Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 1 - Evidence - Meeting of March 22, 2010
OTTAWA, Monday, March 22, 2010
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 4:07 p.m. to examine and report on the national security and defence policies of Canada (topic: Arctic sovereignty and security).
Senator Pamela Wallin (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: This is the first meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Today, we will be looking at issues related to Canadian sovereignty and focusing particularly on the Arctic borders, if you will. That will encompass not only geography but also some of the other issues that are there for us to look at, including resources in fisheries and other things. We will be looking at this over the course of time.
I welcome you all here. Our first guest, Mr. Whitney Lackenbauer, is the co-author of a book called Arctic Front: Defending Canadian Interests in the Far North. We will have a presentation from Mr. Lackenbauer and then will be open to questions.
Whitney Lackenbauer, Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of History, St. Jerome's University: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee to discuss a subject of growing national and international interest.
In broad terms, the role of the Canadian Forces, CF, in the Arctic must be successfully linked to the government's Northern Strategy and its intent to take a leadership role in nation building in our North. There are still difficult questions to be answered when justifying further military investments. If Canada does not face an imminent existential threat to its Arctic in terms of sovereignty, as I will suggest, then why would the government not funnel its money and resources into the Coast Guard, the RCMP and other government departments more involved in human security efforts in our North?
First, I want to emphasize that I do not believe that there is an Arctic race that is likely to deteriorate into military conflict over boundaries and resources. Commentators such as Rob Hubert and Pierre Leblanc are good at stitching together a range of possible security threats and asserting that this points to probable conflict in the region. Grouping together a series of discrete and manageable challenges over maritime boundaries, transit rights and extended continental-shelf limits makes the alleged storm seem scarier than it is. There is still time for bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
Nevertheless, Canada needs robust military capabilities in the Arctic so that the Canadian Forces can fulfill its core defence of Canada's mission and support other government departments. The government has made numerous commitments with which we are all familiar: the port at Nanisivik, the Arctic offshore patrol vessels and the Arctic response company groups to name but a few.
The key, however, is to see how these military investments are conceptualized as a whole. Media coverage tends to treat them as an essential display of military presence necessary to establish our sovereignty, as do ad hoc political statements. I treat the word "presence'' with caution. It is a misnomer to suggest that we need a larger military presence to bolster our sovereignty over our lands and waters. This worries me because it seems to suggest that our sovereignty is currently lacking. It is not. In fact, I worry that a fixation on the word "presence'' reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of sovereignty. Although past and present governments have equated sovereignty with security, sovereignty is actually a legal concept which entails ownership and the right to control over a specific area regulated by a clearly defined set of international laws.
We have some managed disputes with our circumpolar neighbours, but I highly doubt that Hans Island or the Beaufort Sea will lead to the armed conflict. All of the Arctic coastal states, including Russia, have promised to adhere to international law when delimiting their extended continental shelf. There may be some negotiations, but this is nothing new. I am sure you will hear more about this from Mr. Kessel later.
In terms of the Northwest Passage, Michael Byers and other commentators have tried to sell us on the notion that the United States will eventually come around to recognizing and accepting our legal position that the passage is internal waters. They will not. In my conversations with American officials, I have heard time and time again that this is a non-starter. After all, the U.S. has been saying consistently since the 1960s that this would set a dangerous precedent in other parts of the world, and it can hardly retract that position now without prejudice to its global interest. As long as there is a U.S. navy, I have been told time and time again, the Americans will not change their official position.
However, this does not preclude cooperation. The Americans are not keen to undermine us. They would prefer to let sleeping dogs lie, but we keep twisting the tail, and I think we are setting up a lose-lose situation by doing so.
What is missing in too much of the discussion surrounding Arctic security these days is the value of cooperation. The Northwest Passage issue has been well managed for half a century, based on a mutually respectful agreement to disagree with the Americans, and there is no reason that this has to change. Our militaries are interconnected, particularly when it comes to continental air defence, and NORAD's maritime warning mission extends this to the oceans. The U.S. Navy already has an Arctic road map, which is something that Canada Command should emulate. Rather than setting up misconceptions that we need to build up the Canadian Forces to defend against American assistance, we should be more confident and see the advantage in leveraging American assets in the Arctic.
By extension, I think the National Defence, DND, should foster partnerships with the U.S. and other polar countries where appropriate. Inviting the Danes to link up with the Canadian Rangers Patrol Group, CRPG, north of Ellesmere next month is a good example. This demystifies the notion that we are militarizing our North to send signals to others. In the West, infrastructure development should occur in dialogue with the Americans. Both countries would benefit from a Nanisivik-type port in the Western Arctic, and our coast guards work very closely and constructively in that region and have for a long time.
Therefore, if the practical role of the military is not likely to be focused on defending or enforcing sovereignty in classic military terms, and if we retain alliances to deal with the highly improbable occurrence of a foreign military challenge, what roles can the Canadian Forces actually play beyond providing surveillance? There are security threats, including criminal activities, such as illegal immigration and terrorism. Of course, the RCMP and Public Safety Canada have the lead, not National Defence.
There are also safety challenges, such as search-and-rescue incidents, floods, oil spills, pandemics. Except for certain search-and-rescue tasks, DND is not the lead department for responding to these incidents. Depending on the context, primary jurisdiction could fall to Health Canada, Public Safety Canada or Environment Canada. There is a danger in conceptualizing DND as the "first responder'' in a passenger ship going aground or in a case of illegal immigration. Therefore, where does the military fit in the broader national picture?
The obvious answer is that the military's training makes it an ideal responder to probable emergency scenarios, and it is funded and equipped to do contingency operations on a level that other government departments do not have the training or resources to reach.
If this type of support role is the military's central task in the Arctic, the first priority is determining exactly what other government departments in the North actually require of the military. The second priority is increasing training and research so that the military has the understanding it needs to operate effectively in the Arctic. The third priority should be transport and logistical needs so that the CF can deliver strategic materials quickly and efficiently. If a brigade were required to respond to a disaster in Iqaluit, where are the gaps in getting people there and supporting them? It is important to determine what capabilities are needed before deciding what platforms or equipment should be procured.
There is also an expectation that DND and CF contribute to the government's broader nation-building objectives. To that end, I think that individual departments, including DND, should focus on the national rather than federal departmental goals. Canada's Northern Strategy defines four pillars for the Canadian Arctic, which really require a whole-of-government approach. Certainly CF will play a role in visibly demonstrating Canadian sovereignty, but it will also contribute to the other pillars. It is important to keep in mind how operations in the Arctic could, for example, support community building, as they already do through the Canadian Rangers, and how they could contribute to local infrastructure or support local governance.
I would like to end my opening remarks by reflecting on the role of northerners in security and defence in the Arctic. Cooperation is as essential within Canada as it is within the circumpolar world. Certainly, northerners have been vocal in asserting that sovereignty includes them, and their representatives are insistent that they be involved in decision making related to their homeland.
This is complicated in terms of security and defence policy-making, but there is territorial and Aboriginal government representation on the Arctic Security Working Group, an important venue for sharing information that we can discuss later. More regularly, however, northerners are practically engaged in northern defence through the Canadian Rangers.
I applaud the government for its promise to invest in the Rangers, to support their growth and to provide them with better equipment and uniforms. The Liberals certainly made similar strides in the 1990s, and the Rangers benefitted then, as they will now. The danger, of course, is to manage expectations so that policy-makers do not try to make the Rangers into something they are not. They are Reservists, but they cannot be expected to possess the same capabilities as southern-based units. Making them more military will neither improve Canada's security nor our sovereignty. The hard military capabilities can be provided through Regular and Reserve Forces. The Rangers are not broken, and I see danger in trying to fix them.
To wrap up, Canada's Northern Strategy transcends the line between domestic and foreign policy. It seems to acknowledge that sovereignty is not primarily about boundary lines but everything that goes on within them. The litmus test of government resolve will be follow-through. Policy is only as good as the action it inspires, Minister Cannon noted last summer. Laying out a broad, integrated and positive strategy is a step in the right direction. Converting that strategy into deliverables that produce a more constructive and secure circumpolar world will be the real challenge. Defence is a key component but must be carefully situated in a whole-of-government framework.
I will conclude my remarks there, and I look forward to our discussion.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I neglected to introduce myself, which I should have done. I am Senator Pamela Wallin from Saskatchewan, and I am the chair of this committee. My deputy chair is Senator Roméo Dallaire, representing Quebec, who will pose the first question to our witness.
Senator Dallaire: In your argument of the conceptual framework of security in the North, how far into the future do you believe your concept will remain valid?
Mr. Lackenbauer: That is a great question. I am thinking definitely horizon 1, which, in military terms, is extending out 5 years or perhaps even 10 years. By the time we get to 15 or 20 years from now, this is where even the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessments begin to get a bit hazy. Certainly, we have a comfortable window, and I am safe to say that this goes out at least 10 years.
Senator Dallaire: The capital program in National Defence is based on a rolling 15-year program, with another 10 years ahead of that on research. Therefore, National Defence is looking into requirements 25 years into the future. The premise is that we have to look into the Arctic with the idea that 25 years from now we will need something that may take 10, 15 or 20 years to build. My argument returns. What is the scenario in the year 2035 that we should be preparing for in the Arctic?
Mr. Lackenbauer: I am a historian, so that is obviously an awful question to ask me. It is a wonderful question, though. Of course, we are projecting outward and looking into the future, and that is the main question. One of the frameworks that I like to use in this scenario is something developed by the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, looking at four quadrants of what we anticipate. We can look toward a polar saga, one in which you have stable governance — it is a region that is relatively stable — and resource development is occurring in a way that is constructive, everyone has a stake in it, and everyone is cooperating and adhering more or less to international law.
The other side is looking at it as a polar race, which is what the media has homed in on in suggesting that this will be an all-out lawless frontier, that this is the last Eldorado, and everyone will try to get their stake in it.
We have to look at each of the different Arctic littoral states, all of the non-state actors in the region and ask fundamental questions about what they are looking to get out of the region. When we look at Russia, which has been in the news in the last couple of weeks, we need to look at what Russia is trying to get out of the Arctic, if we look at it as a possible belligerent. At the end of the day, Russia is looking to potentially be a great big energy province — it is part of the Arctic and part of the continental shelf — to replace resources in Western Siberia that will be largely depleted, potentially, within 20 years.
Secondly, Russia is looking at a transportation corridor through the Northern Sea Route. If we extrapolate outward, will Russia seek an unstable Arctic region? If you will to be based upon reliable resource extraction and transportation, you will seek stability as well.
We can take that logic and carry it over to all the different actors, more or less, and say that this is what they are looking for. To articulate it in sovereignty terms, I just came back from China and was refreshed to hear from the Chinese that they are intent that they are not out to challenge or undermine Canada's sovereignty. In fact, the Chinese reminded me that they are keen on people respecting domestic sovereignty and not meddling in their affairs. They will certainly not do that in Canada's case. They want us to tell them what the rules are, and they will adhere to them. They are, however, interested in using this passage.
Your question actually raises a whole series of questions not only about how the future might look but about what Canada hopes to get out of the future. That is where we get a difference of opinion in terms of how things will look. I, for one, say that we want to look at a stable, secure, circumpolar world in which our interests are protected but will require us to be accommodating to some extent.
Senator Patterson: I was pleased to hear your view on the military as not necessarily being required only for defence and suggesting a cooperative, peacekeeping approach. That is not the right analogy, but I think that fits in with my own view of things.
You say, in your presentation, that it is important to determine what capabilities are needed before deciding what platforms or equipment should be procured. You mentioned some of the commitments that our government has made for infrastructure and military capability. You did not mention the plan for the Arctic-class icebreaker.
Could you tell us what the capabilities are that you think our military needs? What does it have and what does it need?
Mr. Lackenbauer: Great strides have been taken in recent years. Again, making a series of commitments that — as I am sure you will hear from Mr. Leblanc later — were things that were very much lacking when he developed an Arctic capability study released in 2000. It showed deterioration and atrophying of Canadian Forces capabilities.
Many of the promises and commitments made are steps in the right direction. They are identifying the need for command, control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, which are core capabilities that any sustainable Canadian Forces will be based upon and any integrated government strategy will have to be based upon. It is laying a foundation, to some extent.
Again, we have seen signals coming out of media commentaries on this year's budget that already the Arctic patrol vessels are being put on ice, pardon the pun, for the time being. This is disturbing. It is a versatile platform, which is a part of what makes it so attractive.
Mr. Byers talked about these vessels as slush breakers when they were announced. Having the capability to go through one-metre ice in the navigable season is very appropriate, as well as being able to use these vessels out in the exclusive economic zone, EEZ, in other parts of the country.
Some of the steps taken have been in the right direction. They have been introduced as discrete procurement decisions, rather than articulated as part of a broader strategy. Even in the Northern Strategy, presented last summer, I do not think it was really laid out how all these different components come together into something that is larger than the sum of its individual parts.
It is getting back to basics. It is asking questions of all the government stakeholders and all the stakeholders outside of government, particularly northerners, to get together and address what it is that we need to do. This should not be restricted to the southern alarmist mindset that loves to play on grand notions and dramatic narratives of the Russians coming over the pole or the Danes taking over Hans Island and our need to have a pitch battle against them. I am suggesting that we have time to prepare for it.
As far as time horizons, the further we get from the present, the hazier it becomes. I am saying that people who are thrusting upon us that within two or three years the Northwest Passage could be flooded with foreign vessels intent on undermining our sovereignty are way out of whack.
Senator Patterson: Thank you. One of your observations caught my attention.
I have long been an admirer of the Arctic Rangers and their potential role. I know Senator Dallaire is also a fellow sympathizer.
I was a little concerned to hear you say that Rangers cannot be expected to possess the same capabilities as southern-based units. My view is that they know the land in a way no one else does. They know how to operate in the Arctic environment. They are exceptionally good hunters, which should translate into some form of capability for military purposes.
Why would you suggest that they should stay the way they are, which is really just a little better than being volunteers?
Mr. Lackenbauer: They certainly are volunteers. It is wonderful. Much of my formative experience in the North and many of my views have been shaped with interactions that I have had with the Rangers over the last 10 years. I have been fortunate to have been out on training exercises, patrols and operations with the Rangers from coast to coast to coast. It has been very exciting.
I have heard repeatedly as a message from most Rangers — and it will differ on the region, the Yukon Rangers are different than others, for example — that they see themselves as people who are based at home. They are looked upon to defend their home. They defend Canada.
What I mean by not possessing the same suite of skills as southern-based units is that they will not be deployable overseas. It has been carefully outlined in recent versions of their role, missions and tasks that they are no longer expected to prepare for guerrilla-type activities to delay an enemy advance. This was part of the original concept back in 1947 that was exercised in the 1950s.
In recent years, it has been suggested that they will never have the level of training that southern-based primary reserve units being worked up for Afghanistan will have. At the same time, the Rangers right now, in terms of their concept, are not required to undergo annual training. Therefore, an elder who decides that he will not attend the annual training exercise because he wants to go moose hunting has that prerogative and will not be turfed out of the Rangers, as it stands right now. To go and articulate a more robust set of expectations and qualification standards for Rangers may actually undermine the concept that many of the people who possess the very essential skills to be able to perform those functions in the North are only people who actually reside in an area and know it that intimately. They might find themselves on the outs if too strict a set of rules is created for them.
It is a wonderful question, and I appreciate your sensitivity to it, but it was not meant in any derogatory way. Partly, I am concerned with ensuring that expectations in Ottawa are managed, now that Rangers have become an army asset in recent years, and that they are not retooled in an army form and expected to be people in green. These are the men and women in red, and we should be proud of what they contribute.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: My first question concerns the Arctic Council. I appreciated your thoughts on the importance of cooperation, but do you believe that the Arctic Council is the appropriate forum for Canada and the eight countries of the Arctic region? It is quite an unusual forum because the Aboriginal populations can take an active part in the council's business.
Do you believe this is an appropriate forum? And what do you think of the question raised by the European Union and China, among others, of participating as observers in the Arctic Council?
[English]
Mr. Lackenbauer: I think the Arctic Council remains a very important forum. Even its lineage going back, this gestation occurred under Mulroney and was carried forward by the Liberals. This particular forum has a real bi- partisan appeal. It is not a decision-making forum or one that will be able to assert its will. Given the nature of its structure, that flexibility makes it particularly useful as something for agenda setting and doing some science and allowing for cooperation outside of the security sphere.
Some of the discussions relate to whether or not it is enough, given all the fundamental transformations that seem to be occurring in the circumpolar world, to carry through, whether or not it has been overtaken by events. I stand by our government when we suggested at Ilulissat, Greenland that we are not interested in an international treaty. The Arctic is definitely not the Antarctic; there are littoral states.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: Could you explain for our colleagues what happened at Ilulissat?
[English]
Mr. Lackenbauer: In May of 2008, a meeting of the five Arctic coastal states took place. Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States attended an Arctic Ocean conference. The principle objective was to show that all the different Arctic littoral states were cooperating, that this so-called race for resources was not occurring, but rather it was a rules-based process for delineating the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.
The Ilulissat Declaration that came out of this carried the message that the existing international legal framework governing the Arctic — particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS — provides a solid foundation for responsible management. They said that there was no need for a comprehensive new regime, a treaty-based system, to go and govern the Arctic Ocean. They said that they would all adhere to the orderly settlement of any overlapping claims to their extended continental shelves, that they would focus on cooperating on search and rescue, protecting the marine environment and science and research. At the end of it, they all said that they will continue to contribute to the work of the Arctic Council.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: Including the Americans?
[English]
Mr. Lackenbauer: Yes, including the Americans, even though they are not —
Senator Nolin: — the territories of the UNCLOS?
Mr. Lackenbauer: Exactly, which is an irony. Again, most Americans who are subject matter experts in the maritime domain have been strident for years suggesting that it is an embarrassment that the United States has not signed on. In essence, this reaffirmed that even if it is not something they have ratified, it is something they are adhering to in spirit.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: With regard to the cooperation question, you see this as a major tool for Canada. In your remarks and answers, you referred to this alarmist mindset, often fuelled by the media community that likes to see disputes and blood flowing, but nothing of the kind is likely as long as the states act pragmatically in their own interests. Do you not see this as a lack of information on the factual reality of the North? Consider, for example, the European Union's declaration and, I dare say, aspirations in the Arctic; the European Union has only one member-country that is part of the Arctic "family.'' I think this lack of information may be a source of bad information, unfortunately contrary to Canada's interests.
Do you not think that Canada should promote a broader dissemination of information on the factual reality of the Arctic?
[English]
Mr. Lackenbauer: Those are all very important points. Many misconceptions are swirling around; they are being fed internationally. We certainly circulate enough misinformation within our country. Everyone can shoulder their part of the responsibility for that, from the political realm to the media to the academic realm where we also love to get into the fray of things and make grand narratives that attract large amounts of media attention.
The Chair: You also like to write books.
Mr. Lackenbauer: Yes, write books and sell books. The book I wrote perhaps did not sell as well as I would have liked because we did criticize much of the alarmism that is circulating.
I think it is interesting. Questions about membership in the Arctic Council for the European Union in recent months have been hijacked by the discussion over the seal hunt, which is one close to many Canadians' hearts. It is interesting in that part of our position, at least, that in refusing this application for permanent membership on behalf of the European Union and China, it had very much to do with this emotive response to this issue that did very much offend us.
I think there is a big debate. What are some of the challenges of expanding the Arctic Council to include multinational organizations such as the European Union? What does this mean for the permanent participants, the Aboriginal representative organizations that participate in this very innovative, unique, multilateral forum where they do have a say? They may not be voting members, but they are part of the agenda setting and part of the discourse that is flowing. The more people around the table, with the Chinese and the resources and the delegations that they could send over, will this diminish the voice of the permanent participants? These are core debates that we need to have as a country.
With respect to the European Union, having just come back from Brussels last week, they certainly talk about their interest in the science and in understanding what is unfolding in the region. Similar to the Chinese, they say that what is transpiring in the Arctic affects us all, that there is no simple way that we can say that climate change, as the barometer of what will happen around the world, is something we can keep them out of. At the same time, some management issues relate to how much of a voice they will have, and whether this will double count for certain states. These are real challenges that face us. The Arctic Council is a key instrument in allowing us to try to correct some of these misconceptions.
The Chair: I am sure we will come back to that issue.
Senator Meighen: I misunderstood you, Dr. Lackenbauer. A number of declarations of good intentions have been made. Written agreements are not necessarily any more binding, I have found. Did you say that, in the absence of any written agreements, you feel this is the best or the only way forward where we could have made progress? Will the test come when there is some sort of dispute, and we will then see how the statements of good intentions hold up?
Mr. Lackenbauer: That is certainly one way of looking at it. Depending on what scenario we pick for the future and what we anticipate determines how much risk we are willing to assume on that.
Looking at UNCLOS as a framework for dealing with many of the outstanding issues, we talk about them often as disputes. I struggle when we talk about the extended continental shelf issues as disputes. We have not even submitted what is ours. UNCLOS is clear; it is not something that we have to negotiate to get. We have to submit the science and delineate what belongs to us. It is not a claim we have. It is ours. It is there in law; we just have not submitted the data to show what is ours.
In that sense, these are not probable disputes that we will encounter in the military sense or in the security sense. In fact, the country, I always say ironically, that stands to benefit the most if this unfolds according to international law is Russia. They will have the most extended continental shelf by all anticipated claims. At the end of the day, many of the resources we talk about, such as one quarter of the world's undiscovered hydrocarbon resources, most of them are on the Russian side, and they are comfortably within their exclusive economic zone.
When we talk about the prospect of the Russian bear being renewed and belligerent to gobble up more, the Russians are actually quite worried. Interesting messaging is happening between Canada and Russia. The Russians are basically saying the exact same thing we are. If you take Prime Minister Harper's speeches and line them up beside President Medvedev's speeches, they are almost identical. It is interesting that playing off one of them, they almost set up this contest. In fact, both sides are clear in their foreign-policy documents and in most addresses before Parliament that they will adhere to international law. I fully believe that it is not just UNCLOS; it is other legislation or laws out there, such as those relating to biodiversity, that all play in this particular region. To think that we will be able to come up with a binding treaty that will encompass everything in a region where states already have recognized sovereign rights entrenched in international law to me is a lost leader. I do not see any traction in it.
Senator Day: Dr. Lackenbauer, thank you for your comments. I have a couple of points that I think you have touched on fairly nicely following from earlier questions asked, including by Senator Nolin. I would like you to expand on that a little from the point of view of NATO and Canada's traditional role of acting multilaterally.
In this instance, should we be thinking more of a bilateral agreement, working out our problems with United States and let Russia work out its problems with Norway? Clearly, you expressed that European countries are interested in what is happening up there. I think all nations of the world actually are, from the point of view of transportation but also natural resources, if they think this will be a new area that they can tap into and get some ownership from.
First, if you could talk a bit about the bilateral versus multilateral and whether Canada should be playing its traditional role of bringing these issues up and informing people about what the issues are and Canada's position therein rather than just dealing with those that have a direct interest from a littoral point of view.
Second, with respect to your point on China, we read a number of articles that indicate that China is interested not only in transportation but also in the potential for natural resources. The issue is that they do not want to impose their rights over our Canadian territory, but I think the real issue is the ocean base and how far out we can go in the EEZ. From what I read, China is very interested in that. I would like to hear your thoughts since you just got back from there.
Finally, you talked about the Canadian Forces' role in the North. Would there be less of a Canadian Forces role if we beefed up the Canadian Coast Guard? Does the Coast Guard have a role to play that we are just not developing, and, by default, the Armed Forces are moving in?
Mr. Lackenbauer: Those are three excellent questions. I will start with the second question relating to China. China does have an interest in what is called the "common heritage of mankind'' in UNCLOS, which is seabed beyond extended continental shelves. Again, they are still at a very early stage. They have not articulated a national strategy by any stretch of the imagination. They are still doing investigatory research. One question that we asked them while we were there was what sort of science they are doing. Are they doing seismic testing where they will potentially submit data to dispute Russia's or Canada's submission of what sovereign rights we would possess over seabed subsoil resources? They said, "Absolutely not. That is not our intent at all. In fact, we are anxious for you to tell us what you have rights to, and then we can decide.''
Their big fear relates to the question of the Arctic Council versus gatherings such as Ilulissat, Greenland or Chelsea, Quebec. They said, "We do not want to be frozen out or squeezed out of the dialogue here. It is important that all of this be something that we can all participate in.''
Part of the concern in China's eyes is that the Arctic littoral states are getting together, as we used to do with our old sector principles. We are just dividing it up into wedges, and we will keep the rest of the world out of the Arctic. That will not fly because it does not adhere to international law, and they are well aware of that.
The role of the Canadian Coast Guard is another issue of tremendous debate. Some of you will have read the report that came out of the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. You will hear different perspectives. Some people will suggest that the Canadian Forces should take on a more military role. In the United States, it is a subcomponent of the military. I am particularly sensitive to arguments against it. They have a distinct role in Canada already.
Their icebreakers are multipurpose platforms. The RCMP uses them as platforms in certain scenarios. They are very versatile. The expectation that they take on and wear more hats at the same time is problematic to me from a training perspective and from a personnel standpoint. They have issues with recapitalizing their fleet as it stands, as well as with recruiting and retaining people to serve. When you add on expectations, I am not sure how realistic it is. Potentially, it takes away from the attractiveness of our Coast Guard as not being something that can ever be construed as belligerent. They do work seamlessly with the American Coast Guard, particularly in the Western Arctic, and I have heard incredible stories about how flexibly they interpret mandates. If we are looking for success stories rather than the sensational stories of conflict looming over the Beaufort Sea and that wedge, you can just look to the Coast Guards to see how they really are getting along in operational and tactical terms.
In terms of NATO versus bilateral, my hedge answer is that we need both. In essence, part of the issue surrounding this Arctic race and much of the circulating alarmism is that all of these issues are compressed together. We so quickly move from the Beaufort Sea and Hans Island over to extending the continental shelf and Russia's concerns about NATO enlargement. These are discrete issues, and we are missing an educated awareness of how different many of these issues are.
The Beaufort Sea is a bilateral issue, and bringing in multilateral bodies complicates things. If a multilateral body does come in, it will be an international court. Canada-U.S. will be dealt with bilaterally.
I see very little opportunity for Canada to seek clarity or to secure what we are searching for in the Northwest Passage. We have a strong case to make that these are internal waters and that we will find that confirmation by negotiating internationally. This is something about which we can agree to disagree with the Americans, as we have done for a long time. I do not think the melting of the sea ice means that we have a two-year window in which to solve this or convince the Americans to sign on with us. This is something we can manage. We have been managing it in functional terms for quite some time. The European Union adopts a similar line to the Americans. I do not know what carrot-stick arrangement we can work out with them, but that is something to explore.
The role of NATO has been downplayed. Since we are settings this up as Canada's looming conflict with all of our neighbours, we have downplayed the fact that NATO plays a pivotal role in this region and has done so for a long time. The Secretary-General of NATO has said that NATO has a role in search and rescue and the protection of critical energy infrastructure here. Conferences that have been held lately have searched out the role for the alliance in the high North. It is sensitive in that NATO said that it does not want to encroach on the territory of the Arctic Council. They do not want to intrude on this. Certainly, NATO has legitimate security and defence issues and can provide value added. What does that mean for a country such as Canada? It is a forum for us to go to, to discuss and enhance our awareness of security and defence issues. Cooperative management mechanisms can be worked out through NATO rather than relying on a traditional defence role.
The tension here is that any NATO Arctic action has to consider the potentially provocative effects of the alliance on non-party nations such as Russia. When it comes to protecting NATO countries' interests in the Arctic, it would play a role — and again I do not know how this all plays out. Some of you are more aware of this than I. If Norway and Russia were to come into conflict over Svalbard, how much requirement would there be for Canada to respond? Certainly all our investments in CF capabilities designed for our domestic mission will offer us very little to be able to play in that sort of hopefully modest, limited conflict.
However, Russia is tremendously concerned about NATO, NATO enlargement encroaching on its borders, that Svalbard is basically a proxy legal battle where Norway is extending its claims around it to freeze out the Russians and that in fact all the belligerence and declarations by countries such as Canada are shows of military force. Domestically, we might almost laugh at that, but the Russians are playing this to their domestic audience saying that this all points to NATO being provocative. They are accusing us of being the aggressors. They say, "We know what this is really all about. The Western allies are grouping together around us, and the Arctic will be a playing zone, and they will deny us what is rightfully ours according to international law.'' It may seem absurd from our standpoint. Our position sounds absurd, I am sure, from the Russian's standpoint.
These issues are quickly elevated away from the regional in terms of the entire circumpolar world up to geo-strategic issues about NATO and Russia and constructive engagement. At the same time, we look at some of the transformations around climate change, despite the focus on the Arctic, and the impacts that climate change is having in the Arctic, and we realize that any mitigation efforts cannot be dealt with in the Arctic. These require global solutions. One of the challenges facing this committee is what to articulate in regional terms and what to expand outward and see in grand strategic terms as well.
Senator Nolin: In your remarks referring to Russia and the sensitivity of Russia about NATO talking too much about the North, you have answered my question because some countries around NATO circles are basically saying, "No, no, no, it is our business. Do not talk about that.'' They are talking to other NATO countries. The sensitivity of Russia is, I think, at the heart of that concern.
[Translation]
Senator Pépin: I entirely agree that the countries should work in cooperation. Now I would like to now how Canada should go about getting the communities of the North involved in Arctic sovereignty.
[English]
Mr. Lackenbauer: In essence, a balance exists at all times. We are conflicted as a country, as I see it, because so often our defensiveness about the Arctic and our reticence to get involved in collective engagement relates to this concern over sovereignty of us as a coastal state. We are worried about our interests, our right to defend what is ours and what Trudeau talked about in the early 1970s, being this fragile ecosystem that we need to protect for the lives of the people who live in the region. That is essential. We are also a maritime nation. We have a strong vested interest in collaborating and cooperating in the Arctic.
One of the most important ways, regardless the outcome over the legal dispute of the Northwest Passage, to ensure that the environment is protected is to work toward a mandatory polar code, something that will hopefully arrive before the end of this year. This is not National Defence; this is Transport Canada negotiating at the forefront of negotiations for decades to work out ways of collaborating such that the rules are actually a net benefit to Canada. At the same time, we have had a prime minister and ministers who have said that we need to consider ourselves an Arctic superpower. We really need to be taking a leadership role in promoting collaboration. It is interesting because this comes in conflict with the "use it or lose it'' messages coming out at the same time.
In essence, it is a balancing act. If we develop the confidence as a country that, in fact, our sovereignty is our sovereignty, and, in fact, we possess the sovereignty that we need, then the question is how do we want to exercise it and for what purpose. Do we want to keep the rest of the world out? Do we want to declare our Arctic a great big national park and say that no traffic will come through it? I do not think northerners will be too happy with that because re-supply for their communities would be pretty tough. Do we want to say, as was suggested in the 1970s, "Look, Canada is a maritime nation. We encourage people to use our waterways the same as we use waterways all around the world. However, do so on terms that will not hurt us and hurt the right of our people to be able to live a healthy life.''? This management or balancing act is tough not only for Canadians to understand but the rest of the world to understand when we have such mixed messages emanating from Ottawa. On the one hand, the message is "use it or lose it, stand up for Canada.'' On the other hand, we have the constructive message that came out of Minister Cannon's speech in Whitehorse, Yukon, last year and also what we see written in the Northern Strategy. One challenge facing this committee is which message should take priority. When I go down to the United States, my American colleagues say that Canada is being unilateralist. I tell them that, no, we are not. In fact, we believe that all of our positions are consistent with international law. They point to political statements, and the discussion becomes very interesting because, depending on how you choose to read it, we could look as though we are saying "Canada first means Canada only.'' We have never suggested that in terms of the Arctic.
Senator Martin: Thank you very much for your very thoughtful and insightful answers. I am sitting in for Senator Manning.
I am a southerner, a Vancouverite, and have lived in Vancouver for most of my life. Although I have never been to the North, I appreciate the complexity, the sensitivity and the vastness of this very important issue of Arctic sovereignty. I know that Canadians appreciate the importance that the Prime Minister has given the ministries that have Arctic sovereignty as an important priority.
I concur with what you and my colleagues are saying. I have great respect for the Canadian Rangers and the communities in the North.
I think about the circles of influence. Yes, we live in this global community, but the first circle is the self and us. My question relates to what Senator Pépin said about the northern communities.
As a historian, how do you see further involving the northern communities in Arctic sovereignty and security? As a city person and a Canadian, I believe that our sovereignty and security is very important.
Mr. Lackenbauer: That is a huge and excellent question that cuts to the core of what we are trying to get out of our Northern Strategy. One of the wonderful "aha'' moments in my life came in Inukjuak community of Nunavik, Northern Quebec. One of the Rangers explained to me that their motto is "Canadians first, first Canadians.'' This really is different. I have been enthralled and enthusiastic to see how invested northerners are in Canada. We may not appreciate that in the South. Given all the issues that have arisen in terms of fulfillment or non-fulfillment of comprehensive land claims in the North, still an enduring sense of patriotism and connection to Canada exists, which is the basis upon which our sovereignty lies. It should be celebrated.
Individual northerners such as Mary Simon and Sheila Watt-Cloutier have suggested that sovereignty begins at home. They have said that if we want to use something, we should use it. They say that we need not talk about the need for a presence because we have continuous presence. They live there; this is their homeland.
A number of proposals have come out on how to further integrate northerners into decision making. Activities are taking place in Ottawa. Tomorrow, an Arctic Council strategy session is happening, which will include representatives from the permanent participants and their advisers who will help to set agendas. I have suggested that perhaps we should set up a Canadian version, a domestic version, of the Arctic Council to ensure that decision making is inclusive and that northerners are at the forefront of not only making decisions and setting priorities but also of setting the agenda from the start.
The recent budget included a number of provisions for healthy investments in northern communities. If we consider sovereignty to be healthy, vibrant communities, which is clearly one of the government's main messages, investing in food supplies to ensure that people have access to nutritional and relatively affordable food is key. Education is a very wise investment, and investments in the Canadian Rangers is very close to the heart of many northerners.
Northerners serve in the Canadian Forces at a rate of five to six times the national average, and it is interesting that we are asking them to sign up even more because we need more sovereignty. In the North, they say a large degree of sovereignty exists in Grise Fiord. They know fully that they are Canadians.
Maybe I am skirting your question a wee bit because perhaps it may not be entirely appropriate for me to answer it. Maybe northerners can talk about the priorities. Paul Kaludjak, who represents Nunavummiut, will suggest such things as a Nunavut marine council, which was provided for in the land claim agreement to ensure that people living in Nunavut have a say in managing the waters. That is a first step. Even though it is not written into the Nunatsiavut claim, Nunavut claim and Inuvialuit claim, perhaps the country could be proactive and say that it would be great to have all the different northern people come together and have a say in managing these waters. Even if in strict legal terms it is does not add more weight to our claims that these are internal waters, I would like to see a foreign country come in and try to undermine the Inuit who have lived here for millennia. We have interesting mechanisms.
The Chair: We are almost out of time, but I would like to have a quick comment on NORAD, separate from the other bodies.
I will put you on the spot a little and ask, if one thing could come out of the Chelsea, Quebec, conference, what would that be?
Mr. Lackenbauer: That is a wonderful question. I am of two minds about the Chelsea conference. If it is relating to littoral states getting together to reaffirm the message that they will cooperate in sorting out the extended continental shelf, it is absolutely appropriate. I am not popular with my friends in permanent participant groups when I say this. It is appropriate for the states to get together and talk about this as states because, at the end of the day, UNCLOS is a state-based system. If the issue in the discussion crosses over into the social and economic realm, then it could potentially undermine the Arctic Council.
I am sure Mr. Kessel will say, with which I agree, that having a meeting such as the one at Chelsea is not incompatible with the Arctic Council. Those sorts of meetings can occur. These are two different tracks, two streams, that can be mutually reinforcing. The one thing I do not want to come out of that meeting in Chelsea is that it intrudes on the proper domain of the Arctic Council and undermines the government's message to say that in fact this relates to issues that the Arctic coastal states have to sort out.
In terms of NORAD, we must recognize that NORAD's aerospace and maritime warning missions support Arctic air and maritime domain awareness. We often set it up as though Canada and the U.S. are at odds. In fact, the types of activities that we are undertaking under the auspices of NORAD are mutually reinforcing and, in many ways, reflect the cooperation that we have had for more than half a century. We recognize that NORAD, USNORTHCOM — United States Northern Command — and Canada Command each possess regional responsibilities yet all rely upon one another.
It makes future scenarios such as the ones Senator Dallaire was anticipating a little less scary when we recognize that we are not in a pitched battle with our American allies and that they will not abandon us at the first moment because they disagree with us over the transit status of these waters in the Northwest Passage. At the end of the day, evolving the relationship between USNORTHCOM and Canada Command, capitalizing on mutual defence interests, expanding this in terms of civil support interest, may actually be a signal of how we can resolve political disagreements between allies.
In essence, it is turning to organizations such as NORAD and demystifying this notion that Uncle Sam is constantly casting covetous eyes up at Canada and wants to take Canadian resources. Hopefully my historical work that will come out in the next couple of years will recast much of that narrative, and it will show that what is remarkable about situations such as the Distant Early Warning Line, or DEW Line, is the fact that Canada and the U.S. got along so well. Despite our neurotic insecurities about sovereignty, which often deal with our concerns that we have not invested enough in our North, at the end of the day, the Americans have been accommodating allies, and it is amazing that they have been as patient with us as they have.
The Chair: I could not agree with you more on that latter point.
Senator Dallaire: The premise of your optimistic perspective of the Arctic and circumpolar security lies on a reasonably stable geopolitical situation in the world. When that waterway becomes as wide open as the oceans, where we have all manner of submarines, ships and defence capabilities deployed, and where people can deploy systems that can reach New York from up there, I contend that the scenario may change due to the nature of the protectionist security that nation states impose. More assets will be moving there, one way or another.
When you look at the strategic impact of energy dependency; the Russian energy card; the Medvedev doctrine beyond Riga, Latvia, and Bucharest, Romania; India's increasing global presence; and security of coastal water, then the energy card will shift significantly to the North.
I would contend that if we do not have people who are from the South who are capable of doing far more than just surviving and fishing Arctic char, we do tend to run the risk of finding either ourselves or our environment protected by someone else. Do you not think we should be proactive?
Mr. Lackenbauer: We certainly should be proactive; I fully agree with your comments, Senator Dallaire. More activity will potentially lead to much more unpredictability, for sure.
When we are looking at the region, however, a comment made to me by someone up North was that if we are still reliant on oil and gas by the time the resources at the North Pole are accessible, we are doomed as a species anyway. Therefore, what is the difference? I do not mean it to be a cheeky answer, but in a way it is suggesting the possibility of more unpredictability. The key is to undertake the stability measures now, and that includes a defence component. I do not mean to suggest that I do not believe investments should be made in the Canadian Forces. They should, but I am suggesting that it must be part of a broader government strategy that is sensitive, aware and attuned to a grand strategy, which includes the interests of our allies such as the United States.
The Chair: Thank you very much. We have appreciated the comments of Mr. Lackenbauer, Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of History, St. Jerome's University, and the co-author of Arctic Front: Defending Canadian Interests in the Far North.
We appreciate your comments and your very frank answers today.
Ladies and gentlemen, our next guest on the topic of Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security is Mr. Alan Kessel, Legal Adviser, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, DFAIT, the man with all the legal answers. We will hear your presentation now.
[Translation]
Alan H. Kessel, Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada: Thank you, Madam Chair. It is always a pleasure to be here. I have a brief text with me that has been distributed to you.
[English]
I find it very useful to put matters in context, and I hope you have the deck there as well.
This is a topic of current interest and has been for most of us in this area for many years. The current interest comes, of course, from the growing melting of the ice. I will try to demystify some of the issues to try to take some of the mythologies and turn them into realities in the next eight minutes.
As you know, the government's approach to the Arctic Region is through its Northern Strategy and is built on four primary objectives; they are on page 2 of the deck.
One of these objectives is to exercise Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic, as international interest in the region increases. It is important to remember the lexicon we are using, especially as Canadian officials, Canadian government and members of Parliament; we refer to the exercise of sovereignty in our North. The tendency is to talk about claiming sovereignty in our North. That is a misnomer; you do not claim something that you own. It does, however, create an uncertainty in the minds of those who are mischievous, for example, if the wrong language is used. Throughout my presentation and in any discussion of Canada and what it is, we exercise our sovereignty in the North as we do on Vancouver Island or in Newfoundland and Labrador, particularly.
Much of what we do in DFAIT is the management of our disputes with our Arctic neighbours. Predominantly, the most important thing coming along from an economic point of view is the delineation of the outer limit of the continental shelf. Without getting too technical, essentially, there is an international legal framework within which countries that are a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea have agreed that you cannot have more than you are entitled to in terms of continental shelf, and you cannot have less than you are entitled to in terms of continental shelf. The trick is just to measure it. It is easy for us to measure our continental shelf on the East Coast — we do not have one on the West Coast — but it is more difficult to measure in the Arctic because of the environment. Ice-covered area is very difficult to measure.
However, I am trying to demystify the notion of some major race for territory up there. You cannot have more than you are entitled to, and you cannot have less. Therefore, there is no race. We agreed on that, and I will get to that in a minute when we discuss the Ilulissat Declaration from Greenland.
Page 3 gives you the bottom line, the facts. A significant decrease in the extent of sea ice since 1968 has occurred and will continue. However, climate change and diminishing ice pose no threat to ownership of lands, islands and waters of the Canadian Arctic. They are Canadian and will remain so. Canadian Arctic sovereignty is long-standing, well established and based on historic title.
The stark reality is that there seems to be a confluence of questions of sovereignty and questions of security. If you have a house and someone runs through your backyard in the middle of the night, you do not lose sovereignty of your house. You still own it. You may question the security of your backyard, and you may want to look into that, but you do not lose ownership of something just because you question whether it is secure enough. That is key in understanding this particular issue because once you start falling into the realm of "If it is not secure, it is not mine,'' I think you have lost much of your argument. It is always yours. How you secure it is an issue of policy or politics or capacity. However, many parts of Canada are pretty open, as all of you know.
The other mythology is that somehow the whole place is up for grabs; that is not at all the case. We have three disputes, all very well managed, that you will see on your little map. The one that you have heard most about probably has been Hans Island. That has been in the news. That is a dispute that we have with Denmark. When Canada and Denmark together were delineating the line up the channel, we arrived at the island and said, "That is Canadian,'' and they said, "No, that is Danish,'' so we said, "Okay, let us just go around the island for now.'' We kept going up the channel, and we have done the delineation. It is a tiny little island with no resources. All the maritime resources are in our territory or the Danish territory. There is no argument as to that, but we do have an issue as to who owns that island. We believe it is ours. They believe it is theirs. We have not yet gone to war on it and do not intend to. We do talk to each other, and we will manage this as we have managed other matters.
Essentially, it is one little island out of 36,563 islands of the Canadian archipelago, and the dispute is only about the island, as I mentioned, not about surrounding waters. We have been on this diplomatic track since 2005, which is to look at how we can resolve this to our mutual interest and benefit, and we continue to do that.
The next one is also with our Danish friends, and that is up in the Lincoln Sea; it is a very tiny little dispute. I should mention that probably 300 to 400 maritime disputes exist in the world. We have very few. It is two small zones, 31 and 34 square nautical miles together, north of Ellesmere Island, and it is in dispute as a result of a disagreement about how to measure the equidistance line between Ellesmere Island and Greenland. It all boils down to whether a rock is a rock or a rock is more than a rock. However, we will do that, and, as you can see, it is something we also will manage peacefully.
The dispute that is very interesting — and I think you got into it a little already — is the Beaufort Sea. That is essentially a dispute over the Canada and the U.S. maritime border north of the Yukon and Alaska. The wedge shape on the map indicates the difference between the Canadian interpretation and the American interpretation of an 1825 treaty between Russia and the U.K., which set the 141st meridian as a boundary between the two countries.
Canada depends on this to determine the 141st degree of longitude as the definitive maritime boundary. In the actual treaty itself, it says, "jusqu'à la Mer Glaciale,'' and our view is that "jusqu'à la Mer Glaciale'' has continued up. The Americans view is "jusqu'à la Mer Glaciale'' is right there at the shore. Clearly, we have a dispute.
The area concerns about 6,250 square nautical miles, and that, too, will ultimately be sorted out in accordance with international law and also between ourselves.
You listened to Mr. Lackenbauer talking about the hydrocarbon issue. I am probably less pessimistic than he is, but certainly in terms of North American energy security, the earlier that we can measure, at least, the quantities of oil and gas that we have up there, the better for securing our future.
We do provide leases for the area that is in dispute, as do the Americans. However, there is a moratorium on actual use.
The dispute that has everyone's hair on the back of their neck up, of course, is the Northwest Passage discussion, and that has gone into the realm of mythology. This is, in fact, not a dispute about land. There is no dispute that the waters are Canadian. The issue is control over foreign navigation — in essence, the right to transit, or the legal status of these Canadian waters.
Canada has determined that these are internal waters of Canada and that we have an unfettered right to regulate it as we would land territory. The U.S. disagrees, contending that it is a strait used for international navigation and runs through the Canadian Arctic archipelago, thus giving foreign vessels the right of passage through these waters. Clearly, we disagree, and during the Shamrock Summit a number of years ago, both Canada and the U.S. decided it was time to take a look at it. We came up with an agreement, the 1988 Canada-U.S. Arctic cooperation agreement to govern U.S. icebreaker movements through this area. The U.S. must seek consent for U.S. government icebreakers to use these waters, and the agreement has been respected and worked well for both sides since 1988. Therefore, the other mythology of people freewheeling through this place is not entirely true.
The other issue that is clear is that the waters are ours, the bottom of the seabed is ours, the resources are ours, and we consider them internal. The key words for us, of course, are "strait used for international navigation'' as it is legally understood. This has never been a strait used for international navigation. It is been covered in ice for millennia. You cannot create something out of something that never was.
We believe the U.S. has particular interests in straits around the world and has a geopolitical interest in ensuring in its mind that straits, wherever they are, are open to navigation. Clearly this is an exception, but we understand their view.
The Chair: I will just have you comment on the extended continental shelf because we are over in our time here, and then we will deal with the other issues through questions.
Mr. Kessel: For the extended continental shelf, you can see the two lines; those of you who have it in colour will see an outer white line. That is the continental shelf extension. If and when we do get the full measurements, we expect it to be the size of the three Prairie provinces put together. That is an extraordinary amount of space that will be ours. Together with the four other Arctic littoral states, we are working in concert to ensure that we do this peacefully, as we expect to. In fact, the meeting in Chelsea in a week from now is just an extension of the cooperation of the five Arctic states.
Senator Meighen: The Beaufort Sea dispute map was not terribly clear to me because it is not in colour. Does that set it out better? I see the white line, the extension, and then the black line. What does the black line represent?
Mr. Kessel: If one of your colleagues has a colour one, he can show it to you.
The Chair: We will just have to do that.
Mr. Kessel: I am afraid this is for people under the age of 40 who are able to see it.
The Chair: We will get the colour version and do our homework on this. That is terrific. That is a great overview.
Senator Dallaire: Why not make it the third canal zone of the world? We have the Suez and Panama canals, and we could have the Northwest Passage. Why not create a functionality that is similar to those two canals in its operations and have that accepted?
The second dimension to that is that the underwater transit occurring is significant. Do we have a policy about nuclear-powered vessels, both surface and subsurface in the Arctic, or have we expressed any comment on that?
Mr. Kessel: We have no objection to vessels coming into Canadian waters. We just have a couple of conditions. One is that the vessel has to be up to standard, which is provided by Transport Canada and through the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. This act was a rather far-sighted piece of legislation from about 20 years ago, which had extended then to 100 nautical miles off our coast and recently, with the Prime Minister's intention to extend it further, has been extended to 200 nautical miles to make it coincide with our EEZ.
If you comply with that condition, as well as have notification to us of your entry into our waters — NORDREG will become mandatory within a few months — then we have no problem. In fact, we are a trading nation. We depend on trade. We are looking at the Churchill base in the Hudson Bay as a potential for increasing grain traffic out of the Prairies. The key is just that you do it under our authority, as in the St. Lawrence or any other Canadian waters. Those waters are no different.
There is no disagreement with your suggestion. Of course, it is up to Lloyds of London to determine whether they will provide insurance to these vessels. In fact, it is really probably some guys in a room in London determining whether you can go through our Northwest Passage if you have a vessel that is good enough.
Senator Dallaire: What about the nuclear power?
Mr. Kessel: You seem to have more information than I do about what occurs underwater. I would rather allow my colleagues from DND to respond to you on that.
Senator Dallaire: Let me put it another way: With the increased traffic, is there not a requirement directly linked to an increased surveillance capability for surface, let alone subsurface, to ensure that people are meeting those criteria, rather than what we have now, which is the Coast Guard, which is not one of the Armed Forces and is in dire need of being rebuilt?
Mr. Kessel: Senator, I think the Prime Minister has indicated with conviction that Canada will be present and defend our North, as we will everywhere else. Commitments have been made to northerners, to the Rangers and others. There is Joint Task Force (North), JTFN, which you are familiar with, which is our Armed Forces up there. Members of the Armed Forces can probably explain more clearly to you. In terms of delivering on its commitment, this government has certainly done so and will continue to do so.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: Mr. Kessel, I would like to go back to the matter of the Beaufort Sea. What steps have been taken — by us and by the Americans? What action are we taking to find an international legal solution to our dispute with the Americans? Where are we in those efforts to find a solution?
[English]
Mr. Kessel: This government has made a strong commitment to settle disputes with our neighbours. A large amount of work is done at the scientific level before we can even go into a discussion as to how we settle this particular thing. As far as we are concerned, we are sticking with the Canadian position to date because we say that it is in a treaty.
On the practical level, both Canada and the United States are working together to figure out just what is there, what is on the seabed and where the continental shelf is.
This past summer and for the past three summers, and probably for next summer, the Coast Guard vessel CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent, together with the USS Healy, has been mapping that area. Scientists tell us they cannot give us enough information to have a sensible discussion about this matter until they have done their mapping.
Both Canada and the U.S. have agreed that we need to have good scientific information, and that is the stage that we are at for the Beaufort Sea dispute.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: I understand that aspect and I think it is highly useful. It will ultimately permit joint management of the sovereignty of a territory over which we do not agree, but the fact remains that, with regard to the territory in question, unless we reach a settlement — and I do not get the impression we are reaching a settlement — the two countries will eternally disagree over ownership of or sovereignty over that wedge at the bottom of the Beaufort Sea and we will have to be satisfied with harmonious joint management of that territory.
[English]
Mr. Kessel: You have raised some very important points. They indicate just how well Canada and the U.S. get along, even in the area where we do have a dispute over the maritime boundary. I would prefer not to call it conflict because conflict implies much more.
Senator Nolin: It is a simple disagreement.
Mr. Kessel: It is actually a complicated disagreement. The fact is that a disagreement exists. However, we live in a practical environment, and we are not ratcheting up any discussion that would avoid a sensible approach to looking at what the mutual interests are there. Our mutual interest is to resolve the dispute, to make it go away. Canada has an obligation in 2013 to make its submission to the commission on the continental shelf. We would like to at least have started working to reduce what you call a conflict, or dispute, so that we can then go to the commission and say, "Look, there is nothing on the Canada-U.S. border.'' If not, then we will find an accommodation to our mutual interest in any event.
At the moment, the scientists are doing fabulous work. We are learning facts that we never knew about the continental shelf. This will have an influence on what positions Canada and the U.S. take for what resources are out there and what our North American interests are. For the moment, we talk to each other about this.
The Chair: You implied that the testing will continue over next summer. Is there some definitive end point to this?
Mr. Kessel: We have to submit by 2013. The mapping will continue probably for another two years. We are in the process of testing new Canadian-invented equipment, which are autonomous underwater vehicles up in the area — maybe one of your witnesses has mentioned that. This is to allow us to measure the seabed, but we are finding it difficult to deal with variable ice and so on.
For now, we expect to be putting in our submission in 2013. We have had extremely good weather in the south, which is the Beaufort Sea. We have had variable weather in the north, north of Ellesmere, and moving ice. It is difficult to put an ice cap on ice that is actually moving; it makes for difficult sleeping. We believe we will be on time for our submission.
Senator Patterson: Thank you for your fascinating presentation. We all hope that the process through the Arctic Council and the UN convention will succeed, but it has been pointed out that the Arctic Council is not a decision- making body; it is a vehicle for cooperation.
From a legal perspective, if this issue, perish the thought, cannot be resolved through this process of science and negotiation, is another mechanism available?
Mr. Kessel: The Arctic Council, as you indicated, does not have any legal effect. It does have a strong moral effect. That is why it is a useful environment to discuss the socioeconomic environmental-type issues. These particular ones we are dealing with off the coast are firmly within the realm of a strict international legal regime, accepted by all of the countries around the Arctic Ocean.
The U.S. has accepted it although they are not a party to UNCLOS. They have indicated they consider vast parts of the convention to be what we call customary international law; therefore, existing as law regardless of whether it is in a convention. They are governing themselves according to that, as are our Russian friends, who have also indicated that they will abide by this, together with our Danish colleagues and our Norwegian colleagues. It is premature to talk about anything with respect to settlement of disputes when we are only at the stage of discussing what is out there.
Senator Patterson: It is international law. Does that mean that international courts are a possible vehicle, if it comes to that?
Mr. Kessel: International law is created by states in order to govern them. Clearly, in any relationship, if you do not resolve matters, you can look to other dispute resolution mechanisms. That does not mean you go to court. It could mean that you talk to each other, you arbitrate, you negotiate; you do any number of things. Most countries would prefer not to go to international courts, unless they have convinced themselves they cannot resolve their own disputes.
As I said earlier, this is premature, although we seem to feel that the disputes can be resolved under the current regime.
Senator Meighen: If I am not mistaken, the Americans are not signatories to UNCLOS.
Mr. Kessel: That is correct.
Senator Meighen: To what extent does that influence or affect negotiations?
Mr. Kessel: They have agreed that the majority of the content is considered customary international law, meaning they are bound by it anyway. A couple of issues in it they do not feel bound by, but those relate more to dealing with developing countries and other resources. Therefore, we are seeing successive United States administrations, whether Republican or Democrat, essentially complying with what we see in UNCLOS and constructively working with us. We do not believe they will not continue to do so. The Bush administration did, and the Obama administration has indicated that they wish to send this to the Senate for ratification. Maybe with one of their issues out of the way, they will have more time to do that.
The Chair: That might be premature.
Senator Day: Thank you for being here. I think it would be helpful for the record if you could explain "territorial waters,'' "economic zone,'' and then the continental shelf issue and under which regimes each of these exist.
Mr. Kessel: I will start with internal waters. Essentially, a country puts baselines around its territory. We have done that since 1985; that is, indicated where the baseline is, meaning where the land essentially runs around Canada. Everything inside that baseline is internal. It is not covered by any other regime other than Canada.
The 12 miles from the baseline is the territorial sea within which Canada is totally sovereign, meaning it controls everything within that, except that innocent passage through there by some vessels is allowed with no reason to stop them as long as they comply.
International law has also given us, and everyone else, a 200-nautical-mile EEZ, exclusive economic zone, which means that we can exercise economic sovereignty, if we can use that concept, within those 200 nautical miles.
To complicate matters more, the continental shelf, which is the area that drops off from the baselines, to a point where there is the demarcation between it and the deep sea, belongs to the state. Also, if there happens to be a ridge or an extension, a logical normal prolongation will belong to the state as well. We are trying to determine just where that continental shelf lies. We have learned that the resources on the continental shelf itself have either come through silt or movement of crustaceans that have turned into hydrocarbons. That is where the gas and oil are found. We are keen to ensure that we know the exact position of that shelf extension.
You will also have heard discussions as to the Lomonosov Ridge and other ridges in the Arctic. Those are immensely important to determine the extent to which the North American continent, the Canadian interest, would go out toward the North Pole. Our Russian colleagues have indicated an interest in the Lomonosov Ridge coming from Russia toward the North Pole and Canada.
Before I get the question about the meaning of a flag being dropped on the North Pole, I will answer that now. It is purely a stunt; it means nothing. It means that we were there. It means no more than the National Geographic flag on the Himalayas means they were there or the American flag on the moon means that they were there. They do not own either of those, and the Russians do not own the North Pole. It is safe for Canada.
Senator Day: Is the legal regime for the 12 miles and the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone the law of the sea, which the United States has not signed?
Mr. Kessel: The United States has not ratified it but has agreed that the rules applying to the territorial sea and to the EEZ are considered customary international law, meaning they are bound by it. That law existed before UNCLOS.
Senator Day: That is what I would have thought.
Mr. Kessel: Therefore, UNCLOS incorporated many of those components and added some. The components that it incorporated, people always had to abide by. The added components are what have to be ratified in order to be bound by them. The Americans are bound by what existed before and many of the elements that we have put into the UNCLOS, but not all. In terms of the territorial waters and the EEZ, they are in compliance.
The Chair: In a legal framework, what could be accomplished at the Chelsea convention? This is a volunteer organization. Not everyone is represented at its table. Can anything actually happen?
Mr. Kessel: It is important to understand from where the Chelsea convention came. The Chelsea convention is a follow-up to what was the Ilulissat meeting. The Ilulissat meeting was held May 27 to 29, 2008. You will see that on the last page of your deck.
The countries that appeared there were those countries that are surrounding the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic Ocean is similar to a giant doughnut — not the Arctic entirely, just the ocean. The reason those countries met was purely based on their legal right to an extended continental shelf. The reason the three Arctic Council states were not there is because Sweden, Finland and Iceland are not in there. There is the doughnut, and that is where they are. They are not here; we are. They do not have a right to a continental shelf in that doughnut. We were not leaving anyone out; they just are not there, for geographical reasons.
When we met, it was about trying to stifle some of the hysteria that abounded at the time, as you may recall, by certain authors, newspapers and journalists, which was that the sky is falling, war will break out, everyone has a race to the North Pole and resources are up for grabs.
What these states decided to do, Canada included, was to say: Just ratchet it down. This is not true. We spent 40 years preventing war by developing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Our job is not to go to war with each other; our job is to create an environment where you economically exploit the areas to which you are entitled, and that is what we are doing.
We are saying, as five states, in a declaration in Greenland, that that is what we are doing. The Chelsea convention is a continuation of that commitment to talk to each other rather than having a race; to deal with the issues related to the continental shelf rather than to allow speculation as to what we are doing. It is commendable to both the Danes in Greenland and to Canada in Chelsea that we have that relationship with our neighbours, and I look forward to the results.
The Chair: On the legal point, I know it is an understanding that you are talking about. Could they go any further than that?
Mr. Kessel: What we are doing is about implementation. We have done the norm setting. We are eager to come up with new things. The reality is that we have enough things to implement, and if we laid them end to end, they would probably go to the moon. What we are doing in Chelsea is part of the continuing implementation of a difficult negotiation that took 40 years and by which we now all abide. It is a credit to us that we are actually putting this in place, and in a peaceful way.
Senator Martin: I wanted to take the opportunity to make a few comments rather than ask a question. I found your presentation calming and reassuring, and I appreciate the precise language that you use. I just wanted to put on record that I am feeling reassured, as a southerner, in looking at this important and vast issue.
On page 2, you outlined the Northern Strategy. From your perspective, is there anything to comment on about the Northern Strategy? Are we doing enough? From your perspective, in looking at all of the issues, the disputes and the facts that are before us, do we have a good strategy going forward?
Mr. Kessel: First, I appreciate what you are saying. My hope is that I present a calming approach to this issue because it is sometimes difficult to actually be heard above some of the brouhaha. When you look closely, not at the rhetoric but at the reality on the ground, you realize that we are not as dumb as some people would have us, as states and as governments and as people. We really took a look at some of these issues and decided to fix them before they could become horrible.
We did not know that the ice would melt as quickly as it did. We were clever to create — maybe I could say this about the negotiators at the time — a special provision in UNCLOS to deal with ice-covered areas, to the degree that we treat them as if they are land, which was part of dealing with indigenous populations' interest in ensuring that the ice not be horribly mauled, as well as allowing us to extend environmental interests over these areas, which has allowed us to bring our Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act as far as we have. Those negotiators were prescient. They did not realize that, in our lifetime, we would see the ice retreating to this degree, but they were smart enough to do that.
On the issue of the Northern Strategy, the fact is that we are living in a dynamic and changing environment, not only in the North but throughout Canada. The North particularly is feeling the effects of climate change because of the exponential increase in temperature there and the impact of that melting point, which is so important.
We are seeing infrastructure that will need to be bolstered. We are seeing the melting of the permafrost, which has an impact on housing, airstrips and so on. The government is committed to ensuring that we have sufficient funds to look after that. Therefore, an economic and social development component exists. An environmental component looks at how to deal with mining interests opening up in a new area where mining has not been and how to deal with the tailings and various other things in places that have been pristine.
The issue of devolving governance has been a major effort in this government's agenda, to ensure that the territories are masters in their own houses and that they are contributing to the welfare and the wealth of Canada. In terms of the sovereignty pillar, it is to reassure Canadians that the North, as every part of the rest of our country, is as sovereign as it has been and as it always will be.
The Chair: As the ice retreats — and ice is treated as land — does the definition of 12 miles or 200 miles start to change?
Mr. Kessel: No.
The Chair: Good.
Mr. Kessel: Miles do not change due to whether or not ice is on the surface.
The Chair: If ice is treated as land, does that change the nature of the dispute?
Mr. Kessel: No, because what the provision also says is that it has to be ice-covered for the majority of the year. Our belief is that it will be covered for the majority of the year, so we do not expect to see that change in the near future.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: I would like to go back to the matter concerning the passage. These are Canadian internal waters, and Canadian legislation and regulations therefore apply to the passage. In one of your answers, you referred to regulations that will soon be in effect. Are there any other statutory or regulatory measures that specifically concern the Northwest Passage and that are being prepared to further consolidate the implementation of our sovereignty and more specifically to protect the fragile environment of that region of Canada?
[English]
Mr. Kessel: You have raised a very interesting point. One way to approach it is to first look at the whole concept of the Northwest Passage. You will not see the Northwest Passage actually mentioned on a map because it is a concept more than a thing. On the map are a series of channels that, if put together, can get you either to the east side or the west side. Certain explorers died in the attempt.
We are now at a point where that combination of passages — which are together considered the Northwest Passage because northwest is where they are going, and each of them has its own name — together could provide a way through. That does not change the fact that it is still internal waters of Canada, any more than the Thousand Islands near Kingston changes because it may be iced at one time or not or you can get through or not. It is internal. We govern it as the rest of the country and the waters of Canada. We certainly have not had any indication that we would not continue to do so.
For now, the question would be who is trying to fix a problem that does not exist. The difficulty with trying to fix a non-existent problem is that you actually create different ones. This is a non-existent problem. It does not need fixing. It is internal to Canada. It is our sovereign territory, and it seems to be working well.
Senator Nolin: You referred, in one of your answers, to a regulation that will be in force in the near future.
Mr. Kessel: Yes. We have had, up until recently, NORDREG, which is a voluntary process whereby ships coming into all our waters in the North identify themselves. This is really about search and rescue and safety and awareness of where vessels are so that we can respond. This has been voluntary until now because the number of vessels has been miniscule.
We are looking to the future when maybe more vessels will be in the area. We want to set up a system so that we are aware of where they are and how to respond, if necessary. It will become mandatory that vessels coming into that area not only comply with our environmental requirements under the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act — which is law — but they will also have to notify us of where they are; in which case we will then be able to plot them as they make their way through our territory.
Discussions have taken place in international meetings as to whether ships should have a special type of transponder on them, which our satellites would be able to monitor regardless.
The next big issue will be the search and rescue part as the North becomes more open. As you know, flights now go over the North Pole, which never used to happen before, during the Cold War. We are aware that man-made machines do have issues, on occasion. How would we deal with that?
Part of our working together as the Arctic 5 is also to look at the search-and-rescue capability. In our area, we cannot call someone from Sweden to come and perform search and rescue. It is not about not liking Swedes, it is about who is the most practical to be in the area.
Part of the mandatory nature of NORDREG is to tighten up those capacities. You will have noted about a year and a half ago a Canadian-built icebreaker cruise ship went down in the Antarctic. It was clear blue sky; there was no storm; it was daytime and a huge number of passengers were on board. No one perished. That was because another cruise ship was travelling with it.
A number of things are being looked at currently for the increase in cruising up in the Arctic. We do not want to keep people out of our Arctic. We do not want to stop trade in our Arctic. We just want to ensure that when they are there, they are environmentally sound, safe, and that, if we need to, we can help them in times of difficulty.
Senator Nolin: You just referred to the Arctic 5. I presume you are referring to the five states that will meet in Chelsea?
Mr. Kessel: That is right, Arctic 5, Arctic 8.
Senator Meighen: What is the difference between the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and the Canada Shipping Act? Why could the Canada Shipping Act not have been used?
Also, can we not regulate cargo safety, et cetera, under the Canada Shipping Act in other areas?
Mr. Kessel: Unfortunately, I am not an expert on the Canada Shipping Act. You would have to get one of my colleagues from Transport Canada.
I think, at the time, it was thought that you needed a specific regime dealing with the area of Arctic waters pollution prevention. That is why the government of the day decided to do that. It seems to have worked, but if there are issues with respect to how the Canada Shipping Act works, I would have to defer to one of my colleagues.
Senator Dallaire: Do you know how the Suez Canal is managed?
Mr. Kessel: No.
Senator Dallaire: Do you see, with all those assets, that we might have to move up there? We are looking into the future and not next week. The costs of all that could be charged to those who want to come through that area. If we start moving toward that regime, we could then be open to discussion of that becoming an international waterway and regulated by another body.
Mr. Kessel: No. Something does not become an international waterway that was not one previously — especially when it is internal to Canada — just because the weather changed.
Senator Dallaire: Your position on that is not necessarily reflected by many others. Is that because that is the position we are taking, or is it simply that there is no other option to what you are suggesting?
Mr. Kessel: That is similar to the question, When did you stop beating your wife?
Senator Dallaire: You are in the business.
Mr. Kessel: I will remain in the business, but I will have to correct you if I think there is a disconnect between what is real and what is not. We are very familiar with how the St. Lawrence Seaway works, and we have a very good system of working with our American friends in managing that.
However, I will point out that that is managing a waterway that has a sovereign state on the north and another sovereign state on the south. That does not exist in our Northwest Passage. It is Canada on the north of it, Canada on the south of it, Canada on the west of it, Canada on the east of it and Canada on the more south of it and Canada on the more north of it. These are different things.
We are not dealing with the St. Lawrence here, where we had to have a joint group put this together. It works very well. If the time comes when shipping will be more frequent in the North, Canada will be managing it. That is why we are looking into that now, to be ready, to put in place the legislative, environmental and search-and-rescue framework.
That is why we are working cooperatively with our neighbours. The alternative to cooperation in these areas is death for those who run into trouble. This cooperation, borne out of 40 years of negotiation — after a Second World War when we said that we would not go to war of over territory — has been fruitful. We should actually declare victory.
The Chair: Thank you very much. We appreciate these comments, Mr. Alan H. Kessel, Legal Adviser, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada since 2005, but who has been with the department since 1983. We thank you for your insights today.
We will continue our discussion here at the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence about Arctic sovereignty and security. We are pleased to welcome Professor Michael Byers from the University of British Columbia, the author, for the purposes of today's discussion, of a book entitled Who Owns the Arctic?: Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North.
Do you have opening comments?
Michael Byers, Professor, University of British Columbia: Yes, I would like to make a few comments. I will keep them brief because Mr. Kessel spoke before me, and I have high regard for his abilities. I will assume that he covered a great deal of ground.
I do want to emphasize at the beginning that when it comes to issues of sovereignty, only one dispute in the entire circumpolar Arctic concerns land, and that is Hans Island, 1.3 square kilometres of insignificant rock and nothing else.
Canada and Denmark in the early 1970s delimited a 2,600-kilometre maritime boundary. The only reason that we did not draw a line down the middle of Hans Island is because we did not realize until that point that we had a dispute and could solve it very quickly. When we talk about sovereignty in the Arctic, we are talking about water and about the ocean floor, not about land.
We have a couple of small maritime boundary disputes with Denmark north of Greenland and Ellesmere Island that could easily be resolved. We have a more significant dispute over 21,000 square kilometres of sea bed in the Beaufort Sea. In fact, the dispute has grown beyond that. Those 21,000 kilometres are within the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. In addition, new science concerning the possibility of claims to extended continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles is increasing the size of that dispute but also the possibilities for a negotiated solution. This is because the Americans wish to use an equidistance line to delimit the maritime boundary. Once we get beyond 200 nautical miles from shore, the presence of Banks Island, a Canadian island just to the east of the Beaufort Sea, sends that equidistance line sharply westward toward the Russian maritime boundary, thus actually balancing the Canadian and legal arguments in a very convenient way.
I am pleased that the Canadian government announced in the Throne Speech an intention to negotiate our Arctic boundary disputes. The Beaufort Sea will be at the top of the list, and the time is right to solve that problem between friends and, of course, between partners in a common energy market in North America. We really have no reason to get hung up about the Beaufort Sea dispute. It will be worked out by capable people such as Mr. Kessel.
We have the possibility of a small overlap with Russian and Danish claims to extend the continental shelf in the Central Arctic Ocean. That is not a big issue. Our scientists have been working together closely. Our foreign ministry legal advisers, including Mr. Kessel, have been meeting to discuss the possibility of coordinated or joint submissions to the United Nations commission on the limits of the continental shelf.
People need to realize that most of the hydrocarbons in the Arctic are located in shallow water close to shore. It is because hydrocarbons are essentially old, dead plants that once upon a time required sunlight to grow, so they are not found in 4,000 metres of water; they are found in the shallow water in the exclusive economic zones or on the extended continental shelf. Closer toward the North Pole, the water becomes very deep. It is, in fact, 4,000 metres deep there. It is very remote. It would be exceedingly expensive to exploit hydrocarbon resources.
This is not a dispute about anything other than occasional political posturing for domestic purposes in Russia and perhaps in Canada from time to time. That can be sorted out.
The Chair: Has your own personal view on this changed and morphed? We still do hear the rhetoric, which is very strong, and we have to control that, fight for that and get ready. Has your own view morphed?
Mr. Byers: I have been encouraged in the last few years by increased cooperation between the Arctic countries. For instance, I was pleased when Mr. Kessel went to Moscow last February to meet with his Russian counterpart. That was an important step forward. Let me speak about the crucial issue of disagreement and difficulty, the Northwest Passage.
We are seeing an unprecedented and rapid loss of Arctic sea ice. I myself have sailed through the Northwest Passage and seen almost no ice. My colleague David Barber, at the University of Manitoba, one of Canada's leading sea-ice scientists, is warning that we might see a seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean as early as 2013, three years from now.
I want to emphasize as a public policy person that in public policy, we do not require scientific certainty. We have to guard against risks. It is a matter of risk assessment. If scientists such as David Barber are saying that there is a substantial risk that we will lose all of the multi-year ice for a seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean, my view is that as policy people, we need to prepare for that. Some scientists will still disagree, but if we had, let us say, a 20 per cent chance of a major terrorist attack on Ottawa, we would move heaven and earth to prevent it. We have much greater than a 20 per cent chance of an open Northwest Passage within the next 5 years to 10 years, and so we need to prepare for that.
Two years ago, I partnered with former U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellucci. We conducted a model negotiation on the Northwest Passage. You will find our agreed recommendations as an annex to my book. We conducted that exercise to demonstrate that Canada and the U.S. could constructively negotiate cooperation and confidence-building, even with respect to the Northwest Passage. We did not solve the legal dispute between our two countries, but we built common ground toward that goal. It is absolutely imperative to realize that with the risk of an open Northwest Passage and the fact that we are partnered with the United States in issues of North American security, for instance, in terms of our economies through NAFTA, that there is no reason to wait on this, and we can find common ground.
I would disagree quite profoundly with the advice that the Canadian government is receiving from its diplomats and from its legal adviser. We cannot simply continue to coast along on an agree-to-disagree policy. I think we need to engage with the Americans on the Northwest Passage to find solutions to deal with the risks that arise from ice-free waters, be they from accidents of the type that Mr. Kessel spoke to or be they environmental risks. A single-hulled oil tanker going through the Northwest Passage could cause an accident similar to the Exxon Valdez. I am also thinking of non-state security risks such as smugglers and illegal immigration, for instance. For our American friends, the threat of terrorism looms large. Even if the risk of terrorists using the Arctic is quite remote, still, that does weigh on the minds of people in Washington. The general sense here is that it is time to negotiate all of our issues, the Beaufort Sea and the Northwest Passage. There is certainly scope to do that.
I will close with one final comment. There is also something of a time imperative, not just the one driven by climate change but by the fact that non-Arctic countries are becoming more interested in the Arctic. The European Union wants more of a say in what is happening in the Arctic. The Chinese are starting to wake up to the Arctic as an area that is opening up because of climate change, offering shipping routes and potential access to natural resources. The Chinese have been quite clear, and so have the Europeans, that they respect our rights under UNCLOS. They do not challenge our sovereignty. However, we need to tidy up our loose edges. We need to sort out our maritime boundary disputes and resolve the Northwest Passage dispute with the United States so that we are firmly positioned to deal with these outside actors and to work with them in a cooperative way but on a clear legal basis that does not involve any uncertainties as to the scope of our jurisdiction. That is another important reason for my urging a proactive stance on the part of our government and on the part of our foreign ministry, and not simply hoping that somehow the ice will remain to protect our national interest in the years and decades ahead.
The Chair: Thank you. Just let me follow up because I do not want to leave the wrong impression. You were concerned with Mr. Kessel's testimony and responded by saying that we must engage with the Americans on the Northwest Passage. However, we are, to some degree. Are you suggesting some different route?
Mr. Byers: I am suggesting that we should engage with the Americans with the view to updating the 1988 Arctic cooperation agreement that was negotiated very ably by former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and would have solved the problem but for the advance of climate change in the last number of years. I do want to see a bilateral agreement or treaty here. Then I would want to see us encouraging our American neighbours to bring their allies around the world to a common U.S.-Canadian position.
Senator Dallaire: Professor, Byers, permit me to read these few lines from a recent article from The Associated Press:
In 2008, Medvedev signed an Arctic strategy paper saying that the polar region must become Russia's "top strategic resource base'' by the year 2020.
The document called for strengthening border guard forces in the region and updating their equipment, while creating a new group of military forces to "ensure military security under various military-political circumstances.''
Why do I get a feeling that we are not looking at 2020 and beyond. When we look at all the factors of the significance of the Arctic, we need to start taking more deliberate decisions now, with even more of a sense of urgency. If it takes us 10 years to build one icebreaker, you can imagine the needs, which are seen to be accelerated up there. With a somewhat bellicose statement from someone from a country that has much more knowledge of the Arctic than we do, do you not feel that we are still at the start of this exercise versus a sort of comfort zone that is being resolved?
Mr. Byers: Thank you for the question. We do have trouble building icebreakers and other ships. In fact, it is taking more than four years to actually define the specifications for a contract that may be signed at some point. The Chinese are building a new icebreaker right now, and it is taking them a total of three years.
With respect to Russia and the Russian president's comments, Russia is the largest country in the world. It has a very substantial Arctic Ocean waterfront. It has very extensive continental shelves. It is entitled to a very large portion of the Arctic under the same rules that we use for ourselves on this side of the Arctic Ocean. If you read the Russian president's comments, he certainly does see that unquestioned Russian jurisdiction as providing a major economic opportunity for his country. Similar to us, he will be concerned about non-state threats. He will be concerned about environmental risks. He will be concerned about smugglers. He will be concerned about illegal immigration and terrorism. However, I have not read anything in his or other Russian politicians' statements that suggests a desire to build forces against nation-state threats coming from Canada, the United States or other NATO countries.
The tendency on the part of many journalists is to wish to sell newspapers by ratcheting up the threat of the Russian bear. I do not trust Russia. I do not like what they have done in places such as Georgia and Chechnya. However, in the Arctic, as far as I can see, they are acting responsibly.
Senator Dallaire: I am the patron of the Pugwash movement — the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs — and I have significant concerns about nuclear-powered capabilities in the Arctic, be they surface or subsurface, and not just weaponry but actually systems. Do you have any concern about that? They are an effective propulsion system for large icebreakers and other types of shipping that could be also military.
Mr. Byers: I am pleased to say that I am a member of Canadian Pugwash, and thank you for your leadership in the organization.
Senator Dallaire: I put a plug in there.
The Chair: We have taken note of that.
Mr. Byers: The Arctic Ocean was a frontline in the Cold War. The base for the Russian northern fleet at Murmansk is north of the Arctic Circle. Yes, nuclear-powered submarines continue to operate in the Arctic.
I certainly applaud the effort by U.S. President Barack Obama to reset the relationship between NATO and Russia, which includes a commitment to negotiating deep-reaching reductions in nuclear arms. Canada could play a role there, and I think we need to play a role as a bridge between the United States and Russia. I would like to see Canadian leadership in at least freeing part of the Arctic from nuclear weapons. Perhaps Canada might choose to declare itself a nuclear-weapons-free zone because we are, as part of an effort toward this. We could lead the negotiation of a multilateral treaty to demilitarize the Central Arctic Ocean because no surface military vessels are there now. Perhaps we could keep it that way through proactive diplomacy. Things can be done. We need to work in concert with our American and Russian friends to increase the detente that we are seeing in Arctic relations.
Senator Meighen: I have a clarification on that, Dr. Byers. Are you classifying a nuclear-powered icebreaker as a nuclear weapon and, therefore, something that should be banned from the Arctic?
Mr. Byers: Many of these nuclear-powered submarines are also nuclear-missile-carrying submarines, which goes to the heart of this.
Nuclear-weapons-free zones normally focus on nuclear arms rather than propulsion. I am pleased to say that our American friends are no longer putting nuclear-armed cruise missiles on their attack submarines. With respect to the Americans, we are talking only of the large boomers.
I will be happy to go into detail on this later, but I do think there is scope for progressive diplomacy here. Canada, with its long record of contributing to arms-control negotiations, could think creatively about how it could contribute.
We have the wonderful advantage of being a member of the Manhattan Project that chose not to acquire nuclear arms. We actually had nuclear weapons on our soil during the Cold War and then rid ourselves of those. We have shown real leadership and have real moral authority. The Arctic is not our backyard but our front yard, and I would like to see us explore the options.
Senator Meighen: I am not sure that you answered my question. I may have phrased it improperly. I was talking about nuclear-powered icebreakers.
Mr. Byers: Nuclear-powered icebreakers are a perfectly legitimate form of propulsion, just as nuclear isotopes are a perfectly appropriate way of detecting cancer and other diseases. I am not against nuclear-powered ships.
Senator Meighen: That is what I wanted to know.
Mr. Byers: There is a role to be played there. Indeed, in the 1980s, for a while Canada was planning on acquiring 12 nuclear-powered submarines of its own.
Senator Dallaire: That was six.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: Mr. Byers, I would like to explore the Arctic Council issue with you. At the start of your remarks, you admitted you were increasingly in favour of international cooperation in dealing with Arctic challenges. Then what role do you see for the Arctic Council?
[English]
Mr. Byers: I am very pleased that the Arctic Council exists, for a number of reasons, one of which is that it includes northern indigenous peoples as permanent participants, which is a very important advancement. Of course, some of those same groups are annoyed that they are being excluded from the Arctic 5 meeting in Chelsea, Quebec, next week. The Arctic Council has done very good work with the Arctic climate assessment and the shipping assessment. They have laid a base of research and cooperative diplomatic advancement on non-security issues.
However, at the insistence of the United States, the Arctic Council's mandate does not extend to security matters. One thing that might be considered by Arctic countries such as Canada is expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council so that those security issues can also be part of the deliberations within that growing international grouping called the Arctic Council.
At the moment, again, it is left to bilateral relations and relations between NATO and Russia to work on these security issues. We deal with them in some context in the United Nations Security Council, but the Arctic Council itself does not yet have a role there. I hope that answers your question.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: That is a very good answer and it leads me to my second question. You raised the security aspect of the Arctic. Five of the eight members of the council are members of NATO. Do you not see a complementary role for NATO — and Secretary General Rasmussen has referred to this on a number of occasions — that is to say somewhat expanded international cooperation? We could use the very good relationship that Canada has with its Russian partner on the Arctic Council for NATO's benefit since the relationship between the 28 NATO members and Russia is not always that cordial. There is definitely a major misunderstanding on security.
[English]
Mr. Byers: You make a very important point. From a security perspective, Arctic relations are about relations between NATO and Russia. This brings me to my point about President Obama's initiative to reset the relationship with Russia. We need to be thinking about Canada's Arctic policy in that context. This is a very large geopolitical situation. It is not just about the Arctic. In many respects, it is about the relationship between the two former superpowers, and I want to re-emphasize that. I do not think we need to choose between different organizations.
Senator Nolin: I think you can have both.
Mr. Byers: It is useful to have parallel initiatives and parallel efforts. If NATO and Russia can work on security dimensions at the same time as the Arctic Council can expand its mandate to at least discuss those matters, that would be a good thing. If the International Maritime Organization wants to make its Arctic code into a mandatory treaty as opposed to a voluntary set of guidelines, that would be a good thing. Many different international organizations could play a role here.
I will make two comments on this matter. First, I feel it was unfortunate that the European Union and China were denied permanent observer status.
Senator Nolin: At least for the EU, it was unfortunate.
Mr. Byers: Yes, for the Arctic Council.
Senator Nolin: Whether it was unfortunate for China, we still do not know.
Mr. Byers: They should be allowed to see what is happening inside the tent so that they do not develop suspicions. It is better to have transparency when dealing with these matters.
Second, I regret that the Arctic will not be on the agenda for the G8 meeting later this summer. The Arctic is a global issue, and it is one on which Canada has real stature as the second-largest country on the planet, with 40 per cent of our territory in that region.
[Translation]
Senator Pépin: You have just answered my question on the request made by the European Union and China for permanent observer status on the Arctic Council.
[English]
Mr. Byers: I have a great deal of sympathy for seal hunters, both indigenous and non-indigenous. I understand that denying the EU permanent observer status was at least in some way linked to that, but I would urge people to see the very large dimensions of the Arctic and its role in geopolitics. I also encourage them to see that the European Union can play a constructive role in some matters. We need the European Union there if we want to push the International Maritime Organization to make its standards mandatory. We need the European Union if we want to extend port state authority over shipping to ensure that the highest standards apply. Ports such as Hamburg, Germany, and Rotterdam, the Netherlands, will be direct destinations of trans-Arctic shipping from places such as Shanghai, China.
We need the European Union. We need China on board to push cooperation forward. It will not be easy, but we have to do it because, as I mentioned at the beginning of my presentation, there is a very real risk that we will see a seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean within the next 5 years to 10 years; when that happens we will have an Arctic Ocean and a Northwest Passage without multi-year ice. That waterway and the Central Arctic Ocean will resemble the Gulf of St. Lawrence or the Baltic Sea. We will see 12-month-a-year shipping in those waters with ice-strengthened cargo ships and icebreaker-escorted convoys. Anyone who tells you otherwise is taking a huge risk with the national security of this country.
Senator Patterson: Professor Byers, in Who Owns the Arctic?: Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North, you argue that Canada perhaps places too much emphasis on military solutions to Arctic sovereignty, if I am summarizing correctly. Would you comment on what you do see as the appropriate role for the military in the North?
Mr. Byers: Thank you for the question. It is nice to have a question from the senator from Nunavut.
The Canadian Forces does have a role to play in the Arctic, the most obvious one concerning search and rescue. If we want other countries to take us seriously as an Arctic power, we need to be able to conduct search-and-rescue missions in a very timely fashion. To have our search-and-rescue helicopters flying from Comox, British Columbia, or Greenwood, Nova Scotia, to rescue people in the Canadian High Arctic does not bode well either for the people in distress or for the perception of our political will as seen from outside the country.
I would urge a significant increase in the capacity of the Canadian Forces in terms of search and rescue. I know that some moves have been made. I want to see those new fixed-wing aircraft before too long. I want to see that paratroop capacity in place so that we can respond quickly if a major commercial airliner were to crash-land in the High Arctic. These things are so obvious that they do not require debate.
In terms of the maritime perspective, I would like to point out that we have incredible surveillance, courtesy of RADARSAT-2, our synthetic aperture satellite, which went into operation a couple of years ago. I was pleased to see in the federal budget a financial commitment to the next generation of the RADARSAT constellation. Those are good from a security perspective, and the government needs to be congratulated for that.
I do think that the government is making a mistake with its Arctic offshore patrol ships because I believe we need multi-purpose platforms in the Arctic; those should be operated by the agency with the most experience in Arctic shipping. We need to recapitalize the Canadian Coast Guard Arctic fleet, and we need to double hat some of our Coast Guard personnel so that they can deal with the security issues as they arise. We will not go to war with Russia, and we will not go to war with the United States. We need to be able to enforce our safety regulations and our fisheries regulations. However, that can be done by Coast Guard or RCMP officers with the right equipment, and they can then do the multiplicity of other roles that Canadian Coast Guard icebreakers provide.
The Chair: I want to be clear here. We are not going to war with Haiti when we send the military in, nor are we having a war at the Olympic Games when we send the military in. Why do you feel so strongly about that division?
Mr. Byers: I am concerned partly as a Canadian taxpayer who wants to see a multi-purpose agency making the best use of our money, covering off all of the various missions that the Canadian government has to apply in the maritime domain, whether it is resupplying northern communities, supporting Arctic research or positioning navigation aids. Some things the Canadian Forces does not do and does not want to do. I would encourage the Canadian Forces to develop their search-and-rescue and surveillance capacities, but I would like to see that recapitalization of the Coast Guard Arctic fleet so that they can then do an all-of-government approach to the issue of the maritime domain.
It is not too late to change that. In fact, the actual specifications for the Arctic offshore patrol ships are being repeatedly scaled back as people realize that it is a lot of money for not a whole lot of capacity. I do not want us to make the mistake the previous government made with the maritime coastal patrol vessels, where we ended up with vessels inadequate to the task. We should do this right, reconsider and build not one super icebreaker but a multiple number of new icebreakers for the Canadian Coast Guard and let them do the job that they do so very well with some ancient vessels.
Senator Nolin: You probably were not here when Dr. Lackenbauer spoke specifically on the request from the EU and China to sit as observers at the Arctic Council. He sees a problem there in that Aboriginal peoples are sitting around the table also as observers, but they are taking part strongly in the debate. He sees, perhaps, an overcrowding of observers and sees that as a problem. Do you have a comment on that?
Mr. Byers: I want to make clear that the indigenous groups are not observers. They are permanent participants. They do have a place at the table and can participate in the debate.
With respect to the issue of permanent observers, that status is different. It is the same as Canada being an observer at the European Council. We sit in the back row, take notes and watch what is happening. That is all that China wants. It simply wants to have the status of a permanent observer to follow developments. However, it has other fora in which to talk and to exercise influence, from the UN Security Council down to bilateral relations between China and Canada. They are not trying to muscle their way in here. They simply want to have the courtesy of being permanent observers to follow the proceedings. We should not deny them that; it was somewhat petty for us to do so.
With respect to the European Union, I am pleased to say that their policies, particularly the most recent statement from the European Commission, are showing some added nuance and understanding of the perspective of Arctic Ocean countries. That is not because of Canadian influence; that has to do more with Russian influence, given that Russia is such an important energy supplier to Europe. A change is happening in European policy, and I do not see them as a threat.
Senator Nolin: When you read the first statement they made, it was not exactly appeasing to the Arctic states. Keep in mind that only one EU member sits around the table.
Mr. Byers: I believe you are referring to a statement that came out of the European Parliament.
Senator Nolin: It started there.
Mr. Byers: With all respect, sometimes politicians are not quite as well briefed as the civil servants, and I certainly think a learning process has been occurring. However, if you look at the more recent pronouncements, there is clear recognition of the rights of coastal states under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. They want to be involved because the Arctic is important from a climate change perspective. It will be very important from a shipping perspective, and it is important also from a psychological perspective on the part of some countries such as the United Kingdom, which played such an important role in Arctic exploration; or Germany, which, with all respect, feels that the Arctic has been wasted on other countries because only the Germans have a true appreciation of the wonders of polar bears. However, that is a completely separate discussion.
There is, nonetheless, room to work with these countries. We work with them so closely with other matters. We are negotiating a free trade agreement with them right now.
Senator Nolin: We are trying.
Mr. Byers: We are trying.
Senator Day: Professor Byers, I believe I have this correct. With respect to the Beaufort Sea dispute again, I have been looking at these maps and trying to understand. This arises out of an 1825 treaty. Would that be the same treaty where Canada lost that big chunk of land in coastal Northern British Columbia, called the Alaska Panhandle?
Mr. Byers: That was an arbitration in 1903 that lost us the Alaska Panhandle and created a dispute over Dixon Entrance.
Yes, we are talking about an 1825 treaty and different interpretations of it. This is a relatively new development; it is such a recent development that it is not in my book, which was published only six months ago. Because of the cooperative mapping that has been done by the U.S. and Canadian governments with respect to the seabed, we are learning that we will be able to assert sovereign rights over a much larger area than we had previously thought.
Essentially, the Mackenzie River, over millions of years, deposited huge amounts of sediments of silt a long way out into the Beaufort Sea, and under a technical provision of UNCLOS, if the ratio of the thickness of the sediments to the distance from the shelf is of a certain number, you can continue to claim farther and farther out. We are now seeing a possibility where Canada or the United States could assert sovereign rights out maybe 400 or even 500 nautical miles from shore. That is changing the equation because if you take the legal positions that the two countries have held for decades with respect to the maritime boundary closer in and carry those further out, the Canadian line, being a meridian line, continues straight, as it always has, all the way to the North Pole. However, the American line being an equidistance line, where every point on the line is an equal distance from the coast on either side, tracks outwards just beyond 200 miles, and all of a sudden, the influence of great big Banks Island kicks in and pushes that equidistance line sharply over to the west. You get an hourglass shape, with the traditional dispute closest to shore, and then above the stem of the hourglass, you get a potentially larger dispute further out.
Ironically, the U.S. position might be better for Canada, and the Canadian position might be better for the United States; I have never seen such a wonderful win-win situation for the purposes of negotiation. Before this new development, it was a win-loss or a cut-it-in-half situation, that or some type of joint hydrocarbon-development zone. Now we have an obvious opportunity for compromise. The way you do that is only limited by the imagination of lawyers and diplomats.
Some twists do exist: The Inuvialuit Final Agreement creates certain rights for sustenance hunting and fishing for the Inuvialuit in the southern area of dispute, but nothing that cannot be resolved now that we have a win-win situation.
As I mentioned, this is a win-win situation with respect to close partners who are in a common energy market, so this is not about the oil and gas. Obviously, regulatory control will happen over oil and gas depending on which side of the boundary you are on. However, it is just as possible that EnCana Corporation will be drilling on the American side and ExxonMobil Canada will be drilling on the Canadian side, and it will go into a pipeline that will cross both jurisdictions. It is not the sovereignty fight that some people make it out to be.
Senator Day: Would the win-win from the point of view of the United States be that they would still get some of the seabed further out?
Mr. Byers: Yes.
Senator Day: Would that apply to Canada as well?
Mr. Byers: We would both get seabed; the question really is where it would be and how you would satisfy the different countries' mutual interests.
One complication here is that you can only claim seabed that is a natural prolongation of your continental shelf, so arguably the Americans would want to divide it in a way that would enable them to extend their rights as far as possible, while we would want to do the same off our continental shelf. That would require some creative line drawing but that is the point of negotiation. You can negotiate and agree on a boundary line anywhere.
The Chair: Have you seen the 49th parallel?
Mr. Byers: Exactly.
Senator Day: This exploration or mapping of the seabed has been done jointly by Canada and the United States, so that would help us.
Mr. Byers: The two icebreakers work in common because the equipment they have is actually very sensitive. The scientific evidence cannot be collected while breaking ice because it creates too much noise. Therefore, one icebreaker in front breaks the ice so that the second icebreaker can come up behind and collect the scientific evidence. Now, it happens that the American icebreaker, the USS Healy, has very good sonar equipment on board and the Canadian one has very good seismic equipment on board, so they actually switch so that they can collect the different scientific evidence as required. It is wonderful partnership on which we should build to solve the Beaufort Sea dispute and also to advance negotiations on the Northwest Passage. There is even the possibility of a package deal here.
Senator Day: Has that exploration of the seabed been done?
Mr. Byers: No, the two icebreakers will be working together again this summer.
Senator Day: Would the ideal time then be after that work is done?
Mr. Byers: We need to negotiate in parallel as the science comes in. We will not be able to conclude a deal until we have all of the evidence. However, we can certainly make considerable progress. Given the other imperatives, I think it is time to move now. Like I said, I believe the Canadian government realizes this because when they announced that they would negotiate Arctic boundary disputes, they can only be talking about one thing, and that is the Beaufort Sea.
Senator Day: Would it not be Hans Island?
Mr. Byers: It might be a good way of getting the ball rolling; creating momentum and showing that we wish to cooperate with other countries. If we cannot cooperate with Denmark, with whom can we cooperate? We fight shoulder to shoulder with them in Afghanistan; we are negotiating a free trade agreement with the European Union; we successfully delimited a 2,600-kilometre maritime boundary. We can work this out with the Danes, and, of course, we can work it out with the Americans. I firmly believe we can also work it out with the Russians because all of our countries have a common interest in legal stability around the circumpolar North.
Senator Day: Just so I understand, the line was equidistant between Greenland and Canada and north. Would that line have gone right through the middle of the island? Was that the problem?
Mr. Byers: Yes. They actually drew it up to the low watermark on the south shore of the island, and they continued it from the other side. You can simply connect the two turning points on either side of the island and essentially cut it in half. A more elegant situation would be to declare it a condominium and leave it to the governments of Nunavut and Greenland to manage as a world heritage site of some type on behalf of all peoples.
Senator Dallaire: I would like to come back to the dimensions of the employment of the RCMP, Coast Guard, border patrol and the Rangers. In this whole exercise, we are not looking at next week. We are looking into the evolution of a changing scenario in the North over the next decade and beyond, which requires maybe that much time to get the infrastructure ready and so on.
Can you not see the Rangers taking on far more responsibility on the border, on board the ships, with the Coast Guard, which hopefully we rebuild? We have not recapitalized the Coast Guard in 40 years, so that is a major exercise. Should we have the Rangers more extensively on some of the island areas, and more specifically taking on roles that have traditionally been done by southern people who are not overly keen on going there in large numbers, and have them trained and qualified and on board to carry out those tasks?
Mr. Byers: There certainly is an important role for Canadian Rangers, and I support increasing their numbers as the government is seeking to do. That is for a couple of reasons. First, they provide good search and rescue in the areas around the communities. Obviously, they do not have the range with the shortness of time that could be provided by a long-range helicopter. However, for certain missions, they are absolutely perfect.
They also play a very important role in the training of non-indigenous Canadian Forces members in how to operate, not just in the Arctic but anywhere in cold temperatures. Certain things are just as essential, for example, on the Prairie provinces in January as they are in the Canadian North for disaster relief and other functions where cold-weather training is important.
The Rangers also, let us be honest, provide a source of part-time employment and pride for thousands of young men and women, which needs to be developed as well as a way of helping with the social and economic development of the North. I would therefore encourage some attention to that matter.
I do think that they should be equipped with small boats for the purposes of traveling in places such as the Northwest Passage as the ice disappears. Snowmobiles are good when for snow and ice, but they are not very helpful in open water.
With respect to actually putting Canadian Rangers onto larger ships, I would suggest instead that you might think about the recommendations of your colleague, Senator Rompkey and his Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, who suggested that the Coast Guard should be encouraged to actually train and employ young indigenous people.
Senator Dallaire: That is what I mean.
Mr. Byers: That makes eminent sense to me. What could be more appropriate for Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, where the Inuit historic use and presence is part of our legal claim, than to have Inuit actually working on the Canadian ships that are patrolling those waters?
The Chair: Thank you very much for your presence here today and your testimony. Dr. Michael Byers holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, and he is the author of Who Owns the Arctic?: Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North.
I would like to welcome now Colonel (Retired) Pierre Leblanc, former commander Joint Task Force (North), with National Defence. You have a presentation, I understand, to begin, and then we will take questions from the senators. Thank you very much for being here.
Colonel (Retired) Pierre Leblanc, as an individual: Thank you for the opportunity to address your committee on the matter of sovereignty in the Arctic. On page two of the deck, I included a map to highlight the size of the security challenge and the inadequacy of our security assets in the North. The total number of full-time personnel responsible for security issues of a federal nature in this area is probably less than 300 for most of the year, to look after an area that is larger than continental Europe. This includes Canadian Forces, RCMP officers dealing with federal matters, Canada Border Services Agency, Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Canadian Security and Intelligence Service. The Canadian Coast Guard provides a boost to those numbers during the shipping season.
[Translation]
The next page shows the internal waters of the Arctic archipelago. Unfortunately, a number of nations, including the United States and the European Union, consider the Northwest Passage as an international strait.
[English]
The next page shows the routes through the Northwest Passage. The yellow line is the classical Northwest Passage. That route was free of ice for part of 2007, well ahead of all predictions. The red lines indicate other options to transit the Arctic Archipelago. The airspace above and the waters below each of those routes could be argued to be part of the international strait. Do we want Russian bombers to use those routes; or nuclear submarines to transit across the Arctic submerged; or North Korea to ship ballistic missiles through the Northwest Passage?
During my command appointment from 1995 to 2000, I came to the realization that no one was really looking after the security of the Arctic. The standard answer I received from various federal departments was, "We are not funded for it.'' By default, National Defence was the department best equipped to protect the sovereignty and security of the Arctic, but even the Canadian Forces lacked the equipment, personnel and training to protect the Arctic adequately. More specifically, Canada lacks in surveillance capability and the ability to respond in a graduated manner to security situations in the Arctic or major search-and-rescue events.
The state-to-state threat has receded and can be considered low despite Russian activity and Chinese interest. We must, however, be ready for future challenges. Proper security assets and major military equipment take more than 10 years to be acquired. The concept of human security prevails now. The greatest threat to human security in the Arctic is to the environment. The Arctic is a very fragile ecosystem, as you have heard, that must be protected with the full weight of Canadian law. Too many international protocols have failed to protect the environment. Providing security is the first duty of a nation state.
Our security forces must have the capability to operate 24-7, 365 days a year, anywhere in Canada. You know that the navy does not have that capability. The Canadian Air Force still has the capability through the North Warning System, although the use of forward operating locations has seen limited use, except for the one in Inuvik. The army has no permanent unit in the North, and the amount of training taking place there is insufficient.
The Ranger program is a great program, but their capability in the Arctic is extremely limited, and their expertise is slowly being lost. Canadian Forces Station Alert and the Joint Task Force Headquarters play an important role.
[Translation]
The Coast Guard is the most visible federal presence during the navigation period, but its presence is limited in time, and all its ships are coming to the end of their period of service with only one replacement planned to date. The other departments, such as Border Services, have only a very limited physical presence.
[English]
Search and rescue is one of the missions shared by the Canadian Forces and the Coast Guard. However, they do not have any primary search-and-rescue assets North of 60 except when the icebreakers are deployed — this despite the fact that we have increased maritime activity and that the traditional air corridors have shifted from east-west to north- south.
[Translation]
With the new polar flights, we have more than 125,000 flights over the Arctic a year. Last week, an American Airlines flight from New York to Narita, in Japan, made an emergency landing in Yellowknife for medical reasons. These kinds of emergencies occur once or twice a year in Yellowknife and nearly every month in Iqaluit.
[English]
The probability of a maritime accident in the Arctic is not a theoretical exercise. In 1996, the cruise ship Hanseatic ran aground near Gjoa Haven. Had the accident been of a catastrophic nature, we would have been hard pressed to deal with it. Three years ago, the Canadian-operated cruise ship MS Explorer sank in the Antarctic. The oil spill caused by Exxon Valdez cost in excess of $2 billion to partially clean up. Although we have the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, it is akin to posting speed limits on Highway 401, while everyone knows that the police have no patrol cars and no radars. The best way to protect the Arctic Archipelago is within our internal waters. We must, therefore, make NORDREG compulsory for all ships to have a better idea of what happens in the Arctic.
Recently, the Russians have become very proactive in the Arctic. Former President Bush issued a new Arctic security directive in 2009. The European Community wants to have a say in Arctic resource harvesting. NATO is now becoming interested in Arctic issues, and China has declared its interest as well.
The key capabilities to protect the Arctic are surveillance and the ability to respond in a graduated manner. We must be able to monitor activity below, on and above the surface and have redundant systems. We must make NORDREG compulsory to be able to cross-reference surveillance data. We must develop the capability to respond in a graduated manner to a security issue in the Arctic. Although the other departments must contribute, I believe the Canadian Forces to be best suited to protect the Arctic at this point. The presence of the Armed Forces also delivers a clear message. In time, the other departments should develop adequate capabilities. In any case, someone must guard the gates of the Arctic.
I would like to recommend the following. First, that we make NORDREG compulsory, even for small vessels; that Canada increase its surveillance capability, its ability to respond gradually; increase its training for all departments; increase the capacity of the Joint Task Force (North) Headquarters; and maintain the Arctic Security Working Group.
Let me conclude by saying that one of our Arctic sovereignty arguments is fast disappearing, and it is making our position weaker. Human activity and international interest are rising and will continue to do so. We need to take action now to protect our national interests. Security assets in the Arctic must be improved.
The Chair: Thank you. Colonel Leblanc, could you, in a few lines, tell us about the Joint Task Force (North)? What is its responsibility?
Col. Leblanc: The responsibility of the Joint Task Force (North) is mainly to coordinate military activity in the North. It controls, for example, the Ranger group that is located in the North. All the patrols of the Rangers North of 60 are under the command of the Joint Task Force (North). They operate offices in both Iqaluit and Whitehorse for coordination with the various territorial governments. They run a cadet camp out of Whitehorse, and they also control the operations of a squadron of Twin Otters that provide logistical support in the North. If security operations were taking place under the control of the Canadian Forces, their mission would be to coordinate the application of those assets to whatever security situation would be taking place North of 60.
The Chair: What is the relationship with the Coast Guard?
Col. Leblanc: The Coast Guard is a department that works jointly with the Canadian Forces Joint Task Force (North), especially under the umbrella of the Arctic Security Working Group. I established that interdepartmental working group back in 2000 because, at the time, clear evidence showed that communications between the departments were practically non-existent. We also realized during a symposium that the assets that we had in the North collectively — that is all the departments — were extremely limited to look after the North. We decided at that point to create this working group, to better improve communications between the departments and to essentially improve the security of the Arctic.
Senator Dallaire: When you speak of communications, you literally speak of radios being able to talk to each other in the North, correct?
Col. Leblanc: Yes, but the Coast Guard were not talking to Canadian Forces. One physical example we had was a Chinese government vessel that arrived in Tuktoyaktuk, basically unannounced to all the security agencies in Canada. A Chinese government vessel was in Canadian waters, internal waters, and no one knew about it. The Coast Guard did not know; Canadian Forces did not know; the RCMP did not know; and immigration did not know. Only one agency in Canada, the Canadian Ice Service, was aware of that ship because they were downloading ice data to them. That was the only agency that knew of the vessel, and they did not tell anyone else.
Senator Dallaire: The ability to have long-range helicopters in the North would bring what sort of factor of surveillance and response? I am talking about either a new search-and-rescue helicopter or even the Chinooks with fuel probes. Would the permanent presence of helicopters in the North make a significant difference in the ability to respond and to surveillance?
Col. Leblanc: In my view, it would certainly enhance the capability to respond, and respond quickly. The flight time between Trenton, East Coast, West Coast, Comox, up to the High Arctic, even for a fixed-wing aircraft such as an CP- 140 Aurora or C-130, you are looking at 8 hours or 10 hours before the aircraft will be physically over the target to either drop search-and-rescue technicians or equipment that will provide shelter for the people there. We found that basically every year something of that nature happens. Sure enough, we fly a C-130 from Trenton all the way up to Banks Island or Prince Patrick Island in the High Arctic to do a search and rescue on one individual or sometimes a party of people.
I actually recommended that we position a C-130, on a temporary basis, out of Yellowknife because, obviously, the flying time now would be much shorter to fly to the North and provide search and rescue.
We had a case while I was a commander where a small aircraft travelling to Yellowknife crashed. The crew on board survived the crash, but they died of exposure before search and rescue arrived. If it is -40 degrees with winds of 30 miles an hour, you are looking at a wind-chill factor of around -75 degrees. If you are wounded and you have blood that has dripped anywhere on your body, it is an immediately life-threatening situation. Time is of the essence with search and rescue in the High Arctic.
The Chair: Are any of the helicopters that go out of Trenton or other places ready to go, or do they need to be reconfigured?
Col. Leblanc: I would imagine that they are ready to go. When the C-130 crashed just short of Alert, Nunavut, almost 20 years ago now, they tried to fly a Labrador from the East Coast all the way up to CFS Alert to do the search and rescue. However, those were old helicopters and actually broke down on the way up. In the end, it was a helicopter from the U.S. Armed Forces that went from Anchorage, Alaska, was put on a C-130, and flown into Thule. From Thule, it flew to CFS Alert and eventually did the search-and-rescue operation for our airmen.
Senator Patterson: However, not until three or four people died.
Col. Leblanc: Indeed, some people died, yes.
[Translation]
Senator Pépin: In November 2008, you took part in simulated negotiations between Canada and the United States over northern waters. What is your opinion about the results of that simulated summit?
Col. Leblanc: The simulation was an excellent opportunity for two groups of Canadian and American experts to discuss the possibilities for finding a diplomatic or practical solution to American claims that the Northwest Passage is an international strait.
The recommendations that were put forward by that group of experts were very reasonable, in my opinion. One of the recommendations was to place the surveillance of the Northwest Passage under the egis of NORAD.
NORAD, at one time, coordinated only the aerial aspect. The decision was eventually made to include marine security on both coasts in their mandate. For example, a ship approaching the Canadian coasts must report all its basic information 96 hours before entering Canadian or American waters: the name of the ship, its tonnage, cargo, where it is coming from, where it is going. The marine centres then assess the threat those ships present. If there is no threat, the ship is granted permission to enter the area. If there is a potential problem, we then take the time to act before it arrives.
In the Canadian High North, NORDREG marine services used to be contacted on a voluntary basis, and that is still the case today. Those wishing to report their presence do so, whereas those who do not wish to do it do not. We moreover know that some ships have reported themselves, including the Hanseatic, which foundered in 1996. It was said last year that it did not report, whereas it was perfectly well known that it was in Canadian waters doing cruises in the Arctic.
Senator Pépin: It has been two years; will it be some time yet before it is applied? It was a summit simulation, but the recommendations seemed to be very significant.
Col. Leblanc: They are important recommendations that are becoming increasingly urgent. When I started talking about them in 2000, the forecasted opening of the Northwest Passage was around 2035; and it opened in 2007. I said at that time that we were running a risk because, if we waited too long — in view of our procurement system which takes a decade before we get ships, helicopters or patrol aircraft — we would already be late if global warming accelerated; and that is indeed what happened.
We are now told that it will not be before 2015, but it is highly possible that nature may decide on 2013 instead. What resources, then, do we now have for 2013? We have access to no underwater surveillance to check whether there are any nuclear submarines.
If the nations that have nuclear submarines claim that it is an international strait and that they have a right of passage, then they do not need to declare their passage and those submarines can stay submerged.
We therefore do not know what is going on in our own yard. To go back to Mr. Kessler's example, people are going through our yard and we do not know about it. Other nations claim that, if it is our yard, there must be a right of way. In my opinion, these are internal waters of Canada. Consequently, Canadian laws apply. We are open to marine passage in accordance with our standards.
If an accident like the Exxon Valdez occurs in Resolute Bay, for example, it will cost billions of dollars. And if the ship involved flies a Bahamian flag of convenience, with US$34 in its bank account, who will pay for the clean-up?
The Canadian Forces should not necessarily act as a police force. However, it is up to someone to do it. The task is not part of the Coast Guard's mandate. The RCMP in the North maintains the security of the communities. That police force operates within the communities, not outside them.
When we are talking about a warship or a submarine, the task falls to the Canadian Forces.
With regard to fishing, we know that the fishing banks on both coasts have started to decline. A large quantity of that fish has moved northward, and the fishing boats are doing the same. Who controls that area? What Fisheries and Oceans staff are deployed in the High North today? Who is doing external surveillance? Only the Rangers are monitoring the land.
Now, thanks to RADARSAT 2, we have the opportunity to monitor the surface of waters. By monitoring the surface, and making NORDREG mandatory, we can take a picture of the entry points and compare the situation every day against NORDREG data. If NORDREG reports that two ships are penetrating from the west coast of the Arctic and the photo shows three, the problem becomes obvious. An airplane can then be dispatched to investigate. It may be an RCMP aircraft or a helicopter chartered by the RCMP. We could also send a group of Rangers working with the Coast Guard. We would provide them with a small ship with the ability to go to sea and they would go and make first contact.
Consider the case of a ship that enters Canadian waters when we want to deny it access. We can consider the example that I cited of a North Korean ship transporting missiles that is heading toward Iran. We would not want that ship to take the Northwest Passage. However, that ship is moving. How do you stop it? We have neither the measures nor the physical equipment in place to stop that ship physically.
The Canadian Forces deployed in the Persian Gulf have a lot of training in boarding pirate and other ships by force. The Canadian Forces have some competence in that area. Joint Task Force Two (JTF2) could be deployed in the North to stop a ship where there is a problem. We could attack the ship by means of an F-18 aircraft, but that would not be the ideal solution. We would prefer to avoid any environmental problem that might result from that kind of intervention.
We must have resources that enable us to react in a gradual manner. Currently, however, we have none. On the one hand, we exercise very little surveillance in the North. On the other, we do not have the resources to solve a security problem gradually. We need those resources now.
[English]
Senator Day: Colonel, many of us have the habit of just looking at the conclusions without reading all of your documentation.
In the first two bullets, it says that our one sovereignty argument is melting away and our position is becoming weaker. Could you expand on that? Are you saying that sovereignty is melting away because we are not as active as we should be in the North?
Col. Leblanc: To repeat one line that was mentioned before, when it was all ice, it was considered land. The ice was essentially protecting the Arctic. Travel was practically impossible for large ships.
As this is melting away, the ships can now come in. The sovereignty of the land is not an issue. The bottom of the ocean is not an issue either. The only point of contention is the Northwest Passage and its international status. We say that it is internal waters, but other people say, no, it is an international strait.
When a ship goes through that claiming that it is an international strait and we cannot stop them, essentially they are attacking our sovereignty. We are saying that these are our waters, 100 per cent of Canadian law applies to these waters and they do not have the right of innocent passage or transit passage.
Senator Day: We heard speakers earlier who said that once you have sovereignty, you have sovereignty. It is just a matter of exercising that sovereignty, not establishing it. Those two verbs were used.
You are suggesting that even though we have had sovereignty that that can melt away if the ice melts away.
Col. Leblanc: Our position will become weaker as an increasing number of ships go through uncontrolled. This will eventually establish an international strait, and then we will have lost, in my view, the internal water status of those waters.
Also there is the air above that. Bomber aircraft could transit across the Arctic and have the right of passage — similarly with submarines. It is not only the surface vessels, it is submarines as well.
Senator Day: I hear what you are saying. It is a little different from what we heard earlier, but it is interesting. I understand your position clearly.
I wanted to ask you about the Coast Guard versus the Armed Forces role. Given that we have a limited amount of funds, where should we be putting those funds, first of all, in terms of ships and icebreakers? The Coast Guard normally is not an armed Coast Guard. Is that necessary?
Col. Leblanc: I believe that we should put more resources in the Coast Guard. If I had a choice between giving them to the navy and the Coast Guard, I would probably give them to the Coast Guard. They have the experience. The real threat right now is not the nation-to-nation threat. It is not armed forces from another nation threatening us. The problems are more of a security nature: threat to the environment, regulations not being met, illegal fishing, immigration, drugs, et cetera.
However, the role of the Coast Guard would need to be changed. I would recommend that we arm those ships and that we give the Coast Guard the mandate to look after the security of the Arctic.
Senator Day: Thank you. I appreciate that.
[Translation]
Senator Nolin: I would like to go back to the simulated negotiation in which you took part in February 2008. One of your recommendations was very interesting. If I understand correctly, you, the Americans and Canadians, tried to reach a compromise.
Col. Leblanc: Indeed, it was a compromise.
Senator Nolin: The term "compromise'' is important. And in your search for a compromise, you recommended establishing a joint commission similar to the one that governs Canadian and American internal waters in the St. Lawrence.
I understand that it was a compromise. However, you knew that the European Union was also claiming that these are international waters. Why then not make it an international commission? Why limit ourselves to a joint commission? Was that due to the fact that there were just Americans around the table?
Col. Leblanc: The multinational aspect was explored. However, that avenue is often complex and procedures are longer; you have to establish consensus. On the Canadian side, we instead adopted the Foreign Affairs position because we are at home.
Senator Nolin: That is why I used the term "compromise.'' This matter involves a large element of compromise.
Col. Leblanc: In a group, you have a set of recommendations, but it is not the entire group that supports each individual recommendation. Personally, I did not agree with the idea of a joint commission to manage our internal waters. Instead I advocated setting aside the dispute between Canadians and Americans over the international strait and implementing surveillance of the Northwest Passage under NORAD's egis. If it becomes a North American fortress, who will attack our position? With time, the entire world will acknowledge that the Northwest Passage is a controlled area, that it is controlled and monitored jointly by Canadians and Americans and that, if they want to enter that area, there are standards that must be met, rights that must be respected. Canada's position has never been to prevent marine passage.
Senator Nolin: No. What we want is compliance with our regulations. And the Americans, in your opinion — you took part in the negotiation — are they opposed to Canadian regulations and laws?
Col. Leblanc: Not necessarily. The public position is different from the official position. Some people I spoke with said that, if we ever had a problem in the Arctic, the Americans would be there to help us. They prefer that we start deploying resources to protect the Arctic. The Canadian Arctic is one of the approaches to Alaska, and it is therefore in their interests for that passage to be controlled. It is in their national interest. Moreover, that was Ambassador Cellucci's position. The Americans would be in a better security position if they acknowledged full Canadian sovereignty over those waters and the fact that this is not an international strait. And the position of Mr. Pharand, who delimited the first straight baselines, is that that does not set a precedent.
Senator Nolin: When you mentioned Mr. Pharand, is he a professor at Laval University?
Col. Leblanc: Correct. He is a forensic scientist. I am a former military member, not a forensic scientist. Mr. Pharand's position is that the waters of the other straits have been established by decades of passages by thousands of ships.
In Europe — it was in Norway, if I am not mistaken — there was a group of islands similar to ours; they used straight baselines.
The Soviet Union is experiencing the same kind of situation in its Northwest Passage, along the coast, for passing between the islands north of the main coast, and they take the same approach. I believe that, in that respect, the Soviets or the Russians will support the Canadian position because it is in their interest to do so as well. We would probably support each other in the event of a dispute.
[English]
Senator Patterson: Thank you, Colonel Leblanc, for your excellent presentation. I would like to touch on one thing that I do not think we have touched on tonight. I want to ask you this as a person who has been on the ground commanding the Joint Task Force; you talked about the small number of Canadian government personnel in such a vast area.
Could you comment on the degree of cooperation that exists between DND, which you have said should be a lead agency in sovereignty, and other government departments such as Canada Border Services Agency, RCMP, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada and perhaps the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada? What is the degree of cooperation, in your view? Could it be improved if it should be improved?
Col. Leblanc: In my view, the coordination is excellent. When we started the Arctic Security Working Group back in 2000, we had a total number of approximately 14 people sitting around the table to discuss security issues. My understanding is that now we have approximately 70 people.
Senator Nolin: Did you say, "70 people''?
Col. Leblanc: Yes, 70 people. We sit around the table. In those days, we had also invited the Aboriginal groups, such as a representative from the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation as well as a representative from the Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated to participate in our discussion in the spirit of cooperation, openness, transparency and real communication on the ground.
Many of the reports I was receiving of illegal activity in the North were actually coming in from the Rangers who reported, for example, Inuit coming in from Greenland, crossing over to Ellesmere Island with American tourists on Ski-Doos hunting polar bears and then returning back to Greenland. You can imagine the number of Canadian laws that were broken — weapons, vehicles, immigration, hunting endangered species. They were also reporting illegal fishing in our waters off the northern part of Baffin Island. Therefore, I felt it was important to bring the Aboriginal communities into our discussions.
The North — you have been there — is a different environment than the South. The conditions are so threatening that everyone is much closer together, and we tend to work hand-in-hand and overlook many of the small details that may not be overlooked in a more southern environment. It was in that context that those discussions evolved, I believe to the point where they are today, and I think that has improved the security of the Arctic. I would certainly recommend, as I did in my brief, that we maintain this security working group to better coordinate the security assets we have in the High Arctic.
Senator Patterson: I was pleased with your comments about search and rescue. Is solving that problem as simple as Canada looking at redeploying its search-and-rescue capabilities in more geographically sensible locations than close to the 49th parallel? Is it a matter of redeploying as much as anything else to solve that problem?
Col. Leblanc: It would certainly help if we redeployed assets. They would not have to be stationed permanently in the North. When I made the recommendation to station a C-130 in Yellowknife, Yellowknife is almost dead centre of the High Arctic, so one can go east, west or further north within a relatively short period of time. From Yellowknife, a C-130 can reach any point in the Arctic faster than they could from Comox, Trenton or Greenwood. The C-130 could be rotated. It could still be based out of Trenton for maintenance because some of the arguments that the air force had was that they pool their resources together to have fewer technicians. Everyone is centralized, so you get economies of scale that way.
However, if they are all in Trenton, flying to Ellesmere Island would take eight and a half to nine hours after launch. If there is a long delay on launch, now you are looking at nine or ten hours before the aircraft is actually over your head dropping SAR TECH — Search and Rescue Technician — or equipment for survival.
Senator Patterson: Thank you.
The Chair: From my calculations, there was about $150 million in new money for the Coast Guard. Is that significant in your mind?
Col. Leblanc: Not in my mind. If I consider that only one ship is being replaced, $150 million will not do very much. As I understand it, the whole fleet is coming to the end of their life span.
The Chair: Right.
Col. Leblanc: This is a time when the open season will become longer and longer, and even the multi-year ice that was talked about is disappearing faster than any of the predicted models in the past. That will be gone soon. What will we have in 10 years' time to actually look after the security of the Arctic?
The Chair: Thank you very much, Colonel Leblanc. We appreciate this, and we appreciate your patience because this has been a long afternoon and evening for everyone. Colonel (Retired) Pierre Leblanc, former Commander Joint Task Force (North) with National Defence.
Thank you to my colleagues on the committee. This has been a long day and you have all worked hard. Thank you; I appreciate your efforts.
(The committee adjourned.)