Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Fisheries and Oceans
Issue 8 - Evidence, May 6, 2008
OTTAWA, Tuesday, May 6, 2008
The Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans met this day at 6:15 p.m. to examine and report on issues relating to the federal government's current and evolving policy framework for managing Canada's fisheries and oceans.
Senator Bill Rompkey (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Ladies and gentlemen, I call the meeting to order. My name is Bill Rompkey and I represent Newfoundland and Labrador. This is a hearing of the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. We are studying the government program for fisheries but, more specifically, with a focus on the Arctic and, more specifically still, with a focus on the Coast Guard.
We have heard from a number of witnesses from East to West, a wide variety of people, and we are very honoured to have a special witness tonight to complement those who we have heard before. I would like just to go around the table and indicate who we have with us tonight.
First, we have Senator Robichaud from New Brunswick; Senator Hubley from Prince Edward Island; Senator Adams from Rankin Inlet originally but from all over Nunavut; Senator Watt from Nunavik; Senator Comeau, who is the Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate and the former distinguished chair of this committee, and who has been to the Arctic before; and Senator Cochrane from Newfoundland and Labrador, who is the Deputy Chair of the committee.
I am especially pleased to welcome our witness tonight, Dr. Donat Pharand whose résumé I am not sure that I have time to read because it is very extensive. His CV shows that Mr. Pharand is Emeritus Professor of International Law at the University of Ottawa, a specialist in international and maritime law; he taught for 29 years and has published extensively on the Law of the Sea and Arctic issues. Dr. Pharand holds doctoral degrees from the University of Paris and the University of Michigan. He has been a consultant for various governments. He was a member of an international court, namely in La Bretagne Case, on a Canada-France case dealing with France's fishing rights in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.
Dr. Pharand was a founder-member of the Canadian Council on International Law for which he served as president from 1976 to 1978.
We have a very distinguished witness before us tonight and one to whom we will want to pose questions. He has with him Mr. Denis Grégoire de Blois, who will assist him in his presentation. We are looking forward to that. Senators, we are going to hear from Mr. Pharand for about 20 minutes and then we will want to ask him questions.
I might indicate that Senator Cowan, from Nova Scotia, has joined us and we welcome him.
In order to give a context, we want to talk about the passage itself. Dr. Pharand is considered to be the legal expert on the Northwest Passage and, as I understand, he considers Canada's claim of sovereignty to be very strong but he feels that we need to back that up. We will be interested to see what he thinks of the role of the Canadian Coast Guard, which we are studying particularly.
I understand as well that he believes we need to be reasonable with other nations including the United States. What "reasonable" means we will have to determine as the night goes on, so we will be interested in hearing those questions.
Honourable senators, the last time we met I asked you and you approved that I set a limit of 10 minutes each on the first round and I have always been told that if the machine works do not fix it. It worked so well last time that I will try it again tonight. It does not mean we will have a second round and a third round, it means we will keep some order as we go around the table.
If you are agreeable, we will now ask Dr. Pharand to give us his presentation.
[Translation]
Donat Pharand, Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, as an individual: My mother tongue is French and therefore, I am comfortable speaking in French. I see that certain members of the committee also speak French. So then, I will welcome your questions and answer them in French, if that is fine with you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your invitation, which I happily accepted. I am not sure if I can be of service to you, but I will try nevertheless.
Please feel free to ask me as many questions as you want. Of course, whether are not I can answer them is another matter. However, I will do my best.
[English]
Mr. Chair, with these introductory words to show I am French speaking mainly, I have distributed a couple of texts in English and in French. There are 10 pages. There is a table of contents that I drafted after I drafted the text. I hope that it coincides well enough.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that I have read most of the presentations made so far. I benefited greatly from that reading and will try to take them into account in my own presentation to the extent that I can remember them.
I will begin by speaking about the meaning of "sovereignty." There is immense confusion about the meaning of "sovereignty" and how we use that word. I will use it from the sense that we understand it in international law, that being the only subject I know a little about. It is important that we get that straightened out at the beginning, at least insofar as my presentation is concerned, in order that we do not discuss at cross purposes during the question period.
One can say that sovereignty has two main characteristics. It is absolutely total; that is, when a state has territory, it has complete sovereignty over that territory, which means that it has the totality of jurisdiction. It does not matter whether it exercises its sovereignty. It may make a treaty with other states and within that treaty accept certain limitations, but that does not diminish its sovereignty; it simply grants a neighbour certain rights, for example.
Second, sovereignty applies vertically as well as horizontally. This is my territory called Canada. I have complete jurisdiction horizontally over this territory. It also applies vertically. The old Roman maxim is usque ad coelum et ad infernos. Of course, that does not mean that, because I have sovereignty over the air space, I cannot grant right of passage for aircraft in my airspace, which we do all the time, mostly multilaterally in international conventions. It is very important that we understand that sovereignty is total. We must remember that this is the case for the land territory properly so-called.
What about the strip of seas around, which we call the territorial sea? It used to be three miles and is now 12 miles under the 1982 Law of the Sea convention. It does not mean, however, that it is total. It is subject to the right of innocent passage of ships, including war ships. This was a big topic of discussion during the Law of the Sea conference. You have sovereignty over the territorial sea out to 12 miles, but it is subject to the right of innocent passage of foreign ships.
[Translation]
The reference in the French version is to "passage inoffensif." Would you not agree that this is a far more accurate and representative designation than the word "innocent" used in the English version.
[English]
The further you go out to sea, the less jurisdiction you have. That is perfectly normal. We used to have a fishing zone. It is no longer 20 miles. We now have not only a fishing zone but an exclusive economic zone of 200 miles. This means that the coastal state has complete jurisdiction over the resources of the sea bed and subsoil within those 200 miles, but not the water.
However, the status of the waters remains basically as it was; namely, high seas. The same freedoms of navigation and over-flight apply in the exclusive economic zone of 200 miles as they apply over the high seas properly so-called. The high seas used to begin after 12 miles; now, under the convention, the high seas begin at 200 miles.
That is the water. I will stop there for my introductory remarks on the meaning of "sovereignty," but we will talk later about what is termed in the convention "sovereign rights" — not sovereignty — over the resources of the continental shelf and how far it goes.
Second, with regard to the Arctic Archipelago of Canada there is absolutely no doubt about Canada's sovereignty. We must never forget that. Our sovereignty was questioned on a couple of occasions. The first time was in 1920, by Denmark. Rasmussen, a hunter from Greenland, used to go across Ellesmere Island where the Eskimos, as we used to call them then, the Inuit, hunted buffaloes. Rasmussen said, "This is no man's land." Denmark agreed with Rasmussen. This resulted in a note being sent by Great Britain to Denmark, and that settled the matter. Do not forget that we were not an independent country at the time.
A matter arose in 1928 with Norway which was settled in 1930. The great Norwegian explorer, Otto Sverdrup, discovered three islands west of Ellesmere. Indeed, he had done sufficient that at the time Norway certainly could have claimed sovereignty over those islands. However, he was very kind and he had some correspondence with Canada. Skelton, I believe, was our foreign affairs deputy minister at the time. Sverdrup died, by the way, before the problem was settled. Shortly after, Canada concluded a treaty with Norway, after paying a small sum of money simply representing the reimbursement of Sverdrup's expenses for some three or four years.
We concluded a bilateral treaty with Norway whereby Norway recognized explicitly the sovereignty of Canada over the Sverdrup Islands, subject only to one condition — Norway was very wise — the non-recognition of the so-called sector principle. There is no such principle. It was simply a theory, which came to the mind of that good, well-meaning Acadian senator, Pascal Poirier. In 1907, Mr. Poirier remarked that Captain Bernier was up there in an expedition to claim Canada's sovereignty over the islands. Senator Poirier suggested they follow the meridians of longitude right up to the pole, the 141st and the 60th, and claim everything in between.
That motion of Senator Pascal Poirier was never even seconded. Sir Richard John Cartwright, who was the Leader of the Government in the Senate at the time, intervened. I forget exactly what he said, but he asked Senator Poirier to slow down a little bit.
In any event, this sector theory has no validity whatever insofar as basing a claim for sovereignty over territory, a fortiori, over water areas. I might just point out that I spent a couple of years on that little title called La théorie des secteurs en droit international public back in the 1950s.
I might perhaps add, insofar as the basis of title, we had a transfer of those islands from Great Britain in 1880; first in 1870, but it was so vague that Canada said: We do not know really what this covers. Would you pass another order- in-council? And Great Britain did, so we got the islands in 1880 through the British. Then, of course, we succeeded the British and we continued the exploration with Joseph Elzéar Bernier, et cetera.
Now we go to the continental shelf. First, what is the continental shelf? The "continental shelf" is defined as the continuation, but not any kind — the natural prolongation of the land territory under the sea. What that means, basically, is the geological continuation. Where does it end? This is a question that we have.
We have two basic questions to determine with our neighbours in the Arctic. First, where does the continental shelf begin and how far does it go on either side laterally? In Alaska — that is, in the Beaufort Sea — we have a little problem with the United States. We have another little problem, but not a big one, with Denmark in the Lincoln Sea. Those are the two lateral problems. Then we have a much more serious problem coming up, not yet materialized, with the other side of the pole. How far does our continental shelf go? Does it go as far as the North Pole? Russia, on the other side, says: Yes, ours does. We are talking about the same prolongation, called the Lomonosov Ridge, which is a ridge shown on that map there. You can see the Lomonosov Ridge there, which crosses between Ellesmere Island and Greenland. The Lomonosov Ridge begins here and ends on the other side. All the light blue is continental shelf of Russia, and on this side is our continental shelf.
Denmark and Canada have been cooperating very closely. By the way, it is interesting that the two leaders are women. A woman from Denmark and a woman from Canada are heading the joint enterprise, as it were, of determining whether the Lomonosov Ridge is a continuation of our common continental shelf.
Russia, on the other side, has been studying the Arctic Basin since the 1930s. In 1937, Papanin was the first person on one of those scientific floating stations, and over the years, they have had perhaps over 30 of them.
The Soviet Union, and now Russia, knows the Arctic Basin very well. Indeed, it produced the first geological map way back in 1964. We might make fun, and we can make fun of Russia, saying that planting the flag will not give you anything. Russia is the first to admit that this is just a photo op kind of thing. It is not claiming anything on the basis of planting a flag at the bottom of the sea, some 4,000 metres deep; not at all. It has gathered data and it has already submitted data to the United Nations seaward limit commission, and Canada is in the process of doing the same thing, along with Denmark, as I said a moment ago.
North of Alaska there is another ridge, the Alpha Ridge. It is not as plainly visible there. The issue of ratification of the convention is before the Senate, but the Senate has not taken a look at it. As you know, it takes two thirds of the vote in the Senate and it will not come into force for the United States until such time as the Senate decides to ratify the convention. Hopefully it will not do as it did for the League of Nations. Of course, as you know, Mr. Wilson thought there was no problem, but then the Senate did not ratify it so they did not become members of the United Nations.
To come back to Lomonosov Ridge, each ratifying state that is of the 155 member states of the Law of the Sea Convention, each of the five states claiming continental shelf limits in the Arctic Basin must submit its data to the United Nations commission. Each state has 10 years after ratification in order to produce to the commission its geological and other scientific data forming the basis for the claim it is making.
The Soviet Union had to have an extension, which it obtained because it ratified the convention on March 12, 1997. In theory, its 10 years expired in 2007, and it obtained an extension. I forget precisely, but it has another three or four years to go.
Canada did not ratify until November 7, 2003. It came into force one month after that. Canada has until December 7, 2013, to submit its data to the commission, and it is preparing it at the moment.
What will the commission do with that? Will the commission decide disputes between conflicting claims? No. The commission will make recommendations. Insofar as the settlement of disputes, properly so called are concerned, is when negotiations in good faith have not resulted in any agreement and the parties have completely different views.
Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, there are a number of ways for the settlement of disputes. I tried to summarize this in two pages. I can tell you that it is a very complicated and complex system, but it is a system of settlement. Do not forget that it took 14 years. I have heard it stated, and indeed I read somewhere, someone saying it happened in 1982. It was not born in 1982. It took 14 years before this convention was adopted. It came into force in only 1994, after 60 ratifications. Today, we have 155 member states.
I will not get into further detail as to how you determine the tip of the continental shelf or the end or the margin and the slope. The big problem is the foot of the slope. There are two basic methods. We can get into that later.
There are two ways to obtain sovereignty or complete jurisdiction over the Arctic waters. You either claim a historic title, which Canada does, or you draw straight baselines around the archipelago, which Canada did in 1985. Canada is claiming on both bases but, as I understand it, mainly on the historic title basis. Personally, I do not think that Canada's claim of a historic title is sound. I might add that I had some problem with that issue years ago, and I spent three months at Cambridge University, Scott Polar Institute, examining the reports of the British explorers looking for one single thing. I never found it. I was looking for whether or not the British explorers had ever taken possession of anything aside from land. I was not able to find any instance of taking of possession of water areas. I simply confirmed what Gordon W. Smith had written years previous, but I thought I would find out for myself. I would be pleased to answer questions as to why.
I may point out that a book I have not had the chance to read. Historic Waters in the Law of the Sea: A Modern Re- Appraisal just came out two months ago and was sent for me to review. It is based on a recent case, as strange as this may sound, between Alaska and United States government with respect to the Charlotte Islands along the coast.
It is not easy thing to do because the burden of proof is very heavy. You are changing the legal status of waters that normally would be either high seas or territorial waters, and you are then claiming that they are internal waters over which you have complete sovereignty.
However, we have a second basis which, in my humble opinion, is much better, and that is the straight baselines that we established in 1985 after the passage of the Polar Sea, the American icebreaker, which refused to ask Canada's permission.
The Department of Foreign Affairs told them to just ask permission and it would be given. Of course, not only did they not ask permission, but they now contend that they never even gave us notice. We had discussions but they never gave us official notice even, never mind asking permission.
Therefore, the foreign affairs minister, under the pressure of a number of people, established a straight baseline system. He established straight baselines around the whole of the Arctic Archipelago, meaning that all the water within the baselines are internal waters to Canada and, second, decided that Canada would build a Class 8 polar icebreaker, which never happened. The following government said they could not afford it. If we had it today, it would be a lot better. I believe we have a good case there.
Looking at the map, the red lines are the straight baselines drawn by Canada in 1985. How is this possible? The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides, as did the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries decision in 1951, that if you have a deeply indented coast or a coastal archipelago, instead of following the sinuosities of the coast to draw your baselines from which you are to measure your territorial waters, you can cut across, as it were, the openings, the "fiords," as the Norwegians call them, and use those lines, called baselines, to draw your 12 miles of territorial waters. This is what we did, as you see the red line, in 1985. Then, of course, you draw the green line here, being your 12-mile territorial sea, then your exclusive economic zone of 200 miles.
There is one difficulty with that solution we have with the United States. The United States contends that Canada's Arctic Archipelago is not a coastal archipelago enough and, second, the baselines that are supposed to be drawn along the general direction of the coast do not follow the general direction of the coast because they say the archipelago of Canada is going in a northeast direction.
Well, it looks like that because you cannot take a ball, flatten it out and still have the proper representation. You have distortions. Fortunately, at the National Geographic Society, a geographer by the name of Robinson in 1988 drew a world map. If you look at that map, you will see there is much less distortion. It is not completely accurate. It can never be. However, you can see that the Canadian Arctic archipelago is not going north but is going west to east along the general direction of Canada's coast. It all depends on what kind of projection you are using. The Mercator projection, which is the traditional projection, has the most distortions. Of course, we do not want to take merits away from Mercator, as it was developed a long time ago.
With regard to Canada's sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, if we have sovereignty over all the waters, of course we have sovereignty over the various routes. There are seven possible routes over the Northwest Passage. Supposing there is no problem, everyone agrees, including the United States, that they are internal waters of Canada. The various routes, or some of them, could still be international straits. That is because of the international maritime traffic that it would have been subjected to over the years.
There is only one case, by the way, on what is an international strait or, in the words of the convention, "a strait used for international navigation." There is no definition anywhere in the convention. I suggested a definition to the Canadian delegation. They tried it in committee and it did not work. I suggested a strait "traditionally" used for international maritime traffic, which is basically what the 1949 Corfu Channel case decided by the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Therefore, we are back, as it were, not on the convention but on case law, and the only case law there is that Corfu Channel case of 1949. In order to be an international strait, it must have a history of international maritime traffic, otherwise it is not.
I made a complete study up to the end of December 2005. We had 69 — I can provide the list — transits of the Northwest Passage starting in 1903, of course, with Amundsen's. That is all since then, and many of them have been by little adventure ships and yachts. In recent years, however, we have had a number of tourist cruisers and, of course, we had American icebreakers. I might just add, on the question of icebreakers, in 1988 we concluded that we could not agree with the Americans so we concluded an agreement to agree to disagree. The only thing the 1988 agreement does is give the United States a right of passage, but they have to ask permission. Of course, they do and we grant them permission.
First, this applies only to icebreakers. Second, there is a notwithstanding clause at the end to deal with the fact that the United States says it is an international strait and Canada says it is a national sea route.
The Chair: That was fascinating. I wish I had been in some of your classes. Thank you very much for that very clear and full presentation.
Senator Cowan: Thank you for your fascinating and enlightening presentation.
I understand that in your recent book you said that if foreign navigation takes place in the Northwest Passage without Canada taking adequate preventive measures, it is possible that the passage might be internationalized and subject to the right of transit passage.
What measures can and should Canada take to prevent that from happening?
Mr. Pharand: I will start with the issue of transit passage. It is very important to understand that if it is an international strait, transit passage, a new right under the convention, applies. This means that foreign ships, including warships, have virtually the same right of passage as they have on the high seas, in their normal mode of navigation, which means that submarines do not have to surface. That is transit passage.
Canada should take adequate protective measures to enable it to exercise what I call effective control over all foreign ships. This should begin with a compulsory system whereby foreign ships must not only advise but also ask Canada's permission and subject themselves, if necessary, for the protection of the marine environment, which a very delicate system, to an inspection. As it is, NORDREG is a completely voluntary system.
I do not know why Canada does not make NORDREG compulsory. I tried to find out. At a conference in Victoria three or four years ago, I asked a representative of Transport Canada that question. His answer was that 99 per cent of ships notify us. I said that I was pleased to hear that. At the break, I asked him to send me a note confirming what he had said, because it was very important. I sent him a note and never received a reply.
There was another gentleman there, a Dr. Allan Bartley, Director of Marine Security Policy at Transport Canada. When I wrote this last article, DFAIT was cooperative and said Dr. Bartley would be able to answer my questions. My first question was what is the legislative, regulatory or other authority providing for the creation of NORDREG? I was never able to learn that. I consulted the Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System Standards and did not receive an answer. My second question was would it be possible to make NORDREG compulsory by a simple order-in-council? I did not receive an answer. My third question was where is the obligation for foreign vessels to provide pre-arrival information before entering Canadian waters? I have consulted the Marine Transportation Security Act. Section 4 does not seem to apply to foreign vessels; however, section 201 of the same act appears to apply to foreign vessels, both SOLAS and non-SOLAS. SOLAS is the acronym for Safety of Life at Sea. My fourth question was where is the straight 96-hour requirement pre-arrival information? I had heard that there was a recent amendment to this effect. Section 221(1) of the Marine Transportation Security Regulations provides for it, but not in all cases. I did not receive a reply in spite of telephone calls, et cetera.
Those four questions are still pending and should be answered. I really do not know and I can only guess that Canada is not making the NORDREG system compulsory because it is not in a position to enforce the system if it were compulsory. That is only a guess, but I do not think we have the necessary enforcement capability.
Senator Cowan: Obviously we would need greater icebreaking capacity than we presently have.
Mr. Pharand: Of course. What can we do? In this last article, I suggested 12 possible measures we could take, but one of the most important measures is naturally a polar icebreaker. We have next to nothing, as you know. The Soviet Union has 12 polar icebreakers and they are going to get 12 more icebreaking ships. I believe that the United States still has only three polar icebreakers, which are getting old, but they are thinking of renewing them. We have only the Louis St-Laurent, which is pretty old and is only a Class 4, and a couple of Class 3s.
Senator Cowan: We have the Terry Fox.
Mr. Pharand: That is right. We do not have the icebreaking capability we need. Even with the melting of the ice we need icebreakers.
Approximately 10 years ago, I spent 28 days aboard a Class 3, the Sir John Franklin. It is now called Amundsen. We came here, to this spot called the Victoria Strait — these two lines I consider future lines. The McClure Strait is not possible at the moment even though last year it was navigable as was the Prince of Wales Strait.
You will get stuck at the Victoria Strait because you have multi-year ice coming down the McClure Strait, which has an opening of 100 miles. It comes down Viscount Melville Sound and to the McClintock. We were stuck there. In 24 hours, we might have made something like 20 miles whereas it only took us 8 days for the whole crossing.
Even if there is — and there is — a very considerable thinning of the ice and withdrawal of the ice, you will still be faced with the problem of multi-year ice coming down here. This is all very shallow. That is why in the future it would be much better if you could go through the McClure Strait.
The Chair: Is it your position that NORDREG should be made compulsory. Do you believe they should have the proper backup?
Mr. Pharand: Absolutely. It is one thing to make it compulsory, but it is like any law. You can have the best law on the books but if you do not have the capability to enforce that law, it is worthless.
Senator Hubley: Thank you very much for your presentation. We are back in school and I hope we are all behaving appropriately.
I would like to go back to the historic title versus the strait baseline. You had mentioned that you felt that Canada perhaps did not have a strong case when it came to the historic title.
I would like to have your reasons for that or for you to explain this: In all the negotiations and considerations, does the fact that we have people living in the North, making a living from the lands and the seas, come into the equation at all?
Mr. Pharand: Absolutely. I am very pleased you asked that question because I did not have time to go through it.
In spite of the fact that historic titles are not spelled out in the convention, there is a lot of writing and there is case law on it a bit — not much but some.
When we come to the historical use, from time immemorial, of the Inuit using those waters for their livelihood, we can invoke that. We cannot do that so much for the proof of a historic title because that has to be on the state level. However, we can invoke that and we should for what the international court called in the United Kingdom v. Norway, the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case, "consolidation of title," reinforcement of title.
Now I come to your first question. There are three conditions to establish a historic title and it is a very heavy burden to prove because you are changing the status of the waters, as I mentioned a moment ago. It is much more difficult to prove than for sovereignty over land because that is what we are claiming. First, you have to prove of course that you have exercised exclusive jurisdiction over the water areas that you claimed. If a ship wants to come in, you have expelled him because it the waters are your own and you have enforced it.
Second, there is the question we call "of long usage." How long? No court has ever said how long but certainly it has to be since 1973. Do not forget that in 1970, the SS Manhattan got as far as here and then could not go through and came down the Prince of Wales Strait.
The SS Manhattan, at that time, was remaining on the high seas. We only had a three-mile territorial water. It would have remained on the high seas throughout if it had navigated the McClure Strait. Canada was scared and said, "Look, we better do something about this." Therefore, we extended our territorial waters from three to 12 miles to make what the legal adviser called at the time "a second territorial waters gate in the Northwest Passage." Lowther and Young Islands are less than 15 miles apart so that at 2 times 12 miles, you are creating a territorial waters gate. The other one existed in the Prince of Wales Strait.
If we already had a historic title — if we had been claiming in 1970 that those waters were internal waters by way of historic title — we would not have had to extend our territorial waters there.
The third condition is the acquiescence of foreign states; those particularly interested. Here the United States is particularly interested.
Those are the three conditions. I repeat that the burden of proof is very heavy.
I mentioned 1973. It was in 1973, for the first time, that Canada, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, made a statement that Canada claimed the waters of the archipelago to be historic titles. You cannot prove a historic title in such a short space of time, I can assure you; regardless of what you take as being the proper length of time.
However, to come back to your question of consolidation of title, we can do as Norway did in 1951. In order to justify some of the lines to which Great Britain objected, Norway said, "Our native fishermen in the Lopphavet Basin" — where you had a more than some 50-mile long line they had drawn across that basin — "were given exclusive fishing rights, and we invoked that to justify and consolidate the validity of that particular line."
My point is that the Inuit have been there since time immemorial. They have used the waters in the ice as they have virtually in the same way as land to make a living. We are certainly in a position to invoke that historic use in order to consolidate some of lines.
The United States is objecting — I would imagine — to the whole idea of the lines, but particularly the Lancaster Sound and Amundsen Gulf lines. They are the longest lines; not only the longest lines but as well, they are part of the inevitable future Northwest Passage.
Yes, the Inuit historic use can certainly be very good in that regard. I might just mention that I am not an authority on this question, but there is a professor of international law at the University of Montreal law faculty. I forget the precise title of her doctoral dissertation, but it had to do with historic native use in a case similar to this. Suzanne Lalonde is her name. I have put a few names on paper, two or three of which I think would be very useful, in particular on the question of the continental shelf, which is way beyond me.
The Chair: We thank you very much for that. We will be in touch with Ms. Lalonde, and if you can give us other names, we will be able to contact those people as well.
[Translation]
Senator Robichaud: Perhaps if we had accepted Pascal Poirier's sector theory, we would not be facing this problem today.
Mr. Pharand: I am sorry, Senator Robichaud, but even back then, this was not a valid reason for making a claim, not only to the area in dispute, but especially to the waters. After all, we are talking about 1907. So, I disagree.
Senator Robichaud: Let me play devil's advocate. Had we affirmed our sovereignty at the time, perhaps we could have come up with other arguments instead of Pascal Poirier's sector theory.
Mr. Pharand: You are quite right, Senator Robichaud, we should have started the process of establishing our claim long long ago, precisely because our sovereignty was not clear. The description of the Canadian Arctic archipelago contained in the 1880 British order in council is quite vague. A well-known author, historian Gordon W. Smith, maintains that the description is so vague that people may well wonder what area is covered. By the way, the description surely did not cover — as some people believed — the rocky outcrop known as Hans Island.
I agree that we should have started staking our claim earlier, but not on the basis of the sector theory.
Senator Robichaud: I will accept that. Now then, if Canada stakes a claim to sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, then we must prove that historically we have used this water route. If we had to go before an international court, we would have to argue that historically, this passage has been used by the Inuit, the region's inhabitants, since the dawn of time. So then, if another party wished to claim the right to use the passage, would it not also have to prove historic usage? Transiting through the passage once every ten years does not constitute a basis for a claim of historic usage. Would you not agree?
Mr. Pharand: You are absolutely right. The problem lies with the definition. The convention does not contain a definition. The United States argue that it is a matter of potential, not actual, usage. They draw a distinction between "potential" and "actual." They argue that using a strait for international navigation constitutes a basis for holding that it is an international strait and therefore subject to transit rights.
During the Law of the Sea Conference which lasted 14 years — this problem with the U.S. goes back a ways — the United States published a list of approximately 113 straits around the world, including the Northwest Passage, which it considered to be international straits. I do not recall the exact number. Why did it do this? Well, because there was a very important principle at stake for the United States, namely the principle of naval mobility. This principle was of paramount importance to the U.S. Everything else came down to policy considerations.
I am not sure if I have answered your question, Senator Robichaud.
Senator Robichaud: You have answered it in part. You say that the United States is defending their right to transit through the passage at some point in the future?
Mr. Pharand: That is correct.
Senator Robichaud: However, we can defend the fact that the passage is currently used by coastal communities. Correct? The Inuit who live in the area use the ice surface as a base from which to hunt or fish.
Mr. Pharand: You are right, but we are confusing two issues here. We are dealing with two separate problems. As far as the status of the waterways in general is concerned, you are quite right and I agree with you. With regard to the historic usage of these waters by the Inuit since the dawn of time, we do indeed, in my humble opinion, have a solid basis for invoking this argument. That is one issue. However, in terms more specifically of the routes that comprise the Northwest Passage and our claim that this is not an international strait — or straits, although here we are talking in the singular — but rather an internal waterway, we are looking at the number of foreign vessels that have transited through the passage. We are saying that based on the only similar decision that exists, namely the 1949 decision about the Strait of Corfu, very few vessels have transited through the passage.
In fact, from 1969 up until the end of 2007, there were only single transits through this waterway. I can show you the list. I counted the Manhattan twice, because it made a round trip in 1969. So that counts for two two transits. Perhaps 25 or 30 of these trips were made by small vessels, which cause us problems because they get trapped in the ice. People take off on an adventure, but their vessel gets trapped and Canada, naturally, must come to their rescue.
Senator Robichaud: And that only makes our argument stronger.
Mr. Pharand: Absolutely.
Senator Robichaud: You stated that we should use icebreakers to enforce our claim to sovereignty. Is that correct?
Mr. Pharand: Yes.
Senator Robichaud: Would you go so far as to say that we should seize other vessels?
Mr. Pharand: I would not go so far as to say that Canada should resort to the use of force or coercion to the point where maybe — how shall I put it — a war could break out. For starters, Coast Guard icebreakers are not military vessels like the ones owned by the Americans. The U.S. Coast Guard has armed vessels, even though guardsmen carry only small arms. Personally, I have been recommending for years that Canadian Coast Guard vessels carry small arms, in order to issue warnings like "You did not seek permission, so we are warning you." I am not saying that Canada, the mouse, should declare war against the United States, the elephant. We cannot do that. The point here would be to issue a serious warning to U.S. vessels that if they transit through these waters without our permission, then if an international court was ever asked to settle this dispute, Canada would maintain that they were illegally transiting through these waters.
Senator Robichaud: Yes, but with RADARSAT-2, we have the capability at this time to monitor all surface activity in the Arctic and to issue warnings. A warning is not a weapon, but it has equal merit, in my opinion.
Mr. Pharand: You are absolutely right. I am happy that you mentioned RADARSAT-2. I am also happy that the government seems to have changed its mind about RADARSAT-2, because if we sell this technology to the United States, I am not convinced that we will still be able to use it. As I understand it, the big advantage to RADARSAT-2 is that it would at least allow us to see if a vessel, or even a submarine, has entered the passage through Lancaster Sound or McClure Strait.
When we count vessels, if we have reason to believe that some submarines are present, that could be to our disadvantage. If we do not have reason to believe that submarines are present, then it does not count.
I did not mention submarines earlier when I spoke of the list drawn up in 1969. However, I have the Nautilus and the Seadragon on my list. Are there any others? Did the Charlotte transit through our waters three or four years ago? At the time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bill Graham, had this to say: "I do not think it was in our waters and if it was, it was there under the terms of our defence agreement with the United States."
However, you are correct to say that RADARSAT-2 should allow us to have some visual control and, if an unauthorized vessel was detected in our waters, then at least we could issue a warning. Again, I am not saying the Canada should declare war on the United States.
[English]
Senator Cochrane: Now that we are on this topic, what measures can Canada take to prevent the Northwest Passage from becoming internationalized? You mentioned there may be military icebreaking capabilities, surveillance and policing. Tell us what measures you think we should put in there now.
Mr. Pharand: I think I mentioned 10 measures on page 8 and the top of page 9.
Senator Cochrane: I see that. Thank you.
Mr. Pharand: I am no specialist. I know a little bit about international law. When it comes to politics, I am a neophyte. The political and the legal at some point meet inevitably, particularly in a legal system such as the international one, which is still in the process of development. It is not like a domestic, well-established rule of law system. We are not there yet on the international plane. We have no law makers. The General Assembly of the United Nations does not make law; it makes recommendations. We do not have a legislator. Second, we do not have an enforcer. Third, we do not have a court with compulsory jurisdiction. You can go before the International Court of Justice in The Hague if you want to.
Tentatively, here are some of the measures we should seriously consider. The first is I do not think there is any doubt that NORDREG must be compulsory. Second, we need at least one polar icebreaker. We are talking at least a Class 6 if not a Class 8. As I said, if we have traffic, we need to have services. The maritime shipping community will not use your passage, even if they want to, unless they are reasonably sure that they can do so in safety and without delay. Every day means not thousands but millions of dollars for the cargo-owners and shipowners. Therefore, they need to have a land-based service and sea-based service, a whole infrastructure.
I mentioned RADARSAT-2. Of course, we should have a submarine detection system, which is what we were talking about. The Inuit know their territory like the back of their hand. They have lived there all of their lives. They have an oral tradition that is more sound, perhaps, than the best of the books we have written, but we have to equip them and use their knowledge. Why is it that we do not recruit among the Inuit for the Coast Guard? I do not know. We should, it seems to me. This is my seventh point.
My eighth point is that we need to have search and rescue. If an accident happens, do we have that capability? I doubt it very much. If we want to have navigation to a considerable degree, we need to have a sea port. The Inuit have been asking for such a port.
Lastly, I suggest something I have been suggesting since 1985 or before: We should be able to sit down with the United States and negotiate a satisfactory agreement for both countries. I believe it would be to the advantage of the United States if they were to really listen to us when we ask them to recognize our control over all of those waters because we are very close to them. Who says someone may not come from the North somewhere, or from the northeast or northwest, wanting to attack them through our waters? Do not forget, however, that we are not beyond being the target ourselves.
I am glad you asked this question. It seems to me the United States will never agree to recognize our full control over those waters unless they know that we have the capability to exercise that control, which we do not have at the moment. If I were counsel for the United States, I would tell them they are crazy to give Canada full control.
Senator Cochrane: I appreciate that.
The Chair: To clarify one point, we heard a proposal with regard to the control of the Northwest Passage and who would exercise control. We heard a proposal to create a new Canada-U.S. Arctic navigation commission to address the common interests of the two countries in navigation, environmental protection, security, safety and sustainable economic development. The proposed Arctic navigation commission would follow the model of the international joint commission by acting as a recommendatory body to both countries, Canada and the United States. Could you comment on that proposal?
Mr. Pharand: We should certainly agree on a common code, but not only Canada and the United States. This, as you know, is being done around the pole. This is, after all, a circumpolar problem that needs a circumpolar solution.
If we have a massive oil spill anywhere, on this side or the other side, and it does not matter where, all of the Arctic states will suffer. Within IMO, the International Maritime Organization there is a specialist named Lawson Brigham. He is an American and he is very solid. Within the Arctic Council, we are working on an Arctic code for the protection of the marine environment. That is very important.
The second point is while it is fine to have close cooperation, and we should, not only with all five Arctic states but also, of course, with the United States in particular as they are our neighbours in Alaska. That is fine. However, in my humble opinion, to speak of a joint commission such as we have for the Great Lakes, I think this is a bit dangerous. That is because the status of the waters is not the same. We do not share the sovereignty over the Northwest Passage with anyone. I do not think that we want to. I think that we must maintain our independence, if I can put it this way, and maintain our complete sovereignty over those waters but with, at the same time, the closest possible cooperation with the United States.
Senator Adams: This is very interesting when you talk about our area up in Nunavut. In my younger days, in 1953, I was supposed to go up to Resolute Bay to work up there. It was Mr. Diefenbaker who claimed Arctic sovereignty. It ended up that I went to Churchill. After two months waiting for the ice to break up in Resolute, I was offered a job working for the military in Churchill, Manitoba and ended up working there for 11 years.
I know you have done quite a bit of research on Arctic sovereignty. A senator on the Senate floor asked me what it was like in the two communities of Resolute Bay and Gris Fiord in the Diefenbaker days when Arctic sovereignty was proclaimed. At that time I wondered what information was available from the federal government at the time for the people from Northern Quebec and people being moved from Pond Inlet in 1953. You might remember the C.D. Howe, which was used by people from our communities for X-rays because in the 1950s and 1960s we had many people with tuberculosis.
Also, the Government of Canada was dealing with poaching by Americans, Danes and the Russians. The only thing I heard was that it could not be claimed by other countries because the Inuit were living up there. At that time, in the 1950s, the Russians tried to make a claim on some of the islands in the Arctic and some of the waterways.
Mr. Pharand: Yes, I think it is true. I do recall that period quite well. It is true that during that period of time, after the war, after 1945 and in the 1950s as well, we did have some Americans up in the Canadian Arctic making noises and expressing some doubts as to the sovereignty of Canada with respect even to the islands. This was not officially from the United States. When I say some of the Americans posted, I mean even if there were military in the Canadian Arctic.
I do recall, when the Inuit from Northern Quebec were moved, some to Resolute and some to Gris Fiord, there were no Inuit who had lived in Gris Fiord. However, they were the first ones to live there. The government's intention, as I understand, was to consolidate and solidify its claim, its sovereignty, over the islands, despite the fact that there was no formal state-to-state objection.
I am sure you will remember the commission headed by a judge of the Quebec Court of Appeal — I forget his name — and George Erasmus, who were co-presidents. I appeared before that commission. A former judge of the Supreme Court of Canada who had retired, and who was a member of the commission, Bertha Wilson asked me why did the government do that? Why did they transport against their will, virtually, all the Inuit from Northern Quebec to Grise Fiord?
I do not know, of course, what was in the government's mind. However, surely it had to do with the effective occupation principle of that huge island and that area, Grise Fiord, in particular. This, of course, is confined to territorial sovereignty, to sovereignty over the land areas. As I said before, today, I do not think there can be any doubt. We even had the President of the United States, a couple of years ago, come to Canada and say: We do not agree with you insofar as the waters, but we do not dispute your ownership of the islands. When you hear that from President Bush, what else do you want?
I am not sure that I have commented in a meaningful way on what you were asking.
Senator Adams: I think you answered my question. Maybe I can turn to other issues.
When you marked on the map the green and red lines, it was an agreement with the Government of Canada under the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. In the international waters, we only have 12 miles as well. We do not have any overlap. The Government of Canada says as long as there is ice here, you can hunt past the 12 miles. If we want to go fishing past 12 miles, we cannot go past there. We have to have agreement with DFO regarding how much we are allowed to catch there.
It is too bad Senator Baker is not here tonight. There are about 17 other countries that signed with Canada on ocean law. I do not know if you have heard about that. The countries signed regarding the border and the water. I think you know more about ocean law. We would like to have an Inuk trained in Halifax to learn about ocean law. Even for us, ocean law is difficult.
Mr. Pharand: The question, if I understood correctly, is about Canada permitting you to fish beyond the 12-mile limit. It seems to me this is an internal matter between the Government of Canada and the Inuit. After all, Canada does have, as I pointed out, complete control over the resources, whether in the soil or in the water, within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. If there is not 200 miles, there is, of course, a dividing line on which we agreed between Greenland — that is, Denmark — and Canada. The only part on which we did not agree — in 1974 — concerning the delimitation agreement between Canada and Denmark, was that rock. This is the dividing line, the delimitation line of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone between Canada and Greenland, or Denmark.
One of our problems is Hans Island. We have that little problem, about which the news media made a big issue. As far as I understand, this is a minor irritant and that is all. We also have a little problem here in the Lincoln Sea. The problem there is that Canada and Denmark do not agree as to the baselines from which they should measure to arrive at the equidistance. This line follows the equidistance method. Within those lines, each side has exclusive fishing jurisdiction. If there is any problem on our side, it is between the federal government and the Inuit. In other words, it is an internal, not an international, problem.
Senator Adams: I have one more question. We were talking about 1980s and the Class 6 icebreaker. I was on the Transport Committee when Senator Perrault was the chair. If the Government of Canada had approved, we would have more claim on the Arctic waters. We tried to get a Class 8 icebreaker.
Mr. Pharand: You mean the polar icebreaker of 1985.
Senator Adams: Yes. At that time, it only cost about $500 million. This year, it will be $750 million and we do not know how big of a class it will be, Class 6 or Class 5. We do not know.
Mr. Pharand: The one that Prime Minister Harper promised, as I understand, is a Class 6, but I am not completely sure. Certainly, it would be much better — and we need it badly — than the best we have at the moment, which is the Class 4. I am not sure whether the Louis St-Laurent is operational. It is getting very old. I forget now, but was built over 30 years ago.
Senator Adams: If that Class 8 icebreaker had been approved in 1985, we would have more claims today in the Arctic. The government turned it down.
Mr. Pharand: It is unfortunate, but that is the way it is.
Senator Watt: You have made a very interesting presentation, especially as someone who has a wide range of experience of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, how it works, what it does and does not cover.
I will narrow my questions down to one particular area that you touched upon. We have heard a lot about climate change. The ice is disappearing, but it is disappearing faster than we expected, so not having sufficient infrastructure in place is a problem.
More important is a potential environmental disaster in the Arctic. Canada is not equipped for that, and the Americans are in the same predicament. They are presently building the required infrastructure to deal with such an occurrence.
Russia is much better equipped. I believe that Norway and Russian recently entered into a contractual arrangement to build some new equipment to enable them to be active in the area we are talking about. That scares me.
What do we say to our government?
Mr. Pharand: You have raised a very important question. Previously the Soviet Union, now Russia, have been using the northern sea route for domestic purposes. They have fully prepared themselves for the northern sea route to be opened for international purposes or navigation.
Indeed, three years ago Russia, with the cooperation of Japan and Norway, concluded a six-year study. I have the volumes, because I was involved as a reviser for three or four of those studies. They take up four feet of shelf space and range from 75 to 100 pages each.
That very serious study was paid for mainly by Japan under the aegis of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Norway. It covers all possible aspects, including economic and legal, of future use of the northern sea route, which we used to call the Northeast Passage. There is absolutely no doubt that the Russians are ready. They have the infrastructure and the icebreakers. Indeed, I read recently that the Russians are now cooperating with a Chinese shipyard for 12 new ice- protected tankers in addition to the 12 nuclear-powered icebreakers they now have.
In recent years we have not heard about Japan but, rather, about China. It seems that China is most interested in using either the Northwest Passage or the Northeast Passage. There is less ice on the Russian side.
I attended a lecture the other day by Louis Fortier from Laval who is heading ArcticNet at the university. For some three years he has been doing research, mainly in the Beaufort Sea.
The Chair: He will be a witness next week.
Mr. Pharand: That is marvellous. He has not only theoretical knowledge but also practical knowledge in the related sciences.
To conclude my answer to your question, not only are the Russians ready with infrastructure and control capability with their icebreakers, but they are also cooperating already, it seems, with the countries that have it in mind to use either the Northwest or the Northeast Passage. There is no comparison at all.
Mr. Chairman, I received this yesterday, from Ron Macnab, a marine geophysicist and member of the Canadian Polar Commission. He is a solid fellow on the question of the seaward extent of the continental shelf. He wrote an article that will be published in Lighthouse in the spring-summer of 2008.
It seems that a new ship is being developed that is called the double-acting cargo ice breaker. Macnab says in the articles that a key to the success of this proposition is the development of a new class double-acting cargo icebreaker. In open water, these ships look and perform like conventional vessels, but encountering ice they reverse their direction of travel and proceed stern first into the pack. This is quite a surprising technology. Knowing Ron Macnab personally, I know that he is not making this up. This is quite serious.
Senator Cook: Thank you for a riveting conversation.
You said that the Chinese and Russians are getting ready to use this passage. I have heard nothing about environmental impact studies. How long are they likely to take? From my limited understanding, I believe that while we are trying to build a deep water port there will be a dozen or more ships that are more than adequate to traverse our open water and go about their business.
We are doing the bread and butter things to ensure the opening of this last piece of virgin property, the Arctic. We are looking at sea- and land-based services, RADARSAT, and deep water ports. I heard you say with some disquiet that the Chinese are building the ships that will traverse this water without paying any attention to what Canada believes or what you believe is the proper way to proceed.
Mr. Pharand: I really do not know if the Chinese will use our passage. However, I would think that the Chinese, as the Japanese, would wish to conform themselves with our Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and regulations and all the other marine protective measures that we have in place and that we are developing through the Arctic Council.
I can leave this with you. This came out recently. It is called Impacts of a Warming Arctic. It is a report of the Arctic Council and it covers subjects like the global implications and the animal species shifts. As you know, the polar bear, in particular, might be in danger if the melting continues and the polar bears no longer have sufficient ice to hunt seals. It also covers the coastal impacts on the communities and marine transportation. These are all key findings. The multiple stresses are covered, including stress on the Inuit communities, et cetera.
I can leave this with you in case you do not have this report. I have a number of other documents. I will also leave with you this is French Convention on the Law of the Sea. In addition, this is a book which I co-authored: The Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone. I also have a number of other little goodies here that I can leave with you.
The Chair: Our researcher is jumping for joy.
Mr. Pharand: I will say, when it comes down to drafting, somebody will have to put all this together.
I will be so immodest as to leave this article called "The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage." It is only 69 pages. It is published last year in an American law journal called Ocean Development and International Law. The only reason I published it in an American rather than that Canadian journal is because I wanted the American readers to look at it. I can leave all this with you in case it might be of some assistance. I am not sure, to come back to your question, in concrete terms what else I can add to the few recommendations that I have put toward the end of my paper.
Senator Cook: I have one quick question and I would like your opinion on it. The Canadian Coast Guard does not have an enforcement mandate at the moment. Do you think that the Coast Guard should be armed and have an enforcement mandate?
Mr. Pharand: Yes. I will say two things in answer to your question.
First, I do believe that it is the Coast Guard and not the navy that should have the icebreaking function and mission in the Arctic. I have nothing against the navy but there are many disadvantages in transferring that function, as it seems the government might have in mind when it speaks of naval icebreaking vessels. I say icebreaking more than ice- flushing because, as I understand, it would only be the equivalent of a Class 2 vessel or something of the kind. In any event, the Coast Guard has been developing an expertise in icebreaking for a very long time and it would be very expensive to train or pass on that function and to train new ones.
I gave a little talk on the Arctic Circle in Ottawa, there was a retired rear admiral, and he could speak, of course, since he is retired. In the question period, I asked him what he thought of my lecture and he agreed that it did not make much sense for the government to replace the icebreaking function normally performed by the Coast Guard over to the navy.
I have written that our Coast Guard should have, at least, light armaments. I do not think there is any doubt. It is helpful if to do no more than to give a firm notice if necessary to a foreign ship that it should not enter. I am not advocating the use of force to the degree where you might have a real military confrontation. I do not believe in military confrontations; I do not believe in war.
Senator Cook: They are so far away. Where do they get the backup if they run into problems, if they are not armed? It does not make sense.
The Chair: That is a good question. Our focus is the Coast Guard.
Mr. Pharand: I might leave this with you if you say your focus is the Canadian Coast Guard. Well, I was so impressed by the Coast Guard during my 28 days aboard the Sir John Franklin in 1989 that I drafted this paper, "Canadian Coast Guard: Its Arctic Sovereignty Role." I did not proceed further than a preliminary draft outline. It is dated October 10, 1989. I drafted this aboard ship.
I ended up suggesting that yes, not only should the Coast Guard have a sovereignty role in the Arctic but it should be part of the Canadian Coast Guard's school curriculum. The Coast Guard should develop a pocket-sized book for the Coast Guard mission. I leave a copy of this with you in case that it might suggest ideas for your report.
The Chair: Thank you. That is exactly the sort of thing we want. I can see our report growing exponentially.
[Translation]
Senator Robichaud: Mr. Pharand, you were involved, were you not, in the dispute between Canada and France over the zone surrounding the islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon.
Mr. Pharand: No, I was not involved in this dispute over the continental shelf. I was an arbitrator for Canada in another dispute between Canada and France over France's fishing rights in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. That was a totally different case. I played a minor role as an outside advisor in the dispute over the continental shelf, but that is all. People must not confuse the two disputes that Canada has had with France.
Senator Robichaud: I was entrusted by then Prime Minister Jean Chrétien with the task of negotiating a treaty with France on the fishing zone around Saint-Pierre and Miquelon. That is why I asked if you played a role in settling this dispute because the zone in question was rather odd. France kept a zone around the islands as well as a long corridor stretching out to the open sea, but still located within Canada's 200-mile zone. It was rather odd.
Mr. Pharand: You are quite right. I was not involved in settling this dispute. I am aware of this case and I can picture the corridor. I never truly understood why the five-member court of arbitration, in its decision, decided on this delineation between Canada and France.
I do not recall exactly which equitable factors the court considered. The Convention on the Law of the Sea is not very clear on the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf between states with adjacent or opposite coasts. It merely says that the states shall make every effort to achieve an equitable solution.
There is nothing more flexible than equity. We are all in favour of virtue and against sin, but when the time comes to define virtue, we can no longer agree. That is why the International Court has been developing over the years so called equity factors such as the general direction of the coastline of one state as opposed to the other and historic usage. In the case of the Beaufort Sea, Canada invokes its historic usage of the extension of the 141 degree meridian, while the United States would prefer to use the equidistance line approach. I am sorry, but I cannot tell you any more than that on the subject.
Senator Robichaud: It was merely an observation on my part. Thank you very much, Mr. Pharand.
[English]
The Chair: Dr. Pharand, you have kept our attention for two and a half hours, and that is more than words can say about your performance. It has been a masterful performance. It has been very full, frank and clear. We do thank you for coming and for adding so much to our knowledge of this whole problem. It has clarified many of things for us. It has not necessarily provided all the answers, but it has at least clarified the questions.
Mr. Pharand: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. It was a pleasure for me to have been invited here. If I can be of any further assistance when comes the time to put these things together, and if you want to check certain things with me, if I can be of any help, I certainly will be pleased to do so.
I am here in Ottawa, and I am retired. I had no choice but to retire, even though I would have continued. In those days at 65 years of age, you were no longer competent. As I said to Gerry La Forest, how is it judges remain competent until 75 years of age and I was not considered competent after 65 years of age. Universities have come to realize that perhaps it was not such a very good idea to get rid all of us at 65 years.
Thank you so very much again, Mr. Chair and senators, for your questions. I am sorry if I perhaps was not able to answer all the questions satisfactorily, but I did enjoy this very much.
The committee adjourned.