CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS   The critical assumptions underlying the Committee’s calculations about the future tools required by the Canadian Forces are that the Government needs to, and will:   -         Create a Canadian Forces with an authorized strength of 90,000 personnel;   -         Address the critical funding shortfalls facing equipment and infrastructure;   -         Enhance the strategic mobility of the Forces; and,   -         Move forward aggressively with transformation.

 

 

 

What if our critical assumptions don’t hold true?

Focus on the priorities 

 

The Committee outlines below all that it believes the Canadian Forces need to do the jobs required of them. However, Senate committees do not determine whether these needs will be met. Governments do. And the reality is that when one adds what the previous government committed to fixing the Canadian Forces to what this government has committed, the cash we believe is needed is going to fall short.

The Government has a variety of options. The first, of course, is that it could recognize the validity of our arguments and come up with enough money to do the job.

 

All other options are, by definition, imperfect. If the Government is going to settle for imperfect options, it had better think them through carefully, because any mistakes could prove tragic.

 

 

Taking the Cost-Cutting Route

 

Rather than nibble around the edges, the Government could decides to axe any one of a number of expensive capabilities, such as fighter aircraft, heavy lift helicopters, or strategic airlift aircraft. 

 

There are those who would argue that Canada can muddle through without all of these. The argument goes like this: smaller countries such as Canada have to concede that their participation in any large operation overseas will likely involve some sort of coalition. Within such coalitions Canada could avoid using resources that it either doesn’t have or are being employed elsewhere by taking advantage of the coalition’s shared pool of resources.

 

This is a less radical version of the argument that Canada really doesn’t have to do all that much to defend itself because the United States will always come to the rescue. The price for reliance on the United States, of course, is sovereignty.

 

The price for continual reliance on our allies for resources is the kind of over-dependence on those allies that has been the hallmark of Canadian defence policy for too many years now.

 

In simple, practical terms, such over-reliance can be extremely dangerous. In any given situation, there may not be enough resources to go around. Who is most likely to get the resources at urgent moments? The country that is providing them? Or the country that is borrowing them?

 

Take the current situation in Afghanistan. Canadian troops rely on the coalition to supply at least two critical elements of their combat power: airborne battlefield mobility (helicopters to get to and from the battle, respond to crises and to evacuate the wounded) and combat air support (fighters, bombers, attack helicopters).

 

Blessedly, there have been are no reports to date of this reliance leaving our troops high and dry in difficult situations. But it is worth noting that Canada is the only country to deploy significant troops to Afghanistan without providing its own air cover to support them.

 

The Chief of the Defence Staff has clearly stated his belief that it is an urgent necessity for Canada to acquire its own medium or heavy lift helicopters to have its own airborne battlefield mobility. The Committee strongly supports his position.

 

In the future, Canada should not deploy Canadian troops in these kinds of circumstances without this type of backup. The Committee will discuss this issue further in its next report.

 

Some tools, of course, are more essential than others. They must survive any cuts the Government might make to optimal military spending. Acquiring or replacing the following six capabilities should be urgent priorities for the Government to address this year:

 

1.                 Strategic Airlift: Canada requires a true long-distance lift aircraft;

2.                 Tactical Airlift: the C-130 Hercules fleet must be replaced;

3.                 Fixed Wing Search-and-Rescue;

4.                 Battlefield mobility: the need for medium-lift Helicopters is urgent;

5.                 Fleet mobility and resupply: getting on with the Joint Support Ships; and,

6.                 Army Logistic Support: the need for new medium trucks.

 

A discussion outlining the importance of each of these will follow below.

 

If the Government is unwilling to move towards the $25 Billion to $35 Billion level of funding recommended by the Committee, its best option would be to eliminate certain capabilities. Not reduce. Eliminate. If four items have to go, these are the ones:

 

1.                 Armed Naval Icebreakers (to be discussed in the Committee’s next report);

2.                 The Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle;

3.                 The “Big Honking Ship”; and,

4.                 The Mobile Gun System.

 

CHAPTER 1

 

Navy

 

Sea Changes:

Giving Depth to the Navy

 

The current Defence Policy Statement states that the Navy will maintain two task groups of up to four warships.[88] One of these task groups will contribute to a Canadian Forces Standing Contingency Task Force, a high readiness force that will able to deploy anywhere on 10 days notice. The other will be attached to a Mission-Specific Task Force with a less urgent mandate, ready to be deployed on 30 days notice.

 

Maintaining a single High Readiness Task Group is essentially a gamble. The Government would be gambling that if the High Readiness Task Group has been deployed, Standard Readiness ships could respond to any other crises that might arise.

 

This is a risky wager. The Committee believes that having only one High Readiness task group on hand constitutes insufficient emergency response capacity for a country of Canada’s size and global responsibilities.

 

Given that the mobility of the Standing Contingency Task Force is going to depend upon adequate sea lift, the Committee believes that both coasts should have high readiness task groups, to provide for timely deployment to anywhere on the planet. This would require keeping more ships at High Readiness.

 

If Canada had two high readiness task groups and one was deployed, it would leave the other in “go position” for any other emergency.

 

It makes little sense to maintain a high readiness task group on one coast when there is a 50 percent chance that an emergency will arise closer to the other coast.

 

The Committee believes that the medium- to long-term possibility of instability on the Pacific Rim – an idea which the Committee will address further in its next report – is just one scenario that could necessitate the rapid deployment of a High Readiness Task Group from a specific coast. What would happen if the High Readiness Task Group were on the East Coast at the time, or for that matter deployed overseas? The Government would be limited in its options.

 

Moving a task group from one coast to the other – a journey of over 10,000 kilometres – can take two weeks. Fuel costs and wear and tear on personnel are two other important considerations.

 

The Committee believes that though creating a second high readiness task group will require additional ships, personnel and money, it is imperative that the government plan and implement it as soon as possible.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

19.  The Department of National Defence should create two High Readiness Task Groups – one based on the Atlantic coast and one on the Pacific coast.

 

 

Replacing our Destroyers, Upgrading our Frigates

 

In our last report, Wounded, the Committee observed that the Navy’s major warship platforms, Frigates and Destroyers, were aging and will have to be replaced over the next fifteen to twenty years. Replacement of the Destroyers is long overdue and the need to replace the Frigates looms on the horizon.[89]

 

The Navy has plans in place to address both these issues. The Committee, however, is not convinced that sufficient urgency is being attached to either issue. The Destroyers and Frigates are essential to Canada’s defence capabilities.

 

Since 1990, Canada has sent warships on several missions in support of allied and United Nations maritime operations enforcing sanctions in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Adriatic.

 

Interdiction operations like these involve locating and hailing merchant ships and, if necessary, sending boarding parties to verify ships’ registries, status and cargoes.

 

One obvious example: the 2001-2003 Operation Apollo deployment against terrorism in the Middle East. As part of Operation Apollo, the Navy rotated 16 of its 18 major warships and 95 per cent of its 4,100 sailors to the Arabian Sea. During that two year operation, Canadian ships hailed more than 21,800 vessels and conducted more than half of the 1,100 boardings completed by the multinational coalition fleet in the region.

 

Canada’s Frigates and Destroyers offer the Government its primary capacity to:

 

§        Maintain sovereignty in our own waters;

 

§        Defeat enemies at sea;

 

§        Provide fire support to soldiers ashore;

 

§        Interdict, far from our shores, vessels that might be carrying weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, illegal immigrants, narcotic drugs, or people or goods infected with virulent diseases;

 

§        Enforce sanctions against rogue states;

 

§        Suppress piracy along international sea-lanes; and,

 

§        Participate in naval peacekeeping in disputed waters.

 

Replacing the Navy’s Destroyers is long over-due

 

Our Destroyers also offer Canada its only means of commanding a task group of Canadian or coalition ships. This is a capability widely admired and appreciated by our allies, but it is also a capability that should be admired and appreciated by Canadians. Without this capacity, Canadians sailors in conflicts zones will always be commanded by someone else.

 

The Navy has begun planning for a Single-Class Surface Combatant – which would feature a mix of capabilities in a common hull – as a replacement for both destroyers and frigates. Currently, the project office for the new class of vessels is conducting studies to determine operational requirements for the new ships.

 

The Committee believes that there is considerable potential to developing a single class of new ships to replace the capabilities of both the Destroyers and Frigates. It would markedly reduce Operating, Maintenance and Training costs associated with developing two different types of replacements.

 

The Navy has a small team dedicated to pursuing the Single-Class Surface Combatant, but it is obviously in the very early stages of study and it and the Project have not yet reached the formal Identification stage of the Project Approval process.[90]

 

The Navy does not plan to begin acquiring these ships until the middle of the next decade. The Committee is concerned that given the length of time it can take the Forces to acquire new pieces of equipment, the Single-Class Surface Combatant may not be available until long after the Destroyers are gone.

 

To that end we propose two remedies: a. accelerate the development of the Single-Class Surface Combatant; and, b. explore the temporary acquisition of destroyers that are already in use with our allies, such as the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers used by the United States Navy.

 

Upgrading the Frigates must occur on schedule

 

To address the current state of the Halifax-class Coastal Patrol Frigates, the Forces have planned the Frigate Life Extension Project (FELEX) to upgrade key systems. This is a normal part of a ship’s life cycle. The work is currently scheduled to begin in 2010, with each hull being in refit – and out of commission – for 27 months, with the program ending in 2017. At the very least, this means that there will be times between 2010 and 2017 when the government will have to do without half of the Frigate fleet (see figure 8).

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 8 - The chart above depicts the currently planned schedule for the Frigate Life Extension Project. Ships will be at significantly reduced readiness for both the time that they are in refit as well as the time they will be in workup (source: Department of National Defence)

 

The Frigate Life Extension Project is a worthwhile program, but one that needs to be monitored closely. It should be completed as quickly as possible, without the delays that befell the Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft and CF-18 Fighter modernization programs (see pages 151-152). The decision to contractually break those programs into smaller components meant that aircraft stayed out of commission for longer than necessary, leaving the Government with reduced options to patrol our skies and intercept threats.

 

The Committee has not seen any evidence that this stutter-step approach is planned with the Frigate Life Extension Project. It certainly shouldn’t be. Defence delayed is defence denied.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

20. The Canadian Forces accelerate the Single-Class Surface Combatant project as a successor to the Iroquois-class Destroyers and the Halifax-class Frigates, with the goal of first delivery by 2013.

 

21. The Canadian Forces complete the Frigate Life Extension Project as efficiently as possible to minimize any reduction in the capacity of the Forces.

 

 

Fleet Supply and Strategic Mobility

 

The Defence Policy Statement requires that the Canadian Forces possess the capability to deploy military forces just about anywhere in the world. That means being able to move people and equipment far from our shores.

 

In Report 1, the Committee documented the fact that the Canadian Forces are down from three to two aged naval replenishment vessels and are suffering from an overall lack of strategic sealift capability. Both issues should be addressed quickly in light of the Defence Policy Statement.

 

 

Replenishing the Fleet = Replacement of the Navy’s AORs

 

There is a plan in place to acquire three Joint Support Ships (JSS) to replace the two remaining obsolescent Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment (AOR) ships.[91] These ships are used to supply the Fleet and carry cargo such as foodstuffs, fuel, ammunition, medical/dental facilities and water. At an average age of 36, these vessels are reaching the end of their service life.

 

The plan is that the Joint Support Ships would match or exceed the AORs’ capabilities. Each new vessel would require fewer crew members than the AORs, have the capacity to transport a limited amount of wheeled equipment, and provide some command and control support for forces ashore.

 

Pursuing a replacement to the AORs is laudable, but the Committee has two problems with the current plan: the pace of progress is too slow, and the number of vessels being acquired is insufficient.

 

The Department currently plans to take delivery of the first Joint Support Ship in 2012 and achieve initial operating capability in 2013.[92] By then the average age of the AORs will be almost forty-five.

 

The Department does not plan to award the contract to build the vessel until at least 2008 – and that presumes that there will be no slippage in the Government’s slippage-prone project approval and procurement process. That 2008 target is too distant. Innovative approaches should be adopted to accelerate the delivery of these vessels.

 

Furthermore, acquiring just three vessels will not provide the Government with sufficient flexibility to complete the number of missions that might be important to the country at any given time. Without access to fleet replenishment vessels like AORs, the Navy’s capacity to support its other ships and the Canadian Forces overseas will be limited.

 

An example of this occurred just last fall. Neither of the Navy’s two aged AORs – one on each coast – was able to deploy as part of the Government’s response to Hurricane Katrina because both were in lower states of readiness due to scheduled refits.

 

AORs are ideal for disaster assistance. In 1992, for example, in response to Hurricane Andrew, HMCS PROTECTEUR delivered relief supplies to Miami, Florida, and the Bahamas.[93]

 

The reason HMCS PRESERVER, the Navy’s East Coast AOR, was not part of the Canadian contingent deployed to the U.S. Gulf Coast was because the ship had just come out of refit and was still undergoing readiness trials when Katrina hit. Had she been available, she would undoubtedly have been used just as HMCS PROTECTEUR was for Hurricane Andrew.[94]

 

HMCS PROTECTEUR has now entered a similar scheduled refit, which will leave the Forces without that capability on the West Coast.

 

The Navy cannot control Mother Nature.  But the Government can control whether the Navy has the capacity to offer responses to these kinds of disasters.

 

However, while the three Joint Support Ships specified in the current project represent an increase in capability (i.e. the roles the Canadian Forces can play) and capacity (how often they can play these roles), the Committee is not convinced that three vessels will provide the Government with sufficient flexibility to respond effectively in times of crisis. Three ships means the Canadian Forces will have to regularly rotate one ship from coast to coast just to ensure that each coast is covered when significant scheduled maintenance is required.

 

Also, the Committee believes that the need for JSS-type vessels has grown since the project was first announced. The expeditionary sealift requirement expected to be included in the Defence Capabilities Plan is in addition to the Government’s announced intention to acquire three Joint Support Ships. This new capability will require support from a JSS-like ship. Furthermore, if the Government accepts the Committee’s recommendation for a High Readiness Task Group on each coast (see pg. 86 above), there will be a need to maintain a Joint Support Ship at high readiness on both coasts at all times.

 

Acquiring only three ships of any type is insufficient to ensure the availability of a ship on each coast. The minimum number is four. Regular fleet maintenance schedules mean that roughly one out of three vessels will always be unavailable.

 

The Committee believes that three Joint Support Ships limit the government’s flexibility and are simply not enough to do the entire job. The government should acquire at least four.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

22. The Department acquire enough capacity to have at least one Joint Support Ship available at high readiness on each coast at all times, which requires at least four ships.

 

23.  The Government should provide the Department with whatever resources it requires to acquire four Joint Support Ships as quickly as possible, with first delivery by 2010.

 

 

Strategic Sealift = “Big Honking Ship”

 

Over and above the need to replace the Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment vessels, and as indicated in the previous section, the Defence Policy Statement also points to a requirement for a larger vessel that could perform strategic sealift functions beyond the limited capacity of Joint Support Ships.

 

The Committee supports the goal of making the Canadian Forces more mobile, and therefore believes that the Government must provide them with the means to acquire a new capability to embark, transport, deploy and recover a large number of troops and their equipment, vehicles and other cargo, by air and sea.

 

No current platform in the fleet can adequately perform this task. The Joint Support Ship fulfills a different role. Nobody should think that the Department’s requirement that the Joint Support Ships have 2,500 lane meters per ship for storage will provide enough capacity to fill all the Forces’ sealift needs.[95]

 

The larger vessel has been referred to as a mini-aircraft carrier (which it is not) and “the Big Honking Ship” (which it certainly would be).

 

Whatever you call it, the Forces need something larger than a Joint Support Ships if they are to effectively operate in areas like littoral failed and failing states.  It would be capable of supporting forces ashore in littoral areas, and by owning it, rather than renting it, the Government could avoid situations like that which occurred with the GTS KATIE.[96]

 

The Forces are in the early stages of considering their operational requirements for this type of vessel.

 

There is no indication that the Government intends to have a uniquely Canadian ship designed in this case, for which the Committee is thankful. Several of Canada’s close allies already have a class of vessel that performs this sort of task well.

 

They are using a class of ship that is called a Landing Platform Dock (LPD). The LPD’s primary function is to embark, transport, and deploy and recover (by air and sea) troops and their equipment, vehicles and miscellaneous cargo. They vary in size and specifications from country to country.

 

This is what Canada needs, and this type of design is available off-the-shelf should the Government wish to acquire these kinds of vessels. The Canadian Forces should make it a priority to acquire a number of these vessels in the international marketplace.

 

The Committee believes acquiring only one ship of this type would be misguided and insufficient. It would drastically reduce the Government’s flexibility to deal with more than one crisis at a time, or any crisis at all when it was in refit. How often would it be badly needed when it was in refit or already involved in another operation? 

 

Using the same reasoning that the Committee used for Joint Support Ships, we advocate that Canada should have a least one such LPD-sized vessel available at all times on the east and west coasts, which would require the purchase of four vessels in total. 

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

24.  The Canadian Forces should acquire sufficient Landing Platform Dock vessels or their equivalent, each capable of carrying an Army battle group and its equipment at a time.

 

25.  The Government should provide the Department with whatever resources it requires to acquire four Landing Platform Dock-like ships as quickly as possible.

 

 

Submarines

 

Maintaining a sub-surface capability is critical to Canada’s ability to maintain sovereignty in its own waters and operate effectively overseas, either on our own or as a component of coalition forces. The need for this capability will endure for the foreseeable future.

 

The Government has a duty to ensure that the submarines will serve us effectively. The Committee has always believed that Canada should maintain a strong submarine capacity.[97] Our four Victoria-class submarines can:

 

§        Conduct covert surveillance of our territorial waters;

 

§        Intercept unwanted shipping;

 

§        Conduct continental maritime defence;

 

§        Protect a Canadian expeditionary force at sea; and

 

§        Be used to covertly deploy special operations forces overseas.

 

These are not theoretical capabilities. The ability to approach violators of Canadian waters unobserved is hugely valuable to the Canadian Navy in activities such as fisheries patrols and counter-drug operations. The Navy has concluded that the very existence of Canada’s submarine capability – then the Oberon-class – provided an important deterrent effect during the “Turbot Crisis” fisheries dispute of 1995.[98] Anecdotally, they are also reported to have had a deterrent effect on American fishing boats operating in disputed waters on Georges Bank.

 

Anyone with doubts about the utility of the vessels and their role in the Forces need to look no further than the report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans’ Affairs on the procurement of the boats.[99]

 

The Victoria-class submarines are approaching their mid-life point. As soon as the submarines are fully operationally ready, planning for their mid-life refits and eventual replacement should begin.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

26.  The Canadian Forces should restore its submarine capability by making Canada’s four submarines operational as quickly as possible, setting in place plans for their mid-life refit as necessary, and outlining a plan for their eventual replacement by a new generation of submarines.

 

 

Meeting the Demand for New Ships

 

Given the size of Canada’s coastline, the importance of our maritime capabilities, and the time and effort required to acquire significant new maritime capabilities, there will always be a standing demand for various types of vessels in the fleets of the Navy, the Coast Guard, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the RCMP.

 

The federal government’s current shipbuilding policy was developed in 2001 after consultations between government and shipbuilding industry officials about the problems facing the industrial sector.[100] As part of the policy, the federal government committed to procure, repair and refit vessels in Canada subject to operational requirements and the continued existence of a competitive domestic marketplace.

 

The Canadian Forces and the Canadian Coast Guard urgently require the recapitalization of their respective fleets (discussed in detail in Chapter 4 and in our third report). In the next five to ten years, the Navy requires the new Joint Support Ships, possibly a strategic sea-lift capability, and a replacement for the Iroquois-class Destroyers. It must also undertake significant stringent maintenance programs to maintain Victoria-class submarines, and complete the mid-life upgrade to the Halifax-class Frigates. And that doesn’t even begin to address the needs of the Coast Guard, RCMP and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (each for different types of vessels).

 

The Committee is concerned that the tremendous need for ship construction in the coming years may outstrip the capacity of Canadian industry to support it (the extent of the situation is shown in Figure 9 but does not include any activity for the RCMP). Only a handful of shipyards in Canada can handle the construction of large ships for the Navy and the Coast Guard. The time frame and the near-coincident nature of that many programs beg the question of whether Canadian shipyards are able to handle this volume in a timely way. Even an optimist would have to say probably not.

 

The Committee believes that the national need for these vessels is greater than the build-in-Canada commitments of the shipbuilding policy which could delay the delivery of some ships until Canadian industrial capacity can handle their construction.

 

The Committee recognizes the intent of the shipbuilding policy but it notes that it contains the words ‘subject to operational requirements’. The Committee believes that – with the looming demand across all the government fleets – operational requirements dictate that some of the work must be done offshore to enable an overall program of the magnitude above to be completed as quickly and as cost-effectively as possible.

 

 

Figure 9 – Composite Timeline of Expected Navy and Coast Guard Demand on the Shipbuilding Industry in Canada. The above chart depicts major naval shipbuilding projects currently planned between 2005-2020 by the Canadian Navy and other government departments. It does not include stated commitments of the government for armed Naval Icebreakers or the Big Honkin’ Ship because no timeline has been set for these projects. It also does not include expected demand of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

 

Smart planning requires long-term funding stability. This is particularly true of funding to acquire new ships. Funding should not reflect a dragged-out, start/stop, ‘feast-or-famine’ cycle that makes it difficult to build and maintain ships efficiently and keeps some ships in service long after they should be.

 

Funding for new ships – wherever they need to be built – should be sustained to allow for departments to manage the renewal of their fleets in a rational manner and permit a steady number of opportunities for industry and hence the efficient use of its capacity. In this way Canada will put the necessary vessels in the hands of those who sail them when they need them, which should always be the overriding aim.

 

Furthermore, it has been an accepted principle for too long that the cost of new ships for the Navy comes with a non-military related premium. Certainly, that was the case with the design and construction of the HALIFAX Class Frigates. The Canadian Forces paid a premium of about 25% for designing and building those ships in the way that they did. The Forces cannot afford to allow that to happen again.

 

If the price tag of new Navy ships is inflated because of a non-defence-related policy, like regional economic development, the Department of National Defence should not bear the cost. Whatever other department is served by a premium, like Industry Canada in the case of economic development, should pay for it.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

27.  The Government aggressively pursue the recapitalization of the Navy and Coast Guard fleets as quickly as possible, wherever the most cost-effective solutions can be acquired;

 

28.  The Government maintain steady funding for new ships to support rational and timely fleet management;

 

29.  The Government ensure that any non-defence related premium that arises from a procurement decisions for Navy ships not be borne by a government department such as Industry or Heritage Canada, and not the Department of National Defence.

CHAPTER 2

 

Army

 

What Canada needs on Land

For the latter half of the 20^th Century, the Army oriented toward the Cold War and was structured to face heavily mechanized forces in a European theatre. Since the end of the Cold War, driven by budgetary and doctrinal considerations, the Army has shrunk and moved away from that model.

The Defence Policy Statement crystallizes this evolution by calling for continuous change of focus to a lighter, more mobile, and knowledge-based Army that is better suited for the asymmetric threats of the 21st Century – the “ball of snakes” as General Hillier describes these new threats. To sustain this evolution, the Army must change the way it recruits, trains and fights.

The Statement calls for the Army to perform a variety of combat and non-combat roles on behalf of Canadians, including warfighting, peace support, and humanitarian missions.

 

It was U.S. Marine Corps General Charles Krulak who coined the term “Three Block War”:

 

“In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees – providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart – conducting peacekeeping operations – and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle –all on the same day…all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the ‘three block war.”[101]

 

This is the type of warfare that Canadian Forces are fighting in Afghanistan. This is part of the wide range of duties that fall within the overall mandate of responding to man-made and natural disasters to protect Canadians and their vital interests.

 

Beyond the unilateral defence of our country, Canada is committed to collective defence through alliances with the United States and NATO, and through ad-hoc arrangements with other nations as part of coalitions. To meet these commitments, Canada must maintain multi-purpose combat-capable forces able to fight in all types of environments.

 

Evolutions in modern warfare and the technology used to fight it are constantly changing the way the Canadian Forces must prepare to engage in ground operations. The Canadian Forces have learned many lessons since the end of the Cold War about what the Army needs to do to succeed in modern operations. It has focussed its thinking and its doctrine around concepts like Network-Enabled Operations and the Three Block War. 

 

Like all armies, the Canadian Army is organized to fight as a team, with an array of complementary combat capabilities that are designed to act in concert to defeat any adversary. Direct and indirect fire weapons, capable of engaging opponents at short, medium and long range that can destroy enemy personnel, armoured vehicles, maritime vessels and aircraft all need to be knit together to mobilize a winning military team. No one weapon can meet all needs. Like a golfer, the Army needs a full bag of different clubs, each designed for a specific purpose. However, unlike the golfer, the Army is often swinging all of its clubs at the same time.

 

The Committee believes that the Army is heading in the right direction. However, in order to be able to successfully and effectively achieve its aims, there are eight major procurement projects (and a host of minor ones) that need to be completed.[102]

 

#1. Equipping Canada’s Soldiers to Fight, Win and Survive

 

Over the next decade, the technology that soldiers carry will have to change dramatically to improve fighters’ capacity to operate in complex terrain, particularly in urban areas.

 

A soldier’s success depends greatly on his or her understanding of the situation at hand, the ability to take and execute orders, provide information to their commanders, identify friend from foe, and engage and subdue the enemy.

 

The goal of the Integrated Soldier System Project is to improve each of these capabilities. It will package electronic devices, weapons accessories, operational clothing and other personal equipment into an integrated system.

 

The Committee estimates that this program will cost $300-500 million. The project is in its early stages. The Department plans for first deliveries of elements of the project in 2009 and full capability in 2015.

 

This program is essential to ensuring that the men and women of the Canadian Forces have the equipment they need to achieve their mission and return home safely. It should be accelerated. Waiting a decade for full operational capability is unacceptable. 

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

30. The Department of National Defence should accelerate the Integrated Soldier System Project relying on proven capabilities, to achieve full operational capability by 2009.

 

 

#2. Knowing What’s Going On Around You: Land Forces Intelligence Surveillance Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance (LF-ISTAR)

 

Just as the capabilities of individual soldiers and units need to be upgraded, so do Army-wide capabilities. An overall upgrade will help save lives, act as a force multiplier and improve the chances of mission success.

 

The Forces are trying to ensure that the right kind of information is being collected, analyzed, distilled into sound knowledge, and being made available in a useable, timely fashion to everyone who needs it. This is the goal of the Land Forces Intelligence Surveillance Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance project (LF-ISTAR).

 

The project does not center on any one piece of equipment. It is designed to collect battlefield information and link several battlefield functions to assist the force commander in achieving his aims. This ‘system of systems’ employs a variety of electronic sensors which can include cameras, infrared sensors, battlefield radar and equipment to intercept electronic signals.

 

LF-ISTAR is an omnibus title for a number of smaller projects and existing capabilities that are being brought together to create an enhanced information and intelligence capability for the land forces.[103]

 

At the moment, funding status of this complicated $1 billion project is uncertain.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

31.  The Department of National Defence should accelerate the Land Force Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (LF-ISTAR) project, with the aim for full operational capability not later than 2009.

 

 

#3.Knowing What’s Going on Around You Part II: LARV

 

Situational awareness is the product of information gathered from close by – emanating from sources like other soldiers and reconnaissance vehicles, and information from far away – like UAVs, communications intercepts and satellite intelligence.

 

A good ground reconnaissance vehicle is critical to gathering that information. The Committee supports the Canadian Forces’ acquisition of 75 Armoured Patrol Vehicles for Operation Archer in Afghanistan as a first step towards maximizing this capability.

 

The armoured patrol vehicle (APV) provides good protection for troops while they conduct patrols. It also provides the capacity to conduct command, liaison and reconnaissance tasks in mountainous terrain and complex urban centres. It incorporates enhanced mine blast resistance as well as protection against both improvised explosive devices and ballistic threats.

 

Canada has a duty to provide the best protection possible to our soldiers in the field. The suicide bomber and “improvised explosive device” attacks on our troops in Afghanistan over the last few months have served as tragic reminders of this duty.

 

The Committee estimates that the Forces will require approximately 200 more of these vehicles at a total cost of approximately $650 million.

 

 

#4. Getting From Here to There Part I: Big Trucks

 

There is an urgent need to replace the Canadian Forces’ workhorse trucks, called the Medium Logistic Vehicle, Wheeled (MLVW).

 

The Forces’ acquired 2,769 MLVWs acquired in the early 1980’s and had an expected service life of 15 years. Ours reached the end of their expected service life in 1997-1998 – about eight years ago.

 

The age and heavy usage of the vehicle has resulted in a five-fold increase in the maintenance cost per kilometre.[104] Corrosion has become a huge problem. A spray program is expected to keep the fleet in service until 2008. Corrosion isn’t the only problem. Spare parts have become scarce, braking systems are breaking down, and overloading has taken its toll.

 

The Department of National Defence has concluded that between 2008 and 2012 the fleet will become unsupportable. Extending the life of these trucks beyond that time is technically imprudent and economically foolish.

 

This is a large fleet, which means a large-scale purchase of vehicles is needed.  These will be militarized commercial vehicles that will dramatically improve the capability of the Land Forces to do bread-and-butter work.

 

At an estimated cost of $1.43 billion, the MLVW’s replacement, called the Medium Support Vehicle Systems (MSVS), is the most expensive land capability project in the works. But new trucks are long overdue.

 

Some or all of these new vehicles should be adapted by reinforcing them with armour. Recent U.S. and allied experience in Iraq and Afghanistan with “improvised explosive devices” has highlighted the vulnerability of lightly armoured logistics vehicles. 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

32.  The Government should accelerate the acquisition of approximately 2,900 Medium Support Vehicle Systems (MSVS), with the intent to take first delivery no later than 2008.

 

 

#5. Getting From Here to There Part II: Smaller Trucks

 

The Forces will also soon need to replace its smaller logistics vehicle, the Light Support Vehicle, Wheeled (LSVW). The LSVW is used throughout the battlefield in such roles as troop transport, medical evacuation, maintenance, administration and light cargo. It is transportable in a CC-130 Hercules aircraft.

 

These vehicles are, on average, 12 years old and will go beyond their service life around the end of the decade.

 

The Light Support Vehicle, Wheeled (LSVW) provides transportation capacity between that of the smaller Iltis and G-Wagon, and the larger 2 ½ ton Medium Logistic Vehicle, Wheeled (MLVW). It is based on Italy’s Iveco Model 40.10 and was built at the Kelowna plant of Western Star.

 

The LSVW's cargo capacity is too small for traditional tactical loads. Large stowage boxes and a spare tire mount behind the cab result in a fairly short cargo bed. To overcome the space restrictions, LSVW’s often tow an 850 kg trailer to provide adequate carrying capacity. Towing trailers and piling on the cargo exacerbates the LSVW’s other key limitation – the rather anaemic power provided by its Fiat 2.5 litre diesel engine.

 

The LSVW is unpopular. It has been criticized for poor handling, top-heaviness, unreliable brakes and transmission, and awkward engine access amongst other things. However, much of the difficulty resulted from the original specifications.

 

The Department emphasized fuel efficiency and low purchase price when they were looking for a new light support truck.  That is what it got – a vehicle with top speeds of 25 km/h off-road and only 90km/h on pavement.

 

Neither the small engine (only 115 hp despite turbo-charging) nor the weak automatic transmission is adequate for tough military operational support duties. The transmission occasionally pops out of gear under stress.  Fading breaks and rust have shown up far too early in the lives of these vehicles.

 

In the end the Canadian Forces got what they paid for – caveat emptor.[105]

 

The Committee believes that the Forces will require approximately 4,700 replacements for these trucks as the Army transforms into a larger, but lighter and more mobile force. The Committee estimates that the cost of replacing the Light Support Vehicle Wheeled will be $700-750 million. Replacing them as they reach the end of their mandate service life will reduce excessive maintenance costs to keep them running longer.

 

The Committee believes that planning for the next generation of Light Support Vehicles should take into consideration the likely need to equip some or all of them with armour.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

33.  The Government should accelerate the acquisition of the next generation of light support vehicles, with the intent to take first delivery no later than 2011.

 

#6. Firepower: Replacing Outdated Artillery

 

The ability to deliver massive firepower from anywhere within an area of operations is critical to military success. That firepower can be used to destroy an enemy or support infantry that have come under attack.

 

It has to be recognized that artillery has traditionally been a blunt instrument. Increasing concerns about civilian and friendly fire casualties has limited the utility of Canada’s current artillery. Not only is unnecessary collateral damage morally wrong, it undermines support from the Canadian public.

 

The Forces existing M109A4 are on average thirty-four years old – fourteen years beyond the Treasury Board guidelines for service life.[106]

 

The Forces began replacing their aging M109A4 self-propelled howitzer with M777 light-towed howitzers for Operation Archer in Afghanistan last Fall.

 

In a three-block war, precision is mandatory. So is the capability to employ both lethal and non-lethal weapons. And greater reach is always an asset.

 

The Committee believes that the Forces continue to replace their aging artillery. The Committee estimates the cost of the project at $900 million (for approximately 83 weapons).[107]

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

34. The Government should complete procurement and fielding of the new generation M777 guns no later than 2008

 

 

#7. Firepower: Acquiring the Mobile Gun System

 

The Army’s transformation into a lighter and more mobile force does not negate its need for firepower to dominate the battlefield. Quickness is increasingly important, but it cannot replace strength.

 

Even the most benign humanitarian operations have the potential to escalate suddenly into combat operations, in which a direct fire capability will be critical to the safety of Canadian soldiers and their winning a battle.

 

The Leopard C2 tank represents the Canadian Forces’ primary direct-fire capability. It is reaching retirement age. In their place, the Canadian Forces plan is to procure 66 modern Direct Fire Support Variants (DFSVs) of the Mobile Gun System.

 

Replacing tracked tanks with a wheeled Mobile Gun System is part of a plan to become a lighter, more strategically mobile force. The Mobile Gun System is smaller and lighter than the Leopard tank. Although it cannot be transported in a Hercules aircraft without being partially dismantled, the Mobile Gun System can be carried on larger aircraft.

 

Although the Leopard tank is still an effective direct-fire vehicle, Canada has rarely deployed them either because it was politically unpalatable, or sometimes because the Canadian Forces had no method of transporting these heavy beasts to a theatre of operations in a timely way. 

 

In the lingo of the boxing ring, tanks are heavyweights. The Mobile Gun System is considerably lighter but not nearly as well protected. MGS is worth considering, but the Committee has some reservations that it might not represent good value for money spent.  Our allies have not yet decided whether to invest in this system. We shouldn’t be rushing ahead with them, not at this point anyway.

 

 

#8. Firepower: Developing the Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle (MMEV)

 

The Army also needs vehicles with the capacity to engage ground targets – such as armoured vehicles and bunkers – as well as aircraft, including helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles.

 

Enter the Multi-Mission Effects Vehicles (MMEV), which will combine anti-armour and air-defence capabilities on one platform. The MMEV will also be able to engage targets hidden behind surrounding landscape features – such as hills and buildings – with its non-line-of-sight weapons system. This combination of capabilities on one platform will provide ground force commanders with an unprecedented level of flexibility. 

 

The Committee supports the concept in principle, but has some hesitation in accepting the MMEV – as currently conceived – as being the best answer. The idea of having multiple capabilities on one vehicle sounds exotic, but it may not be all that practical. It could be viewed as an ill-advised attempt at cost cutting at the expense of soldier safety and operational effectiveness.

 

There may be those who think a smaller number of MMEVs could be procured in place of a larger number of single-capability anti-armour, anti-air and indirect-fire weapons. But if an MMEV is destroyed or disabled on the battlefield, the operational commander loses all three capabilities in one moment.

 

There is another concern. In September 2005, the Government announced its intent to undertake a project to design, develop and deliver MMEVs for the Canadian Forces. The full production of the MMEV fleet is expected to begin in 2010 following the completion of the design and development phase of the MMEV project. Do we want to invest in a long development process, or wait and consider where our allies are going on this technology?

 

The MMEV is a Canadian design. The Canadian Forces worked with Defence Research & Development Canada and Canadian industry through the Technology Demonstration Program to develop the fire control systems and ergonomics that will feed directly into the development of the MMEV.[108]

 

While the Committee is certainly not opposed to innovative military developments within Canadian industry, it is wary of the high costs and difficulties that have often accompanied the development of weaponry that is uniquely Canadian.

 

It is usually a better idea to buy off the rack. The Committee hopes the MMEV is the exception to the rule, but suggests that the Government remain alert to ensure that the most cost-effective route is taken to develop this capacity.

 

Our soldiers need a first-class product delivered, and the Canadian Forces need a first-class product delivered at a reasonable cost. The MMEV must be procured in sufficient quantity to offer operational redundancy on the battlefield and be built in such a way that delivery and cost are as promised. We cannot afford – either in terms of financial costs or risk to soldiers’ lives – to get bogged down in an industrial development exercise that doesn’t pay off on the battlefield.

 

 

CHAPTER 3

 

Air Force

 

 

What Canada needs Aloft

 

Strategic Airlift

 

Strategic airlift allows for the movement of large quantities of equipment and personnel rapidly over long distances.  In order to be effective, strategic airlift must be capable of moving even the largest military equipment to get a mission up and running and to keep it re-supplied once it is underway. This may include vehicles, artillery pieces, field hospitals, water purification plants and even helicopters.

 

Speed of response is vital.  Only if Canada has its own strategic airlift capacity can the Government of Canada move essential personnel and equipment to virtually any part of this country or the world in short order.

 

Despite the fact that Canada is a huge country, and despite the fact that it is also thousands of miles from  most potential military theatres of operation, Canada has not possessed a true strategic airlift capability since the Second World War.

 

Canada managed to meet most of its Cold War obligations by pre-positioning the majority of the vehicles, ammunition and other supplies required for the first days of any conflict at forward bases and staging areas. Those bases are gone now. This means that ways must be found to ship heavy equipment directly from Canada. The Canadian military currently has no effective, reliable and timely way of doing this.

 

Canada’s defence policy, like the defence policies of most of our traditional allies, emphasizes lighter, more agile and responsive armed forces.  Agility implies quick and easy movement. It is a contradiction in terms to suggest that our forces can be agile or responsive if they cannot rapidly get to where they are needed.

 

We Muddle Through Emergencies at Home

 

At home, we have muddled through a series of recent emergencies, including the Red River flood in 1997 and the Quebec-Ontario ice storm of 1998. In both cases, we were fortunate that we had enough time to respond, since lives were not immediately at risk. Nevertheless, we were forced to ask the United States for heavy airlift assistance during the Ice Storm.

 

Can we count on that kind of luck and generosity in the future? Would we be able to respond to a massive earthquake anywhere in the country? The Canadian Forces have personnel and resources spread across the country to assist in just about any kind of national emergency. But will we be able to get them where they are urgently needed when the time comes?

 

Hitching Rides Overseas

 

The approach of earlier Canadian governments to strategic lift people and equipment overseas has been to charter commercial planes or hitch rides with the Americans. In 1992, Canada relied on the U.S. Air Force to transport some of our armoured vehicles to Somalia. In 2002, we used civilian rentals and U.S. military aircraft to deploy to Afghanistan. Our less-than-sprightly DART response to the earthquake in Pakistan was accomplished using charter airlift.

 

The importance of strategic airlift is not lost on our allies.  The US maintains a fleet of more than 300 large airlifters (a mix of the C-5 Galaxy and the C-17 Globemaster), and even at that, occasionally finds the need to use commercial resources for less critical or less dangerous missions. A consortium of predominantly NATO nations has set about designing and building a completely new military airlifter (the Airbus A400M) to meet their strategic airlift needs. Barring any delay in the programme, the first will be delivered in 2009. The original seven countries (Germany, France, UK, Belgium, Spain, Turkey and Luxemburg) have since been joined by Malaysia, Chile and South Africa. Unwilling to wait for the A400M, in 2001 the UK leased four of the C-17’s from the US as an interim measure. They have now decided to purchase them at the end of the lease and will acquire a fifth, in addition to purchasing the A400M when it comes available. Australia has announced that it will acquire up to four of the C-17’s, with the first being delivered about a year from now.

 

Being Part of a NATO Airlift Pool is Insufficient

 

As a stopgap measure, ten NATO nations (including Canada) have entered into a collective arrangement that will allow the participating nations to access a pool of leased Antonov-124’s until the A400M is fielded. NATO has made arrangements with an eastern European company for AN-124’s to be available on 72-hour notice for an extendable period of three years.

 

This agreement is clearly a short-term solution for our European allies while they are waiting for their A400Ms. But it is not a good solution for Canada, even on an interim basis.  Since the aircraft will be based in Europe, response times to Canada will be longer than they are for other participants.  In a crisis involving more than one of the participants, Canada would likely have to wait its turn to gain access to this limited pool of aircraft.  When the program expires Canada is likely going to be left to its own devices since many of the other participating nations are planning to purchase A400Ms. One other problem: there is no guarantee that this commercial entity will remain viable over the long term or that the approximately 20 aging aircraft that make up this fleet will be replaced when their lifetimes expire.

 

Strategic airlift is at present and will likely remain a scarce commodity around the world. If Canada had this capability, we would be in a position to provide welcome, rapid, visible and relatively economical assistance in a wide array of military and other crises.[109]

 

The Committee believes that a fleet of 6 to 8 aircraft capable of carrying outsized cargo rapidly over trans-oceanic distances would be sufficient to meet these requirements.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

35.  The Canadian Forces acquire a fleet of 6 to 8 strategic airlift aircraft by early 2008 that can guarantee a rapid response to emergencies in Canada and around the world and proper support to Canadian operations overseas.

Hercules Tactical Airlift

 

The CC-130 Hercules has been the Canadian Forces’ trusted workhorse since the 1960s.

 

These aircraft provide the ability to move troops, supplies and smaller vehicles within an area of operations and are unique in their ability to operate from short and austere airports that provide little in the way of ground services. This capability is absolutely essential in the remote regions of Canada and for the support of Canadian troops operating in difficult territory abroad. The Hercs have also been pressed into service as the fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft for northern, central and eastern Canada.

 

 

Canada’s Fleet of 32 30 Hercules is Aging, Dwindling

 

Canada’s fleet of Hercules is among the oldest in the world. The cost and time required to maintain our Hercules has skyrocketed. In the coming years, it is likely to cost more to keep the current fleet flying than it would to purchase new aircraft.

 

In 2002, the Committee reported that on any given day up to 20 of the Hercules – or about two-thirds of the Canadian Forces fleet at the time of 32 aircraft – sit on the ground waiting to be repaired. This sad situation has actually worsened. Nineteen of the oldest Hercules are reaching the point of being “beyond economical repair.” The fleet now only consists of 30 aircraft as two have already been parked permanently and will never fly again. The rest will soon follow.

 

Media reports during the November 2005 election campaign suggesting that a plan had been approved to replace the Hercules fleet were premature. No contracts were signed and no replacements are on their way.

 

These aircraft have been lifelines for Canadian Forces operating at home and abroad. Troop mobility is essential. Re-supply under difficult operational conditions is essential.  Canada needs this kind of aircraft to perform these critical tasks.

 

If we need strategic airlift (and we do), we also need to replace the wide range of capabilities that the Hercules can provide.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

36. The Canadian Forces should replace the oldest 20 to 25 aircraft in its Hercules fleet as an urgent priority with a target of no later than 2007 for the first delivery of the new aircraft with similar capabilities.

 

 

Medium-Lift Helicopters

 

The Government decided to dispense with Canada’s modest fleet of seven Chinook medium-lift helicopters as a cost-saving measure in the early 1990’s. They were sold to the Netherlands. The Government assessed the needs of the Canadian Forces at the time, and determined that the Chinooks were expendable.

 

Experience gained in recent operations, however – especially in Afghanistan – has shown that Canada needs the type of battlefield mobility provided by the Chinooks. They are a real asset, especially in tough geographic locations.[110] Ironically, the Canadian Task Force in Afghanistan relies on our Dutch allies to carry troops in the very Chinooks that were once part of Canada’s fleet.

 

These helicopters are especially useful where roads and railways and other conventional means of transport are disrupted. The Canadian Government was forced to contract a Russian-built medium lift helicopter to support the DART in its ongoing earthquake relief mission in Pakistan.[111] Canada is filled with remote and rocky terrain, so these helicopters would also be useful for domestic disasters.

 

The Forces have yet to put a number on how many medium-lift helicopters they require. The Committee, noting the Defence Policy Statement’s increased emphasis on special operations capabilities and light fast-moving sea-based expeditionary forces, and taking into account our own recommendation to expand the military, recommends the purchase of significantly more medium lift helicopters than were sold off.

 

Without medium-lift helicopters, Canada will be forced, as LGen Andrew Leslie testified, to keep “sending young men and women tiptoeing through minefields at midnight because we don’t have the lift to pick them up and put them on the top of the hill.”[112]

 

The Committee estimates that approximately 16-20 Medium Lift Helicopters, at a total cost of approximately $2 billion, would be sufficient to adequately maintain the capacity that is required to ensure that Canadian Forces personnel can effectively and safely prosecute the missions the Government asks of them.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

37. The Canadian Forces commence procurement of a fleet of 16 to 20 medium-lift helicopters with a target of 2007 for first delivery.

 

 

Maritime Helicopters

 

The requirement for a Medium Lift Helicopter capability is a separate issue from the seemingly endless project to replace the notorious Sea Kings, Canada’s maritime helicopters. As the Committee noted in Report 1, the fleet of 29 Sea King helicopters (now 28 Sea King helicopters)[113] eat up vast amounts of maintenance resources for every flying hour and now principally support only the High Readiness ships. A new fleet of 28 CH-148 Cyclone helicopters will not be operational until near the end of the decade.

 

Sea Kings operate off Frigates, Destroyers and Auxiliary Oil Replenishment ships and perform a variety of tasks including anti-submarine warfare that differ than those envisaged for the Medium Lift Helicopters.

 

The new Maritime Helicopters will provide a critical extension to the “eyes and ears” of Canada’s surface fleet that was designed to have onboard helicopters to fully realize its potential to counter both surface and sub-surface threats. It is essential that this long-overdue program move forward at the best possible pace to make this enhanced capability available to our Navy as soon as possible.

 

CF-18 Fighters

 

CF-18s represent our only tool for controlling Canada’s airspace, protecting our cities from an airborne threat, fulfilling our obligation to help protect North American airspace under the NORAD agreement and providing air cover in support of Canadian Forces operations abroad.

 

In the last five years, CF-18s have provided increased airborne surveillance following the 9/11 attacks and provided overhead CF-18 protection for G8 Conference at Kananaskis, Alberta. As they did during the Cold War – and now in the face of a possible terrorist threat – a number of these aircraft stand on continuous alert at various locations around Canada.

 

The Committee believes that fighters constitute a unique, essential tool and that the Government must maintain this capability for at least the next ten to

fifteen years.

 

The first step to maintaining this capability is completing belated mid-life update programs. CF-18s were purchased in the early 1980’s.  They are past due for updating with more technologically advanced sensors and communications equipment and adapting them to modern precision weaponry. Not only will these updates increase the effectiveness of these aircraft, they will make it possible for Canada to continue to work with our allies.

 

The decision to split the update program into smaller components may have been the only affordable choice at the time. It has meant, however, that these essential new capabilities will not be in place for quite a while.  A significant percentage of the aircraft fleet will be stuck in hangars undergoing modification for at least another five years

 

Participation in the Joint Strike Fighter Project

 

As we approach the end of the expected life of the aircraft, the question remains: What comes next? The Government must now begin to address the future of Canada’s fighter capability in the next decade. 

 

At the moment, there is no active program to replace to the CF-18. Canada is however, one of nine countries participating in the development of the Joint Strike Fighter, a US-led program to build the next-generation fighter aircraft.[114] Canada has invested approximately $200 million in the program thus far and will decide by the end of 2006 whether to remain in the program into its next phase. Canada’s participation has given it a seat at the development table with the opportunity to contribute to the design; has gained Canadian industry access to compete for high technology development and manufacturing work (worth about $150M so far); and has given us a preferential place in line should we eventually decide to purchase the aircraft.

 

 

CP-140 Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft

 

CP-140 Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft detect and counter submarines in our waters, provide air surveillance of our territory and coastlines, and are used for maritime surveillance in support of Canadian Forces operations abroad.

 

Like CF-18s, the Maritime Patrol Aircraft were purchased in the early 1980’s and are going through a protracted mid-life update program.

 

Colonel Matte, the officer responsible for our east coast Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft, told the Committee that because of this refit program – and the lack of spare parts and technicians – his greatest challenge was simply getting aircraft in the air:

 

“The capacity to generate flying hours today is less than half of what it was in the early 1990s. While our air crew remain safe and proficient to fly their assigned missions, there has been an appreciable reduction in the number of hours flown and subsequently the exposure and experience gained by our crews.”[115]

 

More bad news: it now appears that the CP-140 will require extensive structural upgrading if it is to continue flying past 2020. Funding for this airframe project is already late and requires immediate approval by the government.

If the Government of Canada fails to maintain the Canadian Forces' Aurora capability, the Forces will lose its only strategic surveillance platform. Canada's ability to monitor its coasts and the North will be significantly diminished.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

38.  The government and the Canadian Forces make it a priority to complete the Aurora upgrade programs in the minimum possible time so that these essential capabilities are once again available to protect Canadians.

 

 

Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft

 

Canadians and visitors to Canada can find themselves lost, hurt and desperate in remote parts of our rugged terrain or in our coastal waters. Their equally desperate loved ones have always been able to bank on the fact that the Canadian Forces have often been able to come to the rescue.

 

To bolster its capacity to help those in dire straits, the Canadian Forces recently acquired the new Cormorant Search and Rescue helicopter. Once it becomes fully operational, it will provide an enhanced rescue capability for many years to come.[116]

 

There is another major component of the Forces’ Search and Rescue capacity: the fixed-wing search aircraft.  The news here is not so good. Fixed-wing missions are currently conducted using the aging CC-115 Buffalo aircraft in the western mountainous regions of Canada and the CC-130 Hercules in the remainder of the country.[117] The CC-115 Buffalo played a much larger role in Search and Rescue until the mid-1990s when most of them were retired due to age and the prohibitive cost of maintenance.

 

These aircraft were replaced from the existing fleet of CC-130s Hercules. Now these aircraft are in the same shape as their retired predecessors.

 

Canadians depend upon the Forces’ reliability to perform Search-And-Rescue. In the Fall of 2004, the previous Government recognized this fact and at one point it announced that a replacement program be placed on the “fast track.”

 

Two years later, no new fixed-wing Search-and-Rescue platform has been ordered. The process seems to have been knocked off track by the perceived needs that a competitive bidding process take place and that Canadian industry be given an opportunity to participate.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

39.  The government re-energize the “fast track” acquisition of approximately 20 to 24 aircraft to fulfill the fixed-wing search and rescue role so that the first of these aircraft can be delivered by 2007.

 

 

Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles

 

Canada has a tremendous challenge overseeing its expansive territory and endless coastlines.

 

Even in the days when more resources were available, it was difficult to maintain surveillance of our land and waters with manned aircraft and surface ships. Now that potential threats to Canada are more diverse, and new challenges to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic loom on the horizon, we are even less able to stand by.

 

The rapidly emerging field of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) offers hope for a practical and affordable solution.

 

Recent operations by Canada and/or its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that UAVs are an invaluable reconnaissance tool where ongoing surveillance is required in unfriendly surroundings.

 

 

 

According to Major General Andrew Leslie:

 

“We had [tactical unmanned aerial vehicles] in Afghanistan. They did great work. The ability to use [UAVs] to see over the next hill is a mission winner, whether it is war, peace support or humanitarian support. I think five or ten years from now, it would be nice if a variety of elements down the army chain of command, company, battle group and brigade, had their own means of checking out what is on the other side of the hill without sending a young soldier through a minefield at midnight.”[118]

 

Though the Canadian Forces are using UAVs on an interim basis in the difficult terrain of Afghanistan, Canadian troops generally lack a reliable means of “finding out what is over the next hill.”

 

The Forces have tested several versions of this technology in various environments in Canada, including the Arctic and on the Atlantic Coast. The Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre outside Ottawa is currently engaged in a study of UAVs.

 

The Committee first recommended that the Government acquire an array of uninhabited platforms in its report Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World (October 2003). Such an array would include both tactical and strategic uninhabited aerial vehicles. It would cost approximately $250 million, depending on the type and number of vehicles acquired.

 

UAVs hold great promise as part of the solution to Canada’s surveillance needs at home and abroad. The more ambitious the Government becomes in integrating this technology into general use, the safer Canadians, their military personnel and their sovereignty will be.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

40.  The Government and the Canadian Forces should acquire, deploy and operate an array of uninhabited air vehicles as an integral component of a national intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance picture by 2008.

 

CHAPTER 4

 

Other Capabilities

 

Special Operations Capabilities

 

Cold War era conventional military forces are organized and equipped to fight ‘conventional’ battles that are largely force-on-force encounters. They are characterized by large armoured land formations, technologically sophisticated ‘blue-water’ naval ships and equally sophisticated ‘blue-sky’ superiority jet fighter aircraft. Conventional fighting usually took place in open areas, like the eastern US in the American civil war, the Russian steppes in the Second World War, or in the Iraqi desert in the Gulf War. Conventional operations could also be conducted in urbanized regions like Europe in the Second World War, or in Baghdad during the US invasion of Iraq.

 

Forces that were designed to fight in a less sophisticated environment, against guerrilla or insurgent forces in difficult terrain such as a jungle, highly urbanized or mountainous region, were characterized as ‘unconventional’. They are generally lightly equipped and the troops consider themselves to be more aggressive and physically fit than ‘conventional troops,’ although this is emotionally debated among soldiers. Examples of unconventional operations would be the British operations against the Japanese in Burma during the Second World War, much of the US operations in Vietnam and current coalition operations in major Iraqi cities. Note that conventional operations can become unconventional, and vice-versa. US operations in Iraq were originally conventional during the invasion, but have become unconventional now because of insurgent forces.

 

Special operations are distinct from conventional and unconventional operations. They are operations that aim to destroy, neutralize or disrupt selective, high-value targets. Examples might include the killing of an effective enemy commander, the destruction of an important enemy headquarters or facility, the rescue of hostages held by terrorists, or the capture of war crime suspects.

 

NATO defines special operations as “military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained and equipped forces using operational techniques and modes of employment not standard to conventional forces. These activities are conducted across the full range of military operations independently or in coordination with operations of conventional forces to achieve political, military, psychological and economic objectives. Politico-military considerations may require clandestine, covert or discreet techniques and the acceptance of a degree of physical and political risk not associated with conventional operations.”

 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are generally not designed for force-on-force encounters, but are organized and trained to strike selected, high-value targets. They strive to make every action an unfair fight in their favour. Well-trained SOF are disciplined and ruthless, with a ‘no-fail’ attitude.

 

The recently established the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) has the following missions:

a.                 provide the CDS and operational commanders with high readiness forces capable of conducting special operations across the spectrum of conflict at home and abroad;

b.                 provide centralized command of all activities and organizations that generate special operations forces;

c.                  conduct special operations  on orders of the CDS;

d.                 develop special operations forces, doctrine and procedures.

 

CANSOFCOM includes the following units:

 

a.                 Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2) – Canada’s counter terrorist unit, located at Dwyer Hill, ON;

b.                 Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) – to operate independently or in support of JTF-2, located at CFB Petawawa, ON;

c.                  Special Operations Aviation Unit (SOAU) – a helicopter squadron located at CFB Petawawa, ON;

d.                 Joint Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defence Company (JNBCD Coy) – to protect military personnel or assist civilian authorities in the event of a nuclear, biological or chemical incident, located at Trenton, ON.

 

To be effective, Special Operations Forces must combine highly motivated and capable personnel, extreme and rigorous training and sophisticated, technologically advanced equipment. They also need effective combat back-up in critical operations.

 

The Special Operations Command will be capable of operating as an independent formation but its primary focus will be to generate Special Operations Forces elements to support Canada Command (Canada COM) and the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM).[119]

 

The Committee has examined the structure and role of JTF-2, as well as the proposed additional Special Operations components. We have concerns as to whether their structure and resources allotted will adequately support the very demanding roles that this extraordinary force will be expected to play.

 

 

Enabling Special Operations

 

The Committee acknowledges the government’s intention to provide CANSOFCOM with a suite of modern “enabling” capabilities, including combat reinforcement, logistical and medical support. This will greatly increase the capacity and effectiveness of Canadian special operations.  

 

What are these enabling capabilities that JTF-2 requires to improve its performance?

 

§        Assured strategic airlift that guarantees Special Operations Forces can reach any part of Canada in single-digit hours.

 

§        Assured ground mobility to move to – and manoeuvre within – the incident area.

 

§        An expanded logistics capability to assure that it is able to support and sustain multiple operations – of real importance if Canada sustains multiple terrorist attacks at the same time.

 

§        A variety of capabilities that could spell the difference between success and failure on high-risk assignments. These include special language skills, unique weapons skills, unconventional modes of clandestine insertion and expanded intelligence capabilities.

 

§        A new, well-equipped, Special Operations Forces training base to replace inadequate facilities at Dwyer Hill, outside Ottawa.

 

All this points to a new and welcome interest in modern special operations by DND and the Canadian Forces. Some changes and additions to headquarters bureaucracy and support will be needed to ensure appropriate force development activity in this field. While such capability has been embedded in operational level headquarters and the Strategic Joint Staff, there is a need to develop effective and continuous special operations force development and equipment procurement.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

41. DND immediately establish a standing Special Operations Forces Equipment Project Office to address the need for expanded special operations equipment on a continuing basis, for an enlarged Canadian Special Operations Forces formation.

 

 

Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2)

 

JTF-2, which operates both domestically and internationally, is Canada’s ultimate counter-terrorist force – our incident-management response force of last resort. The unit, equipped with leading-edge technology, is composed of highly-trained assault specialists whose capability and reputation rank them among the very best in the world. JTF-2 is held at high readiness and trained to conduct counter-terrorist operations anywhere in Canada or abroad.

 

Canadians know very little about JTF-2. The Committee expressed concern over the amount of secrecy surrounding the unit in Report 1. While the Committee accepts the requirement for operational and personal security, authorities should do more to make Canadians aware of the role and missions of JTF-2 without compromising its safety or usefulness. The updated JTF-2 website is at least a step in the right direction.[120]

 

JTF-2 has had some difficulty in retaining personnel in recent years. Life for personnel is both secretive and highly demanding. It places significant stress on family life. It is a mix of anxiety – waiting on constant call – and intense pressure when the call finally comes. As well, private security companies have been expanding exponentially since 2001 and they often offer lucrative short-term contracts that can significantly exceed JTF-2 military pay and allowances over the same period.

 

The Committee is pleased to note that the Government has acted to address this issue by increasing the allowances.[121] The JTF2 allowance has been increased from two to six steps based on years of qualifying service with annual compensation ranging from $7,488 to $8,964 for general support personnel, from $13,680 to $16,356 for close support personnel and from $21,756 to $25,260 for assaulters.

 

The Canadian Forces compensation scheme includes special allowances to compensate CF members for skills and knowledge requirements that are not used regularly over a career and therefore are not compensated in base pay. The Special Operations Assaulter Allowance is an example of such an allowance. The allowance contains six steps with annual compensation ranging from $15,000 for those with less than two year’s qualifying service as an assaulter to $39,576 for those with 14 years or more qualifying service.

 

These allowance improvements, together with the other rewards of military service and recent base pay improvements, make JTF 2 compensation competitive with the external labour market and with members of other nations’ special operations forces. 

 

The Canadian Forces are working to double the size of JTF-2 but indications are that the expansion is going slowly. The Government will not reveal the status of the unit’s planned personnel expansion.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

42.  The Canadian Forces complete the expansion of JTF-2 by 2009.

 

Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR)

 

The Canadian Special Operations Regiment was established on 1 February 2006 and is currently in the process of building up personnel, training and equipment. It will be a highly trained, high mobility special operations force that is capable of independent operations, as well as supporting both special and conventional operations forces. At full strength, the Canadian Special Operations Regiment will have approximately 750 personnel and form three direct action companies and a special operations forces company that will complement other capabilities in CANSOFCOM, including JTF-2.

 

Drawn from all parts of the CF, the unit will have a broad range of capabilities to operate in Canada and abroad. Personnel will possess a host of skills that enable them to operate in a variety of terrains and environments. They will be highly flexible and adaptable, with the capability to work in small groups for extended periods of time without significant support. The Regiment’s tasks could include support to counter-terrorism operations, direct action, special reconnaissance and other sensitive, high-risk operations.

 

By summer 2006, half of the unit headquarters and service support will be in place, as well as the first company trained to a basic level. To ‘jump start’ the process, the Army Commander provided this first company complete from the 3^rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment. Remaining volunteer personnel will be recruited from across the Canadian Forces – male and female; Regular and Reserve; sailor, soldier and air personnel.

 

There will be two categories of personnel in the Regiment. Category 1 will comprise Canadian Special Operations Regiment Operators, to be employed in tactical special operations and high value tasks. Category 2 personnel will be drawn from Regular and Reserve force military occupational groups to fill specific staff and support positions.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

43. Other Canadian Forces elements provide further “jump start” formed bodies, commensurate with their ability to do so and in keeping with the unit ability to absorb them. For instance, to follow the lead of The Royal Canadian Regiment, each of the other Army infantry regiments might provide a company. Or the Royal Corps of Canadian Artillery and the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps could provide a platoon each. The Navy may wish to contribute an initial group of trained boarding party personnel to establish a presence.

 

 

Canadian Special Operations Aviation Unit

 

The Canadian Special Operations Aviation Unit is currently equipped with the Bell-Textron CH 146 Griffon helicopter, a helicopter that some feel is not adequate for conventional military operations let alone special operations.

 

In 1998, the Auditor General said in a report

 

“We noted in the projects we examined that affordability constraints resulted in only low-end capability being purchased, limitations in the number purchased, or both … the Griffon helicopter cannot meet the army's original lift and communications requirements.”

 

Also in the same report,

 

“Operational tests that could have been carried out on the Griffon to assess the aircraft's suitability for military use were not done before acquisition. As a result, the Department is now discovering that the aircraft's capabilities are being stretched to their limits, particularly when the Griffon is used in applications that push its envelope, such as search and rescue operations. Problems not yet resolved include engine over-torques, and electrostatic shocks to personnel who ground the aircraft as it hovers…. prior to acquisition the Department did not test the new Griffon helicopter's ability to conduct military missions. After the aircraft was introduced into service it became apparent that its capability to perform certain military tasks is limited.”[122]

 

The purchase of the Griffon was the first major Canadian Forces foray into “commercial off-the-shelf” procurement. Unit purchase prices were lower since development costs were already absorbed by previous commercial customers for the civilian Model 412. The Canadian Forces needed only to pay for the militarization kits. Despite the ease of adapting the civilian 412 model to military roles, the Griffon remains essentially a commercial helicopter – hardly the type of helicopter to be assigned to special operations. Unfortunately, unclassified information on the current status and use of the Griffon helicopter in the Canadian Special Operations Aviation Unit is not being made public.

 

What is known however, is that when carrying troops equipped for combat, the Griffon can be fitted with either long range fuel tanks or Kevlar armour plating, but not both. This means that troops going further into a conflict zone are less protected. The Griffon is also incapable of lifting even the lightest artillery gun in the Canadian inventory. Tail blade weakness has also resulted in crashes, some of which have killed pilots.[123]

 

This is hardly a helicopter that should be assigned to Special Operations Forces.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

44.  DND immediately establish a project office to initiate procurement of a modern, combat capable tactical helicopter suitable for use by Canadian Special Operations Forces; and

 

45. A Special Operations Forces helicopter be acquired by 2009, to be operationally capable when the expanded JTF-2 and the full Canadian Special Operations Regiment reach its full operational capability.

 

 

Joint Nuclear Biological and Chemical Defence Company

 

Since 1976, the Canadian Forces has maintained an enhanced and deployable nuclear, biological and chemical defence response team (NBCRT) for support to domestic operations. The events subsequent to September 11, 2001, emphasized that nuclear, biological and chemical defence is a critical element of domestic and international security. Increasing the Canadian Forces capability was given a higher priority and the December 2001 Federal Budget provided $30 million to enhance NBC defence capability across the military and establish the JNBCD Company as an immediate response unit, at Canadian Forces Trenton, where it has access to military airlift in time of crisis.

 

The JNBCD Company maintains an initial response component on a very high readiness posture as part of the National Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Team and can be deployed by road or by air.

 

The JNBCD Company is a truly “joint” unit with members coming from the army, navy and air force. It can conduct detection, sampling and identification of the full range of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards, and provide expert advice to incident commanders and senior officials. February 1, 2006 marked CF JNBCD Company’s reassignment to Canadian Special Operations Forces Command where it continues to be able to rapidly respond to Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) terrorist threats as the CF Component of the National CBRN Response Team or Special Operations Force.

 

 

Tactical Airlift – Big Honkin’ Helicopters

 

This report also discussed the need for medium lift tactical helicopters to provide battlefield mobility. This capability is also required for the tactical deployment and support of Special Operations Forces. Although there are some special fittings required from time to time when supporting special operations, there is not, at this time, a requirement to have dedicated medium-lift helicopters placed in support of Canadian Special Operations Forces. However, in procuring the medium lift helicopters recommended earlier in this report, it is essential that enough of them be procured to ensure the availability of at least three at any time, to support special operations.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

46.  The acquisition of medium lift helicopters, recommended earlier in this report, include sufficient numbers to ensure the availability of at least three helicopters, to be placed in support of special operations if needed.

 

 

Tactical Airlift – CC130 Hercules

 

Earlier in this report, the grave difficulties facing the Canadian Forces CC-130 Hercules aircraft fleet were discussed and recommendations made for the purchase of new tactical airlift aircraft. The urgent need for Hercules replacement is reinforced by the fact that the operational deployment of Special Operations Forces and all Canadian parachute forces is, for the most part, dependent on Hercules aircraft.

 

Further, as with special operations tactical helicopters, the deployment and support of Special Operations Forces requires specially equipped versions of Hercules aircraft, suitable for a variety of non-traditional combat scenarios. And given that Special Operations Forces must be held at high readiness and prepared to deploy at short notice, time does not allow the leisurely adaptation of Hercules aircraft equipped for normal duty, into an immediately capable special operations aircraft.

 

If Canada’s expanded special operations capability is to be taken seriously, there is no alternative to having dedicated tactical airlift assigned in support.

 

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

47.  In addition to the replacement CC-130 Hercules aircraft called for earlier in this report, DND further procure three additional Hercules aircraft to be dedicated to special operations and appropriately equipped for that role; and

 

48.  Of the three special operations aircraft, at least one be maintained at the same high readiness as the Special Operations Forces it will support.

 

 

Strategic airlift

 

Earlier in Part IV of this report, we recommended that The Government and the Canadian Forces acquire a fleet of strategic airlift aircraft that can guarantee a timely and robust response to emergencies in Canada and around the world and proper support to Canadian operations overseas. Domestic emergencies could include terrorist activity.

 

As Canada’s ultimate counter-terrorist force, JTF-2 must be able to reach any likely crisis site within Canada, in single-digit hours, if it is to be at all effective. From the base of Special Operations Forces in the Ottawa area, no location in the country should be without the effective operational help of JTF-2 beyond nine hours – that’s a maximum of nine hours from warning to operational assault if necessary.

 

In order to be able to do this, Canadian Special Operations Forces require assured, high readiness strategic airlift, capable of deploying operationally capable Special Operations Force elements to any target area in the time required. An important criteria inherent in this requirement, is the ability to be able to land on austere airstrips. As a result, if the crisis arises in anywhere other than a significant urban area with a large airport, the Canadian Forces Polaris aircraft will not be able to land. On the other hand, where a CC-130 Hercules aircraft can land in a variety of austere locations, it does not have the speed or load capacity to meet urgent special operations domestic deployment times.

 

While it is true that, depending on the location, a combination of Polaris and Hercules aircraft might be sufficient (e.g. fly the Polaris into Edmonton, then transfer the JTF-2 operational element and its equipment into a Hercules that flies to the crisis site in Jasper, Alberta), it eats up valuable operational time and produces additional complications that are not needed. The optimum requirement is for a strategic lift aircraft that can land on austere airstrips if and when required.

 

While the deployment of Special Operations Forces abroad will also entail a degree of urgency, quick reaction in international deployments is less critical than in domestic crises. Nonetheless, international deployments of Special Operations Forces will have their own unique requirements and any aircraft procured must be able to be suitably adapted as necessary to effectively support this activity.

 

The Committee recommends that:

 

49.  In procuring a fleet of strategic airlift aircraft, as recommended earlier in this report, the aircraft acquired must be suitable for the strategic deployment of Canadian Special Operations Forces direct to the maximum possible number of locations in Canada, in a time and manner appropriate to operational readiness requirements that will be established; and

 

50.  The strategic airlift aircraft required be appropriately adaptable to the support of special operations and that the numbers acquired allow for at least one aircraft to held at the same high readiness as the Special Operations Forces.

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)

 

Canada’s DART is staffed by approximately 220 Canadian Forces[124] personnel equipped to fly into disaster areas and deliver limited medical treatment, limited engineering capacity and 200,000 litres of safe drinking water a day for up to 40 days.[125] It has deployed five times since it was established in 1996.

 

At Town Hall meetings the Committee hosted across Canada, the Committee quickly discovered how popular this unit is. That makes sense: the DART dispenses emergency care for people in distress, rather than bombs or bullets.

 

The Disaster Assistance Response Team has successfully deployed twice in the last eighteen months to aid victims of the December 2004 Asian Tsunami and the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. 

 

The DART may be popular with Canadians generally, but critics complain that it inhales money and is an inefficient and often ineffective way to deploy disaster assistance. CARE Canada President John Watson has been quoted as saying that sending the DART to Sri Lanka after the December 2004 South Asian Tsunami made “no sense, except as a PR exercise.”[126]

 

As it noted in Report 1, the Committee accepts that there are negative aspects to the DART’s capability and how it is employed. It is very expensive to deploy. The Turkey mission cost $15 million. The cost of the Kashmir mission has been estimated at more than $12 million.

 

However, the Committee respectfully discounts most criticism of the DART because it believes there is an incalculable benefit to Canadian interests in having Canadian Forces personnel in Canadian uniforms delivering relief to people around the world. The Government of Canada can support international aid agencies, such as Mr. Watson’s, and continue to deploy the DART as well.

 

The Committee believes that the unit could be deployed in more timely and effective ways.

 

 

Getting DART There on Time

 

DART is always on 48-hour notice to ship out, but its ability to deploy rapidly is limited by the speed at which it gets orders to do so and its ability to get to the location of a crisis.

 

It was, for example, only six days after the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan that politicians authorized deployment of DART. The majority of the DART left for Pakistan a day later and the last of the team deployed three days after that.[127] There needs to be a way to reduce that lag time.

 

Even when a decision is made to go, the Forces lack the in-house capability to move the DART and its equipment efficiently. To get the DART to a place like Pakistan quickly, the Forces must rent aging Russian strategic airlift aircraft to carry its equipment (personnel are not allowed to travel on these aircraft). This is not only expensive; it adds an element of uncertainty to a deployment. At present, the Forces must acquire strategic lift after a crisis occurs, while other countries without lift may also be vying for that transport.