Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Fisheries and Oceans
Issue 3 - Evidence, October 19, 2006
OTTAWA, Thursday, October 19, 2006
The Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans met this day at 10:55 a.m. to examine and report on issues relating to the federal government's new and evolving policy framework for managing Canada's fisheries and oceans.
Senator Bill Rompkey (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Welcome everyone to the continuing study of the evolving policy of fisheries and oceans. In particular, we are studying fisheries management outside the 200-mile limit.
We have had witnesses in the past. We have heard from the minister. We will be going to Newfoundland in November to hear witnesses, but today we are hearing from three eminent gentlemen who are former employees and senior officials of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. They have been in the trenches for years suggesting, counselling and enforcing policy. We welcome them because of their experience and knowledge. We know that they are going to be a great help to us.
I welcome Bob Applebaum, who was in the international area — perhaps they all have been, in one way or another — Earl Wiseman and Bill Rowat, who also, as we know, was there on the ground during the dramatic incidents of the Estai and all that that entailed.
My name is Bill Rompkey and I am the chairman of the committee. I represent a territory called Labrador, which is just north of that island of Newfoundland. We have with us Senator Gill from the Lac-Saint-Jean area of Quebec; Senator Watt, who is no stranger to Labrador, representing Nunavik in northern Quebec; Senator Hubley from Prince Edward Island, which also has a lot of water around it and marine life; and Senator Johnson, who is the deputy chair of the committee, from Winnipeg, which is quite near to Lake Winnipeg.
Bob Applebaum, as an individual: Honourable senators, I retired in 1996 from the position of Director General, International Directorate, in the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. I have not have much involvement in the department since that time, but when I reviewed, over recent days, the documents relating to current straddling stocks issues in the Northwest Atlantic, I was not surprised to see they remain essentially the same as they were in the early 1990s.
I read the 2005 report of the advisory panel chaired by Dr. May, which reflected how little had been accomplished over the intervening period to implement the 1995 United Nations Fish Agreement, UNFA — to the development of which I and many others had devoted so much time and effort, and which had been hailed as offering a solution to these problems for the future. Then, I was pleasantly surprised to learn that what seems to be a great step forward was made at the September 2006 meeting of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, NAFO. The details of that meeting are outlined in the DFO press release. I believe you have all seen and discussed those details at a recent meeting of this committee. The key elements involve the development of dispute settlement procedures, which require an amendment to the NAFO convention — and this may not be easy to achieve — and what looks like a radically improved system to enforce compliance with the NAFO conservation rules. According to the press release, the latter seems to include the requirement, in the case of vessels caught in the act of committing specified serious infractions, for their flag states to order them to cease fishing and proceed to a port for immediate inspection. However, from the text of the actual adopted regulation, this requirement can, in some cases, be avoided; and, of course, the system depends on flag states doing what is required of them.
The action of suspending a vessel's operations in the middle of its fishery and forcing it to incur the consequent income losses was one of the key elements of UNFA, aimed at giving fishing captains and companies a powerful disincentive against fishing violations. In this respect, I want to draw your attention to a major difference between what NAFO has adopted and what is in UNFA.
The UNFA system was predicated on the assumption that flag states cannot be relied upon to take this kind of quick and costly action against their vessels unless it provided for other states — parties to the relevant regional fisheries organization — to be able to take this action when flag states fail to do so. I am referring to article 21, paragraph 8, of UNFA.
If the new NAFO system works, it is far better for this kind of action to be taken by flag states for their vessels rather than by other states. The UNFA system, which provided for other states to intervene when necessary, created an incentive for the flag states to take this kind of action.
I simply want to note that the UNFA provision is there and available for implementation by Canada at any time it is required. A great deal of effort went into getting it into UNFA, and it is doubtful that Canada would have accepted the conclusion of the UNFA negotiations without it.
I will close with a general comment regarding the various proposals adopted at the last NAFO meeting for amendments to the NAFO convention, including but not limited to the new dispute settlement provisions. In the broad sense, they look like major improvements, but you have often heard the expression the devil is in the details.
It might be useful if another advisory panel was established, perhaps again under the chairmanship of Dr. May, to review the proposed convention amendments and to offer views on whether any changes are required. The amendments to be made now are, after all, likely to be what Canada will have to live with for another 25 years.
Earl Wiseman, as an individual: Mr. Chairman, honourable senators, I appreciate this opportunity to participate in this morning's discussion. My focus will be on the Northwest Atlantic. The positive changes that have occurred over the past few years will contribute to the resolution of numerous high seas fishing problems worldwide. My presentation will be general. I will leave the specifics open to questions.
As an official, I have found it stimulating to discuss issues in the open and constructive forum provided by this committee. Your work has produced a long line of well-researched and comprehensive reports that are important documents in the understanding of these issues. I have been retired from the public service for over four years and it has been fascinating to return to the issues and review what has been happening. Much has improved but as Mr. Applebaum mentioned, many concerns remain.
Clearly, what we used to refer to as ``foreign overfishing'' has been a significant problem for Canada for more than half a century. The committee's June 2003 report, Straddling Fish Stocks in the Northwest Atlantic provides a good overview of the history and evolution of the issues and the views of many of the key participants. The credibility of the committee's recommendations is reflected in much that has occurred since then. In addition, I have reviewed the June 2005 Report of the Advisory Panel on the Sustainable Management of Straddling Fish Stocks in the Northwest Atlantic. This report is an excellent analysis of the problem with some good directions provided for the way ahead. With these two documents and numerous previous reports, we can see what has been happening over the past few years in international law, within the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization in Canada's bilateral fisheries relations, and at sea. Furthermore, I have reviewed the transcript of the meeting that the committee had with Minister Hearn a few weeks ago. His description of the progress in NAFO during last month's annual meeting to finalize a new convention and to improve the conservation and enforcement measures is hopeful. The direction is positive and, apparently, it is advancing in a reasonable manner. I was pleased to see his full support and promotion of the importance of the 1995 United Nations agreement on the Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, commonly referred to in Canada as UNFA, United Nations Fish Agreement. Unfortunately, at the time of the passing of UNFA, the then opposition did not appreciate the value of the implementation legislation. The failures of the past have had their origins in weak legal instruments, lack of political will, poor record keeping, inadequate scientific knowledge and unanticipated ecosystem changes. We have learned a lot but there is obviously still more to do and to learn.
The evolution of sustainable management for straddling stocks has been a slow process; however, it appears to be advancing more quickly in the right direction. More importantly, the hard work over the past decades to strengthen international law and instruments available to deal with the issues are beginning to pay off. Further, science has developed more refined and confident methods to provide advice.
A significant factor for the sustainable management in the Northwest Atlantic has been the removal of a major roadblock. Canada and the key members of NAFO have now ratified both UNCLOS and UNFA. The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, including the compliance agreement and various international plans of action has also been adopted. This has allowed regional fisheries management organizations, such as NAFO, to move toward a more realistic sustainable management framework. A critical factor for Canada is the negotiation of a new NAFO convention. Work on elements of this has been underway for many years to overcome some of the fatal flaws of the existing regime. Now that the major players are party to UNCLOS and UNFA, there appears to be a more serious effort and greater momentum to conclude the new convention.
In the past, it was difficult to have non-parties to an international agreement work hard to commit themselves to changes in NAFO outlined in those agreements. Only when ratifications were concluded were they in a stronger legal position with their stakeholders to move toward the implementation of these new agreements.
We have turned the corner on gaining acceptance that a new convention is required and what that new convention must contain. As Mr. Applebaum said, the devil will be in the details. As the implications of the new convention become clear to all stakeholders, the level of resistance and questions are likely to build.
It had been said that NAFO had some of the toughest control measures found in any regional fisheries management organization. It is true. NAFO has long been a leader. In 1995, the monitoring control and enforcement measures adopted by NAFO arising from the Canada-EU agreement to resolve the Estai incident were groundbreaking and foreshadowed similar provisions in UNFA. Despite some of the tightest controls on paper, we have seen that without political will on the part of authorities, progress at sea and its influence on the stocks is too slow. Political will is much more than lip service. It is the acceptance of the need to ensure sustainable use of the world's fishery resources, the vision and commitment to take the difficult decisions and, most importantly, the allocation of the resources necessary to implement change and to enforce the rules. UNFA provides governments with directions. It is not perfect, but no negotiated agreement ever meets all of the objectives of the parties. However, Canada achieved a great deal. We need to ensure that it is fully implemented. With some real evidence of how effectively it works, we will have the basis for suggesting future improvements. We must give it a chance. As Mr. Applebaum pointed out, it is important that we recognize what we achieved in UNFA and not give anything away without being conscious of what we are doing.
Contrary to current wisdom and myths, Canada is an influential power in fisheries management. The Government of Canada has long been a leader in the evolution of international fisheries law. While we have not succeeded in moving NAFO forward as quickly as many would like, we have won virtually all of the critical votes on measures we have proposed. Some of our secondary objectives were not met as quickly as some would have liked, and at times this lead to negative comments by a few outspoken stakeholders or the media despite a largely successful outcome. Our major impediment was the limitations of UNCLOS.
We have punched above our weight to achieve significant gains in international institutions. However, to maintain credibility it is important for Canada to work within the international framework. Any attempt to make claims of special needs to justify inconsistent actions by Canada will only open the door to more requests from other parties for flexibility on the high seas and will weaken our credibility. To achieve the results in the Northwest Atlantic, Canada has to maintain the lead. We have to be seen to walk the talk and we need to continue with our incremental progress. I know how frustratingly slow the NAFO process has been. Much hardship has been caused by earlier failures but we have reached the tipping point and are moving toward the more sustainable practices that we all want.
It would be great if we had the power to do what some wish — to start from scratch and create the ideal organization in the Northwest Atlantic to meet Canada's needs. It is not so easy when you want and need the cooperation of 12 other parties. Canada's efforts appear to be culminating in what we have long desired: a new NAFO convention based on UNFA principles. Science will continue to provide greater clarification and options as we gain knowledge and experience. The Government of Canada must ensure that we do not drop the ball.
Bill Rowat, as an individual: Thank you Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the invitation from the committee to join this panel today concerning fisheries management in the Northwest Atlantic. I am delighted to be appearing with my former friends and I regret that Mr. Parsons is not here today as well.
During my 30-year career with the government, I spent two terms with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The first term was for nine years, 1979-88, starting as a fisheries economist in Prince Edward Island and ending as Assistant Deputy Minister, Atlantic. My second term was as a deputy minister from 1994-97. That period coincided with the famous turbot war in which my colleagues and I played a central part. It has been nine years since I have been associated in any direct way with fisheries issues. It is a fascinating topic and you tend to become a bit of an armchair quarterback when you leave. In advance of this meeting, the Clerk of the Committee sent me a number of reports, two of which were particularly germane to today's discussion. The first was the committee's report on straddling stocks in June 2003 and Dr. May's panel report on straddling stocks from June 2005. Both reports are comprehensive in their assessment of all the key parameters affecting fisheries beyond the 200-mile limit.
Yesterday, we had a briefing from DFO officials on what has happened since those two reports were produced. In particular, we were briefed on the outcome of the latest NAFO discussions in September 2006. Dr. May's panel report assessment of NAFO was particularly damning. On pages 73 and 74, the panel outlined the main flaws of NAFO, and these have continued throughout the life of NAFO. The flaws include the lack of a precautionary and sustainable management approach. The second flaw is the current voting procedure, which allows minority interests to influence events out of all proportion to their involvement in the fishery. Third, is the existence of an objection procedure that allows parties to opt out of a majority decision. Fourth, is the lack of a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism. Fifth, is the ineffectiveness of flag state enforcement and sanctions for serious fisheries infractions on their own fishing fleets. The panel's bottom line is that NAFO has failed, and miserably so. Further, the panel concluded that given the pace at which international law develops, the only realistic option for corrective action would be to change the RFMO.
In this context, the panel went on to review three options for reforming or replacing NAFO. First, it reviewed the various arguments for custodial management and essentially rejected it as an option at this point in time. I agree with the panel's analysis and its conclusion. Second, the panel reviewed the option of reforming NAFO to modernize it and to bring it in line with the principles and management approaches laid out in the new UN Fish Stocks Agreement, UNFA, which came into force in December 2001. The panel's conclusion was that such a reform initiative would not be successful, arguing that many existing members of NAFO have little to gain from effective conservation when it mainly benefits the few major players in the organization.
The panel reviewed and recommended a third option, that a new RFMO be negotiated to replace NAFO as soon as possible and that it incorporate the modern approaches and principles of sustainable ecosystem management contained in the new UNFA and other recent agreements.
I do not share the panel's enthusiasm for creating a new regional fisheries organization to replace NAFO. Such an exercise would take an inordinate amount of time to negotiate amongst parties who are and who have been active in the Northwest Atlantic. Moreover, at the end of the day, it is questionable whether the advances would be any greater than can be achieved through a reformed NAFO.
Since NAFO came into existence, just prior to the UNCLOS in 1982, there have been many annual changes within NAFO itself, including many changes, which Mr. Wiseman referred to, coming out of the turbot war in 1995. However, the biggest contribution of the turbot war was that it created a context for the negotiations of UNFA to succeed. The UNFA discussions, which began in 1993, suddenly became very focussed in 1995 with the international attention given to the turbot war. The UNFA is an elaboration and improvement over the original UNCLOS.
On December 4, 1995 — six months after the turbot war — the new UN agreement on the conservation and management of straddling stocks was completed and opened for signature. This agreement, which came into force on December 11, 2001, after 30 signatures, set the stage for what Canada achieved in NAFO negotiations this fall.
Following the turbot war, NAFO parties were reasonably well behaved for about five years and then some started to revert to their old practices. Canada has, over the past few years, again expressed frustration in NAFO with non- complying parties and their fleets. Canada has mounted a major diplomatic and educational effort over the past few years with NAFO parties, as well as with the public. Canada has also put more funding into science and enforcement activities, and that seems to have been effective. However, it was really time for another showdown in NAFO, which I think came this fall, to see if some of the more progressive UNFA measures could be incorporated meaningfully into the NAFO convention or whether, as Dr. May argued, NAFO needed to be replaced by a new RFMO.
If one looks at the list of items which Dr. May's panel report said could best be achieved through a new RFMO, remarkably, the Canadian delegation achieved the key elements at September's NAFO meeting. First, the panel report recommended a sustainable management, ecosystem approach. Following the September NAFO meeting, the NAFO fisheries management process must now take into account the precautionary approach and the ecosystem approach. Decisions will reflect scientific advice on fish habitat in marine-sensitive areas, including seamounts in the Northwest Atlantic. Second, the panel highlighted the need for a dispute settlement mechanism to constrain the existing unfettered NAFO objection procedure. In September, NAFO members agreed that a dispute settlement procedure, as outlined in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, will be made part of the NAFO convention so that countries that object to NAFO decisions cannot simply proceed with unilaterally declared quotas. They must enter a dispute settlement process with an impartial panel. The new dispute process makes the objection procedure more difficult to invoke.
One of the practical next steps will be to find ways to ensure that objecting parties are not free to fish while the dispute resolution process is under way, perhaps by penalizing the following year's quota.
Dr. May's panel pointed to the failure of NAFO with respect to detection, enforcement, and a lack of timely and serious penalties and sanctions imposed by flag states on their non-complying vessels.
What did the Canadian delegation achieve? Vessels cited for major infractions will be directed to port for immediate inspection. This includes misreporting their catch, directing for species under moratoria and repeat offences.
NAFO has now agreed to guidelines for sanctions when vessel owners are caught breaking the rules. Countries will be obliged to impose a fine, suspend or withdraw a licence or quota, and confiscate fishing gear and/or the illegal catch. The principle is that the punishment will be commensurate with the crime. The next step will be to set some common standards so that each state is not left to define what courts consider as commensurate.
The bottom line on enforcement, however, is that we still have flag state enforcement. Only the flag state can prosecute its own vessels for violations. This will continue to be an Achilles heel until, if ever, states agree to cede sovereignty.
The new enforcement rules are a definite improvement in that they further proscribe the potential for flagrant abuse. It will take a couple of years to see how they work out in practice. The true test will come when stocks eventually start to recover.
In summary, I do not share the panel's view that the best avenue to achieve Canada's goals for effective management outside 200 miles is to replace NAFO with a new RFMO. In fact, NAFO, the way it is going, will be a revision to the convention, so it will be a form of new NAFO.
The Canadian delegation at NAFO this year was able to secure significant improvements to the NAFO management regime by incorporating key measures from UNFA. These measures will further prescribe NAFO parties' ability to transgress basic principles. The new measures put further limitations on discretion of flag states and their fleets to defy basic conservation principles, invoke the objection procedure and evade their enforcement responsibilities.
The Chairman: I would like to get some clarification before we go to questions.
With regard to the flag states, Mr. Applebaum said the devil is in the details. One thing that has plagued us all along is the right of the flag state to impose a penalty.
Perhaps all of the witnesses might want to comment on the effect of the Estai, because there was clearly an immediate effect in terms of moving UNCLOS and those international agreements.
Mr. Rowat has said that as a long-term effect, countries will be obliged to impose a fine. Was a fine ever imposed on the Estai? Was there a diplomatic resolution that may have moved international agreements but did not actually oblige Spain to take any action on its own?
Mr. Rowat has said that only the flag state can prosecute its own vessels for violation. That may meet with international law. Maybe it is difficult to get around that, but it seems to me that is the core of the issue. Whether we have a new organization or an old organization which has changed, how do we deal with the fact that it has to be the flag state which imposes the penalty and controls its own people? That is the main nut; it seems to me, that we have to try to crack.
I would like you to address that, please.
Mr. Rowat: With the arrest of the Estai, we charged but eventually stayed the charges. It was a long time ago, but I think we charged the captain. He was fined $10,000, but I am not sure whether we gave it back or eventually did not take his cheque.
Mr. Wiseman: It was a bond to release him and we returned that bond.
The Chairman: Who did that?
Mr. Wiseman: Canada. Canada arrested the vessel on the high seas. The Spanish never charged the vessel or acknowledged that the vessel did anything wrong. Therefore, they challenged Canada for its actions.
Mr. Rowat: Basically, staying the charges was part of the agreement that we arrived at with the European Union. It was one of the necessary elements.
With regard to the rest of your question as it pertains to today, what the Canadian delegation achieved in September in terms of setting out the guidelines for penalties is a good one. They got a principle of ``the punishment shall be commensurate with the crime.'' That is, to deter future activities of the same sort. It is very high level. They essentially lay out the kinds of penalties that can be applied from fines, and so on — I went through the list already.
What is necessary, and what has been done in other areas — we did it in fisheries back in the 1970s and 1980s — was to lay out the type and level of fine, an actual schedule. If you are caught, to use a lobster example, fishing too many traps, you shall be suspended 30 days from the fishery and fined $5,000. If you are caught twice you will have a full licence suspension, et cetera.
One of the next steps — and it is quite doable in my mind — is to take these general principles and the list of various penalties and do up a schedule or a set of standards so that the various countries understand the kind of severe penalty that is required for a particularly serious infraction. The way it is set up is very good; the principle is commensurate with the crime. However, if you are in a Spanish court, they could say, ``Maybe a $5,000 fine is enough,'' whereas in Canada we might say that a fine of $100,000 and a 30-day suspension is what is required as a level of deterrence. A schedule must be set up to better define what ``commensurate'' means. That is a very doable step. Sometime over the next couple of years within NAFO, it would be possible to propose something like that.
The Chairman: Who would draw up the schedule and who would enforce it? Would it still be the flag state?
Mr. Rowat: That is the key. One of the working parties in NAFO could draw it up. Hopefully, they could get agreement to it. It might be difficult, particularly with various countries such as Spain and Portugal. It would be up to the individual flag states to take it and state either that they will use this as a set of guidelines or they will set it aside and not use it. Flag state enforcement is still the Achilles heel, and that has been the weakness in UNFA.
Mr. Applebaum: When you talk about an Achilles heel, we cannot avoid the fact that whatever system of fines or agreements, the flag state's tribunal makes the decision based on the evidence put before it. It is still, and it always will be, pretty easy for a ship's captain and crew crossing the Atlantic Ocean to get back home where it will face this tribunal. It is still easy to find various ways of concealing and getting rid of the evidence, and putting the tribunal in a position of saying, ``If we could find them guilty, yes, this is what we would do; however, we cannot find them guilty because our own people did the inspection and the boat is clean. None of these problems found at sea back a few months ago appeared when our inspectors honestly looked at it.'' That problem will stay. It is a real problem and it will continue.
With regard to your question about how the Estai fit in to the UNFA convention and how that worked, I think I can offer some illumination, because I was a member of the delegation that developed the UNFA and I was the head of delegation for one of the sessions.
When the UNFA conference was on, the Estai was in front of everybody at that meeting. You may remember Minister Tobin being there with the net up there and all the journalists.
The Chairman: The last turbot clinging by its finger nails to the Grand Banks, yes.
Mr. Applebaum: It was in the forefront of the attention of the people there — not only in terms of this being a real issue that was really ongoing at the time, but that it was an issue that should be dealt with because it would rise in the future again inevitably, maybe in Canada; maybe in other countries. The issue was will the coastal state so desperate to stop a problem do something like going out on the high seas and arresting a foreign flag vessel? Those people around the table knew that one of the things they had to come up with, and did come up with, was a provision that said that when it is necessary, it is not only the flag state that can grab hold of its vessel and stop what it is doing. In a regional organization, other parties to the organization should have the right under circumscribed circumstances to do what the flag state is failing to do. That is the provision I referred to earlier, namely article 22 of that convention. That is why I said it was extremely important and difficult to achieve. However, the point was made that Canada has done it; other countries will do it when they are desperate. We must have a provision which says, they can do it.
The Chairman: It is still there and you could get away with it under international law if you did it, could you?
Mr. Applebaum: I would not say ``get away with it.'' It is there. The provisions say the parties are entitled to use this provision.
The Chairman: That is bad terminology. We are still learning English where I come from. The point is that it is there and it is defensible. We would be within our rights to do it, right?
Mr. Applebaum: Absolutely, yes, and when I say that, I want to make clear as well, that as any lawyer knows — and I have been a lawyer for a long time — there is always a counter legal argument to everything. The EU has already, at various times, put us on notice that if we try to use this they would not roll over.
What it takes is what it always takes: The will to say, ``This is the provision. We are entitled to use it and we will use it. If they object, they can take us to court on it.''
The Chairman: Following from that, your conclusion that where Canada has taken direct action things have happened over the years, is there a series of actions that Canada has taken as a member of NAFO over the years that has precipitated reform?
Mr. Applebaum: There is no doubt about that. You could go through all sorts of lists including the last one we just talked about, the Estai. All through the process of the 1980s and 1990s, the actions taken by Canada produced reactions that ended up improving the system.
The Chairman: That is important for us to understand, namely that the reforms have come because Canada has taken some action.
Mr. Applebaum: I have no doubt in affirming that.
Mr. Wiseman: I fully support what Mr. Applebaum said, not only our actions at sea but also our actions in international fora. Canada, by going to Rio, got the whole issue of straddling fish stocks on the international environment agenda, which led to the creation of the negotiation for UNFA. Through diplomatic meetings and other fora, we have always been promoting these things.
Many of the current views toward the implementation of UNFA are also arising out of meetings largely lead by Canada. A meeting was held in St. John's a few years ago which brought ministers together and they produced a declaration which was reflected and picked up by other ministers in a task force set up in Europe of fisheries ministers. The North Atlantic fisheries ministers meet. These ideas are coming together. A major meeting in Johannesburg took place a few years back as well. These ideas have been promoted and put forward not only by Canada but also with a lot of direction and input from Canada.
In terms of the sanctions issue, one of the improvements to NAFO — Mr. Rowat is right — there is no formal list, if you do A the fine will be B, but the transparency will be much greater. Parties will have to report in a more timely and accurate manner as to what they are doing if a vessel has received an infringement and what specific sanctions have been applied. A NAFO committee will review these reports annually and do a report on the level of compliance. It might be embarrassing if a particular flag state had a number of infringements and was also seen to not levy significant sanctions. I believe other members of NAFO would want to focus on that and there would be discussions in NAFO.
Mr. Rowat: I would like to add something. I agree with Mr. Wiseman that Canada has been a leader in terms of developing the concepts, major diplomatic efforts and so on, but I agree that every once in a while you have to get your elbows up in the corner to make yourself credible. Before the Estai incident Canada had never been considered credible in the fisheries area. By the way, it was never expected that we would have to fire on the Estai. We were ready for it but we never expected that it would actually go that far.
Deputy Minister Murray's agreement to bring in the Canadian navy just to show the flag on ground, I thought was a very good symbolic move, because over the last three or four years we had been pushing hard to get the new UNFA in place. It did not hurt to have a few extra navy boats out there with our own Coast Guard. It is a further indication of the level of frustration and all those factors tended to bring things to a head in NAFO this year and really pushed for a conclusion.
Senator Hubley: If a state is constantly ignoring these rules and regulations, is there an avenue to bring them to change, or can any flag state abuse this system by frequent violations?
Mr. Applebaum: That is a legal question. Senator, the answer is that there is an avenue but it is a difficult avenue. The avenue is for parties to UNCLOS, which really covers most countries. On high seas matters, there is a compulsory dispute settlement system under which they can be brought to court. There are several international courts including the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. However, a country that continually causes problems, and will not follow the rules, can in principle, in theory be brought to court and forced to comply. There are also other avenues, of course, too, diplomacy, United Nations approaches, and all that. However, it is a very expensive and time-consuming process and countries are generally reluctant for good reason to invest the time, effort and personnel to start a proceeding, say, before the International Court of Justice to bring another country to court and to force them to change their behaviour.
Senator Johnson: We certainly have some incredibly experienced people here today. Can you tell me in your collective experience, which is very extensive, which nations are the best behaved regarding sustainable development of the high seas stocks?
Mr. Rowat: Canada is among the best behaved.
Mr. Wiseman: Norway, I think would be up there too.
Senator Johnson: It that it; those two?
Mr. Wiseman: I am thinking of the Northwest Atlantic.
Senator Johnson: I will not ask for the names of the worst offenders.
In terms of the objection dispute settlement procedure, there are certain NAFO reforms, measures concerning monitoring and control, surveillance, which are to take effect in January 2007. The new proposed objection and dispute resolution procedure must be ratified by legislatures in the NAFO member states because it involves a change of language in the treaty, which was establish in NAFO in 1978. Does amending NAFO's convention require the approval of three-quarters of the members?
Mr. Wiseman: Yes.
Senator Johnson: In your opinion is there the political will on the part of the contracting parties to affect the reforms announced in September 2006? You mentioned political will, Mr. Applebaum, in your opening comments. In the end analysis, does it not come down to that? How will these new reforms make a difference?
Mr. Applebaum: Senator, putting the emphasis on political will is obviously the right way to start. The three of us are no longer in the middle of it any more. Remember, we are out of the whole system and we can only watch what others are doing and follow what they are telling us they are doing. The impression is that in NAFO now those who are in the forefront of these issues, the countries that are party, are now open to adopting these amendments. There are many steps to go through before that step can be taken. They must first agree to launch the amendments and then agree to ratify those amendments.
As I recall the NAFO convention procedures on this, it is even more difficult than the senator's reference. There is a three-quarters rule in there, which means that every NAFO member has to agree to these amendments for these amendments to come into force. In almost every country, and I think it is every country, it will have to take some form of legislative approval by their legislatures, and I would not be surprised if it involves all the legislatures or in the EU at the relevant time.
When I started by saying that it is a very difficult process, once launched, to get amendments to the NAFO convention, that is some of the detail as to why.
Mr. Wiseman: It took the EU about 10 years to ratify UNFA.
Senator Johnson: Time is of the essence in terms of the oceans. I am not an expert on the subject, I have been on this committee for many years and we hear the same things, but you say Canada is one of the best in terms of sustainable development on the high seas but can you put a time frame with your collective experience again on when it will be impossible to save the oceans from the ravages of overfishing and everything else?
The whole legislative thing is like changing a Constitution. Machiavelli said that was the hardest thing in the world and I guess it is the same with this situation.
Mr. Rowat: My sense is that we are in a spirit of cooperation amongst the parties and we are making some very significant progress. The one hole in the boat is still on the enforcement side with flag state enforcement. While we may find parties cooperative on that front for the next few years, I think the real issue could be in a number of years out when fisheries start to recover. As Bob said, you are redesigning a convention to last another 25 years and, from our collective experience over the last 25 years, we have seen things go in NAFO from a period of cooperation from 1979 through the early 1980s and then suddenly an event happens that makes people very uncooperative.
When the Spanish fleet was kicked out of Namibia in the early 1980s, suddenly the EU had to find a place for those fleets to go. Literally, overnight, we found a different set of circumstances and we were dealing with a very uncooperative NAFO.
Today, we exist in a very cooperative period. NAFO is making many advancements, but it is always the weakness that as if circumstances change in five or 10 years there are some holes that could lead to a need for more aggressive action at that time.
Mr. Applebaum: I agree with Mr. Rowat that a distinction has to be drawn between the reform of the NAFO convention itself, the adoption of these reform proposals, and the larger question that you raise, senator, about how long will it take to be able to get action on the high seas to rebuild the stocks and keep them preserved. They are two somewhat separate things. Mr. Rowat's answer is right that, currently, there is an atmosphere of cooperation, which is relevant to the fact the stocks are so depressed. It is the action in the organization pending what might take 10 years to ratify these reforms, but it is the action of the organization over the next 10 years, let us say, without these reforms in place that will be key to rebuilding those stocks. As Mr. Rowat indicated, at some point in the future if the stocks rebuild — and let us hope that they do — we can anticipate problems.
The Chairman: There is an old saying that university politics are intense because the stakes are so low. It seems to me that could be applied here. Most of it is gone. It would be great to get an agreement about something that is not there any more.
Senator Johnson: To your knowledge, has Canada ever launched an objection to a NAFO decision?
Mr. Wiseman: No.
Perhaps I could add one more point to the previous question asked by Senator Johnson. I may be a little naive and overly optimistic. While I agree with what Mr. Rowat and Mr. Applebaum have said about stocks being low, everyone is cooperating, and everything looks like it is going along well, but when the stocks rebuild we will be back to the wars of the past. Maybe it is not quite the same.
In the past, there were perceptions that the stocks were indestructible, that you could overfish and it really would not hurt too much. It may slow things down in terms of rebuilding, but it would not be a big deal. Today, people realize that the ecosystems are more fragile than we thought they were 25 years ago. People now recognize that there has to be some concerted action to put in place measures to protect stocks. International law and diplomacy has moved much further than it was. I also think that the public knowledge and understanding has moved much further than where it was. I am not sure they would ever be able to get away with the kinds of stuff they tried to do in the past.
Senator Johnson: Public scrutiny plays a role in this issue. As well, the level of knowledge on issues concerning the environment is better.
As a nation, have we always abided by the conservation measures and catch levels set by NAFO?
Mr. Wiseman: As a nation, I think so. We had violations, though, and we would enforce those violations.
Mr. Rowat: That is the key. In NAFO, we have generally abided. We have had captains who have overfished and it has been reported. However, we have always imposed serious penalties because of overfishing.
Inside the 200-mile limit, it might have been a different matter over the last 20 years. However, that was a case of learning how to manage after 1977 when we declared 200 and virtually imposed a domestic regime very quickly. It took us about 10 years to get on top of the kind of management that was required.
Senator Johnson: I have one last personal comment. Were you not happy when Iceland did what they did? My family comes from there. Did that not make a big difference in the history of all this, too? It was an amazing thing to do. In your view, how is Iceland in terms of conservation? Leave the question of whaling alone for a moment. Are they in the same league as Norway?
Mr. Wiseman: In many respects they are, but Iceland has become a distant-water fishing nation. Historically, it had focused on the waters of Iceland. Now that it has broader interest, it tends to have a slightly different perspective on the high seas.
[Translation]
Senator Gill: After listening to your explanations and reading the information passed along to us, the lay person could be left with the impression that the whole process is very slow. From what I understand, agreements between different countries are implemented at a snail's pace, or often, after a period of ten years. Therefore, it is likely that concepts advanced ten years earlier may have been forgotten. I would imagine a great deal of money is spent and that provision is made for substantial budgets.
I would think the underlying principles of some agreements were linked to the sovereignty of each country. Did these agreements also really have in mind the goal of stock conservation? Do all parties have access to the same information on migratory stocks when that information is needed? Do other countries have a place a structure that allows for the sharing of genuine, verified and credible information? In other words, does everyone have access to the same basic information?
[English]
Mr. Wiseman: In a regional fisheries management organization such as NAFO, all the parties are members of the scientific council. They have a responsibility and obligation to provide the scientific council with all the data they have collected through various means on the state of the stocks in the area managed by that organization.
That information in NAFO, for example, is shared. There is a common extensive computerized database which is accessible by all the contracting parties. For the Northwest Atlantic, for example, there is a large database.
Clearly, individual contracting parties, individual countries, have their own scientists doing their own work. They are supposed to be sharing that work. In that case, there is some real exchange of information and there is this understanding of what is happening.
What is perhaps even more important now is not only the state of the stocks but understanding the interrelationship of the stocks, the whole ecosystem approach. There is a great deal of work that still needs to be done. Much work is being done in Canada. Just to understand our own complex interactions in our own waters is something which will take much time and effort. That will be fed into the NAFO process. It is peer reviewed among the scientists from all the various countries. Together, they come up with advice and recommendations to the fisheries commission.
[Translation]
Senator Gill: So then, a structure is in place to allow for information sharing. However, is this information given the credibility it deserves in the various countries? Does everyone accept that this information is credible and work toward similar solutions in terms of preserving an ecosystem's stocks?
[English]
Mr. Wiseman: The credibility is greater now than it used to be. One of the major problems we have had with NAFO in the past followed along the lines of the old expression, garbage in, garbage out. Scientists get poor data including incorrect catch reports. They put incorrect findings into a formula and the results are far from reality. There are better methods of doing surveys. There are tighter controls on reporting and greater accuracy in the data being produced for the scientists. There is greater credibility in the data now than there was 20 years ago.
Mr. Rowat: There is another answer to your question. As to whether the information is there, I will leave you with what Mr. Wiseman said. As to whether they believe in ecosystem management, the precautionary principle and so on, on a country basis there is growing awareness and an understanding that we must move in that direction. As a political entity, most countries will agree to the principles, but many are faced with practical political pressures. For instance, on the issue of fleet capacity, the ecosystem of the ocean is very important, but at the same time there is a massive Spanish and Portuguese fleet that wants to deploy. You have all been in the political process long enough to know that you have to balance those pressures, and often the decision made does not match the principles.
Second, even though a country believes in a set of principles, the captains of the fleet have a different motivation. The country can say that it adheres to these principles, but the captains have to come home with a boatload of fish. If there are regulations that allow them to cut corners, in all likelihood they will, because the fishery is a common property regime. That is where the new regulations have to have a pointy end to them.
[Translation]
Senator Gill: Is there some way of determining who is at fault?
[English]
Mr. Wiseman: There are at least three vessels patrolling, as I understand, two at a time from Canada and an EU vessel, as well as a naval vessel from time to time. The level of inspection is quite high. If they are caught, that information is available to all contracting parties and the flag state. Vessels have to report. They have vessel-tracking devices so that all the contracting parties with enforcement capability know the location of the vessels. Under the new regime, if vessels do not have observers, they have to report their catches in real time. Every time they pull in their nets, they have to report their catch. All of this data is added up so that when the vessel comes home there is a better record of what is supposed to be on the boat and what is actually there. The difficulty is how strenuously the port authority enforces the rules. In the past, a Spanish captain would return home, get off the boat after off-loading, go to the port authority, present his report, and the port authority would stamp it. It is not quite that way any more.
[Translation]
Senator Gill: I would think it would be very difficult to say if it is the captain or the country in question.
[English]
Mr. Applebaum: It may not be obvious to all of you, but in the NAFO system every year every NAFO member reports its catches. Everyone in NAFO, including all the scientists, have the reports of the catches, which generally show, in a cooperative period as we are in now, that the catches are within the restrictions. There is no reason to doubt the honesty of the country reports. However, if there is cheating going on that produces the numbers that the country reports, they are degrading the stocks. Preventing cheating to ensure that the reports are accurate is the important thing now in order to rebuild the stocks.
[Translation]
Senator Gill: Based on your experience, are these reports credible? Can you rely on their findings?
[English]
Mr. Wiseman: They are much more credible now than they used to be.
Senator Hubley: UNFA requires that conservation and management measures established for the high seas and those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation management of the straddling fish and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety. Does this pose a problem for Canada or other countries? Is the fisheries management regime inside Canada's 200-mile zone compatible with the regime outside the zone?
Mr. Rowat: Since the declaration of the 200-mile zone, Canada has developed a quota management regime and refined it considerably into enterprise allocations, interchangeable quotas, and so on. Because Canada was taking a lead in it, the NAFO regime developed a similar approach, establishing a total allowable catch and assigning quotas to nations. It was almost identical to the way we approached our management inside the 200-mile zone.
A big issue that has came up, about which you asked a few questions at a recent meeting, is that the U.S. has suggested a ban on bottom trawling in international waters. Some people have asked why Canada did not seize that within the regime. One issue is compatibility inside and outside. If you agree to it outside, there is an issue of compatibility inside. To change our whole offshore fleet technology inside would require a multi-million-dollar expenditure. Now that we have refined it so much, the question is whether the ban on bottom trawling could be made as effective as what we have now.
Mr. Applebaum: A provision similar to the one you read out from UNFA has always been in NAFO. Article 11 talks about consistency inside and outside. During my period of involvement in NAFO, since its establishment to 1996, there was never a problem with ensuring consistency. It was understood that there would be consistency and it was done in discussions between Canada and other countries.
The only time there was inconsistency was in the late 1980s when the EU refused to abide by the NAFO rules. The NAFO rules were consistent, but one party refused to abide by them. Apart from that, there has never been a problem in NAFO in this technical process of ensuring consistency between what is settled for inside the zone and what is settled for outside the zone.
Senator Hubley: Would you talk for a moment about discrete stocks? How is that term used and what situations arise to which it must be applied?
Mr. Applebaum: Except for Greenland halibut, it has always been understood in NAFO that discrete stocks are discrete because they are in 3M, in the Flemish Cap area, separate from the area inside and outside the 200-mile zone in the straddling stocks area. Throughout those years, there were three discrete stocks, and there is now shimp.
When Greenland halibut started to be developed that stock actually went right across the entire area into the Flemish Cap as well. Therefore it is not a discrete stock; it is a straddling stock. The shrimp go back and forth, but there are still three discrete stocks, as I indicated, and because they are discrete, they are separated by an area of deep water from the area of the Grand Banks that people normally think of as straddling stock areas. Overfishing them does not affect what happens to the same species of fish further toward the Canadian coast, but is not to say that they should be disregarded. They are valuable stocks. They are by NAFO, but they are not straddling stocks. They are separate and do not affect the straddling stocks.
Senator Hubley: Do all countries have discrete stocks, or just Canada?
Mr. Wiseman: Technically speaking, those discrete stocks, according to NAFO, are not Canadian stocks because they are not straddling the Canadian 200-mile zone. The discrete stock lives on the high seas and not within the 200- mile zone of any coastal state. There are stocks that exist in high seas areas around the world, but they do not belong to a specific country.
Senator Hubley: I was wondering if the term ``discrete'' in any way protected that fishery for a particular country, but it does not. That is fine.
Mr. Wiseman: There are international organizations in some areas that protect discrete stocks. NAFO has a responsibility to manage and conserve those stocks.
The Chairman: Mr. Rowat raised the important issue of bottom trawling. We heard yesterday from the Living Oceans Society, which wants a temporary ban and for bottom trawling to continue in regulated areas, both inside and outside, I assume. What is your comment on that? Apart from a total ban on bottom trawling, would it be possible to have a temporary ban on bottom trawling, except in those areas that are now regulated, either inside or outside? Does that make any sense? Is that something we should be focusing on? The whole issue of bottom trawling is important to us and we must come to grips with it. Some people say we need a total ban, and Mr. Rowat says it will be expensive. There is another saying that if you think education is expensive, try ignorance. If you think that doing away with bottom trawling is expensive, try destruction of the seabed.
I would like you to comment on that, because it is an important issue for us.
Mr. Wiseman: It is difficult to understand putting in a temporary ban where there is no regulation. There is NAFO regulation everywhere. Technically there are regulations. I do not quite understand that part.
The other point is if you want to put in a temporary ban, what is the basis for it? Is there some science, some justification for saying you have to ban it everywhere?
Mr. Rowat: You raise an interesting point. In 1995 or 1996, quite separate from anything that was going on in NAFO, the crisis was such at that point one of the options we actually considered within the department was moving to a hook-and-line fishery right across the whole of the Canadian fishery. It was musing at that point, but we were facing such dramatic circumstances with the collapse of the internal as well as outside stocks that it was one of the issues that we discussed.
The advice we had at the time was that perhaps it was not as progressive as the thinking is now, but it was not necessary to make that move, that better methods of trawling could be developed and the bycatches could be reduced and so on. We concluded that we should stick with the bottom trawling we have and improve it.
I have not really tracked it enough to see what developments have taken place since that time to know whether that was the right decision or not. We definitely discussed it.
Senator Watt: I would like some clarification in regard to regulating NAFO. Is NAFO actually an instrument that has been set up to have a role to play inside and outside the 200-mile limit?
Mr. Applebaum: The NAFO convention was specifically constructed to replace the ICNAF convention to make it clear that NAFO does not regulate fisheries inside 200 miles. NAFO only regulates fisheries outside 200 miles.
The compatibility point that we are talking about, the compatibility or consistency rule requires that the coastal state, Canada being the primary one amongst others, coordinate with NAFO to see that there is consistency, but that does not require that Canada follow any rules that are set by NAFO, because NAFO is not allowed to set rules inside 200 miles.
Senator Watt: In what way are we influenced by other countries in terms of regulatory aspects within 200 miles? What are we giving away?
Mr. Applebaum: I suggest we are not giving anything away, but let me give you a concrete example how this system works so you can see what I mean. With Canada and the other countries around the table, NAFO sets a TAC for a straddling stock. Let us say it is 3NO cod for the whole stock, inside and outside 200 miles. Canada agrees to that TAC, NAFO then sets up quota allocations for the whole stock inside and outside the 200-mile zone. Canada controls its fisheries, even if they are only inside the 200-mile zone. Canada agrees to stay within the quota agreed to in NAFO. Backing up a bit, NAFO sets the TAC and the quotas for the whole stock, but it is up to Canada to fit into the system.
Senator Watt: Do you mean it is up to Canada to comply?
Mr. Applebaum: Not comply in the sense of a legal obligation.
The legal obligation is, if it does any fishing outside 200 miles it is required to control its whole fishery inside and outside 200 miles to stay within the quota it has agreed to for that stock.
The Chairman: Are you saying there is a quota for the stock inside and a combined quota inside and outside?
Mr. Applebaum: NAFO quotas are stock-wide quotas.
Mr. Wiseman: You have a stock, and it is a straddling stock.
The Chairman: Let us use cod as an example.
Mr. Wiseman: They are all under moratorium so it is hard to use as an example. I am going to come up with a number.
Canadian scientists consult with their scientific colleagues in NAFO, and Canada's view is that this stock should have a TAC of 100,000 tons. Canada, as part of the NAFO process, has an obligation as a coastal state to inform NAFO before the meeting that this is the level of TAC that Canada feels is appropriate for this stock. For the parties of NAFO to be consistent with the measures adopted by the coastal state, NAFO should adopt a 100,000-ton TAC. Then that TAC is distributed by a formula or by a NAFO decision, with Canada and other parties getting a share. Canada has the right to fish its share inside its zone totally, or inside and outside as long as it stays within its share.
Senator Watt: What would happen in a case where NAFO decides not to comply with a request from Canada? Then if the agreement comes to a standstill and then it goes back to the Government of Canada which sets the regulations, what happens there? How do you deal with that situation? How do you deal with the tension that NAFO generates?
Mr. Wiseman: I do not believe it has ever happened that Canada has not accepted a NAFO decision.
Senator Watt: It could happen.
Mr. Wiseman: It could.
Senator Watt: I am trying to determine what leverage we have if we end up with something where we do not necessarily like what the NAFO is doing. What leverage do we have to overcome problems that could be generated by NAFO if it yields to political pressure, not from Canada but from the international community?
Mr. Rowat: I am not sure that it has ever come up. In essence, we have been very successful in NAFO over the years. Whatever proposals and TACs we have put forward have largely been agreed by consensus. Even in 1995, when we had to go into hard-nosed voting, we won all of those votes. It has never arisen that we have challenged all of NAFO. It usually has been the other way around. NAFO agrees with us, and then one party within NAFO, back then it was the EU, went offside with their objective. Then it was up to us and NAFO, or in that case it was up to us. We went out and arrested the Estai. It is usually one other party within NAFO that challenges NAFO and implicitly Canada. I do not foresee the circumstances where NAFO as a whole would go offside with the coastal state.
Mr. Wiseman: We could. We would have a dispute. The NAFO convention says that decisions have to be consistent with those of the coastal state. If there were a decision taken that is inconsistent with the coastal state, we would use dispute settlement procedures to try to sort it out.
Senator Watt: The biggest problem we have now is that the fishermen themselves, the trawlers or whoever they might be, are not complying with the rules that have been set by NAFO. That is one of our biggest problems today. This is a very complicated area, and there is no quick answer to it. It has been around for quite a number of years. We still have a long way to go.
I have no idea what to recommend that would improve the situation. Perhaps we need to look at that further down the road. I raise this issue here because I see there is an instrument set up for the scientific component. As long as the scientific component or the scientific community is dealing with it, there is a certain amount of harmony. When other people become involved, such as the business sector that is when we get problems. The corporate side is where people look after their bottom lines. If they start having a bigger role to play within NAFO, I think we will begin to see some problems. We are already seeing problems of going behind the set allowable catch.
Mr. Rowat: You raise an interesting point. In fact, part of Dr. May's report talked about working with international fishing companies. He made a good point in the sense that, like most other industries, they are becoming highly concentrated. The companies have become bigger and bigger, and they are not so adverse to arguments for long-term planning in terms of stock recovery and so on. He was making the point that a lot of work might be done with these international fishing companies to get the agreement of the CEO and the board of directors, et cetera, to come on side with the overall strategy. In the past, some of the smaller companies only had one thing in mind, which was coming back with as much volume on that boat as possibly. Hopefully, some of the new CEOs have a longer-term vision and could well understand the need for stock recovery and long-term planning. They are looking at the long-term salvation of their companies as well.
Mr. Applebaum: Senator, what you are saying amounts to a forewarning that at some time in the future, when stocks recover, there may well be circumstances similar to those that arose in the late 1980s with the EU. It may not be the EU, but one of the other members of NAFO who could have the same kind of business pressures aimed at trying to get TACs higher than the scientists' recommendations. They could launch objections if they do not get what they want, and they could overfish the stocks. These are potential problems for the future. They are part of the human condition. To deal with exactly that situation, we have been trying to get an effective dispute settlement procedure to control and overrule the objections.
Senator Watt: I have been involved in this for quite a number in the international waters through Makivik Corporation and this is the way some business people talk. They are not very patient.
I would like to raise one other issue because a few days ago we had some people from British Columbia talking about integrated management. I asked them what they meant by integrated management. I began to ask them whether they will allow mining companies and forestry companies, oil companies, you know, the big companies that determine their bottom lines, to become players within the management of fish. I was a bit worried about what symptom would come out of that. I am sort of feeling that what I am talking about and what we just talked about a minute ago might not be very far down the line.
I am not sure whether we are equipped, as a country, to at least be jealous of our stock. Let us put it that way. If the ocean is in trouble, then the stocks are in trouble too. Whether the cod will come back, we do not know. That remains to be seen, especially with what is happening through climate change. Some things are beyond our control today.
The Chairman: This brings up a very important point. No meeting of the Fisheries Committee should go by without the mention of John Crosbie. I encourage members and others to read what John Crosbie wrote recently. He does a column for The Independent in St. John's. His last column was on the whole issue of the common resource versus a licence quota or a stakeholder quota or a boat quota. You have just raised a very fundamental issue. It is something we need to focus on later. The ruin of the common stock is because it has been common, and nobody has really owned it. The question is should someone actually own it? It is a big issue that we cannot get into right now; however, it is something we need to focus on.
I do not want to leave without going back to NAFO. While these people are here, I think we should clarify this in our own minds. There is a show on one of the American networks called Deal or No Deal. The question is: NAFO, to be or not to be? Is it NAFO, or son of NAFO?
I believe I heard a consensus from our witnesses this morning; it was, do not work on the son of NAFO, but try to fix NAFO. That is what I thought I heard.
I would like you to go into that again because I think it is a key question for us. NAFO has not worked. There is some evidence now, it is true, that changes are being talked about, but we heard from Mr. Applebaum that these will be very difficult to implement. We heard from Mr. Rowat that it is still the Achilles heel that the flag state is still in control. It is a complicated question for us but it is the nub. I would like all three of you to try to help us clarify that issue of NAFO or what alternative?
Mr. Rowat: NAFO versus son of NAFO, I would reject the idea of creating a brand new RFMO. The way we are moving now is that NAFO actually has an amended convention. In essence, it is progressing and it will be a new NAFO in some ways once everybody has ratified the new agreement for the convention. NAFO is evolving and will have, in essence, this new amended convention. I believe that is the way to go.
With regard to that impending new convention, the department and the negotiating team they sent into NAFO achieved some remarkable advancements at the last meeting. As I think we have all been saying, based on our wry experience from the past, we have been disappointed so many times that you have to understand a few serious areas that will take a lot of work over the future. I feel that NAFO is the forum within which to do that work.
Mr. Wiseman: I agree with Mr. Rowat. One of the major weaknesses we had in the past was that NAFO was based on UNCLOS principles and we all recognize the holes in UNCLOS which led to the creation of UNFA. Now that NAFO is evolving into an organization which will be based on UNCLOS and UNFA principles, when the new convention is ratified, I think it will become a new and different organization. It will still be called NAFO and whether it is son of NAFO or a new organization, it will be an organization that has evolved to a degree to take into account the principles of more effective sustainable management.
Mr. Applebaum: I agree with my two colleagues. If the kind of reforms now being proposed go through and are accepted, you will have a new organization. It will still be called NAFO because no one has proposed changing the name of the organization but it will be a new organization.
Whatever time it might take to get these reforms through is nothing compared to the effort it would take to tear up the old convention and try to start off with the idea of saying, now we need to think through an entirely new organization. These kinds of reforms are the new organization and they seem to be underway.
The Chairman: You raised an interesting point, that is: Dr. Art May or son of Dr. Art May. You raised the point of Dr. Art May becoming a permanent watchdog. That is an interesting idea. There has been an advisory panel on what was there before, right?
Mr. Applebaum: Right.
The Chairman: Do we need an advisory panel on what the proposed changes are and what it will look like in future? Maybe one of the things we need to recommend is a reincarnation of the advisory panel to the minister.
Senator Watt: Is that not already built into NAFO?
The Chairman: This was an advisory panel to the Canadian Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.
Senator Watt: Does it not exist?
The Chairman: It did, Senator Watt. It had a shelf life. It existed and made a report and it no longer exists.
Should we reinstate it and should the minister put it in place and have it advise him on the changes that are proposed?
Mr. Rowat: In my mind, it would be a question of timing and the fact that the wording is negotiated over many months to come up with a draft document. It would have to be fairly fast.
An alternative might be to collect a certain group of similar individuals and have them as an advisory body to the Canadian negotiators. That might be a version. I would be interested to hear the others on that point.
Mr. Wiseman: I agree with Mr. Rowat. We have two concepts. One is almost a permanent advisory body to the minister on high seas and sustainable fishing. It could just keep providing advice and input, but maybe outside the normal channels where the minister would get advice. That is a major commitment of effort and funds and whether it will pay off I do not know.
On the other hand, Mr. Rowat has made an interesting point which is that we are in the process of finalizing the convention. I understand there will be a meeting early next year to pull it all together. Would the department benefit from having outside advice? Perhaps it would, and it is something that could be done.
Mr. Applebaum: Whether you call it one thing or another, my suggestion was that there should be a review panel that reviews what is coming out of these negotiations with a somewhat broader and more open-minded perspective not having been sucked into the various compromises. That is what I meant about the devil in the details. The review panel could do that job and maybe find a number of things before this process goes on too far.
The Chairman: We have not exhausted this topic by any means. You have been helpful. We appreciate you coming. We appreciate your wisdom and your experience and your reflections have been helpful to us.
The committee adjourned.