Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Affairs
Issue 16 - Evidence for June 15, 2005
OTTAWA, Wednesday, June 15, 2005
The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, to which was referred Bill S-21, to amend the Criminal Code (protection of children), met this day at 4:20 p.m. to give consideration to the bill.
Senator Lise Bacon (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Today we are considering Bill S-21, to amend the Criminal Code with respect to the protection of children. We have before us, from the Department of Justice Canada, Ms. Carole Morency, Senior Counsel to the Criminal Law Policy Section. I know we kept you waiting last week, and I apologize for keeping you waiting again today. We do thank you for your patience, Ms. Morency. We will hear from you, and then we will ask our questions. Thank you for being here with us again.
Ms. Carole Morency, Senior Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice Canada: Thank you, Madam Chairman and senators. It was as much my pleasure last week to observe as it is to be here again today.
With the permission of the committee and the chair, I thought I would make a few opening remarks to provide a bit of an overview of the issue and the context for section 43 in Canada, and in particular the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision, because this is really at the heart of much of the discussion before the committee. I apologize if I repeat some information that you may already have, but I thought it would be useful as a general overview.
The origins of section 43 in the Criminal Code flow from the English common law's parental duty to maintain, protect and educate children. It was codified in the first Criminal Code in 1892. In that first Criminal Code it was section 55, and it was titled Discipline of Minors. Its wording was similar to what you have now in the Criminal Code. It was:
It is lawful for every parent, or person in the place of a parent, schoolmaster or master, to use force by way of correction towards any child, pupil or apprentice under his care, provided that such force is reasonable under the circumstances.
The section was then amended in 1954 to become one with the exact wording that we have now, and the number was changed in 1970 to what is now section 43. Since 1970, section 43 has retained that number, so it is easy enough to track how case law has developed under it.
What is section 43? I will not read it out to you again. The committee has it, but there are a few things to note about how it actually works. First, section 43 is a limited defence. It is a limited defence for a defined, limited group of persons: only for parents, teachers or persons standing in place of parents. It is only available for a specific purpose, namely, for correction. It is only available in limited circumstances, that is, when it is reasonable in all of the circumstances. In the absence of section 43, parents who spank a child, who remove a child from a room in a ``time out'' or who, for example, physically put a reluctant child into a car seat are applying non-consensual force, which is our definition of assault in Canada, and would be convicted of an assault.
As this committee knows, section 43 has been the subject of judicial interpretation over the years with some variation in the outcomes, at trial levels in particular, and always against the backdrop of a specific criminal case involving charges against a parent or a teacher usually, or most often.
Section 43 has been considered by the Supreme Court in two specific cases. The first one was in 1984, in Ogg-Moss, which did not involve a constitutional challenge to section 43. In that case, the question before the court was: Does section 43 apply in the case of discipline involving a disabled adult? The court held that it did not.
More recently, and of tremendous importance to this committee and many of the witnesses who have appeared already before the committee, and no doubt will continue to appear, the second case is the Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General). That case was argued before the Supreme Court in June 2003 and the judgment was rendered in January 2004. I do not propose to take you through the decision in my opening remarks but I would like to highlight a few important points about the decision and the case. First, the case was a Charter challenge that was not brought in the context of a specific case. In other words, it was brought by way of what we call an application before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. In this manner, evidence was presented to the court, but through affidavit evidence and through cross-examination on that evidence.
On this point, I know there was some evidence last week, but I would like to underscore that this was probably the first and only case in Canada, and I would guess even internationally, to assemble such a vast body of evidence on the issues before the court. If you look at the trial judgment, it summarizes that there were 25 experts who provided evidence through affidavit and cross-examination, representing child development, empirical research psychologists, child protection, police, parenting experts, legal and human rights, and educators. All of this evidence was put before the court and was vigorously tested and challenged through cross-examination that spanned four months. It was a vast amount of evidence brought together for the first time, and really quite an interesting opportunity for everyone to look at the most recent information on this aspect across the spectrum on how section 43 is working, how it is not working, the latest social science evidence on this, et cetera.
Another thing that is important to note about this case is that the term ``spanking,'' which is commonly used and often reported in the media, has perhaps a different meaning for many people but, for the purposes of this case, we had an agreed-to definition, and this is what influenced and was before the court at each level. For the purposes of this case and throughout, the definition that all parties and all witnesses accepted was the administration of one or two mild to moderate smacks with an open hand on the buttocks or extremities, which does not cause harm. It is important to bear that in mind because, when you look at some of the social science evidence, very often we do not differentiate between what I am sure all of us here today would agree is abusive behaviour and the type of conduct that section 43 has been interpreted as being restricted to protecting in those limited circumstances.
Another point to highlight is that the issue before the court was the constitutionality of Parliament's decision to carve out a sphere within which children's parents and teachers may use minor, corrective force in some circumstances without facing criminal sanctions. The issue was not whether spanking is a good or a bad thing. Before the court, the question was: Is section 43 constitutional under the Charter? The challenges were specifically in the context of section 7, which protects life, liberty and security of the person, and not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice; section 12, protection against cruel and unusual punishment; and section 15, equality.
As well, at each level of the case the issue before the court was also: Is section 43 consistent with Canada's obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child? At each instance, the challenge was dismissed. I do want to indicate what the government's position was throughout the case. It remained then, and is today, that the government does not condone or authorize the use of physical correction, and that section 43 itself does not condone or authorize child abuse. The conduct that constitutes child abuse is caught by the Criminal Code, and section 43, properly interpreted and applied, does not excuse that kind of conduct.
The federal government maintained, and all experts on both sides of the case agreed, that it is not in the best interests of children or Canadian society to bring the full force of the criminal law to bear on parents who give a mild, non-injurious spank to a child. From that, the court provided a set of guidelines on interpreting section 43. I emphasize that these guidelines absolutely reflect the consensus of the social science experts on this issue, which was squarely before the courts and accepted at every level.
The decision of the Supreme Court is authoritative in its finding of fact and conclusion of law. It is highly comprehensive in its reasoning and provides the guidelines mentioned. The committee will be aware of those guidelines, and I am happy to answer relevant questions. Again, at each instance, the court found that section 43 was consistent with Canada's obligations under the convention.
I will highlight a few other points. If we are to compare section 43 and Canada's response to the issue with that of other countries' laws and responses, then we should have a full comparison of the laws. This issue was fully before the courts at each instance. Comparing section 43 to a civil law ban that does not have criminal consequences is not a full comparison. It is unfair to compare the duties and responsibilities of parents in caring for their children with the duties and responsibilities of husbands and wives. Those differences have been noted by the courts. Equally, Canada protects children on a number of levels. We have the Criminal Code and federal social programming. This was evidence before the courts throughout. At the provincial level, there is child protection legislation and programming. Combined, these provide a comprehensive approach to protecting children. The criminal law system and the child protection system operate independently of each other to a different standard and, in each instance, can justify state intervention to protect a child, to hold a parent accountable and, in many instances, particularly under the child protection regime, to work towards a longer-term goal to support the family so that they can support the child and maintain their role as parents.
The government has continued to undertake education and support for parents to explain the issues, not only through the case but also to better identify parenting alternatives for parents, including other methods of disciplining children. I would be happy to refer the committee to some of the most recent examples and take any questions.
Senator Mercer: Thank you for appearing today. You talked about the challenge of section 43 and the decision of the Supreme Court. I am curious about how often section 43 was used, and whether the opinion of Justice Canada was used too much or too little. Will Bill S-21 fix or complicate the issues?
Ms. Morency: I do not have a reference to the number of charges. However, after the decision of the Supreme Court on January 30, 2004, we looked at how many cases have been reported under the use of section 43 of the Criminal Code. We had 12 reported cases, four from Quebec and eight from across the country. Some were referred to in the evidence before the committee last week. Eight of the cases involved parents and four involved a child caregiver/ teacher.
If I use that as an example, the use of section 43 has not been as frequent as one might think. That does not help the committee to understand how many cases are charged and section 43 is argued and not reported. As well, it does not give a sense of how cases might be dealt with through a child protection system.
Throughout the course of the section 43 case, there were charts — although I was not able to put my hands on them quickly for the purpose of my presentation to this committee — that summarized cases that had proceeded under section 43 over the last, I believe, 30 to 40 years. The reported cases totalled fewer than 200, if I remember correctly. Reported cases tend to be on an ad hoc basis as they occur. I do not have any more direct information for you on that point.
We are interested in seeing how the Supreme Court decision is being interpreted and applied by trying to track the cases to see how it is working in terms of frequency of use of the section. The Supreme Court decision has been cited in many more cases than it has under section 43, such as child protection cases and other kinds of criminal law cases for some of the principles that the majority has addressed in its decision, including the de minimis and other aspects of the decision, which was quite comprehensive. I am not certain that I have answered all of your questions.
Senator Mercer: Yes, but I may complicate it further. When you said there had been 12 cases since January 30, 2004, why did you specify that four cases came from the province of Quebec? Is that an indication that the problem is greater in Quebec? I would not have thought so.
Ms. Morency: No. From the evidence presented, including that of Senator Hervieux-Payette, and from some of the polls on parental practices across the country, we know that parents from Quebec typically have less regard for the use of spanking or corrective, physical force. My expectation would be to see fewer cases in Quebec, although this is not a scientific approach. I would say that these cases are happening everywhere in that sense. The issue is not unique to one part of the country. I understood and had an expectation from the polls on attitudes across the country that in certain areas the response to the issue would be different.
Senator Mercer: I have seen the numbers that suggest that this method of discipline is not used as often in Quebec.
We have talked about 12 cases since January 30, 2004, following the decision of the Supreme Court. Of those 12 cases, how many convictions have there been?
Ms. Morency: I did not tally in that way because a conviction or an acquittal does not always tell you how section 43 has worked. I could provide that information to the committee in writing.
Senator Mercer: That is fine, because that leads to a complicating factor. We talked about 12 cases. You made reference to how many cases would have been dealt with by child protection agencies, et cetera, in various parts of the country that would not show up in the statistics of the 12, in which charges were not laid but where there was intervention by the police or by children's aid societies, or what have you. I find it difficult, sitting on this side of the table. I know how I will vote on the bill but I would feel a lot more comfortable if there were statistics telling me how many interventions there had been. We have had people come here and tell us horrific stories about the police being called where children have been abused, and where the police walked away from the situation and did nothing. This is the difficulty with policing and with the interaction between child protection agencies and families, but we need to have the statistics to tell us that what we do next is working. Somewhere along the line, someone will have to start keeping score.
Our number one motive here is to protect children: to make sure that their rights are protected and their safety is protected. I do not know how that is fixed. How do we get all of the agencies, governments and police agencies that are involved in delivering these services to Canadians, to keep score so that if we come back to visit this issue at some point in the future, we can look back on the statistics and ask ourselves: Since Bill S-21 was passed — if it were to pass — what have the statistics been?
Just as important, let us assume that Bill S-21 does not pass, although I certainly hope that that will not be the case. It would be important to have the statistics to support the argument for a future version of Bill S-21. How do we fix the number-keeping here? This is not a criticism of you; you have given me the numbers that you have. I am thinking that the system should be able to give us more statistics to tell us how many calls police agencies have had, how many interactions there have been with child protection agencies and how many corrective measures have been taken — and the level of those corrective measures. We know that corrective measures go anywhere from the parents or caregiver being charged and the child being removed from the home, the daycare, school or whatever, to just an educational aspect for either the parent or the child on what is going on.
Ms. Morency: First, my reference to 12 cases was to the reported case law under section 43 of the Criminal Code. Do we have statistics about the number of children who are abused and by whom? Yes, Statistics Canada does release information on that on an annual basis. The next compendium is the Family Violence Report, which comes out around June or July of each year. Therein is baseline data that would serve for any kind of tracking from a certain period of time. That report is prepared in support of our family violence initiative at the federal level. It tracks, for example, how many children are abused physically and sexually, and in particular by parents or persons in a familial or intimate relationship with the children. Does it give you 100 per cent of the numbers across the country? No, because the reports are based on the uniform crime survey, UCR2, which is, I think, about 90 per cent reporting by police agencies under Criminal Code-established offences, and the adult criminal court survey. You can track who is the offender and who the victim, and their relationship; so that information is readily available.
In terms of how we monitor what impact section 43 now has on police practices, there was evidence before the court in the section 43 challenge case, introduced by the government. That was by way of an affidavit from a police officer from the Toronto police service who was responsible for overseeing and training police officers in the Toronto area on how to respond and deal with child abuse cases. In his evidence before the court, he said that section 43 does not have an impact in terms of preventing police from dealing with processing allegations of abuse — investigating and laying charges where charges are appropriate.
Will there be some situations where something like Cheryl Milne described, may happen, concerning the young girl who came to her seeking counsel? I think anything is possible, and I cannot speak to that particular case.
Provincially, provincial governments would be responsible for tracking how cases are monitored. They may have statistics about child protection interventions in cases such as this, which can happen independent of the criminal system's response. Federally, we have had one national or Canadian incidence study released a few years ago, and the next version will be released in the fall. It looks at reported child maltreatment. Therefore, I believe the government does have access right now to statistics on a number of levels to attempt to track how changes in the law will benefit children, whether it is because of the Supreme Court of Canada decision or whether it is because of other legislative reform through this bill or otherwise.
Senator Joyal: I do not know if I should say this, but while I was listening to the witness answer questions from Senator Mercer, I was thinking of that famous story, ``Aurore, l'enfant martyre,'' a story that will be on screen later on this year in Quebec. The movie will probably have an impact on the way people react to the use of force by way of correction.
I have many questions. First, do you know if the Law Reform Commission has ever recommended that section 43 be amended or removed from the code in previous reports? I want that to be on the record for the purpose of our discussion.
Ms. Morency: Yes, the Law Reform Commission did look at the issue, and the majority recommended against its repeal. There was one who recommended for its repeal.
Senator Joyal: When was that?
Ms. Morency: I am not sure if it was in 1970.
The Chairman: We have the information here. It was in 1984.
Senator Joyal: Twenty years ago. Second, I would like to come back to an issue of philosophical law. The conclusion of the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh, which occurred only three years ago, does not seem to be definitive. I read former justice Arbour this morning, and she expressed regrets regarding this decision of the court to allow torture in some special circumstances when an immigrant is returned to his country. When I read that, I said to myself, perhaps they made a mistake, too, in the Canadian Foundation for Children.
While we are assuming that the court did not err when they concluded, six-to-three, that it was not a violation of the Charter, personally I was triggered by the argument that was put forward around the table that, inasmuch as we do not accept force against women or seniors, we should not be accepting force against children because they are in a similar position of vulnerability. In that context, there is some kind of a logical definition of what I call human integrity, or human body integrity, which could justify the removal of section 43.
However, as I explained to you, and as you have outlined yourself, the Supreme Court has concluded that the interpretation of the Charter as of 2003 — that is, the way in which the court has read the legislation in Canada, and the international obligation of Canada — is not in contravention with any of the constitutional or international obligations of Canada. If it is not in violation of those two sets of rules, there must be another set of rules that are, although not legally binding upon us, on a matter of the underlying values of our society, that we do not accept force against a human being.
How do you answer that question? You are in criminal law policy. This is a policy issue, in fact.
Ms. Morency: I am also responsible for spousal abuse issues, so I am well informed on those issues. I understand the interest to draw some analogies.
As I said in my opening remarks, and as the Supreme Court and each level of court below that found, there are differences in the relationship between children and parents. Parents have duties and responsibilities to maintain, support, nurture and educate their children. However, children, because of their evolving capacity, are vulnerable and dependent on others. The evidence before the court on the section 43 case was that, as the capacity of the child develops and as they get older, how the parents discharge their responsibilities changes. That relationship shifts and changes. I think everyone understands that. That is why the guidelines reflect a differing approach as the child gets older, depending on the capacity of the child to understand or benefit from the correction being used. That is one thing.
That relationship is unique and is not the same as the relationship between two spouses. You do not have that kind of relationship. For example, as a parent, I may have to pick up my child and put my child in a car seat. I never have to do that with my spouse, but I would do so with my child. I may have a situation where they may not want to go home but I may have to do that for their own benefit and safety.
That highlights our existing definition of ``assault'' in criminal law, which is similar to what we have in the United Kingdom, with similar common law origins. It is very broad indeed. It is the non-consensual application of force. Touching a person, technically, is an assault. In the case of a child, I must do that on a regular basis: First, to care for my child; and, second, to nurture my child, I want to do that. Currently, section 43 provides a very narrow sphere. The Supreme Court's decision has significantly clarified and narrowed how section 43 has been interpreted to this point.
Concerning your reference to whether the court got it wrong: Yes, six justices were on the majority in the sense that they upheld section 43 across the board. Mr. Justice Binnie concurred in the outcome vis-à-vis parents. He arrived at that conclusion through a different process of interpretation but, in the end, his conclusion is the same as the majority as it applies to parents.
You have a seven-to-two decision. I would not want to speculate on anything beyond this. The other two minority judgments decided the case on a different interpretive process. I can refer you to Madam Justice Arbour's decision as well. She notes — and again, I am not trying to impute; I am just reading the decision — the difference between her approach and that of the Chief Justice in interpreting the decision. This is found at paragraph 135 in the English version of the judgment of Madam Justice Arbour, right near the beginning. She is acknowledging a different approach to the interpretation of this section than the Chief Justice. In the middle of the paragraph, she states that: ``To say, as the Chief Justice does, that this defence cannot be used to justify any criminal charge beyond simple assault, that the section cannot justify the use of corrective force against a child under two or against a teenager, and that force is never reasonable if an object is used is a laudable effort to take the law where it ought to be.''
On its face, it certainly confirms that she brought a different interpretation to the section. I am not sure if that is suggesting some concurrence in the practical outcome, but the important thing is that the judgment reflects a seven-to- two outcome, in particular vis-à-vis parents, reflecting an understanding of the definition of ``assault,'' as I have described it, reflecting the reality of the interaction and the responsibilities of parents between a parent and a child, and the evidence that was before the court at each level.
Senator Joyal: On the other hand, if you finish reading the paragraph, it states that: ``However, section 43 can only be so interpreted if the law, as it stands, offends the Constitution and must therefore be curtailed. Absent such constitutional constraint, it is neither the historic nor the proper role of courts to enlarge criminal responsibility by limiting defences enacted by Parliament.'' In fact, the role of the court is precisely the opposite.
If the bill is not adopted, the minimum we can do is to amend section 43 to put it in the context not of the guideline but of the interpretation. That is what Justice Arbour says. She says that there are built-in limits in there, but if those built-in limits are not properly and clearly stated, Parliament will have to change the legislation. While I totally agree with the guidelines that the court proposed involving children under age 12 and teenagers, and ``not on the head,'' and ``a limited force for education purposes,'' and ``not to harm or degrade the child,'' and ``to use the force in a transitory and trifling nature,'' we still have force being used. However, we do not have spanking.
I agree with you that a spank is — and, I do not know the word you used — two small taps on the hands. I have no problem with that, but that is not what this section says. Section 43 does not talk about spanking; it talks about using force. Force is not spanking. If you want to limit force to spanking, then we should put it in section 43.
I feel that the Supreme Court was right and wrong at the same time, if we leave section 43 as it is now. As one of the witnesses said, ``If we are to make a decision, on which side will we be deciding?'' To me, section 43, as it is set out now, is not the proper message to send to parents generally, because it does not change a word from what it was before. As you said yourself, there are so many limitations in the decisions of the court that I am tempted to say, let us rewrite section 43, at least. The minimum we can do is rewrite section 43. The government does not seem to want to do that, so we are dammed if we do and dammed if we do not. We are caught in this situation.
Some of my colleagues have made up their minds that we should get rid of section 43, and they may have good reasons for taking that position. However, I have equally good reasons for saying that if we maintain a defence in the Criminal Code for parents who spank their children, the limits should be very specifically spelled out so that the adjudication process is consistently administered right across the country.
The Supreme Court seems to have excluded schoolteachers in its interpretation of section 43. Therefore, there are categories of people who have responsibility for children who are not allowed to use the defence of section 43.
Rather than pleading for maintaining section 43, if we want to follow the majority decision of the court, should we not reflect what the court has said in its interpretation of section 43? Parents will not consult this 265-paragraph decision to determine exactly how far they can go. It is unrealistic to think that they would. All those who have the responsibility of applying the law should know what it is.
I had reservations about supporting this bill at the beginning, contrary to my colleagues around the table, but now I am trying to determine whether this is the right thing or the wrong thing to do. I do not think we have enough evidence before us that, if we leave the matter as it stands, there will be improvement in the way parents in Canada approach the use of force with their children.
Ms. Morency: I agree that parents will not carry around a 335-page judgment, nor will they carry around or consult the Criminal Code in order to determine the impact of various actions. One of the choices for this committee may be whether to codify the Supreme Court decision. The Criminal Code is interpreted by the courts. The statute and the common law interpretation is our body of law. The body of law that evolved up until the Supreme Court decision reflected much of what has been curtailed with the guidelines, that is, the type of conduct that most people consider reasonable. Of course there have been exceptions, and the Supreme Court talked about that. Although there was not an appeal, and some cases may have been decided differently today, in the majority of the cases on this issue, they were following those principles.
The Supreme Court of Canada's decision brings more clarity to the issue. The committee could choose the approach of spelling it out in more detail in the code. However, it is common to have common law interpretation of the Criminal Code expanding our understanding of how the law operates.
In the evolution of the case law, there have been some problematic cases that seem unreasonable to many people. For the most part, however, parents conduct themselves as parents should. They love, nurture and care for their children, and we are not faced with a barrage of cases under section 43. There have been some, although we would hope that there would be none.
Senator Joyal: We heard evidence that in the most recent report of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, Canada was again asked to adjust section 43 of the Criminal Code to comply with our obligation under the international Convention on the Rights of the Child. We were told that that report was not in the knowledge of the Department of Justice until the case was presented in court, and that therefore the Supreme Court did not correctly interpret the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Many other countries around the world have changed their criminal laws to reflect the spirit of that convention. What is your appraisal of the Supreme Court's evaluation of Canada's obligation under the Convention on the Rights of the Child?
Ms. Morency: You are right that the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child released its most recent observations on Canada's implementation of its obligations under the convention in 2003, after the case was argued before the Supreme Court in June of that year. However, Madam Justice Arbour quotes those observations in her dissent, so they obviously were before the court nonetheless. Even if the observations were not formally before the court, that recommendation of the UN committee was similar to their first round of concluding observations, which was formally and officially before the court.
Therefore, these observations were before the court at each level and were fully part of their considerations. At each level, the court also considered what Canada's obligations are under the convention, and at each level the courts found that the convention does not explicitly require any country to prohibit all forms of corporal punishment, albeit they must protect children.
Article 19 directs state parties to take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury, abuse, neglect or negligent treatment. The courts acknowledged that obligation but did not interpret it as an explicit requirement to prohibit corporal punishment, or as a constraint on how a country could fulfill its obligations. In other words, a country can seek to prevent abuse and neglect of a child through a number of measures. It does not necessarily have to be through a criminal law or civil law measure; it could be through a cumulative approach of programming that supports children and parents.
The courts at each level considered how other countries have addressed this issue. No other country that has banned corporal punishment or the spanking of children has done so through the use of the criminal law. Other countries have civil law or family law types of bans, with no criminal consequences for the breach of them.
As well, the criminal laws of other countries typically have a much narrower definition of assault that usually includes physical harm or injury. That is not the definition in Canada.
Senator Joyal: Are you telling me that they are better protected with a limited criminal defence than they would be if the prohibition were only in civil law?
Ms. Morency: What is being proposed by some groups, that is, repealing section 43 as the answer to better promote the best interests of the child, will not necessarily achieve that result. All of the social science experts on both sides of this case agreed that for the type of conduct that section 43 has been interpreted as being restricted to, the spank on the bottom or on the hand, as the guidelines suggest, there is no dispute. All of the experts agreed that to prosecute such a case under the criminal law would not be in the best interests of the child. We can go through some examples and cite what the full impact of having a prosecution in such a case is. There were some examples of how detrimental that is, not just to the child but to the family as a unit, and the ripple effect back on to the child throughout that exercise.
The complicating factor here is that the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides a bundle of rights for the child. The best interests of the child are a primary consideration, and they are all relevant. Providing the child with a nurturing and caring family and supporting parents, so that they can discharge their responsibilities to care for their children, educate them and look after them are all part of it. If you look at only one of the rights in that bundle in isolation and not in the broader context, and not as part of the big picture, then you have a distorted way of trying to serve, promote or protect the best interests of the child, particularly if we appreciate that the evidence before the court was that that was not in the best interests of a child in that limited circumstance.
Can we do more to better protect children beyond that? Of course. I referred to some of the educational activities that we are supporting. Should we do more? Absolutely. It sometimes comes down to an instrument of choice type of an issue.
The committee may be aware that the Law Reform Commission currently has a study underway, ``What is a Crime?'' and is looking at how society should regulate conduct and through what means. Criminal law is obviously one means of addressing conduct, but it is not necessarily the only means or the most effective means. The evidence before the court in this case at all levels has shown that education has been the most effective tool or instrument to achieve that outcome, or the type of conduct that we all would like to see become a reality, which is no spanking of children,
The Chairman: Maybe I will interject on what Senator Joyal just said to our witness. If we look at paragraph 62 of the 2003 report, we can read that the committee invited Canada to submit its third and fourth periodic reports by January 11, 2009. When we consider the two previous Canadian reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, we can conclude that, without changes to section 43 of the Criminal Code, the United Nations will again, for a third time, express its concern regarding Canada's behaviour on corporal punishment involving children. Is that a possibility?
Ms. Morency: I guess anything is possible. When we appeared before the committee in the fall of 2003, they were aware that the decision was pending. They were aware of the position that the government had maintained. They were also very much aware of everything that the country is doing at the federal level, at the provincial and territorial levels, through child protection measures, through education, and through social programming. They were aware of all of that. In fact, they often compliment Canada as being at the front, and leading the pack on those types of initiatives.
Is it possible? Given how they are interpreting the convention to this point, I think it is possible. Again, however, the committee, as it has been established under the Convention of the Rights of the Child, is a monitoring body. It raises issues. It identifies, it promotes, and it tries to suggest actions.
Certainly, the Supreme Court decision has provided a lot of guidance and clarity, and we hope to be able to go forward in terms of trying to let the law settle. When you have either a statutory change or a change that comes about as the result of a Supreme Court decision, it takes a bit of time to work its way out. We have been trying to get the message out.
The Department of Justice has been working closely with Health Canada to get that message out to parents, but not just since the decision. Since the 1990s, we have been trying to get information out about better parenting techniques: Do not do this. It is an issue where we can always look to do more. There is not a single response or one particular thing that will achieve the outcome.
In Sweden, for example, where they have a narrower definition of assault and a civil law ban, and they have had it in place since 1979, even with those types of measures the one thing that has had the greatest impact in terms of trying to address and prevent spanking, the use of force to correct children, has been their educational campaign. Statistics Sweden's evidence was before the court through the experts. If you look at the evidence and their statistics from shortly after their civil law ban was implemented, it did not yield the results that might have been expected, which is to ban spanking, expect less children to be abused, and expect better and longer-term outcomes for children because they are not being disciplined physically. In fact, in the next intervening five-year period, that was not the case. The rate of abuse increased, and there was more abuse between young persons against other peers.
What does that tell us? We do try to learn from other countries' approaches. We do try to sake seriously commentary by the international community, including the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. We try to come at it from a Canadian approach within our context and within our constitutional framework and division of powers. What can we do with our provincial counterparts to try to address this issue? There are many things that we can do and continue to do, and of those, education internationally and domestically seems to be the most responsive instrument of choice.
Senator Joyal: I will come back on a second round. I do not want to monopolize the time.
[Translation]
Senator Ringuette: You work for the Criminal Law Policy Section. Is that the same section of the Department of Justice responsible for drafting various versions of the bill on cruelty towards animals?
Ms. Morency: Yes, but I did not work on that piece of legislation.
Senator Ringuette: I am simply trying to understand the organization.
Senator Joyal: Cruelty towards animals and amendments to the Criminal Code.
Ms. Morency: I work for this section as well as for the Family, Children and Youth Section.
Senator Ringuette: In light of what you have just said, I am having a somewhat difficult time of it, knowing what your section colleagues have tried on numerous occasions to have us accept as legislation on animal cruelty. The exact same wording is used.
[English]
You said that the wording is the same today as it was when the act was introduced in 1954; in other words, section 43 reads exactly the same as it did 51 years ago. There has been a great deal of social evolution in this context in all that time. I listened to your comments about Sweden doing the ban through their civil law. In Canada, civil law is the jurisdiction of the provinces. First, the wording of section 43 has not changed in 51 years. Justice Canada is hoping that the provinces will introduce the ban and, therefore, relieve it of the international responsibility.
Ms. Morency: No. That would not be the position of the department. As we have put before the courts throughout, the Canadian response is not singular because we have federal laws and federal programming, provincial laws and provincial programming to better protect children. Under the provincial child protection legislation that operates independent of criminal law, the state can intervene to protect a child in need of protection. It is done on a civil balance of probabilities. The protection of the child is the paramount consideration. It is not a criminal law standard but it does not prevent criminal law from intervening as well.
The Supreme Court decision has defined, narrowed and clarified how section 43 should be interpreted and applied today. I agree that the provision has not been amended. The fact that it remains virtually unaltered since it was enacted has not prevented practices of Canadian parents from changing.
There has been a revolution in parenting today. Absent a legislative reform of section 43 of the Criminal Code, and irrespective of that, the majority of parents in Canada do not spank their children.
Senator Ringuette: You are inferring that the wording in the legislation from 1954 has set a benchmark for Canadian society. If we looked at the statistics, the physical abuse of children by parents was probably much more prevalent then than it is today. Do you agree?
Ms. Morency: That is our understanding.
Senator Ringuette: In 1954, the wording set the benchmark in respect of the abuse of children. That is now 50 years old. Do you think it is time to reword section 43 to set a new benchmark for the next 50 years for Canadian parents?
Ms. Morency: Again, the wording that presents in section 43 is capable of reflecting the changes in parenting practices that are reasonable in all of the circumstances. The committee may choose a different approach but if you are asking me to explain how it may be that parents may have changed their practices without legislative change on a similar track —
Senator Ringuette: It is not without legislative change. You said that the words have been the same for 50 years. Today, we agree that more than the majority of Canadian parents abide by these words. You have agreed with me that that was not the situation in 1954. A social evolution occurred because of legislation introduced in 1954 such that parents, through educative programs, slowly conformed to that new benchmark. Do you think it is time to set another benchmark that would put, in concrete terms, the convention that we agreed with at the UN on the rights of the child?
Ms. Morency: If I may clarify, the law did not change in 1954. Section 43 has been almost exactly the same since it was first codified in 1892. The number changed and we had minor wording changes but the effect was much the same. The wording of section 43 is the same, for the most part. The standard built into section 43, as interpreted by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, indicates, confirms and demonstrates that that standard of ``reasonable in the circumstances'' has a clear, defined understanding that the courts use. The concept of reasonableness is neither new nor unique. The courts deal with it all the time, particularly in the context of criminal law. The concept can adequately address the circumstances and changes in practices of society.
The evidence before the court was that despite the fact that section 43 has been on the books all that time and the wording has not changed much, most Canadians today have a different approach to parenting than they would have had in 1954. When asked whether they are allowed to hit children on the head, or practice any of the kinds of conduct that we have seen in some cases, most parents would say, no, they cannot do that.
Senator Ringuette: How do you think they manage to acknowledge that? I am sorry but, from my perspective, the notion of the education of parents on this issue has been vacated by the federal government. Most education seems to be gleaned from the publicized court cases affecting children, parents, teachers, et cetera. That has been the education process from the federal government. You do not have parenting, physical offence and education programs.
Ms. Morency: With respect, Health Canada and Justice Canada have produced material that is widely recognized as positive parenting educational materials. The advice to parents is: Do not spank your children because there are better alternatives to discipline. Those materials are well received. The ones that existed at the time the experts were looking at and providing their evidence on this case were recognized by some of the social science experts as being among the best they had ever seen. I believe Mr. Newell referred to some of those materials in his evidence before the committee.
I would understand if some of members of the committee may not be directly familiar with some of the materials. I believe Senator Hervieux-Payette has supplied you with some of them.
The Chairman: Some.
Ms. Morency: As an example, I have one that I think she already provided to the committee. I have a hard copy, which I will provide to the clerk as an example. This is a hard copy but it is accessed on the web — on Health Canada's website and on Justice Canada's site. We have been promoting the development of further training under Health Canada's ``Nobody's Perfect'' Program, including through the conference to try to educate what the state of the law is in Canada today.
Can we do more? I think I have already agreed that I think we should and can do more. However, to say we have not done anything would not be a fair comment, because we have done some things.
As I say, those who might be most directly aware of those materials that we have produced already are people who have young children, who are parents. My children are young, but not that young, so I would not go looking for it except for the type of work that I am doing. I do know these materials have been well received, and that we are trying to promote and enhance opportunities such as that to get the message out.
Senator Ringuette: I would certainly like to know what your distribution network is. I do not think that any parent, before exercising any form of physical discipline on a child, will go on your Department of Justice Canada website to see if it is okay or not.
Ms. Morency: I am not sure if I am in a position to provide you with the numbers on distribution. I will make the inquiries. I am happy to do that. However, I cannot track, for example, how many people might actually try to access some of these materials on the Internet. This is becoming an increasingly popular way for individuals to access materials.
Another thing is that there are a number of ways in which we educate ourselves and others. I think you are quite right; the notoriety that some cases bring to an issue, the headlines that some cases bring to an issue, sometimes brings a focus that is not the focus we want publicized or highlighted.
If we step back and look at the type of publicity that this case, that has worked its way through to the Supreme Court of Canada, has brought to the issue, that has been one of the most powerful educational tools that we could have on this issue. It has brought together experts from across all disciplines; it has brought issues and evidence before three levels of court. It has asked and received a very full determination by the Supreme Court on the issues, and the media attention on it has been quite significant at all levels. It has not always been, as I say, the balanced approach. However, my assessment of the media attention shortly after and since the Supreme Court of Canada decision was handed down is that it has been more positive than negative. In other words, do not indulge in this kind of conduct.
Again, should we do more? We are trying to do so but I would like to suggest to the committee that the case itself has done a lot to highlight and educate all of us about the issues.
Another thing is that on an issue such as this, we have a very wide definition of the type of conduct we are discussing. On the one hand — and this was true before the courts as well — we do not differentiate between the very abusive criminal type of conduct — beating up a child, as in some of the cases we have seen in the courts; that is not corporal punishment; that is not discipline of a child, even if a parent says ``I was just trying to discipline them.'' That is not what section 43 is about and that is not what the Supreme Court says section 43 is about. The court has restricted its definition to this narrow type of conduct.
If the intent is to say that we do not want that kind of conduct, we do not want to promote the abuse of children, then the Supreme Court judgment does exactly that. It does say: ``Do not do that. If you engage in that conduct, you, as a parent, will know that you are engaging in conduct that we will not condone or accept.'' The Supreme Court majority said that there may be some borderline cases, but the guidelines will be there and will guide courts in applying that standard. In the end, it is the courts that will determine that, not individual parents. As a state, you want to have that control so that the courts can be the arbiters of that standard.
Again, we are talking about a very narrow, limited range of conduct in limited circumstances. Much of what has transpired or is often reported as child discipline, even if people say that it is child discipline, it is not; and the Supreme Court clearly says that it is not discipline. That is not what we are talking about in section 43.
[Translation]
Senator Rivest: Reference is frequently made in bills to the protection of children's rights. Section 43 is really a minor provision, given the scope of the problem.
Government measures aimed at protecting children fall more under the purview of the Youth Protection Act and provincial legislation. Referencing the Criminal Code in exceptional, extreme cases, occurs very rarely. It is important to put matters in perspective. The issue here is not the number of cases that have been dealt with by the courts, despite all of the interest in the Supreme Court decision and the distinctions drawn.
If the federal government wanted to do more to help children — it already does that through various social transfer programs — I think it would do well, before amending the Criminal Code, to allocate more funding to provincial government efforts in the area of youth protection. Realistically, that is something the federal government could be doing.
You mentioned that youth protection services in provincial jurisdictions were a world unto their own. The same can be said of the Criminal Code. You maintain that there is not much communication between parties because individuals working with families realize full well that the Criminal Code, even in cases of abuse, is probably not the solution.
As you noted, all of this has a divisive, destabilizing effect on the family and the interests of the child are not always served. The Criminal Code cannot tolerate violence against children and must denounce it, one way or another.
You referred to comments made by international agencies about Canada. Were these comments meant as a criticism of the quality of the services delivered overall by the various levels of government in Canada in the area of child protection, or were they strictly focused on section 43?
Ms. Morency: I will answer in English, if I may.
[English]
First, just a correction or a clarification. I did not mean to suggest that there is no communication between the criminal law sector and the child protection sector. I was trying to make the point that the two systems can operate independently with different tests and with different outcomes. However, commonly at municipal levels, often protocols exist between social service agencies, police and child protection. To clarify this point, a call may come in through child protection, may be communicated to the police, or vice versa, and there are protocols at work to try to bring all related agencies together so that, at the end of the process, you have the best outcome for the child, for the family and for society.
I cannot go behind the deliberations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child and how it comes to its findings but from the questions we received when we were before that committee on the last round, it would seem that they do not look at Canada's response at a higher level in terms of section 43, in and of itself, as opposed to the broader, contextual, holistic approach that I have tried to describe today and which was very much before the courts in terms of saying how Canada has sought to fulfil its obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. If you look at the wording in the convention, it does not say exclusively ``ban corporal punishment.'' It does say ``protect children against neglect, abuse, violence.'' How a state may do that will differ.
Canada's approach will differ from some European countries and from the United States on some issues, but that does not mean that our response is less or ineffective or wrong. It is a response that reflects our constitutional makeup, together with the laws of the federal and provincial levels and the programming that is available at both levels of government. This information was before the courts to say that we do a lot at the federal level to support healthy outcomes for children on a broad range of programs. It is all part of the response to promoting better, safer outcomes for children.
Can we do more? It is an instrument of choice. Bill C-2, which will be before this committee soon, proposes a number of Criminal Code reforms to strengthen our existing legal framework to better protect children, particularly in situations of abuse and neglect, but you must have more than legislative change to implement the types of improved outcomes we are all hoping for.
I interpret the UN committee's response on this issue as a focus more on section 43 and less on the broader, contextual response that we have across the country.
Senator Joyal: I do not want to abuse the patience of my colleagues around the table and of the witness, but may I take exception to one of your last statements, namely, when you mentioned that the committee did not refer specifically to corporal punishment in Canada. If I can quote you concerning the committee's second report on Canada, you told us that: ``It is deeply concerned that the state party, that is, Canada, has not enacted legislation explicitly prohibiting all forms of corporal punishment and has taken no action to remove section 43 of the Criminal Code, which allows corporal punishment.'' That is as clear as day and night.
Ms. Morency: That is what I acknowledged, namely that their focus has been on section 43 and not on much else. If they looked at some of the other things that are happening in Canada, for example in schools, you can look to the state of the law in the provinces and you will see that with section 9, and proposed section 10, once it is proclaimed, we will have legislation that bans the use of corporal punishment in schools at the provincial level. At the municipal level, we have, more often than not, school boards that also disallow the use of corporal punishment.
I completely agree that that seems to be the focus of the committee, namely, on section 43, in and of itself, and less on the contextual approach.
Senator Joyal: When this committee was studying the new criminal justice bill, we learned that 80 per cent of the abuse of children is by parents or by close friends or relatives — not 1 per cent or 10 per cent, but 80 per cent. If we are to limit the growth or reduce the proportion of the authors of that abuse, it is the immediate family — that is, the parents, the brothers and sisters, the immediate relatives who happen to have a close relationship with the family, the uncles, and so on.
I do not have to quote the famous Homolka case, but one of the Bernardo victims was the sister of his spouse. When you think of that you ask: What should we do in terms of criminal law policy? I am talking about policy here and not specifically this section. What should we do systemically to reduce the abuse by the immediate family and relatives who happen to be the authors of the largest proportion of abuse against children? Most people today work, and most of the time it is a family member who is taking take care of the children.
[Translation]
Interestingly enough, the Government of Quebec has banned the use of force in schools.
[English]
If they have removed it from the school, why would they allow it at home? When I was a child, one day a nun at the primary level used a ruler to hit me on the hand. Later, the Brothers hit me with a strap across the hands, too. If we adopt a set of rules in the school for people who are not the parents but who are responsible for the guardianship and education of the child, why should we allow it when the child comes home at five o'clock and says:
[Translation]
``My boy, you are going to get it this evening!''
[English]
We must have the same approach. I try to be coherent when we devise policies in this place. I have the greatest respect for the Department of Justice Canada, and I am not saying that just because you are here today. I have fought the department on other issues such as the extradition law, such is the imposition of that penalty when we extradite Canadians. I was strongly opposed to the views of the Department of Justice on that. The department based its decision on the Ming case of 1991, and in 2000 the court reversed itself totally.
We should not be reluctant to consider a different set of policy frameworks if we want to achieve the objective of limiting abuse against the child, especially when it is not allowed during the greatest number of hours of the day: that is, when the child is being educated. I try to reconcile that with a set of clear parameters of policies that are consistent. I do not want to quote you out of context, but you said, ``Do not do this kind of conduct.'' You said earlier that it is not proper to spank your child. If it is not proper, it is not proper. It cannot be proper at home and not proper somewhere else. If you promote not spanking the child, we should say, ``Let us remove it from the Criminal Code.''
Ms. Morency: Let me respond on a number of points: First, the school bans are school bans. That is not the same as a criminal law power. That said, the Supreme Court did say, in the majority, that section 43 cannot be used to excuse conduct by teachers for corrective purposes, but only where force is used for restraint. For example, a teacher may be escorting a student to the principal's office or something like that. The decision does bring the clarity and consistency you were speaking about. A ban does not have the same impact as the criminal law.
The type of conduct that a teacher might engage in with students is different from the kind of conduct in which a parent will engage in the day-to-day care of a child. Further to my remarks on how we define assault and what a parent's responsibility is, we do not expect teachers to physically touch students in the way that parents do on a day-to- day basis. There is a difference, and the Supreme Court decision recognizes that.
I agree with your point about children being at greatest risk of abuse from family members and others closest to them. Statistics bear that out. There is a federal family violence initiative, of which Justice Canada is part with six other funded departments. That is exactly the type of conduct we try to get at. The objective of the initiative is to enhance criminal law, programming and educational materials, and to increase understanding so that victims will report, and so that when they do there will be assistance to help them deal with it. That is a broad, multi-sectoral response.
However, the type of conduct we are referring to as family violence is not the type of conduct that section 43 deals with. A parent breaking the bones of a child or beating a child repeatedly is not the kind of conduct that section 43 is intended to excuse. Section 43 deals with a very limited type of conduct to ensure that parents can discharge their obligations to their children without fear of the state intervening for these minor acts that we have described.
As to whether it is inconsistent for the government to have different thresholds, we use that approach with a number of things. With impaired driving, for example, we have had much success with campaigns to educate people not to drink and drive. Yet, in the Criminal Code, where we use the state's most serious power to criminalize or prohibit certain types of conduct, there is a threshold. Under the offence of operating a vehicle while impaired, you are either impaired, which is not zero tolerance, or you have a blood alcohol content of .08. The messages are not inconsistent. There are different ways of using the criminal law to create a strong response to an issue.
It comes back to instrument-of-choice issues. I had hoped that the Law Commission's report would be available, but it is not. They have a consultation paper out and have done some studies, and are proposing to do more, on how to deal with this type of conduct.
Senator Joyal: You said that following the decision of the Supreme Court, you have taken some initiatives. I will suggest to you some initiatives that I think you might have taken, and I will ask for your comments on them.
Did you send with the family allowance cheque a leaflet informing parents of the law in Canada on the use of force with respect to children? Have you contacted new parents through hospitals to inform them, at the critical moment when they have their new child in their arms, that the use of force against newborns is prohibited? Where will your campaign be?
Ms. Morency: Those are interesting suggestions, and I will be happy to explore them further. We have not done that. We have focused our energies on partnering with Health Canada to enhance the ``Nobody's Perfect'' Program to reflect the new standards. It is a well-recognized and well-established program with distribution chains to get the information out.
When the decision came out, the department immediately posted a fact sheet to give some understanding of the decision and the history of the case. We will try to get the message out more directly, in partnership with groups that have established networks.
Before the Supreme Court decision came out, we had been working on similar issues through other opportunities. For example, we partnered with Heritage Canada to develop a training manual for newcomers to Canada on what the law is in Canada with regard to caring for children. That is an important message to get out. Although that was developed before the Supreme Court judgment, we had the benefit of the case to that point, as well as the Court of Appeal decision and the guidelines, so we tried to reflect that as best we could in those materials.
Senator Joyal: Did you put the issue of how this decision has reframed the administration of justice in Canada on the agenda of the federal-provincial annual conference of ministers of justice and attorneys general across Canada? As the administration of justice is a provincial responsibility, they have to be made aware of the new decision so that they can follow up on it in their provincial departments.
Ms. Morency: That is not officially on the agenda of the federal-provincial-territorial ministers of justice. The case began in November 1998. I have had opportunities for updates on it since then at the level of federal-provincial- territorial officials. Your point is an important one. It goes beyond the justice sector. It would involve the education sector, the health sector and the social services sector.
Senator Joyal: Let us start with the attorneys general, since this is a Criminal Code matter, not a matter of law for the protection of youth. Of course it has impacts throughout the system, but it begins there. The interpretation was changed in such a limited way that people need to understand exactly what it means. It is not clear if you do not read the decision. As I said, it is a complex decision and not everyone will take the time to read the 265 paragraphs and the contradictory remarks of three justices. The general public cannot do the analytical interpretation that you and others around this table can.
I am not yet convinced that we have done everything possible to fight violence against children, especially since this decision can be interpreted as having changed nothing. I might be wrong, but I think the decision has changed something very important. It has confirmed an evolving trend in society whereby the use of force that was previously admissible in schools — and everyone around the table can give examples — is now totally excluded as a way of addressing the education of a child, and that is also evolving in the family.
I would like to see us being in that same evolutionary trend, rather than just saying, ``Well, the code does not need to be changed, it is as it is, and we will try to alert people that something has changed but we do not know exactly what.'' I would feel more comfortable being reassured that enough measures have been taken that we can leave the code, that there are initiatives to complement that reading and to ensure that the evolution that we have noticed in Canada in the last 20 or 30 years is the direction that the federal government supports in all of its capacities.
Ms. Morency: I agree. I think we can work towards doing more to educate and to raise awareness of the issues. I think we have done a lot, and the case has done a lot. Sometimes there is a benefit in allowing a case such as this to settle a bit, and to see how it is being interpreted.
Just to repeat, our evidence before the court was that section 43, as it was before the Supreme Court of Canada, was not impeding police on a day-to-day basis from responding to allegations of child abuse, from investigating and from laying charges. It was not impeding child protection workers from discharging their responsibilities.
We will try to track section 43 and how the decision may be implemented and what kind of an impact it is having. So far, of the 12 cases that have come up under section 43 and have been reported, five resulted in acquittals and five in convictions. One was an appeal of a conviction in which the conviction was upheld. Another one was an appeal of an acquittal and a new trial was ordered. One of these cases was before the decision, so there was not a reference to the case.
In those 12 cases, we are seeing implications right now in terms of how the decision is being interpreted and applied. It is being referred to, and it is being given consideration. The cases broke down to one case in Newfoundland, one in Nova Scotia, one in Saskatchewan, one in Alberta, five in Quebec and three in Ontario. Across the board, I think the Supreme Court decision is having an impact, but it is too early to say.
Is it progressive and proactive? Is it all that needs to be done? I think I have agreed with you and others that we should do more to educate. I will take your suggestions back and see about exploring opportunities. I did undertake to provide, if I could, information from my colleagues at Health Canada, if they have any information about distribution. I can provide the clerk as well with at least the information on last year's family violence report, which gives the statistics. There will be another one soon in terms of abuse of children. Just to reiterate, that is not the type of conduct we are talking about in section 43. That is, nonetheless, of concern in terms of better protecting children against all forms of abuse and neglect.
The Chairman: Perhaps you could give the names of the cases you just mentioned to the clerk, please.
[Translation]
Senator Rivest: I believe it is important for s senators to inform the public of the changes that have been made. There are many advertising agencies in Montreal with a lot of free time on their hands. Perhaps they could help out.
Senator Joyal: They could volunteer their services.
The Chairman: Volunteer their services for the good of society.
Thank you for your patience with committee members, Ms. Morency. You have enlightened us about this issue with your responses to our questions and comments. It was worth waiting a while to have you here for two hours.
[English]
Senator Joyal: We should alert our colleagues on the committee who were not able to attend today to read the answers given by the witness.
[Translation]
The Chairman: Most do read them, Senator Joyal, but I will remind them nonetheless.
[English]
Tomorrow we will hear one witness at 10:45.
The committee adjourned.