Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Finance
Issue 30 - Evidence - March 23, 2011
OTTAWA, Wednesday, March 23, 2011
The Standing Senate Committee on National Finance met this day at 6:48 p.m. to examine the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2012.
Senator Joseph A. Day (Chair) in the chair.
[Translation]
The Chair: Honourable senators, we are going to continue our review of the estimates for the 2011-12 fiscal year before our committee.
[English]
This evening we are pleased to welcome back Maria Barrados, President of the Public Service Commission of Canada, who has appeared before this committee regularly during her tenure as president. As honourable senators are aware, yesterday she tabled a special report to Parliament entitled Merit and Political Non-Partisanship under the Public Service Employment Act (2003).
[Translation]
With her is Mr. Donald Lemaire, Senior Vice-President of the Policy Branch, and Mr. Gaston Arseneault, Senior General Counsel and Vice-President, Legal Affairs Branch.
[English]
This will be Ms. Barrados' last appearance before this committee, I expect, and probably one of her last before any parliamentary committee, as she is retiring this spring.
On behalf of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, I wish to say how much we have appreciated working with you. We hope that a young lady like you, with all the experience that you have gathered in your job, not only as President of the Public Service Commission of Canada but also previously with the Auditor General's Department, that you will be able to put that experience and those talents to use in other ways around the world, which I fully expect that you will. Thank you very much for being here.
We will let you have the floor now to say what you will.
[Translation]
Maria Barrados, President, Public Service Commission of Canada: Thank you very much for your kind words. Mr. Chair, I would like to thank you and the members of the committee for this opportunity to meet with you, today.
I am pleased to be here with Mr. Donald Lemaire, Senior Vice-President, Policy, and Mr. Gaston Arseneault, Vice-President, Legal Affairs Branch, to discuss our Special Report on Merit and Non-Partisanship under the Public Service Employment Act 2003 that was tabled in Parliament yesterday. This report reflects the views of the commission as it approaches the end of its mandate. We hope it will also provide useful input into Parliament's five-year statutory review required by the act.
The Public Service Employment Act (PSEA) affirmed the PSC's mandate as a guardian of merit and non-partisanship in the federal public service, first enshrined in federal statute over one hundred years ago. With the passage of the November 2003 act, the commission's role is clear. We have put in place a highly delegated system, with appropriate oversight and supporting guidance and support, with regular reports to this committee.
As noted in my last appearance in front of this committee with regard to our 2009-10 annual report to Parliament, the essential elements of the act are now in place. Significant progress has been made. Five years after the coming into full force of the PSEA, it is too early to draw final, definitive conclusions about its implementation. However, we believe the essential structure of the act is sound and will stand the test of time.
Our report focuses on three key issues that, in our opinion, need attention, and we offer some recommendations for addressing them.
Number one, we need to improve the effectiveness of the staffing system; number two, enhance the approach for safeguarding the non-partisanship of the public service; and number three, strengthen the governance and operation of the commission.
An effective staffing system is the backbone of a modern, well-functioning professional public service. There are, however, substantial opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the staffing system. Our report describes four.
First, our experience over the past five years has confirmed the ongoing need for some centralized services to assist deputy heads and managers in assuming their roles under the act. These services, which include our electronic recruitment system as well as several national recruitment programs, can foster greater efficiencies and improvements in the staffing system. A delegated system needs to be balanced with centralized support functions.
[English]
Second, we need more proactive integrated planning to better manage the entire workforce, not only the permanent workforce but also the contingent workforce. The use of term employees, casuals, contractors and temporary help workers should be part of the planning.
Third, there are difficulties in the recourse system that need to be addressed. The statutory requirements for double notification of appointments have proven to be administratively burdensome for large processes. We also have made recommendations to address a gap in the system where deputy heads are directly involved in an internal appointment process. Under the Public Service Employment Act, PSEA, the commission cannot currently investigate these processes.
Fourth, continued effort is required to improve data analysis and measurement.
I will turn now to the issue of non-partisanship of the federal public service. The PSC's mandate to safeguard this core value independently is laid out clearly in the preamble of the PSEA and Part 7 of the act, which sets out specific obligations regarding political activities by public servants.
There are always tensions between the non-partisanship of a public service and the need for a public service to respond effectively and loyally to the direction of elected officials. Scholars have pointed to the pressures to politicize bureaucracies; while these pressures are not as prevalent in Canada, there are ongoing questions. We have identified gaps that need to be addressed with respect to processes involving Governor-in-Council appointments, political activities of public servants and relations between the public service and the political sphere.
I want to elaborate briefly. In our professional, non-partisanship public service, it is established that appointments are independent of ministers, and must be merit-based, non-partisan and independently overseen. The Privy Council Office has processes in place with respect to the Governor-in-Council appointments. However, there is no independent assurance that the appointments to positions of leadership are merit-based and not politically influenced.
We recommend that further steps be taken to ensure external appointments — that is, those from outside the public service — of deputy heads, associate deputy heads, heads and members of separate agencies and boards to the core public service are based on merit, are non-partisan and are subject to independent oversight. This oversight could be provided by an organization like the Public Appointments Commission, which was provided for in the 2006 Federal Accountability Act. Alternatively, it could be added to the responsibilities of the Public Service Commission of Canada.
We identified a need for increased awareness of organizations and individuals about non-partisanship as set out in the preamble and Part 7 of the act. Work needs to continue on providing greater clarity to public servants through policy or regulation. We also recommend a statutory change that would allow the PSC to investigate any complaint of improper political activity on the part of a deputy head.
This point brings me to the relationship between the public service and the political sphere, particularly ministerial staff. There is a need for improved guidance to political staffers on their relationship with the public service. Accordingly, we recommend that a code of conduct for ministerial staff be put in place to provide clear guidance on the relationship between ministerial staff and public servants.
Progress has been made in managing the movement of former ministerial staff into the public service, following the December 2006 amendments to the Public Service Employment Act.
I will turn now to the issue of strengthening the governance and operation of the Public Service Commission of Canada. Over the past five years, the commission has reoriented itself successfully to play a leadership role in the implementation of the Public Service Employment Act. We have made changes in how the commission operates within the statutory framework, and we have recommended additional measures to improve the capacity of the PSC to fulfill its mandate.
The commission itself has gone from full-time commissioners to part-time members. The statute did not go far enough in modernizing the governance and operation of the commission. We recommend that the PSEA confirm the current operation and division of duties between the president and part-time commissioners.
We further recommend a series of legislative amendments to increase the capacity of the commission that includes the following: providing commissioners in office with a role in the appointment of other commissioners; using fixed rate of pay for setting the president's salary; and allowing the PSC to table its reports directly to Parliament.
Other legislative proposals to remove barriers to our operations include the following: providing authority to contract for goods and services; allowing some of our services to be provided to other jurisdictions, for instance, language testing to the provinces; and providing protection to our auditors and investigators as well as our audit reports and documents.
[Translation]
Mr. Chair, for more than a hundred years, the PSC has protected merit and non-partisanship in the public service. We can be proud of the public service we have today. Our observations and recommendations are intended to help ensure the act's sustainability, so that Canadians will continue to have the professional, merit-based, non-partisan public service they need and deserve.
[English]
In closing, we want to extend our gratitude to parliamentarians, in particular, members of this committee, for their ongoing interest in the issues we have raised. We want to thank deputy heads for their engagement and advice. Most of all, I want to thank the staff of the Public Service Commission of Canada for their dedication and support in doing the work of the commission.
Thank you. I am pleased to answer any questions you may have.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Barrados. I appreciate the thoroughness of your report and the strong recommendations.
This committee was engaged in dealing with the amendments to the Public Service Employment Act and the concept of delegation of authority from the Public Service Commission to the various departments. Then we were engaged with an oversight role and, over the last five years, we have been working with you to determine how that role is working.
Fundamentally, do you accept and recommend the delegation of authority concept to the deputy heads that was in the Public Service Employment Act?
Ms. Barrados: The legislative change that you are referring to is the Public Service Modernization Act in 2003. The discussion at the time, as much as the statute itself, influenced the direction in which we went. The statute itself says that the Public Service Commission may delegate. The discussion at the time was a model of full delegation and putting the management of human resources in the hands of deputy ministers, with the oversight of an independent body, namely, the Public Service Commission.
We, at the commission, determined that we should fully delegate. We have delegated almost everything, but there are two big things that we have not delegated that we could delegate.
One is that we require everyone to post all jobs on the jobs.gc website, so that there is one place where all Canadians can go to see the jobs. People can post jobs in another place as well; the posting does not have to be exclusively on that website. The other thing we did not delegate was the priority system. We could not see how we could delegate that system.
I think the model is the right one. My comments about no big structural changes to the act reflect the view and the experience of the commission that this model is the right one. We do say that, yes, we have the right model; however, with five years of experience, we think a number of things should be adjusted.
The Chair: You have pointed out those things in your report, and we will have a chance to consider them as we go along. We thank you for that information. When the act was legislated and then implemented, I recall, that was a fundamental change.
Ms. Barrados: Yes: Our experience to date has been that we have the structures in place. We have the delegated systems in place. Deputy heads are seized of taking on these responsibilities. We have the oversight. However, we are not entirely sure that the values have taken hold. There is still a tendency for people to turn to wanting lists and processes, instead of making judgments that are values-based and explained. However, I think this change comes with time.
The Chair: The change in the legislation to make deputy heads or deputy ministers accounting officers, this term "accounting officers," which we do not all fully agree on the definition of, does that change impact at all on this delegation to the deputy ministers?
Ms. Barrados: No: The system that we have is essentially that the delegations come from ministers, for most of the financial management responsibilities, and from the Public Service Commission for staffing and promotions. Those authorities come from the Public Service Commission. We have an independent reporting to Parliament on those responsibilities and their discharge. For the financial responsibilities, the notion is that the accounting officer reports. If there was greater maturity, we could expect accounting officers potentially to report also on their discharge of human resource management responsibilities. However, I have not seen any move in that direction.
From my personal view, I do not have any objections to the system working that way, because the commission's role is to ensure that the system is working properly. If it works properly by deputy heads reporting in another way, through another vehicle, as long as that reporting can satisfy the commission, that could potentially work.
The Chair: Thank you for those preliminary remarks.
Senator Marshall: Welcome, Ms. Barrados, to you and your officials.
Congratulations on the report you released yesterday. I have read the entire report; it is just the right length. I found it interesting. The most interesting part of the report is the section on non-partisanship within the public service, especially at the senior level.
I am fortunate in that I have occupied positions at the senior level in the public service in Newfoundland, and I have also occupied political positions. I occupied some of the positions at the executive level in Newfoundland as a result of competition, and others were through political appointment.
It is almost like looking at the issue from the reverse side of a mirror. We talk about political partisanship and the attempt to eliminate it, but there is also the issue that the bureaucracy itself has biases. We used to refer to it as — and I do not know if this is the right term — bureaucratic nepotism. I was wondering if you had done any work on that area, because we are talking about non-partisanship. If that is the objective, how do you prevent the other biases coming into the system if you shift to the merit principle? I know, from my own experiences, that it is there.
Have you ever done any work on that issue? What has been your experience? Do you have any comments? I have seen this bias first-hand, so I would like to hear your views on it.
Ms. Barrados: We have done work on that area. We searched for the appropriate term. We have never used "bureaucratic nepotism." That has a nice ring to it. We have used "bureaucratic patronage," and we settled on "favouritism" because I want to be careful how I use the terminology and how critical I am of people in the bureaucracy.
We do most of our work in the staffing area to determine compliance and what we say is adherence to the values, hence adherence to this concept that there should be fairness in all the appointment processes.
In our audits, on a regular basis, you will see areas of compliance, and there is always a good section where we do not have sufficient documentation. As you well know, that can mean one of two things. It can mean sloppiness, or it can mean that it was not done correctly and the best way to cover it up is not to have anything in the file.
We also have sections that we say have indicators of favouritism, and we have identified a number of factors. Those factors came out of a study that we conducted early on in this commission's mandate looking at favouritism. It had started out being called "bureaucratic patronage," and a lot of exception was taken to the use of the term, given the statute and the terms in the statute: therefore, we ended up calling it "favouritism," and we still pursue that issue systematically.
When we identify something in the audit as an issue, where we feel there was favouritism or indicators of favouritism, we turn it over to our investigative group and they conduct an investigation. The process is quasi-judicial.
Then we have the powers to correct, which can include removing people from the public service, and we do that. We take people out of the positions. We have taken people out of the public service.
Senator Marshall: Have you ever released a report on that topic?
Ms. Barrados: Yes, we have.
Senator Marshall: Is that available on your website? I have read a lot of your reports, but I have not read that one. How old is it?
Ms. Barrados: 2004, I believe.
Senator Marshall: How widespread do you think that problem is?
Ms. Barrados: We conduct surveys of employees, and we ask employees whether they think the system is fair. We tend to have about 30 per cent of the employees saying the system is not fair, and we have asked that question in many different ways. If someone is in a process and they get the job, they are less likely to have a problem with the process. The ones who do not get the jobs have greater difficulty with it.
I think it is an issue, and I think it continues to be an issue. One thing we have seen in terms of the work that the deputies and the clerk have done on the renewal initiatives, which I have been happy about, is that a number of those issues that worried me a lot have diminished. We have seen more direct entry into the public service, for example. I worry a lot about people coming in as a casual or as a term and working their way through the system. We have seen more direct entry. We have seen less of a reliance on some of those term positions. There is still a reliance on the casuals.
My concern is that as things tighten — we are tightening and there are reductions — there will be less hiring and a tendency to slip back to some of those convenient practices, such as dealing with people you know and not providing opportunities to other Canadians.
Along the same lines, one issue we are raising is the way the act is structured for an internal process. If, in an audit, we identify a problem with the process and we think there was preferential treatment or favouritism, we do not have the authority to investigate internal processes. The problem is that we have the power to delegate, and we delegate all of that investigation. We cannot delegate only part of it. I have only the strong weapon of removing delegation, which I do not want to do. Otherwise, I enter into a long negotiation, which does not correct the problem. That area is one where we are asking for change.
Senator Ringuette: Ms. Barrados, I have been on this committee before you were appointed, and we went from having a public service for which only 23 per cent of departments had human resources plans, to today, where I think we are up at 75 per cent, roughly.
Ms. Barrados: Satisfactory human resource plans.
Senator Ringuette: Exactly: We went from a public service with geographic barriers limiting people applying for federal jobs to within 50 kilometres, most of the time — which was restrictive and unfair to all Canadian citizens, wherever they lived — to a situation where, after a lot of patience and dedication on your part, we have removed from the Public Service Commission the posted jobs area of selection. Posted jobs are now open to any citizen who is qualified.
I have also seen your major support for the graduate program, and I want to thank you for that support. I appreciate the efforts you have made to move our public service forward. I have also read your report, and I am hoping that, down the road, we can put forth your recommendations. You are putting forth a lot of recommendations.
There is a review of the act, and hopefully this committee will look at it. However, in the case that the act is not put forward for parliamentary review, if you and your legal advisers could provide the legal text of the recommendations in your report, I would be happy to put them forth as a private member's bill to start the process.
I also have a lot of worries about the current situation in the public service. You have highlighted a few, one of which is the political division and the possible political appointments and your concerns about that situation. We have had a high-profile political operator in Atlantic Canada, having a highly profiled appointment to the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, ACOA.
I do not want to put forth any names but I was wondering if you could investigate an agency like ACOA.
Ms. Barrados: Thank you for your comments. With regard to the move to national area of selection, I think you can take a good part of the credit for that move. If it had not been for your persistence, I am not sure we would have all moved the way we have. I thank you for that.
In terms of the statutory review, the statute requires that a review be initiated within five years. This review has been initiated. It is the responsibility of the President of the Treasury Board. The review is headed by a capable deputy minister, Susan Cartwright. We have been working closely together, so she sees my concerns, and we have been exchanging material. Our overall view of the act, in terms of its general frame being a good one and a move in the right direction, is the same. We may have differences on the detail.
The plan had been that these reports would appear together in front of Parliament, and that when Parliament is asked to review the recommendations from the government, they would have our report at the same time.
The coordination has not quite worked, and it was important for this commission to release our report before the commission ended. Parliament should have the two reports when the other one makes its way through the process. That report will definitely be there. We will provide you with the information the committee is looking for. If there is more detailed description behind this review, we are happy to provide it.
With respect to your question on ACOA, we have had a specific series of written allegations from a member of Parliament. Our process, when we receive those allegations, is that they come to my office and I refer them to my investigative group.
They look at the allegations and determine whether there is enough to warrant a full-fledged, quasi-judicial investigation that respects everyone's rights. I turned this complaint over to them. They have completed that preliminary work and have determined the allegations warrant full investigation, so that has been initiated.
Senator Ringuette: What is the time frame to complete a full investigation?
Ms. Barrados: It depends on people's availabilities and the issues raised. I have asked them to complete the investigations quickly, completely, and thoroughly because of the sensitivity of this particular set. The results of our investigations are subject to judicial review; therefore, we have a high standard that we have to meet. I do not think the investigations could be done any faster than three to four months.
The Chair: There will be a vote at 8:05 on a motion to adjourn debate on second reading of Bill C-393. Senator Greene has the adjournment on that motion. A bus has been arranged for 7:50 to take all members to the chamber. We will try to move along here and see how well we do, and either conclude at 7:50 or suspend.
I want everyone to have the opportunity to ask at least one question.
Senator Ringuette: I have been reading a report that was released this month entitled The Shadow Public Service. It was done by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. It is discouraging, and it confirms my suspicion with regard to contracting out federal public service jobs.
The first paragraph reads as follows:
Since 2005-06, the cost of federal personnel outsourcing of temporary help, IT consultants and management consultants has ballooned by almost 80 per cent, costing taxpayers nearly $5.5 billion over the past five years. Despite the capping of departmental budgets, personnel outsourcing costs have remained above $1 billion a year.
The report goes further in explaining that first paragraph. Outsourcing for temporary staffing is concentrated within four departments and ten contracting agencies.
My question is the following: Do you know about this report? I would like to have your opinion on it.
Ms. Barrados: I have not studied the report in detail, but I did read it. It combines temporary staff, which we looked at, and contracting. There is nothing wrong with using contractors. In fact, it is an important tool that the public service has to use, particularly a downsizing public service. We do not want to hire people and then lay them off.
The report suggests, however, that there is a violation of contracting rules, so that contractors are not used for contract work. They are basically being used as employees.
Of course, I do not agree with contractors being used as employees, but it becomes almost a contracting issue. It is something I will ask the next commission to take a look at, because we are concerned about people who are acting like employees. I would be careful in terms of asking the first question about how carefully we are managing the contracts.
Senator Runciman: Off the top, welcome.
When you talk about the Governor-in-Council appointments not being part of the public service, why have you delved into those waters?
Ms. Barrados: There are over 3,000 Governor-in-Council appointments. I am not talking about the whole 3,000. I am talking about the 400. Those 400 are the ones that have the leadership positions in the public service.
As the Public Service Commission, we are charged with protecting the non-partisan nature of the public service and with ensuring that there is merit. There is a desire to have an independent body that has been there for a hundred years to assure that protection.
We do that for everyone but the top positions. My argument is based on what we have seen in the large Westminster parliaments that have said, yes, we want functions like the public service, but we also want to do something about our public appointments.
It is not a far argument to say that those principles we hold dear and want to see in the public service should also apply to the leaders in the public service.
As I said, I am not talking about the full 3,000, but those ones that are in leadership positions in the core public service.
Senator Runciman: Are you talking about the heads of agencies as well?
Ms. Barrados: Only those that are managing public servants.
Senator Runciman: Are you talking about deputy ministers as well?
Ms. Barrados: I am talking about deputy ministers who come from outside the public service, not from inside.
Senator Runciman: In my experience, I do not think politics was ever involved with a cabinet secretary and the folks surrounding the cabinet secretary. There may have been an appointment like you are expressing a concern about, but I cannot recall it being a common practice. I doubt that it is at the federal level, either. I think the government itself wants the best possible people.
My concern was that you were going beyond that situation in terms of the general Governor-in-Council kinds of appointments. If that is not the case, I am somewhat relieved.
You talk about your salary being set by the Governor-in-Council, and I am drawing an inference that you think that exposes your office to political influence. Would you like to expand on that point?
Ms. Barrados: Not political influence, bureaucratic influence. When I took my position, I asked that my salary be fixed, and that there was no performance element in that salary, which was agreed to.
However, in a number of the other organizations, it is in the statute. In the Public Service Commission, it is not. It is good practice for the Public Service Commission head.
Senator Runciman: You have suggested tying it to the judges. Is there a rationale for that suggestion?
Ms. Barrados: It is what the Information Commissioner and the Privacy Commissioner have. I think the Auditor General is the supreme court judge.
Senator Murray: Members of Parliament and senators, too, in the past.
Senator Runciman: I wish it would return.
I want to echo what Senator Marshall said with respect to bureaucratic patronage, as you have described it. I will take a look at your 2004 report as well. My experience has been that bureaucratic patronage tends to creep into the picture. When we look at these senior or other positions you are referencing here, at least with elected officials, there is an opportunity for accountability. That accountability disappears with the growth of bureaucratic patronage. My concern is that will grow.
Ms. Barrados: I am no fan of any bureaucratic patronage.
Senator Murray: I do not have a political party, but I am a strong believer in political parties and their vital role in our parliamentary democracy; if anything, in my judgment, they need to be revitalized so they may play a greater part in public policy and so that their members have the opportunity to play a modest role in governance when their political party succeeds in forming a government.
I am distressed — which is putting it mildly — and somewhat scandalized by the belief in sections of the media that voluntary participation in a political party is not evidence of good citizenship, but of the contrary. Suppose a person who may be highly qualified is appointed to a board, whether by this government or any of its predecessors. If that person is seen to have a role in his or her political party, he or she is immediately derided by certain sections of the media as being some sort of political hack. I think that view is unhealthy and counterproductive in many ways.
I do not understand the distinction you make between the 3,000 appointments and the 40 "leadership" appointments. We will not get into that now. When you say "merit-based and not politically influenced," these things are not necessarily mutually exclusive or contradictory. With regard to a person who is otherwise qualified, having participated in the political process is evidence of that person's good citizenship, in my opinion.
When I say "otherwise qualified," I am talking about these part-time positions. To those positions, it is neither necessary nor advisable to appoint specialists. The CBC board of directors, which is largely an advisory group, does not need to be composed entirely of people with a broadcasting background. Obviously, it must be sensitive to language and region. Board members should have some interest in public policy relating to broadcasting and culture, some idea of the relationship between that Crown corporation of the government and, most important, they should be well connected or attuned to what is going on in their regions so that they can reflect that information back to the management of the CBC and to the government.
Similarly, the Parole Board of Canada has a number of part-time board members. I do not think one puts criminologists, lawyers, sociologists, psychiatrists and other experts into those positions. Presumably, the Parole Board of Canada has those people on the full-time staff. One should put people in these part-time positions who have some interest in correctional policy. However, more important are people who are firmly anchored in their community and have some ability to reflect back to the top management of the board and to the government what the traffic will bear in the country in terms of our public policy.
I would not want to tie the hands of a prime minister or to complicate unduly his or her freedom to appoint deputy ministers as the prime minister and colleagues see fit. When my party was in government, I remember three people appointed to senior deputy head posts. One was Frank Iacobucci who came out of the University of Toronto and became Deputy Minister of Justice. That job is a big one. Stanley Hartt came out of a law firm in Montreal and became Deputy Minister of Finance. Norman Spector came out of the Government of British Columbia and became Secretary to the Cabinet for Federal-Provincial Relations. I have never heard anyone suggest that the performances of those three were anything less than stellar while they were there. I cannot remember the names of others. However, there were others who performed well.
I was never a big fan of the public appointments commission, with all due respect to the fellow that Prime Minister Harper wanted to appoint. Suppose the Prime Minister had succeeded in appointing him: Who would that fellow have been accountable to? I know who Prime Minister Harper and his government are accountable to. I was never impressed with the idea of a public appointments commission and I would not like to see such a commission come between the government and its ability to appoint deputy ministers.
Finally, Mr. Chair —
The Chair: It is good for you to get this off your chest.
Senator Murray: I do not have much time left in public life and neither does Ms. Barrados. We can follow this up at our leisure when we both retire.
Political staffers' relationship to public servants should be minimal. The role of the political staffer is to give the minister political advice, to make the trains run on time in the minister's office, to handle the ministers' relationships with caucus, cabinet colleagues, the media and with their constituencies and to ensure that there is plenty of time and opportunity for the minister to carry on their relationship with the senior ranks of the public service. There is a difference between "staff" and "line" function. The idea that ministerial staff should be out there terrorizing the public service, as one sometimes hears that they are doing, is absolutely foreign to anything I have known, experienced or believed. There is something wrong if a deputy minister, assistant deputy minister or any senior public servant does not feel perfectly comfortable in throwing a political staffer out of their offices if political staffers try to throw their weight around.
It is one thing to communicate a message from the minister. The deputy may say, "Send me a note or have the minister put it in writing." I do not understand why those relationships have become so clouded. There is something wrong with both ministers and deputy ministers if they allow political staffers to do the things they are sometimes doing and behave the way they are sometimes behaving.
The Chair: Ms. Barrados, do you want to comment on any of those points?
Ms. Barrados: Well, I should. With regard to the political staffers, there are stresses in the system. Our recommendation is a modest one: namely, that we start by articulating a code of conduct. That would allow for a conversation of what we expect them to do and not to do. It allows the public service to say, that is not what you are supposed to do. It is particularly troublesome in the communication area. Our effort is to encourage people to have that discussion and to move to something that has less stress in it.
With regard to the appointments, we may not be entirely in agreement. My view is that politics should not get one a job or prevent one from getting a job. In the Osborne v. Canada decision, the Supreme Court ruled for public servants. They have political rights. However, they must exercise them in such a way as to maintain the non-partisan nature of the public service. People have political rights, and one should not be punished for being politically active or, as a public servant, taking time out and being active politically.
I worry about the nature of the public service and its leadership. I am talking about the public servants who are leading the public service. There is a risk there — far less from the deputy ministers that I have seen. Most of the deputy ministers came from the public service at some time. There is not a large risk there. However, there are other situations where we have to make decisions as a commission as to whether someone can run for political office and what they may or may not do. The leadership is operating in a completely different way. That does not make any sense. That does not hold any water for me.
If there were no risk there, I would agree. However, I think there is. There is more demand for transparency and assurance. One sees the questions that are raised in Parliament. There is no one that is viewed as saying, yes, this is okay, or, no, this is not okay. This is why I suggest an organization like the public appointments commission, whether they are running processes or coming in afterwards and conducting a review. It could operate the way we do or the way they do in the United Kingdom or in Australia. That suggestion is what I am putting on the table. Parliament could have a good discussion as to whether they want it and how it should work. There are many options. Those two options do not have to be the only ones.
Senator Callbeck: Ms. Barrados, thank you for coming here. I guess this will be your last appearance, and we appreciate it.
I want to ask you about student bridging mechanisms. It is important to integrate young people into the public service after they have finished their education. Tell me exactly how that integration works. My understanding is that there are three different programs where students can come in on a temporary basis while they are completing their education. One is the Federal Student Work Experience Program, FSWEP; then there is the Research Afilliate Program, RAP; and then there are the cooperative intern programs. After that experience, by this student bridging mechanism, they can come into the public service. I want to know exactly how the programs work.
Ms. Barrados: There are advertised and non-advertised processes under the Public Service Employment Act. The Public Service Commission clearly favours and encourages people always to use advertised processes. These three programs, FSWEP, co-op and RAP, are advertised processes, so all students have a chance to apply to these programs. There are many more applications than there are people hired. We run these processes, and we have various preoccupations to ensure they are fair. There are things we have had to improve. We conducted an audit on them, and it showed that there were issues that had to be dealt with, and we have dealt with them.
Once students are selected for one of these appointments through one of these programs, then they are eligible for what we call student bridging. The first step is that they must have gone through a full selection process. The eligibility means that they can get a job in the public service if they are qualified. It is considered as an advertised, competitive process because they came in through a competition. We require an assessment that they, as individuals, meet the requirements of that job.
Senator Callbeck: Under these three programs, if they worked on a temporary basis while going to university and then go through this student bridging mechanism, do these students have to write exams like the student that has not been in the system on a temporary basis?
Ms. Barrados: They have to complete their studies, and they have to be assessed against the requirements of the job. That means the statement of merit and whatever is required. There must be a formal assessment. We are looking to see if that person meets the requirements. If the job involves languages, it means a language test. If it involves writing, we would expect a demonstration that the person has the writing skills they need. If it is some form of a judgment, they can have either a judgment test that we have at the commission, or it can be assessed through interview. We expect reference checks. We expect that full assessment.
Senator Callbeck: Are those students preferred over other students? I have heard it said that these students who go through these programs and then go through the student bridging mechanism are more liable to get the position since it is much easier for them to qualify for that position than students that have not had the opportunity to go through those programs.
Ms. Barrados: Yes, it is easier for them. However, they have gone through a competitive process to get those jobs in the first place.
Senator Callbeck: Do I have time for another question?
The Chair: Yes.
Senator Callbeck: In the audit of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada that the Public Service Commission conducted in 2010, it was found that in 40 of the 64 appointment positions audited, merit was not demonstrated. For 28, PSC could not determine from the documentation on file that all qualifications were assessed, or there was no clear link between qualifications and assessment. Furthermore, for 12 of the appointments, there was no documented assessment at all. What happens then? Do those 12 people stay in those positions?
Ms. Barrados: When we conduct those audits, we go through a process of asking the departments to determine what the issue is in terms of the documentation. We are looking for documentation, and we are asking the auditors to make a judgment. Is this truly sloppiness, or do we have other issues with those appointments?
In the case of the Indian and Northern Affairs Canada audit, there was a lot of misunderstanding of what was required, and good records were not kept. For those particular ones where we feel that it was more than sloppiness, we turn them over for further examination, which means we can order either reassessment or someone to be taken out of the job. I do not recall from memory as to how many of those appointments were sent to investigation, but I can provide that information to the committee.
The Chair: If you could, that would be appreciated.
Senator Callbeck: Does it happen often that someone is taken out of a job?
Ms. Barrados: Yes, it does happen. Under the new act, because of the way we have done the delegation, if we find that the appointment was improper, we will order the person to be taken out or completely reassessed. The departments still have the power to reappoint them to another position.
Senator Callbeck: Thank you.
The Chair: We have approximately three minutes left before we must suspend. I will ask Senator Ringuette, who is the only one left on my list and on round two, to pose her question. If you could answer it within that time, that is great. If not, perhaps you could provide us with a written answer to that question as well.
Senator Ringuette: Thank you. I have many questions.
The Shadow Public Service report states:
As well as increasing costs, reliance on outsourcing circumvents regular hiring requirements such as bilingualism and geographic and merit considerations. It also reduces institutional knowledge, constrains flexibility and heightens privacy concerns.
I would like to have your comments on that statement in this report. I know it is a lot to ask in three minutes.
Ms. Barrados: I was not sure what the evidence for that situation was in that report. As I said before, it comes down to whether the people were contracted for a job, whether it was truly a contractual relationship for the particular task, or whether they were functioning as a public servant. If they are functioning as a public servant, I have an issue with it, and all of these things are at risk. If it is a true contractual relationship, then I do not think it is an issue.
Senator Ringuette: I agree with you. There is a growing concern about the temporary staffing situation that is becoming a parallel public service and circumventing the rules and the guidelines that you have put in place. That is my major concern.
The Chair: Ms. Barrados, you may want to look at that report or have someone in your group look at it again. If you wish to say you do not agree with some of the fundamental premises in there, then we would be pleased to know that.
Ms. Barrados: I would be happy to do that. As I said, my concern is the real evidence that is brought to draw those conclusions. I will have my staff take a closer look, because I only gave it a read.
The Chair: That is good. That concludes my list, fortunately, because we are required to be in the chamber in the next 15 minutes. The bus is waiting now.
On behalf of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, I want to thank you very much for being here with Mr. Lemaire and Mr. Arseneault — good Acadian names. Lemaire is probably a good Québécois name. Ms. Barrados?
Ms. Barrados: Portuguese.
The Chair: We appreciate the Public Service Commission of Canada being here, not only this evening but on many occasions, to help us with one of the areas of our mandate, which is how the public service works and the machinery of government. We wish you well, Ms. Barrados. We wish you every success in your retirement.
Ms. Barrados: Thank you very much.
(The committee adjourned.)