Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs
Issue 5 - Evidence - September 26, 2006
OTTAWA, Tuesday, September 26, 2006
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs met this day at 5 p.m. to examine the development and security challenges facing Africa; the response of the international community to enhance that continent's development and political stability; and Canadian foreign policy as it relates to Africa.
Senator Hugh Segal (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honourable senators, welcome to this meeting. Our agenda today is continuing focus on Africa with a specific reference to the role of the Canadian military.
[Translation]
It is therefore with great pleasure that we welcome Gen. Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff.
[English]
We are delighted the general could make time in an ever more pressing agenda to give his best advice and counsel to this committee in our continuing work on Africa.
As colleagues will know, the Chief of the Defence Staff is the senior military adviser to the Prime Minister and the government. Decisions about where deployments are made, however, are carried out by our duly elected government. The military implications and tactical issues surrounding that are based on the advice of the Chief of the Defence Staff.
We invited Gen. Hillier to discuss a specific, namely Africa, which has, in turn, broad components. More specifically, we asked the general to make a short presentation on current operations and deployments in Africa, recent requests for Canadian assistance both military and civilian, with which he has been involved, Canadian operational capability in terms of deployments in Africa, the specific challenges for military operations in Africa and Canada's involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. After his presentation, the general has consented to be available to answer questions.
General R.J. (Rick) Hillier, CMM, MSC, CD Chief of the Defence Staff, National Defence: Honourable senators, I am pleased to be here today to talk to you for a very short period of time on the Canadian Forces' involvement in Africa. I will discuss our historical involvement, current operations and our Military Training Assistance Program, which I hope you will find interesting. I also hope you will find some value from my opportunity to be here with you today.
[Translation]
I will not dwell excessively on our history in Africa. It is a long one — stretching back to the Nile expedition in 1884 when Canadian Voyagers and armed forces personnel assisted the British who were under siege in Khartoum. They also cut their teeth on the continent during the Boer War at the turn of the last century.
[English]
As a young army officer joining the Royal Canadian Dragoons, my first regiment, I was forced to memorize every single detail of one memorable event in the southern part of Africa: The Royal Canadian Dragoons, on November 7, 1900 fought in action and three members of the regiment won the Victoria Cross. This, of course, showcased that regiment as being the pre-eminent regiment in all the Canadian Forces and the Canadian army. Is that not right, Senator Dallaire?
[Translation]
Fifty years ago, of course, we sent our troops into Egypt to help end the Suez crisis. This was an important moment in Canada's long history of peacekeeping in Africa.
Since that time, Canadian soldiers have been actively involved in peace support operations throughout the continent, including in Angola, Rwanda, Zaire, Somalia, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Congo. Our men and women deployed to Africa face tremendous challenges. They step into difficult operational environments, characterized not only by extreme violence but by harsh geography and climate conditions. They also experience pronounced cultural differences. And in these stressful conditions, they put their lives on the line — 57 soldiers have lost their lives on the continent since 1956.
Notwithstanding these sacrifices and challenges, Canada has an impressive track record in Africa. Our men and women in uniform are, as we all know, well-respected and valued by the international community for their professionalism and compassion in dealing with crises.
The Canadian Forces are especially valued by African nations not only for their professional skills, but also their bilingual capacity and lack of colonial baggage.
Today, most of our military resources overseas are focused on our mission in Afghanistan. We are fighting terrorism head on while helping Afghanistan build a better future for itself.
[English]
Africa continues to be unstable, plagued by conflict, poverty and despair. In constant turmoil, it has turned to the international community for much needed assistance. As you are well aware, honourable senators, at the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis, the G8 countries adopted the Africa Action Plan that pledged to develop African countries' capabilities to undertake peace support operations.
That has been the focus of our role. We continue, in the Canadian Forces, to be a player in this action plan and we recognize that the armed forces of African countries and states need our help to carry out their roles and, in particular, need our help to build their capacity to conduct effective peace operations.
We provide, and have provided, equipment, logistics and military training assistance in support of these efforts, but with our finite resources, we do not have the luxury of being everywhere and doing everything.
Canada's approach to Africa is not just about what the military is doing. We focus and coordinate our efforts closely with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian International Development Agency — CIDA — and of course, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in an effort to maximize our return on each of the investments from those departments and institutions.
Currently, we have 65 Canadian Forces personnel serving on operations in Africa. Over half of them, 41, are specifically serving on UN missions. The majority of the forces with whom they are working and supporting on those peace support missions in Africa are from developing countries. Our contributions are valuable because it is the strategic gaps that we attempt to address and the critical positions in which our people are usually placed.
On to current operations, where, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo we have been involved from day one in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC. The goal of this operation is to enforce the Lusaka Accord of 1999, which calls for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement between the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congolese rebel groups and regional states. Our contribution to MONUC consists of nine staff officers located at headquarters in Kinshasa and Kisangani. Our officers are part of a core cadre that is the glue that holds those headquarters together because of their ability, staff work, bilingual capabilities and, certainly not least, their can-do attitudes. They provide direct and targeted professional military capabilities precisely where they are needed to help this UN mission succeed.
With respect to Sierra Leone, some of you may remember that beginning in 1999, we did have soldiers in Sierra Leone as part of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL. We were there to assist in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration plan for that country. After successful elections, the mission was concluded in 2005.
However, the transition in Sierra Leone from war to peace requires the development of a professional military, one that is clearly under civilian control. Thus, we are still involved in that country through the International Military Advisory Training Team, IMATT, which began in 2000. The goal of this British-led team is to train and equip Sierra Leone's reconstituted armed forces. We currently have 11 Armed Forces members deployed as staff officers and instructors with the IMATT. They are highly valued because of their expertise. This focused training assistance, provided for six years, is modest but is paying off. We believe that the Sierra Leone military is evolving in line with democratic values deploying throughout their country and providing stability for their population that it was not able to offer before.
We are in the Sudan on two separate missions. The first is the United Nations Mission in Sudan, UNMIS, deployed to address the north-south conflict for which a comprehensive peace agreement was signed in January 2005. From the very beginning we provided a deputy force commander to UNMIS and part of a staff for that headquarters team. In fact our deputy commander went to Sudan in the advanced headquarters team and ensured that the mission was set up in the most effective and precise manner possible. We now have seven staff officers working on that mission and some 25 military observers dedicated to UNMIS.
The second mission in Sudan, of course, is the African Union Mission in Sudan, or AMIS. This force's mission is to improve the security situation in Darfur. Its efforts have been hampered by warring parties, what perhaps is considered a weak mandate by some, lack of equipment and the tremendous challenges of operating in a rugged theatre that lacks most infrastructures, is about the size of France and has an environmental climate that is extreme.
We have stepped in and are supplying AMIS with training and equipment. Canada has 13 staff officers and other specialists assisting AMIS in Sudan, including eight in Ethiopia, three in Darfur and two in Khartoum. Our contribution includes working with CIDA to facilitate the use of 25 helicopters and two cargo planes that CIDA have contracted for the African Union force.
We also loan 105 armed personnel carriers, the AVGP — the Grizzly — to countries in the African Union, including the training to be able to use them and the maintenance support to be able to sustain them. In addition, we provided helmets and flak jackets for the soldiers in the African Union Mission in Sudan itself.
We are making some difference there. African Union soldiers are better able to carry out their jobs because of what we have done and they are more confident in their operations. They do have armoured vehicles to support them, and armoured vehicles that can be sustained. In some small ways they now have better personal equipment, particularly for their survivability, based on what we have done.
We will continue to do our part to help the African Union improve their effectiveness, and Canada is working hard at the United Nations to try to turn AMIS into a United Nations mission as quickly as possible.
For the last part, I will talk a little about the Military Training Assistance Program, MTAP. This has been a key tool for defence diplomacy for use by the Canadian Forces on behalf of Canada since the 1960s, and in Africa we train soldiers, through MTAP, in their own countries. This program also brings African officers here to Canada for training and to expose them to our society and to Canadian values.
MTAP's activities in Africa have significantly increased in recent years, with the funding almost doubled in 2004-05. Last year we trained approximately 190 African officers. This year we plan on bringing that number up to 300. This will include language skills and staff training, courses for tactical officers, et cetera. This is a notable increase for us, and obviously we feel it is right.
This year they have put together, for us in the MTAP, almost a $2-million training package for 2006-07. It is specifically aimed at the African Union countries that are troop contributors in Darfur.
I will conclude by emphasizing that the men and women of the Canadian Forces are making a contribution, modest in numbers but significant in effect, in Africa. Whether in the jungles of the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the deserts of Sudan, they are committed to their work and do a great job. They are not only helping African nations recover from the ravages of war, but also doing their part to protect our interests and values.
Honourable senators, thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you. I would be delighted to answer any questions that you might direct my way.
The Chairman: Thank you very much.
Senator Stollery: Welcome, General Hillier. I must say that it was an interesting statement, but it does not really answer my questions and perhaps questions of some other members of the committee, who, as you probably know, are quite familiar with the Democratic Republic of the Congo; we visited the DRC last year. I was in the Congo during colonial times. I know Africa rather well.
In the Kivu area, an area not much bigger than Eastern Ontario, 1,000 to 1,200 people die every day. This is not Peter Stollery coming up with some exaggerated figure. This comes from The Lancet, the British medical journal. It is a well-known figure; it is a tragedy. I have been in some difficult places but I have never seen such tragedy as this committee saw in the Eastern Congo in the Kivu area.
When we were in Kinshasa, the old Léopoldville, we met with the ambassadors, I believe, of Canada, France, the U.K., Belgium and the head of MONUC, who was an American — a retired American ambassador. They all asked us if Canada could help MONUC, the largest mission in UN history. We have approximately 62,000 people in the Armed Forces. How can we defend? There are only 65 officers in the whole of Africa, and in the Eastern Congo.
I received a copy of a telegram — with regard to training — that said after a recent reassessment of the local situation in Kamina by our J2 cell, DND has decided to put on hold the deployment of four Canadian instructors that were to partake in a Belgian initiative to provide training to the Congolese military.
I will be back in Kinshasa on Sunday. I am certain the same questions will be asked of me upon my return: What can Canada do, seriously, to stop one of the great tragedies that is unfolding in Africa? What can the Canadian Armed Forces do? Will my reply be the same as it was last year? We have eight people. We have fewer military observers than Bolivia, an impoverished country; we have fewer than many countries, I am sure you know them as well as I do. What kind of a response will I be able give to these people on Sunday on behalf of the Canadian Armed Forces? Is this the best that we can do?
Gen. Hillier: I do not believe you give a response on behalf of the Canadian Armed Forces. That is my job.
I will offer some commentary without trying to provide any justification or defence.
I have been in many poorer places but I have not been in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I have been in other countries where Canadian Forces soldiers, officers and NCOs, air, land and sea, are deployed in significant numbers to try to keep people alive and prevent more from being killed.
There are many poor places around this world that need desperate help from a variety of countries, and obviously Canada is not the sole source to provide that help.
Right now we have almost 4,000 Canadian Forces, men and women in uniform, deployed around the world in various operations in various countries, obviously a significant percentage of that in Afghanistan. In addition, on any given day here in our country, we have some 6,000 to 8,000 men and women on duty performing tasks on behalf of Canadians here at home where they live and work to ensure their stability and security. Whether that is search and rescue operations, maritime patrol, controlling the skies over North America, being ready for counter-terrorist operations or an immediate reaction unit in various regions across the country, if something goes wrong, we can respond effectively.
When you take those numbers and take the relatively underpowered units that are the force-projection part of the numbers and multiply it by the rotations that we have going off to do those missions, we are tapped out, senator. We do not have the resources to give to every single location around the world that needs our help desperately, or more accurately, needs help desperately. Perhaps other countries besides Canada have to step up to some of those other places.
I speak only for the Canadian Forces. We are now at the extreme limits of what we can contribute anywhere. We are, in fact, undergoing revolutionary transformational moves as we sit here now to ensure that we can be successful in the missions we have — particularly Afghanistan deployed — continue to maintain the domestic peace at home and, in fact, change the way we are producing men and women in the units to do that.
We do our small, focused pieces, but we are at the maximum level of operations that we can sustain.
Senator Stollery: I said I would not talk about Afghanistan, and I intend to keep to my word.
General, I do not want to bore my colleagues. I was in the Algerian war. I know how these things work. If the most we can come up with is 65 people in a continent that the whole world knows is going through a terrible time, then that is a disgrace. I will not comment on the Afghan adventure. In my opinion, the response is a disgrace.
The Chairman: General, you can respond to that.
Gen. Hillier: There was no question there, I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, so I have no response.
Senator Andreychuk: Thank you, general, for coming and putting your position forcefully.
I discerned three movements of Canadian activity. Historically, one was to train and try to build up the local military so that they could carry out the functions that normally would rest with any sovereign state. When all of these countries came on as independent states, the question was how they could move away from the French, British and Belgians and develop a truly indigenous force for their countries. Canada played an admirable part in training officers.
We then assisted the United Nations, and I do not feel I need to go into the history of Somalia, et cetera, but we pulled away. You pointed out Kananaskis, but I would say it began before that, when we started to say the Africans would take care of Africa. I also remember when Europe would take care of Europe and Bosnia.
How can we train and reinforce the African Union? There is now a push to move the UN back into the situation, with some justifiable reasons, such as the Africans not being ready. In the long run, with our limited resources but carrying our weight, would you put the emphasis on training bilaterally, on training the Africans, or on going in with the UN?
Gen. Hillier: We always prefer to set up our training regimes because we feel we can accomplish more and get a better effect if we train within an institution or within the context of an institution like the United Nations. We would much prefer to do it under that context or with NATO. We get a much better effect, because we have the opportunity to build on years of preparation and interoperability; to work with allies and friends who could be part of that and therefore achieve more for limited amounts of resources.
The reality is that, as we train people, sometimes we include equipment donations, as we have done in Darfur. It is part of that training and increasing capacity of the African Union forces. We are then forced, because of international agreements on the release of certain technical equipment and data about them, to deal as Canada to each individual nation — in other words, bilaterally. There is no reason we cannot do a combination or, indeed, all approaches.
We prefer to work within the context of the United Nations or NATO where we have developed good relationships and can actually work with the British, or whoever else might be there, and achieve more by synergizing our activities with theirs; by them having a focus and us not being redundant to that but having a separate focus. The same applies to the other way around. We much prefer to do it within the UN context from that perspective.
Senator Andreychuk: The Somalian situation changed how interventions occur in Africa. I believe we are still suffering because we have not really figured it out. The military goes in, but the needs are just as high for security, and they are even higher for humanitarian and medical aid. The UN has struggled with trying to bring humanitarian assistance. More recently, people are arguing that it is not really the role of the military to try to be civilian facilitators of development; they are there to secure the peace. We seem to be fudging the two together in many cases. What is your take on that?
Gen. Hillier: It is pretty simple from my perspective, and perhaps it is easier to say than do. We would like to not be engaged in anything outside purely military operations. However, we learned long ago that you solve none of the crisis in either failing or failed states or fragile states with military action alone. We also learned that international community efforts — those hundreds of non-governmental organizations and international organizations — were poorly organized at the very best and, at the very least, could not organize a one-man rush to the toilet.
We realized that without some energy from us, at times, without some focus from the general military community and without some coordinated planning, development would be so slow that people would continue to suffer and perhaps die. The folks who wanted to destabilize or prevent more stability coming had a longer opportunity to do that. Thus, we had to become somewhat engaged.
The question is how far we go down that road. We would prefer, in any dynamic with which we work, an efficient, coordinated international community effort that undertakes development as soon as security allows it, but that is rule one. Schools or medical clinics, or even roads for vehicles to carry the humanitarian assistance or to evacuate them, cannot be built unless there is some kind of basic security that permits that. A medical clinic can be built one day and destroyed the next if security does not exist.
We know we are engaged in doing some of that humanitarian assistance. We prefer to facilitate the humanitarian assistance by providing that security. We know that we are engaged, in some cases, in providing medical care, sometimes simply because those international organizations cannot get into certain areas. Our choice would be to facilitate them getting in as soon as possible by providing that security and that protection, if you will. We are designed for that; we have the resources for it. We do not have the dual focus of providing security and keeping people alive and in their homes while trying to do humanitarian work and providing them with some kind of hope for the future.
It is a complex issue; there is nothing simple about it. Where we worked in Afghanistan, there were some 1,500 different non-governmental organizations and international organizations. We simply tried to synchronize with them in an indirect way. Some were perfectly a part of that, others wanted nothing to do with it, and others were simply going their own way no matter what occurred in coordination or synchronization. We watched the same situation occur in the Balkans during the 1990s. At times, the military has to become engaged. Otherwise, our mission of providing security is made more difficult, takes much longer and perhaps sometimes becomes impossible.
Senator Andreychuk: I would like to ask another question of Gen. Hillier with regard to the dilemma of military acquisitions particularly in Africa, but I feel that would be best placed to a minister.
Senator Dallaire: Welcome, and, if I may say, congratulations on the leadership that is being provided to the Canadian Forces through you. I hear it from everywhere. Well done, sir.
Gen. Hillier: Thank you, senator.
Senator Dallaire: I will try to be succinct. Brevity is supposed to be one of our qualities, but it not necessarily always there.
Is the strategy 20-20 still a document of policy reference? In recent years — certainly since I have been out from 2000 — has there been a desire to focus on regions and structuring the potential of the forces with regard to response to regions? I use the example of Africa. Is Africa specified in there? Is there a sense that Africa is a target area — I say that not in a pejorative sense, but meaning an area where we might be involved and should be aligning capabilities, not only in intelligence but also in language and knowledge and such — to potentially be involved in operations that are not pure chapter 6 peacekeeping?
Gen. Hillier: First, 20-20 is still relevant.
Senator Stollery: This is not the Defence Committee. None of us know what that is.
The Chairman: Senator, 20-20 is a strategic document that was approved by the government of the day and the Department of National Defence with respect to future directions and priorities. It has been on the public record for the better part of four or five years.
Senator Prud'homme: Will it be distributed?
The Chairman: I will be glad to have it distributed to members of the committee.
Senator Stollery: Let us talk a common language.
Gen. Hillier: Yes, it is still relevant, Senator Dallaire, but, I would say, increasingly overcome by events of these past several years. Perhaps a timely refocus on 20-20 is necessary, how we go out there guided by the vision of the Canadian Forces on what we can produce and also the shape of that vision of what needs to produced.
Africa does remain a focus, without question. With regard to the first question, we cannot go somewhere and focus there when we are stretched to the extreme with use of our resources and, in particular, the men and women in uniform at this point in time.
Africa is still important from every perspective that I can judge and still important from 20-20. Our capacity to do more is the challenge that I have and wrestle with on an hourly and daily basis to ensure that I balance the burden carried on the shoulders of the men and women who wear a uniform with the burden that the country wants us to carry. That is difficult to do on certain days.
Senator Dallaire: That brings me to the fact that Africa, not necessarily being a priority or within the exercise of establishing priorities, may not necessarily be as reflective of priorities as other areas. Yet so many of the countries in conflict including nation's humanitarian catastrophes are there.
The concept of the African standby force was created five years ago, in which the five sub-regions of Africa would build capabilities but would need the help of outside countries to help that become a reality. The French, British and Americans are involved. We have MTAP, which is not a significant capability. It helps, but, in my opinion, it is a very low-level contribution to assisting nations building democratic militaries and responsive to civilian structures.
Can we not go into MTAP with its instructors' capabilities and significantly expand it to be able to directly feed into supporting the African standby force capability that, ultimately, would be able to handle things like AMIS?
Gen. Hillier: Yes, we can consider all of those possible solutions. My level of ability to do them in the shorter term is the major challenge I have.
I take a tiny bit of issue with your opinion that I perceived of MTAP. I believe there is good effect that comes from it, which I do not try to overplay. It is a massive challenge on the one end, and it is a smaller effort against that massive challenge. However, it does produce good effect. As I mentioned earlier, we are going to train 300 military personnel out of Africa this year. Our focus will be on African Union nations that have had a lead and, therefore, use the effect to create better effect than perhaps other nations.
Can we consider what you discussed for the African standby force and start focusing more of our MTAP people forward deployed into Africa as part of that MTAP which we started to do with Kenya, for example? The answer is yes. The ability to do it short term in any kind of significant number is the challenge we wrestle with.
Senator Dallaire: With respect to deployment to Darfur of a capable combat team, there is an absolute requirement of the Canadian Forces in this time of crisis.
I want to raise a specific question in regard to the Canadian Forces and peacekeeping. The impression in New York and other places was that Canada was withdrawing from the peacekeeping business. A sign of that was that we are not taking on senior positions, both in staff and in command, in peacekeeping. The Congo mission asked for a three-star general plus forces; we refused the request. We also had offers at the UN headquarters for colonels; we do not necessarily send them.
Are you not able to give more knowledge, skills and experience to senior officers, generals and full colonels in command and staff positions in multilateral bodies that are more into peacekeeping and conflict resolution, such as Africa, because you are being limited in the numbers, specifically, of generals that you have, that you can actually train and employ in such opportunities?
Gen. Hillier: No, I am not limited by the numbers, because I do not care, for example, whether it is a colonel or a general, if I need a job done. The United Nations might care if they are asking for something specific. Many other institutions, organizations and countries are more rank conscious than we are.
However, I am limited in a very real ability to generate people to do those jobs at this point in time. Let me put it into context. I spoke to a group this morning, telling them that we, in the Canadian Forces — and, senator, you know this better than most — are at present changing every single thing we do. We are changing how we conduct operations from peacekeeping right through to peace enforcement; the way we train to be ready for those kinds of operations; the way we do our command and control from the strategic level of focusing as Canada as an operational theatre to having operations commanded by one individual internationally to strategically shape the environment; how we attract, recruit — in a whole new revolutionary manner — young Canadians and how we train them; and the way we handle our infrastructure. Senator Andreychuk referred to it. We are also changing the way we procure equipment and the way we equip our men and women to do business.
That is an incredible demand whilst at the same time we are running intense operations in a variety of places — specifically Afghanistan — internationally, and doing more to be ready in Canada for a whole variety of activities. The unpredictable activities of natural disasters man caused or predictable ones such as getting ready for Olympics 2010, which is just a stone's throw away, are perfect examples.
The leadership of the Canadian Forces has never been under such high stress and demand in my time in uniform. We are using everybody from young officers through to senior generals to achieve those events. We are at the limit at this point in time.
For the short term, my response is, no, I cannot. I am not limited by rank structure. I am simply limited by the numbers of people we can generate out of that force structure who have spent time away, and I do not cause them to break because we need to have them over the middle and longer term as healthy leaders in the Canadian Forces. We reassess that almost every day here. We are asking a lot from our leaders right now. I believe you would know they are being demanded to do more and be on top of more than has occurred in a long period of time.
Senator Di Nino: Welcome, General Hillier. We should express to you and the men and women of the Canadian Forces our deep gratitude and thanks for the great work they are doing all over the world, particularly in Afghanistan.
Just to go back to the DRC for a moment, I was with the committee when we visited the Congo. One cannot help but be moved by what is happening over there. I can understand the frustration of my colleague because of the effect that a visit there — talking to the people, seeing them and understanding the kind of situation they are in — has on us as human beings.
One particular fact struck me when we were doing our research. We met with the Pakistani general in charge of the south, Kivu, who told us in no uncertain terms, "I can solve the problem. I do not have the mandate or the rules of engagement to solve the problem."
Is that a problem that exists when forces are deployed on behalf of the UN in nations that have conflicts?
Gen. Hillier: That is a great question. First of all, I have heard from people when I have been on a variety of missions, and I have done a lot of that. As soon as anybody says to me, "I can solve the problem," and usually it is, "I can solve it pretty quickly," my antennae go up. I have never yet met one of those problems that could be solved easily and quickly when dealing with a failed state, a failing state or a fragile state, where millions of people are at risk or dying in some numbers.
We usually saw it — when I was on mission — from folks who visited the theatre. After 24 hours on the ground, they always had the immediate, absolute correct answer on how to solve the situation and, invariably, were wrong. That is how we saw it. That is my first point.
Second, yes, there is often a challenge with mandates. I have never been on any mission where we had a perfect matchup of the mandate with the contacts and circumstances on the ground that continued throughout the life of that mission. It is usually difficult to change the mandate itself. We often went in with only, for example, the mandate under chapter 6, self-defence, and had to facilitate things in other ways, which we were incapable of doing. We suffered through it in the Balkans in the mid- and late-1990s, where the mandate did not match the conditions and the context on the ground.
We also find that frustration gets multiplied and exacerbated by national caveats. Nations agree to put forces into a UN mission, a coalition or NATO mission of some kind, but then say, "We agree minus the following." They say, "You cannot move out of an area; you cannot use live fire to protect people; you cannot do patrols at night; or you cannot do a variety of things." I have had units under command on international operations where the units representing a country could conduct any mission whatsoever, any mission you would demand of them, as long as they could conduct it in the safety of their base camp and never go outside. Unfortunately, that is a factor.
I can almost feel that commander's frustration and emotion when he said that, because I probably made similar comments myself, even though I should have known better than to say, "I can solve this if I had the mandate and the force structure to do it."
Senator Di Nino: In his defence, General Hillier, he did not say "quickly" and he had been there for a period of time; the frustration was very real. Thank you for that answer.
When we deploy to an area of conflict, is it better to be part of a multinational force? Is the effectiveness of the force better under a multinational force, or should we be looking at national forces going into areas and taking on a job instead of being part of an entity of forces from different cultures and languages?
Gen. Hillier: My response is very much one-sided and very clear from my perspective: obviously, multinational.
First, we do not have the capacity in a large way to generate a national force, deploy it offshore, sustain it in an area of a failing state — because that is where we are going — or a failed state that is austere. We cannot depend on that society's infrastructure to support ourselves, conduct a mission, be successful in it, keep the risk to the men and women conducting and implementing that mission low, and then come home safely. With the size of our armed forces, we do not have the capacity to do that beyond some very precise surgical moves; for example, to assist in evacuation of civilians caught in a war somewhere. Perhaps we can play a role there.
Multinationality is a two-edged sword. At the very lowest level, we want to avoid it, yet not at the level of units of about 1,000 soldiers, because at that level the skills, drills and tactics involved are something one trains for over long periods of time. Then it becomes similar to, as Senator Mahovlich can attest, a hockey team who wins a Stanley Cup, who does it after they train together and know each other thoroughly and put the pass on the stick because they know the individual is there. That is likewise with our soldiers.
Above that, the power of multinationality is in their flag being there. That is a sign of agreement and strength in the international community and a sign to the people of the country in which we are that the international community has coalesced on this.
Second, I found that most countries who undertake these missions tend to send their best people and equipment. I ended up in Bosnia as a division commander with the very best tank in the world, the Leopard 2, and the best attack helicopter, the AH-64. Many countries participated and each wanted to showcase the best of their military forces. As a result, we had good capability.
Third, many countries, including us, do not have all the spectrum of capabilities from combat troops to aviation to long-range transport to medical to intelligence, in the depth we need to maintain an operation over a period of time. Some of the countries have, in fact, some specialty in such matters as providing a role three hospital or a hospital that can handle significant surgery and medical cases. Multinationality allows such countries to provide the cadre or core of those medical facilities.
There are other examples equally important to any kind of mission. Without them, one cannot do a mission, guarantee some probability of success and keep the risk low to the men and women who do their job.
I believe it was Omar Bradley who said that the only thing worse than fighting a war with allies is fighting one without them, because multinationality brings its own frustrations. I am always asked whether language is an issue in a multinational operation. I say, "Yes, it is." Language was always a significant challenge. During the times I was on tour, I never understood a single word spoken by a British soldier. Multinationality is what I have always come down to. Fundamentally, that is what it should be.
The Chairman: The term for that, General Hillier, is "divided by a common language."
Senator Downe: I believe I heard correctly in your presentation that you have in the past trained 190 African Union members.
Gen. Hillier: That was last year.
Senator Downe: You hope to train 300. Do you know how that compares to the training done by other countries?
Gen. Hillier: No, I do not. I know the French are significantly engaged in Africa, doing similar training. The British are significantly engaged, and we are working with them, as I mentioned, in Sierra Leone. They are major players to help develop those capacities. I cannot give you the figure on what the United States does there, but beyond those, we are one of the major players.
Senator Downe: I assume these people are selected by the African Union. Are they permanent African Union troops or do they go back to the host country after rotation through the African Union?
Gen. Hillier: They go back to their host country. They do not remain forever with the African Union. Thus, if we train officers from Kenya, for example, they are Kenyan military officers who work for that country.
We have tried to focus the program to give as much short-term value as possible. We sent a small team — just a couple of people — into the African Union mission headquarters, had a look around with the commander and chief of staff and asked, "Where are the weaknesses in your headquarters running the mission in Darfur? What kind of assistance do you need?" That was to try to fit what we are providing in training to exactly what their need was. That is part of what we have recently done and part of what we are doing this year. We tailored some courses with the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. We used our own training centre in Kingston for part of this, plus our own staff courses and other mechanisms. We try to tailor precisely. It is the officers from each individual country, but we try to focus on the African Union ones on mission.
Senator Downe: How long is the training? Do these 300 come to Canada for three months?
Gen. Hillier: It is not all one block. Some could be here for 10 months on language training. Others could be here for three months on a staff course in Kingston. Others could be here for as short a period as two weeks down in the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre or on our military observer course in Kingston. It runs the gamut from weeks through to perhaps a year.
Senator Downe: Prior to your appearance here today, did you notify the Privy Council Office or the Prime Minister's Office?
Gen. Hillier: Did I notify them of what, senator?
Senator Downe: Did you notify them that you were appearing here today?
Gen. Hillier: I honestly do not know. I did not notify anyone. I do not know if anyone on my staff felt obligated to tell someone, but I doubt it very much.
Senator Downe: Are you aware if your remarks were sent to the Privy Council Office or Prime Minister's Office before you presented them today?
Gen. Hillier: Senator, I doubt the Prime Minister has time to read my remarks. I barely had time to formulate them myself. No, senator; that does not happen with my remarks.
The Chairman: It struck me, General Hillier, that whatever you did say to us would have been top secret until you said it.
Gen. Hillier: Even I might not have known it.
Senator Prud'homme: General Hillier, I was chairman of the National Defence and Foreign Affairs committee in the House of Commons for over ten years under Prime Minister Trudeau. I was in the Provost Corp., so I am accustomed to inflammatory language.
I am not a member of this committee, but with a great deal of interest I will make two comments. I want them to be well understood. That is why I will say them in English, even though I would be more precise in French.
If at all possible, due to the immense sensitivity that we discover more and more about people in general, and some in particular, if it was understood that our top military will avoid, what I call, inflammatory language when we deal with enemies, I feel it could be very helpful. Sometimes one word or two can cause great problems. We must remember that the reputation of Canada is at stake. Suddenly, Canada seems to be perceived as using inflammatory language. I do not believe I need to give any explanation of this.
As the top person in the military, I respect you and hope that any critique or debate about our role, wherever it is, but especially at the moment in Afghanistan, should never be perceived by our troops as being non-supportive of our military. It demands a lot of sensitivity and flexibility for you — and down the line — to ensure the message is understood. There are people — I am not one of them — who may be critical of the role we play in Afghanistan. I repeat: I am not one of them. That is my first comment.
My second comment concerns a discussion I had in the old days. I will return to it through some of your staff with which you allow me to meet. I am very interested in Africa, but I was of the opinion that the role of Canada in Africa and in Asia would be to train people extremely well in Canada and do everything possible to modernize people in Africa. I do not want to be at odds with Senator Dallaire, who did a marvellous and unbelievable job on Sunday night in Quebec, which over 2 million people saw. I tip my hat to you.
[Translation]
I am from "Québecistan."
[English]
I would like to know if it is your plan that eventually you will strengthen the African Union so it will be in the position to deal with Africa and to eventually have the same kind of military training for Asia. Some people will say that sounds racist, but human nature is such that maybe that is the best solution. I am in your hands, if you give me the right person for reflection, I would appreciate that.
I hope my message gets through you to the people to make a great effort.
The Chairman: General Hillier, before you respond to that, I have four other members of the committee who would like to ask a question in the time we have. Would you allow my colleagues to put their questions and have you respond at the end of the questions so that we respect both their right to participate and your time frame, with which you have been so generous today? If that is all right, I will call on Senator De Bané, who is next on our list.
[Translation]
Senator De Bané: Chief of the Defence Staff, allow me first to express my admiration for our troops who are doing an exceptional job under your command. You provide them with outstanding leadership and I would like to take this opportunity to convey the respect and admiration that I have for you.
Second, I am humbled in the face of the men and women of my country who have been injured, or who have made the ultimate sacrifice in a bid to defend the ideals of our country.
[English]
As you know, we are doing a study on Africa. Poverty on that continent is increasing not only in absolute numbers, but also percentage wise. Over 50 per cent of the people will be below the line of poverty within a few years. This is very troublesome. One of the reasons for this is that there are so many wars going on there between different factions. Of course, those wars could not be maintained if there were not people selling arms to the different groups on that continent.
It struck me that one branch of the Government of Canada, CIDA, is spending billions of dollars there every year. On the other hand, other branches, of either our government or our allies, do not mind selling arms there. Since 1945, there have been 500 or 600 wars in Africa.
I remember former General Dallaire, now my colleague, telling the Canadian public how an official of one of our friendly countries asked, "Is there oil in such a state in Africa? No. We do not care about them. There is no strategic importance."
You, General Hillier, have a network and you do political analysis of that continent, as of others. Canada should take a leadership role, not only to bring ideas about military strategy but also to advise the government on what policies should be implemented to help that continent develop. I see three essential causes for that poverty in Africa: There are causes that relate to the Africans; causes that relate to the international community; and causes that relate to Canada.
As a result of your network with other friendly countries, should Canada not undertake some action to stop those wars that are a major impediment to economic development of that continent?
Senator Mahovlich: General Hillier, my trip to Africa last year was in the darkest part of the Congo. I found that the political will was not there. I do not know if sending troops is the proper answer to the question. Is there a country that you can point out to us where the military was the answer?
Senator Smith: This overlaps a bit with Senator Mahovlich's question, but I invite your views on the Sudan and Darfur situation. I feel this is a prime example of a failed state situation. I know a number of Canadians believe there is a role there.
Terrible atrocities occurred, where people of certain races and religions that have been there for centuries have been uprooted and are living in refugee camps. If there is no will or determination whatsoever to correct the terrible atrocities that caused such a situation, and if we were to go in there — and they only want African Union countries in there and not us — we perpetuate the atrocities that occurred as opposed to successfully implementing any effort or scheme to restore the rights that most people believe these people, who have been abused, had.
How do you feel about going into a situation like that? How do you react to that type of proposition when you hear people discuss that?
[Translation]
Senator Dawson: Earlier, you highlighted that, contrary to popular belief, today's soldiers are trained for peacekeeping, not war. Could you provide us with an example of a change in military training that has led to the situation whereby a significant percentage of our troops are involved in peacekeeping as opposed to traditional warfare?
Nowadays, the countries in which our troops are deployed, be they in Africa or elsewhere, are no longer involved in transnational conflict, but tend to be countries that are in state of virtual civil war. Canada's role in such a conflict is not necessarily to support one side over the other, but, rather, to foster and preserve peace. How does military training reflect this new reality?
[English]
Senator Stollery: I have a technical question. I have been looking through the Royal Military College, and others of us have been looking at the courses that they give, chairman. As you know, I spent my youth with the colonial armies in Africa, around the French and the British. I cannot find anything where there is training for counter-insurgency, which is the sort of thing I am used to. Am I right or wrong?
The Chairman: General Hillier, you have a broad range of questions that embrace philosophical, geo-political and military issues. I wish you every success in your response.
Gen. Hillier: I do have a broad range of questions, but fortunately I am out of time so I cannot answer any of them here, it being 6 o'clock.
Let me start with Senator Prud'homme. I will comment upon, as opposed to answer the question, when you asked if the debate about a mission like Afghanistan translates into the soldiers' perception they are not being supported.
Senator, there is always a danger of that. People are people. To pick that pepper from other stuff is difficult to do when they are in an intense operation and they are looking over their shoulders and saying, what is the debate about? They only get a piece of it through the media clips. If your soldiers are deployed 30 to 45 days out from base camps, they do not get a lot of it; they will get snippets. Sometimes that does occur, yes.
My view is that it is balanced superbly by, first, things like your words of support here. The rally in red that took place on Friday on Parliament Hill was seen visibly in Afghanistan — and, believe me, word of that went around like wildfire. Those kinds of gestures help balance things for our soldiers, from whom we demand a lot and ask a lot for our nation. They feel comfortable that Canadians support them. The debate on a mission is a fair and free debate; we have spent our life in uniform defending the ability to do so. Precious few countries can do the same.
We train people here in Canada for various missions — from Africa and Afghanistan, but also from other countries — as part of the Military Training Assistance Program. However, there is a balanced training when bringing people to Canada and training them in our society and context; there are some benefits from them being exposed to a different society and values. One of the consequences we experience, if we are not careful, is a mass exodus when they have to go back to their home countries. We have seen that before — not in large numbers, but folks come here and they do not want to go back to an impoverished society and a military that has a tough job in front of them.
We also find that sometimes we can get more effect and impact with more numbers being trained if we project ourselves forward and run a course in the home country or in the mission area. That is something we have done. We have not done enough of it; I would say we need to do more of that.
You talked about wars causing poverty, and the selling of arms; it is a concern for everybody. Weapons that are free and available in places like Africa — and, right now, specifically in Afghanistan — directly lead to the deaths of young Canadians.
We see the cause of mass mayhem, murder and destruction, which lead to poverty, are weapons in huge numbers out of the former Warsaw Pact. The primary killer of people that we see right now is the hundreds of thousands of small arms — AK47s, unlimited amounts of ammunition and all the other weapons that go with it to make that an even greater killing machine. Afghanistan, for example, is inundated with weapons from the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet days. In Africa, you perhaps have seen it yourself as you have gone there.
Can Canada take a role in helping develop strategy and helping shape military actions internationally to have a better effect in places that are failed and failing states, or fragile states at best, where people suffer severely? I believe we are. However, one has to do that based on one's credibility as a military force. The Canadian Forces are perceived by allies and friends, who are part of that international context, as having not been a fully credible military force in recent years. One's ability to give advice and shape things, to have an effect internationally and influence friends and allies and former enemies or former potential enemies, is limited by exactly what has occurred.
We are rebuilding the Canadian Forces right now. We have just started and, along with that rebuild, what we are trying to do is rebuild the credibility of the institution — not the men and women in it, because they are recognized worldwide for the professionalism they bring and the effect they do have. We are engaged for sure.
Senator Mahovlich, as I said earlier, I do not believe there has ever been a solely military solution. A military solution merely is an enabling factor in the rebuilding of a country. When we go into a place, whether it is the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan or Somalia, as we are doing security operations, if we are not building a country, reconstructing a country — and that means, in general, building a government that can do something that is not totally corrupt — building security forces, building some kind of rule of law with a justice system and building the infrastructure so they have some basic economy, we will fail on the military side. Eventually, we run out of time and the population there loses patience with us and we are then seen as simply a part of the problem.
Our view is that three kinds of security are brought into a country like the Balkans or the former Yugoslavia and the pieces of it. The first is psychological security when we arrive as a military force, so that people see they are not alone in the most devastating days of their lives; we provide hope that things might get better. We are bringing that now to millions of Afghans, so perhaps they can see some light at the end of the tunnel. That is psychological security, as we would call it, or hope.
Second, there is short-term security, which is simply a cessation of major hostilities, and a military force can do that. However, the most important factor is sustainable security; that is a society that lives based on the rule of law. We are not the most important player in that. It has to be others. It has to be training police forces, building the economy and governance.
We believe that is succeeding with baby steps in Bosnia. It has succeeded to a great level in Croatia. It is doing the same in some other countries but there is no guarantee that it will be successful when we go in.
We do not believe the military is a solution in and of itself. There is a security window that we go in and open up to allow the other steps to occur. If the other steps do not occur effectively, that security window will slam shut and we will be seen as part of the problem. That occurred in the mid-1990s in Bosnia with United Nations forces and Canadian Forces because we were not achieving those courses of action.
Senator Smith, is there any point in going into fragile, failed or failing states? Is there something that is a precondition for it? Unless one is going to invade a place, and there is already a plan to put in a government that will take the courses of action that I just talked about, in response to Senator Mahovlich's question, one had better have a political settlement before one goes in. Otherwise, it is a waste of time and, more importantly, the lives of men and women are potentially being wasted in the devastation they would encounter.
As a military force going in, we will not be impartial. We will be viewed from day one by one group or another, one side or another, as being partial or impartial to them or to their rivals or enemies. We have encountered that on every operation we have gone on. If we are not doing certain things, we will be perceived as benefiting the other individuals; and if we are doing certain things, they may see us as the enemy.
Political settlement, which stands a real chance of success, is a precondition to almost every intervention and use of Canadian Forces. Without it, our chances of success are probably incredibly low.
With regard to the preparation and ability, the Canadian Forces' training and preparation for operations makes them one of the few armed forces in the world, although small in capacity, to perform the spectrum of operations. First, we train our men and women to survive because if we cannot survive in a hostile environment, we will not be able to impact positively on the mission. We train them for the most intense kinds of combat that we can imagine possible and probable in any of the areas in which we operate.
Second, we train them to deter, which means that the last thing we want is to be involved in violence or killing people in order to achieve a point. That deterrence includes a great deal of training and education, and not at RMC, senator, because that is for the most junior officers. We train them to deter, for example, at the summertime training program. In that way, they can help to implement a political settlement by deterring a resumption of violence or hostilities, et cetera. We train them to be prepared, in the event that things go south in a hurry and are in the middle of a violent mix up, to fight to win because we do not want them coming in second in such an environment.
We believe, and our practice and operations have shown, that these young men and women, with the right leadership, which is incredible at the mid-level and officer level in particular, can perform the spectrum of operations.
We do all of that as a basis for forming that good soldier, sailor, airman or airwoman; the basis before that is a good person and a good Canadian. Immediately before we put them on a mission, we give them a training package focussed on the mission that they are going into. We do it no other way. If the mission is peacekeeping, then we focus on how we can be part of a solution, deter the resumption of violence, help the political players get on with the game and help the country recover. If it is a different mission, we do the training package differently. We believe we have pretty much the right solution but we do not rest on our laurels because we learn lessons every hour of every day. Currently, we are trying to turn lessons observed into lessons learned, and we feel we are getting better.
The Chairman: General Hillier, you have given us more time than was agreed. We appreciate your generosity.
General Hillier, on behalf of all of us would you express to the men and women under your command our great respect, admiration and gratitude for the work they are doing.
The committee continued in camera.