Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Fisheries and Oceans
Issue 5 - Evidence - March 13, 2008
OTTAWA, Thursday, March 13, 2008
The Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans met this day at 10:50 a.m. to examine and report on issues relating to the federal government's current and evolving policy framework for managing Canada's fisheries and oceans.
Senator Bill Rompkey (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: We are in the process of studying the emerging policy in the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, currently focused on the Arctic and specifically the Canadian Coast Guard.
We have heard witnesses on the subject of fishing in the Eastern Arctic in particular. Some witnesses have helped us understand what is happening in the Arctic generally; and we have heard from witnesses who have talked about the mandate of the Canadian Coast Guard, how they currently exercise it, what it should be and the tools they have to do their job.
We hope to go to the Arctic in the first week of June. The Senate has approved the first week in June as a committee working week, which means that all committees of the Senate will work during that week on their specific mandates, ours being the Arctic. We will travel north during that week or ten days to meet with people there who will help us formulate our thoughts on the emerging policy.
Today we welcome Dr. Rob Huebert. He is a Winnipegger, which means he is a typical Canadian. Dr. Huebert has an outstanding academic record. He is currently an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary and Associate Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. However, he taught at Memorial University — which I want to be sure to put on the record — as well as at Dalhousie University and the University of Manitoba.
Dr. Huebert's research interests include international relations, strategic studies, the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea — which is important to us and which we have had discussions on, too — maritime affairs, Canadian foreign and defence policy, and circumpolar relations. He edited Breaking Ice: Renewable Resource and Ocean Management in the Canadian North.
Dr. Huebert will make his presentation, after which we will ask questions.
Rob Huebert, Associate Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary: It is my pleasure to appear before this august body to discuss an issue that is central not only to my own research but my whole sense of being Canadian, that is, of course, the Canadian Arctic.
The Arctic is one of those overnight successes that everyone talks about that suddenly became a hot issue. In reality, all the challenges and opportunities that we now have before us have been developing for at least the last 20, if not 30, years. It is fitting that I am able to appear before you to share some of my thoughts on the changing nature of the Arctic and the role that the Canadian Coast Guard has played, is playing and should play into the future.
One of your predecessors, Senator Poirier, back in 1906, offered one of the most defining explanations of what Canadian sovereignty is. He created what subsequently became known as the sector theory. Without going into details, the sector theory suggested that all Arctic nations together draw sectors from the North Pole. That theory has no standing in international law, but the Russians, without giving credit to Senator Poirier, are now trying to revisit that approach as they stake their claim within the continental shelf.
I have three major points to make. The first is on the changing nature of the Arctic. Even if we wanted to ignore the Arctic, which would be an un-Canadian thing to do, it will not ignore us. There are changes of such magnitude that even if we did not want to spend the required money, the Arctic would find us and we would need to spend the money reactively.
The second issue is sovereignty. From reading the transcript, I have learned that this committee is interested in concepts of sovereignty. I have a few thoughts to offer on the reason sovereignty is important, and on what sovereignty means in terms of importance to Canadian values and interests.
The third issue I will speak to is the Canadian Coast Guard, which is, of course, the central focus of your investigation. The Coast Guard has an interesting relationship to Arctic sovereignty.
I will begin with the changing nature of the Arctic. Three major factors are changing fundamentally the face of the international Arctic. First and foremost is climate change. I have presented the committee with satellite photographs that show the decreasing ice cover. From both a scientific historical perspective and a traditional knowledge perspective, we have never seen this magnitude of ice decrease.
We know that prior to the existence of humans there were periods when the Arctic was ice-free, but we have never experienced this as a species. The magnitude of the ice diminishment is concerning to almost any scientist who is conducting active research, because in addition to the ice diminishment we are seeing changing current temperatures within the waterways. Seeing an open Northwest Passage for the first time ever is of major concern for those who have been studying the ice.
I argue that even if the ice were not decreasing our attention would be focused on the ice due to the reality that a barrel of oil is worth in excess of $120. With the entry of the Chinese as oil consumers on a level equal to the developed world, and the expectation that India will soon have such demands as well, we are seeing a run on commodities that we have not seen since pre-1973 when the oil embargo by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Companies, OPEC, threw the entire oil market into chaos.
Short of a major meltdown, such as if the mortgage crisis becomes too out of hand in the United States, we will not see a decrease in oil and gas prices. Every conference I attend in Calgary related to the oil and gas industry underlines this fact. The reality is that the Arctic is the last undiscovered region of oil and gas exploration.
Starting this year, Esso, with partners, is paying over $600 million to explore in the Beaufort Sea and the Mackenzie Delta over a five-year period. On the American side, Shell is spending $700 million on exploration. However, they did not do a good job with community consultations and they may not start this spring as they had intended, but they will begin next year.
The Russians are already developing the offshore. This development has major ramifications for us from a technological perspective, and I will return to that issue.
The U.S. Geological Survey issued a report a couple of years ago that suggested that up to 25 per cent of undiscovered world supplies of oil can be found in the Arctic. They have backtracked a little on that and are hedging their bets saying it may be closer to 18 per cent, but 18 per cent of world supply is greater than what the Saudis have. That gives you an idea of the magnitude of the expectations.
To make it even more interesting, a third source of energy, gas hydrates, may or may not be, depending upon who you talk to, the next major source of energy. Some say it is too expensive to exploit; others suggest that may be the future. In my opinion the jury is out on that subject.
From a geopolitical perspective, the major change is that the world has finally recognized what the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, actually does. UNCLOS provides a means by which the Arctic nations are able to divide up the ocean seabed. It also provides us with guiding procedures on how to handle environmental, fisheries, navigation and status issues.
It does not provide clear answers. It does not tell us whether the Northwest Passage is an international strait or if it is internal waters, as Canada claims. However, it provides the means by which we can examine the issue in a peaceful manner.
UNCLOS is coming into effect. It was signed in 1982. Canada played a leading role in the creation of this treaty. However, you will recall from your history that because of issues in the American political system, from 1982 to 1994, the treaty was put in abeyance. The Reagan administration had ideological opposition to the treaty. By the time the issues with the Americans were resolved in the 1990s, it has been only in this decade that everyone has realized what it means for the Arctic. As a result, we are playing catch-up.
There are two other geopolitical realities. First, we have a resurgent Russia. Under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, Russia is demanding either to reassert itself as a dominant power or is acting to reassert itself in its rightful role in the international system. I will leave that up to you to decide which side you will take on that reality.
Putin has moved aggressively to centralize control over northern oil and gas resources in Russia. That control has revised their economy and, in effect, also allowed them to rebuild their military. They are now in the process of a renewed submarine construction program. There are only two places they can place the submarines with the new geopolitical realities. They can place them on the Pacific or in Murmansk. In the long term, that means we can expect to see resumption of submarine traffic like that during the Cold War. Will it be as bad as the Cold War? Stay tuned. It is clear that the period of the 1990s, when this issue had seemingly disappeared, is back.
The Americans have also created a situation assuring that the Arctic remains critical for strategic consideration. One of two operation American ballistic missile defence systems is placed in Fort Greely, Alaska, 70 miles west of the Yukon-Alaska border. The system is operational.
The recent example, when the Americans shot down one of their own satellites, has demonstrated that they have gone much further than the general population understood their capabilities to be. The reality is that Fort Greely is an operational interceptor base. That means the Arctic will remain in a strategically important role in the international system.
The last geopolitical reality is that we have entry of new states into Arctic issues. Most Canadians were shocked in 1999 when a Chinese research vessel showed up at Tuktoyaktuk seemingly unannounced. It was not unannounced; they informed our embassy in Beijing. However, there was some miscommunication.
I provided you with a photo of the ship, the Xue Long. It is a 20,000-ton research vessel built in a Ukrainian yard that the Chinese have retrofitted to state-of-the-art scientific capabilities. The Xue Long is used primarily for their Antarctic research station, which is large and on par with any developed country. However, the Chinese have also shown that they are interested in using it for scientific research in Canadian northern waters. They were in the region of Tuktoyaktuk in 1999 and again in 2003. There are rumours that they are preparing another trip either for this year or next year as part of the International Polar Year.
Besides the Chinese, from a technological perspective, countries such as South Korea also are becoming interested in Arctic issues. The South Koreans are the world leaders for commercial ship construction. About five years ago, they made the decision to invest heavily in Arctic ship construction. Traditionally, the Russians and the Finns made most of the Arctic-capable vessels. Specifically, in Finland it was Akers Industries, in Russia it was the Murmansk Shipping Company.
Samsung Heavy Industry and several other key South Korean shipyards are now constructing ice-strengthened oil tankers. I provided you with a picture of one of these smaller tankers that is 70,000 tons. They are building two at 120,000 tons and there are rumours that they about to go up to 200,000 tons. These tankers are not the largest supertankers, but good transfer tankers.
It is noteworthy that the Koreans have figured out how to make these ships commercially viable in ice-free waters and in ice up to one metre thick. The technology is new. The propellers rotate 360 degrees. They are put in a pod. When they move through ice, they go backwards. They put an ice-breaking bow on the stern. There is no loss of efficiency when the ship is breaking ice. When in open water, they turn the propeller around and the ship uses the regular sea- going bow. The ship is economically viable in both open water and ice cover. Traditionally, ships are one or the other. The South Koreans have solved how to do both. These ships are more expensive to build and the Russians are the ones buying them now.
The Russians face a problem related to climate change. Their pipeline systems are collapsing, partly because of Soviet construction techniques, but also because the permafrost is melting. As a result, they now plan to use these transfer tankers to ship oil from mid-Siberia to Murmansk.
I raise this point because of the implications for Canada. How long will it be before a Canadian or American company says we have dealt too long with this pipeline issue so let us explore this new technology that the Russians are buying from the South Koreans and skip the idea of a pipeline? We will put up a distribution nodule offshore to avoid dealing with state or territorial politics and simply off-load and carry the product through.
If a company decides to go that way, a host of issues will preclude anything we have dealt with in pipeline politics. I am not saying this will happen. I am saying that if the pipeline issue in Canada takes too long to resolve, it is only a matter of time until someone says, maybe we can go back to the 1969-1970 reasons why the Americans sent a supertanker through the Northwest Passage in the first place. Transport the product by ship rather than by pipeline. I argue that situation is, indeed, a possibility.
In terms of Canadian sovereignty, this issue is about accessibility, both as a reality and a perception. I am often asked about my understanding of sovereignty because that issue seems to be a red button one for Canadians. If we say our sovereignty in the Arctic is being undermined, Canadians will become justifiably annoyed. We will see it in the front page of The Globe and Mail and the National Post. It is one assured way to attract attention on the Arctic.
We do not fully appreciate what sovereignty is. Sovereignty is a means, not an end. We have to ask ourselves what we want sovereignty for. We want sovereignty for control, so that the Arctic region is for Canadian values and interests. In particular, those who call Canada ``home'' in the North are to have their interests and values protected. We do not want sovereignty only so we feel good about it. It is not worth the tax dollars to make us feel nationalistic. However, it is of critical importance that the rules and regulations for those coming into the Arctic as it becomes accessible follow Canadian values and interests. That is why I contend sovereignty is so important.
What are the sovereignty issues? Several speakers have outlined them for you. However, I can tell you that we do not have a maritime border with any of our Arctic neighbours that is accepted.
The Northwest Passage is disputed by the Americans and the Europeans. I suspect the Japanese probably will take the American side on this issue if we ever push them on it.
We have a major boundary dispute with the Americans in the Beaufort Sea that is about oil and gas. There is a complicating factor. Our first land claims agreement, the 1984 western Iqaluit agreement, is based on our understanding of that border. That border follows what your predecessor, Senator Poirier, put forward in terms of the sector theory.
If we must renegotiate the boundary, we must also renegotiate the land claims agreement of 1984. The issue is complicated for Canada. We also have small disagreements with the Danes over the Lincoln Sea. I have provided you with maps of the Beaufort Sea and the Lincoln Sea. The issue with the Lincoln Sea is straightforward. It is technical and will not be hard to resolve.
I also contend we will face challenges with the Russians, the Americans and possibly the Danes over the continental shelf. The publicity stunt the Russians pulled last year, dropping a flag at the North Pole, grabbed people's attention. Minister Peter MacKay rightly pointed out that, in international law, the stunt means nothing. However, I contend from a political and geopolitical perspective it means everything. The Russians are trying to convince the world that we should go back to the sector theory and divide from the North Pole.
First and foremost, there is a question of whether the Lomonosov Ridge allows the Russians to go up to the North Pole. We are waiting to see what happens with that question. Even if the Russians are allowed to go up to the North Pole, international law traditionally requires an equal distance division: our northern point to the Russian northern point. A retired oceanographer, Ron McNab, who is based in Halifax, has basically gone through the drawings of the limitation. You will see we go over the Russian side of the North Pole if, in fact, we were to divide it equal distance and if the ridge allows us to go that far.
In other words, the Russians are trying to convince us to go to the pole and use the pole as the dividing feature. If we accept that argument and, if the ridge allows us to go that far, we short-change ourselves in terms of access to oil and gas. Hence sovereignty is important in this regard.
Additionally, we have the ongoing other issues of the North. We have the whole issue of the role of the indigenous groups in terms of international organizations. We are always fighting a battle against our other seven Arctic neighbours in terms of the Arctic Council. However, we do not have time to go into that issue.
My last point is with respect to the Canadian Coast Guard. Let me be clear: The Canadian Coast Guard's professionalism and capability are critical when it comes to the enforcement of rules and regulations in the North. They are the ones with the expertise, and I would say it is expertise par excellence. Probably nobody in the world has more expertise in terms of ice capabilities than our people.
However, the Coast Guard faces two major problems. First and foremost is the issue of political support. As someone who has followed the Coast Guard since the 1980s, I can tell you they do not have political support in the way that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Department of National Defence or any of our other agencies involved in the North have. The Coast Guard has been a political orphan; they have not had the resources allocated to them that have been necessary to do the job. Any funding that goes to the Coast Guard is almost always as an after-effect. Not only do their capital programs suffer but their operational budgets are often slashed whenever we are looking for means of saving money.
The Coast Guard is so good, they always figure out a way of doing more with less. In some ways, their professionalism is their own worst enemy.
The second point about the Coast Guard is that they have not been able to find an outside set of champions. Take DND as an example. Under the Trudeau administration, when a similar circumstance was recognized that we did not have a full appreciation of defence issues in Canada, Trudeau took the step of developing a link between universities and DND with a program that was first referred to as the Military and Strategic Studies Program and is now known as the Security and Defence Forum. Regardless, universities were invited to examine issues of Canadian security. I would say this program has been one of the outstanding successes of the links between understanding Canada's role in the world and a government department.
At the same time, DFAIT has been effective in terms of also fostering communities of interest, be it human security or the legacy of peacekeeping. We see this link of people examining the issues. When the government forgets about these agencies, someone steps up and reminds them of the importance. The Canadian Coast Guard has no such champion.
The third factor is that the Coast Guard has not formulated, in my view, the necessary strategic understanding of what it must do. It understands full well what it needs to do from a tactical perspective and it executes that task outstandingly. However, if we ask the Coast Guard, ``What is your strategic vision for Arctic sovereignty,'' they would say, ``We do not have a vision. We simply enforce and do what we are told.''
We also need mandatory, not voluntary, enforcement of things such as the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. We currently have a voluntary reporting system rather than mandatory. This issue irks the Canadian Coast Guard because they must enforce it. However, they say, ``That is the will of government and that is what we will do.''
If you say to them, ``You must be thinking in terms of a strategic plan for the recapitalization of your ice-breaking fleet,'' they will say they will put a memo to cabinet but they do not want to rock the boat.
This continued response is a ``ready, aye, ready'' mentality that undermines their ability to go forward and say, ``We are the central agency that will enforce and protect Canadian sovereignty in its truest context.''
As such, I leave you with a consideration. We have this typical Canadian dilemma. We have an agency that is excellent in terms of what it can do. It is able to do so much with less all the time. However, we face an Arctic situation for which we no longer have the luxury of allowing them to proceed on a shoe-string budget.
We need to recognize that we have uncertainty before us. We will have winters where the ice conditions will be horrific. We will have years in which the ice conditions are great. We will have years when we will say, ``We did not realize the South Koreans were spending billions of dollars building this new capacity that all of a sudden will show up on Canadian doorsteps. We did not know the Japanese were interested in terms exploration. They will be up there. All of a sudden, we will have this traffic.''
I do not want to go on record as suggesting that all of a sudden we will have these direct military challenges from our Asian neighbours. However, we will have a much busier Arctic and it will catch us off guard. We will have the typical Canadian response of saying, ``If we had only known.'' The problem is, the Canadian Coast Guard knows the situation fully. It needs the capability, in conjunction with DND, DFAIT, the RCMP and the territorial government, to provide us with a pan-Canadian response.
We have the opportunity to act now. Time is not too late, but I contend that we have seen improvements starting with Prime Minister Martin and following with Prime Minister Harper. However, as someone who has followed Arctic issues for a long time, I can point out that we have talked big several times before. It is our follow- through that is always problematic. As an academic, I can tell you that the first thing to be cut in terms of the Arctic is always the Canadian Coast Guard.
We need to reverse that thinking. If we cut funding and do not pay attention to the situation, we do so at our peril. I am happy to take questions.
Senator Cowan: I want to follow up on that last point. In 2007, the government announced the new Arctic patrol vessels. Those vessels will be under DND. I gather from what you have said, you would prefer that they be Coast Guard vessels. Does it matter who owns those vessels as long as coordination exists? We have heard this issue before about Transport Canada, DND and the Canadian Coast Guard. Can you comment on what appears to be a bit of a turf war, and how we can resolve that?
Mr. Huebert: Turf wars in some conditions are good things. We tend to have the idea that we must resolve them. For example, in the early 1990s, a report suggested that we had too many fleets and should consolidate them.
The problem we face is that we will have requirements both for what DND can do with these offshore vessels and requirements for what Coast Guard icebreakers can do. The Coast Guard's expertise is ice breaking, not what DND is proposing with these six to eight offshore patrol vessels. We will have such a busy Arctic that we will need both.
By having both DND and the Canadian Coast Guard committed to the North, we then know that we have more actors within cabinet discussions saying we are running into the Japanese, the South Koreans, the Russians and the Chinese. Those voices are heard at the cabinet level. Frankly, it is at the cabinet level, when it comes to Arctic policy, that we see whether we are successes or failures.
It is good to have both, from the context of the political realities in Canada and also because they are different instrumentations. They each provide a different set of expertise. If you leave the responsibility with one agency, if you leave it with Canadian Coast Guard, my fear is you will not have enough political weight that foreshadows the coming crises in the Arctic. Therefore, if a heavyweight player such as DND has a constant Arctic portfolio, you will ensure that the Arctic will receive better attention. It will not guarantee success, but I see the two organizations working well together.
In terms of the turf war argument, when it comes to the operational side, the two work seamlessly. I have been to Iqaluit for some of the exercises. Last summer, I saw the Martha L. Black operating in conjunction with the HMCS Fredericton. Once again, the cooperation at the operational level between the Coast Guard and the navy is outstanding.
You run into some of the issues at the most senior levels where people say, ``If you get that, my budget will be cut.'' We need to recognize that we need a pan-Canadian response. If we can rise above the petty funding issues, in my view, that is the way to go for the coming storm that I see developing in the North.
Senator Cowan: What about the position of Canadian Coast Guard within the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, DFO? We have heard this relationship has always been a problem. The Coast Guard is the poor cousin in the DFO structure, and perhaps a freestanding Coast Guard would receive more attention and funding than if it is submersed within DFO, which has other responsibilities aside from the Coast Guard.
Mr. Huebert: Absolutely: I have seen the Canadian Coast Guard within Transport Canada; I have seen it when it was clearly within DFO; and I have seen it when it has been given special agency issues. In my view, it is not a question of where you place it. It is a question of the political support it has and the funding you provide.
It goes back to this issue of champions. It needs some community that will say constantly; these are our front lines when it comes to the enforcement and protection of Canadian values and interests in the Arctic.
Do you achieve that support within a bureaucratic reshuffling? My analytical response is that I have not seen any indication that any reshuffling of the deck chairs has worked. There was even an offer at one point, and consideration was given, to putting Coast Guard within DND. When Admiral Buck was the head of the Canadian navy, they experimented or considered that move as another possibility. His response was, will you offer me any more resources to bring it into the shape for what we need it to do? The response was, of course not, we are only reshuffling the deck chairs again.
It was not his decision to make, but I think his appreciation of the challenges was correct. It comes down to the point that if we are serious about Arctic sovereignty, control of our Arctic regions, we must ensure that our instruments and those who maintain them are properly funded. We have not been serious on that matter.
I place the blame at the political level in that context. We do not have much more time to address that issue.
Senator Cowan: Going back for a long period of time?
Mr. Huebert: I will assign blame equally. I look at what preceding Liberal governments have done, as well as what preceding Conservative governments have done. There has always been the talk but never the follow-through.
The Canadian Coast Guard always takes the first cut. We need to go back only to the Polar 8 incident, where the Coast Guard would have gotten a new Polar 8 class of icebreaker that, if it had been built, would be performing superbly right now in 2008. Ultimately, when we cut it back in the name of deficit control, it was the Coast Guard that lost it.
Furthermore, Coast Guard was developing other projects. Then, everyone said, stop those projects and focus on Polar 8, because that is where you will get the money. When it was cut, nobody said we will give you back the money for those smaller projects.
That is why we have the situation where the CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent is now 40 years old. Only now, in the most recent budget, will it be replaced. I might add that the four medium icebreakers we have that are behind the CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent were built between 1978 and 1983. There is no talk yet of replacing them, but we have to be on the ball for that issue as well.
The Chair: Before I go to Senator Cochrane, to add to the point about operations done well at the operational level, it is interesting to note that in search and rescue, they work together. I think DND is at the top of the command structure, but they work with Coast Guard. The Coast Guard marine platform is used, whereas the DND helicopters are used. The relationship seems to work well in that regard. I think the whole question of search and rescue is something we have not focused on, but that we should in the context of the Coast Guard.
Mr. Huebert: You absolutely must. The sinking of the Discovery in the Antarctic should have been a wake-up call to all Canadians. When the Discovery sunk in the Antarctic, which happened last December, it happened that the Chileans had a ship and units nearby to perform the rescue.
If we had a similar event in Canadian waters — and we see an increase in terrorism in Canadian waters — I daresay our ability to respond would not be anywhere as capable as what we saw in that particular incident.
We have had cruise ships go onto the rocks in Canadian waters. We had an incident in 1997 where the Hanseatic went on the rocks off Cambridge Bay. It was a calm period, it was summertime, and a lot of industry capability went to their rescue in that particular instance. We will not be so lucky the next time this happens.
Senator Cochrane: I will begin my questioning with a hypothetical question. Do you have a time frame for all this activity?
Mr. Huebert: It is not hypothetical. For the oil and gas, it is 2008. If we look at what Esso is doing on our side, it is occurring now. If we look at the American side, once Shell figures out they need to do what their advertisements say they do — be concerned about community involvement — and they clear that issue up, they will start oil and gas exploration. The Russians are exploring now. The Norwegians are about to begin a massive oil and gas examination on their side and, one suspects, development within their northern waters. For oil and gas, the future is now.
I fully expect that you will see, within the next five years, major announcements of fines; in which case, you will see flurries of activities of how we regulate this type of behaviour. This activity is occurring now
You have heard of the activity in terms of fish. We know there is movement of both shrimp and turbot into the eastern Arctic waters, which we have not seen before. What we do not know, because our surveillance capabilities have been downgraded, is how many international fishers are coming into Canadian waters. When we talk to people off the record, they will say they think that the Greenlanders, the Faroese and the Danes are coming into Canadian waters in the Davis Strait. However, we do not know for certain because we have cut our surveillance capabilities.
The Chair: What do you mean by surveillance capabilities?
Mr. Huebert: I mean the whole aspect of being able to see who is acting in our Arctic. I know you have had discussions on RADARSAT 2; that is one way to perform surveillance. In terms of our ability to use our Auroras for fishery patrols, that is two. In terms of having local surveillance through something such as the Canadian Rangers patrols, that is three. There is also sensor programs, which we are only starting to look at in terms of having fixed sensors, mainly for underwater surveillance but also in terms of choke points.
Senator Cochrane: Is this all happening as a result of climate change? In regard to the oil developments and so on, has this climate change issue brought industry to the forefront?
Mr. Huebert: Partly; it depends on which industry. For the changing fish stock, I would say yes. The changing water temperatures bring many of these commercially viable fish stocks up North that we have not seen before; and the fishing fleets follow them.
Tourism is increasing because many of these medium capable vessels can now go into waters where they could not go before. Russian icebreakers have been coming into thick ice for some time, since about the end of the Cold War, but the Discovery-type vessel has limited ice capabilities or none. Those vessels are increasing.
The Greenlanders are seeing an explosion of tour vessels. Everyone is shocked to learn that there were more than 150 Arctic tours into Greenland waters last year. They are dealing with those numbers. We are at about 15 to 25 tours so far this year and each year it is increasing. Is it because of climate change? It is in part. Shipping will be driven by climate change but oil and gas will not be. Oil and gas are driven by the $120 barrel of oil and the expectation of Chinese and Indian demand. In other words, the companies will go ahead with oil and gas development. Oil and gas, in my view, will occur regardless of climate change.
Senator Cochrane: That development will not be year-round, will it?
Mr. Huebert: They are thinking about, and the Russians are examining this now, setting up various exploration points. Once they are into production, they either set up something like the Hibernia rig or they go subsurface, such that they place a series of tanks on the ocean bottom. Most people say that a pipeline into Arctic waters is too dangerous because there is still substantial ice build-up and they never know when something will scour the bottom so they put it just under the surface or very deep. Others suggest finding a relatively stable and safe place and put tanks on the ground to store the oil or gas during the winter. In the spring, they send the tankers in to retrieve it. Everyone is exploring the issue now but no one is admitting to how they will proceed in this context. There is a lot of re-examining of the issue of oil and gas as a year-round activity. Fishing, tourism and transportation will be seasonal but others, and oil and gas will be the big driver, will not be seasonal.
Senator Cochrane: I am looking at South Korean shipbuilding. You say they can operate when the ice is up to one metre thick.
Mr. Huebert: Yes.
Senator Cochrane: How deep is the ice up there now?
Mr. Huebert: Looking at one of the diagrams of the satellite photography of ice diminishment, the one phenomenon we have noticed is that the Russian side of the Arctic is melting the fastest. In other words, even in the winter years, we are not seeing ice redevelop within the region. When you hear people talk about one-metre-thick ice capabilities, take that as a code that means, we can go through first-year ice, which means the ice that completely forms as new ice over the winter months. If the ice melts and refreezes, those are the kinds of conditions that these vessels will go through. It is the same with our Arctic offshore vessels. We are talking about that capability.
Because of the particular nature of the wind currents, there is a phenomenon called the Beaufort gyro that places the ice against our Arctic side, not against the Russian side. As well, an atmospheric phenomenon called the Arctic oscillation pushes the ice away from the Russian coastline. The Russians are seeing that their coastline ice is melting first, and most scientists say that it will remain this way for the foreseeable future. The Russians have good conditions right now.
Senator Cochrane: How does that compare to the new icebreaker that was recently announced?
Mr. Huebert: The problem we face is that we will have some years in the Canadian Arctic that will be substantial ice years. That is why I contend we absolutely need icebreakers in conjunction with the offshore patrol vessels. You ask hypothetically but we will see a continuance of the decrease of ice and increase of oil and gas exploration. However, we will have some winters where the ice conditions will be bad once production has begun. It is at that point that we will need the ice-breaking capabilities for resupply if something goes wrong on one of the rigs, for example. Your questions are not hypothetical because they are occurring as we speak.
Senator Cochrane: You said that the Russians are buying South Korean ships.
Mr. Huebert: Yes.
Senator Cochrane: If we do not reach an agreement on the Mackenzie Delta pipeline, they might decide to take another route.
Mr. Huebert: They would not use another route. Let me be clear. It is not a question of the Russians coming into our waters. Their business plan is to go to Murmansk. They have Europe in their sights, full stop. However, the issue comes down to: At what point does a Canadian or American oil company say, we have been waiting to see the Mackenzie pipeline or the Alaska pipeline develop since the 1970s but nothing has occurred. We have the resource and would like to develop a business plan to develop an offshore terminal for off-loading, as the Russians are showing can be done. Ice conditions have improved to the degree that it can be done reasonably optimistically.
At what point do these companies simply say they want to do that and the Government of Canada needs to help regulate them?
At what point do we say: No, sorry, you must go by pipeline and, by the way, we have not been able to make up our mind on the pipeline or 10, 20 or 30 years. In other words, we are coming into a tricky political situation. That is my contention.
Senator Cochrane: My understanding is that this pipeline might be settled in three or four years.
Mr. Huebert: I have been hearing that for about 15 to 20 years, to be honest.
Senator Hubley: My first question is: Canada considers the Northwest Passage to be internal waters, whereas the United States views the Northwest Passage as an international strait, where all vessels have the right of transit passage. You participated in what has been described as an extraordinary exercise in simulated diplomacy. Is that correct?
Mr. Huebert: Yes, I did.
Senator Hubley: We heard about that from Dr. Michael Byers as well. Two teams of experts, one from Canada and one from the United States, undertook a model negotiation.
Can you tell us a little bit about how that went and how you see this model being applied in the future? Were Canada and the United States the only players that should have been present in this negotiation?
Mr. Huebert: When it comes to the Northwest Passage, it is about how Canada and the United States resolve the issue. The problem faced by the United States is that they will tell you off the record that if we are serious about controlling the Northwest Passage, they would be more than happy to give us that responsibility. They know the ramifications of making the Northwest Passage a strait used for international navigation. They know if that occurs, the North Koreans and the Iranians do not need to ask for permission to go through it. If it is transit right, they will go through. The renewed Russian air patrols, the Tu95s, that exploded on the scene after August 2007 have, under international law, the right to use the airspace over international straits. In other words, if the Northwest Passage is an international strait, they are basically inviting the Russians to send one of their long-range patrol vessels and they would have the right under international law to do so. The Americans know this. Their concern is precedent internationally. In the simulation exercise, we tried to ask the question, how do we ensure that Canadian control over Arctic waters is maintained and that the American position does not undermine our ability to say to those who come into our waters: These are the regulations; these are the rules you must follow; and, if you do not follow them, we will stop you.
I might add that the Russians assert that control. In other words, the Russians have a similar legal situation to the one we face in the Northwest Passage with their Northern Sea route. They make it clear: ``If you come into our waters without our permission, you will meet our navy. Our navy will stop you.'' This happened back in 1967. They have told everyone else, ``That situation has not changed. We will stop you. You follow our rules. We want you to come in, but you follow our rules.''
For us, the question was, how do we ensure that the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act is enforceable? How do we ensure that these single-hulled tankers do not come in? Under international law, at least until 2015, they have the right to come. After that, everyone must have double-hulled tankers. That is one of the International Maritime Organization, IMO, rules. At what point can we go beyond what international law currently says and say, ``That ships looks unsafe. We do not want you in.'' That is the issue for us.
On the American side, the issue the ambassador and several others tried to deal with is how to ensure that freedom of navigation is protected so that the Turks, the Indonesians and the Filipinos do not look at us and say, ``Well, you let Canada do this, so now we want to do the same thing.''
The issue is, how do we persuade the Americans to sidestep the freedom of navigation issue and at the same time, allow Canada not necessarily to become caught up in our own rhetoric about sovereignty but to do what we really need and want to do, and that is, protect Canadian interests and values.
For Canada, the issue is, how do we take sovereignty out of the issue but have control so that politically we are not criticized, as everyone will automatically say, for ``selling out to the Americans.'' On the American side, how do we give the Americans enough confidence, particularly the Department of Defence but also state departments, that this control will not create an international problem for the U.S. elsewhere but that we ensure that North American interests are protected. That was the issue. Do you approach it like a St. Lawrence Seaway where there is shared responsibility? Do you approach it like North American Aerospace Defence Command, NORAD, where airspace is a shared responsibility? There is not a surrendering of sovereignty in those particular instances if both countries agree to it. That solution is what we were searching for.
Senator Robichaud: If the Americans say that this Northwest Passage is international in nature, and that they should be able to go by that route, are they not making the point for other nations to go through it?
Mr. Huebert: Absolutely: This is the irony. Their defence of an international passage undermines their own interests in these waters.
I will give you another example that is often missed. The Americans have substantial oil transportation between southern Alaska and California. The Alaska pipeline carries oil from the North Slope of Alaska to the port of Valdez, and then they have about 12 supertankers to carry it from Valdez. We remember the crisis in 1969 when the Exxon- Valdez went on the rocks. After Valdez, the Americans brought in one of the world's leading pieces of legislation, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. It says that any vessel must be double hulled and they must have specific ballast transfer conditions. In other words, it does everything that our Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act does and what we want everyone to do in our waters.
The question comes up, how do the Americans enforce that act under freedom of navigation? The answer is protectionism. They have an act called the Jones Act that says, any shipment of goods between two American points must be carried by an American crude vessel that is built in American yards. It is protectionism, pure and pure. They say, ``We have this 1906 Jones Act that basically covers anything between two American points. Yes, it is protectionism but, by the way, it gives us the type of protection that Canada wants with the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act.''
We say, ``Are you not being hypocritical?'' They say, ``No, they are different international regimes. Yours is an international strait, and ours is from U.S. to U.S. port point destinations.'' We say, ``We have the same objectives. You want to ensure that Americans benefit from the oil and that is fine. We want to make sure that in the Northwest Passage, Canadians benefit. You want to protect the environment by having these standards that are world leaders. That is what we want.'' However, the problem comes back. I have to be careful about joking about letting the lawyers become involved, because I am married to a lawyer, but that is basically the mindset. One is international and one is not.
The report on the Empress of the North was released yesterday and we find out that we have total sovereignty over what happens to internal water shipping. It turns out we are not enforcing any forms of real regulations. It looks like the accident was sloppy seamanship with the fact that they did not close, for example, the various sea-tight compartments. We have the right to control it, and then we choose not to.
The international rules are there, but I come back ultimately to the point about how much political will we must enforce. This is where we come to the Northwest Passage. I strongly suspect that if we have the tools to enforcing what we want done, since our ultimate values and interests are roughly the same as the Americans, the Americans would probably simply say, ``Okay, we will never publicly say we agree with you, but we will not say anything against you. In other words, go ahead, Canada. Go ahead and set up all these rules and regulations, just as the Russians are doing, and we will not contest them if you actually show you have the ability to do so.''
That is always the under-theme with American officials. In other words, when it comes to the North, if we show we are serious, and do it, they will not publicly say anything.
Even if they do say something, so what? They offer diplomatic démarche against us saying they want control. I doubt they will escort a Panamanian single-hulled vessel through our waters. That is the alternative. We stop it, arrest it and it becomes caught up in court. That is fine, but we make our point. I suspect the Americans will say, ``Here is our political démarche, but by the way, go, Canada go.''
The Chair: Before I go back to Senator Hubley, I was an observer at the discussion between the Americans and the Canadians. As I recall, the general consensus seemed to be that there should be some sort of organization or association — I am not sure what the word would be — that would involve not us or the Americans but us and the Americans. The model was probably the international joint commission that operates the Great Lakes, which are in the territory of both Canada and the U.S. This is not an immediate concern for us in fisheries and oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard, but it is not irrelevant either. It is worthwhile for us to reflect on that model in the course of coming up with our report.
Senator Hubley: When you spoke about the Coast Guard, you mentioned two problems. One was the funding issues. You also mentioned that the Coast Guard had not formulated a strategic vision. Can you elaborate on that point? My question is: Is that strategic vision left to only the Coast Guard themselves, or must that strategic vision start in our Fisheries and Oceans Committee here today?
Mr. Huebert: The prodding for who does it must start at the political level, because the Coast Guard does not want to formulate a strategic vision. Look at what DFAIT does in terms of its vision and, under the Martin government, all the various documents about Canada's role internationally. In DND, the White Papers provide an overall direction. The individual environmental services also do it. The navy has been par excellence, for example. It produced a document called Leadmark that said: How do we visualize what the Canadian maritime strategy should be in the future? Was that mandated from the government? In other words, did one of the committees, either the Senate committee or the House of Commons committee, say to the navy, ``By the way, we need some vision in terms of where you want to go?''
The reality is no. It was within the navy. They said, ``We need to understand what direction we want to go, but yes, of course we will take political direction wherever we are told. It is ``ready aye ready'' ultimately when push comes to shove.'' No one questions that.
However, they still say, ``In the absence of that, we are the experts on the Maritime situation facing Canada. What should our strategy be?'' We see the navy going forward. We subsequently saw the air force coming through with vectors and then the army belatedly coming forward with their strategy. The agencies have the understanding that they cannot simply sit back and be tactically proficient. They are saying ``What will be our vision?'' In other words, what do other navies and air forces do? The Coast Guard needs to start looking at what other coast guards have in terms of a vision.
The Americans have a unique situation because their coast guard is militarized and is part of the armed services. It is a different situation, but it still gives examples. What do the Australians and the Indians do with their coast guards? We have plenty of examples to look at. Ultimately, what is the future ahead? If that type of thinking and vision — basically, it is vision — was left to DFO or the mother department, it will not go ahead. It must be from Coast Guard. Coast Guard must ask, ``What is our mission statement above and beyond being the best we can be?'' That is fine. That is wonderful at the tactical level, but what are the future problems that they think are coming down? What do their experts tell them? What do the ice services tell them to expect? What will the requirements be? What are the capabilities out there? It is that type of vision that then starts the junior ranks thinking. As the junior ranks come up, and when they become decision makers, that is when things start to occur. It is a long-term education process, but one that is absolutely required.
Senator Hubley: That was such a good answer; I am collecting my thoughts again.
Are these images from RADARSAT-1 or RADARSAT-2?
Mr. Huebert: No, that is the visual. To interpret RADARSAT imagery, you must be trained because it all looks like a blur, except for large pictures. This is the strength of RADARSAT-2. The resolution makes it more understandable to the untrained eye. For maximum imagery, you must be trained to recognize it. This is visible spectrum. In other words, various American satellites are taking a photo. It is a visible wavelength, not radar, which we cannot see with the naked eye.
Senator Hubley: Would you like to comment on the issue of RADARSAT-2? Whether it remains in Canada or it is sold may be resolved as we speak. However, if it is not resolved, what are the losses to Canada for losing what I think is technology that is irreplaceable?
Mr. Huebert: This is a no-brainer. I am with anyone else who has seriously considered the situation and how we could allow it to be considered for sale. It is a typical Canadian problem. We do not think strategically in this context. Selling it is bad enough. The fact we have allowed this to come without any oversight is another matter. We have had this problem with it. We sold RADARSAT imagery because we said it needed to be a joint government-commercial enterprise? We sold RADARSAT imagery to the Danes because of that requirement, which I think was ludicrous, after the Danes sent the Vaedderen, an ice-strengthened naval vessel, to Hans Island in 2001. When it went to Hans Island, they used RADARSAT ice imagery to go there. What other country would sell someone who is challenging the sovereignty of their land and territory, and say, ``Here is a map so that you can get there.'' That is what we did. The idea of selling RADARSAT to the Americans is totally the wrong thing to do.
The Chair: On comparative coast guards, we hope to have testimony from someone who knows the American coast guard. The one we had in mind was Scott Borgerson. I think he comes out of the American Coast Guard, but he is not there anymore.
Mr. Huebert: Yes, he was a bit too vocal.
The Chair: We hope to have testimony from someone who understood the American Coast Guard.
Mr. Huebert: Mr. Borgerson is outstanding, but in terms of experience in the North, he has had limited experience there. A person who has had extensive experience in the North is Lawson Brigham, with the American Polar Commission based in Anchorage. He was the captain of the Polar Star. You have had testimony from Commissioner Turner about the voyages of the Canadian icebreaker to the North Pole. When the Louis S. St-Laurent went up to the North Pole, she went in conjunction with the Polar Star, and Mr. Lawson was the captain.
Mr. Huebert: He is the leading expert in America when it comes to Coast Guard and Arctic operations. He is a semi- government official, but he is not afraid to speak his mind. I strongly recommend him in addition to Scott Borgerson.
Senator Robichaud: You supplied us with maps and a lot of information. One is the Russian first claim. We have not done anything similar to that, have we?
Mr. Huebert: Not yet. We are in the process of developing the scientific evidence that allows us to make the claim. I have provided you with the map of the Russian claim. You will also see where we stand right now under the graph name, ``Canadian Exploration Efforts for Article 76.'' This is where we are currently developing our scientific effort.
Our policy — and this is a criticism — is that we will leave it to nine scientists to explore and then make policy after. In other words, it is a bit of a chicken-and-egg problem when it comes to the continental shelf, at least the extended continental shelf. The official policy is that we want to go for our maximum claim, but if you look at our chart closely, you will see that our exploration stops at the North Pole. Someone has said, ``Go up to the North Pole and stop there.'' The reality is that we may have a claim beyond the North Pole, if the ridge is an extension. It may not be an extension, in which case we can only go 150 nautical miles beyond our Exclusive Economic Zone, EEZ. In other words, we may not reach the North Pole. It depends on the physical nature of the ridge. However, if it is an extension of the continental shelf, then I ask this: Why do we not go beyond the North Pole? Why have we made a decision to stop at the North Pole? It seems to be a political decision that we are making de facto in that context.
As you can see from that graphic, I do not know how we will get around the problem of negotiating with the Americans. The Americans probably have a different viewpoint in terms of where the dividing line is located. What are we doing to set the stage for that difference from a political basis? Perhaps I am not privy to behind-the-scenes negotiation that is ongoing. We have made good decisions with the Danes and are working with them, but even the Danes are holding some cards close. They have an agreement with the British to use one of their nuclear-powered submarines. They are using it on the other side of their line and are saying that it is not part of our cooperative agreement. I may be mistaken, but my understanding is that the Danes are not sharing that particular information.
We must be political about this issue.
Senator Robichaud: We cannot use the submarines that we bought from the Brits to go out there and see what they are doing, can we?
Mr. Huebert: No; unfortunately, we bought the wrong ones to do that. If we had bought the ones we said we would buy in 1989, we would have had this tool in hand. Although 10 or 12 were ludicrous, buying even one or two would have made imminent sense.
Senator Robichaud: You also mentioned what we are surveying now relates to the continental shelf and how far out it extends. You also mentioned something about equidistance, which is totally different, is it not? If the Arctic Ocean is to be divided into those lines, then we go closer to Russia than the continental shelf would allow us to go.
Mr. Huebert: The real challenge is that, article 76, the international rule that allows us to divide along these lines is a combination of science and international law.
When they drafted that particular article, they tried to use the state of knowledge of what is a continental shelf. I remember having discussions. My supervisor when I did my PhD was Elisabeth Mann Borgese. She was Canada's leading expert on the UN Law of the Sea Convention. She was involved in the negotiations. She told me that the intent of that particular article was to use state-of-the-art science saying what the continental shelf is. This convention was negotiated in 1974-75. Picture the state of knowledge of the continental shelf. They then needed to translate it into a context that international lawyers were comfortable with.
We have this issue that the clause attempts to be scientific. That science is now accepted to be somewhat limiting — I will not say wrong, but limiting. However, the convention also says that they must make a claim that they have the physical rights of continental shelf but then they must go back to international law for delimitating between any of their neighbours. It is a two-step process. The first is to ask whether they have a continental shelf under the scientific criteria set up, and then, if they have overlap with their neighbour, they must go back to standard tools of international law to delimitate. It is a situation where we say, ``Yes, we have it,'' and they say, ``Yes, we have it.'' It overlaps and then they go back. In other words, the processes are separate processes but they are interconnected.
Senator Robichaud: However, when the Russians established their claim to the North Pole, they did not have all the information, did they?
Mr. Huebert: They did, but they were not able to release it. The big problem with the Russian claim is that they used some of their submariner information. Of course, the commission said that they needed to show their data. The Russians said they could not do that. That is where the commission said the Russians needed to go back and show them what they called synthetic data: ``You have to go back and show us your actual measurements.'' The Russians have gone back since 2001 and are in the process of re-measuring it so it so they can say, ``Here is our scientific exploration and here is our data.'' They are doing that right now. They know what it is from their submarines, as the Americans know what theirs is, I have no doubt. It is a question that they must have open data to show the commission that examines it.
I want to be clear. The commission does not make political decisions. The commission only says, ``Yes, your science is right and your claim scientifically stands up to rigour.'' At that point the commission says, ``Okay, go at it.'' In other words, the commission has nothing to do with the settlement of overlap. That is left up to the countries to resolve under the rules and regulations set up under UNCLOS. That is clearly understood by everyone in that context.
Senator Robichaud: Are there things we should do now to help our claim before we receive all the data? With negotiations, we go as far as we can and then if there is overlap we find ways to compromise.
Mr. Huebert: What we are doing right now is what we need to be doing, and that is ensuring that the head of the scientific effort has the funds needed. The $20 million in the last budget, from my discussions with the various scientists, will allow us to do that research.
We should have done this in the 1990s. Short of having a time machine from Star Trek, we cannot go back. The reality is that in 2008 we are now doing what is necessary to prepare. We must ensure that the scientists engaged in this effort have all the funds they need; in other words, that we are not nickel and dime them. When they say they need extra money to do this faster, our response should be ``ready, aye, ready,'' not, ``Please justify your budget and we will think about it.'' That is what we need to do.
Senator Robichaud: Does the Russian claim go to the North Pole?
Mr. Huebert: Yes, absolutely.
Senator Robichaud: We could have gone there as well, right?
Mr. Huebert: Possibly, but it depends on whether the physical attributes of the ridge meet certain criteria. It may be that the Russians cannot also go beyond 150 nautical miles of their EEZ, which takes them well short of the North Pole. There may be a situation that there is a high seas mini-circle surrounding the North Pole. It depends on what happens in terms of the scientific examination of the ridge. That is why that is so important. If it is an extension of the continental shelf, then people have the right to go beyond 350 nautical miles. The situation is that they go up to where they meet their neighbour. If it is not that, then they go only 150 nautical miles beyond their EEZ, which takes us short, the Danes short and the Russians short. In other words, there will be a high seas area.
That raises interesting issues because there is already a company trying to establish its rights for the oil and gas in the High Arctic. In other words, a submission was made — it was in the news a few weeks ago — making a claim in the northernmost waters. At this point, everyone is ignoring that claim because nobody knows whether the national claims go that far or if, in fact, it is high seas.
Senator Cochrane: Is that an American company?
Mr. Huebert: It is an American-Canadian company.
Senator Robichaud: Are they not all? Is the ridge in question a connection between the continental shelf of Russia and Canada?
Mr. Huebert: We are hoping it is. The Russians are starting to make the argument that it is an extension of their shelf that then bumps into ours. We will then have interesting geo-legal arguments. The Russians say they are finding evidence that historically, this extension starts at their continental shelf, and the plate tectonics takes it into northern American waters.
We will argue with the Danes that it is basically a link between the two, because that then allows us to make the counterclaim.
There is a physical interruption of the ridge as it connects to both the Russian and the Canadian continental shelf. The Americans say there is enough of an interruption that it is not an extension. Right now, all three countries base the geology on their national interest. It is an interesting exercise at this point, trying to use science to make a viewpoint, which is exactly how the convention was construed to be.
Senator Robichaud: I want this committee to try to make it up to the North Pole and somehow drop a buoy there with a Canadian flag to say that we have been there and we are home.
Mr. Huebert: That is something we have done. We did it and they never paid any attention.
Senator Robichaud: It is not done often enough. Any time people pay attention to what we are doing out there, it is a step in establishing sovereignty over the waters.
Mr. Huebert: You will not have disagreement from me. For example, when Minister Graham went to Hans Island, some people saw that as provocative. I did not. The fact that the Danes sent naval vessels to Hans Island two years in a row absolves us from being the provocative party in this context. There is also the issue of what to do with the Beaufort side as well.
The one cautionary note I have is that we cannot be provocative without having the means behind us to support it. Having Minister Graham go to Hans Island but without any means of enforcement or surveillance behind him basically sets us up for failure. To make the political statement and to have the means to support it, which incidentally returns to the importance of the Coast Guard, is the critical way to go. That is how the Russians are going, frankly. They talk big and act big. They say the Northern Sea is theirs; they have complete control over it. They avoid the issue of whether it is international internal waters. The Americans have demurrage against the Russians on that — against the Soviets, actually — and they have tried to send icebreakers through what was the Northeast Passage at the time and the Russians said, ``You are welcome to come into our Arctic waters. Here are the forms to fill out asking for permission. Here is the fee schedule, and we will be happy to set up an escort for you.''
The Americans said, ``No, we will go through.'' The Soviets said, ``No, here are our frigates that will stop you.'' It was 1967 and the decision was made by the Johnson administration not to provoke the Russians because of the developing geopolitics.
We have a bizarre situation. Here, the Americans are backing down from the Soviets, who, of course, were the enemy during the Cold War, and two years later when it comes to the Northwest Passage our response is, ``You have to ask permission, but since you are not asking permission, we are giving it to you. By the way, we will help you go through.''
The Chair: Send your RADARSAT images to help us go through. I like the idea of going to the North Pole, but it would require some budget.
Mr. Huebert: Yes, it would.
The Chair: There are no further questions today, at this moment. We have a lot of questions. We want to thank you very much for such an informed, frank and easy to understand presentation and answers to our questions. It has helped us immeasurably as we continue our discussion.
Mr. Huebert: It was my pleasure. If I can be of any future assistance, as I said, this is the core research area I am looking at but also, as a Canadian, I feel strongly about this subject. I am always at your disposal for anything we can do to strengthen the Canadian position when it comes to our Arctic.
The Chair: We need help. One thing that occurred to me when we were talking is I remember when we prepared the defence review in 1993, we had people seconded to the committee from the Armed Forces. I wonder if it might be a good idea to have someone seconded to the committee from the Canadian Coast Guard. That is an idea that we can play with perhaps.
I thank you very much for appearing. I now suspend the meeting, but I want to have a motion to go in camera and to allow staff to stay in the room while we are in camera. Do I hear a motion? I hear a motion. Thank you.
The committee continued in camera.