Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs
Issue 7 - Evidence - Meeting of February 16, 2005
OTTAWA, Wednesday, February 16, 2005
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs met this day at 3:30 p.m. to examine the development and security challenges facing Africa; the response of the international community to enhance that continent's development and political stability; and Canadian foreign policy as it relates to Africa. TOPIC: Canadian foreign policy towards Africa.
Senator Peter A. Stollery (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: I see a quorum. We can start the proceedings at any time. I call the meeting to order.
This morning, I read in one of the newspapers that we are a subcommittee on Africa. We are definitely not a subcommittee on Africa. This is the main committee. We are not just having three meetings; we are having three meetings this week. I want to correct any impression that we are here for the short time; we are definitely here to do this properly.
I know that we are all seeing some of the same faces, and we appreciate the time that this must be taking out of our witnesses' schedules.
I would like to remind people of our February approach, which is to hear as much background as we can during this month. I know that some of it can be repetitive but it is for the benefit of our members to get as much background as we can before we break for a week. When we come back we will deal with other elements of this enormous issue. There is a method to our madness, and with that, I will call on our witnesses.
Senator Di Nino and others have talked about the private sector and we are certainly working on having witnesses here to bring us up-to-date on that sector.
Today, we will hear from witnesses concerning Canadian foreign policy towards Africa. There will be some subtle overlap today because we have already heard about some of the aspects of African policy from other witnesses.
We will hear from witnesses from Foreign Affairs Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency, and from the Department of National Defence.
Ms. Bourcier, if you would like to begin, may I suggest that because we have heard some of what you are about to say, that you are brief; not so brief that you cannot express yourself, but brief enough that we can go to questions as quickly as possible. We gain a great deal of our information from our questions. One more reminder, our staff does take notes. Your testimony is important to us because it goes on the record and we will be using it when we make our report.
[Translation]
Ms. Anne-Marie Bourcier, Director General, Africa Bureau, Foreign Affairs Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We were asked to talk about Canada's foreign policy and commitment with respect to Africa today. Canada's commitment to Africa attests to the importance of this continent in the eyes of Canadians.
In two successive polls conducted in 2002 and 2003 for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, as it was called at the time, Canadians picked Ottawa as the second most important region behind the Americas. Canadians of African origin are becoming more and more numerous and politically active. Canadians, parliamentarians, and the media have kept a close eye on African files such as the situation in Darfur, the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The Canadian business community has become more active in several African countries or key sectors.
Canada's foreign policy objectives bear witness to our commitment to Africa. We have affirmed our top priorities, which include sound economic and political governance, the promotion of democratic development, human rights and safety, the rule of law, dealing with failed or failing states and threats to international security. To a large extent, these aspects of Canada's international policy mirror most of the major challenges Africa faces today.
Two Canadian interests underpin these international policy objectives. Firstly, they represent fundamental Canadian values. In this regard, we have the capacity and the determination to help the downtrodden and disadvantaged. These objectives also have a negative characteristic: costs. In the absence of a solid response to the African challenge, there will be further and substantial damage to the already weak social and economic fabric of African society. The international community, including Canada, will pay the price.
[English]
Africa's interconnected and complex problem will only be resolved by multidisciplinary approaches that involve all parts of the Canadian government. All departments work closely together on African issues to achieve a current, effective and efficient response. This whole of government approach applies more broadly as well. We need to support the participation of Canadians, the NGOs, the business and other associations, and the rest of the international community. Last but not least, we need the Africans themselves to be involved, especially at the level of civil society, as well as at the level of its institutions.
You had the opportunity yesterday to engage in a discussion with the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Mr. Amoako, who represents an institution that is engaged in the development of Africa as a response to NEPAD.
I would like to repeat that it is important to strike a balance that is often missing in reviewing the state of Africa. To overlook progress is unbalanced and undermines progressive African leadership and the successful work of countless Africans and others. We must consolidate, build, and shine the spotlight on this recent progress, however, the progress achieved is not enough. Complacency must not be allowed to substitute for continued focussed attention.
For the 2005 Gleneagles summit Prime Minister Blair designated Africa as one of the two principal agenda items; the other is climate change. Canada agrees with the U.K. decision to keep an African focus for, in spite of the progress, there is clearly a need for more effort.
We have been talking throughout the hearings of the role of Canada. We will be working hard with the G8 and our African partners to further advance the G8 and the international agenda in support of NEPAD. We have been talking as well of the participation of Minister Goodale, and I understand that colleagues from the Department of Finance were here earlier this week.
[Translation]
In order to achieve our international policy objectives sound economic and political governance, the promotion of democratic development, human rights and safety, the rule of law, dealing with failed or failing states and threats to international security, are central to reversing Africa's marginalization from the world.
And on an equally important matter, it is absolutely essential that we tackle the challenges that Africa faces in order to meet our own international objectives, not only on the African continent, but globally. It is Africa, with its burgeoning population, that is home to the majority of the problems facing humanity today. Our success or our failure in Africa will, to a large extent, determine how successful or unsuccessful we are from a global perspective.
[English]
Ms. Nadia Kostiuk, Director General, Policy, Strategic Planning and Technical Services, Africa and Middle East Branch, Canadian International Development Agency: It is a pleasure to be here with you again. I want to speak generally about how CIDA operates and how the broader instruments of Canadian development assistance work together with regard to Africa.
An easy starting point is funding. There have been budget increases to Africa. The 2003 and 2004 budgets increased the international assistance envelop by 8 per cent annually in support of the objective of doubling the assistance budget by 2010, with one-half or more of these increases earmarked for Africa. You have heard about Mr. Goodale's role. We have also had discussions about some of the trade measures that are being taken. You heard yesterday about debt relief. We have also mentioned HIV/AIDS as a global issue. We have made considerable progress in terms of investing in the fight against that scourge. Dr. Amoako mentioned last night the 3 by 5 initiative of the World Health Organization. CIDA committed, in May of 2004, to contribute $100 million to that initiative, which, as you may recall, is aimed at getting 3 million people suffering from AIDS in developing countries into treatment by the end of 2005.
The international consensus around aid effectiveness principles indicates that aid must be targeted at very poor countries that are committed to their own development. We have a policy on strengthening aid effectiveness that we are implementing to intensify the geographic and sectoral concentration as well as working jointly with all development partners, and we are increasingly moving away from stand-alone projects toward joint programming. Part of this also involves more untying of our aid as it is delivered to Africa.
On page 2 of our presentation is a representation of the international assistance envelope that was created in February 1991. Just over 95 per cent of it is official development assistance as defined by the development assistance committee of the OECD. The other 3.5 per cent goes to countries in transition. That was a little pot established for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It counts as official assistance, not as official development assistance.
CIDA plays a coordinating role with regard to all partners in development assistance and is directly responsible for administering almost 85 per cent of the envelope. We work with a range of Canadian and international partners to deliver these cooperation programs. In Canada, as you probably know, our partners include private sector firms and voluntary sector organizations, including NGOs, unions, cooperatives, professional associations, and educational institutions, as well as federal government departments. Of those departments, Finance Canada and Foreign Affairs Canada are the key participants, as well as National Defence, Industry Canada, the Department of Justice, the RCMP, and the International Development Research Centre.
On page 3 you see the multi-faceted range of instruments that are at our disposal. These are all institutions funded by the Government of Canada. There is the multilateral branch and the institutions it supports. My colleague can answer specific questions on that if you wish. There are multilateral organizations including the World Bank, the IMF, the African Development Bank, and other UN agencies such as UNICEF that involve themselves in long-term development matters. There are also other agencies that focus more specifically on emergencies. We heard about many of those agencies when the tsunami occurred, although there are some, like UNICEF, that operate in both the short- term and the long-term.
There are also global funds that focus on specific issues and are more sectorally oriented, an example of which is the Global Environment Facility. There are also funds like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria that focus on improving services available to people with those illnesses.
We also work with the Canadian partners, and I have already mentioned the types of organizations that this encompasses. There is also the bilateral program, where I work, which is mostly based on relations directly with partner African governments, to a lesser extent with African civil society, and increasingly with important regional organizations such as the African Union and other entities.
The bilateral program gives us the opportunity to build long-term relationships and to undertake initiatives that take more than two-to-five years; we are in for the long haul. That does not mean we keep on doing the same things or necessarily doing them in the same way, but the relationships tend to be longer.
You have heard over the past week or two about strengthening aid effectiveness and how important that is for the developing countries that are working on their own development and the Western partners who support them.
Key principles of strengthening aid effectiveness are, again, greater local ownership, improvement in donor coordination, establishment of stronger partnerships, uses of results-based approaches and, of course, greater policy coherence between industrialized countries, and we are very much working on that.
You heard yesterday about poverty reduction strategies and the opportunities that they present to take some of the funds that were freed up by debt relief to invest in poverty and other key areas. Yesterday, you also heard mention of the Stephanie Nolen article in The Globe and Mail that specifically focused on what a country is able to do in regard to education when that country has more domestic funds at its disposal.
Three central factors on the effective use of aid investments in focusing for results are good governance, building capacity, and working with civil society. I found the discussion yesterday interesting about the role of parliamentarians in that process. I am not sure you regard yourselves as civil society, but you certainly speak on society's behalf. There has also been a transition toward the increased use of programs as a way of engaging in development based on the principles of coordinated support for locally owned programs of development. The responsibility for results is increasingly with the partner governments, and these modalities have the potential to significantly improve public sector management capacities, good governance and accountability. It is back to the notion of the country being in the driver's seat and having more responsibility for what happens.
I will describe the tailoring that takes place specific to country conditions. On page 6 you will see that we have six countries of concentration. There are also countries of regional significance such as the major African powers of South Africa and Nigeria.
If you are involved in Nigeria you are involved with one-quarter of Africa's total population. We have some long- standing development partners in Malawi, Zambia and Kenya. We have long been active there and been with them through both good and bad times. Then there are the crisis or fragile states, such the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Sierra Leone.
Paul Hunt mentioned the Nile Basin Initiative and just what that means in terms of countries being able to work together to manage a precious resource that has very significant implications to all of them.
If we take West Africa and look at the evolution of our programming over time and place, there are three countries of concentration: Mali, Senegal, and Ghana. We have been working with them for a long time. I started as a planning officer on the Ghana program 20 years ago. Ghana's political situation is quite different from what it is now; they had a series of not very nice military coups. Instead of pulling out completely we focused our programming on the north of the country, which is the poorest part, and we focused on the provision of basic services, primarily water.
We stayed away from the government. The message was clear that we were not all that happy with the political situation, but there was the important aspect of not making the people suffer. There is that concept of double jeopardy; you are already in a bad situation and then someone makes it worse for you. We stayed put, but adjusted our programming. I am personally, and also as a Canadian, happy to see how Ghana has turned around. They have had a series of democratic transitions, and their economy is doing better. It really is a very positive story and it is one of the first countries to be going through the peer review mechanism, which is quite a rigorous exercise.
I have mentioned that Nigeria is huge, it is important and it has a one-quarter of sub-Saharan Africa's population. We have worked hard there on the eradication of polio. We are also working in the areas of environment and agriculture in strategic targeted programming that keeps us engaged and working with an important partner.
There are smaller programs in Burkina Faso. It has been a Canadian partner for a long time, and is committed to poverty reduction and doing its best to make progress and is working well with donors. In Burkina Faso we are focused on basic education and the development of local economies.
Then there are the fragile states. Sierra Leone was a country that, as the chair mentioned last week, was doing well for a while and certainly went through a very rough time. We have the capacity in that instance to provide some emergency assistance, when we can, and make sure they get food aid and other basic assistance. Then, as you also heard from our colleagues from DND, there was an opportunity to try to help with some of the longer-term security issues and Canada did that as well.
This graphic and the next one show that there was a commitment made in 2000 to invest in social development priorities, basic human needs, child protection, HIV/AIDS, basic education, and health and nutrition. We were able, with increases to the budget and also targeting priorities, to surpass the targets that we set for ourselves. We are very pleased that we were able to do that, but there is a great deal more to do. Those disbursements were 35 per cent of our budget in 2000-01, and went up to 51 per cent and we expect to be roughly in that area. We have listed some of the tangible results that have come out as a result of that increase.
I mentioned last week Mozambique education and how the statistics had improved on school enrolment. One thing I did not mention then, because we were not talking too specifically, was the fact that Canada is actually providing textbooks for Mozambique's very successful primary school program. One of the things that is really neat about that textbook program is that we are building in gender and HIV issues into the curriculum. Not only is it good in terms of educating these kids, but we are also helping them to be able to deal with challenges that are very fundamental to their future well-being as they grow up.
There are some priorities that are not necessarily socially oriented. I think pretty well all of us in the room would have some recollection of the Ethiopian famine of 1984 and how Canadians mobilized in response to that crisis. There was another famine in 2003, which was almost as severe. The good news is that the Ethiopian government was much better equipped to deal with the famine on its own, and also the broad international community was better prepared to coordinate and to make things happen.
While some people died, there were many less deaths than in 1984. Is that a success? I wish the famines did not happen at all but given Ethiopia's geography and a number of other facts that make it drought prone and therefore famine prone, at least we did learn that we are better equipped to deal with such disasters that do happen quite regularly. I have given you some examples that I hope you will take the time to read.
The issues ahead are mutual partnership and moving forward. As Ms. Bourcier has said, the challenges are huge and they do affect us all. We cannot just say it is over there and not worry about it. The first time I spoke here, I remarked that a lot of this sounds very bureaucratic, but it actually does make a difference in terms of the effectiveness of the delivery of development assistance.
This is an important year for Africa with the G8 summit, and with the high-level forum that will be looking at aid effectiveness. The spotlight will be on all of us in September when we look at what the accomplishments have been in the first five years of working toward the millennium development goals. We have a lot to do.
Mr. Andrew Rasiulis, Director, Military Training Assistance Program, National Defence: Honourable senators, it is a great pleasure for me to appear before you to brief you on MTAP, the Military Training Assistance Program, and its specific mission in Africa.
MTAP is Canada's primary tool for defence diplomacy and it is designed to enhance Canada's security. Through MTAP Canada has provided various developing, non-NATO countries with military training since the early 1960s.
With 65 member countries, MTAP has enabled Canada to establish a presence in Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe. With a $12-million budget, the program's objectives are to promote Canadian foreign and defence policy interests; target assistance to achieve influence in areas of strategic interest to Canada; raise Canada's international independent national profile as a valuable player in the international arena; promote Canadian bilateral defence relations; promote democratic principles, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and international stability; build peace support operations capacity amongst Canada's peacekeeping partners; and contribute to the global war against terrorism through selective assistance.
To achieve these objectives, the MTAP relies on three main pillars: language training; staff training and professional development; and peace support training.
The MTAP is a strategic instrument of policy and must be responsive to political direction. In order to remain effective the program must also have stability; hence, a three-year planning cycle has been introduced to facilitate these objectives. When extraordinary strategic situations arise, MTAP has the flexibility to meet these requirements with supplemental special projects, as we have seen before this in Afghanistan and in the Balkans.
In facilitating bilateral defence relations, MTAP is often the first or only formal contact that the Department of National Defence has in many developing countries around the world. Specifically relating MTAP in its mission to Africa, 19 African countries are currently members of MTAP. In the current fiscal year, MTAP is forecast to spend an estimated $1.2 million, or approximately 10 per cent of its budget, on training Africans.
In line with G8 initiatives, MTAP is working to build indigenous peace support capacity within Africa through its train the trainer plan. This directly supports the G8 plan to build up a substantial African peacekeeping capacity.
The train-the-trainer concept seeks to provide training and expertise to Africans in order to effectively equip them to assume a role in training their own forces with the knowledge they have acquired from their MTAP training. The MTAP toolbox offers staff training, peace support training, language training and other special projects to further this goal.
The MTAP toolbox, I might add, is uniquely Canadian. As a bilingual country, Canada is well positioned to provide both French- and English-language training to countries for interoperability among African countries. We have South Africans at St. Jean who are learning how to speak French so they can participate in peace operations in francophone West Africa. We have the capability to train francophone countries to operate in anglophone Africa. The Canadian cultural context is actually applicable in Africa, and we make good use of that through our program.
In line with Canada's multicultural values, MTAP works with Africans in-theatre to build indigenous peace support capacity. Some examples include a United Nations logistics course at the Karen peacekeeping training centre in Kenya; special projects such as training of South African chaplains to build their own chaplain school for their region of Africa to participate in peace operations; and a UN military observer course at the peacekeeping school in Mali.
As for the way ahead, while MTAP has a long-standing presence in Africa, it is looking to significantly expand this presence in the region under the auspices of the G8 action plan. DND is developing options for a supplementary train- the-trainer package that could more than double the training available to African militaries. Equipped with the tools of staff, peace support and language training, an enhanced MTAP will exponentially raise Canada's contribution to peace support capacity in Africa.
MTAP is a modest program with a broad, strategic Canadian international impact.
[Translation]
Senator Prud'homme: I will be uncharacteristically brief. First, I would like to state that I am indeed happy that the two bills that divided the Department of Foreign Affairs were defeated.
These matters were debated last night in the House of Commons, and again today in the Senate, and such debates shall continue. I would hope that the record will bear witness to my enthusiasm. I see you together and I hope that you remain so. I do not like this divisiveness which only serves to complicate the task incumbent upon the department, a task currently carried out with such gusto.
From what I understand, the Department of Foreign Affairs has a very broad mandate that also includes the Maghreb. Is there anything that you would like to add in particular about this part of Africa that is not included in the documents?
The Chairman: We will now hear from Mr. Sébastien Carrière, Political Affairs Desk Officer for Algeria, Libya and Morocco. I am sure you have the pertinent documents, Senator Prud'homme.
Senator Prud'homme: I will hear from Mr. Carrière later but I would once again like to say how happy I am to again have the opportunity to see the people that are working to ensure that the department remains united. I understand that you are not in a position to comment; this is unfortunate, but that is life.
The Chairman: Was is your question, Senator Prud'homme?
Senator Prud'homme: Could you describe the part of your mandate — which we know is very broad — relating to the Maghreb?
The Chairman: To whom is the question directed?
Senator Prud'homme: The question is, of course, directed to Mr. Carrière.
Mr. Sébastien Carrière, Desk Officer, Political Affairs (Algeria, Libya, Morocco), Maghreb and Arabian Peninsula Division, Foreign Affairs Canada: At the Department of Foreign Affairs, for strictly operational reasons, the Maghreb is part of the North Africa and Middle East Bureau, as distinct from the sub-Saharan Africa Bureau.
It goes without saying that a thorough study of Canada-Africa relations would not be complete without a Maghreb component. For the benefit of the committee, I will provide a general context which will illustrate how we perceive our relations with the Maghreb.
Due to its geostrategic position, the Maghreb is perceived as a crossroads of civilizations. Located on the very fringes of the Arab-Muslim world, the Maghreb plays a bridging role between Europe, with which its economic ties are growing, and sub-Saharan Africa, with which some Maghrebian countries have developed cooperative programs.
The Maghreb's demographic weight makes it a totally necessary partner for Canada. Canada's relations with Maghrebian countries have spanned more than four decades. Initially, relations were primarily based on cooperation. According to our colleagues from CIDA, hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent since the sixties under the aegis of the cooperative programs in Algeria and Morocco. Today, relations are more trade-based.
Maghrebian countries are on their way up. They are becoming favoured Canadian trade partners. For example, Algeria is Canada's foremost trading partner in the whole Africa and Middle East region. Morocco, Libya and Tunisia are amongst Canada's top seven trading partners.
In the Maghreb, there are also a number of important political partners, especially in the United Nations and the francophonie. Currently, three of the five Maghrebian countries are part of the francophonie and a fourth should soon join their ranks. Let us talk about the human side of these trade relations. In Canada, it is estimated that the Maghrebian community is 100,000 strong. Most of these immigrants live in Quebec; however, there are some to be found throughout the entire country.
The Maghreb has also developed academic relations with Canada. About 3,000 Maghrebian students go to Canadian universities each year, including 300 to 600 new students and 300 to 600 graduating students.
This illustrates the fairly broad scope of our relations with the Maghreb. Should you have any specific questions, I would be pleased to answer them.
Senator Prud'homme: If we were to review our very broad mandate, would breaking it up into major components, including the Maghreb and West Africa, seem logical to you? Or perhaps at the end of our mandate, which will last at least a year, we will be able to draw conclusions, as best we can, about the regions, the one you oversee, among others. I am trying to fit your region with the rest of our mandate, which is Africa, and the two seem to fit together nicely.
Mr. Carrière: I do not want to define the committee's mandate. You can carry out your mandate, which focuses mainly on sub-Saharan Africa, bearing in mind that the Maghreb has a role to play. However, I will not venture to say whether or not your mandate should be broadened.
[English]
Senator Corbin: On a point of order, are we going to continually question the mandate of this committee? I thought we had settled that once and for all and people are forever questioning our decision and our mandate. Let us get on with it.
The Chairman: We will not change the mandate.
Senator Corbin: I am getting sick and tired of these comments.
The Chairman: Senator Corbin is correct, we have a mandate. We are sticking to the mandate. As I said to you Senator Prud'homme, we do have someone here from the department on Northern Africa.
[Translation]
I know the Maghreb well, as you are well aware, I lived there. I spent three summers in the Sahara. I know the changes that have occurred between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. We have a mandate from the Senate.
[English]
Senator Di Nino: I wonder if any one of our panel saw the CBC program last night on refugees in the Sudan. Ms. Kostiuk is nodding.
Ms. Kostiuk: I saw some of it; I am not sure that I saw all of it.
Senator Di Nino: I bring up the program because we are talking about one area, one experience, one camp. The experience of watching the show left me quite discouraged. It was a pretty strong condemnation of that particular camp.
The Chairman: Where was the camp?
Senator Di Nino: The camp is in Chad and the program was about Sudanese refugees. It was a documentary with a gentleman filming the experience of a family that was looking for refuge. The program followed these people from their home and documented their experiences to the camp and during their stay at the camp. I thought it was a strong condemnation of how that camp was run.
This is a UN-run camp. Are we made aware of the problems that exist in these camps, and do we do anything with the information that we do or do not receive concerning the way in which they are run?
Mr. Mario Renaud, Director General, Policy, Planning and Management, Multilateral Programs Branch, Canadian International Level, Canadian International Development Agency: Thank you very much for your question.
Unfortunately, I did not watch the program on CBC, but I did hear about it. At the end of the program Mr. Mansbridge said that the family was all right; they had moved to a proper camp and they had all the proper identification to leave the Darfur area to get into Eastern Chad.
In Chad, the camps are under the mandate of the UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The UNHCR is professionally recognized all over the world. It is an organization of the UN family that deals with refugees that are living in camps. Dealing with the camps and the refugees is not always easy; often we have to deal with very tense political situations. UNHCR is a very good partner that Canada supports year after year.
Senator Di Nino: I support the UNHCR, and I support CIDA. I am not questioning that, my question relates to what we do when we discover these problems. We are talking about families that had not been fed for weeks; people were starving to death. People were dying. The program gave us the statistics of the death toll last week and of the number of children that are starving to death right now.
I do not question the value of the work that they are doing. I think they are trying to do the best they can, but obviously, it is not good enough.
Since we are partners, to use your word, what do we do about it?
Mr. Renaud: The information gets to us eventually. I did not watch the show myself, but I know that my colleagues in the humanitarian assistance division are looking at this information. They have been in contact with UNHCR to learn more about the situation. It is not easy to be a refugee. There are tremendously difficult situations that people have to go through while they are in this unfortunate position. It is difficult in Sudan.
What can we do right now? The journalist that produced the documentary has done something about it by bringing this information into our homes. At least we know about it, and we will follow up with the organization.
Senator Di Nino: Time is going to be a problem.
Mr. Chairman, may I ask that we have an answer to the question that I have asked, particularly when we are dealing with a situation where we have to wait for a journalist to go there and spend literally weeks travelling with this family and be part of what I thought was a shameful, awful treatment of human beings. It touched me greatly.
I think we should get some answers from our folks, and I do not necessarily mean you, Mr. Renaud, but somebody that knows how we deal with an issue such as this. We cannot let those people go on in those conditions.
The Chairman: I suppose Senator Di Nino what you are asking of the staff and myself, is to find a response time.
Senator Di Nino: I am asking the witnesses, if this is their responsibility.
Ms. Kostiuk: The problem is multifaceted; the responses are multifaceted. What we saw last night was the very bottom, and where you find the worst effects of the system. This is where there is a political imperative to put pressure on governments to change the political situations so that the people do not have to leave their homes in the first place.
The UN system works, and that is one camp. I do not know how many camps there are in the world. I do not know how people keep on working in those camps never mind living and dying in those camps. It is a very difficult job. Eastern Chad is not a great place to be. It is better than Darfur, which tells you something, but it sure looked bleak and desolate.
We all fund the UN system. Could they use more money? Well, of course, they could, but they do the best they can with what they have. It is a multidimensional problem and there are different actors trying to get at the solutions, but when you see it live in front of you it is terrible.
We can get more information as to what is being done, but I do not think there is an easy answer.
Senator Di Nino: On a different subject, when the minister of CIDA was here, I asked what percentage of CIDA aid was tied and I think the response was that it is somewhere in the 60 per cent range. Can you confirm that figure?
Ms. Kostiuk: Mr. Chairman, I know it has gone down. It is now close to the OECD average. I know there is one issue where there is very little untying, that is food aid. That does get into an issue that is of interest to members of this committee to untie Canadian funds so that they can be used to buy food that has been heavily subsidized by some of our OECD member competitors. It becomes dicey. There is more tying of food aid, but certainly there has been a lot of untying that has happened over the last few years consistent with an OECD consensus on this subject.
Senator Di Nino: I will mention a few things from the Auditor Generals report that I would like your thoughts on. The report refers to tied aid where conditional transfers, specific terms and conditions must be met. As I said, these are among the highest in the world and basically not an effective way of transferring funds.
It talks about the use of grants being increased 25-fold, which on the surface sounds like a good idea, but the report says these are non-audited, non-transparent and untraceable grants. It is untied aid but with no assurance that Canadian taxpayer dollars are used for legitimate and effective aid efforts.
Would you comment on the Auditor General's report?
Ms. Kostiuk: Not having had an opportunity to read it yet, I would say that, as we have been discussing over the last while, yes, the way in which Canadian programming with developing countries is evolving does mean that there is less tying and more grants. At the same time, those grants are based on rigorous analysis and strict financial controls, working in tandem with other donor countries. It is not like Canada is out there doing something alone. We are usually working with the British, the Netherlands and the Nordics. This is an evolution in how development assistance is working. I would be pleased to get you some further specific details, but that is about where I can go with it right now.
Senator Di Nino: I have one final comment. We have heard your expert witness a few times now. You are doing a very good job of trying to impart to us the knowledge that we need to go forth. I understand the situation is complex.
There is a serious accusation being made by the Auditor General about the funds, or at least part of the funds, that are being used. The Canadian taxpayers' money is used for aid. It would be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, if we could get an appropriate answer specifically on the accusations of the Auditor General in her last report.
Ms. Kostiuk: We will do that.
Senator Downe: My questions pertain to the presentation on the Military Training Assistance Program, which I found very helpful and very useful. I particularly appreciate the fact that you did not overstate what you are doing in Africa.
As I understand from your presentation, 10 per cent of your budget is directed toward Africa, and $350,000 is actually spent in Africa. The balance of your $1.2 million is spent in Canada training Africans.
Mr. Rasiulis: That is correct. That will shift in the next three-year cycle. We had been doing small training packages in Canada on peace support operations. We have received feedback from our attachés who administer our programs overseas for us through an annual evaluation process that we have and the overriding result was that we needed to actually bring the training to the Africans in Africa and build up the capacities of local training centres.
That figure that you see is good for this last fiscal year, but it will shift to a significant degree in the next fiscal year. I do not have the exact break down for you here today.
Senator Downe: Over the next five years the budget will increase for this program and more will be spent in Africa; is that correct?
Mr. Rasiulis: The current budget for MTAP will stay the same until perhaps February 28 when my ADM for policy has his hearing with the deputy minister and the chief of defence staff for his business plan.
In the business plan, we have put in a recommendation for an expanded MTAP. Within that recommendation, we have identified Africa and, to a lesser degree, Latin America as areas of expansion.
I think that Canada's G8 Africa initiative is very important, and we are working with colleagues in Foreign Affairs Canada and CIDA to determine what the Canadian envelope will be like and what share defence and MTAP will receive from it. That envelope itself will be completely dedicated to Africa.
Senator Downe: After the end of February, if I have this correct, you will have increased funding that you will be able to tell us about after the end of February.
Mr. Rasiulis: I hope so.
Senator Downe: Do see a larger percentage than 10?
Mr. Rasiulis: There will be an increase in either one of two ways.
Senator Downe: My last question pertains to the selection of the African countries that participate in this program. We have heard from other witnesses that there are countries that we favour because they are more transparent and open, and they meet certain criterion. I assume these are the same countries with which you participate; is that correct?
Mr. Rasiulis: We do not participate with countries that Foreign Affairs Canada would object to, because foreign affairs has an override in the countries that are members of MTAP.
There is no contradiction in countries; however, in the specific focus of countries under MTAP, obviously there has to be that military and security dimension. We are trying to build peacekeeping partners to help the Africans take care of their own missions in Africa. This would in fact lessen the burden for the Canadian Forces. In that sense, we are looking at particular forces or countries with forces that are active in peacekeeping and are looking for our assistance to further their capabilities.
Senator Downe: Am I to understand that you are currently involved in some African countries where there is no other contribution received from any other department of the Government of Canada?
Mr. Rasiulis: I doubt that. I am not familiar with exactly what the Department of Foreign Affairs and CIDA are involved in. What I was saying in my presentation is that within defence diplomacy or defence interests, in many cases MTAP is the only instrument for DND to actually have a bilateral defence relationship with a country in Africa or any country in the world.
Senator Carney: I would like to thank all of the witnesses for the wealth of information that you have presented to this committee. It will take us some time to digest everything that you have given us.
Before I start my question, there are a few points of clarification I would like to address to Ms. Kostiuk. What was Burkina Faso known as in its previous incarnation?
Ms. Kostiuk: Upper Volta.
Senator Carney: Second, in the material that you have given us, the panel talked about the doubling of aid to Africa.
Could you give us the figures of what percentage of your total CIDA budget is directed to program aid itself and what percentage of that money is designated to Africa? You talk about doubling, and you talk about increasing, but I cannot find the figures on how much is actually involved.
I want to ask you questions about the delivery of programs. We have been told in studies here in this committee on this mandate as well as other mandates that CIDA's ability to function at the program level has been inhibited over the years by constant reorganization, being in transition, being in a state of flux. A current example is the recent efforts to divide up the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Now, of course, with the defeat of Bill C-32, there is another hiatus.
You are not responsible at the director general level for this, but given your 20 years of experience in this field, how would you describe the effect of this constant change on the effectiveness of your bureaucrats and people to actually deliver program aid? It is used as an excuse, ``We would like to do more, but.''
Ms. Kostiuk: It is so nice to be with you here today. As far as funding for Africa, some of what gets counted is after the fact.
I have the official statistics to the end of 2003 on Canadian ODA for sub-Saharan Africa and the figure is about $500 million out of $1.1 billion allocated on a geographic basis. That proportion would have changed in 2004 because of the increase to Africa. My calculations for funding for the bilateral program is about 40 per cent of CIDA's funding and about 30 per cent of the international assistance envelope, which is bigger than CIDA's.
Senator Carney: Having the latest figures on this would be appreciated by the committee.
Ms. Kostiuk: I brought the regional distribution for ODA for Canada for the years 2002 and 2003, which is the latest data that we have.
Senator Carney: Could you deal with the corporate culture issue because it is fundamental to our ability to deliver aid?
Ms. Kostiuk: Change is a reality of life. I find that we work on issues that matter. We follow the directions that are given to us by our political masters. The program has ebbed and flowed over time in terms of funding. The orientation has generally been fairly clear. Canada works as one of many nations on this file. We soldier on. CIDA is populated by people who consider themselves to be lifers. It is a values-based organization, not unlike other organizations within the government.
Senator Carney: That is a very diplomatic answer. In terms of partnership, you talk about the private sector. What percentage of your contracts is delivered through the private sector? How are they regionally allocated?
Ms. Kostiuk: I will have to provide you with that information because I do not have a geographic breakdown. Certainly, the private sector is a major partner.
Senator Carney: You have identified it as such but you must have some idea of how much of your budget is delivered to the private sector.
Ms. Kostiuk: I would prefer to give you the specific numbers because it is more than just the Africa branch that would have to be factored into that.
Senator Carney: Is it on the order of 5 per cent or 50 per cent?
Ms. Kostiuk: I am not in a position to give you a good enough answer now. If you do not mind, I will get back to you with that information.
Senator Carney: I speak to regional allocation because we have been told, and I had heard, that one of the problems for contractors and suppliers to CIDA have is the sense that if you do not have an Ottawa-Gatineau area code, you are not considered. Do you have a comment on that?
Ms. Kostiuk: I would base it purely on my own understanding of the corporate world and where head office is as opposed to where the work may actually be done. That means it is difficult to come up with reliable data on whether there is a concentration of where the money is actually spent. The headquarters may be in one place and the factory may be somewhere else, so it is a difficult thing to pin down.
Senator Carney: I know, but you talked about it in your brief and it was part of your presentation. I believe you said that you had some regional allocation figures and that is why I am asking you, again.
Ms. Kostiuk: With my apologies, the figures are regional in terms of the world and not regions of Canada.
Senator Carney: You do not identify where the suppliers, the NGOs and the private sector are. You have offices all across the country and they are much valued and appreciated. However, you do not have an evaluation system to determine how much business they generate for CIDA or how much money is allocated to the various regions.
I know you allocate by language sometimes and that certain regions are English language and other regions are French language, depending on the countries involved. You must have some sense of the regional allocations of your suppliers.
Ms. Kostiuk: Mr. Chairman, for the reasons I have already given, it is very difficult to define. We know that the private sector may be concentrated in certain area codes, as the senator said. The reality is that they may be located anywhere in terms of where the production is so, to my knowledge, we have not been able to do much analysis of this subject.
Senator Carney: Is it a policy of CIDA to try to source? We talked about tied aid, which is a fundamental fact. Is there no discussion within CIDA or policy about the allocation of supply of services that are ``exported abroad'' through CIDA, and if so, why not?
We do this in industry and in other areas, such as in trade. You have offices to solicit bids for contracts across the region. You must have some sense of how effective this program of disbursing your officers across the country and the seeking of suppliers. You must have some sense of how effective that is.
Ms. Kostiuk: Mr. Chairman, CIDA has small offices in a couple of other Canadian centres. It is not a major aspect of the architecture of our organization. There is a policy on untying and we work with the standards that have been consensually defined by the development assistance committee of the OECD.
If I may, someone else may volunteer to speak to this specifically because this is outside my area of expertise, or if I could provide the response at a later date, which would be preferable.
Senator Carney: I want to make the point that there would be more public support for increasing development aid, to which we are all committed or we would not be here.
There would be more public support for that if there were more broadly-based regional benefits so that people could actually see and participate and have hands-on experience in this area and not have it so concentrated in the Ottawa- Gatineau area. You cannot build support for increasing development aid if the country does not see it as a national effort.
The Chairman: You have made that point well, Senator Carney. How many offices are there in Canada?
Ms. Kostiuk: There is one in Vancouver and there is one in Calgary, if I remember correctly. The development assistance community is increasingly focused on responding as best we can to the needs identified by our developing country partners. The quality will be better, more effective and more efficient. That does not necessarily mean that we will continue to do business in the same way. I personally hope that Canadians will appreciate that if we can maximize the impact on the ground that it would be a worthwhile investment.
Thinking back historically, I do not know how strong the correlation has been between the percentage of every aid dollar spent in Canada and Canadian support for development assistance. I hope that the quality of the aid and the results will be what will determine what Canadians think of our programming.
The Chairman: I think most of us can understand what Senator Carney is saying in that support for CIDA would be greater if local efforts reaped some benefit from it. In Calgary where you have offices, there must be some form of monitoring or they would not have the offices. I also appreciate the fact that this is not your area of expertise. We will try to obtain more information on the subject, Senator Carney.
Mr. Renaud: I have a comment to add. Ms. Kostiuk and I do not have the specific information that you are asking for, Senator Carney. However, I know that our colleagues in the procurement management division have some information of that nature. We would be pleased to share that with the committee.
We have three business lines: core support, responsive, and directive. Core support is support by CIDA to an organization for its program of work over the long term. This is used for multilateral, long-standing organizations such as UNHCR and the UN family.
Canada responds in an unsolicited way to Canadian organizations or international organizations that come to CIDA with proposals. We do not go to the market for these proposals. We are responsive as long as they meet the priorities set by our partner countries or CIDA.
The competitive aspect will be mostly in the directive where CIDA, the Government of Canada, after consultation and discussion with the local authorities, decides to engage in the planning and design of projects and programs. That is what Ms. Kostiuk alluded to at the beginning of her presentation. There is a major change in the way business is done in the international community because countries are taking more and more responsibilities.
We will provide you with very specific information on the distribution of those contracts by CIDA across Canada.
[Translation]
Senator Corbin: I would like to ask two questions. Ms. Bourcier spoke about the Government of Canada's priorities, including but not limited to providing assistance to failed or failing states. This is the opposite to what one normally hears. What do you consider to be a failed state? That is what is written in your text: ``... assistance to failed or failing states.'' Are you talking from a domestic policy, administration or military point of view? What is a failed or failing state? And in what ways do you assist these states?
Ms. Bourcier: Thank you for your excellent question which allows us to clarify, for example, what we mean by ``failed or failing state.'' An unfortunate example of a failing state is Sudan. We had to label it as a country facing tremendous governance difficulties.
Fortunately, this country is currently making progress, albeit fragile. During the recent presentations, and in the text that we tabled for today's presentation, there has been reference made to the signing of the peace agreement between the north and the south in the wake of a 20-year war.
The country has been independent since 1956, but due to a series of events, any progress has been very limited. What contribution has Canada made? Canada contributed by supporting the negotiation process between the countries in the region.
In particular, we supported Kenya's excellent role. General Simbao played an important role in helping the southern and northern parties find a middle ground on the division of responsibilities in the new future of this country, wealth distribution, and new governance models.
CIDA, both from a diplomatic and financial standpoint, was of assistance to the stakeholders in this negotiation process.
In what ways do we continue to offer support? Well, your colleague Senator Jaffer was one of a number of people to make a contribution. The senator actively followed and is still following the negotiation process. The negotiation process involved more immediate observers that were and that still are involved in the ceasefire. I am referring to the British, Norwegians and Americans.
Canada has successfully broadened this first category of partners, in addition to those immediate partners, to include: the Dutch, Canadians, other Nordic countries, as well as the Germans.
We continue to be greatly concerned about countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This country, through a process of political dialogue, has also managed to sign peace agreements and has committed to a transition period which will lead to an election next fall.
How was Canada's role carried out? Well, through efforts that were made, which I did not describe in great detail — whether it be for Sudan or another country, because civil society was very active in this respect — and we have encouraged these efforts.
Now, coming back to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we worked extensively with civil society during this period of political dialogue which led to the different parties in the conflict reaching a consensus and signing this agreement. Also, a lot of diplomatic work was carried out by a special envoy, a career diplomat from the department, Ambassador Marc Brault, who was succeeded by the current ambassador, Anne Leahy, who is following up on this mandate.
Ambassador Brault has shed light on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo which, to a certain extent, was kept alive and fuelled by certain disparate interests.
Zimbabwe, Angola, Uganda, Rwanda and, to a certain extent Burundi, just to name a few, continue to be a tremendous challenge.
Currently, we are involved, along with 28 countries and 11 multilateral organizations. We contribute by supporting the International Conference on the Great Lakes, which focuses on developing trust and the capacity for dialogue between countries in order to seek renewed regional peace and security.
Canada co-chairs a group of friends with the Dutch. This group supports an international conference approach and brings together 11 countries. Why 11 countries? Because 11 countries are affected by the regional stability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I gave you two examples of countries in which Canada has been and continues to be active in terms of its support.
Senator Corbin: I would like to thank you for this largely satisfactory answer to my question.
My second question is directed to Ms. Kostiuk. She referred to the situation in northern Ghana. Now, you should think back to the non-democratic period of the country. You said, in English, the following.
[English]
We stayed away from the government and yet we went ahead with our programs. How can you do such a thing? Am I quoting you correctly?
Ms. Kostiuk: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
[Translation]
There are still agreements in place with the governments. It is not as if we are able to work in any country without the government's approval. This is particularly true of bilateral programs. These long-term agreements are not cancelled upon a change of government.
Senator Corbin: You mean that you continue to work even if a military or dictatorial regime takes root?
Ms. Kostiuk: That may be the case if a program is well established. For example, in Ghana, a poverty-stricken region, we were in the process of developing a drinking water program. We decided, given the political situation, that putting an end to this program would not be a good idea. As a result, the decision was made to remain in the north to help residents set up the drinking water system in the communities. This initiative was undoubtedly approved by the government.
Senator Corbin: There was a tacit agreement.
Ms. Kostiuk: However, it did not involve the country's central government. That distinction needs to be made.
Ms. Bourcier: If you will allow me, I would like to add to my colleague's remarks that the term ``délinquant'' is perhaps a poor English to French translation. What is more, I used this term on a number of occasions:
Senator Corbin: In English, we would say ``failed'' or ``failing state.''
Ms. Bourcier: This concept of a failed or failing state involves two notions. In any cooperative program, it is the responsibility of officials to ensure the sound management of state funds. Miscommunication between the various administrative branches of the state may lead to certain problems.
The Department of Foreign Affairs must attempt, according to its mandate, to improve the political or economic governance of these failing states. In order to do this, we rely on the efforts of our colleagues from the Department of Defence, CIDA and the Department of International Trade, insofar as this support is reciprocated.
Last week, I drew your attention to another area of concern, the Togo.
Senator Corbin: I was going to mention it.
Ms. Bourcier: In circumstances which have been criticized by the African authorities, the Togo and certain military and political authorities have benefited from the situation and have pushed the former president's son to maintain a rather dubious level of governance. Furthermore, this led the francophonie to invoke measures it had adopted over the past years in Bamako, in Africa, in order to suspend Togo's presence in its proceedings.
Senator De Bané: Would you be so kind as to explain the area of jurisdiction for each of the authorities in the area of development? I understand that the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance determine CIDA's budget. Then, the cabinet decides on the different programs that CIDA can undertake. They also decide which continents and countries will be the beneficiaries as well as the range of eligible programs. The minister responsible for CIDA also makes certain decisions. The head of CIDA, in turn, has the authority to make certain decisions as do various directors general, such as Mr. Renault who is in charge of multilateral organizations.
Could you explain to us what each one's area of jurisdiction would be so that we can understand who speaks for the African continent, for example? What are the countries that receive particular attention? What countries are treated as special cases? I would like you to provide us with a list of the persons in authority with their respective areas of responsibility.
[English]
Perhaps they can send us a table so we can see each of those.
The Chairman: I am not sure that we do not already have that in our papers that we have been receiving for the last couple of weeks.
Senator De Bané: Why is a country a country of concentration and has the whole gamut of programs available to it and others do not?
The Chairman: I understand. I believe we went through this last week, if I am not mistaken. I do not know where we go from here. Does someone want to take a crack at that? We will try to provide Senator De Bané with some information.
Ms. Kostiuk: May we offer an organizational chart? In terms of the general principles, the government sets a policy framework. The budget, as you are aware, is provided based on decisions that are taken by ministers and then, of course, put forward to Parliament, so the minister is responsible for the agency, the deputy. The president is a deputy minister like other deputy ministers with the same responsibilities, but perhaps the easiest thing would be to provide an organizational chart and more written information that describes this structure.
The Chairman: That will be fine.
Senator De Bané: Thank you very much.
The Chairman: We will give that to Senator De Bané. We have piles of materials.
Senator Prud'homme: I thank you for providing an organizational chart. I will be more precise though. I would like to get, if it is possible, a chart from November 2003, and the new chart since the Order-in-Council was passed that divided the departments since December 2003, because I hear that there is a completely different approach being made. I may be wrong. A new ambassador will be appointed in July, I heard, under the new chart, so I want to know on whose chart we will be working. If it is possible I would appreciate having those two charts.
The Chairman: Realistically, they had the episode last evening in the House of Commons so I do not think anyone knows where this is all going at the moment. I would not want to ask our witnesses something that they are unable to answer. If you feel that you can, then you could provide members of the committee with what Senator Prud'homme has requested, but my own impression is that things are in a bit of a state of confusion at the moment.
With that, honourable senators, I will adjourn the meeting until next Tuesday.
The committee adjourned.