Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Issue 8 - Evidence - December 6, 2006
OTTAWA, Wednesday, December 6, 2006
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs met this day at 4:05 p.m. to examine and report on the evacuation of Canadian citizens from Lebanon in July 2006.
Senator Hugh Segal (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: I want to welcome honourable senators and guests today to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Today, we continue our study on the evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon last summer. Members will remember that Minister MacKay appeared before us on November 1 to discuss the policy aspects of this extraordinary exercise. Today, we will look at the actual operations of the evacuation, among others, scrutinizing the level of preparation of the Canadian embassy in Lebanon at the outbreak of the crisis, the effectiveness of the decisions made and the challenges faced during the evacuation.
We now welcome officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, DFAIT, and the Department of National Defence, DND. Those departments were the main ones involved in the evacuation, with, as we understand, the Department of Foreign Affairs directing much of the action.
We have with us today two gentlemen from DFAIT who appeared previously on this issue with the minister: Peter Boehm, Assistant Deputy Minister, North America and Consular Affairs; and Robert Desjardins, Director General, Consular Affairs Bureau.
From Citizenship and Immigration Canada, we have Daniel Jean, Assistant Deputy Minister, Operations.
From the Department of National Defence, we have Brigadier-General J.Y.R.A Viens, Director General, Plans, Strategic Joint Staff; and Major-General J.P.Y.D. Gosselin, Director General, International Security Policy.
We will begin with a statement from our colleagues from DFAIT with a reflection on behalf of the three departments, and then honourable senators will have a chance to put questions to all of our guests here today. Welcome, and thank you for joining us. We appreciate your making time in your busy schedules.
[Translation]
Mr. Peter Boehm, Assistant Deputy Minister, North America (and Consular Affairs), Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure for me to be here today with Robert Desjardins, Director General of Consular Affairs in DFAIT and my colleagues, Daniel Jean from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, and Brigadier-General André Viens and Major-General Daniel Gosselin from the Department of National Defence.
The Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of Foreign Affairs, appeared before this committee last month and provided an overview of the evacuation and the coordinated efforts of the Government of Canada to successfully accomplish a very challenging task.
My comments today will focus on the actual operations of this massive and unprecedented effort to assist and protect Canadians who found themselves in harms way in Lebanon in July 2006.
As the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for consular services in DEFAIT, as well as for North America, I was front and centre throughout the crisis and fully involved in all operational aspects of the Lebanon evacuation. In addition to chairing all interdepartmental task force meetings, I was in constant communication with the 24/7 Emergency Operation Centre in DEFAIT which was the hub with respect to management of evacuation operations — both abroad and domestically. I spoke almost daily with the heads of task forces of the U.S., U.K., France, Germany and Australia, as well as with other foreign ministries and their ambassadors in Ottawa.
I exchanged views and information on the evolving situation and options and possible shared opportunities to assist our nationals in Lebanon.
[English]
Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by briefly providing the committee with some background on the department's crisis contingency planning, preparedness and ability to assist Canadians in times of crisis or catastrophic events.
During 2005, the department dealt with 68 new natural disaster cases and 25 new civil disaster cases. The department's consular affairs bureau successfully managed 24 per cent more distress cases in 2005 than in 2004. These cases included: natural and civil disasters, 93 cases; deaths, 870 cases; child abductions, 95 cases; medical evacuations, 31 cases; family distress, 216 cases; and evacuations, 8 cases. One case can involve more than one individual, particularly those related to natural and civil disasters, family distress and evacuations.
That being said, the evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon is by far the largest and most successful effort ever mounted or attempted. It was conducted without access to resources and assets that other countries such as the U.S., U.K. and France had at their disposal. The French had a naval ship in the Port of Beirut when the crisis began and were able to evacuate a large number of children and parents at the outset. The U.S. and U.K. were able to base their military naval operations out of Cyprus, where the U.K. has a military base.
The first evacuees to leave Beirut were U.S. citizens ferried to Cyprus on U.S. military helicopters, which could carry a maximum of 20 persons. The problem encountered by the U.S. and the U.K. was to match naval assets used for evacuation from Beirut with chartered airlift capacity in Cyprus. This problem created a situation where these evacuees spent approximately 72 hours in crowded reception centres. At one point, I was able to provide my counterpart at the U.S. State Department with contacts for charter airlift that were surplus to our needs.
One of the first actions taken by Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in response to an emerging crisis is to review the consular contingency plan for the country or countries involved. Currently, the department has 253 country-specific consular contingency emergency plans, CONPLANs, on file, including plans for each of Canada's missions in the United States.
These CONPLANs are a database of information, prepared and updated regularly, which provide the basis for development of a strategy to respond to various types of crises. They include such information as the size and location of the Canadian community, vulnerability to natural or manmade disasters, local response capabilities and identification of routes and options, should evacuation be required.
In the case of Lebanon, the CONPLAN and the registration of Canadians abroad for the country were reviewed on July 13, with a view to providing options on a strategy to provide information and assistance to Canadians in a rapidly deteriorating security environment. Within two days, and following the bombing of the Beirut airport and destruction of land and bridge infrastructure, it became evident that the only viable and safe means for Canadians to leave what was becoming a war zone was by sea.
A series of interrelated factors compounded the considerable challenge to the implementation of the plan. These factors included the Israeli air and sea blockade, the deterioration of communication networks in Lebanon, the serious capacity shortages of Lebanon's port infrastructure, high international demand for limited commercial maritime and airlift capabilities for immediate use and the distance between Canada and Lebanon.
[Translation]
It was also obvious that while just over 11,000 Canadians had registered with the Canadian embassy in Beirut, the actual size of the Canadian community in Lebanon was approximately four times that number, or in the order of between 40,000 and 50,000. By July 17, registration had doubled to 22,000 and at the height of the crisis, approximately 39,100 Canadians had registered their presence in Lebanon.
On July 12, DEFAIT began issuing a series of e-mail messages and telephone calls to registered Canadians, as well as posting information on the consular Internet website, to apprise Canadians of developments, including departure options. Messages to registered Canadians with updated information, as well as postings on the website continued throughout the crisis, on an average of one every two days or more often as required.
DEFAIT worked closely with Citizenship and Immigration Canada in order to ensure continuity of messaging. CIC's website, with a link from the main page to a dedicated section on the crisis, was continuously updated with the latest information, including frequently asked questions of clients.
The first interdepartmental task force meeting was convened on July 15, involving departments and agencies from across government, including the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, the Privy Council Office, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Department of National Defence, Citizenship and Immigration, Public Safety, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and Canada Border Services Agency.
Twice daily task force meetings continued throughout the crisis, involving the teleconference participation of Beirut, Cyprus and Turkey and the attendance of Minister MacKay.
[English]
On July 15, the DFAIT emergency operations centre was expanded to create a crisis call centre and family liaison centre. It took over all the calls and email related to the crisis. This role included automatically redirecting all calls and email received by our embassy in Beirut to the centre in Ottawa. There were 215 trained DFAIT volunteers who created a roster to respond 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to 45,323 phone calls and almost 13,000 emails. As well, they placed more than 30,000 calls to Canadians in Lebanon, and to family and friends in Canada to provide information and details of confirmed maritime departure schedules.
The family liaison centre handled individual consular case needs, such as minor children who were in Lebanon visiting relatives and whose parents were in Canada, as well as special-needs Canadians, those who were physically challenged or had medical and treatment needs and problems. For these cases, the centre advised family and friends of departure and arrival of evacuees, et cetera.
This work also included coordinating information on individual cases with reception centres in Cyprus and Turkey, where Citizenship and Immigration Canada provided on-site medical evaluation and coordination for treatment to ensure that those travelling were medically fit to do so. It was also essential to coordinate and provide accurate information to Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada to ensure appropriate support on arrival in Canada. In total, the family liaison centre managed approximately 175 individual cases, in addition to supporting the overall evacuation operation.
On July 16, an evacuation plan was developed and presented at an interdepartmental task force meeting chaired by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. The first contracts for maritime and air transport charters were negotiated, with the first departure from Beirut on July 19, carrying 308 passengers and arriving in Larnaca, Cyprus, in the early morning hours of July 20. Over the next nine days, until July 29, 31 ferry passages out of Beirut and one out of Tyre carried 11,905 evacuees to safety — 8,686 arriving in Cyprus and 3,219 arriving in Turkey.
Each sailing into and out of the Beirut port required the prior approval of Israeli military authorities. In this regard, the office of the Canadian military attaché in our embassy in Tel Aviv was responsible for coordinating requests for safe passage certificates, which could be submitted only 24 hours in advance of planned sailings. Once safe passage certificates were obtained, we had a narrow window of time to forward them to the maritime charter companies, who would then prepare routing and timings to match the authorities contained in the certificates.
Three more departures were subsequently organized as a result of substantial ongoing demand. These departures occurred on August 3, 13 and 15, with a total of 2,157 evacuees transported from Beirut to Cyprus.
Of a total of 14,370 evacuees, Canada assisted 699 foreign nationals from 32 countries to leave Lebanon, while 943 Canadians and their immediate family members were carried to safety by other countries.
All Canadians and their immediate family members were then transported to Canada on 61 charter flights and four Department of National Defence flights, including the Prime Minister's aircraft; 45 from Cyprus and 20 from Turkey. Arrivals and departures of charter aircraft in Cyprus and Turkey were coordinated to ensure that the evacuees spent a minimum amount of time in the safe haven reception centres, but rotation of the charter aircraft also needed to take into account international aviation regulations on downtime for crews and maintenance of aircraft. Our teams in Cyprus and Turkey worked closely with local airport authorities in both countries to accommodate our charter aircraft to meet turnaround times to continue the rotation of the aircraft.
In addition, confirmed aircraft schedules were then forwarded to Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, PSEPC, who in turn, coordinated the arrival of aircraft in Canada and liaised with appropriate provincial authorities to process, and provide for, the various needs of the evacuees.
One of the most urgent priorities in developing an evacuation plan was to organize additional human resource support for our embassy in Beirut, as well as establishing two safe haven evacuation reception centres: one in Cyprus, where there is no Canadian diplomatic presence; and the second in Mersin and Adana, Turkey, which are halfway across the country from Ankara where our embassy is located. Volunteers from various government departments and agencies began leaving Canada on July 17.
In total, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada deployed close to 200 employees from headquarters as well as from Canadian missions around the world. In addition, 151 officials from Department of National Defence, 2 officials from Transport Canada, 34 officials from Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Canadian Border Services Agency and 8 officials from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service were deployed to a region where pre-crisis Canadian government personnel was sparse or non-existent.
Throughout the evacuation, Government of Canada officials worked in a coordinated fashion to ensure the safe return of evacuees to Canada, and sought to balance urgency and compassion with due diligence for the safety and security of Canada and Canadians, and the government's fiduciary responsibilities.
[Translation]
One hundred and twenty-six Government of Canada officials were deployed to Beirut, where they were integrated into our embassy's crisis management team and assisted in organizing and establishing an evacuation centre to receive those wishing to leave, which included arranging and setting up amenities outside the centre for the line-ups which began at 5 a.m. each morning, filling up the centre with tables and chairs, water and food for evacuees, as well as registration and documentation verification areas to process evacuees, buses to transport evacuees to port, baggage trucks and handlers, and medical services to assist as many as 1,500 evacuees per day.
Department of National Defence personnel played a critical role in providing information and advice to our ambassador, handling crowd control at both the evacuation centre and the Canadian embassy, as well as liaising with Lebanese military authorities at the Port of Beirut and providing additional security on charter vessels.
Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Canada Border Services Agency resources provided essential assistance in screening immediate family members and non-Canadians authorized to accompany minors.
Citizenship and Immigration officials ensured that all requirements under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, including security and medical criteria, were met. In addition, Citizenship and Immigration Canada supported the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's consular response, by confirming the citizenship of Canadians who were eligible for evacuation.
[English]
Two hundred and one Government of Canada officials were deployed to Cyprus. As Canada does not have a diplomatic presence in Cyprus — only an honorary consul office — the challenges to create something from nothing in a short time frame were enormous. Compounding factors were that the crisis occurred during the peak of the tourist season, therefore accommodation and airport facilities were stretched to their limit in Larnaca. A number of other countries also used Cyprus as their safe haven destination so our options were severely limited in organizing reception centres and onward transport of Canadians to Canada.
The first deployments to arrive focused on establishing an operations centre and communications systems, rental of three reception centres to accommodate as many as 2,000 evacuees at a time for a period of between 24 and 36 hours, and buses to carry evacuees from the ships to holding centres and from holding centres to the airport and baggage transport and handlers.
Establishing emergency reception centres involved arranging for cots, food, water and medical attention, all of which needed to be in place to receive the first wave of evacuees beginning early morning on July 20. In this regard, our team workers worked closely with the Red Cross and the Cypriot civil authorities. Once again, the Department of National Defence personnel were essential in providing assistance with crowd control and logistics for movement of evacuees on arrival and for air departure.
Officials from Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Canada Border Services Agency were on hand to provide second-tier screening and document checks prior to departure for Canada, as well as assisting in the management of individual special needs consular cases and related immigration cases.
[Translation]
Fifty-two Government of Canada officials were sent to Adana and Mersin from the Canadian embassy in Ankara, as well as from headquarters and other Canadian missions around the world, to establish a "safe haven" destination in Turkey. They had to deal with the same challenges as those highlighted in establishing reception centres in Cyprus in terms of limited availability of facilities, hotel accommodation and commercial air transport, due to both the summer vacation period and other foreign governments using the same location to receive their evacuees. Officials, led by our Ambassador to Turkey, arranged arrival facilities in the Port of Mersin, and both an operation and a reception centre in Adana, in time to receive the first arrivals on July 21. The team in Turkey quickly established a close working relationship with Turkish immigration, police and airport authorities, Red Crescent, Governor's Office, and local volunteer groups to accommodate approximately up to a maximum of 1,200 evacuees per day.
The Department of National Defence, Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Canada Border Services Agency officials played a significant role once again in providing essential support to the operations in Turkey. It should be noted that this operation was carried out in a theatre of operations which was positively influenced by the status of bilateral relations with the countries involved in the crisis, and those who provided authority to establish safe haven destinations in their countries.
Future crises may occur in these areas — regions where Canada's influence is limited, making management of the crisis and possibility of evacuation of Canadian nationals an even more difficult and complicated operation.
[English]
As Minister MacKay has stated before this committee, local governments were extraordinarily cooperative. The governments of Cyprus and Turkey were exceptionally helpful and gracious in welcoming Canadian citizens entering their country. They worked tirelessly with our officials to help our citizens return to Canada as quickly as possible. Minister MacKay has expressed our appreciation to representatives from those countries and hopes to do so in a more personal way in the future by travelling there.
Overall, the government of Canada response to the protection and assistance of Canadian citizens in Lebanon has been reviewed by senior government officials and deemed timely and appropriate. Polls taken after the evacuation indicated that 71 per cent of Canadians agree that the government of Canada acted efficiently in all phases of evacuation.
At the same time, all participants agreed that a number of lessons can be drawn from this operation and initiatives developed to further strengthen Canadian crisis response efforts.
Deputy ministers from all departments and agencies involved in the Lebanon evacuation met in September to discuss lessons learned. They identified several priority issues and concerns to address government of Canada crisis response tools and resources, so there will be sufficient to meet future demands and address both domestic and international aspects of a crisis abroad.
The interdepartmental community has already begun work on these crisis management issues. At the same time, they are reviewing individually their in-house needs and capabilities to continue to provide and improve on the level of support and expertise witnessed in the Lebanon evacuation.
In summary, the Lebanon evacuation was a multi-faceted operation with participation from a wide range of government departments and agencies. Government of Canada officials worked in a complementary and coordinated fashion, both in Ottawa and at all three crisis response locations abroad. There is no doubt in my mind that the Lebanon evacuation was a success in terms of protecting and assisting Canadian citizens. It was a success because of the outstanding cooperation and assistance of key partner departments, such as the Department of National Defence and Citizenship and Immigration Canada, who are with us today.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Boehm. I want to drill down with you and your colleagues into the review that took place in September, the analysis of lessons learned from the exercise and what went right and wrong. On a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being perfect execution in every respect with no turf wars and all the resources necessary, in situ, versus an utter disaster, which it clearly was not by any assessment, where do you think you and your colleagues would put this particular exercise on that scale?
Second, with respect specifically to the notion of logistical resources in the area, both those that we deployed de nouveau and those that we might have deployed if we had a different doctrine with respect to where our resources were in the world, what conclusions has that interdepartmental group reached that you feel comfortable in sharing with us today?
Mr. Boehm: We, of course, are not used to speculating on a scale, but I would say we scored a pretty strong B-plus to put it at 7 or 7.5, if you will.
I do not know we could or would have done many things differently. Obviously, if we had more people deployed in the centres, in Beirut, perhaps, we could have moved in a different way. However, in the case of Turkey, for example, as a staging area, our people were far away from Mersin and Adana. They needed to fly there, in fact, so that was a difficult point.
In Cyprus, one could make the point that an honorary consul located there is little in terms of having communication, other facilities and, indeed, infrastructure to set up an operations centre.
My colleague Robert Desjardins has the list of some of the lessons learned in front of him that we have put into a matrix, and he can provide that information.
Robert Desjardins, Director General, Consular Affairs Bureau, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada: First, there was a two-track lessons-learned exercise. Early in September, deputy ministers from the departments involved met to see at the macro level what lessons could be drawn quickly from this exercise. Parallel to that, each participating department is still undergoing its own micro level lessons-learned exercises.
Deputy ministers focused on seven elements. In terms of communications, particularly equipment required for the transmission of information in a secure environment, it is fine to operate where we have an embassy, facilities and equipment, but in places where we do not have a permanent presence, we need to bring the equipment. In this case, we could not deploy the required equipment. That problem is something we are working on, and we will provide clear recommendations on the way forward.
Another element that deputy ministers retained is the need for a funding structure, and clear guidelines as to how we proceed under similar circumstances. One need has to do with the policies related to the recovery of funds from repatriation exercises. The policy for consular services is that any help provided is on a cost-recovery basis. That is the policy, and it is applied systematically. However, under extreme circumstances and, certainly, this evacuation qualifies, a decision was made by the government to proceed without recovering the costs from individuals.
Another element of the funding is how the burden is shared with the provinces, particularly, Ontario and Quebec, in this case, which provided significant assistance to evacuees once they arrived in Canada.
Another element of interest was surge capacity, that is, the individual capacity of each department to bring together quickly the resources needed to respond to a crisis. Departments were able to provide the required resources, but there is room for improvement in terms of time limits of response and bringing together quickly all the various competencies required to respond to a crisis.
Another area is that of dual citizenship. The debate was not launched, but a great number of questions were raised based on the citizenship of individuals, particularly, if they have dual citizenship, and that is an area where work will be done at the interdepartmental level, and then the government may decide to where to go on that issue.
Another question is the level of service provided by consular officials abroad. Are we out of line with like-minded countries? What kind of service do we provide, and on what basis do we provide that, particularly in extreme circumstances?
Two other elements are contracting authorities. An operation of this magnitude required the negotiation and signature of contracts worth significant amounts of money quickly to put into place what was required to come to the assistance of our citizens. Certainly, there is room to refine the rules, particularly as they relate to emergency circumstances.
The last element is the authority of the head of mission, which needs to be perhaps clarified in certain areas when a crisis of that magnitude arises.
Those seven elements were identified by deputy ministers and a response is expected soon.
The Chairman: The minister at his last presence before our committee made it perfectly clear that there was a reasonably supportive response from the Israelis with respect to safe passage. The other Lebanese authorities were cooperative in every respect, although to be fair, Senator De Bané had put on the record a concern that the Israelis had not responded as quickly as one might have hoped. I believe that concern was expressed.
To our colleagues from the military, a situation where Canadians are gathered up for the purposes of removing them safely from the territory and they were not under fire nor was the port territory under fire by any of the combatants on any of the sides for whatever reason, that provided one context for operating. When we look at areas, including Lebanon now, and threats of civil war where circumstances may not be as constructively compartmentalized with respect to the security of our people, can Canadians be assured that in a more disorganized context, without that level of security, we have contingency plans to get our people out safely, notwithstanding?
Brigadier-General J.Y.R.A Viens, Director General, Plans, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence: We have existing plans for the evacuation of Canadians abroad. Those plans involve certain levels of military capability to activate them.
As you correctly pointed out, for Lebanon we did not need to activate the full scope of the capabilities that would be required to evacuate Canadians in less permissive areas, even though the scenario in Lebanon was complex. I do not want to diminish the challenge faced by Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the other departments involved for the evacuation of 15,000 people.
We have plans but they are limited by existing capabilities in the Canadian Forces. Can we envision some scenario that could potentially exceed our capabilities? I guess it could happen, but I am confident that what we have as a plan closely reflects our current capabilities in the Canadian Forces, and we would use those capabilities properly and efficiently.
The Chairman: However, it would not be unreasonable for Canadians to expect that in the process of transformation that the Canadian Forces has been undergoing at a significant pace, these sorts of issues normally would be discussed and reflected upon by members of the senior military command.
BGen. Viens: The capacity I was talking about regarding the planning for evacuation of non-combatants is a capacity that we maintain at all times, regardless of other operations abroad and in Canada. This capacity is something that we are required to maintain; this is our mandate.
[Translation]
Senator Corbin: I would like to thank Mr. Boehm for his excellent and very detailed presentation. It is not every day that we are given so many of the finer points.
You referred to a situation of extreme crisis. I know that we do not have extreme crises every day, but by what criteria would you decide that a situation is an emergency versus what you qualify as an "extreme crisis"?
I would like to discuss the current situation. You are aware that tensions have once again escalated in Lebanon. I believe that it was the Israeli Minister of Defence who stated that if the government were toppled and control taken by radical elements, he would not hesitate to intervene again.
There is no doubt that there is a potentially extreme crisis situation that would be serious. Are you in a position to react more quickly this time? Would you use the same operational methods this time, assuming that their airport had been bombed again? Would you proceed differently this time, presuming that you are better prepared to do so?
Mr. Boehm: It really was a war crisis, because the airport as well as the roads were being bombed. People had no options.
[English]
The message we received from Canadians in Lebanon was that they could not move and they wanted to get out. Following the bombardment of the airport and the major roads, including in the Becca Valley, we decided that by sea was the only way to go.
That decision was part of our earlier contingency consular plan. We had identified some of these ships, even two years ago, for such a situation. Would we proceed that way again? It would depend if transport links were cut and if the war situation was such that it was unpredictable as to what would happen — we would assess on that basis.
Senator Corbin: If war occurred again, would it be reasonable to expect that, together with the various intervenors here, you would immediately call the situation one of extreme crisis and become involved right away?
Mr. Boehm: Senator, I think if it were war and it meant all escape routes would be closed, as was the case, we would find ourselves in a task force, likely with the colleagues here. We managed to bond well during the course of July, so we know each other. We would be in touch quickly, I suspect.
[Translation]
Senator Corbin: Did you run up any bills with the Turkish and Cypriot authorities? Do you expect to be billed for the services they rendered or was it a free service, in good faith?
Mr. Desjardins: In both locations, we called upon the local governments as well as the private sector. Contracts were signed for the rental of equipment, of vehicles, of buses, for accommodation, the purchase of food and other costs. It was done on a commercial basis. On the other hand, governments from both countries provided direct aid for which we have not been billed; it was most generously offered. There are also the non-governmental organizations such as the Red Cross, amongst others, who came to the assistance of the Canadian, Lebanese and other nationals who were evacuated from the territory.
Money was exchanged on a commercial basis with commercial entities. However, there were no charges levied by NGOs nor by the governments who had the generosity to assist us during the evacuation.
Senator Corbin: At the Senate Committee on National Finance, we established that $63 million were required for the government's supplementary estimates, because of the evacuation of Canadian citizens from Lebanon. This amount appears under the Foreign Affairs and International Trade line item.
The costs incurred by the other agencies, be it the armed forces, immigration, et cetera, were not disclosed at the committee. Are you in a position to put forward a figure today as to the total cost of the operation by all the agencies?
Mr. Desjardins: Beyond the $65 million spent by Foreign Affairs, there are 10 to 11 million in expenses that were incurred by the other agencies and departments involved. We do not have an overall figure, but that is the order of magnitude. We are talking about 10 to 11 million, over and above Foreign Affairs' 65 million, for a total of approximately 75 or 76 million. These are the additional costs that do not include salaries and the services offered in the normal scope of activities. These are the supplementary costs incurred by the agencies and departments involved during the operation.
[English]
Senator Downe: I share the view of others around the table that the various departments did a good job in difficult circumstances.
I am interested in pursuing the work done by Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Have you followed up on the roughly 15,000 people who came to Canada? How many have returned or left Canada? I assume not everyone had documentation coming into Canada because documents would have been lost or destroyed. What percentage of the 15,000 people have been deported or detained because of some question about their citizenship?
Daniel Jean, Assistant Deputy Minister, Operations, Citizenship and Immigration Canada: I will start with the end of your question. All the screening and issuing of the necessary documentation was done in the staging areas. A lot of it happened in Turkey and Cyprus because that was where most of our CIC and CBSA personnel were. People were documented, screened and allowed to travel.
Once people are admitted to Canada we do not control when they exit, so it is not possible to give you an estimate of how many people who were evacuated are still here versus how many people may have returned to Lebanon or other locations.
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada has a process of inviting citizens to register when they are in a country of origin, but as we have seen in this situation, not everyone registered. Everyone that needed documentation was issued documentation before they came here, and they were screened. As far as foreign nationals, if there was any concern from security they were not allowed to proceed.
Senator Downe: It is your understanding that all the people who came to Canada were indeed Canadian citizens or dependents of Canadian citizens?
Mr. Jean: They were either Canadian citizens, immediate dependents of Canadian citizens, spouses, minor children, Lebanese citizens who had good, valid reasons to come and travel to Canada or they were returning residents. Some people were permanent residents in Lebanon at the time it happened, and were documented.
Senator Downe: I understand from your answer that you stopped a number of people from coming to Canada. How many were stopped?
Mr. Jean: We stopped a few people. I do not think it would be appropriate for me to go into detail on that. A number of people, however, who were foreign nationals asked to come but were not allowed to. We screened everyone that we had concerns with.
Senator Downe: I assume that in addition to immigration, CSIS would have been involved in screening as well.
Mr. Jean: Absolutely: The screening was done in partnership with Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. We had support from both CSIS and the Canada Border Services Agency.
Senator Downe: The last question is to the people from DND. Did we lease planes or were enough airplanes available in the Canadian Forces?
BGen. Viens: As was mentioned by Mr. Boehm in the opening remarks, we provided four airplanes, including the airplane of the Prime Minister, for evacuation purposes. If we could have provided more we would have done so. We contracted a number of commercial airplanes to support the evacuation operations, so the four airplanes that could be provided was the maximum we could provide in the circumstances.
Senator Downe: How many were required in total? How many planes were utilized?
BGen. Viens: I believe it was over 60 aircraft.
Mr. Boehm: It was 61 commercial aircraft.
Senator Mahovlich: I want to thank the witnesses for coming. You mentioned that there were 40,000 to 50,000 Canadians in Lebanon. How many Canadians of Lebanese background do we have here in Canada? Those numbers of 40,000 to 50,000 sound like a lot of people to me.
I came from Timmins where there were only one or two Lebanese families. There were not many Lebanese people in Northern Ontario, but you mention there were 40,000 to 50,000 Canadians in Lebanon. It is mind-boggling. I can see where we can run into problems trying to evacuate that many people. How many Canadians of Lebanese background are here in Canada?
Mr. Jean: I do not have the information with me, but it is something I would be happy to follow up with in writing. We can give you an estimate as to the size of the Lebanese community in Canada.
Senator Mahovlich: Did these Canadians have jobs in Lebanon, were they all tourists or do we know?
Mr. Desjardins: First, the census has precise figures on the number of people who claim Lebanon as their country of origin and we can provide that number to the chair after the meeting.
We have known, anecdotally, for many years that the size of the Canadian community in Lebanon hovers around 40,000 to 50,000 people. The fact that 30,000 people registered over and above those in the data bank at the outset of the incident confirms that our number is in the right ballpark figure. However, of the 40,000 people who proactively registered with us, we evacuated only 15,000 so we can assume that a fair number of our citizens still continue to reside in Lebanon.
That number is not untypical given the social fabric of our country. We find ourselves with significant Canadian communities in many different countries. It does not necessarily follow the immigration pattern but we can see trends in people either returning or going to the country of their origin or the origin of their parents.
That pattern is a given and we will probably see more of that in the years ahead as the fabric of our society changes.
Senator Mahovlich: I know those in the Balkans, Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have a difficult time now when they try to obtain visas to come to Canada; Canada scrutinizes them because of the war. I am always receiving calls asking if I can do something. Will we do the same thing now to the Lebanese? Will we scrutinize the Lebanese? I know terrorists are involved in Lebanon; they are demonstrating over there. I read that in the papers. Will they have a difficult time now entering Canada?
Mr. Jean: I believe, senator, you are referring to the screening that we do for people who have been in positions of authority in countries where we know that war crimes have been committed, or crimes against humanity. Given the history of the Balkan wars, the same thing is true of Western Africa and other countries, we do certain screening for people in positions of authority.
The kind of concerns in the area we are describing now would be on the security side rather than crimes against humanity. It could happen, but it does not necessarily require exactly the same type of screening mechanism we have put in place for the Balkans.
Senator Downe: Prince Edward Island has a large, prosperous and successful Lebanese community, and I think the time of year may have been a factor. A lot of the citizens of Prince Edward Island of Lebanese descent return to Lebanon in the summer. Given the distance, they go for many weeks so the children meet their grandparents, cousins and so on. That may have been a factor as to why so many were there in the summer.
Mr. Desjardins: To support what was said by the senator, indeed our figures indicate that 40 per cent of the traffic between Canada and Lebanon takes place in the summer months, in the second quarter. Anecdotally we know that in the summer months many people go to visit their relatives. We have a peak at that time of year in this respect.
[Translation]
Senator Dawson: Deputy Minister, what was the total cost of the operation?
Mr. Boehm: We believe it was more or less $75 million.
Senator Dawson: The department decided not to recover the money, but had we decided to do so, how would the cost of each repatriation have been determined?
Mr. Boehm: It would be impossible to determine in my opinion.
Senator Dawson: But you have done so in other cases, you have asked for reimbursement.
Mr. Boehm: Mr. Desjardins is our expert in the matter of reimbursements.
Mr. Desjardins: Generally, it is done in cases of very limited scope, when there is a maximum of a few hundred citizens. In the case of such a large operation, it becomes very complex logistically.
But that is not the issue. On a humanitarian basis, under the circumstances, the government took the decision not to recover the funds.
Had the government decided to do so, a formula would have to be established by assessing the total costs or by some other means, but it would be at the discretion of the government to determine the formula to be used in such a case.
Senator Dawson: I am not suggesting I want to recover the money. But when you do recover it, how is it done? For example, for the tsunami, did we evacuate people and did we ask them to pay the costs?
Mr. Desjardins: No, for smaller operations, for example, in the Turks and Caicos, it involved a few hundred citizens and it was simply an issue of moving them from one island to another. The costs were simply those directly related to contracting the air transportation service. It was very easy to say that it cost $200,000 to charter a plane and that 400 people were moved, which gives you the cost.
Senator Dawson: You had the registrations of Canadian citizens at the embassy; you mentioned the number earlier on for those that were already registered.
Mr. Desjardins: There were 11,000 at the outset.
Senator Dawson: And how many did you estimate there were in the end?
Mr. Desjardins: Thirty thousand others registered.
Senator Dawson: The operation came to an end. Since then, have people gone back and re-registered, to your knowledge?
Mr. Desjardins: We have not examined that, but we know that our data bank has to be redesigned because of logistical difficulties. We must re-contact every individual and every family to see whether they are there or not. Over the next few weeks, we will be asking the Canadians who are there to re-register. At this point, we do not intend to compare the list with the pre-existing one.
Senator Dawson: So we will never have an estimate of the number of people who travelled to Canada.
Mr. Desjardins: That is one way to put it. We came to the aid and assistance of our citizens in need and we are always prepared to come to their assistance wherever they may be.
Senator Dawson: I understand very well. There was a public debate with several of your ministers as to whether or not there are two categories of citizens, those who have lived or do live in Canada and other people who have not lived here for 15 or 20 years and whom we rescued. They came to Canada and they left again. Are we to believe that the whole concept of dual citizenship, the subject of the day, should be of concern to us if we repeatedly undertake these kinds of operations?
Mr. Desjardins: Until further notice, within the framework of the consular service, a Canadian is a Canadian; the rule is very clear. However, you are right, the debate has been launched and the discussion will take place. The challenge before us concerns how to frame that debate.
From the perspective of the consulate, I must say that eligibility for consular services should not be a factor in the determination of citizenship in any case. Within the scope of providing consular services, we offer the service to all those we consider as our citizens. If there are any restrictions or limitations that will potentially be imposed, we will act at that time, but the provision of consular services will flow from the definition that you wish to give, if we are to change the current one.
Senator Dawson: Please understand what I am saying; it was a success, congratulations, but when the committee decided to study the issue, it was to learn from it, speaking to you and other departments such as Defence, Citizenship Canada or others, to see how we can learn something from this operation. I am trying to ask questions that will result in recommendations when we are drafting the report, to see whether we should continue to study citizenship or dual citizenship in depth or to say in what kind of operations, everything having succeeded, we should try to be more disciplined with the lists.
Some time ago, a witness talked about an embassy audit where there was an assessment in proportion to the number of citizens present. Has that been done recently in Lebanon?
Mr. Desjardins: Consular services are an integral part of the operations of each mission and of the department; we have a system whereby every two or three, or four years maximum, each mission is subject to an official audit. And consular services are part of the terms of reference of the audit. In addition to this audit in a prescribed form, we work continually with the missions to ensure that consular services are provided and that contingency plans are in place to meet what appear to be the current needs.
Senator Dawson: Last question: When did the last assessment take place for Lebanon?
The Chairman: Before the crisis.
Mr. Desjardins: I do not know, we will check on it.
Senator De Bané: The only difference in Canadian law between those who are Canadian-born and those Canadians who obtained their citizenship here is found in the 1982 Constitution, where it states that for parents who studied abroad, their children do not have the right to attend English schools in Quebec whereas those who studied in other Canadian provinces may send their children to those schools. That is the only difference that exists in Canadian legislation between natural-born citizens and naturalized citizens.
[English]
There is no other difference between the two. That is the only one and it happened in 1982.
[Translation]
I have other questions I would like to ask. No doubt the greatest challenge was the issue of communications. If another crisis were to arise, have we learned some lessons as to how we might tackle it next time? These are the main complaints that I have heard. People did not know if there would be a boat to take them, on what day they were supposed to present themselves at the port. And that is essentially how it was. People were waiting there, until someone came to get them. Did we learn anything about all that and can we improve on the great challenge of communications for the next time?
[English]
Mr. Boehm: If I may respond in English, senator, communications are a challenge. I think the direction of your question is, how do we communicate with citizens?
We communicated through the website. We communicated by having all calls from within Lebanon directed to our 24/7 operations centre here so that the embassy team could do its work.
We had Ambassador Louis de Lorimier on radio and television saying when the citizens should come to the reception centre to get ready, how they should pack and what documents they should bring. We coordinated that as best we could with sailings we had scheduled that would then connect with aircraft that would meet the ships at the other reception centres in Turkey and Cyprus.
Communication was most difficult in the south, in terms of getting the message out. As part of our consular program, we also have wardens who are volunteers — often Canadians themselves. We set up a phone bank for them in a hotel across the street from our embassy in Beirut so they could spend all of their time phoning people. Our ambassador tried to send messages by phone, through websites, through our operation centre in Canada and through the media available to us in Lebanon. Of course, families contacted their loved ones as well.
We tried to cover all bases. That does not mean we cannot improve in terms of communication. Communication was also affected by our knowledge of what was happening. At the beginning of the crisis, perhaps that was not as clear as it could have been.
Senator De Bané: We have about 22 Arab countries. By far the largest community in Canada of Arab origin are from Lebanon.
I said the other day, when Mr. Boehm was here with the Honourable Peter MacKay, that there was a time when our two embassies, the one in Cairo and the one in Beirut, were the two most important Canadian embassies in the Arab world. Today, the Canadian embassy in Beirut, compared to other embassies around the world, is the one with the fewest staff, lowest rank and what have you. The one in Damascus, Syria, has close to 100 people. I think it is the tenth most important in terms of staffing.
Canadians of Lebanese descent are bitter — I do not know if that is the word in English — that they must go to Damascus for the processing of their files. For anything related to immigration, the Canadian embassy in Beirut is essentially a substation of the real embassy, which is in Damascus.
My colleague Senator Downe spoke about the contribution of Canadians of Lebanese origin in Prince Edward Island. I can do the same for my region. The Lebanese community has been in Canada for over 100 years.
I understand what happened early in the 1980s when there was a war, but I urge you to review that status of that embassy in Lebanon. It is not commensurate with the contribution of Canadians of Lebanese descent or the importance of the Canadian community in Lebanon. I want to put that to you forcefully, and ask if you can review the whole thing. This is what I would like to tell you.
Mr. Boehm: Thank you very much. I recall full well you made that point when we were here with Minister MacKay.
Minister MacKay, in turn, has sent a letter to the chair in which he listed the number of people in our embassies and compared Damascus and Beirut. In Damascus, there is a total of 78 office staff, 46 working for Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Beirut has 26 staff, with five CIC employees.
I will call on my colleague Daniel Jean to provide a fuller explanation.
[Translation]
Mr. Jean: It is quite true that in terms of personnel, the presence is much more significant in Damascus than it is in Beirut.
However, it is important to understand that this sevice, the delivery of visas for visitors, for students, for temporary workers or people who are coming as tourists or on business is done in Beirut. For people of Lebanese origin who want these services in Lebanon, the services are therefore offered in Beirut.
A certain number of Lebanese however do choose to go to Damascus because they live closer to Damascus than to Beirut, particularly when they are in the valley.
As far as immigrant services are concerned, it is true that applications by mail are dealt with at the embassy in Damascus. Largely speaking, these applications are dealt with on paper; the clients therefore have no need to travel and the services are offered by mail.
In cases where interviews are required, in most cases the interviews take place in Beirut; the clients are therefore not inconvenienced. In fact, often the clients that are met in Damascus are met there because that is what they requested, and it is precisely because they live closer to Damascus than to Beirut.
The staff is larger in Damascus, but in terms of service delivery, the great majority of clients who must be seen in person are served in person in Beirut.
Senator De Bané: I must say, Deputy Minister, with all due respect, that I receive many complaints from Lebanese people who have to go to Damascus, and who are wondering when all of these services will be available in Beirut.
I have a final question. Can you explain what the Government of Canada's overall command and control structure was?
[English]
Who was in charge of that immense operation? Is it the Department of National Defence, which is trained to do large operations such as this one of evacuating thousands of people? Is it DFAIT that was in charge of evacuating thousands of people? Where was the command structure of that complex operation?
Mr. Boehm: Right here, senator. We chaired it out of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, in cooperation with our partner departments represented here, and many others that we have mentioned in our various comments.
We met twice daily, usually at 8 a.m. and 3 p.m. — given the time differences in the Mediterranean — with our ambassadors and other key people plugged in. For example, when Minister MacKay was at the conference in Rome, he was also on the call from Rome. When he was not in Rome and was in Ottawa, he was with us in the operation centre in our crisis team. It was chaired by DFAIT, with close cooperation from the other departments and agencies.
Senator De Bané: Would you say that the Department of National Defence is the organization trained to carry out large-scale operations like this one?
Mr. Boehm: This situation was a consular emergency in terms of providing assistance to Canadians. That mandate falls to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The Department of National Defence clearly had an important role in terms of the logistical aspects — moving people and controlling crowds — but by and large, this action involved other governments as well, and that is where DFAIT becomes involved.
The Lebanon situation also involved coordination with some of our friends and allies in terms of what they were doing — how we could help them and how they could help us. In some cases, they too used their military assets where they had them. In other cases, they could use military assets — such as the Americans for one part of the evacuation, the naval portion — but then needed to rely on other means to evacuate citizens because they also did not have airlift assets.
The Chairman: Do you want to add anything, Major-General Gosselin?
Major-General J.P.Y.D. Gosselin, Director General, International Security Policy: The Canadian Forces, DND, was in total support of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada in this case. However, Canadian Forces personnel are always under the command of the Chief of the Defence Staff. What happened in this case was that a senior Canadian was designated as the senior Canadian in the theatre and he was working directly in support of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada.
In a situation that becomes a non-permissive operation, which you alluded to, where it becomes a military operation, then it would be different. In a non-permissive situation where we needed to use force to get in and out, then it would be different — that was not the case here.
Senator De Bané: The situation was an evacuation operation of a large scale. We have the impression that when you arrived in Cyprus, things started moving.
MGen. Gosselin: I suspect it is perception more than anything else because we were totally in support. The people there supported the embassy staff and the foreign affairs ministry.
The Chairman: Before I call on Senator Cools, who has been most patient, let me understand that the chief of the mission in place would have been an officer of the foreign affairs department, whoever was designated. There would have been a senior military officer who reported to the Chief of the Defence Staff with respect to military activity, but obviously through the chief of the mission. Therefore, a unified Canadian command was present — a structure of command. Had the circumstance gone through a difficult transition to a complex military operation, we would have seen a change in that structure. Is that what you suggest?
MGen. Gosselin: You may but it would need to be consistent —
The Chairman: It is hypothetical. I know people do not like to answer hypothetical questions.
MGen. Gosselin: Let us say we have a situation that extends and the head of the mission there would give orders, if we want to use that term, to the Canadian Forces personnel. If they do not fit with the terms of reference the senior commander had when the senior commander left, that person would need to go back to the military chain of command.
The Chairman: I assume that the military people in situ, giving logistical and other support to the Department of Foreign Affairs people in charge, had one set of rules of engagement based on a permissive circumstance in place, crowd control and various other normative obligations. In the event there is a transition, how quickly would officers have upgraded rules of engagement in the event it is necessary to protect Canadian nationals?
MGen. Gosselin: There are two parts. They always have self-defence. The military personnel who deploy have that. The chain of command element is always from the Chief of the Defence Staff to the commander, in this case of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command to the task force commander. That is the military chain of command. It is the same everywhere. It does not matter where we go.
If the situation had deteriorated, this commander would have gone to the commander of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier, and asked for whatever direction he needed, but he deployed with rules of engagement that allows self-defence.
The Chairman: That would have extended to responding to any hostilities that any combatants in the region might have subjected Canadian nationals to without the need for a meeting back at defence headquarters relative to what we then do to protect our nationals in situ?
BGen. Viens: Based on the situation on the ground, the military deployed with a set of basic rules of engagement that allowed them to take defensive action if they were attacked, but they were not to confront any other groups or any of the parties. If the situation had changed and evolved to a point where the rules of engagement needed to be changed, then the request, as LGen Gauthier has mentioned, would have been made through the chain of command to change those rules of engagement. However, the rules of engagement they had for the mission and that were judged to be sufficient allowed them to take defensive action to defend themselves.
Senator Corbin: That would be to defend themselves and Canadians as well?
BGen. Viens: They could take defensive actions affecting them and Canadian interests.
Senator Corbin: That would include Canadian citizens.
BGen. Viens: If you want to read it that way, it would.
Senator Corbin: It is not what I want to read.
Senator Cools: Mr. Chairman, the witness, if I may, is saying that the rules of engagement are circumscribed and if more is required or if the situation changes and escalates, one has to speak to home. Is that what you are saying?
BGen. Viens: I am sorry, I missed the question.
Senator Cools: I understood you to say that the rules of engagement that our forces had in respect of Canadian nationals and Canadian interests are considerably circumscribed. In other words, they are not as wide as if you were belligerent or in a state of active warfare. If the circumstances were to change or if your mission needed to be amended, upgraded or whatever, you would have to refer to home, I would guess to the chiefs here, for a different set of rules of engagement. That is what I understand you to say.
You cannot go into a country to evacuate your nationals and then act as if you are there to go to war with someone else.
The Chairman: So we are clear and for the record, Senator Cools' question was precise, and BGen. Viens was precise in saying that she has it right.
BGen. Viens: That is correct.
The Chairman: There would need to be a fresh reference back home for fresh direction through the chain of command.
BGen. Viens: That is correct.
Senator Corbin: I do not have an answer to my question.
The Chairman: Let us go to Senator Corbin, who wants more precision.
Senator Corbin: I forget precisely in what terms I put my question, but it aims at obtaining an answer to the following. The military on the ground are being attacked, but within their midst there are Canadian citizens. It may not necessarily be the military who are attacked but the Canadian citizens under their guard that area attacked. Is your first duty to protect those Canadian citizens, rather than thinking of yourselves? I do not mean this question in any deprecatory or pejorative way.
[Translation]
That is not to disparage the value of our military; but you were overseeing an operation that involved evacuating Canadian citizens. If people arrived and opened fire on Canadian citizens, you would respond.
BGen. Viens: I understand that the rules of engagement mean precisely that. If people feel threatened, they will take the necessary means to protect themselves.
Senator Corbin: It goes without saying that you would defend yourself and defend Canadian citizens.
BGen. Viens: It goes without saying that if there are Canadians in the vicinity and if military personnel feels threatened, they will take means to defend themselves, including the people around them.
Senator Corbin: That is clear.
Senator De Bané: What he said was "if the Canadian military feels threatened." At that point, they would respond for themselves and for the Canadians. But if only Canadian civilians felt threatened but not the military, what would happen? That is the question.
[English]
The Chairman: Let me put it perhaps in a less legal way. As I watched the coverage on all our networks of the Canadians gathering at the port in Tyre or at the port in Beirut, my quiet prayer was that by accident or otherwise none of the combatants in the region would find themselves, for whatever reason, shelling the port, whether it was Israeli ships, Hezbollah or other combatants in the region who might end up shelling the port for whatever other reason. I had concern about our Canadian nationals and their safe egress, and about our own public servants who were there to assist in that egress. The question that would occur naturally to all of us as citizens is, in the event of that unlikely but nevertheless possible circumstance, what is the context within which our foreign and defence capacity can respond to provide a measure of protection for Canadians in that circumstance? I think that is the question you are hearing from colleagues around the table. I also realize it is a touchy area on which you may want to reflect.
BGen. Viens: Again, in the case of the evacuation of Lebanon, the military measures that were taken were those of assisting the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the head of mission on the ground in the evacuation. Of the people who were deployed, some were deployed for security and crowd control, as was mentioned in the opening statement, but many more were deployed to ensure communication between the embassy and Canada, and to offer planning and provide logistical support. Also, medical people were deployed.
This deployment was not a mighty military capability in traditional terms of military. We were there to assist in the logistical operation and we had some security personnel to perform crowd control and ensure the security of the premise of the embassy.
Senator Downe: We all know this, but for the record, the Chief of the Defence Staff would not be able, in this country, on his own, to change the mission from defensive to offensive without coming with the Minister of National Defence to seek that permission from the cabinet.
Senator Cools: Absolutely.
The Chairman: Mr. Boehm, you wanted to add something.
Mr. Boehm: I did not want to give the impression that we were only task forcing twice a day.
Those were the formal meetings. In the meantime, there was a lot of activity in terms of assessing the situation on the ground, including with our colleagues at DND who were in touch with the military attachés in Tel Aviv in terms of how the conflict was evolving and what impact that would have on our operation. In addition, of course, we watched the media, which is often a good thing to do.
The Chairman: My assumption is, our colleagues in the Department of National Defence would have normal access to the usual sources of intelligence with respect to other activities on the ground that may have been relevant to their contingency planning for that port egress.
MGen. Gosselin: It is a fair statement. We talked to our allies. The Chief of Defence Intelligence is active as an extended network; your speculation is fair.
Senator Cools: I want to begin by thanking the witnesses for appearing before us. In addition, I want to thank you all for your efforts and for running a successful operation. I am aware that there will be criticism, as is normal, and there should be, but it is much better to face criticism from a position of having attained the objective than from not having attained it. I wanted to let you know, in case you ever think that your soldiers or that your staff and your department people are not appreciated. When I reflected on it, when I saw it, I was amazed. It seemed so enormous. I admire you greatly and I thank you very much for it.
On a different point, I was in California at a speaking engagement on September 11 and I cannot tell you the anxiety and panic that I felt when I could not get out of San Diego to go home. There was no one to help me and it was the most terrible panic I have ever experienced. We went to the bus station to buy a bus ticket for Vancouver, then we stopped, thought about it, and realized we were panicking. Even though we were thousands of miles away from New York, the social experience and the psychic feeling that was going through the population across the U.S. was this terrible panic, and I shared in it.
It gives one some insight into how these things arise so quickly and suddenly and then your governments are faced with gargantuan tasks to respond.
My question has to do with some of your responses. In your opinion, how does Canada's capability to respond to such a disaster, such a need really — it is a need, to evacuate X thousands of people — compare to other countries?
One of you testified that we had four planes, and I think you said we needed 60. I was not too sure if you said 60 planes or there were 60 flights. To wake up one day and say the Government of Canada today needs 60 planes, where do you find 60 commercial planes that can react so quickly? I have no idea, but what I am asking you to make a judgment on is about our capability to respond to such situations, and how that capability compares to equivalent countries. You are free to compare us to the U.K. or wherever.
Mr. Boehm: The four aircraft were DND aircraft that were made available. Because of the numbers involved we realized quickly that we needed to charter aircraft.
To give you a comparison, we were in touch with the operation centres in Australia, France, Great Britain, and the United States. I made a lot of calls to Berlin as well, to the Germans. They were also in constant contact with us, wanting to know how we were doing because each country had different capabilities.
The British had naval bases in Cyprus so they could deploy naval vessels. They moved a carrier group from Gibraltar, where they also had a base, to Beirut. That took five days. That is a lot of personnel; a crew and a carrier is about a thousand people.
The U.S. had military assets that came up through the Suez Canal. They arrived there on the following Friday as well. They had tremendous capacity to transport people. You saw the pictures on television with these landing crafts coming onto the beaches and people crowding on. They took people to Cyprus but they did not have airlift capacity to take them out of Cyprus. People booked flights to Europe where they became secondary consular cases. In other words, they would go to a U.S. embassy or consulate and then seek assistance. We took the decision to bring our people right back to Canada.
In the case of the French, they had a ship in Beirut harbour and of course it is not far to the Mediterranean ports of France from Beirut.
The Australians had a big challenge because they have a large Lebanese-Australian population. In some ways, they were after the same assets that we were after, in terms of ships that had been identified that could be chartered, so we partnered with them a fair amount. They ended up taking some of ours and we took some of theirs.
To come to the nub of the question, I think we did well. We also had luck on our side in that there were no injuries for the people that we took out, or worse. We managed to get a rhythm going in terms of ships and ships available, and then aircraft to meet the ships so people were not in the staging areas in Cyprus and Turkey for too long. The weather in the Mediterranean cooperated. The windows of opportunity provided by the Israeli defence forces, with respect to their blockade, were narrow, and the defence force security certificates were valid only for a certain period so we had a lot of needle threading to do. Logistically it all worked for us. I think, on balance, we did fairly well.
Senator Cools: I was trying to look at the scope of the challenge, which was the evacuation, and the scope of the Canadian capability to respond. What you have told me is that we did well, but we did not have that much capability to respond. You have essentially said, and correct me if I am wrong, that we responded — when I say we I mean the Government of Canada — and met a challenge with remarkably few resources. I understood you to say that the Government of Canada needed to purchase, rent or charter, I do not know the language, capability to transport its nationals back, but I do not get the impression that some of those other countries needed to do that.
Mr. Boehm: They did, in fact, need to do that.
Senator Cools: To the same extent that Canada needed to?
Mr. Boehm: I do not know what their totals are, but they came to us for help and advice, including our biggest partner, because they could not move people out by air. It is difficult to calculate the costs based on fixed costs they might have for their military equipment.
In some cases, the numbers were different. However, on balance, I think many were in the same game and had identified the same naval assets. They faced the same questions, such as increased insurance premiums that were passed on to the client — in this case, the Government of Canada, because it was a war zone. Shipowners needed to do that for Lloyd's of London to insure them. Also, there was the uncertainty factor in terms of how many citizens could be loaded and how the demand and the supply would work. We were on the phone a lot, and they were on the phone to us from their operations centre, asking how we were doing this, and have we encountered this? Yes, we have.
Senator Cools: I understand that and I think that is worthy, but I cannot help but believe that those other countries have far more resources at their disposal than Canada does.
Mr. Boehm: In some cases, I think they had military resources at their disposal.
Senator Cools: I should have said military resources. I know that the military in Canada has been impoverished or starved for many years; but I cannot help but feel those other countries had far more military resources with which to respond to the challenge.
Mr. Boehm: Australia did not and Germany did not; France did, the U.K. did and the U.S. did.
Senator Cools: Senator Mahovlich responded to the fact that there were 40,000 to 50,000 Canadians of Lebanese origin, and you were involved in evacuating 15,000 of these people. I am curious because this sort of situation gives one pause. For example, if a situation such as this arose in another part of the world — for example, even in the U.S. — where we needed to evacuate Canadians, how many Canadians are in New York or Los Angeles on any day of the week? We do not think about these things until something makes you think about it, but I am curious.
Granted, we say that it was during the peak of the tourist season in Lebanon, so the number present was a bit higher. I am not sure if we keep much information or data on how many nationals we have at any given moment in any country, but out of curiosity, how many Canadian nationals live in New York or Los Angeles? Ten years ago, we all thought nothing could happen, but the world has changed since September 11; we know many things can happen.
How do the numbers of Canadians living in New York, Los Angeles or London compare to the number of Canadians living in Lebanon? I am curious, if you have an answer.
Mr. Boehm: We have a program called Registration of Canadians Abroad, ROCA. It is not necessary for a Canadian to register with a Canadian diplomatic or consular establishment abroad. Some do; in the old days, everyone did. If they were a student, they would do that as a natural thing, or they would want to see their embassy and sign in.
People do not do that anymore; it is completely voluntary. For example, in the southern U.S., when Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Wilma, the big hurricanes, hit last year, only a few hundred Canadians had registered, so we did not know how to contact people. Our anecdotal estimate of Canadians in the United States is the equivalent of the province of Ontario, population-wise.
Senator Cools: We could have 20,000 Canadians living in New York, for all we know.
Mr. Boehm: I think there are far more, but we do not know that.
Senator Cools: I have a friend who lives around Los Angeles, who tells me all they need to do is build a rink and the Canadians will come.
I think, however, as we review your review and the lessons to be learned to be ready in the future for these kinds of emergencies, one of the issues you will deal with is the fact that our Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade must have better knowledge of where Canadians are.
I remember a time when I travelled, a long time ago now, one of my first trips was to Europe when I was 19 years old. Documentation when we obtained our passport cautioned us about trying to go behind the Iron Curtain. I only remember that because I took the Orient Express. I remember reading all that information and it used to come with a passport — inform the embassies that we are in the country or whatever.
I think a lot of that has fallen by the wayside. Perhaps we should resuscitate more of that and impress upon Canadians the importance of informing embassies that they are in a country. It may be a good idea to start that again.
Mr. Boehm: We agree, of course.
Senator Cools: Thank you, again. I watched it and I felt proud of you. I know there were lots of hiccups and bumps and so on, but you lost no lives. That is a measure of success.
The Chairman: Before I call on Senator Mahovlich, I have a short question. You have constructive bilateral relations with the Lebanese, the Israelis, the Jordanians, the Turks and Cypriots. What relationships do you have with non-state actors, which might be as vital to securing the safe egress of Canadians — for example, Hezbollah?
I understand what the interdictions are. I understand what governments say and do over time about whom they will or will not speak to but if you are on the ground and you need to secure access to take Canadians out, how do you address questions of that kind? What do you do when one of the combatants, whose goodwill you may need in support of safe Canadian egress, falls into the category of a non-state actor who may be on a difficult list for various reasons historically?
Mr. Boehm: Mr. Desjardins will need to answer that question — I cannot read his writing. He is helping me here.
[Translation]
Mr. Desjardins: It is a matter of pragmatism and of diplomacy. We have diplomatic missions in a great many countries and the role of our missions is indeed to maintain contact with the principal stakeholders.
Sometimes, those stakeholders are not our usual contacts or interlocutors of choice, but it is definitely part of our duty to ensure that we are in contact with the people who can have an effect on Canadian interests, whatever they may be.
Also, a good measure of pragmatism ensures that our people on the frontlines, in light of their knowledge of local conditions, will naturally gravitate to those who are in a position to help us or harm us if they feel they must.
[English]
Mr. Boehm: If I could add, Mr. Chairman, that I am not aware of this particular situation having developed in this operation, but generally speaking our heads of mission — particularly Ambassador de Lorimier — is plugged in within Lebanon. As Mr. Desjardins has said, the first line would be in terms of any approach or assistance we would ask for from non-state actors.
Senator Mahovlich: I wanted to ask if the United States had more Americans in Lebanon than we had Canadians.
Mr. Boehm: Senator, the U.S. evacuee figure is about 14,650, so they were close to evacuating the same number, more or less, that we evacuated.
In talking to them at the time of the crisis, their estimate was about 30,000 Americans in Lebanon. The Australians had a number similar to ours in their estimation. The Brazilians had upwards of 60,000. We ended up taking out some Brazilians. Many of them went out by road to the north.
Senator Mahovlich: Were trains leaving, or had they all been bombed?
Mr. Boehm: There were buses in some cases along the coastal highway up into Turkey, which was a long and treacherous journey.
Senator Mahovlich: In Europe there are many trains and they are excellent to travel on. Was there any train travel?
Mr. Boehm: There was not in Lebanon.
[Translation]
Senator Corbin: I have a question, once again, regarding cost recovery from people who benefited from our services. At the top of page 2, you indicated to us that in 2005, you were involved in approximately 1,300 cases. But that figure in fact includes many more people than that. You are talking about cases that can involve several people. In reality, how many people does that represent in total, for the 2005 figures? You have 870 deaths, which leaves 440 other cases, living persons I presume. But that represents how many people who benefited from your services?
Mr. Desjardins: That is how our statistics are produced. It is difficult to look at each and every incident and determine how many people were involved. I cannot give you the precise number, but we could do so if you wish.
Senator Corbin: It is not absolutely necessary for the moment, because we are talking primarily about Lebanon and it was to put the importance of the operation into context. But the fact remains that I must ask you the question: Have you recovered costs in these cases?
Mr. Desjardins: In all of those cases, yes.
Senator Corbin: In every case?
Mr. Desjardins: In every case where there were expenses over and above what is normally provided. Canadians reimburse the money on the spot, or if they themselves are in distress, they must sign an acknowledgment of debt to the Crown. That is the mechanism used to recover costs incurred.
Senator Corbin: Can we conclude that 100 per cent of the people involved honour that commitment?
Mr. Desjardins: No, but it is a very high percentage because the Crown reserves the right to withdraw passport services to people who have a debt towards it. Those who wish to travel again must pay their debts in total. The reimbursement rate is quite high. I do not have the figures, but it is very high.
Senator Corbin: One last question: In terms of the consular service, do you have an annual budget?
Mr. Desjardins: Yes, my branch has a budget of a quarter of a million dollars per year, but the program overall represents $66 million, as the consular resources are essentially in other countries and are part of the mission accounts. In other words, the consular staff, their salaries and consular expenses incurred are accounted for in each mission. We know that the overall program represents $66 million.
[English]
Senator Cools: I think it was Senator De Bané who noted that there are 22 Arab countries. As a result of the crisis this summer, two things came to mind. I wonder if you could answer one of them, as to whether in your recruitment processes, both in the military and in the foreign affairs department, you are currently trying to find individuals who speak Arabic. I wonder about the communications that our officials would have in Lebanon. I know there is much French spoken in Lebanon, but I wonder if the recruitment processes in the departments and the armed forces are beginning to look for that set of skills: some capability in Arabic. I often wonder about how the troops sent to serve here, there and everywhere communicate. Some attention should be paid to encouraging the use of the Arabic language. This is a characteristic years ago of those individuals who were in the Middle East. One of them was Gertrude Bell; I think she spoke three or four languages, including Parsi. I wonder if that is on the horizons, on your radar screen.
The Chairman: Can I invite any of our guests to reflect on that?
Mr. Boehm: The answer is yes. It is not on the horizon, it is here, and it has been for some time.
Senator Cools: Good.
Mr. Boehm: As we put together our lists of people who could go, obviously on a voluntary basis, some were convinced that maybe it would be in their interests to go, and they did. We looked at Arabic speakers. We looked at Turkish and Greek speakers, and also at people who had experience in these countries and the Middle East. We were able to field a good team with linguistic capability.
We also have in our missions, of course, locally engaged staff who do a fine job. They are permanently based there and speak the language of the country. We were well served that way.
Senator Cools: Also, in continuing on Senator Segal's question about non-state actors, the history of human conflict is always punctuated with individuals within those conflicts who will be courageous and decent to others. It becomes important in the business of your intelligence to identify some of these individuals at times. Senator Segal put it nicely, that everyone was concerned, and I certainly was, that the areas where the Canadians were might suddenly become targets, or somehow be involved. It is overwhelming to think about it, but somehow, one has to have some conversation or access at some point in time to individuals.
I have recently done a fair amount of work on the Arab revolt in World War I, and Lawrence of Arabia had many, many roots of contact in many different places. I put that out because as one looks at the enormity of the task you faced and your success, we could have had several disasters. However, I think we need to be mindful that the situation has pointed us to huge gaps in our knowledge and huge needs to which we must turn our minds. That is one advantage of this particular study that we are undertaking here. I thank you very much, Senator Segal, for that as well.
The Chairman: On behalf of all our colleagues, I express our profound gratitude to members of the public service and the armed forces who were able to share their perspective and their experience.
At the outset of this inquiry, at our first meeting, we began with a universal expression of gratitude for the tremendous work done in Canada's name, repatriating our nationals safely, in difficult circumstances. The purpose of this study is to make sure that the benefits of the lessons learned are conveyed, both in the context of your own activities but, more important, the context of public awareness and education so that there is an understanding of resource issues and others that need to be met by Parliament and others so as to even better equip in the future based on the superb experience to date. We thank you for your frankness and the clarity of your responses.
The committee adjourned.