Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on
Anti-terrorism
Issue 11 - Evidence
OTTAWA, Monday, December 13, 2010
The Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism met this day at 1 p.m. to examine matters relating to anti- terrorism.
Senator Hugh Segal (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Honourable senators, this is the twelfth meeting of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism of the Third Session of the Fortieth Parliament. As we await legislation from the House of Commons, we continue our inquiry into the changing nature of the terrorist threat in Canada.
Today we have two parts to our meeting. The first part will feature Dr. Alex Wilner as our witness. We will have a presentation from him and then questions from members of this committee.
Mr. Wilner is senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland. He is a Canadian. He joined the centre in October 2008 as part of the Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellowship for International Relations and Security, a two-year, post-doctoral initiative awarded by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
Mr. Wilner is a native of Montreal. He completed his doctorate and master's degree at Dalhousie University and holds a bachelor's degree from McGill University. He was awarded scholarships from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and from the Department of National Defence for his dissertation, Deterring the Undeterrable: The Theory and Practice of Coercing Terrorists. He is a research fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Ottawa, the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies in Halifax and the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University.
We will invite Mr. Wilner to make an opening statement, and then we will open the floor to questions.
Mr. Wilner, thank you for making yourself available in the early evening in Zurich. We appreciate your doing so and are eager to benefit from your advice and counsel.
Alex Wilner, Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland: Thank you very much for inviting me to participate in these hearings. My intention is to introduce Canadians to the threat of prison radicalization and to help establish a comprehensive strategy to combat it. My comments are based on a report I published in October with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, a public policy think tank in Ottawa; I am a fellow with the institute.
The report, which is based on open source materials, offers a comparative illustration of European and American trends in prison radicalization. It does so both to highlight the challenges that Canadians might face and to detail some policy solutions.
Today I would like to emphasize two central points. The first is that counterterrorism does not end with the incarceration of would-be terrorists. What happens behind bars should worry Canadians, too. Far from being the last phase of a successful security operation, the incarceration of individuals who orchestrate or facilitate terrorism represents the beginning of a second series of related threats. Of particular concern today is Islamist prison radicalization, whereby members of the general prison population adopt militant ideologies that legitimize political violence. The worst-case scenario is that in jailing one terrorist, we unintentionally produce two more.
The second point is that Canada is in a unique position to learn from the experiences of our allies. We have only just begun jailing our own homegrown radicals, but other countries have been doing so for years. It is in their collective successes and failures to counter prison radicalization that Canada finds the policy lessons we need to pre-empt, contain and reverse the threat here.
Unlike most criminals, terrorists enter prison with strong, if not always refined, political and ideological beliefs. Treating terrorists as if they were like ``normal'' criminals minimizes the importance of that ideological motivation, a motivation that influences their self-perception, their goals and their behaviour while imprisoned. While criminalizing terrorism may deny it any legitimacy, we need to be careful not to ignore the political, ideological and, in some cases, religious motivations that shape a terrorist convict's behaviour.
The problem is that some terrorists do not consider themselves as mere criminals but rather as foot soldiers in a global and cosmic conflict. Instead of idly serving their sentences as other criminals might, they may treat their imprisonment as an opportunity to refine their ideology and strategy, to influence others and to mobilize support for their cause. Imprisonment certainly restricts their ability to participate in terrorism, and it may deter some from again participating in violence, but for others, prison may open new doors for spreading their message and methods.
Prison radicalization is a product of that ambition. While exact figures are difficult to pinpoint, some prominent Western terrorists were radicalized and recruited while in prison. British shoe bomber Richard Reid converted to Islam behind bars and radicalized after his release. Britain's Muktar Ibrahim, leader of the failed July 2005 London bombings, and Mohammed al-Figari, re-imprisoned on terrorism offences in 2008, both adopted radical Islam in prison. Moroccan Jamal Ahmidan and Spaniard Emilio Trashorras both radicalized in prison and went on to orchestrate the 2004 Madrid attacks. A number of terrorist groups, including France's Ansar al-Fath, Spain's Martyrs for Morocco and the American JIS — Jam'iyyat ul-Islam Is-Saheeh, or Assembly of Authentic Islam — were all established in prison.
Here in Canada, consider the case of Ali Dirie, a self-confessed member of the Toronto 18. He was first jailed in 2005 for smuggling guns into Canada, but while serving his sentence, he continued and remained an enthusiastic member of the group. Crown prosecutors revealed that he supported the Toronto 18 with ``encouragement, advice and direction'' and took an ``active role in recruiting other inmates to adopt extreme jihadi beliefs . . . and become members of the terrorist group.'' In advocating his radical views, Dirie posed as big a threat in prison as he did outside it.
Since 2008 alone, more Canadians have been indicted on terrorism-related offences than used to face such charges over decades. Fourteen Canadians have been sentenced, with all but one conviction related to Islamist terrorism. The list includes Momin Khawaja, sentenced to over 10 years for facilitating terrorism in the U.K.; Said Namouh, handed a life sentence last February; and 11 members of the Toronto 18, of which 7 admitted their guilt. Three other terrorism-related trials are ongoing, stemming from the arrests made last August in Ontario. All of these individual are Canadian citizens, and few have had contact with or received any training from foreign-based organizations.
In comparison to European and American figures, these Canadian statistics are — I am happy to say — rather small. The threat of terrorism from al Qaeda-inspired radicals is enormously higher overseas than it is in Canada. In the U.S. alone, for instance, there have been over 45 cases of domestic radicalization and recruitment since 9/11. While there is a wide range of figures on incarceration rates, by most accounts the U.K., France, Spain and the U.S. each have between 125 and several hundred Islamist terrorist convicts sitting in their respective prison systems.
That Canadians face fewer threats from terrorism should be of some comfort. Not only does it mean we are generally safer, but also it means we can learn from others' experiences with prison radicalization to address the problem here pre-emptively.
Unfortunately, understanding how and why people radicalize is not very easy. The radicalization process is inherently individualized; different people radicalize for different reasons and in different ways. Therefore, while radicalization might usually be defined ``as a personal experience through which individuals adopt extreme ideals,'' mapping out that process is complicated.
We know that individuals who participate in terrorism do so because they believe that murder for a cause is feasible and just. We know that radicalization is a psychological and social process, and we know that it entails a mental, emotional and cognitive transition.
However, we do not know what drives that process. It is usually a combination of factors like alienation; religious solidarity; acute anger over foreign policy; and resentment to feelings of dishonour, humiliation, prosecution or xenophobia. These precursors to radicalization in society help us identify the process in prison.
First, inmates of all sorts often experience feelings of isolation and insecurity that drive them to seek protection within prison groups. In some cases, prison gangs not only satisfy an individual's need for safety but also solidify a particular prison identity. In the U.K., for example, Islamist prison gangs offer protection while promoting an exclusivist ideology that glorifies violence and intolerance. Convicted extremists dedicated to advancing jihadism might purposefully take over such groups to more easily radicalize and recruit others.
Second, religion also plays a role in prison radicalization. I want to emphasize that increasing religiosity and conversions can have very positive effects. Islam, like other religions, can have a calming effect on a prisoner's behaviour by offering direction that can steer a person away from destructive and anti-social behaviour. The risk, however, is that converts and lapsed adherents brought back to their childhood religion might be especially susceptible to hard-line interpretations of their faith.
Finally, anger towards the prison system can facilitate radicalization. Islamist inmates can amplify real or perceived grievances, especially concerning religious practice and obligations, in order to radicalize others.
In my report, I offer a long list of recommendations for addressing prison radicalization, and I urge committee members interested in the details to look it over. However, I want to conclude today by focusing on four overarching recommendations.
First, we need to appreciate better how radicalization occurs in Canada, specifically. How is Canadian radicalization different from British, French or American radicalization? What domestic factors and characteristics drive the process? Dissecting Canadian radicalization will require establishing a task force to study the phenomenon. We might also consider developing an inter-agency extremism unit that can monitor domestic trends and rapidly inform policy responses. Also, like other countries, Canada might also produce a prison guide describing the indicators of prison radicalization to help prison staff identify troublesome developments.
Second, we need a balanced strategy that denies incarcerated terrorists access to other inmates without retarding their rehabilitation. Simply isolating radicals from one another, or segregating them from the general prison population, may not be enough. Segregation may protect other inmates from radical ideologies, but long-term isolation does not facilitate rehabilitation of convicted terrorists. Many terrorist inmates will eventually rejoin society. We should be careful not to trade short-term security gains for long-term losses. With that said, prisoners who are adamant about promoting radicalism should be isolated and repeatedly relocated within the prison system to disrupt their social ties with potential recruits.
On the other hand, however, terrorist inmates who legitimately repent should be used to counter radical ideologies. Radicals who turn their backs on old comrades might have a positive influence on other inmates. If so, the best strategy would be to concentrate them with others in order to inoculate the prison system from radicalism.
Third, rehabilitating terrorists may require specially designed treatment programs to help them reject violent convictions and re-socialize them into society. Canadians should take stock of international rehabilitation programs and identify the best practices of each in building a national program.
Since Canada has only a few terrorist convicts, it might be enough to build a small one-on-one program. We will have to identify and train appropriate interlocutors and develop a way to assess an inmate's progress. We will also have to think about post-release rehabilitation and assist ex-convicts to properly reintegrate into society. Rates of recidivism are influenced by an ex-convict's social environment and success at reintegration.
Finally, we need to recognize that prison imams play an important role in denying radicalism. Like all Canadians, Muslim inmates have a right to access religious leaders. Ensuring there are enough qualified imams to address prisoners' needs will sideline radical voices. At the same time, we need to exclude radical religious leaders and extremist literature from prison.
Islam is a multi-faceted religion with a diversity of interpretation. Some espouse violence. There have been unconfirmed reports, for example, that Hiva Alizadeh, one of the men arrested in Ottawa this past August, had spent two years volunteering as a spiritual caregiver at various Winnipeg-based correctional facilities. He is said to have ``counselled many Muslims and Aboriginal people who were incarcerated.'' Today, Alizadeh faces three terrorism charges, including possession of explosives with the intent to kill and injure. It might be difficult, but Canada must establish a review system that can vet members of the prison chaplaincy, part-time contractors and volunteers.
These solutions are easier to describe than to implement, but the emerging threat of homegrown terrorism in Canada may have a new source if we do not take the problem of prison radicalization seriously and act to stop it before it starts. Thank you kindly.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Dr. Wilner. I am tempted to say I wish you would get off the fence and tell us how you really feel, but that is clearly not necessary in this circumstance. I appreciate the clarity of your advice and counsel.
I will call on the deputy chair, Senator Joyal, to begin the questioning. Senator Joyal is from the province of Quebec.
Senator Joyal: Thank you, Mr. Wilner, for appearing here and giving us the insight of your thinking and knowledge. I would like to come back to the level of principles. In your presentation, you advocate for special treatment of terrorists who have been sentenced to jail for a certain period of time, and you advocate a special approach to their stay in prison.
Let us go back to the issue on the level of principles. Do you agree that the approach we have followed up until now, which is to treat the terrorists as normal criminals under the Criminal Code, needs to be reviewed to take into account the fact that, as you said, they are not the usual suspects? In other words, since there is a political, ideological or religious motivation behind their gestures, they are specific types of criminals. As such, the system should reflect that before they are sentenced instead of only after they are sentenced.
Do you agree that we should maintain the same approach to the justice system in relation to terrorists, pre- sentencing, or only post-sentencing, the way you expressed it today with your four recommendations?
Mr. Wilner: I think the system is working quite sufficiently. I want to be careful: Special treatment is one thing, but I am advocating for a tailored approach to dealing with terrorists. The idea is that they are politically motivated, so they are not like common criminals. They should be treated like criminals, but they might need extra incentives to rehabilitate. That should be part of a tailored approach in Canada's prisons as it has overseas.
Senator Joyal: Does that imply changes to the Criminal Code the way it is written now and the way that we implement it as is to apply to terrorists?
Mr. Wilner: I do not think so. Others might be better suited than I to respond to the minutiae and the details of the Criminal Code, but I think the system is working.
Again, I must emphasize that certain conditions need to be addressed, in particular with Islamist terrorists, that deal with political, religious and social issues. These are issues that, thankfully, Canada has only really had to deal with in the last five years. It is still a new area of concern. That is why we are fortunate. We have the ability to gain some logic and intelligence from our allies and come to the right policies. The Criminal Code should be left as it is.
The Chair: May I ask a small supplementary?
Senator Joyal: Yes, of course.
The Chair: Mr. Wilner, we have different kinds of terrorist experiences in this country. For example, we have had incidents in Northern Alberta with pipelines. To my knowledge, the incidents did not involve anyone of extreme Islamist background. We have had other sorts of difficulties, as have other countries, that have not involved people from Islamic backgrounds. For example, the government building that was destroyed in the United States did not involve anyone of Islamist background. I assume that your advice to us is with respect to people associated with conspiracy or actual terrorist activities, notwithstanding their ethnic or other background, and who have been found guilty under the existing provisions of the Criminal Code. I note that the Senate recently passed legislation dealing with conspiracy and suicide bombing such that conspiracy to plan a suicide bombing is an indictable offence. Your view relates to terrorists per se. You are dealing with the Islamist threat because that has been the recent experience in some circumstances. Are you suggesting that we should sort out by nature of the religious affiliation of the criminally convicted terrorist about to enter one of Her Majesty's Canadian prisons whether that person gets special surveillance or other kinds of monitoring because of the concerns that you raise? It is the crime of terrorism, I expect, that you are suggesting we need to address and not the religious affiliation of the convicted terrorist. Or are you saying that it is a combination of both?
Mr. Wilner: No, it is absolutely the crime of terrorism. Terrorism from any sect or religious or cultural group, such as white supremacy versus Sikh versus Tamil Tigers, et cetera, should all be considered as one criminal offence — terrorism. However, we might need tailored responses in each individual case. I have discussed Islamist terrorism because it is the biggest threat Canadians face. Of the 14 convictions, 13 were al Qaeda-inspired, if you will. Looking forward to trends in Europe and in the United States, where they deal with separatist terrorism and Marxist terrorism, al Qaeda-inspired homegrown terrorism is nonetheless the main threat.
The Chair: Thank you, Senator Joyal, for your indulgence.
Senator Joyal: I would like to return to your main topic of de-radicalization, if I may use such a broad heading.
You said we have not been able to develop a sufficient program of de-radicalization for convicted terrorists. It is my view that the de-radicalization program is twofold. One part addresses pre-terrorist acts to prevent groups that might be more vulnerable than others to what I call ``radicalism discourse.'' The second part comes into play when the person who has committed a terrorist act has been found guilty, sentenced and sent to Her Majesty's prison.
Should we not view the two parts of the program with a single approach to terrorism? Should we be much more concerned with de-radicalization at the pre-accusation stage? How should we approach de-radicalization within Canadian society and the identified vulnerable groups to make them more receptive to the ideology that sustains someone's terrorism conviction?
Mr. Wilner: You are right that prevention is important. The pre-terror de-radicalization that you talk about is of great utility. You are talking about broad society-based and community-based approaches to helping individuals in an effort to prevent radicalization within Canadian society.
The flip side of that is preventing radicalization within prisons. Some of the recommendations that I offer are tailored more specifically to the prison environment, notwithstanding the importance of de-radicalization in society. I believe the committee has heard numerous views on this. In the prison system there are a number of examples of cases from which Canadians might be able to cull lessons. In particular, there are a number of Asian-based and Middle Eastern-based de-radicalization prison programs that offer a number of incentives for de-radicalization and disengagement from terrorism, along with ideological or religious debate against some of the factors that legitimize terrorism.
Our prison system does not need a large-scale de-radicalization program. We have few terrorists in prison at this time. However, we need to think about what policies and strategies we might need on a one-to-one basis to deal with these individuals to assist their rehabilitation process, notwithstanding the important role of de-radicalization in society.
Senator Joyal: Do you think we should amend the correctional services legislation to establish those principles? Does the existing statutory framework for the management of prisons and prisoners have the necessary legal framework to implement a de-radicalization program within the prison system?
Mr. Wilner: Yes. It is simply a numbers game. We can do this within the existing framework. I do not think we need a large overhaul at this time, and hopefully we will never need an overhaul. However, we can learn lessons from our close allies, the U.K., France and Australia, and see what they have done to address these issues. At the current level, I think it would be sufficient to use the existing framework that we have in place.
Senator Joyal: Your prime recommendation to us is to form a task force that would include various agencies, such as the RCMP, prison authorities and other professional experts for the development of a program to meet the objective presented by you today. Would that be the first step in the implementation of such a program?
Mr. Wilner: These are the first steps. It will absolutely require community input from Canadian Muslim leaders and the prison chaplaincy. Certainly, there is a role for the RCMP, CSIS — the Canadian Security Intelligence Service — and others with correctional services. However, it will have to be at least formed and shaped with assistance from religious leaders.
Senator Joyal: Would it require the involvement of the National Parole Board? If the de-radicalization objectives are to be included in the system framework, someone would have to pronounce at some point whether the person has been meeting the objectives of the program. As you know, various steps are required of someone before he or she may be released into society. As well, the appeal process requires various steps for the release of someone who is deemed a danger to society. Have you considered that aspect in your reflections?
Mr. Wilner: I have done so briefly, exactly as you mentioned it.
Many Canadian terrorists are in prison for a couple of decades, at most; and some have life sentences, in the odd case. The majority of them are in prison for two to seven years. Some were convicted and released immediately. It is important to have some kind of measurable system to gauge how well the individual radical has addressed these issues and rehabilitated. That is the role for the National Parole Board.
Senator Joyal: You concur that the re-evaluation of the risk and of the intention of the person towards past terrorist activity or links with previous terrorist groups should be included within the present framework of the National Parole Board. That would need to be re-evaluated in the overall context of the commitment of the person to maintain the peace and to contribute to society as a good citizen in the future. That seems to me where the most important authority lies to evaluate and reach a conclusion, positive or negative, in relation to the recommendation you make.
Mr. Wilner: Yes, I think you are right. That is a very important part. Upon the release, we certainly want to help ex- convicts, ex-terrorists, rehabilitate and reintegrate into society. If they are not willing or ready to do that properly, we will have a problem, and the parole board will then certainly act as a defence to that risk.
The Chair: I will call on Senator Wallin from Saskatchewan. She chairs the Senate's National Security and Defence Committee, and she began her career as a social worker in the prisons of Saskatchewan, so she may have a particular perspective to add to this discussion.
Senator Wallin: Thank you, and yes, I do. That is where I will start with these questions.
You suggest trying to exclude radical literature coming into the prison. We now live in the era of the Internet. I do not know how on earth you would go about screening volunteer caregivers or religious advisers and determine whether they are spreading radicalization or not without infringing on everyone's rights, so I have a couple of general questions that puzzle me.
What would lead you to believe that we could change people's minds if they are al Qaeda-inspired with some kind of very limited education program that would be circumscribed by the prison system? If you have any examples from the U.K. or France or Australia, or you also mentioned Asia and the Middle East and the techniques they have, I would be interested to hear about those specifics.
Mr. Wilner: I do think that the screening process can be done with a mix of a review board and using peer review methodology. This will involve current chaplaincy members and other members of the community. There are cases from overseas and the New York state prison system and elsewhere that suggest that a review board of incoming prison imams and other religious leaders do work and can be done on a legal basis.
How can we change their minds? The problem we have with gauging lessons from overseas rehabilitation programs is that they are based almost exclusively on the local environment and local characteristics of the terrorist. Saudi Arabia's de-radicalization program might have some broad lessons for us in terms of identifying what kind of incentives might work, but the finer details do not apply to the Canadian or French or British experience because it is Saudi Arabia. The same would be said for Singapore, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and so on.
Broadly speaking, there are lessons that a de-radicalization program would have to involve de-legitimizing the kind of religious ideologies that go into and legitimize terrorism. I think you have had other speakers discuss a 12-step de- radicalization program. I think the bottom line is that de-legitimizing the ideology would involve debating some of the more religious aspects that some Islamist terrorists hold.
However, there are positive inducements we might offer as well. For instance, Saudi Arabia offers fast cars and cash to family members to help radicals see the light that what they were doing was wrong. We do not have to give terrorists cars, but we can offer other incentives. How about secular education, opportunities to work and opportunities to speak to other young, susceptible individuals?
Senator Wallin: The chair referred to the case that we call the Toronto 18. Given our own rules, many of them were not actually charged or incarcerated because they fell under the purview of the Young Offenders Act. We have all sorts of exceptions to prosecuting criminals and seeing that they stay in jail.
I know you are saying the idea of the fast cars is not applicable here, but we are dealing with people who have a radical commitment. These kids who were here — and I use the word ``kids'' advisedly because they are not — are old enough to go to university. They were wealthy; they lived in the West; they were not oppressed. They took this up as a cause because they thought it was sexy or interesting or fun. No one dissuaded them from that.
I come from the other school: The largest disincentive is to show others what might happen to them if they engage in this. Our legal system does not give us many of those tools.
I am at a loss. Maybe it is a philosophical difference we have here, and I do not mean to be dismissive, but I do not think we can hug these kids into changing their minds, because they are not suffering, especially the homegrown radicals that we are talking about. They are not experiencing any of those things that we might think they are in other lands.
Mr. Wilner: I appreciate your case. I think you are right. The problem stems from an inability to appreciate how radicalization works. It is different for different people. As you said, many individual terrorists are university- educated. The fellow who blew himself up in Stockholm on Saturday had a university education. They are not from the lower economic stratum. They have loving families and loving and warm communities and so forth.
Nonetheless, people do leave terrorism. Professor Silke discussed this with you earlier, two weeks ago, I think, in another session, but there are cases of people disengaging and de-radicalizing. They may become older or disenfranchised with the movement. They may come to realize with religious learning that what they espoused was in fact against their religion.
However, to suggest that every terrorist who goes to prison will come out a terrorist is too simplistic. Some individuals will retain radical ideals but will no longer support terrorism; some will come out and say they were wrong, for whatever reasons. It is our job in Canada to assist those processes. It will be difficult and uphill, but I think there are a number of avenues we might investigate.
Senator Wallin: Thank you.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you very much. I found your presentation very interesting. In your experience, have many people gone to prison and de-radicalized while in prison? What kinds of programs exist in prison to help de-radicalize prisoners?
Mr. Wilner: It is difficult to find measurable cases. You hear about the Saudi Arabian cases, the Egyptian cases that I discussed. They offer numbers, whether it is 75 per cent of people who go through their de-radicalization programs or not. Of course, you always hear about the one or two, or sometimes more, individuals who do come back and join terrorism after their release. Going back to earlier testimony that you heard from the U.K. experience, Professor Silke suggested that of the 300 or so U.K. terrorists who were released, not one went back to terrorism, which suggests a very low rate of recidivism. I have some reservations about his testimony, but his immediate environment, his study, suggests that there are low rates of recidivism, and he attributes deterrence and other roles. When we look for them, there are cases of de-radicalization and disengagement from terrorism.
Senator Jaffer: Do you think we should have separate prisons for terrorists?
Mr. Wilner: I do not think Canada needs to do that yet, or ever. It is a numbers game. We do not have so many of these criminals. As I suggested in my statement, we need the right process for separating those radicals in prison who are hell-bent on espousing and recruiting others, but we need a different system of containment or segregation or rehabilitation for the individual inmates who legitimately come to reject terrorism.
Canada needs detailed information on each particular terrorist convict. We can do that inexpensively at this point. We can then follow through on an individual basis as to whether that individual should be segregated or isolated, for how long and in what case, or whether the individual might be better off from a rehabilitation standpoint by being reintegrated into the general prison population.
Other countries, such as the United States and Spain, are dealing with hundreds of Islamist terrorists. They are thinking about building single wings of prisons or individual facilities for terrorism convicts, but there is no one blueprint for all. I think Canada needs a tailored, individualized system for its incarcerated individuals.
The Chair: Senator Jaffer, could I ask a supplementary, with your indulgence?
Mr. Wilner, when you say ``research,'' are you talking about longitudinal defendant, inmate, parolee, former defendant, former inmate kind of research that gives us micro data sets from the cycle of individuals who pass through the system on some sort of an automated basis? Or are you talking about research in best practices elsewhere? I was not clear what you meant by that, and any clarity would be helpful.
Mr. Wilner: I meant mostly best practices. When I say ``research,'' I mean from the academic perspective and some think tank perspectives on what other countries have been doing to deal with prison radicalization. There are some qualitative and quantitative studies on radicalization and de-radicalization, but the research collectively is nowhere near where we need it to be. When I say ``research,'' I mean best policy practices from other countries.
Senator Jaffer: I found your presentation interesting from the perspective that you are a Canadian working in Europe, so you are learning from many different experiences. You said Canadians face fewer threats from terrorism. Are we doing something correctly? What more should we do to discourage terrorism? How can we prevent homegrown terrorists?
Mr. Wilner: If I had the answer to that, I would be rich. To be honest, I am not sure. It is interesting to be a Canadian living in Europe when there are weekly terrorism alerts, whether in France, the U.K. or Germany. Switzerland has flown below the radar, except of course there have been bans on minarets and those kinds of things, so they have caught the ire of some al Qaeda types.
I do think Canada has particular domestic characteristics. For instance, we have a disproportionately large Shia community, and al Qaeda-based terrorists are usually Sunni-oriented, so that might have an impact. Potentially, we are simply better at integrating our young individuals and young immigrants. It seems very difficult for a Turk to become German. We are seeing these debates come out in the open. It is very difficult for an Algerian to become a Frenchman. It is much less difficult for those similar types to become Canadian, partly because of our historical background and political experiment.
Senator Marshall: Mr. Wilner, when you talk about deradicalization and about other countries' programs, do you know for a fact that there are programs that have been successful? From what you have said so far, it sounds like much of it is theoretical in general. Would you know whether specific countries have deemed their programs to be successful and whether those have been proven to be successful through some sort of analysis?
Mr. Wilner: Your question is excellent. I think the main difficulty we have now is in measuring successes in de- radicalization. Saudi Arabia might say it has a success rate of 98 per cent, but what does that mean? Does that mean that 98 per cent of the people are no longer radicals or terrorists, or that 98 per cent reintegrate into Saudi culture? We should take every success story with a grain of salt.
However, the big issue is that there is distinction between de-radicalization and disengagement. They are similar processes, but the differences are important. De-radicalization is rejecting the ideology and the world views that went into legitimizing the political violence. Disengagement from terrorism is rejecting the violence but not rejecting the ideology. Therefore, I think we are seeing success rates in disengagement from terrorism. Individuals are leaving prison no longer participating and no longer willing to participate in terrorism, but they are retaining their radical ideologies.
I think what Canada will probably need to do is have a debate. Is that sufficient? Is that good enough for us?
Senator Marshall: You can really break the prison population down into components: the regular prisoners, the serial killers, the sex offenders and the terrorists. When it comes to the rehabilitation of a serial killer or a sexual offender, history has shown that we have not been that successful. Whether we have programs that can rehabilitate certain types of prisoners is still questionable. We do not know at this point whether rehabilitating a terrorist is possible, and we have a long road ahead of us.
Mr. Wilner: We do have a long road ahead of us. Again, it is about developing the proper tools to measure successes and failures in overseas programming.
The U.K. is rolling out its own small-scale de-radicalization program. I suspect it will have built in a way to measure success, so we should stay attuned to that development, certainly in the coming year or in the two- or three-year process to see how the U.K. is finding the program. We might build general lessons from overseas, but it is in Western Europe, Australia and the United States where we will find lessons for our own small-scale de-radicalization programs.
Senator Marshall: I can follow the logic in your comments, but many of them are still theoretical, are they not?
Mr. Wilner: Many of my comments are theoretical, but the policy prescriptions are developed from the policies that our allies and friends have pursued. If France finds it has success throwing its terrorist convicts into the general population, that is measurable and something Canadians can learn from. If the Netherlands, which has only half a dozen or so homegrown terrorists, concentrates them within one wing, we should understand why that is and learn from that and implement it here.
The bottom line is that we are particularly well placed as a country to learn from others and to think about this problem well ahead of others in order to nip the problem in the bud before it becomes a full-blown issue.
Senator Marshall: Do you think terrorists should be isolated while they are in prison? You just mentioned a country that has a terrorism wing for all its terrorists in prison. I do not see the logic of putting them all in one wing. I would think it more logical to hold them in segregation. Could I have your comments on that?
Mr. Wilner: It depends on the individual case. It does not have to be very complicated. Some individuals may benefit from being segregated from others and of course the general prison population. Individuals like Ali Dirie, who, as I reported, tried to recruit others, should be isolated and segregated for a predetermined amount of time.
However, individuals who do renounce terrorism — again, I have to stress that there are people who do come back from political violence — should not be segregated. They should be mixed in with others to help show them, by saying, ``Listen, I did this; I was wrong. Here is why I was wrong, and here is why you are wrong too.'' There is a lot to be learned from inter-prisoner interactions.
The Chair: Before I go to Senator Furey, Senator Joyal wanted a brief supplementary.
Senator Joyal: Mr. Wilner, I was listening to you carefully, and I understand that the U.K. has a greater number of jailed terrorists than the Netherlands and certainly Switzerland. Why did you not choose to go to the U.K. to continue your studies, considering that this is the main focus of your reflection and research? It seems to me that if there is a country where there is more to learn, it could be the U.K. I do not mean to say that from Switzerland you cannot study what is going on in the U.K. However, having studied in the U.K., I felt it was the place where I could learn more directly from the source. Why did you not choose to go to the U.K. to continue your study on the basis of your assumption?
The Chair: Before you answer that question, I would point out that the decision about where to do a post-doctoral research assignment is complex and includes a series of variables unrelated to the subject being studied. I will let Dr. Wilner address that question.
Senator Joyal: I did not want to get too personal.
Mr. Wilner: Senator, if you can find me the grants, I will happily go to London and study there.
Senator Joyal: I was on a grant in London.
Mr. Wilner: I think you are right. My research would be well served in France, Spain, the U.K., the U.S. or Canada, I would suggest.
This is a preliminary study. The study was timely, given that we have seen a rise of our own homegrown terrorists. The research I am presenting to you is all open source. I did some interviews over the phone with other experts to get their advice. The next step is to do some more on-the-ground interviews with former jihadis and terrorists. If I can get into prison to do so, that would be great. This is a preliminary investigation that might stretch out for another decade.
If you do know of research grants available for me to take my work to London, that would be great.
Senator Joyal: Maybe we should speak after the committee today and see what we can share as a common experience.
Senator Furey: Thank you, Dr. Wilner, for being with us today. I certainly agree with much, if not all, of what you have said today. However, much of what you talk about requires developing new programs, training personnel, increasing the numbers of personnel, segregation and, in fact, more bricks and mortar.
There are huge costs associated with just about everything you talked about today. Are other countries making significant economic investments in these types of suggestions?
Mr. Wilner: I believe so. It depends on how you want to label ``significant,'' but they certainly are investing, if not in bricks and mortar, then in new prison systems and in the research to understand radicalization in their own backyards and in training front-line staff to first identify and then deal with radicalization. They are printing handbooks for prison guides and so on.
These are all things I think Canada should do. There are a number of things we could do cheaply up front, given the fact that we are well ahead of the curve and well positioned. Prison radicalization is on the radar. The Correctional Service of Canada has been dealing with it. CSC has liaison officers with CSIS researching this topic. It is a matter of focusing our energies a little, investing some resources and coming out with a plan.
Senator Furey: My second question is somewhat similar to the one Senator Marshall raised. You indicated that Canadian radicalization is different from British, French, and American radicalization. You suggested that to better understand Canadian radicalization, we should move in the direction of establishing a task force.
What are a couple of the main similarities among the British, French and American radicalization that you have studied, and what are some of the dissimilarities?
Mr. Wilner: Among the Canadians we have incarcerated, many suggest that what they are doing is based on anger over foreign policy, the ``get out of Afghanistan'' mentality. That is a common thread running through various nations, whether it is get out of Afghanistan or get out of Iraq, and so forth. That is one similarity.
There are global issues going on as well. Islamist terrorists self-identify and consider themselves to be good Muslims. That you will find across the board.
One of the differences, though, is that I think Canadian radicals find a lot less sympathy within the broader community. While we have some issues, let us say, within the university, we do not have hotbeds of radical thought in Canadian universities like they do in the U.K. or in France.
There are both similarities and differences. A university-based task force could bring together academics, policy- makers and community leaders and come up with a broad description. As far as I have seen, the RCMP and others have come out with smaller documents illustrating Canadian radicalization, but we need a more substantial and beefy report on the subject.
Senator Wallin: You keep suggesting that foreign policy might have triggered this. However, America was not in Iraq or Afghanistan when the towers came down. I am thinking about Air India and earlier terrorist events.
Do you really believe these people are all motivated by specific foreign policy events?
Mr. Wilner: No, I do not. I think foreign policy events are one precursor or aspect of radicalization. These people suggest they are motivated by such acts. I think you are right.
For example, with regard to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a number of countries vociferously condemned that invasion — Canada, France, Belgium and Germany — and were nonetheless attacked, well after the Iraq war. Countries that joined the United States, like Spain and Australia, only to retreat, nonetheless suffered attacks. A number of countries that went to Iraq and remained there — Hungary, Romania and others — did not receive attacks. The relationship is complicated. Nonetheless, foreign policy does seem to be some sort of precursor.
Senator Furey: To follow up on Senator Wallin's question, I know it was a few years before, but would the Gulf War have played into that, do you think?
Mr. Wilner: I think so, and I would even suggest the wars in Bosnia as well. I am not an expert on the motivations of jihadis, but I do think they have a broad view of history. Osama bin Laden goes back generations and millennia to suggest that he is legitimate in what he is doing. The lessons of the Gulf War might be one factor, and certainly there are others. Now the focus is Afghanistan, and it was Iraq until a couple of years ago.
The Chair: Let us suppose a 19- or 20-year-old gets caught in a barroom brawl and someone is killed; perhaps it is manslaughter. He goes through due process and is put in jail, in the general prison population. He meets up with some bad actors — which is whom you tend to find in the prison population — all of whom protest their innocence every day, just as a matter of course. They have no political justification for why they are there. They are not part of some greater cause or about creating a large Islamic world empire. They are about crime, specifically.
We know that on many occasions this young person found himself in a difficult situation. He is found guilty by a court of law and then comes out of prison with a network and a skill set substantially broader than those he brought into the facility.
Our prison systems have been concerned about this effect for a long time. The John Howard Society and others have worked hard; prison social workers have engaged fully; and there has been a mixed outcome, at best, in the process. The issue you are discussing is, in a sense, a whole new level of complexity to this particular kind of paradigm.
What gives you confidence that, with the best of efforts, the best of intent, and with unlimited budgets — not all of the three are always in place — our system could deal with this level of complexity any more efficiently than we now deal with what we know to be a long-term recidivist problem related to the networks and relationships that are built in prison when young people at an impressionable young age find themselves guests of Her Majesty in a serious facility?
Where does your confidence come from? That question derives from one posed by Senator Jaffer. What is the basis upon which you conclude that governments, with the best of intentions, can actually construct a system that would make a difference in these difficult circumstances?
Mr. Wilner: I think just a general overview is that terrorism does end. People do not always facilitate and participate in terrorism. That has been the case with all other types of terrorism that we have seen. There is waxing and waning of support. There should be no difference with the current state of Islamist terrorism, the current rise, if you will. There is even debate. Some people suggest that it is on the downfall. Again, I cannot be sure.
However, I am sure that doing nothing would be the absolute worst thing that Canada could do. Doing nothing to prepare ourselves to deal with the current influx of Islamist terrorist prisoners would be catastrophic. Do I think we will have a 100 per cent success rate? Probably not, but we can certainly try.
Senator Joyal: Mr. Wilner, I would like to return to the issue of motivation. You have mentioned anger over foreign policy, getting out of Iraq, et cetera. I would like to suggest something to you and get your reaction.
I think the new reality is that now al Qaeda and all the extremists are advocating violent reaction to Western society and will use any opportunity and any arguments to try to whip the new soldier.
Over the weekend, I was reading what happened in Norway. One of the alleged reasons was the Muhammad caricature, which came after the invasion of Iraq, after the Afghanistan war and September 11. However, it became a target for anyone who wanted to express anger towards Western society. There might be another situation down the road, and that will become the new motivation.
We must recognize that those people who advocate violence toward Western society now have the international media. They have an international platform. They have the new media to communicate. They will use any opportunities or arguments to try to return to the forefront of whipping the troops. This is a reality that as a society we must cope with. It is there and will stay there.
We should not be limited in our interpretation of where the context lies in which the discussion we are having today will find itself developing in the coming years. I do not think we are addressing a situation that, through time, will settle 9/11 or when the war in Afghanistan will wind up or when Iraqis will take control of their own country. I think new arguments will develop over the years, because we are facing peoples who have decided that it is a war against Western society and Western values. We will have to face anything that will be seen to offend Islamic views of their own depiction, which is totally outside the Quran in the way it has been interpreted. This seems to me to be an important element of what I call the new dynamism, which is much beyond 9/11 and Afghanistan, where we are now.
Could you comment on that? Am I wrong, or do you think there is a basis for that?
Mr. Wilner: No, I think you are right. I think there is a continuous search for these ``lightning rods,'' if you will, whether they are foreign policy engagements or acts of humiliation, which is how I would categorize the cartoon fiasco. There is now anger over drone attacks in Pakistan and elsewhere. You are correct: There is a list of continuing lightening rods that jihadists can use to help facilitate radicalization and promote their cause.
Again, research shows that terrorism does end. It might take decades, but radical movements often lose steam. It is not only about soft tactics; we might need hard tactics, and I think we are using these in certain areas. Through the right combination, we can come out on top in this conflict.
Senator Joyal: I would like to return to your earlier point, which is what we should do from there.
Have you had any contact or exchange of information with CSIS, Public Safety Canada or Correctional Services of Canada regarding your proposals and work? Did they express any interest, or are we at the point where we should be recommending, in our own work, that that aspect of the responsibility be acted upon differently than in the past? In other words, have you received feedback from them expressing interest in your overall approach and how serious it is?
Mr. Wilner: Yes. In August I presented to CSIS the preliminary findings for the exact research document that I am presenting to you. I was invited to come represent myself, and I discussed not only prison radicalization but other aspects of deterring terrorism. They were very interested. The meeting included members of the Correctional Service of Canada, the CSC, who were liaising with CSIS. I think what they need, though, is some research on the ground. I offered them open-source materials which, quite frankly, they have. I may have been able to bring different ideas, examples and lessons together, but they are certainly interested in these issues, as far as I could tell.
Senator Joyal: Is that interest materializing in some decisions, or were they just polite to you in saying, ``Yes, we are interested,'' but from there on what do they do? I am sorry, but if we are to be specific, we need to know what to do with your approach.
Mr. Wilner: I think there was legitimate concern within CSIS, among the limited number of people I met in the room. There was severe concern with prison radicalization in particular. They were trying to suggest that they needed to ``ring alarm bells'' — that was the phrase they used — to try to drum up support.
The individual there representing CSC said that he was the only one doing this research and that he needed help. That was the message he brought to the table.
I think there is an awareness. I think this report is well timed. It drummed up some media attention, and that, I am sure, infiltrated the Department of National Defence, the RCMP and elsewhere. I do think it is on the agenda.
Senator Jaffer: My question again is on the radicalization. I have been on the Anti-terrorism Committee since its inception, and I have never heard what you have said, that maybe we have less radicalization here because our Shia community is bigger. I am not sure whether it is bigger or a larger proportion, but it is the first time I have heard that observation.
Especially since you are in Europe, do you not think one of the reasons we do not have as much radicalization is because we have better integration policies? One can become a Canadian in three years; in Switzerland it takes 15 years before they even look at you.
Mr. Wilner: I think you are right. I will never become Swiss. I will never be invited to become Swiss, and that is fine. I do think it is much easier for people who want to immigrate and become Canadians citizens to do so. I am not sure whether that buys us goodwill globally, but it does help our immigrant communities to settle better. That is a fundamental difference, but you will have to get someone who is an expert on multiculturalism to give you the finer details.
I have to admit it is night and day between living in Europe as a foreigner and what I would expect a foreigner would experience in Canada. I think that is based on fundamental historical developments of pitting European versus Canadian political development. It is night and day.
The Chair: Dr. Wilner, on behalf of all of us, I want to express our thanks for the time you made available to be of assistance to us. May I also express the hope that when you are finished your post-doc there will be a way for you to come back to Canada and contribute to our intellectual acuity on this and related issues. I know that contribution would be deeply appreciated.
Honourable senators, I am delighted to introduce our second witness. Professor Kent Roach, who has appeared before this committee in the past, is the Prichard-Wilson Chair of Law and Public Policy at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, with cross-appointments in criminology and political science. He is a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. He is a graduate of the University of Toronto and of Yale and a former law clerk to Justice Bertha Wilson of the Supreme Court of Canada.
He specializes in anti-terrorism law and policy and is the co-editor of The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's Anti- Terrorism Bill, 2001, and Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, 2005. Professor Roach also served on the research advisory committee for the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar and was the director of research, legal studies, for the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. Professor Roach's current research involves the comparative study of miscarriages of justice, comparative judicial review and comparative anti-terrorism law and policy.
Dr. Roach, we are grateful that you would make yourself available to us for both an opening statement and for questions from my colleagues on the committee. Welcome to the committee. We are in your hands for your opening comments.
Kent Roach, Prichard-Wilson Chair of Law and Public Policy, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, as an individual: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. It is an honour to be here again.
I want to start by saying that I accept that homegrown terrorism as seen in the Khawaja, Namouth and Toronto terrorism prosecutions is a real and serious threat to Canada's security. Canada has of course faced homegrown terrorism before, including most tragically the Air India bombings. Although we must be vigilant to the dangers of homegrown terrorism, we must also respect the fundamental differences between radical or extremist beliefs and expressions, and criminal actions or security threats directed towards or in support of terrorist violence.
We should take care not to stigmatize certain religions or sects within religions with associations with terrorism. We should do this for both principled and pragmatic reasons. A free and democratic society such as ours can of course tolerate a diversity of views, including those that we find objectionable. We also cannot afford to send a message to any community that it is presumptively suspect. Muslim Canadians, including those associated with so-called Muslim extremism, played an important role in assisting the state to obtain important evidence in the largely successful Toronto terrorism prosecutions. The Air India investigation affirmed the dangers of treating informers within small and even radical communities as if they were criminals.
Canada has not enacted a new advocacy or glorification of terrorism offence in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1624, and I applaud this restraint. Our existing offences in relation to counselling crimes and hate propaganda should be adequate to respond to extremist speech that causes harm. I hasten to add, though, that elected officials and the media should not hesitate to denounce hateful and extremist speech or speech that condones violence and that sometimes extremist speech may provide grounds for further investigation and surveillance.
To my mind, the battle against terrorism and in particular homegrown terrorism is in part a battle of ideas. From 2001 to 2003, Canada issued five security certificates to detain men suspected of involvement with al Qaeda terrorism. As this committee knows — and I know things have changed, perhaps, with the Harkat decision — there have been numerous and often successful legal challenges, especially to the use of secret evidence in these cases and CSIS's practice of destroying raw intelligence.
I would invite this committee to look at security and security certificates through another lens. In an October 2009 speech, Richard Fadden, the director of CSIS, claimed that a:
. . . loose partnership of single-issue NGOs, advocacy journalists and lawyers has succeeded, to a certain extent, in forging a positive public image for anyone accused of terrorist links or charges.
I disagree with Director Fadden's admittedly candid remarks. In my view, any fair appraisal of media and civil society discussions reveals that the vast majority of the sympathy that Director Fadden claims exists for those accused of terrorists links or charges is in fact directed toward security certificate detainees who have been detained on the basis of secret and at times flawed evidence produced by his agency or Canadians who were tortured abroad, again with indirect contributions from Canadian agencies, as opposed to those who have been charged with or convicted of criminal terrorism offences.
In my view, security certificates have failed as counterterrorism policy. They have resulted in long-term and indeterminate detention that is only sustained by the threat of deporting the detainees to countries where they may be tortured. I am aware that I am disagreeing with the The Globe and Mail's editorial today, but so be it. Those who have been subject to security certificates, especially before the introduction of special advocates, have become martyrs in what is an unfair process. I am concerned that the three security certificates that linger on may be doing more harm than good, not only to human rights but also to public confidence in counterterrorism efforts. I would urge this committee to advise the government about an appropriate exit strategy from these problematic proceedings.
The use of immigration law as anti-terrorism law is fundamentally flawed because it cannot be directed against citizens who are prepared to engage in terrorism. It also distracts our attention from more fundamental reforms such as those Justice Major recommended in the Air India inquiry to improve the ability of our criminal justice system to respond to terrorist threats. Whatever the case may have been for issuing these certificates between 2001 and 2003, the government needs to have a more viable strategy as 2010 ends.
I am confident that Canadians, including those who have been critical of some of our past security efforts, will accept that those who would plot terrorist violence should rightly be punished and denounced after their guilt has been established. One unfortunate by-product of frequent publication bans, especially in the Toronto terrorism prosecutions, is that Canadians may not have ready access to the evidence that has been accepted by judges and juries in our successful terrorism prosecutions. It would be helpful if the Department of Justice Canada or the Director of Public Prosecutions issued a factual report on Canada's recent terrorism prosecutions. I also note that the last entry in a list of publications on terrorism on CSIS's own website is from 2000.
I am concerned that Director Fadden's remarks that I quoted reflect a certain siege mentality at the highest level of our security establishment that tends to see lawyers, non-governmental organizations, review agencies, public inquiries and the courts as the enemy of security.
It took the government four years to respond to the recommendations of Part II of Justice O'Connor's Arar commission. In my view, the response, in the form of Bill C-38, falls far short of what Justice O'Connor recommended. It provides a recipe for continued conflict, delay and litigation about whether the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP can have access to information that the RCMP claims is secret. It rejects Justice O'Connor's recommendations that that commission should have the same access to secret information as does the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC, and that SIRC's jurisdiction should also be expanded.
The type of enhanced review of the propriety of national security activities recommended by Justice O'Connor and of the efficacy of such activities recommended by Justice Major should not be seen as a hindrance to the admittedly difficult work that our agencies do in trying to prevent terrorism. Rather, review is critical to ensuring public confidence in our security efforts and ensuring that improvements are made when they are necessary. In my view, effective review is the best way to avoid both another Air India and another Maher Arar case.
Finally, I would ask this committee to urge the government to address the 2004 National Security Policy. I believe that that policy, based on an all-risk approach that features the need for review and coordination, is basically sound. Events such as Hurricane Katrina and the recent fires in Israel underline that terrorism is not the only threat to security that we face.
I would note that the government has not issued a progress report on its 2004 National Security Policy since 2005. That is five years. Any national security policy will only be effective if the government is committed to it and evaluates its work against that broad strategy.
One innovation in the 2004 policy that is particularly relevant to this committee's work is the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security. I am aware of the information that the Department of Public Safety Canada has posted about the frequent meetings of this round table, but I must say that it has failed, in my view, to emerge as an active presence. This is unfortunate because there is a need for an effective interlocutor between Canada's diverse communities and the government on security issues. This dialogue needs to be genuine. It needs to be two way so that the government both conveys information and is informed of perceptions and grievances that exist in specific communities. It is not clear to me that the round table is up to this task, but it is clear to me that this task is an important one that should be pursued. I hope this opening statement has been of assistance, and I look forward to answering your questions.
The Chair: Professor Roach, thank you very much for that.
You referred often to a review of our security activities as recommended in the O'Connor commission, I believe it was. Our allies, Australia, the U.K., the U.S., France and the Dutch, to name but a few, have a process called legislative oversight. In some cases, it involves legislators who have had security clearance. In the Dutch circumstance, it does not involve people who have security clearance, even though the meetings are confidential and take place in the presence of senior legislators and the minister.
I have heard various folks involved with security services around the world make the case that this is helpful to them in the performance of their duties because when they have to come close to the line for reasons that relate to real threats to national security, there is a place they can go, other than to an official in the Privy Council Office, who has no direct formal accountability, to have that discussion.
Am I to interpret from your presentation that you have a bias, for good and substantial reason, no doubt, in favour of review as opposed to legislative oversight?
Mr. Roach: I do not think the two have to be mutually exclusive. Obviously, the Arar commission focused on review as practised by SIRC and as practised by the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP. There are some advantages to having an independent body that can audit the ongoing works.
I have no opposition to the legislative review you speak of. It is regrettable that our parliamentarians do not see secret information in the way that SIRC saw secret information and in the way that the public inquiries saw secret information. I am not at all opposed to the idea that we would have a parliamentary committee that would see secret information. Given that SIRC relies upon people being members of the Privy Council, I also do not think that it is insurmountable from a legal point of view. Although the secret information cannot be made public, having seen it would improve the debate.
You mentioned the idea of agencies coming to legislative oversight with issues that I think you said go close to the line. I am a little more leery about that sort of legislative review, because there are principles of ministerial accountability. In the United States, for example, when the scandal broke about President Bush's orders with respect to the national security intelligence agency using electronic surveillance on Americans in violation of their legislative structure, it turned out that some people in Congress had been briefed about that activity. They really could not do anything. Of course, that activity was all classified. I look at what happened south of the border on that issue and I am quite proud of the Canadian response, which was to legislate this issue in the Anti-terrorism Act of 2001 and to establish a watchdog for our signals intelligence agency that issues periodical reports.
It is a long answer to your question, Mr. Chair. I am not opposed to parliamentarians having access to secret information. I think it is regrettable that they are not, but we need to be careful not to confuse lines of ministerial accountability or frankly to put our parliamentarians in a position where they may know about things that they find objectionable but really cannot do anything about.
The Chair: Thank you for that, professor. I have a question on control orders, but I will save it for the second round.
Senator Joyal: Welcome back, Professor Roach. I would like to come back to the general policy approach to issues of terrorism and the way we manage them. I have the general perception, drawn from the statements made by Mr. Fadden over the last month, that he seems to lead us to understand that the courts are a hindrance in the management of the activities of CSIS and the activities of counterterrorism.
We have been waiting for the government action plan following the Air India report. There was a major recommendation in it for a national security adviser, which would have structured the management of our responsibility in a more balanced way. This committee that you have been testifying before over the years has recommended specific roles for parliamentarians. We almost succeeded at one point in time, but unfortunately the political deadlines put it on the back burner. We recently had recommendations that were also left pending.
It seems to me that there is an internal discussion within all those agencies — the RCMP, CSIS, Public Safety Canada — regarding ministerial responsibility, as our chair has put it, and we have not yet defined the management structure and level of responsibilities.
If something happened in our country to make us go back on the way we have managed our reaction, we would probably find ourselves reinvestigating 9/11 — a diffusion of responsibility in the system with many grey zones, many principles that are still being debated. We have seen the decision of the court last week — it is under appeal, and I would prefer to abstain from comment — but it is still not yet clear.
You and others from the academic community have been making recommendations over the years, but it does not seem that we have succeeded in grasping all those elements to make it a structure with an efficient and coherent policy management approach.
Am I right or wrong in that? From there, what should we be doing or taking as the first step to come to grips with what should be the government policy in 2011, 10 years after the triggering situation that led us to where we are today?
What is your perception — not from the outside, because you have been following that issue closely — of the reading of the situation? Am I totally wrong? I am not an expert. It seems to me I am still losing track of the logic of the system.
Mr. Roach: I agree with that, Senator Joyal. Having had the honour of working on a number of commissions, I have learned that Ottawa moves very slowly. I do not know this for sure, but my perception is that there has been resistance to some of the major recommendations that both Justice O'Connor made in Arar and Justice Major made in Air India. As I said, the most important recommendations from both of those commissions were about review, oversight and responsibility — exactly what you were talking about.
The Air India Inquiry Action Plan says nothing about the issue of a national security adviser. I am not speaking for Justice Major; I am just speaking as an academic. I think it is clear from Justice Major's report that he said we have given CSIS and the RCMP two different jobs to do. One is about secret intelligence; the other is about crime prevention and law enforcement. However hard they work, however much goodwill there is, there are inevitably going to be conflicts because we have given them conflicting mandates. His approach was that the only way we can solve that is basically by taking it to the top and allowing the Prime Minister, through his national security adviser, to resolve these issues of conflicts.
For me, the biggest disappointments are, first, that the Air India Inquiry Action Plan does not seem to address this issue or the related issue of amending the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. The recommendation for the national security adviser was in large part because Justice Major concluded that CSIS should no longer have a discretion to keep relevant intelligence to itself, not that it should necessarily always be passed off to the RCMP and get into the disclosure stream, but that in those difficult cases the issue should sit on someone's desk, that of the national security adviser.
Second, I know that some people, including the late Mr. Hooper, saw this as a potential conflict between the two inquiries, and having worked on both inquiries I have a vested interest in thinking that there is some consistency between the two. However, Justice O'Connor's recommendations were also about having a basic principle that as the whole of government is involved, and appropriately so, in issues of security and terrorism, review should also expand to match those intensified and integrated national security efforts.
Those are the two areas where, unfortunately, the government just seems not to have accepted those recommendations. My only explanation for it is that the agencies have interests that they do not want that sort of review. They do not want SIRC having review over the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or over FINTRAC — the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada — and they do not want a national security adviser having that more direct, hands-on role. As someone who is aware of how organizations and bureaucracies work, I can understand that, but I have to say that I do not think it is in the public interest.
The Chair: We had three police forces, anti-terrorist investigative units, appear before this committee, from Montreal, Vancouver and Toronto. They all agreed that a national security adviser with a statutory capacity to force the sharing of information on a timely basis was something they would support. Even our friends in Quebec were supportive of that proposition.
Even though the police are of this opinion, and two royal commissions have made substantially the same recommendations, and I cannot imagine that elected politicians would be going out of their way not to take upon themselves and their advisers a kind of coherent, strategic capacity on this issue, are you saying it is essentially the bureaucratic biases of protect oneself first and one's freedom of operation that are keeping the matter from moving ahead? Is that your sense, based on your experience with these sorts of issues?
Mr. Roach: It is my sense. To be fair, the best argument from the government's perspective — and we heard echoes of it with respect to the Air India action plan — is a fear that the national security adviser will somehow circumvent the authority of the Minister of Public Safety.
There is an argument that the Minister of Public Safety is the one who, especially with the RCMP and CSIS, should resolve the disputes. However, I think the Major commission report proceeds under the function that national security is such an important issue that it is ultimately going to be a matter for the Prime Minister. That is why it is the Prime Minister's national security adviser.
I think it is very important to recognize that is part of the equation. It is not a new bureaucracy or some other agency that will be invented. It is the Prime Minister's national security adviser, who already exists, as you know, within Privy Council.
In addition to bureaucratic inertia, the best argument I have heard against the national security adviser is the argument for ministerial responsibility. However, given the importance of national security, and given there is already a Privy Council Office presence here, I ultimately do not find that persuasive.
Senator Joyal: I would like to come back to that. In the system, I feel there is an element of mistrust between the two agencies. There are boundaries or fences still, even though when we heard the representatives of those agencies, they seemed to be happy with one another. However, we know that in the land, when they are confronted day to day with the operational issues, things might be not as cozy as we have been told they are.
On the other hand, I feel there is also, as you pointed out in your presentation on pages 2 and 3, an element of uneasiness with the court intervention. You were there from the beginning when we proposed the special advocate. You will remember the discussions in those years and where that led us to at this point in time.
There is also another element. Knowing the culture within the agencies responsible for security, there is a view of the mind — as we say in French, une vue de l'esprit — to think that on a daily basis, the minister will be there to arbitrate between the various agencies on whether they should issue this or that information over an investigation.
I think it is wrong for a minister to be involved in the management of an investigation. That is my strong perception and conviction. Believe me, as a minister, I would feel much more comfortable having a national security adviser do that on a daily basis and report to me at the end rather than being the arbitrator among all the discussions and exchanges of information and so forth.
I think it is a way of hiding the politics with a small ``p'' behind the curtain by saying that questions the ministerial responsibility. If you have read the Gomery report — and I am sure you have — over the principle of ministerial responsibility, if there is one thing we have learned from that, I think this is one of the conclusions.
There is still, in the system, an overall element of mistrust about the rule of law and where the responsibility lies. Ultimately, the minister is responsible to Parliament. The way for Parliament to assume that responsibility is to have a committee of Parliament totally structured for the job — sworn into confidentiality and so forth — to be able to carry that responsibility in the proper way.
After 10 years, we are still trying to find our way in there. It will probably take another royal commission or another investigation chaired by another justice of this world to try to come back finally to the same conclusion.
We have read the recommendations from those reports, from commissions of inquiry, and we have been reflecting upon it, and, as senators, we have seen the train passing in front of us always come back to the same fundamental principle. Do you think there is a way for us to get out of that conundrum? It seems that at this point in time, we are back at point one of where we were before.
Mr. Roach: I think we cannot wait for another inquiry. We need to do the hard work now, to really digest all of the inquiries that we have had.
You speak about the distrust. I agree with that, but I would add that it is not a psychological thing that we can expect CSIS and the RCMP to get over. It is inherent in their mandates. In some ways, they really should distrust each other if they are both doing their own jobs.
For example, you have a human source. CSIS wants to keep that human source always secret and always going. The RCMP looks at a human source and says, ``We need evidence, and if it has to be the source, then it has to be the source.'' This distrust is not something that is solved by personalities. It has to be solved by institutions — specifically, a dispute resolution institution.
Finally, with respect to the rule of law, to be fair to CSIS — and the security certificates have largely done this — it has gone through what Director Judd referred to as a ``judicialization of intelligence,'' which the CSIS people never imagined would happen to them. They have come out of a Cold War, where you could argue that security intelligence should always remain secret, to a world where there will be adversarial challenge with the special advocates. Charkaoui 2 — Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 — told CSIS that since 1984 it had been misinterpreting its act and that it is no longer sufficient to destroy the raw intelligence. This has been a real sea change for CSIS.
Yes, like you, I see some resistance, and I am not particularly happy with it. However, I also recognize that their world has fundamentally changed in the last five years. I hope that they get away from this defensiveness and accept that their fundamental job description has changed.
Senator Joyal: As parliamentarians, should we take a special initiative at this point to bring a resolution to the conundrum you describe?
Mr. Roach: I think one role of Parliament is to hold the government to account. Decisions have been made not to follow significant recommendations of both the Arar and the Air India reports. Obviously, that is the government's prerogative; these are just advisory commissions. However, I do think that given the time and effort that was put into these reports, the government should have to give us more detailed reasons about why it is not pursuing these recommendations.
Senator Wallin: On your last point, I agree there should be some explanation. However, we have also heard testimony at this committee on the idea of a national security czar. I do not think it was clear in the recommendations that the intent was that it be the same person as the national security adviser under the Privy Council Office. I think that concept was open.
There was testimony saying we do not need another bureaucracy. Maybe I misunderstood this, but the czar role seemed to be a different role than the national security adviser, so you would in fact create another structure.
We heard from the organizations themselves, who have worked out privately and behind the scenes some way to communicate with each other, that if that were then forced into public view, it would probably break down. I think there are some arguments against that kind of a structure. That is kind of a detail in this context.
You made two points that I would like you to elaboration upon. The first is the publication bans that we see. I think I am interpreting you correctly to say that you see that as denying the role of public education that happens through this process in keeping Canadians aware. What would you recommend regarding that? Would you recommend that the bans be banned?
The second issue was about the National Security Policy. You commented that you have not seen a progress report since 2005. SIRC presumably looks at that. What do you want to see? Is this something you want from the minister or the Prime Minister? What would satisfy that so-called need for a progress report?
Mr. Roach: Thank you for the questions. On the issue of publication bans, there is a role for publication bans, especially where there are ongoing trials. However, we have now had a completion, especially of the Toronto terrorism prosecutions. I think it would be helpful to do a kind of very factual lessons-learned report that makes available to the public in a digestible way all the things that went into those cases. As someone who follows this on a full-time basis, I have to say it is frustrating that there is no single judgment that can be read.
I do not think this should be an opportunity to make policy arguments or to do fear mongering. However, a factual lessons learned would be helpful, and we could indicate that these are the prosecutions we have had since 9/11 and this is the information.
On the issue of the progress report, Senator Wallin, there was a fairly detailed 2005 progress report issued through the Minister of Public Safety; it is still available on the website. I do not have any inside information, but the fact that there has not been a progress report suggests that the present government may not be completely comfortable with the 2005 all-risk policy. I am happy to talk about those issues.
Canada was ahead of the game with an all-risk policy. I think we see the United States after Hurricane Katrina and the new government in Britain moving towards what has actually been the Canadian approach since 2004, which was an all-risk policy.
Senator Wallin: What leads you to believe the government is not happy?
Mr. Roach: There has not been a progress report since 2005. Presumably, if it is a national security policy you believe in, you would want to inform Canadians about what you are doing to develop and enhance that policy. I think it is a bit shameful that we have a 2004 policy, a one-year update and then radio silence.
Whether it is done through the Minister of Public Safety or through PCO is a matter of design. The government should decide whether the 2004 policy is the policy it wants, and if it is, then the government should at least issue a statement saying, ``We have been working with this policy for the last four years, and this is what we have achieved.''
On the issue of the czar, that is definitely not language used by Justice Major. He was fairly clear that such a role would be served by the existing Prime Minister's national security adviser. You are right that he did talk about some people being brought in to advise the national security adviser, but he saw that happening largely on a secondment basis from the various agencies.
He did recommend that there be a director of terrorism prosecutions. That was a new position. We do not know what, if anything, the government is doing about that. He also recommended an official with respect to witness protection. Although the Air India action plan says they will be doing something on witness protection, it is not clear to me what will be done with respect to the important issue of witness protection.
Senator Wallin: Thank you for those comments.
The Chair: I will offer the view that it has been known to happen over 140 years of Canadian history that great ideas that came from one government were not as warmly embraced as their merits might have suggested by another administration. That might happen for callow, small-minded and shallow reasons, but it has occurred on occasion. I do not know whether that is the circumstance here, but I have not dismissed it completely from my analysis of why it has not happened.
Senator Wallin: Thank you for that, Mr. Chair.
Senator Joyal: The Air India report was an initiative of the present government.
The Chair: Indeed.
Senator Joyal: I can understand what you said for some former decisions. I am trying to be as objective as possible. However, there are decisions that the present government has taken that contain recommendations as serious as the ones we are discussing today.
From one government to the other, I try to understand what seem to be elements built into the system that are resistant from one government to the other. We are not here to try to nail down one government against another. We are trying to understand the way the system works. That is why I think it is important to have someone like Professor Roach, who has been a keen observer of one government with the other and one inquiry with another, to know how the system works and what is possible within the system. I think that is the major point we are trying to understand here.
The Chair: I could not agree with that assertion any more than I already do.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you very much for appearing before of us again. You always have challenging ideas for us.
I appreciated your saying that the community should not be suspected presumptively. I come from such a community, and I hear from many young people who say they feel very much under the eye of security, especially at the airport. I appreciate your comments on that.
In 2001, when we had the terrorism bill, I was sold in supporting this because we would have the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security. My greatest disappointment has been how weak that round table has been and how rarely it meets. It does not meet independently, and it has very few resources.
I am not trying to throw any bad feelings towards the people who serve on that round table. I think their hands are tied. However, it is not what we originally envisaged it to be. We wanted it to be a good response to the terrorist bill and a good response from the community on having a balance. I believe that this Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security exists now just in name; it has not been able to provide the balance. I would appreciate hearing from you how we can fix it.
Mr. Roach: I believe this committee has expressed concerns about at least a perception of a lack of independence that the round table might have from Public Safety Canada. From the information posted about the round table's meetings, most of the meetings appear to be briefings by Public Safety Canada.
As I said, we need a credible interlocutor for a genuine two-way dialogue. Yes, whoever serves on this or another committee should have some briefings, but that should only be 30 per cent of what they do. The rest of the budget and time should be about outreach, going to communities, having town hall meetings, hearing from young people, and also conducting research and hearing from researchers.
I think it is very difficult to know what makes an institution viable. Often, it is individuals. You need someone to take the initiative. However, the communities will not have a trust to come forward to the cross-cultural round table and express their perceptions, grievances and fears unless they have a lot of trust in the people at the round table and not see them as an extension of the department.
I think having the round table was probably better than simply relying on the RCMP and CSIS to fulfill that role. They would be in a difficult position. Britain has worked on these issues for a while and is coming to the sense that you do not want front-line policing and security people doing this.
It is a good idea, but we need a fresh start with a real show of independence from the government and initiative, perhaps a national conference, working with civil society organizations. I am sure they would be willing to work with a cross-cultural round table. I am not privy to the day-to-day operations of that round table, but I would be surprised if it reached out to various civil society groups that would not welcome an opportunity to talk to someone they saw as a credible interlocutor between them and government.
Maybe it should not be a round table. Instead of a round table, one or two prominent Canadians could be appointed to the role, for example. I, like you, am disappointed. It is a good idea, but I have not seen much in the way of concrete results, although it has been up and running for five or six years.
The Chair: I will ask our guest as well as Senator Jaffer, because she has been involved with this committee much longer than I have. Was the purpose of the round table not to allow fellow Canadians from various groups an opportunity to provide actual advice so that our police and other agencies could be well informed about the nuances of various communities in a fashion that allowed them to build constructive and helpful networks to prevent bad things from happening?
Extremely troubling is the notion that they would meet for briefings only, that their advice would not be sought and that there would be no way for those who plan strategically to protect our national security to benefit from that rich advice. I separate that out from operational matters, where people involved in the enforcement of laws or the prevention of terrorist activities at the operational level have a series of informants and others who help in many ways.
The original policy was something I monitored in my private life before coming to this place. Was the main purpose not to have some sort of advisory linkage that was a part of the reality of our multicultural society, or am I missing something? Has that entire advisory function disappeared over the last few years through non-use or by some effort on the part of some to diminish that possible role? I defer to anyone who cares to offer a view on the matter.
Senator Joyal: I could offer a view.
The Chair: By all means, but let us have the witness engage first, after which you may respond.
Senator Joyal: Of course.
Mr. Roach: I have not reread the 2004 policy recently. However, I seem to recall something similar to your comments, Senator Segal. I thought it was part of the emphasis on review and the airing of certain grievances, recognizing that grievances and perceptions, if they are not addressed, will adversely affect cooperation from those communities down the road.
From the information I have seen, it looks like they have become simply a kind of platform for briefings by the Department of Public Safety. I agree with you that that was not the intent.
Senator Jaffer: I would be remiss if I did not add that CSIS and the RCMP have reached out to the communities since 2001, but the additional step of intelligence gathering is another thing. It is a missed opportunity not to get advice from a cultural round table.
In your presentation I was interested in the security certificates, given the number of people — I believe there are three left — and how much they helps us. They cause great issues. I believe that when the head of CSIS speaks about non-governmental organizations and lawyers getting together, which you alluded to, it is around the security certificate issues, not around other issues that people wear the hat for.
What should we do with the security certificate? You study this all the time. Obviously, there are issues, and there is a reason to deal with foreigners in Canada. We do not want them to make trouble or hurt people while they are here, so how do we deal with them?
Mr. Roach: This is part of the Harkat decision that the press did not seem to pick up on. Although Justice Simon Noël of the Federal Court said that the certificate was reasonable and the legislation was constitutional, he also said that we need to revisit the conditions, given that the allegations found to be reasonable were from quite a long time ago.
With the three remaining cases, perhaps we need to have their certificates ended on an agreement for a one-year peace bond, which is still part of the Criminal Code. The peace bond provisions with respect to terrorism were not subject to the sunset clause. That would be my preference.
I fear that we will go into issues with the remaining three cases about whether deportation will happen, and there will be serious issues about deportation to torture. The public will hear a hot about torture but will not always distinguish the fact that the torture is not at the hands of Canadian officials. The serious issue is sending someone back to Algeria or Syria and what might happen to them there. We do not need to fight that battle. Whatever the evidence against these three men is, they have been subject to detention and tight controls for a very long time now. Surveillance to some degree might be appropriate, and a peace bond might be appropriate, but my view is that the remaining security certificates seem to be doing more public relations harm than necessarily security good.
Having said that, allow me to add that obviously I am not privy to the secret information. The government could gain a fair amount of goodwill if it were to deem this a transition issue and say that there might have been issues because we did not have the Anti-terrorism Act. The government could tell people it will proceed with acts of terrorism now mainly through the criminal justice process.
I Mr. Fadden's speech unfair in that I do not detect any sympathy for Mr. Khawaja or for Mr. Namouth or for those convicted in the Toronto terrorism cases. It is unfair to say that any group sympathizes with those people.
I truly believe that the criminal law is our best instrument because it is fair and it has a publicity value in that it is accepted by the vast majority of Canadians as a fair system. Many Canadians did not accept the security certificate system as a fair system. Obviously, it is a much fairer system now than it was in 2001, but we need to put that page of our history behind us.
Senator Jaffer: When we studied this before, the Honourable Stockwell Day, then Minister of Public Safety, gave us the task of looking at security certificates. Perhaps when we return after the break we could look at the issue to determine whether it should be studied further.
Senator Joyal: My only comment to add to Senator Jaffer's proposal is that a case is pending, so we would have to be careful in our approach.
I want to come back to the issue of the round table and try to put it in a broader perspective. It seems there is a reluctance built within the agencies we are talking about — CSIS, the RCMP and Public Safety Canada generally — to have too much of the public in their kitchen. Once you put the round table in motion, you bring in on a yearly basis a group that can exercise some kind of capacity to criticize. I use the word ``criticism'' in the broadest term, that is, making recommendations and expecting that there will be a reaction. You build that as an element in the system. When you have that, plus a permanent committee of Parliament, be it the Senate or a joint committee, you build in another element of publicity to which the agencies will have to react.
If you add to that an annual report, as you have proposed, you add to the system the general public at large and the press and experts like you from academia to pronounce on the validity of that report, on the recommendations and on conclusions of that report. If you add what Justice Major proposed in the Air India report, that is, a national security adviser, you add to the system another element of check and balance. Plus, if you act on the basis of the Arar inquiry on reviewing the complaint commission of the RCMP as well as the report of the Vancouver investigation on the Vancouver airport situation that we heard about where the RCMP was depicted in its weaknesses, you add another element of criticism in the public.
There might have been in the system, as we say, a full brake on everything that could place more pressure on those agencies to exercise their responsibility. We have to try to understand the dynamics that are built into the system when you add a certain number of layers or a certain number of accountability points or checkpoints in the system.
When I try to understand, as the Germans would say, the overall gestalt of how we manage our public policy of addressing security in Canada in relation to terrorism, I try to understand why at this point in time you and I and all the others around this table might be left, as we say in French, under our appetite over decisions being taken. I have the conviction that if all of that had been implemented the way it was conceived, we would be in a totally different kind of ball game today in relation to the rule of the law and in relation to the accountability of Parliament.
I am not trying to be the devil's advocate; I am trying to understand what would have been built into the system. Hence my question is this: What did we learn and not learn from the last 10 years of policy management in relation to safety and security in Canada? I know it is unfair, professor, but as I said, I try to understand those dynamics.
Mr. Roach: I am trying to write a book right now on that topic, and I am sure you do not want me to go through chapter and verse.
I share with you that if those recommendations were implemented, I think we would have a stronger system, both from the point of view of efficacy, which is largely what the national security adviser is about, and from the point of view of propriety, which is what Justice O'Connor's recommendations were.
In addition to that, even from the agency's perspectives, we would have a more informed debate. Although I disagreed with Director Fadden on his comments, I think he was reacting to what he sees as kind of a know-nothing, knee-jerk opposition that his agency gets. We need to recognize that effective review and a bit more transparency — after all, in an age of WikiLeaks, there will be transparency whether we like it or not — will educate the public about the difficult task and will instill public confidence.
I think both Justice O'Connor and Justice Major came back to this issue of public confidence. You hear it again and again in their reports, and they are talking about the reasonable person. If we had the review system and if we got away from what I said was a siege mentality that I detect among our security establishment, we actually would have a system that is better on security and better on human rights, and the public would also have more confidence and more knowledge about how it operates.
The Chair: As a final addition to Senator Joyal's question, you do comparative research in this area. We often define national security as the protection of Canadians from threats, violence and harm and the protection of our values — democracy, rule of law, et cetera. That implies of course that there is a balance between civil liberties and freedom on the one hand and a prudent state seeking to keep its people safe on the other.
If you look at our other allies, other democracies, our French, American, Australian and British friends, who all have to deal in some measure with these kinds of challenges, would you say we are making more or less progress? Are they doing things that we could be learning from that are better-informed and more thoughtful, or are we making the kind of progress that for all sorts of reasons strikes you as rational, or are we falling behind? I would be interested in your sense of that.
Mr. Roach: It is a complicated question. On the all-risk policy and on respect for human rights, Canada was ahead of the game. I think now many countries are starting to recognize that you respect human rights not only for principled reasons, because it is the right thing to do, but also for practical reasons with respect to public confidence. I think we are ahead of the game there.
On issues of oversight, we are way behind the game. As you said, Senator Segal, we are way behind on legislative oversight but also on other review agencies. I would look at the Australian inspector general who has an ability to look not only at every Australian intelligence agency but also at any kind of national security function within different departments of the Australian government. The Australians, partly because they do not have a charter of rights and freedoms, have taken this issue of parliamentary review and reviews by inspectors general and ombudspersons very seriously. I would definitely look at what Australia is doing.
In terms of community outreach, the British are ahead of us. They have invested a lot in their contest strategy. It will be fine-tuned by the new government, but it is seen as a critical way of dealing not only with the hard end of national security but also with issues of radicalization and extremism. I think we can learn a lot from our Australian and British friends, but I also think we have some things to be proud of.
The Chair: Professor Roach, I know I speak for the entire committee when we express our thanks for your generosity both in time and in sharing your insights and perspectives with us. It has been of great value. We appreciate it very much.
Senator Joyal: We will want to have a copy of Professor Roach's new book.
The Chair: You will have to tell us where we can find it because I think it will be a benefit to the public debate in many ways.
Mr. Roach: Thank you. I have to finish writing it.
The Chair: Senators, we will gather on February 7 to hear from FINTRAC officials: Denis Meunier, Assistant Director, Financial Analysis and Disclosure; Gina Jelmini, Manager, Terrorist Financing Analysis; and Carole Bonhomme, Senior Counsel, Legal Services. We now stand adjourned until that time.
(The committee adjourned.)