTF2 and the Special Operations Forces. We have seen them here and other places, for example, we bumped into them in Afghanistan and in Halifax. When you speak about special operations, are you including land, air and sea?
LGen. Dumais: No. The reference is to one unit that trains in all environments and is highly specialized. We will not have a special forces unit for each of the three arms of the CF.
The Chairman: For example, someone working as a sub-mariner would have to be trained to deal with special forces when JTF2 is on board. It becomes a different job in such a case.
LGen. Dumais: They would receive all the required training to complete those missions.
The Chairman: Do you face any unusual problems in terms of training?
LGen. Dumais: No, senator, we have not had any problems in training.
The Chairman: This group reports directly to you.
LGen. Dumais: Yes.
The Chairman: In terms of going forward, it is clear that the CF Dwyer Hill Training Centre site does not work and that you are looking for a new site. What kind of training needs are you looking for in the new site? What have you found challenging at Dwyer Hill apart from irritating some of the neighbours?
LGen. Dumais: The Dwyer Hill site has become an encroachment issue because the area is small and so the facility is bursting at the seams. That will be exacerbated by the increase in size as we develop the special operations group. We do have to find a larger, better site for them. It is not clear whether all units that will belong to the special operations group will need collocation, but we still need a different site.
There are a series of factors in terms of their ability to respond quickly to the large population centres — to have ready access to airlift, to be responsive and yet to be able to do very complex training in a large, multi-dimensional, appropriate training facility. They also go to other locations for specific aspects of their training.
The Chairman: How far has their role morphed or changed from the original one, dealing with hijacked aircraft?
LGen. Dumais: Their role has expanded significantly, without going into detail. It does require intensive training and highly skilled individuals.
The Chairman: When you say ``without going into detail,'' when you are talking to Parliament, how much can you share with Parliament about what they do?
LGen. Dumais: Unfortunately, not very much. This is a matter of operational security for several reasons. We all understand that divulging too much about their capabilities or any other aspect of what they do could compromise their ability to execute their mission or could put them at individual risk.
The Chairman: Our understanding is that the CF determined that there was too much secrecy surrounding this group and that there would be a more candid discussion of their activities. My understanding is the minister made a statement to that effect some months ago.
LGen. Dumais: From my perspective, I am not at liberty to divulge any specifics.
The Chairman: Has he not talked to you about this matter?
LGen. Dumais: No, he has not.
Senator Forrestall: The most visible call on the JTF2 and the Canadian Forces generally is by the provinces. Thank God it does not happen sufficiently often to have an experience or a record, but how do you keep the provinces' premier informed as to the services the Special Forces can offer in the event of a perceived emergency in the provinces? Who informs them, who keeps them abreast, and what is the chain of request?
LGen. Dumais: The Special Forces are employed strictly under the direction of the government, so they do not respond directly to provincial requests.
Senator Forrestall: Do the premiers get briefed?
LGen. Dumais: Clearly, when there is an event, there is a handover from the local site commander to the joint task force commander on the site for them to take control of the situation.
Senator Forrestall: If I were the Attorney General of Nova Scotia and Minister McLellan said here are some services we can offer if you feel you ever need them, I would want to know details. With all due respect to the minister, I doubt if she is in a position to respond in a professional way. How does the Attorney General know? You do not want to be calling up and saying I do not know whether this is a role for JTF2.
LGen. Dumais: That is a good question. I understand what you are getting at. The point is it actually occurs the other way around. There are different mechanisms for the Canadian Forces to engage in dealing with provincial or federal issues. They are all very legal and complex; as a situation unfolds, there are different mechanisms that can be brought to bear on the situation, and the response may or may not be with JTF2. It might be another military contribution. In some cases, it is a provincial jurisdiction, so we would only assist another agency; and in most cases, that is what we do.
It is actually the other way around. Depending on the scenario and the type of request, an assessment is made of what military contribution would be best brought to bear on the situation.
The Chairman: On behalf of the committee, thank you LGen. Dumais. We very much appreciate you appearing before us today. We are grateful to you for the information you have shared.
The committee continued in camera.
The committee resumed in public.
The Chairman: We have before us now a very distinguished panel. Commodore Roger Westwood, Director General, Maritime Equipment Program Management, was promoted to his current rank in April of 2003 and assumed is current duties in May of 2003. He enrolled in the Canadian Forces in 1970 and has a background in marine systems engineering. On promotion to captain in 1991, he was appointed as Director Naval Architect and Specialty Engineering. In June 1992, he assumed responsibility for the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel Project.
In February 1999, he assumed command of the Fleet Maintenance Facility Cape Breton in Esquimault. In June of 2002, he was appointed Director General, Maritime Force Development on the Maritime Staff at National Defence Headquarters and remained in that position until assuming his current duties.
Also with us is Brigadier-General Dwayne Lucas, Director General, Aerospace Equipment Program Management. He has held this position since June 2002. He began his military career in air maintenance, with 1 Canadian Air Group. He completed a Masters of Science in aircraft design at Cranfield Institute of Technology in the United Kingdom and, upon returning to Canada in 1980, joined the Directorate of Aeronautical Systems Engineering in Ottawa. He was a member of the team that introduced the CF-18 engine test system to the air force.
In May 1998, he became Director, Aerospace Program Management, (Fighters and Trainers) and CF-18 Hornet Modernization.
In June 2000, he was promoted to Brigadier-General and assigned to 1 Canadian Air Division, A1/A4, where he was responsible for personnel training, reserves, logistics and airfield engineering and maintenance.
BGen. Lucas is an Officer of the Order of Military Merit.
Finally, we have with us today Colonel Doug Wingert, Director, Land Equipment Program Staff, a position he has held since May 2005. He enrolled in the Canadian Forces in 1973 and has served overseas in Egypt as part of the United Nations Emergency Force, and also served with the United Nations in Namibia as commander of a Canadian logistic contingent from 1 Service Battalion. Upon promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel in 1990, he was posted to National Defence Headquarters and served as Deputy Project Manager for Light Armoured Vehicles. He was promoted to Colonel in 1998 and was appointed as Director Personnel Plans in the Military Human Resources Group.
In December 1999 he became Special Assistant to the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, and in July of 2002 he took command of 202 Workshop Depot leading to his current position.
Gentlemen, welcome to the committee. Please proceed with your statements.
Commodore Roger Westwood, Director General, Maritime Equipment Program Management, National Defence: Good afternoon. It is an honour to appear before you today to provide some insight into my roles and responsibilities. Within the Department of National Defence I report to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), Mr. Dan Ross, providing materiel acquisition and support to the maritime program in response to requirements set by the Chief of Maritime Staff, VAdm. Bruce MacLean. In essence, I am the materiel authority for all naval ships, submarines, auxiliary vessels and naval equipment for shore establishments. I am responsible for procuring and subsequently supporting all naval platforms, systems and equipment. This responsibility extends for the complete life cycle of the naval equipment and is commonly referred to as ``from cradle-to-grave'' responsibility. I also provide the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) and the Chief of Maritime Staff naval engineering expertise in fulfilling their advisory roles to government.
My division consists of approximately 390 civilian and military personnel split 66 per cent civilian and 33 per cent military. Of these 300 personnel, 80 occupy positions specifically to support capital acquisition projects. The Maritime Equipment Program Management Division supports naval equipment assets valued at some $6.5 billion and represents approximately 41 per cent of the department's total equipment assets.
Before I provide you some details on the maritime procurement and in-service support programs, I should provide you some background on the unique nature of warships and submarines. Warships are perhaps the most complex engineered projects ever conceived. On a warship, systems and equipments are packed into a compact, floating, self- propelled vessel that rolls, pitches, and slams. It is continuously subject to the harsh marine environment and must be able to withstand or contend with shock, fire, flood, chemical and biological attack, et cetera. It must also fight; the available space is crammed with weapons systems.
A minimum of space is allocated to the crew, who must live and work in the ship for extended periods. With this density of people, machinery and weapons in a moving platform, a warship is technically complex, highly integrated and potentially dangerous. As a result, navies are both capital and maintenance intensive.
I fulfill my acquisition responsibilities in support of the requirements set by the Chief of Maritime Staff through the expenditure of capital or Vote 5 funds. The magnitude of the capital program that my division delivers is generally in the range of $200 million to $750 million annually. In recent years, because the navy is only commanding a small proportion of the department's capital expenditures, the outlay has been in the range of $200 million to $250 million. However, as the maritime capital plan begins to ramp up, resulting from the recent approvals of projects such as the Joint Support Ship and the various components of the Halifax class modernization, this annual outlay will steadily increase.
My capital expenditure for this fiscal year is estimated to be $240 million and is dominated by expenditures for the improved defence missile system project for the Canadian patrol frigates and the submarine capability life extension project, which you probably know as the Victoria class submarine acquisition.
My division is currently responsible for some 35 capital projects valued from millions of dollars to billions of dollars. These projects are at various stages of implementation, some just getting underway and others reaching the point of completion. Some of these projects are proceeding very well, such as the YAG 300 class replacement and the improved defence missile system, while others are experiencing or have experienced difficulties. For example, as you are aware, the Victoria class submarine acquisition has experienced schedule delays due to technical difficulties associated with both the reactivation while in the United Kingdom and the Canadianization after the boats had been accepted by Canada. Despite these difficulties, the project is still estimated to complete under budget and provide the Canadian navy with an excellent capability at a fraction of the cost of a new building program.
In general, each project is unique, as are the difficulties that they might encounter. Provided risk is adequately assessed and managed, there appear to be no clear indicators to determine whether or not a capital project will experience difficulty.
On the in-service support side of the house, I fulfill my responsibilities to sustain the current naval fleet and all related equipment through the expenditure of Vote 1, operating and maintenance funds. This portion of the operating and maintenance accounts is commonly called ``national procurement.'' Annually, my division expends between $200 million and $400 million in support to the fleet, covering such components as periodic refits and docking work periods, the procurement of spare parts, the repair and overhaul of various equipment, maintenance of technical data packages, addressing materiel obsolescence issues, and the provision of engineering support services. This year's national procurement forecast expenditure for my division is $370 million. This $370 million forecast is against a demand of approximately $500 million.
In recent years, the demand of the maritime national procurement account has been steadily increasing due to the aging of all major fleet assets and to the introduction of the Victoria class submarines into service. This has necessitated setting priority on the work to be completed and has, in turn, started to impact fleet readiness. As a result of Budget 2005, the maritime national procurement allocation has been increased significantly. This increase will help.
In delivering both the acquisition and in-service support programs, my division, as is the case with my land and air counterparts, must work closely with a number of organizations within the CF and DND, but also with a number of other government departments. We deal with Industry Canada and its regional agencies in negotiating Canadian industrial and regional benefits associated with the projects. We also work with the Treasury Board Secretariat in gaining government approval for our projects. Of course, we work very closely with Public Works and Government Services Canada, which has contractual authority for our procurement work.
There are times when the requirements of other government departments might be perceived to be a hindrance to timely procurement or to achieving an optimal product. However, in general, we have excellent working relationships with the other government departments, and the conditions that are imposed on our acquisitions are consistent with the current, government-approved rules and regulations.
Colonel Douglas Wingert, Director, Land Equipment Program Staff, National Defence: Honourable senators, as mentioned, I am still the Commanding Officer at 202 Workshop Depot in Montreal and I have only been in Ottawa as Chief of Staff of Director General Land, Equipment Program Management, for the last two months, since May 2005. As well, I have a third responsibility. I am the branch advisor or senior officer of an army corps of approximately 3,500 reserve and regular force technicians.
DGLEPM, Director General Land Equipment Program Management, the land division of the materiel group, is responsible to deliver an integrated, cost-effective land equipment program in order to sustain multi-purpose, combat- capable forces. More specifically, the division provides materiel acquisition and in-service support of assigned equipment and materiel systems, largely for the army. The division responds primarily to the requirements set by the Chief of the Land Staff, Lieutenant-General Caron. While the division's responsibilities extend for the complete lifecycle of land force equipment, the division also provides all lines of maintenance support, including third and fourth line repair and overhaul, through 202 Workshop Depot. Finally, the division provides land maintenance support to the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff in support of operations and land force engineering expertise to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) and the Chief of Land Staff.
The division employs some 400 military personnel and 600 public servant employees, half of which are located at 202 Workshop. The division controls or manages approximately 30,000 vehicles, an equivalent number of communications equipment, and more than 233,000 small arms and other types of weapons.
To provide for this in-service, lifecycle support, the division spends annually from $400 million to $550 million to provide periodic equipment refits, life extensions, component repair and overhaul, procurement of operational clothing, repair parts and ammunition.
The division manages over 50 different capital projects, three of which are specifically mentioned in the defence policy statement. These three projects are the mobile gun system, or MGS, multi-mission effects vehicle or MMEV, and the medium support vehicle system, or MSVS.
The MGS project will deliver 66 vehicles with associated integrated logistics support. These vehicles will be fully developed with minimal modifications required to accommodate unique Canadian equipment, such as the existing communications suites. The details of the required modifications will be determined during project definition. The procurement contract is designed to coincide with the U.S. Stryker MGS production schedule to ensure economy-of- scale costing.
The MMEV project, coupled with the MGS project and LAV TOW-under-armour vehicle, form the army's direct fire system-of-systems. This project aims to provide an information-age, direct fire system which possesses increased lethality, agility and survivability on the battlefield. The MMEV will require increased precision and accuracy and an automated command, control and communications network capable of the receipt from, and input into, joint and allied tactical data systems. The MMEV must be effective against both ground and air threats.
The MSVS project will modernize and improve the logistic capability and capacity of the Canadian Forces. This project will replace the capability currently supplied by the fleet of medium logistics vehicle wheeled vehicles.
Certainly, there are many factors that cause a project to go well or that could cause difficult problems. Some of these factors are as follows:
First, assigning a small number of positions and associated military and public service personnel early to the project will greatly facilitate a timely and effective Treasury Board staffing process. This small investment or ``seed corn'' in the more critically important projects has been proven to expedite the early staffing times by over 50 per cent. Other governmental departments do not necessarily have similar positions available to assign these projects until the projects receive Treasury Board approval.
Second, some projects benefit from a significant investment from the senior members of the Department of National Defence and government in pulling the process forward and removing roadblocks that tend to impede projects that are moving forward only on the push-from-below format. This pull acquisition works well for key major Crown projects that have high visibility.
Third, the defence industry base in Canada is limited in scope and thus significant response time differences are seen from those companies that are busy or are unwilling to devote assets to developing Canada's defence requirement compared to those companies that are not as busy or willing to devote assets to developing the requirement. Industry as a partner can make a significant difference in the defence acquisition timeline, particularly when, for intellectual property, policy and other reasons, a sole-source acquisition is the only viable strategy.
Fourth, staffing a project with qualified and experienced personnel when the project needs the resources can be a big problem. For military personnel, the problem lies in having the correctly trained individuals available when positions are required. For civilian staff, the fundamental problem relates to the time required to staff positions.
Major-General Dempster spoke to you on April 11, 2005, during which time he gave you his insights as to how to make the acquisition process faster or more effective. I cannot offer you any new recommendations. I would like to state, however, that procurement is a complex business. Extensive early liaison with other governmental departments ensures that project strategies are supported across government and decisions are made so as to respect government- wide mandates. This early liaison also helps to ensure that we do not revisit strategies that were initially supported or approved by all stakeholders. Simply stated, getting government input at the beginning and holding firm on these decisions should facilitate a smooth and timely acquisition process.
The Chairman: Thank you.
Brigadier-General Dwayne Lucas, Director General - Aerospace Equipment Program Management, National Defence: It is an honour for me to appear before you today to outline my responsibilities and activities within the aerospace equipment program. I am Brigadier-General Lucas, leader of the division. Needless to say, program activity has been dynamic and will continue to accelerate as we drive forward with transformation within the department. My division provides the in-service support for all air vehicles and air radar systems throughout their lifecycle. Additionally, we are responsible for the majority of air capital acquisition projects. I am the Chief of Engineering for the air force and accountable for all aeronautical engineering advice. Under the Aeronautics Act, I am assigned the responsibility for technical airworthiness and I am accountable to certify the technical airworthiness of all aeronautical products. I note this because it is a legal responsibility under the Aeronautics Act.
I work with the Assistant Deputy Minister, Mr. Dan Ross, to execute the air materiel program in response to requirements set by the Chief of the Air Staff Lieutenant-General Steve Lucas. My division is composed of 1,100 personnel that include the Aerospace Engineering and Test Establishment in Cold Lake, Alberta. I know you had the opportunity to speak with their commander. We support 14 different aircraft fleets with over 1,000 in-service support contracts at a cost of approximately $800 million. It is important to note that we do not have major overhaul facilities within the air force, as this work is carried out solely by industry. From a capital perspective, we execute 450 contracts, ranging in size and complexity from small millions to billions of dollars. The total expenditure on an annual basis is around $500 million and growing exponentially. With the introduction of the fixed wing search and rescue project, the new tactical helicopter project, uninhabited aerial vehicles project and potentially an air mobility project, the capital program will grow substantially. The situation will bring an attendant need for additional technical and project management personnel.
The CF-18 Hornet and the CP-140 Aurora modernization programs dominate the current capital program. The CF- 18 modernization project is running well because we have a single contractor and integrator, and we are leveraging off a similar program being undertaken by the United States Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force. There is a close sharing of lessons learned and in various cases each nation has taken lead of certain development areas to share and reduce overall project risk and cost. I should highlight that when we could not find an adequate display for our aircraft, we took the lead in a new coloured display system that has resulted in a world-class product being developed in Canada and being acquired by the other nations. These collaborations are essential to produce the best product at the best cost and in the shortest possible time.
Our most challenging project is the CP140 modernization project, where we are the systems integrator for over 23 major contracts with a multitude of companies. This project originated in the late 1990s, when there were insufficient capital funds. As a result, the project was initiated in an incremental manner.
I should point out that this project is proceeding as well as it can through an outstanding project team led by a superb project manager.
I would like to highlight one thrust that we have initiated in the in-service support domain that should result in increased operational output, significant savings, and a better overall accountability structure to create a ``best of breed'' and globally competitive aircraft support industry. Our optimized weapons systems support program, OWSM, produces an output-focused, performance-based and long-term support structure for the total service support of a given weapons system.
We are nearing the completion of our project on the CP-140 Aurora and the C-130 Hercules aircraft, where we will enter into long-term performance-based contracts. As stated, this should result in reduced service support costs, enhanced operational output and an excellent Canadian industrial support base.
Over the past years, the demand for in-service support funds to meet operational requirements has outstripped the available funding. The result has created a backlog in service support and reduced operational availability. With the recent introduction of increased service support funding, this situation will turn around. Our staffs are working hard to make this a reality, but we need to recognize that there are significant lead times to produce highly complex equipment. Funding must be consistent and provided over the long term so that programs can be optimized and we are not creating inefficiencies through varied funding levels on an annual basis.
To deliver our program, whether capital or in-service support, we work closely with other government departments. While I recognize that we spend significant funds within the government at large, we need to place a higher value on the military benefits rather than on industrial and regional benefits. Our first priority should be to our men and women on the front lines, who need our equipment expeditiously, which will help them to meet their mission and, in the majority of cases, reduce the risk to which they are exposed.
While I recognize that these final comments challenge the status quo, I think it is important that we look at all opportunities to accelerate the acquisition of new equipment. We owe it to the young men and women that we serve; it is our duty.
I am honoured to lead such a highly motivated mission-focused defence team. They continually amaze me in the way that they deliver capability to our personnel on the front lines.
Senator Forrestall: I keep facing such expertise, having twice watched the building of the Queen Mary II, done by a foreign nation outside of Britain. It was done in a couple of years, which generally motivates some of my questions. I want each of the three of you to respond.
In your commitment, could each of you give me an idea of one or two successful projects and indicate why they were successful and, at the same time, one or two projects that were not so successful, and particularly why they were not successful. I am thinking in terms of time, other forms of overruns, and delays.
Cmdre. Westwood: I am not exactly sure what you are looking for, but I will look at the two major shipbuilding programs.
Senator Forrestall: I am looking to find out why it takes 15 years to get a helicopter into operation when the Queen Mary II can be built in two years.
Cmdre. Westwood: Ship design is a little more complex than that, senator. If I look at the two major shipbuilding projects that have occurred in my lifetime, both the Canadian patrol frigates and the Canadian maritime coastal defence vessels programs experienced schedule delays at the front end. Contracts were put in place, the shipyards and their subcontractors had a delivery schedule, and in both cases at the front end they ran into delays because they could not ramp up the required personnel to do the design in time, they could not ramp the people required to do the building in time. As the projects moved forward, and as they got near the end, they made up those schedules because they learned through a learning curve process. There were 12 ship programs, and by the end, in both projects all of the vessels were delivered ahead of schedule and at lower cost than what was originally in the program.
At the front end, however, you would look at those as if they were unsuccessful projects because there were delays. The first frigate was three or four years late, and the first MCDV was a couple of years late. It is the nature of the business.
Senator Forrestall: The projects that were not successful in the beginning became the projects you would cite as being successful; is that correct?
Cmdre. Westwood: The Canadian patrol frigate is a world-class ship, recognized by most experts in the word, but it did take a lot of time to ramp up the expertise and technical capability to deliver that product.
Senator Forrestall: What are we doing about replacing the four DDHs?
Cmdre. Westwood: We have a project at the requirements level with the Chief of the Maritimes Staff, known as a single class surface combatant, not presently in the funded program but off to the right-hand side, which is meant to replace the four destroyers and then be a follow on for the frigates.
Senator Forrestall: When will you begin to build those ships?
Cmdre. Westwood: I cannot tell you off the top of my head, but we are still looking in the 2015 period before we would be building.
Col. Wingert: I cannot identify any one project that has not delivered the proper product to meet the requirements of the land staff or the army. All the projects we have delivered are serving the army well. They are world-class products. Of course, that does not mean that the equipment is purchased as quickly as you require.
The time required to acquire the materiel in service is unfortunate and I commented on that in my opening statement, but the equipment has been all very successful. Everything we have bought has fully met the operational requirement for the army.
Senator Forrestall: Are any of your delays caused by other departmental concerns that you must deal with, the Treasury Board, for example?
Col. Wingert: I refer back, sir, to General Dempster's visit to the committee and the recommendations that he offered you as to how improvements could be made to the acquisition period. I believe those recommendations and insights still apply. The departments work very closely together. Things could be expedited, things could move faster, but it is not because of any one's ill will towards any one project, but rather it is a matter of ensuring that the projects are staffed appropriately, with the right resources to move the projects forward.
I also would like to comment on another point that General Dempster spoke of, and it was how quickly we can stop projects if there is an urgent requirement and we have seen this repeatedly during our operational missions in which we have had to staff urgent operational requirements. We can move projects extremely quickly and we have done so in Afghanistan, Iraq, and every other theatre. The only problem is those projects, to require things through the UOR process demand a lot of staff time. Basically, we have to drop everything else in order to staff those particular projects.
It would be an easy fix to treat all projects as UOR, but we do not have the human resources to move projects that quickly, on a standard basis.
Senator Forrestall: I understand what you are saying.
BGen. Lucas: In regard to the CF-18 program, in the beginning — and I was there in the beginning — we struggled. We struggled because we could not get a clear articulation and agreement within government. This was a fighter program in an era where we were struggling with the question of whether we would have a manned fighter. Without that clear government will to drive forward, it was difficult.
Once we got that agreement, then the next hurdle was to get clear, consistent funding. In the beginning, we received only incremental funding. Then we finally broke through in 2000 and got a clear mandate for the full period of the program. Since then, the program has accelerated. That is because of the close collaboration with other government departments.
One of the key elements is when other nations are working like products or like activity. We need to set up those multinational teams to share requirements and to drive forward. The cost of research and development on a time period for those phases is quite significant. We did that on the 18. I can give you the example on displays. We could not find a proper display; neither could the Australians. The Americans were hedging their bets. We decided we would do it. We sat down with our defence research folks and with industry, we built a team and we now have a world-class product. If we sell the anticipated number, we will get the product at half the cost because we will get royalties from the sales.
I now turn to the state of the CP-140. On the Aurora case, we were in an incremental phase and are still in an incremental phase, where we have a single individual trying to pull 23 different major projects together to deliver that aircraft, and a team that is constantly trying to integrate a number of different companies. It is a difficult task.
I believe you must have a single integrator, make him accountable and make him deliver. That is where industry must stand up and build those collaborative teams. If you get the government will, you get the appropriate funding levels; you can drive these activities faster.
Senator Forrestall: I appreciate your point. Within materiel command, is there a capacity to organize the type of team capability to which you refer?
Is it possible to form a multinational or political in the industrial sense in the military as well?
BGen. Lucas: On certain weapons systems areas, we maintain strong relationships with our allies. It is one of our key components for interoperability. We share this with the other two services and we maintain those strong links either through the NATO sector, our American allies, or with New Zealand and Australia.
In our different weapon system areas, we maintain close relationships to build those activities forward. I would say yes, absolutely.
Senator Forrestall: Do we do particularly well in terms of time and efficiency, where we seek out an existing piece of equipment?
Cmdre. Westwood: We have a cooperative project right now with the Dutch to provide an infrared sensor. That is going into the implementation phase. The development is a cooperative team with both Dutch and Canadian military managing the project with a combination of Dutch and Canadian industry.
In the development phase, the Dutch led the organization. As we are entering implementation, we will lead the organization and Canadian industry will be the prime contractor on that particular project.
If you can find like requirements and funding in the program to support it, if both countries have the funding available at the times when the product can be developed, then you can cooperate and get efficiencies; you share the cost of getting the work done. It tends to be more a cost-sharing than necessarily speeding the schedule up.
Senator Forrestall: What is your major challenge?
Cmdre. Westwood: My major challenge — and I am sure my colleagues will echo this — is the lack of sufficient personnel trained with project management capability in order to deliver the program, especially in light of the fact that we have an increase to our national procurement budgets to give the in-service support.
In my particular case, I am going from a dormant capital program that is beginning to ramp up in terms of the joint support and modernization of the Halifax class, is getting the people to deliver the product.
Col. Wingert: I would echo that, sir. It is a significant problem. It will continue to be a problem for the next few years. Stepping out of Ottawa, as a member of the EME branch and as senior officer in that particular corps, it is a problem for all of my technicians.
In the last few years, we have recruited many people, but they are not at the stage in their careers where they can offer value to projects in Ottawa. At this time, we have between 25 per cent and 40 per cent of our technicians who are not considered at a journeyman level. That means they are still at the apprenticeship level. That has a huge impact on the army in terms of finding the qualified technicians to deploy into operational theatres.
In Ottawa, 30 per cent of the captain positions are vacant at this stage as we are employing those people elsewhere. The numbers all add up, we have the right numbers, but it is the junior officer we are trying to keep in the field to get experience in the operational environment before pulling them to Ottawa to build the project management experience. Human resource is definitely a problem from the military perspective and for the public service.
Since 1990, we have reduced the project management experience in the public service. My determination is it has been cut by at least half, and this is something that, with all the acquisition that we focused on in the last five to six years, we are trying to rebuild. It is getting better but it is still a problem.
BGen. Lucas: Personnel are the biggest challenge for all of us; money is not the issue, sir. We received $1.6 billion this year in capital funding. That will rise to $4 billion within two years. We will be challenged to deliver that, to get the necessary people to drive the projects forward.
This is not only related to the department; but also to industry. If you will put another $2.5 billion dollars out into industry within the next couple of years, they will have to generate more technicians and more skilled labour.
In my view, people skilled and knowledgeable to execute the task, both internally and externally will be our biggest challenge, it will not be money.
Senator Forrestall: Is there a role for the public education process, such as universities and technical schools?
Is there a role for them in the process of developing the type of skilled personnel we need?
It sounds like the Department of Labour goes to the bricklayers and says, ``We will need 4,000 bricklayers year after next; do you have them?'' Do you go to the universities and say that you will need a certain type of person with a certain type of skills.
Is there any of that initiative on the part of the Canadian Armed Forces?
BGen. Lucas: Absolutely, on the technician side, we are working with a number of colleges, Collège Édouard- Montpetit in Montreal, SAIT in Calgary, and Red River College in Winnipeg.
I think there is good alliance. The problem we will encounter is that Air Canada is producing a C-series and Bell Helicopter is coming in with their new family of helicopters. If Air Canada buys the new aircraft that they are struggling with right now, they will be looking for another 2,000 technicians. They have an aging population in their technician regime, so the demands across the country will outstrip the ability of the institutions.
On the university side, we work closely with Carleton, RMC, and Montreal Polytechnique. Those three universities produce students with aeronautical engineering skills. Again, that will not be enough. If the amount of money we spend and if the aviation sector grows at the current rate it is growing, there will be insufficiently skilled personnel in that sector to meet the mission.
Senator Forrestall: Would you describe that situation as critical?
BGen. Lucas: I would describe that situation as critical, yes.
Senator Munson: You talked about insufficient personnel. Did anyone in the three armed forces see this shortage coming five or 10 years ago? Should someone have been planning for the shortfall?
Cmdre. Westwood: We went through the 1990s where the mantra from government was to downsize and to cut back, and management focused on doing what they were told to do.
As the CO of the maintenance facility on the West Coast in the period of 1999-01, I was told to cut, cut, and cut.
I looked out the front window one day and realized that in five or six years' time, I would not have any technicians left that could actually do the maintenance onboard ships because they were all reaching retirement age. While I was being told to cut back and offer people packages to leave, if I looked forward and projected what my workforce would be in five or ten years' time, I would not have anybody to do the work.
Senator Munson: Brigadier-General Lucas seems to be implying it is the same in the private sector.
BGen. Lucas: It takes ten to fifteen years to produce someone with the skills and knowledge you need to execute the task. There is no question that this decision should have been made in 1995, when PR one and PR two came out.
I would suggest to you, as I was also a branch advisor; we were pulling our hair out. There used to be 12,000 technicians in the air force, and there are now 4,500. It is also an aging population.
If you look at the population distribution, you have a whole bunch in the zero to five-year bracket, young and inexperienced. Then if you move to the 18-25 year zone, you have another large group, which will be approaching their retirement age over the next number of years.
The personal planning system at that time was not focused on generating new people, and we have missed the window. It will be a struggle to regenerate it now.
Senator Day: Commodore Westwood, in your opening remarks you indicated you were responsible for naval platforms for procurement and subsequent maintenance.
We are reading a lot these days about the joint supply ship. I would be interested in knowing what if any role you or your personnel have in determining what capabilities the supply ship might have in addition to straight supply.
Cmdre. Westwood: It is actually the joint support ship as opposed to the supply ship.
The project manager works for me directly. However, the requirements are set by the navy. One of the roles that I have always felt incumbent upon the engineering side of the house is to ensure that the requirements are valid, that they can be executed and that they are feasible and can be done by industry.
There is a requirement validation process, and we need to participate with the navy in that role. However, the actual capability or requirement comes from the military side of the house, and we tend to respond in providing the technical solutions.
Senator Day: Do you have any input into that decision-making process in terms of recommendations?
Cmdre. Westwood: Yes, we do. Through the review processes in place for the various projects, we provide feedback to the operators and to the requirements people as to whether something is achievable or not and make recommendations as to what might be more achievable. That definitely takes place.
Senator Day: If we bought this off the shelf, would it take an awful lot less time to procure than if we tried to design for several different support functions in one platform?
Cmdre. Westwood: I do not believe it is quite as easy as that. I do not know too many places I can go and buy this ship off the shelf. In this particular case, this one-off requirement will require a dedicated design effort.
Having said that, if we simply replaced the existing AORs, auxiliary oil replenishment vessels, with an AOR that is in service in another country, we would still have to go through a process. It would still have to be built, and we would likely change some of the systems, such as communications, to make them compatible with the existing fleet. There would be a design effort, even from an existing design.
Senator Day: Is there someone within your group in the navy, and the same would apply for the army and the air force, who is thinking about how much more time it takes when you try to devise one platform to do many tasks?
Does someone make a decision in the abstract about doing these five things with this one platform, then your people get involved in saying we have to procure this and we have to design this and it then takes forever to get anywhere?
Cmdre. Westwood: There is a give and take through the whole process, from the conceptual level to the point where the project is actually initiated. Both sides provide input.
My background is naval architecture. I am a ship designer. At one time, I was the section head responsible for ship design and concept development. The operators would come up with a requirement, and I would provide them feedback as to whether that was achievable or not and what the cost might be.
We have been trying to put more than one requirement into one hull form simply because we do not have enough money to satisfy all the requirements in single platforms. We have tried to economize by pulling requirements together into one platform.
Senator Day: Does that result in tremendous delays and ultimately more expenses if you factor in all the time and people involved?
Cmdre. Westwood: The question is whether it would be more expensive to have two one-off platforms or to have one platform with both capabilities in it.
I think that on the expense side of the house we are putting the two requirements into one platform because it is cheaper. Because the complexity is higher, it will take longer to design it. There is no doubt about that.
The Chairman: It strikes the committee as strange that there are so many things that have to be uniquely Canadian.
Why do we have needs that are different from other countries? Other countries have financial difficulties, they have to perform similar roles, and some are the same size as Canada.
Why would Canada ever need something that some other country does not already have?
Cmdre. Westwood: In the case of joint support ship in particular, I can understand that. We have some unique requirements in terms of providing sealift capability that we are trying to fulfil in an economic manner.
Generally, other countries require sealift and AORs. They may be fulfilling that with two different platforms. We have tried to bring those together because it is more economical to build one ship. As the admiral explained it, the space and the steel required to enlarge an AOR to have sealift capability is cheap when compared to building a second platform to provide that.
The Chairman: You seem to be saying that we are the only people smart enough to have figured out this solution and that all other countries have figured out solutions that are not very smart.
Cmdre. Westwood: Perhaps that is so. Our CPFs are built differently than other people's warships.
The Chairman: However, we could not sell one to anyone else.
Cmdre. Westwood: Understood, but that tends to be the nature of the ship-building industry across the world.
The Chairman: I agree that it is not a nice industry.
Senator Day: Commander Westwood, you understand the point that we are trying to make. I hope that you will take that message back. As I put it on previous occasions, trying to invent another Swiss army knife for all functions and one platform may not be the economical way to proceed.
Cmdre. Westwood: I understand that fully but in some cases it might be the way to do this. As I mentioned in answering Senator Forrestall's question, in the case of developing an infrared sensor, we have gone with the Dutch and developed our requirements together; and that has moved ahead as required development.
Senator Day: We have made our point and established our mutual disagreement on that point.
I will move on to the issue of the number of people in your division, two-thirds of whom are civilian and one-third of whom are military. There was an interesting discussion earlier and I would like to explore it further with you.
Are some members of the military talking to officials of universities and military colleges to say that they should be teaching courses and encouraging people to move in the direction of procurement?
Would it be a good career move for a member of the military to move on to procurement?
Should there be a higher percentage of civilians who are quite content to continue working at NDHQ and gain some expertise rather than returning to the field?
Cmdre. Westwood: In our case, two-thirds civilian and one-third military is a nice balance. You need to have someone with the experience of going to sea and working with the equipment in order to provide the right solutions to support the personnel that are at sea.
Within our division, the majority of the pure procurement staff is civilian with PG category. The military personnel tend to be engineers or from the operational side of the house who bring their requirements with them. The key is to strike the right balance. Two-thirds civilian and one-third military provide continuity from the civilians and an understanding of the requirements of a unique environment from the one third military.
Senator Day: Do theses individuals specialize in procurement or do they give a military flavour to the procurement process?
Cmdre. Westwood: I came to Ottawa as a new commander, having been educated as a naval architect and having supported ships on the coast in terms of doing repairs. I entered the area of forward ship design and getting programs off the ground. As a director, people worked for me who managed the projects. I became a project manager for a large Crown project for close to six years. After doing the job on the coast, I took responsibility for the entire organization that does both the procurement and in-service support side of the house. It is a nice balance to do both sides.
Senator Day: We have read quite a bit about the new Chief of the Defence Staff's vision in terms of joint formations and a much closer cooperation between the various elements of the Canadian Armed Forces.
Do you anticipate that spilling over into procurement such that one or two years from now, one person will be in charge of the army, navy and air force, rather than one person in charge of each element?
BGen. Lucas: I think there will be a single chief of force development, which CDS will bring forward. One individual will ensure we have a well integrated approach from that perspective. Because of some unique characteristics of aviation, surface and maritime, you will still need people with specific knowledge of warfare skills and applications of technology in those domains and fields. I suggest that closer integration is on the way. For our technical airlift project — the big honking helicopter — we have army, air force and naval people working together to ensure that we have the right requirement to communicate accurate information on the airplane. At the top, there will be a chief to run the whole project but he will have people with specific operational warfare expertise.
If I may, to the question that you asked Commodore Westwood, there are two key points. First, the military people on project teams bring operational context. They have physically done it in the field. When they come to the project team, they bring that information that helps to shape and form that piece.
Second, because of their operational work, they generally know the different nations because they have worked with the different officers and men of those nations. When they come to the project teams and want to phone the Australians, Americans or British, they know the contact point because they flew and operated with that individual. Such context helps you to get in the door and shape these programs. It is the relationships. I think it is important to have that operational context with military folks on project teams.
Senator Day: You mentioned that aeronautical engineering expertise is developed at RMC but there is a different expertise in respect of procurement, which is more an industrial engineer approach. Have you had discussions with the Royal Military College and civilian universities about training Armed Forces personnel so they come in with an experience that needs to be tested and developed?
BGen. Lucas: Our aeronautical engineering program now includes project management, although it is a smaller piece but growing. A few weeks ago, we talked with Dr. Cowan about an aeronautical program. In the first year of training at CFB Borden, it is taught to members to develop their hands-on field skills.
Mr. Ross at ADM (Mat) has identified this as a key thrust. He wants to build relationships with the program management institute and set up courses for personnel. I have not personally spoken to universities other than Carleton and Montreal's École Polytechnique to introduce some of these planning management courses as part of their engineering degrees.
Senator Day: I will assume it is the same for the army and navy, unless I hear otherwise.
Col. Wingert, in your introductory remarks you referred to MGen. Dempster's presentation to this committee; do you disagree with any of his comments?
Col. Wingert: I would not dare comment because I worked with General Dempster when we both worked for Admiral Garnet when he was the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff. I would not dare say anything to counter either one of them. They are astute, valuable comments, but not easy insights or recommendations to put in place.
Senator Day: It was a more frank discussion than we normally get from military personnel. That might have had something to do with the fact that he was getting ready to retire, but maybe not.
Col. Wingert: I think he was very correct in his comments. I do not want to talk technical issues here on project management, but the departments are trying to work together to do our jobs to deliver the best product as quickly as we can. There are different mandates in the various departments and we are all trying to do our jobs.
General Dempster commented on the HR issue and the minister's authorities for spending. All those would do wonders to the timelines we have to face now to try to deliver the products.
I could not offer anywhere near as many recommendations with the background that General Dempster has delivered to this committee.
Senator Day: The Treasury Board Secretariat informs us that they will be conducting a study on military procurement.
Would General Dempster's comments form a good place to start and have you participated at all yet with the Treasury Board's review of procurement from a military point of view?
Col. Wingert: I cannot speak for the other two but no, we have not started to participate yet. I truly think that General Dempster has listed basically a good starting ground for any future study.
The Chairman: The shortage of project management personnel seemed to digress into the shortage of technicians and people who are actually working on the maintenance of things. Is there a difference between the two groups?
My understanding is that we are short everywhere on technicians to repair things and keep things running. Are these the same people that manage projects?
Col. Wingert: From an army perspective — and I believe the same applies to the navy and air force — I will speak of an officer, because those are the people that tend to be the core of the military side of a project. When the officer graduates or is picked from a university to join the Canadian Forces — because we do directly recruit from the universities and colleges into the officer corps — we do not bring them to Ottawa on first employment. We throw them into an operational environment, working in a unit or formation, to gather the experience that he will require later in his career.
After a first tour or two, we would pull that officer to Ottawa. We would train or educate the officer in project management, which is fundamental at the junior officer level, but it is at the Major and Lieutenant-Colonel rank that he becomes a valued member of a project management team. At that rank, the officer would receive further in-depth training in project management.
The same applies to the technicians. The technician will not necessarily come to Ottawa until some 20-25 years into his career to deal in the divisions from a technical aspect back to the units to offer advice and technical direction to the units.
The Chairman: Are you telling the committee that you cannot hire engineering firms to manage a project and effectively bring it on line for you folks?
Cmdre. Westwood: The majority of the effort still comes from industry. There is a requirement to be a smart customer, to a certain level. We are talking about fulfilling the smart customer requirement. We do have a shortage on the military side, in terms of those trades and officer occupations that generally get involved within project management; and, in addition, the civilian people — in my case, the two-thirds of the division made up by civilians — are difficult to find as well. I am seeing people taking their uniform off after 20 years to become a civilian engineer and get into project management.
The Chairman: Are there not a lot of folks out there? Is it not natural, when you are faced with a spike in spending, that you go to firms outside and say you have been around the block; come in and manage this one through for us?
BGen. Lucas: We do that. We have less than 50 people on the CF18 project. We have a major contract with Boeing, because they are working on the same project with the United States Navy and with the Royal Australian Air Force. Their planning project and team is about 350. They are running a multi-line. They have people up in Mirabel, Ottawa and St. Louis working the program itself.
The job of this team is to ensure that the requirements come out right — that they deliver on time, that they give us the value they are supposed to give us for the dollar and that they build the right in-service support program so we can maintain it at a reasonable cost with a reasonable reliability. It does happen right now.
It is the same for CP140. We have contracted out portions of those contracts, where we have amalgamated three or four activities and given it to an individual. We have said, you are now in charge; you work those five other companies and their pieces of equipment to deliver the final product and output. That is occurring now.
The optimized weapon system management program is moving exactly down that vein; we are transferring larger amounts of responsibility into industry that we used to hold within the division. We are handing that to the various corporations such as IMP, L-3 Communications in Halifax, and we will be doing the Hercules shortly.
Senator Atkins: We have been talking about procurement of large items. What about small items? For example, this committee went to Kingston and it did a tour of the communications sector. During our tour, a technician tried to demonstrate something to us but could not because he did not have a part required for the equipment. He told us he could purchase the part at Radio Shack but that he had to wait for the army to send it; it takes months sometimes to receive a part.
How do you deal with that kind of a problem?
Is the military addressing the inventory systems with computers?
Col. Wingert: I find it hard to comment on the specific case; there could be 100 reasons why the particular part was not available.
Obviously, there are priorities. I am not speaking of priorities of money because money, as mentioned earlier, is not the issue.
Senator Atkins: It is the process.
Col. Wingert: It could be process or the specific item itself. The technician mentioned it was available downtown. I am not disputing that is not accurate. I would have to know the details to be able to respond specifically to that issue.
It is not money. Honestly, it is a people issue. It also is that we have had problems with the implementation of our new supply system, which has caused some problems trying to find stocks that have not been all hoarded elsewhere in the supply system. It could be a multitude of reasons why that part was not available.
We do use the supply system as well as we can to ensure that the shelves are stocked with the right items at the right place. Today in the army, we do not have a repair parts problem; we have a large backlog of labour awaiting technicians. However, in general, we do not have a repair parts problems in theatre or in Canada. I would have to get the details to deal with the specific case that you saw in electronic warfare.
Senator Atkins: When this committee travelled across the country, we heard on a number of occasions that part of the problem in maintenance was a lack of parts.
Cmdre. Westwood: On that particular example, most coastal and formation organizations have local purchase order capability. If they need something from Radio Shack or Canadian Tire, they can go and get it. In the fleet maintenance facility, we often purchase materiel locally. If we try the supply system and what we need to get the ships back to sea is not available, we go out and buy it. There are vehicles in process to help with that problem.
In many cases, however, the spare part or piece of equipment that you need is not available off the shelf from a commercial enterprise and we need to go to the original equipment manufacturer to get it. For example, a company from which we bought a damage control console trainer went into receivership and was no longer in business. That is a computer-based system and I needed replacement part for it. We bought the intellectual property rights when the company went under to allow us to try to find an alternate source of those parts to support the system until we can eventually replace it. We cannot ensure that companies stay in business.
Senator Atkins: As long as a piece of equipment is on stream, there should be some inventory.
Cmdre. Westwood: We try to maintain the inventory level as well as possible. However, we have a lot of equipment across the Canadian Forces and occasionally we run into situations where that source of supply no longer exists and we have to find an alternate source, which takes some time.
The Chairman: Senator Atkins is describing a situation that we have seen everywhere. We have seen it in repairing Hercules, where technicians in Trenton like their working conditions in every respect but want to leave because they do not have the parts. When we were in Esquimault, we saw equipment moving from Ottawa to Winnipeg because they had a lack of equipment.
We find this very difficult to accept. The list of bases that we have visited is very long. At every base visit, we talked to enlisted personnel during our lunches breaks. It is remarkable that we get one version of events here, that being that inventories are fine and a different version when we have lunch with the folks who are replacing those parts.
Cmdre. Westwood: I did not say that all the inventories are fine. I admitted that there are some cases where we do not have the source of supply. I commented that this year I would spend $370 million of national procurement money against a $500-million demand.
We have to prioritize and some things are not done. In some cases, the bins are not full because the priority may be a repair and overhaul or a refit. When a ship is deploying and needs a piece of equipment, you have to get it from a ship at a lower readiness level.
At the same time, we are trying to find a replacement for that piece of kit and get it back into the supply system. However, you are correct that not all bins are 100 per cent full.
The Chairman: It is not a question of all bins being 100 per cent full; it is the number of bins that are 100 per cent empty. If there was one piece in it, they would obviously use it.
Cmdre. Westwood: If they could find it.
The Chairman: The difficulty we see is the carry-on inefficiencies that result from this, the number of people who are frustrated and idle, and how much it costs to take a part off one vessel and put it on another, then take it off that vessel again and put it back on the first one.
It seems that in many cases the lack of allocation of funds, which is not your problem but that of the government, ends up costing the CF a lot more than if there was a reasonably steady supply of parts.
Has anyone made the business case to the Treasury Board or the government that it is being penny wise and pound- foolish?
BGen. Lucas: You probably saw a number of error cases. You saw the Hercules, about which there is no question. I am in charge of that. They were definitely short of equipment. There are 50,000 parts on a Hercules and we missed a number. When there is a shortage of funds, the team prioritizes. They tried to guess which parts were not going to become obsolete and were not going to break at certain times, given their reliabilities. We are dealing with airplanes that are 40 years old and, although we thought we got it right, we were wrong in a number of cases. We guessed that some parts would fly for 5,000 hours but they broke at 3,000 or 3,500 hours.
We had insufficient funds and we had to prioritize. We are on the turnaround now, having to look for new suppliers to rebuild those pieces. That takes time as well. Industry does not have them sitting on the shelf, so we have a bit of lead time there. I suspect it will be another 18-24 months before we will have it fully up to snuff.
We are shifting our responsibility for new acquisitions and this optimized weapons system management to industry to guarantee a given reliability/availability output. They must guarantee that when we go to the wicket, 98 per cent of the time the right part will be there.
We recognize the problem. I could point to shortfalls in any one of our aircraft fleets.
Senator Atkins: Commander Westwood, in your opening statement you said that as a result of Budget 2005 the maritime national procurement allocation has been increased significantly. Will you expand on that statement?
Cmdre. Westwood: I said that the demand is in the neighbourhood of $500 million a year to do everything we should be doing for in-service support. I started last year with an allocation of about $320 million. This year, I am starting with $370 million, which will allow me to do more of the things on the priority list. I am grateful for that extra $50 million to fulfill more of the requirements.
That also happens to be about the amount of money I can spend prudently with existing staff. If I got much more money, I could not meet much more of that demand because I do not have the people to move the program.
Senator Atkins: That is the other point I was going to make. In our travels, we continuously heard that even if you had more money, you could not spend it. I ask all three of you: Why are we getting that line when everything suggests that if you had more money you could spend it?
BGen. Lucas: We have to take that in context. Using our operations and maintenance budget, three years ago I spent $450 million. This year, I will spend $830 million. Within a couple of years, we are doubling our output to procure. You have to ensure that you are buying the right stuff, that you have the reliabilities and assessments right, that you do not buy kit that you do not need or spares that you do not need. We are growing. We have to have consistent budgets on an annual, long-term basis.
We have all dealt with the difficulty of budgets that do not remain the same; one year it might be $300 million and the next year it might be $250 million. It makes it difficult for us to set up a relationship with a supplier when we are unsure of the next year's funds. We cannot promise to buy X number of parts in the next year and so the supplier sells them to someone else.
It is critical that we get long-term, balanced funding. Vice-Admiral Buck is striving for us to have consistent, long- term funding. Without the consistency, we cannot be efficient.
Cmdre. Westwood: You need to put contractual vehicles in place. You need a place to spend that money, and in many cases, you need to do some background engineering work in order to do it properly. You just cannot walk down to the local store and buy more parts. You need to set up the correct vehicles for allowing you to do that.
Senator Atkins: I think we are getting the message.
Senator Munson: I know we are running out of time in this session, so I will give you a chance to think of the first question I will ask in terms of the projects you think have gone well and what has contributed to that success, and the projects that have gone badly and what were the difficulties, perhaps one or two examples on what has really gone well and be candid on what has gone badly.
Colonel Wingert, I will read a paragraph. I want to understand it.
Some projects benefit from a significant investment from the senior members of the Department of National Defence and government in pulling the process forward and removing roadblocks that tend to impede projects that are moving forward only on the push-from-below format. This pull acquisition works well for key major Crown projects that have high visibility.
What does that mean in nonprofessional terms, and what are the roadblocks?
Col. Wingert: Senator, I suggest that the three projects in the defence policy statement are classic examples of government visibility. In some cases, we are not even going to compete with the contracts. Rather, we are directed to where the contracts should be assigned. We are told to get on with it, so we cut through whole levels of government bureaucracy, if you wish, in order to achieve something that could be years in the making, if the project originates from the grassroots, from the army's lowest desk officers and escalates towards Treasury Board for approval.
Those three projects are good examples. In the past, we have had the luxury of having other high-profile projects such as the light armoured vehicle and the Coyote vehicle that we have been able to staff with government's assistance. It had enough profile that it was in our interest to have that project move quickly.
We also have had, through the various operational theatres, as I mentioned before, our urgent operational requirements staffed very quickly because of the threat or operational requirements in a theatre.
Cmdre. Westwood: Having resources in place is key. If you have the required project management resources in place, that certainly helps. As I mentioned in my statement, as long as you are assessing and managing the risk properly, which generally means you put more effort up front, then projects are successful.
The most difficult projects are usually ones that involve a great deal of development, where you are taking a concept, something that may have been developed within our research and development organization, and we then try to get a solution that industry can support and also allow us to put in the service and then provide in-service support for that particular piece of kit over the lifetime.
Those tend to be where you run into problems. On my maritime coastal defence vessel project, there were no real problems with the commercial based design, although I admit upfront that the schedule was delayed, but we put into that ship a route survey system that had to be developed from scratch to meet a new requirement. That was the one particular aspect of that project we ran into problem after problem, as the industry tried to develop the product.
BGen. Lucas: You have to get personnel earlier in the program. The ones where we got personnel earlier in the program went faster and better. When I say personnel, it is not just in the department. It has to occur in Public Works, it has to occur in Industry Canada, and it has to occur with the oversight of Treasury Board.
In my view, those are the three principal agencies, so if each of the departments do not have exactly the same vision, same priority, and same allocation of personnel, that is where we have had some difficulty. Then there has to be a clear articulation and agreement in government, because if we do not have that, we continually have this debate, and you will never get it through cabinet. There has to be that will and a clear vision, and it has to be strong. I have worked two projects where the will was very debatable, and in those ones, we would say, ``Is this the right rock?'' Then we would bring back another one. When it is clear what you want, you can buy Challengers in a week, right? I guess my point is, if the will is there, you have to do it, clear, articulated, funding, with all the government departments on board.
Senator Forrestall: Just remember, blue sky up.
The Chairman: Honourable senators, I think we all agree this has been a very productive panel. We would like to turn off the cameras and sit down with you folks for another couple of hours.
In any event, you have been helpful to us. We may well be coming back to you. I just want you to know that we do appreciate your time. This is an area of great concern to the committee. We are learning as we go, and we appreciate you assisting us in that process. Thank you very much.
The committee adjourned.