Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Issue 13 - Evidence
OTTAWA, Tuesday, February 27, 2007
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade is meeting today at 5:05 p.m. to elect a Chair, and to examine such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations generally.
[Translation]
François Michaud (Clerk of the Committee): Honourable senators, I note that we have a quorum. As the Clerk of the Committee, it is my duty to see to the election of a Chair.
[English]
I am now ready to receive nominations to that effect.
Senator Andreychuk: I nominate Senator Di Nino for chair of this committee.
Mr. Michaud: Thank you.
Are there any other nominations?
Senator Downe: I nominate Senator Stollery.
Mr. Michaud: Thank you.
Are there any other nominations? I do not see any. We will put the first question on the floor.
It is moved by Senator Andreychuk that Senator Di Nino be chair of this committee. Is it agreed, honourable senators?
Some Hon. Senators: Agreed.
Some Hon. Senators: No.
Senator Corbin: Can we have a recorded vote, please? Would you repeat the question, clerk?
Mr. Michaud: There is a roll call, so I will proceed with my list in alphabetical order.
The question is this: It is moved by Senator Andreychuk that Senator Di Nino be chair of this committee.
Senator Andreychuk.
Senator Andreychuk: Yes.
Mr. Michaud: Senator Corbin.
Senator Corbin: No.
Mr. Michaud: Senator Dawson.
Senator Dawson: No.
Mr. Michaud: Senator Di Nino.
Senator Di Nino: With great honour — even the nomination. Thank you.
Mr. Michaud: Senator Downe.
Senator Downe: No.
Mr. Michaud: Senator Merchant.
Senator Merchant: No.
Mr. Michaud: Senator Segal.
Senator Segal: Yes — enthusiastically.
Mr. Michaud: Senator Smith.
Senator Smith: With regret, and nothing personal, I say no. However, you are a good guy.
Senator Stollery: He is a good guy, but I am still voting no.
Mr. Michaud: Yeas three, nays six. The motion is defeated.
I shall now go to the second motion. It is moved by Senator Downe that Senator Stollery be chair of this committee. Is it your pleasure, honourable senators, to adopt the motion?
Some Hon. Senators: Agreed.
Mr. Michaud: The motion is adopted.
Senator Stollery, you are duly elected chair of this committee.
Senator Peter A. Stollery (Chairman) in the chair.
The Chairman: Thank you. My first duty is to resign as the deputy chairman of the committee, and I am so doing that. My second duty is to look for the witnesses, but I do not see them.
Excuse me, Senator Corbin and then Senator Downe.
Senator Corbin: Mr. Chairman, I believe you should be resigning as deputy chairman at this time.
The Chairman: I thought I just did that. I resign as deputy chairman.
Senator Corbin: And the committee accepts that?
The Chairman: I hope the committee accepts that.
Senator Corbin: I have a third item I wish to add to the agenda. I want to entitle it as follows: ``Future work of the committee, consideration of the draft report of the evacuation of Canadian citizens out of Lebanon July 2007.''
We can discuss that at the end of today's meeting, if the committee agrees.
The Chairman: Is it agreed, honourable senators?
Some Hon. Senators: Agreed.
Senator Downe: Given that Senator Segal resigned because the Conservative leadership asked him to resign, notwithstanding the outstanding work he did as chair of this committee, particularly the promotion and the work on the recent report on Africa, he is a great loss for this committee, the deputy chair position is now open and the Conservative members may want to fill that position.
I notice that none of them is here at the moment, but they may want to take that under consideration. The committee may want to consider it as well in the not too distant future.
The Chairman: Absolutely. That ties in with Senator Corbin's motion regarding future business of the committee. I will not take up any more time, because our witnesses have arrived.
For anyone watching, this meeting was organized by Senator Segal. To some extent, we have inherited the agenda, with which we all agreed. There was never any question about that. At the last meeting, we congratulated Senator Segal on his time as chairman.
We have as witnesses Mr. Christopher Alexander, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan from the United Nations, and Mr. James Appathurai, who is a spokesman for NATO.
I do not know who would like to go first.
You would not have noticed this, but we have noticed that there have been complications in our committee since we tabled our very important Africa report a week or so ago. Senator Dallaire is joining us at this meeting. He is not a member of the committee but he has a particular interest in Afghanistan. I guess the best would be — Senator Corbin.
Senator Corbin: I apologize to our guests, but before we proceed with the work of the committee, I should like, with the support of my colleagues, to ask for a roll call of the senators present at this meeting at this time. It is most unusual, but I think it ought to be done, under the circumstances.
The Chairman: Would you like to call the names of the members, Mr. Michaud?
Senator Corbin: Call out the names, and we will indicate our presence when our name is called.
Mr. Michaud: The current members are Senator Andreychuk, Senator Corbin.
Senator Corbin: Present.
Mr. Michaud: Senator Dawson.
Senator Dawson: Present.
The Chairman: Call it and we will tell you whether we are present or not.
Mr. Michaud: Senator De Bané, Senator Di Nino, Senator Downe.
Senator Downe: Here
Mr. Michaud: Senator Merchant.
Senator Merchant: Here.
Mr. Michaud: Senator Oliver, Senator Phalen, Senator Segal, Senator Smith.
Senator Smith: Here.
Mr. Michaud: Senator Stollery.
The Chairman: Here.
Mr. Michaud: The ex-officio members are Senator LeBreton and Senator Hervieux-Payette.
Senator Smith: On a point of procedure, for clarification by the clerk, it is my understanding that, while there is a convention that committees not proceed unless both sides are represented, it is not a rule of procedure. I am assuming that members who have left have chosen to leave.
Is there any precedent — for the committee to proceed as long as the numbers are adequate within the quorum rules?
The Chairman: For the record, the procedure has been a bit unusual today — because of the nature of the events. Committee quorum is four. If one member decides not to show up, then we will see what happens. This meeting is perfectly in order, and we will take evidence. Of course, people who are a little irritated at the moment because they instituted procedures that were not in accordance with our routine are finding that this is the result of that.
As you know, Senator Smith, when Senator Segal was forced to resign, our members did not want to accept his resignation, so we find ourselves in this situation.
It is now 10 minutes past five o'clock, so if there are no other questions, the committee will proceed with the hearing of testimony. I call on Mr. Christopher Alexander, from the United Nations, to proceed with his opening remarks, followed by Mr. James Appathurai, from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
Christopher Alexander, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan, United Nations: Thank you. It is a pleasure to be with you today just as it has been a pleasure for James Appathurai and me to be in Ottawa for two days with several parliamentary committees and in several public contexts to discuss the challenges and the achievements of the Afghan mission to date.
I should like to begin by expressing congratulations to Canada as a country, as a society and as a government, which, for some years from the beginning of the Afghan mission and most recently yesterday, has shown substantial and growing commitment to one of the great international causes of our time — the development and rebuilding of Afghanistan after a quarter century of conflict.
[Translation]
Honourable senators, it is very clear in our mind, on the ground in Kabul and within the international organizations represented in Afghanistan, under whose aegis we are working in Afghanistan, that collaboration is extremely important. This is the spirit in which we appear before you today, as representatives of the United Nations and NATO, to show the extent to which these organizations, so valuable to Canadians and to our international policy, are working together in Afghanistan towards achieving the same objectives, the same goals, to stabilize this country and to establish the conditions required to ensure that prosperity and strengthened economic growth advance rapidly in Afghanistan.
[English]
Let us be clear. Even at the outset, this was not a mission to disrupt terrorist bases only. Rather, from the beginning, it was and has become a key proving ground for the challenge of nation-building — a test of the will of the international community to support poverty reduction and to bring about the emergence of new institutions in a country that deserves both.
Afghanistan has not been a country at peace since at least 1978. The conflict that erupted in that country at the time of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had many faces and many stages. There was a period when Afghans considered their country occupied, and that lasted for more than a decade. There was a time when Afghanistan was the arena of one of the bitterest civil wars fought in the second half of the twentieth century. As well, there was a period when Afghanistan was ruled by one of the cruellest, most repressive regimes of the late twentieth century. That regime was antithetical to the values and human rights that we hold so dear. September 11, 2001, presented us with yet another tragedy that had its origins in Afghanistan. As well, it has been an opportunity for the international community to engage in Afghanistan on a scale, with good faith, and a plan that is unprecedented, certainly in the annals of international engagement in Afghanistan.
The principal message for the committee is that our achievements, collectively as an international community, in Afghanistan are substantial. It is to some extent a minor tragedy of the past five years that that story is not better known in Canada and elsewhere around the world.
In 2001, access to health care in Afghanistan was negligible. Today, over 85 per cent of the population has access to a basic package of health care services. This means that Afghans can now find a clinic within walking distance of where they live. They can find a doctor or nurse within the district or the broader community where they live, and that simply was not the case under the Taliban regime.
In 2002, the economy of Afghanistan amounted to approximately U.S.$4 million, exclusive of the poppy industry. In 2006, it was estimated at U.S.$8.9 million. It more than doubled in four years despite the circumstances of continuing conflict. This rate of growth has outpaced the growth of the opium poppy economy, which continues to represent a huge obstacle to the country's development. In 2002, the annual per capita income in Afghanistan was only $150. That amounts to not much more than $10 per month for every man, woman and child in Afghanistan. Today, it stands well above U.S.$300, and trade with neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and Iran has burgeoned. The Afghan currency has been reformed and remains stable. Inflation is low, the Afghan budget is balanced, and revenues have grown by over 30 per cent in each of the past three years.
These facts read like a typical economic success story, but, for Afghans, they are economic oxygen. For the people who live in this country, which is among the poorest in the world, these facts represent a window of opportunity that they simply have not seen in well over 30 years.
Thousands of schools have been built or reopened, placing 5.4 million children, 34 per cent of them girls, in education. That is a historic high for the country — above all for the attendance of girls in education. Afghanistan has experienced the most ambitious road-building period in its history. New transmission lines now under construction will bring power to Kabul next year and to the main cities of Southern Afghanistan by 2009.
The poverty we still see in Kandahar, Kabul and throughout Afghanistan often blinds us to the scale of the advancement that has taken place over the past five years. It is difficult for us as North Americans and as westerners to understand the difference between $150 per year and $300 per year. Frankly, not everyone chooses to celebrate $30 per month as a success, but, for Afghans, this is a precious step forward and they are proud of it because it has been generated by their own sacrifice and toil, and it is a form of advance that we Canadians, as representatives of the international community, can be proud to have supported.
These statistics have generated and sustained hope. They show that peace and an improved life are within reach.
There are, of course, others who are trying to show that the conflict in Afghanistan is not ending. In 2001, the Taliban, as a regime, was not dismantled; it was simply pushed out of the country. In the intervening five years, it has recovered and reconstituted itself. It has found new funding sources and reconnected with old allies.
Last year, in southern Afghanistan, with the transition under way from U.S. to NATO leadership, the Taliban set out to challenge government authority in Kandahar. This was the main effort of the Taliban-led insurgency in 2006, directed principally against the province for which Canada is responsible, principally against the Canadian Armed Forces.
The Taliban set out to show that Afghanistan's clocks were once again turning back to 1999, or even 1994, when girls were banned from school, when summary justice was meted out with blatant disregard for due process and human rights, when literally the terrorists took charge.
In September 2006, under the International Security Assistance Force — ISAF — and with a UN mandate, the response of the international community to this threat was Operation Medusa, a conventional military response to a stubborn enemy of peace. It was the first brigade-level combat in NATO history, and it was a battle waged and won primarily by Canadians, with the strong support of allies and the sanction of the United Nations Security Council.
[Translation]
Operation Medusa has altered the landscape of southern Afghanistan. It has given new hope to the tribes living in this region. The tribes have rallied to Canadians and to the cause, which they have championed during this difficult and demanding, but successful, operation. The Taliban have been particularly demoralized and ultimately this operation has resulted in the creation of a road network and jobs, and the development of rural districts such as Panjwayi, which 10 or 11 months ago was still under Taliban control.
[English]
Operation Medusa allowed the Afghanistan government to regain the advantage in its deadly contest of wills with a resurgent Taliban. In December, President Karzai himself spent five days in Kandahar province, the longest period since he took office. His rural development minister has visited the battle-affected communities and offered very concrete forms of government support. The Afghan national director of security has helped to take down suicide bombing networks and facilitators in Kandahar, Khost and Kabul. Indeed, toward the end of the year, the third- highest ranking leader in the Taliban was killed in an operation in Helmand Province, adding to a series of successes for NATO and successes for Afghan security forces that helped to ensure the pain of 2006 ended on a more hopeful note.
In 2007, while we all realize that there will be more violence in the spring and summer, NATO, ISAF, President Karzai and his government are better prepared than ever to manage the challenge of insurgency. It is with the support of countries like Canada that issues such as the quality of governance in southern Afghanistan, the quality of governance at sub-national and provincial levels, and the overarching need for a solid focus on the rule of law and the reform of judicial institutions in Afghanistan are coming into focus.
Opium poppy cultivation in the insurgency-affected provinces of Kandahar and Helmand remains a tremendous challenge — one that I, as a UN official, must tell you is not under control and is not being addressed satisfactorily at the moment. This is not for a lack of success elsewhere in Afghanistan, where levels of production have come down in all cases where the rule of law and governance has been established on solid foundations. As we know, this is not yet the case in the south. We, as Canadians in the international community, have our work cut out for us in trying to bring these dividends of peace to these provinces that are pivotal for the future of Afghanistan.
The plans, the strategies and the resources in place are all credible; and with announcements such as yesterday, they have every chance of being on the right scale. Our challenge now is to implement properly, to convince our Afghan partners to take difficult decisions with regard to replacing corrupt and ineffective leaders with capable ones. In every case where we have brought our views together as an international community and operated in a spirit of partnership and persuasion with the Afghan government, we have succeeded, even on these difficult fronts.
[Translation]
Thank you very much for inviting me to appear before your committee so that I could talk to you about Afghanistan.
[English]
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Alexander. I will take a moment to describe something of your background to members of the committee. Mr. Alexander is one of the two UN Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary General for Afghanistan. He joined the Canadian Foreign Service in 1991 and served as Deputy Director for Russia, as Assistant to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was posted to Moscow from 1993 to 1996 and from 2000 to 2003. In 2003, he was appointed Ambassador of Canada to Afghanistan.
Mr. Appathurai, who will be speaking to us now, has been, since 2004, spokesperson at NATO. After a brief stint at the CBC, Mr. Appathurai joined the Department of National Defence in 1994 as a policy officer. In 1998, he became Deputy Head and Senior Planning Officer at the Political Affairs Division of NATO.
[Translation]
James Appathurai, Spokesperson, North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to talk about this subject that has been of primary importance to NATO for the past few years. In fact, it has become our number one priority. Canada's role is very important to NATO, particularly because of this mission. This is a good opportunity to discuss among ourselves the major issues that concern us.
[English]
Afghanistan has become a priority for us, which is a great change in NATO; it is easy to explain what we are doing in the Balkans and harder to explain what we are doing deploying troops in the Hindu Kush. That is a challenge to everybody here, as well as for our populations.
The relationship between NATO and the UN is also leaping ahead from what it used to be. You can see it at the strategic level between the two of us. Certainly, on the ground as well, we have a fundamentally new relationship.
NATO understands that our mission in Afghanistan is at the direction of the UN, under UN mandate, and our role is to clear the ground and hold it for reconstruction and development, to make the lives of the Afghan people better and to create the conditions in which a security bubble in which Mr. Alexander, leading the UN effort, and all of the NGOs and civilian actors can create the conditions for increasing stability.
We understand there can be no development without security, and we can provide that, but there can be no long- term stability without development. This is a true international team effort between us and the UN. It is a good thing for Canada because we have been engaged in both organizations for so long. These have been the two principal pillars of our foreign policy for a very long time in terms of international organizations, and it is just developing.
I will make four brief points. First, we need, as officials and politicians, to continue to hammer away at why we are in Afghanistan. It is easy for people to forget that Afghanistan posed a clear and present danger to the international community up until 2001. It was the host of a multitude of terrorist organizations — al Qaeda, of course, but many others.
The Taliban hosted Islamic extremist groups from Russia, Pakistan, China, Burma, Iran, central Asia and several countries of the Far East. All of these people were coming to Afghanistan, training and leaving to conduct operations; and we have seen those operations before, on September 11 and beyond. We should not and cannot forget that this country was the Grand Central Station of terrorism and we must ensure we prevent it from being that again.
Mr. Alexander mentioned the human rights abuses in the country. They are so stark that I as the NATO spokesman tend to avoid using them, because they are so dramatic. I do not want to be accused of over-dramatizing, but you cannot over-dramatize what it was like. It is in the finest tradition of our country to engage to preserve fundamental human rights. We have a fundamental strategic interest to be there as well as the preservation of our tradition as defender of human rights. That too, is why we are there, and we have to keep making that story. Both of these logics for our intervention in Afghanistan are as true today as they ever were. The people we are fighting as the same ones we were fighting five years ago, which is one the strong messages I bring from NATO, for the alliance.
This is a long-term engagement. Those motivations for intervention are as strong today as they ever were. We have a clear long-term interest in ensuring that Afghanistan is no longer a threat to itself, its region or to us, as an international community. I am a strong advocate on behalf of NATO of encouraging all NATO allies to take a long- term view. It is as much in our interest now as it was five years ago and it will be in five years.
It is winnable and we are getting traction. People need to hear that. The development indicators Mr. Alexander gave are important. People's lives are getting better, they have more money in their pockets, they have more access to health care, and their kids are in school, including girls. There are students that are in university that were never in university before, including many women.
This year, 4,000 kilometres of roads have been built, including the critical ring road. There is another 1,000 kilometres planned for this year. The Afghanistan national army, and this is NATO's business, is being built to fight the fight — the Afghans need to fight for themselves. We have gone from zero to 30,000 Afghan National Army personnel. They are being equipped with tens of thousands of small arms, millions of rounds of ammunition, armoured personnel carriers and helicopters, by NATO countries. We are not deploying enough operational mentoring and liaison teams to help them deploy in a most effective possible way. We need to improve that.
We need to do better, in particular when it comes to police. I know that Canada is engaging to helping to train the police. That is a critical pillar. They are a weak spot now in Afghanistan and it is important to push in that area as well.
The big picture, six years later, is the tide is raising the boat, a lot of boats, when it comes to the standards of living of Afghans and that is why we are there.
Third point: Do we have enough troops on the ground and are the other allies pulling their weight? I know this is a question in the press. The answer from NATO is yes and yes. We have substantially increased, in the last three months, the combat capability. We have added, taking into account the U.K. announcement, about 7,000 more troops than we had at the Riga summit. The bulk will be deployed to, or available in the south, and that is good news for Canada as well as for NATO. I might add that, on top of the U.K. and U.S. contributions, we have Norwegian Special Forces. We have Special Forces from other countries that have not yet made a public announcement. The Danes are looking to increase their contribution and the Germans will approve the deployment of six reconnaissance Tornado fighter planes. We have more UAVs and more C130s. The Australians are looking to substantially increase what they have on the ground. This will more than double our forces.
The number of troops deployed in Regional Command South has gone from 1,000, 18 months ago, to over 12,000 today, a 12 times increase in the space of 18 months from eight countries, with Canada, of course, playing a very important role. All this to say, the media impression that Canada is operating by itself, that we do not have allies to support us, is simply not the case. I can tell you that French Mirage aircraft deployed in close air support of Canadian troops three or four weeks ago are having a very important effect on the ground. The commitment that we heard in Riga, that each and every NATO ally will go anywhere in the country in emergency situations, has been fulfilled by France, by others as well, but I mentioned the French example because it was in direct support of Canadians.
You have heard Minister O'Connor and General Hillier both say that they are satisfied broadly with the troop levels and with the commitment for mutual support. Both have been fierce advocates of higher troop levels. If they say things are better and they are satisfied, that is a message we should take. We certainly do.
Fourth point: You can read in the press the idea that the Afghans have never accepted foreign occupiers, that they will overthrow us as well, because they see us as occupiers, that they do not like the government, they like the Taliban. I have seen all of these points made quite repeatedly in the press. The polls are very clear that this is not the case. Three major polls have been taken in the last three years. Those polls, if you average them out, show 75 to 80 per cent support to this day for foreign forces.
The Chairman: How do you take a poll in Afghanistan?
Mr. Appathurai: There are two companies that have been there from the beginning — the Asia Foundations, and one other company. I know the people who have conducted the polls, which have been taken throughout the country, in all regions, with tens of thousands of Afghan. They have done the foot work with locally engaged staff. The BBC poll — I do not know their methodology but it is the BBC — knows what they are doing, I would imagine.
In terms of what the polls have found, 80 per cent of the population on average still supports the presence of foreign forces — and that number is not going down. Second point, 80 per cent support their democratically elected government — and that is important. Third point, 3 per cent would like to see the Taliban back; there is no popular support for the Taliban. These are very important foundations on which we can build or should take courage and encouragement as we go forward.
The final point is on NATO, because I speak for the organization. This is a transitional moment but also a transitional operation for NATO, to learn how to project stability around the world. This is not an abstract concept. You have to have the logistics, transport and retool your armed forces to be able to go where you need to go, and we are doing that.
We are developing a situation in which 37 countries have combat experience — which has not always been the case. They are learning to work together, with the language skills, the command and control arrangements — which will have benefits. We can already see this in other areas.
In all the peacekeeping operations we want to do, all these things are important. We are also developing fundamental new relations between NATO and the EU, NATO and the UN in particular, UN and the G8. NATO is engaging with global partners, including Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand. You are seeing a new NATO being built and one that I believe fundamentally meets Canada's foreign policy interests. This has up sides for the Afghans and for Canada in terms of security, but also for an alliance, of which we are long-standing members.
Senator Downe: Mr. Alexander, you must be familiar with the report done in late 2006 by the German government for their officials. They would argue that their report is more realistic. In fact, they said that it requires an honest appraisal of the situation.
Are you familiar with the report?
Mr. Alexander: Yes.
Senator Downe: I have a copy. You know the conclusion. They support the mission, but they raise a number of concerns. They talk about scant good news from Afghanistan over the last several months. In their opinion, the security situation has deteriorated in many regions. Disappointment over the failure to improve living conditions, based on both realistic and unrealistic hopes, is spreading among the population, and the drug trade continues and in many cases prospers.
I am sure the polling companies have an interesting time trying to poll in Afghanistan, but the German report also references the riot of May 2006 where 2,000 people in Kabul attacked state security authorities and the international donor community as a sign that there was some concern and unrest among the population.
Do you have any overall reaction to the report from Germany?
Mr. Alexander: We read a wide variety of reports. That one would stand out by its particular bleakness.
We all respect the rights of individual donors and parliaments, indeed, to report in whatever way they see fit. We see the debate about the reality of Afghanistan, an honest assessments of that reality, to be valuable. We in the UN mission have sometimes issued sobering reports. For instance, in December 2006, we had to inform our U.S. and German colleagues, who have led the way in police reform, that their efforts were not necessarily bearing fruit, that we were not advancing on police reform as quickly as had been hoped, and that difficult political decisions of the sort I mentioned earlier were not being taken.
In the wake of the riot mentioned by you and as mentioned in the report, the police chief of Kabul was changed; a professional was replaced by someone who was best known for strong links to organized crime and was by every reckoning not a professional police officer. That was a cause for real concern. It led to a process of probation for several police leaders in Afghanistan that, in the end, resulted in a decision by President Karzai on January 13 of this year to appoint 40 senior police leaders, including new chiefs of police for Kabul and many important provinces, all of whom were selected on the basis of a merit-based program. So there is good news.
We in the United Nations would frankly challenge the view that 2006 was a night in which all cows are painted black, as the expression goes, but parliaments and governments are entitled to assess the situation however they wish.
I would simply argue that the consensus view in UN reporting, in NATO reporting, in the view of most donors, is slightly more balanced than the view expressed in the report that you cited.
Mr. Appathurai: NATO's view is the same. That is fair. We see reporting every single day on this subject. It takes up half of our day. Balance is the right word.
It is too easy; one could spend all day looking for negative stories in Afghanistan. It is a fact that this is a country coming from a devastated and devastating position.
If you look at any individual area, you will find great difficulties. We have identified a few — narcotics, police, governance, and support for the insurgency — that I think are shared priorities between the two organizations as to where we need to focus our efforts.
However, that people's lives are not getting better or that the trend lines are negative is not the consensus view of our reports; on the contrary.
Senator Downe: The report does not say that at all. I made that comment earlier. The report still supports the mission but indicates that it is not nearly as positive as others are saying. Is it as rosy as it has been presented or is the German report more realistic? There seem to be two very different views.
For example, you referenced earlier that the per capita income has increased from $150 to $300. Others have noted that, given the billions of dollars that have been spent there, that amount is very low. The German report again talks about the concern of nepotism and corruption.
In your last answer, you talked about the chief of police being replaced, so there was a problem there.
Given the billions spent, why has there not been more progress on the per capita income? That is a question many people would ask.
Mr. Alexander: It is a fair question. One can debate the effectiveness of aid as delivered by various donors in the context of various programs. Clearly, we in the United Nations and I think the donor community as a whole are uncomfortable with expensive parallel structures that tend to benefit the contractors of donor countries much more than the private sector or the beneficiaries, who ought to be on the receiving end of assistance, and the principal beneficiaries of assistance inside Afghanistan. However, these inefficient forms of assistance and inefficient delivery mechanisms are not the rule in Afghanistan. They tend more to be the exception. Afghanistan has also been the arena, the proving ground, for some of the most efficient and visionary forms of development that we have seen in recent decades.
Canada, over the past five years, can take enormous pride in the fact that the Canadian International Development Agency has supported programs such as the national solidarity program delivered through an Afghan ministry to 7,000 villages in Afghanistan in only three years — that is half the villages in the country — empowering village councils to decide what development project is their priority, be it an irrigation project, road building, erecting a community centre, which can also function as a mosque, and then empowering those councils to receive block funding up to $50,000 and to ensure the project is implemented under the proper supervision of engineers and financial administrators.
There is no corruption in this program. It has reached the grassroots. It has helped to augment and reinforce the habit of democracy and democratic decision making in Afghanistan, and it has been financed by some of the best, most principled donors, including Canada. It has had a real impact on standards of living. You can argue that $10 billion was spent on assistance and that, on a per capita basis, that ought to have led to a higher standard of living, but that is not a sustainable standard of living. None of us is in the business of giving people handouts, and Afghans do not want it. They want to rebuild their livelihoods and they need the skills, the education and the social protection to be able to do so, and they have achieved high rates of growth with the forms of support that have been provided up until now. Growth in double digits for five years in a row is not a bad performance, and, frankly, they have been ahead of most of the countries of their region.
Senator Corbin: I do not know who to believe any more. I do not want to discount the accuracy or truthfulness of what the witnesses are telling us today, but when I go through my research notes prepared by the Library of Parliament researcher, I get a different picture. It bothers me and it worries me at the same time.
The Canadian government, as announced yesterday, for example, is pumping another $200 million in development aid. We have statements from Barnett Rubin, who testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations last September. I would like to quote that paragraph, because I think it is quite relevant to what I am concerned about. He said:
Attempts to inject aid into the government have met a major bottleneck: last year the government managed to spend only 44 per cent of money it received for development projects. The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development accounted for nearly half of the government's development spending, while key ministries like agriculture, energy and water, and public works could not execute their budgets. According to the Ministry of Finance, donor countries spent about $500 million on poorly designed and uncoordinated technical assistance, to little effect . . .
And the Canadian government is continuing to pour money into it.
I would like to know how the development aid programs are administered, by whom, who gets what cut, and what is left at the end of it all. We hear these horror stories — you may not like them; I do not like them, either. I heard one on CBC last fall on my way back home after one of these meetings. You have a road construction project. By the time the government officials take their cut and the guy who gets the contract gets a subcontractor to do the work, they only have peanuts to execute the work and it is so poorly done that the road is useless at the end of it all. That is one horror story; I am sure there are others.
I would like to see positive news for the money we are pumping into Afghanistan. I believe you when you say there are success stories, but when you consider the information put before the Senate committee of the U.S. by Barnett Rubin you have to keep asking questions. I want to be satisfied. I want to be reassured that Canadian taxpayers' money is being put to very good use.
Can I have some comments?
Mr. Alexander: Yes; by all means.
Barnett Rubin is a close associate of the UN mission and someone with whom we have regular exchange. I would sign my name beneath his comments. We all realize that there are problems of aid effectiveness and delivery and that the government is not performing uniformly well across its 25 ministries. My point — and I think our point over the past two days to the Canadian public and to you — has been that in the overwhelming waves of negative security- related publicity that you receive in Canada, the significant achievements of the past five years are sometimes obscured from view. I know for a fact that Barnett Rubin accepts this point. We need you to understand, and we need the public of donor countries such as Canada to understand, that there are problems and serious challenges. Nevertheless, there is traction and success for our effort in Afghanistan today.
With regard to ministries and their uneven performance, there must be six or seven ministries out of 25 in Afghanistan that have the capacity to deliver large-scale programs to the population, and on whom we can rely, who have tens of millions of dollars and who have the accountability in place. That accountability is improving. We are frank in insisting on its strengthening and on pointing out problems, including problems of corruption when they arise. Those strong ministries are the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance, which is very important to the development process, for obvious reasons, the Ministry of Education, which is under a true visionary leader at the moment, the Ministry of Women's Affairs, and one or two others. There are other ministries that are simply not pulling their weight and where there is a dire need for reinforced capacity and for training and, in some cases, for stronger leadership on the part of the Afghan government.
The last budget execution ending March 21, 2006, was relatively poor. However, by the standards of developing countries — that is, if you speak to development experts — 44 per cent was not a bad figure. In this budgetary year, which will end in roughly one month, the percentage of disbursements achieved will be above 60 per cent and perhaps approaching 70 per cent. That is a 50 per cent improvement over last year's figure.
There are bottlenecks to performance, however. One is the complicated rules that the World Bank requires governments like Afghanistan to meet for procurement. Not all the ministries with access to funds in Afghanistan know how to make those rules work. The civil service commission has failed Afghanistan to some extent by not equipping all ministries equally well to administer the programs and meet the challenges with which they have been burdened. There is also a legislative bottleneck. The new Afghan parliament has responsibility to legislate, almost in all areas at once, to update the legislative framework that was more or less dormant for 25 years — virtually overnight. It is extremely difficult for them to set their priorities and to move legislation swiftly, both through committee and through both Houses of Parliament. This has a real effect on budgetary performance and on the development process.
The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, a body co-chaired by the UN and the Afghan government that brings together all the donors, is trying to address and improve the benchmarks and improve the performance. There is a high degree of focus on these issues at this moment and a determination to continue trend lines of performance that will point upwards.
Senator Dallaire: Thank you very much for your indulgence. I wish to welcome the witnesses to this committee.
Before asking my question, I have a comment. Operation Medusa and the small brigade that undertook that successful operation was conducted on terrain that the Taliban had used against the Russians and knew it very well. It had defeated a Russian division of four brigades the last time they operated in that area. They were convinced they would be able to do the same. The Russians sustained extensive casualties, whereas we took 24 and beat them. That is mostly because of technology but also because of command and control and the interoperability between land and air forces that was conducted, as well as good leadership and excellent and courageous individual soldier effort. We were in the eye of the storm and we beat them. That cannot be negated in the history of the operation.
We have been in ex-Yugoslavia; NATO was there for 15 years. We are still pouring billions of dollars into that place and there is still a large number of troops there. There is the feeling that if we pull out the place will go up in smoke again. Yet, that area is not particularly questioned, nor are we flustered about it. That is a European white area that should be more flexible and prone to be able to adapt to the things we are involved with, namely, democracy, human rights, gender equality, and so on, that we want to happen in Afghanistan.
My colleagues commented about the Germans. The Germans are responsible for developing the police. They have been assessed as wholly ineffective. They are trying to build a German police force; that takes about 25 years to do. They are not using Canadian experience in Haiti and other places. It has not been a successful exercise there.
I would like to move on this particular point. You have met with the Prime Minister. You have been in the country now for a while. We know that we are working under the concept of the three Ds — diplomacy, defence and development. We have built a security umbrella in Kandahar and we have noticed that there is an incredible vacuum between the security umbrella and the real development work and governance that is going on there. That vacuum seems to have lacked commitment or assets or coordination.
If you are holding jobs both in NATO and in the UN in the field, who runs the Canadian operation? Who is handling the development, the diplomacy and the defence arenas? Who is the most senior person who should be advising the Prime Minister? Who is running the show here in Canada, and have you met him or her?
Mr. Appathurai: The Canadian experience in deploying police officers is very important in Afghanistan. There are only three or four countries that have personnel that have experience in training other police forces and are deployable. As I mentioned, the Afghan National Police is lagging far behind the Afghan National Army. It is all about governance and security, so this is a very important role that we can play, regardless of the track records of other countries. Together, we encourage that very much. It is a force multiplier that Canada can provide.
In terms of the vacuum, when I was in Afghanistan three days ago, I heard that there are high expectations among the Afghan people to see benefits. The benefits are there, but they are relatively slow and not easy to grasp, and there is a bit of a décollage between the immediate post-operational impact funds that are at the availability of NATO commanders. We have a trust fund; they have money. After kinetic operations, they can ask what needs to be fixed that we broke, which is good. There is also development, which, if you do a proper needs-based analysis, takes a bit of time to come on stream. It is true that there is a delay, and it is hard.
I have heard from non-Canadians who do development work, who head up development agencies from other countries, that CIDA is a textbook case for how to do it right. I do not work for CIDA; I do not even work for the Canadian government, so I have no dog in this fight. I simply pass that on to say that there is great respect for how Canada does its work. Based on what I have heard from others, I would not think that they are doing it wrong. However, there may be elements that are not being carried out because of the way things are structured.
We have met with many senior people who do coordination in Afghanistan. The person who would normally advise the Prime Minister would be David Mulroney, but he is out of town. Had he not been, we would have met with him.
Senator Corbin: Who is it that has enormous respect for CIDA's development work?
Mr. Appathurai: They are the head of the British development agency and a very senior member of the U.S. development agency, both of whom have been in Afghanistan for many years. The comments were unsolicited, because I do not come from a development agency. They pointed out to me, as a Canadian, that CIDA does a great job.
Senator Corbin: Can you give us the name of the U.S. official who said that?
Mr. Appathurai: I do not know his name, but I could find out and provide that to you.
Senator Dallaire: David Mulroney is a director general, the equivalent in the military of two stars, at best. In one of the most significant commitments of the Canadian Forces in the modern era, our national security advisor is not an assistant deputy minister, a deputy minister or even a politician, but rather a very junior functionary who has to go through the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. That is not the most progressive tool we have seen in this exercise so far.
Do other countries have representatives who bring all of that together, both on the ground and in their national capitals? Do you see those types of people who do what you are doing?
Mr. Alexander: All the major players in Afghanistan face challenges of coordination, and they are sometimes as acute on the ground in Kabul as they are in capitals. Generating inter-agency collaboration, cohesion and unity of effort is a challenge for everyone. It is a challenge for the United States, especially given the scale of their involvement and their institutions, as well as for our European partners. Everyone solves the problem in their own way.
I think the rank of David Mulroney is a bit higher than you give him credit for. He was the Prime Minister's foreign policy advisor until recently. I think he holds the rank of associate deputy minister or deputy minister.
The leadership on the ground in Afghanistan also counts for a great deal. For Canada and other countries, a very important role is played by the ambassador. The ambassador sits on the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board for the principal donors as well as on the Policy Action Group, which is chaired by the Afghan president's national security advisor and, on occasion, by the president himself. This is a crisis management tool created in June 2006 out of the recognition that the insurgency was hitting with such intensity that President Karzai and his key allies in the south needed a forum where they could come together and coordinate not only security operations, but also development, strategic communications and intelligence assessments.
This has been a highly effective body. It is selective. Only four embassies are represented there, including Canada. The United Nations and NATO ISAF are obviously there and are among the principal players. However, the leadership there is civilian, as it ought to be, although we all recognize that military leaders and development leaders have extremely important roles to play with their own coordination mechanisms.
The Chairman: The other day, I learned something new about Afghanistan. I have been in the tribal areas on the Beluchi and Waziristan borders. I learned that the Durand Line runs through Afghanistan. One hundred years after Hong Kong became British, the lease expired and Hong Kong went back to China. The same is apparently true of the tribal lands that we think are in Pakistan. In fact, they were divided by the Durand Line, and 100 years after that line was drawn those lands were supposed to go back to Afghanistan. That seems to me to be an important security issue.
Mr. Alexander: This is a very important issue for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It has been a recurring theme of bilateral relations between the two countries. In the 1950s, there were periods of particularly strong tension between the two countries over this issue even before the Durand Line had allegedly expired. However, there is no issue in the eyes of the international community and there is no issue in international law with regard to the Durand Line.
The Chairman: Surely it is not a question for the international community; it is a question between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Mr. Alexander: It certainly is. Everyone would like to see border demarcation between Afghanistan and Pakistan take place in due course as a confidence-building measure that would inject badly needed reassurance into communities on both sides of the border that territorial claims are not being made by one country against the other.
If anyone entertains for a moment the notion that the Afghan-Pakistan border is not a border but is actually a line subject to revision, they have a responsibility to answer as to where the border is. If the answer is that the border is as it was in 1747, namely, the Indus River, or that it includes the northwest frontier province or some portion thereof —
The Chairman: I would have thought it would include Balochistan and most of the northwest frontier province.
Mr. Alexander: Or Balochistan. Those claims would count in international law as territorial claims of one country against another. Quite frankly, we all know that, over the history of international relations, wars have begun more often as a result of these kinds of irredentism than for any other reason. There is no appetite in serious political circles in Afghanistan for entertaining any other notion than the fact that the current border is the one that everyone must accept. Pashtuns will continue to live in both countries. Everyone has an interest in the border being properly managed to allow normal human intercourse to take place across the border but also to ensure that both countries' security interests are respected.
The Chairman: It seems to me that what has been said is that the border is not the border. We have heard in Canada that the military, who I found very naive on the subject, were saying people are going back and forth across the border from Pakistan to Afghanistan, but actually they are not. They are going from what many people think is one part of Afghanistan, that is to say, Balochistan and the northwest frontier, up along — the name eludes me at the moment — to what many Afghans in Pashtun is part of Afghanistan.
There are many thorny questions here, but this one seems to be problematic. If we tell the Canadian public, say, that Afghanistan exists in the borders that we see when we buy an atlas but the view of the people who live in eastern Afghanistan along the Pakistani border is that border is a meaningless line drawn by foreigners, that sounds to me like a recipe for a lot of trouble.
Senator Mahovlich: It seems quite complicated. I read in the paper that there will be an offensive this spring. What do the polls say? Where are the Taliban training? Are they on the Durand Line? Are they up in the mountains? I was quite pleased to see that Britain has come up with more troops. Will the Americans come up with more troops this spring?
Mr. Appathurai: These are good questions. It is important for us to deal with what will happen. I do not know if spring is the right term. It is usually a summer offensive. There has been a long tradition in Afghanistan of an uptick of violence in the summer. We are certainly not anticipating but are preparing for any eventuality.
As I said, about 7,000 troops have been added to NATO ISAF in the past three months — 1,800 of those British and well over 3,000 American. The Americans have made a substantial contribution of forces, not only forces but $10.6 billion for the vast majority of training and equipping Afghan National Security Forces. The Americans are fully engaged for this. They are by far our biggest troop contributor. They also have command of the overall NATO mission.
As to the Taliban and where they get their support, there are three kinds of Taliban.
Senator Mahovlich: Which kind was it that defeated the Russians?
Mr. Appathurai: We have a command and control structure and hard-core Taliban leadership that exists not just in Afghanistan but also across the border.
Senator Mahovlich: Into Pakistan?
Mr. Appathurai: That is a fact.
Senator Mahovlich: That is a concern?
Mr. Appathurai: It is a fundamental concern. There is no way around this. The Pakistanis do not necessarily share this view, but we have the general impression that there are elements of Taliban command and control across the border in Pakistan.
The much larger group of people who fall under the label of Taliban are people who are being paid by the day, young men getting paid $10 a day to pick up a weapon and fight on the side of the Taliban. They are not committed ideological hard-core fighters; they are, rather, people not getting money elsewhere and who sign up to do it.
We in NATO want as much as possible to deal with these two groups separately. The hard-core leadership must be addressed and taken out one way or the other, because these are not people who will be convinced. To the extent possible, we do not want to be mowing down young day labourers for the Taliban. We want to try to separate it out and go after the leadership, engage with the second tier, if you wish. I do not mean engage necessarily diplomatically, but to provide them with an alternative and be more targeted in what we do. This is a critical issue. This is an insurgency, or extremists who are undermining the overall efforts. We must tackle it, and that means a concerted diplomatic effort and economic efforts to provide alternatives and better livelihoods to the day labourers, and it means, where we have to, taking on the hard-core leadership. We are doing that.
Senator Mahovlich: When Canada is constructing roads, for example, or providing funds for roads, are Canadians going over and building roads, or do we supply just the money? How does that work? Do we supply the labour and ensure that the roads are built properly?
Mr. Appathurai: On the contrary. We do provide expertise. I say this as the international community. There are international contractors, but a critical effort must be made to employ the Afghans. We must use the opportunity to provide these people with jobs. They are hard-working people with skills, and by providing them with an income, we take away the attraction of the Taliban, which has a lot of money in its pocket, not least from taking a cut, like the Mafia, from the drug trade. If we can provide people with a job building a road, a school, installing a turbine in a damn, all of which are being done, they are much less susceptible to the appeal of the Taliban.
Senator Mahovlich: Once the road is built, you have to look after it; correct?
Mr. Appathurai: We do that. We have patrols up and down the ring road, which is a critical road connecting Kabul to Kandahar and other critical cities. We patrol it and ensure that it is indeed protected — we, meaning NATO, not just Canada.
The Chairman: Do we patrol it at night?
Mr. Appathurai: Yes.
The Chairman: Are there curfews?
Mr. Alexander: Sometimes, but not at the moment.
Mr. Appathurai: The road has been effectively protected. It has not been destroyed.
The Chairman: I have been on those roads, and you protect them by having patrols. My experience has been that, after four o'clock in the afternoon, you are not safe because they can make a hit on you and get away under cover of darkness. Is that different in Afghanistan?
Mr. Appathurai: The truth is in the result. The result is that this road has been built, it continues to be built, and it has not yet been significantly attacked.
Mr. Alexander: You are absolutely right. It is not as secure in the late afternoon and at night as it is in the early morning and the middle of the day. There are security problems, but there has been a very targeted, focussed NATO ISAF operation for the last several months, called Operation Eagle, which has as its purpose the provision of security in-depth to the road, which means not just patrols but operations well inland from the road to try to deal with the sources of insecurity that can result in illegal check points being set up. They have had some success.
The Chairman: I would not want to leave Kabul at four o'clock in the afternoon and head off to Kandahar in my pickup truck.
Mr. Alexander: That would not be prudent. You would be better off leaving at six o'clock in the morning.
[Translation]
Senator Prud'homme: I am here because I have a great deal of admiration for Christopher Alexander, whom I had the pleasure of meeting when I founded the Canada-Russia Association, which I must say has been very useful to us. I wanted to be present to hear you speak. I am rather sorry about your appointment to the United Nations because the Canadian people have lost you. However, I am delighted to see a very young Canadian ambassador, who has served his country very well, assume a senior United Nations position. It is an honour for all of Canada.
I do not have any particular questions to ask you. I will look forward to rereading all the testimonies, but I wanted to be here to express to you all the admiration I felt for you in some very difficult circumstances that many other people would have been afraid to face. Good luck and thank you very much.
[English]
Senator Downe: Are there any NATO countries that have not contributed troops to Afghanistan?
Mr. Appathurai: No.
Senator Downe: What is the smallest number contributed by a country?
Mr. Appathurai: I do not have all the figures off the top of my head. I would say in the low hundreds, 200 or 300.
Senator Downe: How many NATO partners would have contributed less than 300?
Mr. Appathurai: NATO partners or NATO members?
Senator Downe: NATO members.
Mr. Appathurai: Off the top of my head, I could not give you that figure. You have to keep in mind that countries like Bulgaria and Luxemburg have personnel there, but not military personnel. There are a number of countries, like Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, for whom even sending 100 is significant. These are countries that have left a different system. They do not have a long tradition of deploying armed forces on peacekeeping missions. They have had to go through a period of fundamental military transformation simply to be able to deploy troops.
The fact that all 26 of 26 have personnel on the ground, including even the smallest, is a good sign of solidarity, even if the numbers are low.
Senator Downe: You mentioned earlier the contribution of France. How many do they have on the ground?
Mr. Appathurai: France has about 900, I believe.
Senator Downe: Are they one of the largest or smallest?
Mr. Appathurai: They are in the middle of the pack, but they have 900 in the NATO ISAF force. They have had, for a long time, significant amounts of military forces under Operation Enduring Freedom. They also have significant air assets outside of Afghanistan that are used in support of the NATO ISAF mission, including just a few weeks ago. The French contribution throughout this operation has been significant.
Senator Downe: Of the 26 countries that participate, how many NATO troops are there in total?
Mr. Appathurai: There are 37 countries under this ISAF.
Senator Downe: As members and partners?
Mr. Appathurai: Yes. The total number is now growing to about 37,000 troops, the majority of which do come from NATO countries such as Australia and New Zealand. Even Jordan and United Arab Emirates are in Afghanistan. They are not yet under NATO ISAF command, but they are there. Eleven countries outside of NATO are there.
Senator Downe: The original objectives of the Afghanistan mission were to destroy the al Qaeda training camps and the Taliban government. That was obviously done very quickly and very successfully. Regarding the long-term reconstruction, what is the end point for NATO?
Mr. Appathurai: You are quite right to say that the original intention of the coalition was in direct response to the September 11 attacks and was very successful at that.
We have now two missions, in essence, in Afghanistan. NATO ISAF has taken over operations around the country, but our UN mandate is very clear: To create the conditions for reconstruction and development and to extend the authority of the Afghan government throughout the country. That is what we are doing.
There is a small U.S.-led capability still in-country that does targeted intelligence-led operations against terrorist leadership, again with full UN support. We have command arrangements in place to ensure that these two missions do not conflict in any way and that, where necessary, and that means, principally, in emergency situations where the lives of soldiers are at risk, we support each other. They are separate.
Senator Downe: What is the projected end date?
Mr. Appathurai: We go for end state and not end date. For NATO, there is no end date. From a NATO perspective, which is not the same as the UN, which is broader, we are working to clear and hold the ground for reconstruction and development. That is the main mission, but at the same time we are training and equipping Afghan security forces and support governance improvements to the point where the Afghans can increasingly take over the burden of supporting their country and we can step back into the mentoring and liaising role. We are not close to being there yet, but that is where we are increasing our efforts to hold the ground that Mr. Alexander and his organization are coordinating. That is all the civilian effort.
Senator Downe: What is your projected date to be there?
Mr. Appathurai: We are working, for example, to help the Afghans create an Afghan national army. I believe in the next two years it will be up to 70,000 troops. The U.S. has come in with almost $9 billion to do that. That being said, these armed forces need to be trained and equipped and they are only one pillar of a stool that has many legs. The police are a critical part there, but NATO cannot do the police training. The EU has stepped up its effort and I believe they will double the number of police trainers they have, but that is a small number.
There is no date for us. We have timelines when it comes to training and equipping, but we are there for the long haul.
Mr. Alexander: In the spirit of support between our two organizations and on this very important question, it is important to realize where discussions of timetable lead. If we around this table, or around tables in Kabul or the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, try to determine an end date, there is only one group that will take heart in that, and that is the Taliban. They are looking for signs that political will, resolve, and the bringing of security to Afghanistan is finite. It is only by showing resolve, to some extent open-ended resolve, that the member states of the United Nations and NATO ISAF will succeed in breaking the will of the Taliban and those supporting them to continue this fight.
It is possible that this insurgency will crest this year and that we will see a need for less robust commitments next year. Let us hope that is the case. It is also possible that the violence this year will be worse than anyone has anticipated, and we need to be ready for that eventuality.
As long as the phenomenon described earlier of external sanctuaries and support continues to drive this insurgency, it will be necessary for NATO and the Afghan government to demonstrate strong resolve and an open-ended commitment to this mission.
I should like to quote Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, the outgoing commander of the former U.S. command that was the largest security player in Afghanistan before ISAF's expansion earlier this year. He appeared before one of the committees of congress earlier this month. He said — and I quote: ``I do emphasize that al Qaeda and Taliban leadership presence inside Pakistan remain a significant problem that must be satisfactorily addressed if we are to prevail in Afghanistan.''
That was one of the key conclusions of his testimony, unprecedented in many ways for a U.S. commander, but it speaks to the need for resolve to literally remove the factors driving insurgency. We cannot assign an anticipated deliver-by date to that particular objective.
Senator Downe: Canadians support the troops in Afghanistan, but I disagree with your answer in that many Canadians and a growing number more are concerned about Canada's situation in Afghanistan. We went there originally to take out the al Qaeda training camps. Forty-five Canadians have died and over $2 billion have been spent by Canadians for that country and questions are asked. For example, there was the well-known case one year ago when the Afghan civilian tried to convert to the Christian religion and was attacked by his own government, and because of international interventions, the government ruling was overturned — the government forming a department for the prevention of vice and the promotion of virtue. AS well, we have the Canadian emphasis on human rights. While it is important to keep out the Taliban, there is the concern about the end state, how long we are there for and whether this is in the best interests of Canada. In the public debate in Canada, rosy opinions have been expressed as well as deep concern. This committee is trying to get to the bottom of the situation by asking as many pointed questions as possible. In that way, we can find out for Canadians what is going on in Afghanistan, what Canada is truly involved in and for how long we are involved. We are not giving any comfort to the Taliban but rather to the Canadians who are concerned.
The Chairman: We have exhausted this part of the meeting. I hope the government is not contemplating extending the war zone to the Indias, because that could be a problem. Think back to Indochina and the war in Vietnam, when, in the name of eliminating an enemy refuge, they blew up Cambodia while looking for people in hiding. I hope that kind of thinking will not lead to attacks within Pakistan. The obvious conclusion one can draw from Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry's testimony is that he is promoting that kind of thing.
On behalf of the committee, I thank the witnesses for giving us the benefit of their broad knowledge.
The committee continued in camera.