Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Issue 13 - Evidence - Meeting of June 4, 2014
OTTAWA, Wednesday, June 4, 2014
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met this day at 4:17 p.m. to examine such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally (topics: situation in Turkey; and Tunisia/Egypt/Libya in the context of post-Arab spring).
Senator A. Raynell Andreychuk (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: This committee presently is authorized by the Senate to examine such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade, generally. Today, we are pleased to have officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development who will brief us on one of the two important issues we want to cover today. In our first session, we are pleased to have Mr. Matthew Levin, Director General, Trade and Diplomacy Europe and Eurasia, who will provide us with an update on the situation of the Republic of Turkey.
As you know we had intensely studied Turkey, travelled there and indicated to the officials the need to strengthen our bilateral relations. We did, however, note human rights, press issues and also the political situation. The political situation has become very complex, and we would like an update so we can reflect on the appropriateness of our recommendations and be generally informed of Canada's approach at this moment to Turkey.
Welcome to the committee. I think you know how we operate, so please make your opening statement, and then we will go to questions.
Matthew Levin, Director General, Trade and Diplomacy Europe and Eurasia, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada: Thank you very much, Madam Chair and honourable members of the committee. It's a pleasure to have this opportunity to speak to you today on this important subject and to give an update.
On behalf of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development I would like to thank the members of the committee for the attention they have devoted to Canada's bilateral relationship with Turkey. The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development considers it be an increasingly important relationship and one of strategic relevance to Canada.
[Translation]
I will give you an overview of the national context of Turkey's domestic, foreign and economic policies. I will then summarize recent developments in the relationship between Canada and Turkey, and will address a number of challenges Turkey has faced this past year and what that means for Canada.
[English]
As you know, Turkey is a key NATO ally, will host the G20 presidency in 2015, is a candidate for the European Union, and is the world's seventeenth largest economy. Turkey is a very young society, its youth is tech-savvy and its middle class is growing. With a population of approximately 76 million citizens, Turkey would be the second-largest member state of the European Union after Germany, were it to become a member. It is a founding member of the IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations and many UN agencies. It's a member of the OECD, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the World Trade Organization.
Since its foundation, Turkey's foreign policy has largely focused on maintaining strong relations with the West. To this end, Turkey joined NATO in 1952.
[Translation]
Just like Canada, Turkey is a trading nation. As part of its staggering economic expansion over the past decade, Turkey has substantially increased its trade and has become a commercial hub in the region. Its geographical situation and multidimensional foreign policy have allowed Turkey to forge a place both in the region and globally. Turkey is home to the headquarters of numerous multinational corporations doing business in the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, Caucasus, and the Balkans.
[English]
As well as being a substantial market in its own right, Turkey has significant potential as a springboard to other markets. It provides access to third countries in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, North Africa, and increasingly across Africa, bolstered in the case of Central Asia by strong linguistic and cultural linkages.
The Turkish government has announced priority development plans in education, information and communications technology, infrastructure, and energy. These investments provide excellent opportunities for Canada, with these sectors matching closely with Canadian supply capabilities. Other sectors of particular opportunity for Canada include aeronautics and natural resources.
Turkey is Canada's thirty-fourth largest destination for foreign investment abroad. Canadian companies active in Turkey include BlackBerry, SNC Lavalin, Bombardier, Inmet Mining, Alamos Gold, Eldorado Gold and Silvermet. There is also significant potential for enhancement of the commercial relationship for mutual benefit.
Turkey is a highly competitive market; Canadian firms entering the Turkish market face strong competition from European, American and Asian competitors.
[Translation]
One of our key priorities in our missions to Turkey is to support Canadian investment, particularly in the mining sector. Recent changes to Turkish law have resulted in delays in obtaining the required licences. The embassy and consulate general are working closely with Canadian companies to resolve these issues over the next few months.
[English]
In terms of security and military cooperation, Turkey and Canada's Armed Forces enjoy a positive and long- standing relationship. Both military forces are partners in the multilateral sphere and work well together within NATO. This has again been recently demonstrated through close Canadian and Turkish cooperation as contributors to the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, in Afghanistan.
Following a significant investment of effort to normalize relations that had been complicated by the Government of Canada's official recognition of the Armenian genocide, a reset in Canada-Turkey relations was achieved in 2012, and Ministers Baird and Fast have made it a priority to enhance Canada-Turkey bilateral relations.
During Minister Fast's visit in August last year, he and the Turkish Minister of Economy agreed to establish and co- chair a joint economic and trade committee, known as the JETCO. The JETCO will be a forum for representatives of our respective business communities to help governments and the private sector to work together to increase trade and commercial cooperation between our countries.
Canada and Turkey also agreed to expanded commercial air routes. Yesterday, in fact, Turkish Airlines made its inaugural direct flight from Istanbul to Montreal.
[Translation]
In another visit by Minister Baird in September, the minister and his Turkish counterpart, Minister Davutoglu, agreed to continue discussions on issues of strategic interest to the two countries. Our Canadian mission in Istanbul was also given the status of consulate general during the minister's visit.
[English]
These high-level visits have propelled bilateral relations to their closest in many years and have led to a series of concrete follow-up results. When the government announced the Global Markets Action Plan in November last year, Turkey was identified as a priority country and an emerging market with broad interests for Canadian business. Turkey is also a priority country in Canada's International Education Strategy, which was released in January of this year. Both Turkey and Canada acknowledge that our current bilateral trade, which was valued at approximately $2.3 billion last year, is well below potential.
I would now like to take a moment to refer to recent developments in Turkey that have garnered considerable media attention since last summer. This past year has been without doubt a difficult and complicated one for Prime Minister Erdogan and the Turkish government, with domestic and international criticism for excessive use of force in response to popular protests, various corruption allegations, questions regarding judicial independence, and the nation-wide banning of popular social media sites Twitter and YouTube.
As well, and together with global economic factors, these political developments spilled over to affect the Turkish economy. The results were a run on the lira, eventual intervention of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey to raise interest rates, and a partial downgrading of Turkey by international credit rating agencies.
On May 13, a coal mine explosion in the town of Soma claimed the lives of 301 workers. This tragic accident identified the critical need for stronger occupational health and safety regulations in the mining industry in Turkey. Thousands of protesters gathered in Soma and in major cities across Turkey, demanding greater government accountability for the state of the mine.
The Turkish government has since launched an investigation into the accident and has detained a number of high- ranking members of the company. The government of Turkey has vowed to increase the frequency of inspections in mines and to take measures to avoid future accidents.
[Translation]
Canada has been deeply concerned by the blocking of the websites Twitter and YouTube, particular in the lead-up to municipal elections in March. Canada has, on a number of occasions, made its concerns known to the Turkish government, and has urged the government to better protect rights and freedoms across digital platforms.
[English]
It is important to mention that all these events have unfolded during a particularly intense electoral cycle in Turkish politics. Municipal elections were held at the end of March, while presidential elections are scheduled for August of this year. Together with general elections in 2015, this has meant a particularly charged political environment in Turkey. The end of the electoral cycle in 2015 will likely yield a period of greater political stability.
Turkey is a relatively new democracy and, just as with any young democracy, growing pains are not unusual. Turkey has an increasingly robust civil society, and its institutions are strengthening. Last March, Turkish citizens took part in municipal elections and demonstrated overwhelming endorsement for Prime Minister Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party, also known as AKP, despite the past year's popular protests and corruption scandals.
The government of Turkey is also subject to a system of checks and balances, including the Turkish National Assembly, the constitutional court in Turkey, and the European Court of Human Rights which, in the past, have overturned legislation inconsistent with the Council of Europe's norms.
Linked to the above is Turkey's engagement with the European Union on accession, which will see Turkey continue to reform its laws and institutions as the accession process gradually advances.
Turkey's economy is likely to perform well in the medium to long term, and investors remain confident in Turkey's dynamic and growing economy and the opportunities it will present. Canada's commercial relations with Turkey are expanding, but there is substantial room for further trade and investment growth. The time is right for Canada and Turkey to pursue deeper commercial partnerships and for Canadian investors and businesses to pursue opportunities in and through this important market and partner.
In February 2014, this committee's report, entitled Building Bridges: Canada-Turkey Relations and Beyond, was adopted in the Senate of Canada. The report offers recommendations to the Government of Canada that focus on ways to deepen political engagement and enhance economic diplomacy with Turkey. The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development welcomes the recommendations in the report and looks forward to further tapping the commercial potential between our two countries and intensifying our overall relationship. As is mentioned in the preface of your report, the department also believes that despite governance challenges, Turkey will be an increasingly strategic partner for Canada in advancing shared interests and values in a very challenging region of the world.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Levin. I have a list.
Senator Oh: Thank you, Mr. Levin. Turkey is having a presidential election coming up in August 2014, right?
Mr. Levin: Yes.
Senator Oh: What is the potential now with the problems of the major demonstrations a year ago and the impact of the accident at the coal mine? I know from the news we read that there were thousands of protests; it seemed like a wildfire going on. What will be the impact on the presidential election coming up and what impact will that have on our economic ties with Turkey?
Mr. Levin: Thank you very much, senator. It's a very good question, and an answer to that question is speculative to some extent, but I'm happy to share what our current assessment is.
The year in the lead-up to the municipal elections at the end of March of this year was also problematic, beginning with the large-scale demonstrations in Gezi Park and Taksim Square, and in subsequent corruption allegations that emerged at the end of 2013. Actually, in the period just before the municipal election, despite the series of events —with a number of allegations that emerged on social media sites that the government found embarrassing and led to its closure of the sites — Prime Minister Erdogan's AKP party scored a very convincing victory in municipal elections. Despite the turbulence in the period preceding the elections, the elections themselves went very well. There were no allegations that came to our attention of any serious misconduct of the election. So the process went well and the results demonstrated a strong, in fact growing, support for Prime Minister Erdogan and the AKP party in, I think it is fair to say, most of Turkey.
When we think of the impact of these events on the presidential elections, without forecasting what the results might be, I think we would not automatically conclude that these events will necessarily be damaging to Prime Minister Erdogan or the party. Having said that, we don't yet know who the candidate will be for the presidential election.
I don't know if that answers your question, senator, but our view would be there is nothing in what we see now that suggests a fundamental disruption of the presidential elections or even necessarily the conclusion that the governing party may not do very well in those elections.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Thank you, Mr. Levin, for your presentation. During our committee's fruitful trip to Turkey, we saw first-hand the country's extraordinary economic growth. We came home to Canada having formed a positive opinion of Turkey. It was our recommendation that Canada engage in free trade between our two countries.
Unfortunately, we also observed that freedom of the press was on the decline. We saw — and you mentioned this in your remarks — civil society groups face off with the Turkish government, and the riots prompted government authorities to sporadically block access to social media such as Twitter and YouTube.
The OSCE spokesperson for freedom of the media condemned this violation of the freedom of the press. The Turkish government's track record in terms of freedom of the press is well known, and not very flattering.
Is it your opinion that we are going to see a rapid decline in the conditions relating to freedom of the press in Turkey? During our trip, we met with a number of journalists and, quite frankly, they were being very closely scrutinized. They did not have the right to say everything they wanted to say.
Mr. Levin: Thank you for your question. It is a very good question and one that we are focusing a great deal of our attention on.
Indeed, your early remarks concerning Turkey's impressive economic growth are true. They are absolutely true. In the ten years that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government has been in office, the rate of economic growth has been truly impressive. It is one of the highest growth rates of any emerging country worldwide.
Freedom of the press is obviously fundamental. According to the Canadian government, it is one of the elements we showcase in our bilateral and multilateral relationships; freedom of expression and freedom of the press are vital to our democracy. There can be no true democracy without an independent, active and free press.
Now, as for the situation in Turkey, certain incidents have undeniably given cause for concern. However, it is our sense that the recent trends, that is, over recent months, or the past year, are connected to specific periods in Turkey's history. It is our hope that, at the end of the electoral cycle — the presidential election in August, and the parliamentary or the general election next year — things will stabilize somewhat, or calm down from an electoral and, generally speaking, political standpoint, which will permit the government to adopt a stance vis-à-vis the press that is somewhat more relaxed, and less restrictive.
Obviously, in our own conversations with the Turkish government, at all levels — this was the case during Minister Baird's visit, in September, but also at our embassy in Ankara — this issue is raised constantly. It is a question of making known our view, which is that, for the sake of stability, democracy, and even the continuing health of the economy, a free press is fundamental.
We continue to stress to our Turkish partners the importance of adopting a clear position regarding freedom of the press. At a time when the Turkish government is taking steps to block social media such as Twitter and YouTube, we have called on our ambassador in Ankara to raise, at the highest possible echelons of the Turkish government, our concerns regarding actions which strike us as completely inappropriate, and neither in the interests of Turkish society or the Turkish government. After a very short interval, Turkey's constitutional court threw out the government's decisions and gave assurances that access to Twitter would be restored. That has, to some degree, reassured us that within the system of Turkish government, there is the capacity to correct what may otherwise be a tendency to excessively limit freedom of expression.
[English]
Senator Housakos: Thank you, chair, and thank you for being with us tonight. It's an interesting subject, one that perplexes me when I look at the whole region there in Turkey.
I was wondering if you could comment on and shed some light for this committee. I'm a newbie; I wasn't involved when the committee filed the report on Turkey, which was a year ago, and I didn't have the opportunity to travel to the country with the committee. However, I have a tendency of believing that our Foreign Affairs Department has a propensity to be overly impressed by the potential rather than the reality in Turkey.
Without a doubt, it's one of the most powerful countries in the region from a population perspective, from the capacity to generate wealth and to do trade, and Canada has pursued for many decades some interesting trade arrangements with Turkey, both for the benefit of Turkey and for the benefit of Canada. Without a doubt, there are a number of economic opportunities that need to be exploited and have been exploited. Yet we can't diminish the fact, either, that coming from the Western Hemisphere and being great supporters of democracy and freedom and the rule of law, that we expect that from our allies and friends around the world.
Today you testified to the fact that there are certain problems that seem to be seeping out of the cracks and rearing their ugly heads. There have been many critics that feel there's a lack of freedom of expression in Turkey, a lack of freedom of religion in Turkey, a lack of independence in their judicial system, and that the government is highly influenced in large part by their military complex and that it constantly infringes upon the development of their Constitution and democratic process.
As an observer of foreign affairs politics, I have looked at Turkey's behaviour, for example, in showing an interest one day in being an active, official member of the EU, and then turning 180 degrees diametrically opposed to that objective. We see Turkey showing a diplomatic desire to extend an arm to Israel and create strong diplomatic relations with them, and then a few years later, they do another virage and they conduct themselves as they did in 2010.
I have a number of questions in my preamble here. Where does Turkey see itself? I, for one, look at that country and wonder if they see themselves as being Europeans or as being a country that can be secular, respecting the rule of law and the fundamental principles of democracy. Do they see themselves as part of the Asian continent? Do they see themselves as being part of the Middle East and being the leaders of the Islamic fundamentalist movement?
When I follow that country at various times, I get different pictures. To me, Turkey very much is an enigma in many ways. I think maybe I've said too much and added too many questions to that statement, but perhaps you could share some comments with us.
Mr. Levin: Thank you. Those are very interesting and important comments and reflections, and I'll do my best to express the department's view on some of them to the extent I can. You've raised many complex issues that would require some time to explore in detail, certainly.
Let me just start with one of the questions you asked, if I could, senator, which is how Turkey sees itself. I'll try to give you our sense of that through our own interactions with Turkey.
Over a certain historical span — because I think, senator, you also made an important point that there have been some contrasting signals over time and some fluctuations that make it harder to assess, but when we look at it over a certain span of time — and this is reinforced by the most recent ongoing contacts we've had with Turkey at the senior level through the minister's visit and through senior officials — we do believe that Turkey sees itself very much as a country of the West.
One example is its commitment to NATO. It joined NATO in 1952 and has been a very committed partner. In fact, just in terms of our own action in NATO, we have felt that Turkey, as a non-EU member of NATO, has often been very close to our positions and we felt them a very strong ally, whether it's through ISAF in Afghanistan or elsewhere.
In the case of Turkey, I think you're quite right to point out it's quite a complicated thing because, while I think they've demonstrated their commitment to the West over time, they are situated where they're situated. In fact, if you look at the countries that Turkey has on its immediate borders — Syria, Iran, Iraq and now maritime boundaries with Ukraine and Russia — those are probably four or five of the most complex security dynamics we have in the world, and those are all of Turkey's neighbours. Of course, Turkey, like all other countries, doesn't get to choose its neighbours. That is part of its reality.
In terms of how Turkey sees itself, our conviction is that it sees itself as fundamentally a country of the West and aspiring to core western values, I think recognizing itself that its own governance has not fully achieved the reflection of all of those values in every aspect of its governance, but aspiring to them very clearly and considering itself part of that community of values.
Turkey also sees itself — and I think this also reflects the tremendous growth that the senator referred to — as a regional power — and by region, that means its region of the near east, the Middle East — but also increasingly as a global power. We see that expressed in many ways in the geographic ambitions of Turkish companies and also of the Turkish government and its network of diplomatic missions; the reach of Turkish Airlines and how it's positioning the international airport in Istanbul as a major, global air hub; the increasing presence of Turkey not only in Northern Africa, which could be seen as part of its immediate region, but throughout Africa and even in Latin America.
Our sense is that Turkey sees itself as having concentric circles of relationships and platforms for its global projection from the West, but in its immediate neighbourhood, which is that complicated neighbourhood of the near east and the former Soviet Union, but increasingly global.
The last point I would make, if I may, senator, is thatyou also referred to the European Union and how it sees that relationship. Our sense, confirmed by what our Turkish colleagues tell us, is that Turkey remains very committed to pursuing its accession to the European Union. This has been a very long process. Of course, not all of the delay, if one can use that word, can be attributed to Turkey. It's a bilateral negotiation and European partners, as a union and as the individual member states, have strong views of their own.
It's also true that, especially since the global financial crisis and its impacts on the EU, like other countries, Turkey has sought to diversify its commercial and financial relationships. Even compared to 2008, at the start of the global financial crisis, the share of Turkey's bilateral trade with the EU as a share of its global trade has fallen — I don't have the exact figures — but roughly from 60 per cent to 35 per cent. It has been quite a successful process of diversification, but on the other hand, it has made Turkey feel a little less reliant on the accession process than it might have felt in the past. That's also part of its evolving relationship with the West, at least as the West is expressed in the European Union.
The final point I would make, senator, in response to the many interesting points you raised, is that, as we gauge our own relationship with Turkey, given these complexities, the same issue of trade diversification is not absent from our decision making and our calculus. Canada, like Turkey, is a trading country and our global economic engagement is fundamental to our prosperity. As Canada has viewed the changing nature of growth in the global economy and power shifting in the global economy, the value of engaging with emerging markets, which are the sources of most of the growth in the global economy, is something that has become clear to us.
That often means engaging with countries that are at earlier stages of democratic development and consolidation, which perhaps implies some of these uncertainties.
Senator Housakos: In your opinion, in the last five years, where has Turkey engaged more diplomatically? Have they engaged more in the Middle East in terms of bilateral negotiations and agreements with Middle Eastern countries, or have they negotiated more and placed more of an emphasis in trying to become a member of the EU?
There are some big hindrances for them in achieving that; for example, the recognition of Cyprus, which they're occupying right now and have been occupying and ignoring countless UN resolutions to withdraw.
Mr. Levin: That's very true.
I don't know that I can speak with any authority of the relative attention Turkey has given to various trading relationships. They have quite a range of free trade agreements. There are many in the region —
Senator Housakos: I'm not only talking specifically to trade. It could be political arrangements with Iraq and Iran, and the whole Middle East. They've spent a lot of time, in my opinion, in the last four years re-engaging in the Islamic states, and they have done so at the expense of their diplomatic arrangements in Europe.
It's funny how our perception is that they have more of a desire to be more of a western, modern state, yet if you look at their government's actions in the last four or five years, they spent a great deal of time defending the Islamic movements or the Islamic states at the expense of the relationship in Europe.
Mr. Levin: That's a very good point.
Our impression is that Turkey hasn't seen it as a trade-off, but as two tracks that could be managed simultaneously and which, in fact, could become complementary. I think Turkey has seen itself as a certain model of governance for an Islamic country that could be a sort of bridge between the West and other parts of the Islamic world.
They've had a strategy in their immediate neighbourhood of essentially trying to avoid problems. That hasn't been entirely successful. Earlier on, Prime Minister Erdogan tried to reach out to the Assad regime and that really didn't work out at all, of course, because of events in Syria. Also, the relations with Iraq have proven problematic.
So their strategy in terms of becoming, if this is the right word to use, "leadership within the region" or within that part of the Islamic world has turned out to be quite complicated for them in reality, partly because of events in those countries.
I take your points; they are serious points to reflect on. However, I guess our view continues to be that there is not a fundamental incompatibility with their sense of their need and potential in reaching out to their neighbours, including the Islamic world, and their continued sense of their own western vocation.
Senator Johnson: I would like you to comment, please, on Iran and Turkey, if you could tell us perhaps the short- and long-term implications for their relationship, following Erdogan's visit to that country in January; is that right? They signed an agreement to establish a council for political cooperation. Would you comment on that?
Mr. Levin: Turkey takes a very careful and nuanced approach to its relationship with Iran. These figures are approximate, but I believe Turkey relies on Iran for something like 30 per cent of its oil and perhaps between 15 and 20 per cent of natural gas imports. Turkey is not an energy producer, so it relies on imports for almost all its energy. Another of its major sources of energy is Russia.
There have been regular high-level encounters between Turkey and Iran. It's a feature of the relationship. It's clear they are seeking to both understand Iranian intentions and to provide Turkish views on issues of common concern that they perceive to exist.
Both countries have diametrically opposed objectives and interests in the Syrian conflict. That's a point of significant difference between them. They appear to have agreed to contain their different positions on the Syrian issue; they appear to be isolating that from the management of their bilateral relationship.
I think you referred to a visit —
Senator Johnson: They were there in January. There was just nothing about this council they set up. What about the council they set up or decided to set up? Has that happened?
Mr. Levin: Not that I'm aware of, but we will confirm that for you. I'm not aware that the council has actually come into existence.
There is a discussion of a visit to Turkey by Iranian President Rouhani, but that has been mooted for some time. There is a notion that it could take place at some point this year, perhaps over the summer and the fall, but we haven't seen any confirmation of that.
To pick up on some points, Turkey did vote against UN Security Council sanctions against Iran relating to the Iranian nuclear program. It continues to apply UN-mandated sanctions, but it hasn't introduced the complementary bilateral sanctions some partners have.
Senator Johnson: In response to some of Senator Housakos' comments, which were very interesting, Turkey considers itself a country of the West and yet it is playing all over the block. Is this typical of what we can expect from Erdogan if he's re-elected? He does have some very peculiar ways of dealing with social unrest and communications issues.
Even when they were reviewing their position in the Ukraine and the succession of Crimea, with which Turkey has had historic and undeveloped ties, it's hard to pinpoint them on anything, as my colleague said. Where does this leave Canada in terms of dealing with it? As Senator Housakos said, do you not feel there will probably be more restriction on civil liberties with the way the unrest has unfolded?
Mr. Levin: Our expectation is over time — the question is how much time — when we look at the longer term trend in Turkey, we see a gradual but significant improvement in civil liberties. If we look at the course of Turkish history and even the modern republic, it seems quite clear to us. If you graph it over a long period of time, the press is much freer now in Turkey than it was a considerable period of time ago.
There is a robust civil society in Turkey now. I don't mean to say it doesn't face certain challenges, but it's very robust and active, and certainly our missions in Turkey, both in Ankara and Istanbul, engage with it constantly. That engagement takes place with no restrictions that are perceptible.
On a number of measures and over time, we see a positive trend and it's really through our own engagement — commercial is an important part of that, but not exclusively; it's also political — that our closer engagement will be supportive of that continued, positive evolution. Certainly without closing our eyes and ignoring many of the complex and important issues you have raised and that we need to constantly be aware of and that we need to make part of our bilateral dialogue, I think we make clear our expectations of our partners.
Our expectation is that this longer term trend will continue over time. We will see what the outcome of the presidential elections is, but we expect it may create an environment in which some of the turbulence of the last year or so will subside and we can return to a trajectory we had been identifying earlier, which was quite positive.
[Translation]
Senator Robichaud: My question follows on that of Senator Johnson. Should we be concerned about the government's response over recent days to demonstrators, who are being met with water cannons and tear gas? It appears that the police even resorted to violence.
[English]
Mr. Levin: That's a very important question. We certainly express to the Turkish authorities that we recognize the right and the responsibility of governments to maintain public order, but we express concern when there is a perception of excessive or disproportionate use of force, and certainly Canada is not alone. All of Turkey's friends and partners have noted that the response of the government to some of these protests appears to have been excessive. That is an issue that requires constant attention, that we are attentive to and raise on a regular basis or when circumstances warrant.
[Translation]
Senator Robichaud: Did this happen? Was there an indication that we disagreed entirely with what was transpiring there? The Council of Europe strongly denounced the current measures. Are we going to wait weeks or months before taking a stand?
Mr. Levin: We are responding in our conversations with the Turkish authorities through diplomatic channels at our embassy. We are engaged in quite intense dialogue with the Canadian embassy. We are meeting with visitors from Turkey on a regular basis. Today, in fact, we met with the deputy finance minister. We are taking advantage of every opportunity to engage in a dialogue with Turkish representatives and senior officials in the Turkish government in order to appropriately voice our concerns. The events of Gezi park last year did, to some extent, spark this wave of demonstrations, which resulted in a response from the government that many consider excessive. Since then, generally speaking, this is a topic in our ongoing diplomatic dialogue that is frequently raised.
Senator Robichaud: You say that this theme is broached regularly. However, in the current context, given the demonstrations and action taken over recent days, have we taken the time to respond, and inform the government that this type of response is certainly not the direction in which we wish to see our relationship with Turkey heading?
Mr. Levin: In light of the events of recent days, we have not yet had such an opportunity, to my knowledge. However, we may find an opportunity to do so in the very near future.
Senator Robichaud: I encourage you to do so.
[English]
Senator Ataullahjan: How much pressure are the Syrian refugees placing on public services in Turkey? What is being done to ensure the infrastructure is suitable for managing the refugee crisis? Is Canada involved in any way in that?
Mr. Levin: Thank you, senator. Certainly Turkey has borne a large share of the brunt of the exodus of refugees and displaced persons from Syria. I think officially speaking the registered number of Syrian refugees is something less than but close to 800,000 people. There may be more than that who are not registered.
Canada, as you know, has been very active and has been a leader in responding to the plight of Syrian refugees in the region generally. The Canadian government has dedicated over $350 million to working with international organizations in providing humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees. The bulk of Canadian assistance has been focused on refugees in Jordan. In part that's because, particularly in the early stages of the Syrian crisis and the refugee crisis, Turkey had indicated its intention and capacity to respond to the needs of Syrians taking refuge in Turkey on their own.
Our assessment, as well as the international community and the Turkish government's own assessment, has been that Turkey had considerably more capacity than did Jordan, for example, Lebanon or other countries that were facing the challenge of giving refuge to displaced Syrians.
Recently, Turkey has expressed more openness to working with international organizations, and Canada has devoted a certain amount of funding and resources to support those organizations working in Turkey with Syrian refugees as well.
The Chair: We've studied Turkey in depth, and certainly we noted that our relationship with them was primarily through NATO. Their focus was to enter the EU, but certainly there was not the willingness from the EU. The standards needed to be met. It's like NATO; you have to meet the thresholds. There were some positive things going on and they were turning west.
Politics being what they are in Europe, certainly at times it was not a climate for them to be able to enter Europe, so consciously this government said there were other alternatives.
Now, as we are going into the final stages, hopefully, of our treaty, CETA, with Europe, since there is a customs union, that gives us some advantage as they are looking for the trade agreement with us. The focus has now turned to us not on a multilateral level but a bilateral one.
To what extent do you believe that this disruption may be growing pains, we hope? It may not be. Is that going to slow down our discussions on trade directly in a bilateral relationship? Turkey certainly has a lot of alternatives around the world, but we don't want to miss the opportunity with them in the long run. Do you think it has had any impact on the trade negotiations? Will we slow them down to see what happens with the Erdogan government? Will we talk more closely with our European partners to see what their stance is with Europe?
Mr. Levin: Thank you, chair. Of course, we haven't actually begun our negotiations with Turkey yet. We did engage in exploratory talks, which is the normal process. Before actually formally engaging in negotiations, there are exploratory talks, and those were concluded last fall. I really can't say.
The next step would normally be a consideration by the government about whether, how and when to proceed or not with formal negotiations. I really can't say much, chair, about that discussion, when the government will turn its attention to that and how it would factor into current developments in terms of decisions with respect to the timing of proceeding, if it chooses to do so under free trade negotiations with Turkey.
The Chair: Has Canada seen any change in attitude in Europe towards Turkey, given the neighbourhood at the present time?
Mr. Levin: That's also a good question. After a certain period of no progress or stagnation in terms of actual very concrete work in terms of Turkish accession, over the past year and a bit, there has been a bit of a renewal of the momentum there.
The European Union accession rules are very complex. There are 35 different negotiating chapters that refer to different areas of governance and government, and a number of those are open and active and are being pursued. I obviously can't speak definitively with respect to the European Union's policies or approach, but our impression is that there has not been a notable slowing down in terms of the European Union's interest in proceeding with this process because of events of the past year.
The Chair: Thank you. In our report, we noted Turkey's new accelerated activity, both commercially and politically, around the world, utilizing the UN and utilizing relationships with Brazil, et cetera. Have any of those countries changed their position due to the internal dynamics of Turkey, or are we still exploring all of these new initiatives of Turkey?
Mr. Levin: As far as I'm aware of those countries, because of some of the issues that your committee has turned its attention to and that senators have raised during this hearing, I can't think of any country that has either publicly or perceptibly to us privately actually fundamentally altered its interest in strengthening its engagement with Turkey.
Certainly, a number of the countries you mentioned — for example, Brazil, some of the other BRICs and some of the other principal emerging economies — many of them, like Brazil, make quite a clear distinction between matters of internal governance and its own bilateral relationship in a way that is different from our approach and the approach of some of our other partners.
As far as I'm aware, we haven't seen evidence of any of those new and increasingly important partners with which Turkey is engaging having fundamentally altered or diminished the attention they are devoting to the relationship.
The Chair: We could say as a committee that the cautions and the issues that we raised in our report have some resonance, but the directions, as we also pointed out in our recommendations, are still sound. Is that correct?
Mr. Levin: I think that sums it up perfectly from our perspective as well.
The Chair: I think that's still our perspective. Thank you for sharing and updating your perspectives on Turkey, as it was a significant report and we want to continue to monitor these recent political developments and be abreast of any changes in our policies here.
Thank you for coming and taking our questions. We look forward to continuing the dialogue.
Honourable senators, we are shifting now to examining issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally. The topic will cover Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in the context of the post- Arab Spring.
Honourable senators, there is some indication we may be receiving Bill C-20 very shortly. In light of that, the department has invited us to participate in a technical briefing, which is for all members of the committee. It has been scheduled for Tuesday, June 10, between 8:30 and 9:30 a.m. in room 172-E, Centre Block. There should be a notice coming out. You will receive the normal materials that come with every bill we receive, but since it is a technical trade bill, they are affording us this opportunity, should you wish to avail yourselves of it. If you cannot make it at that time and need more information, please contact me or the clerk, and we will arrange something for all members.
Senator Downe: I assume senators and staff are invited?
The Chair: Yes, I am going to make the assumption that the staff should be there; there should be no restriction. It is a technical briefing and sometimes the staff are our best resources. They should be there.
Senator D. Smith: We have Rules Committee at 9:30. As deputy chair, I will have to leave at 9:15. This is my lot in life.
The Chair: I will give you special dispensation.
Senator Downe: Some of us who have other commitments could send our staff to debrief us.
The Chair: Absolutely. If you need more material or briefings from the department, contact us and we will arrange it. This is on Honduras.
Now we will turn back to why we are here, and that is to examine further the issue of the post-Arab Spring with regard to Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. We have with us from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Mr. Mark Gwozdecky, Director General, Trade and Diplomacy Middle East. I think you have a few officials behind you whom you may want to call on.
Please provide an opening statement, and then we will turn to questions. Welcome to the committee.
Mark Gwozdecky, Director General, Trade and Diplomacy Middle East, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada: Thank you, chair.
When the Arab Spring began three years ago, men and women across North Africa and the Middle East region took to the streets to fight for dignity, democracy, prosperity and security. Despite initial similarities in 2011, the North African states of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya have since followed quite different trajectories. After the initial excitement receded, these states have been faced with the daunting task of living up to the high expectations of their people. It has not been easy. For the most part, Egyptians, Libyans and Tunisians have seen few tangible dividends from their revolutions.
On the economic side, among the chief challenges facing all three states are high youth unemployment, a lack of economic diversification, an entrenched system of subsidies that create market distortions and reduced competitiveness, poorly developed private sectors and infrastructure, and outdated regulatory environments.
In Egypt, the economic situation is now dire after a sustained drop in tourism and investment, and worrying levels of unemployment and inflation. Egyptian families struggle with poor access to basic necessities. Daily gas shortages and power cuts only compound the many frustrations of average Egyptians.
In Tunisia, state expenditures for subsidies comprise roughly a sixth of the state budget. The lack of real progress in creating opportunities for young people is as much a struggle now as it was in 2010 when a young fruit vendor's tragic self-immolation sparked the Arab Spring.
In Libya, months-long blockades of oil and gas infrastructure have cut production to a trickle of its former capacity. The government is forced to run a large deficit, drawing upon its foreign currency reserves as a temporary but indeed unsustainable mitigation measure. Last year, Libya's real GDP fell by 5 to 6 per cent and, in the absence of a political resolution to the current tensions, the economy is likely to continue to fall.
Leaders in post-Arab Spring states are fully aware of the need to realize meaningful and sustainable economic reforms, politically unpopular and painful as they may be. In Tunisia, Prime Minister Jomaa has made economic reform his top policy priority, along with security. The new government, in which business-friendly technocrats have been named to key cabinet positions, has been sending business delegations to Gulf and Western states, including one to Canada in early April, in an effort to galvanize trade and investment.
In Egypt, the new government has committed to tackling economic reform, but there are no easy or quick solutions. Subsidy reform and anti-corruption measures will require sustained efforts over the long term. The new government, just elected last week, has a resounding and a very clear mandate to tackle the economy.
[Translation]
From a political standpoint, the similarities are less evident. The transition towards democracy in Tunisia, which is progressing in a relatively calm and peaceful manner, is in stark contrast with the climate of violence that continues to reign in Libya.
In Tunisia, a national dialogue between all political parties resulted in a peaceful handover of power between the coalition government, led by the moderate Islamic party Ennahdha, and a non-partisan technocratic interim government. This event played a role in the National Constituent Assembly's decision to adopt the most progressive constitution in the Arab world.
Tunisia plans on holding an election later this year and seems to be in the process of creating, albeit gradually, a democratic foundation for the country.
[English]
Libya, meanwhile, is at a crossroads. It made early strides towards democracy, with free and fair elections of the General National Congress and a smooth transition of power to an elected government. However, since then, political instability and insecurity have become the norm, which has impeded key steps needed to build an effective and democratic state, such as drafting a new constitution, and disarming and demobilizing militias.
The struggle between diverse and competing factions over control of the National Congress and state institutions has crippled decision-making and weakened the central government. As we have recently seen, the anti-terrorism campaign, led by a coalition of anti-GNC and anti-Islamist militia, which started in the east of Libya and has garnered some political support, has also exposed deep fragmentation in Libya's political and security structures. It has also highlighted the government's lack of control over its own territory. These factors are compounded by the government's inability to provide basic services, manage its economy and control its borders.
The rise of violent extremism in Libya, reinforced by steady inflows of foreign jihadis, a vibrant trade in illicit arms and narcotics, the continued expansion of human smuggling networks, and the cumulative impact of a sophisticated campaign of terrorist attacks and assassinations targeting state institutions and officials further complicate the situation, making prospects for stabilization and security in the near term remote. Without political dialogue and willingness of various parties to make concessions, it's difficult to be optimistic about political stability and security in the near term.
Finally, there is Egypt. Egypt is the most populous Arab country. In fact, one in four Arabs is Egyptian. It has long been recognized as a political, social, cultural and religious focal point in the Middle East and North Africa. As such, we view Egypt as a bellwether, because what happens there has influence on the entire Arab world. This makes it all the more important that democracy, prosperity and security take root in Egypt. Egypt's transition to democracy, which began with the removal of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, has not followed a linear trajectory and is still ongoing.
The government of Mohammed Morsi, which was elected in the summer of 2012, gradually lost the support of the vast majority of Egyptians and virtually all of Egypt's key political and social elites. After a difficult year in office, the Morsi government was removed last July, following mass public protests on an unprecedented scale. Since that time, Egypt's interim government has been implementing its transition road map to democracy, and Canada has been engaged with it to support the implementation of that plan.
A constitutional referendum took place in January and presidential elections took place last week, both marking key milestones in that road map on the path toward an elected government and constitutional order. The next step in the process will be parliamentary elections, which are expected in the fall.
One of the greatest challenges for Egypt's new leaders will be to open up political space and move toward meaningful dialogue and reconciliation with political opponents, while maintaining respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Egypt is also facing very serious security threats from Islamist terrorist groups who are engaged in an insurgency against Egyptian forces in the North Sinai and who have increasingly claimed responsibility for attacks elsewhere in Egypt. The flow of arms and militants across the porous borders of North Africa is an increasingly serious and complex concern shared by both Egypt and Canada.
[Translation]
The Arab Spring demonstrations did not only focus on the desire for regional renewal and employment. Reform of the security sector, transitional justice and a greater role for civil society also feature among its revolutionary aspirations.
Reform of the security sector has been successful to a degree; however, the process will take several years. It will be important for the new Egyptian government to implement major reforms in the security sector as a way of responding to the long-standing expectations of Egyptians.
While the popularity of the Tunisian army got a recent boost due to its contribution to successful operations to combat terrorism, the police are fighting to regain the confidence of the people after decades of brutality and repression at the hands of the Ben Ali regime.
When it comes to developing a united, post-revolutionary security framework that the public trusts, Libya remains the country with the most ground to cover. In Libya, there are major difficulties dismantling, disarming and integrating the militia, especially in a polarized environment with increasing allegiances being formed along ethnic and tribal borders.
Based on some estimates, there are up to 15 million weapons in Libya, in other words, three weapons per person. The militia already has broad access to a wide array of low calibre weapons, light arms, armoured vehicles, artillery, anti-aircraft weapons and other military grade systems that were acquired during the revolution.
There is no doubt that the continued presence of armed militia, most of which are acting completely outside government control, is a major threat to stability in Libya and in the region.
[English]
With regard to transitional justice, those who expected swift action for ousted authoritarian rulers and their powerful entourage were quickly disillusioned. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, all three states sought to recover stolen assets from former regime members. They also considered or adopted political isolation laws, which have the effect of imposing a blanket ban on anyone associated with the former regime, rather than opening up space for healing and dialogue.
In Libya, the political isolation law adopted last year is one of the main drivers of conflict and a significant barrier to meaningful political dialogue and national reconciliation. Imposed by anti-Gadhafi and pro-Islamist militias, its chief objective is to prevent anyone associated with the former regime from participating in political life. A transition justice law has also been passed, but to date there has been no meaningful progress in its implementation and it is likely to be unenforceable.
In Egypt, the quest for justice for former regime members led to numerous trials, with many Mubarak-era officials, Mubarak included, being incarcerated. In the post-Morsi context, the focus of the search for justice has shifted from Mubarak regime officials to Muslim Brotherhood members.
In Tunisia, members of Tunisia's National Constituent Assembly ultimately rejected proposed provisions in both the draft constitution and the draft electoral law that would have barred former members from taking office.
The number of civil society organizations, along with their freedom to assemble, associate and voice critical opinions, is a valuable indicator of the openness and pluralism in a given country. In post-Arab Spring states, a blossoming of new NGOs and civil society organizations has been a remarkable feature across the region. In Libya and Tunisia, civil society organizations, which were repressed under the Gadhafi and Ben Ali regimes, enjoyed an unprecedented surge, providing new outlets for citizens to actively participate in the political and economic spheres. While they require significant support and assistance, particularly in Libya, these new channels of civic and social engagement have opened up for youth, women and formerly disenfranchised groups. This phenomenon, in turn, is helping to foster key ingredients for democratic society, such as freedom of speech, diversity, opposition and participatory governance.
Egypt has long been known for its vibrant civil society. We believe that it is vital that its components, including political parties, activists and journalists, have a major role to play in Egypt's transition to democracy. As such, it is crucial that they be allowed to function freely, as they have much to contribute and have a crucial role to play in any healthy democracy.
[Translation]
Despite the fact that women were significantly represented in the Arab Spring demonstrations, a study of their rights in the wake of revolutions attests to the profound difficulties they face when it comes to challenging deep-seated conservative norms. In Tunisia, the rise to power in the election of the moderate Islamic party Ennahdha, has raised complex questions about how to broach freedom of religion and women's rights. The issue was addressed following the adoption, earlier this year, of the constitution, which contains provisions on the freedom of religion and gender equality that comply with international norms.
In Egypt and Libya, women have played a crucial role since the beginning of the revolution, and they continue to promote equal democracy for both sexes, combat gender-related violence, and to prevent the return of conservative notions of women's place in society. Nevertheless, women continue to face obstacles and additional pressures.
[English]
As these Arab states proceed on their paths toward democracy, Canada and other external actors are watching closely in order to identify areas where we can assist. What role Western states can and should assume in helping establishing political stability is a very complex question, given the sensitivities and risks associated with perceptions of external meddling.
Less politically sensitive areas where Western states can constructively engage include promoting inclusive economic growth, building transparent and accountable institutions, and strengthening civil society. In the case of Libya, the United States, the U.K. and other states are focusing on training the Libyan Army, with troops on the ground working to inculcate professionalism and know-how.
Whether the revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt fail or succeed to achieve their aspirations will depend largely on the very group that precipitated the Arab Spring: young people. This is why supporting and enabling the development of civil society will be essential.
In North Africa, civil society engagement is particularly pertinent because of predominantly young populations. For instance, 50 per cent of Egypt's population is under the age of 25. Civil society organizations offer a vital vehicle to mobilize support around key issues such as the democratic process, rule of law and human rights. Throughout the region, democratic movements are competing with extremists, jihadis, militants and other anti-democratic forces for support. Offering young people a voice and meaningful economic opportunities will be critical in helping them realize their dreams of prosperity, freedom and dignity.
Since the Arab Spring, Canada has supported all three countries in many ways. In Tunisia, for example, we have strongly supported women's participation in the democratic process, through various projects amounting to more than $1 million, and the decentralization of government institutions.
Canada has deployed expert advisers into Libyan ministries to help build capacity, enhance the capacity of civil society organizations, and support women's political participation and empowerment. In total, we have provided more than $30 million in security and development assistance to Libya since 2011.
In 2012-13, Canada provided more than $6 million in development assistance to Egypt. The primary objective of our assistance is to generate economic growth by supporting micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, and to provide skills for employment to marginalized women and youth. Canada deployed election observers to monitor the recent presidential elections through the European Union electoral observation mission. We also contribute to the Deauville Partnership transition fund, and Tunisia, Libya and Egypt are major fund recipients.
With that, I will conclude my remarks. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair: Thank you. That was a very comprehensive overview of all of the issues, probably more than I had anticipated. You put it into the context of the differences of the three countries and where we are, bringing us to the Canadian contribution. Thank you very much.
Senator Johnson: As our chair said, you've given a very comprehensive overview. Thank you for that.
You probably heard that many observers have called the Arab Spring the most significant set of events to occur in the Middle East and North Africa since the end of the Second World War. However, the results today appear more ambiguous. As you pointed out in some of your remarks, a number of countries that saw early democratic gains have suffered setbacks.
How would you assess the results of the Arab Spring over the last three and a half years, since the uprisings first began?
Mr. Gwozdecky: I'd start by saying that one really has to take them case-by-case, because every country has very unique circumstances. I could make a few generalizations.
Senator Johnson: You did it pretty carefully already in terms of each country.
Mr. Gwozdecky: Yes. One very important generalization is the fact that in modern, mature democracies, governments are sensitive to their peoples and the voices of their peoples. In many Middle Eastern countries, for decades, the calculation was the inverse: People feared their governments. The Arab Spring, if it has done nothing else, has turned the tables and now politicians have to wake up in the morning, like our politicians, and care about what people are saying.
Senator Johnson: More accountability?
Mr. Gwozdecky: There is more accountability. That sometimes produces perhaps less fiscal discipline than some of these states should be exercising, because, in an effort to appeal to populaces, sometimes we see policies that are not healthy for economies. I'm speaking in terms of subsidies and the like.
But I think that's the fundamental difference; namely that the Arab Spring has turned the fear calculus on its ear.
Senator Johnson: Which countries in the Middle East and North Africa would you say have seen the biggest improvements, say, in governance since 2011? And where have there been setbacks?
Mr. Gwozdecky: There have been setbacks in every case. The one nation most experts believe has made more progress than others is Tunisia. We welcome that. All the Arab world is hopeful that their path continues to make progress.
As I mentioned, in the Arab world, Egypt is the bellwether. Egypt is where everyone is watching and Egypt is where many countries, including Canada, see the need to place our priority in terms of engaging with them and assisting them to the extent that we can, because what happens in Egypt will have an impact right across the Arab world.
Senator Johnson: What kind of weight or credence do you put on the 47 per cent voter turnout in Egypt in the election? Does that give the mandate that he wants to the president, the army chief?
Mr. Gwozdecky: I think the turnout was less than a lot of people would have liked, but 47 per cent is not extraordinary in many modern mature democracies. The ultimate result, more than 90 per cent of the vote for candidate Al-Sisi, is where he derives his mandate and I think it's a pretty clear one.
Senator Johnson: Egypt is a model for the others still, or will be?
Mr. Gwozdecky: I would say Egypt is the most important Arab state, because of its regional impacts. I'm not sure I would hold any country up as a model. It's a process; they're working their way through it.
Senator Johnson: Model wasn't the right word there, that's for sure. Thank you very much.
Senator Downe: I just want to get clarification and follow-up on Egypt. It's a military coup that took over the country and then they had these elections. I wasn't clear. Have we sent election monitors or did we contribute to the election monitoring with the $6-million figure you mentioned in your presentation?
Mr. Gwozdecky: The $6-million figure I mentioned has to do with our development assistance program in Egypt, which is separate from election monitoring where we sent, I believe, four Canadians, and they participated in a European Union-led election observation exercise.
Senator Downe: Thank you for that clarity. So we sent four election monitors as opposed to the hundreds we have sent to the Ukraine?
Mr. Gwozdecky: I believe those numbers are accurate.
Senator Downe: How do we engage with the government? On what level do we engage? You've indicated and I share your view — and I appreciate you're an employee of the department and not the minister so I'm not going to ask you about government policy and get you in any trouble — but how do we engage with the government given the way it's assumed the power and the previous government was removed?
Mr. Gwozdecky: We engage with the government as we do typically across the world. We have conversations at many different levels. Minister Baird was in Egypt about a month ago where he met with his counterpart and other leaders. We have virtually daily conversations led by our ambassador in Cairo with counterparts across the Egyptian government. I meet with the Egyptian ambassador here regularly, as do my staff meet with their people.
There are quiet conversations taking place all the time and I think that is a big part of our engagement.
Senator Downe: When the Muslim Brotherhood group was removed, jog my memory. Did Canada object to the removal, the way they were removed?
Mr. Gwozdecky: I think it's important, senator, to recall that the vast majority of Egyptians rose up at that time. There were tens of millions in the street who had become disaffected with the government of Morsi, who felt that Morsi, his regime and his administration were eroding progress towards democracy and in many other areas of rights and other aspirations of the Egyptian people. So it's important to cite that context.
Egyptians were speaking pretty resoundingly about the need for a change. Indeed, our government was supportive of the change because it led to this road map, which we and most western governments have applauded and shown our support for. The road map was what we perceive and what Egyptians want, which is a pathway toward democracy where they can have some measure of prosperity, where they can have their rights secured again and where real democracy can take root. That's not what was happening under Morsi and it has an opportunity now to take place.
Senator Downe: The short answer is, we supported the citizens who were uprising more than the government that had actually won the election?
Mr. Gwozdecky: We stand with the Egyptian people and we think the Egyptian people spoke.
Senator Downe: What do we tell our friends who complain that citizens of Turkey may be upset or that people in some parts of the Ukraine have an uprising, but we pick and choose where we support and where we don't?
Mr. Gwozdecky: What I would say is, first, we carefully assess every situation based on its merits and find, in most cases, that every situation is rather unique, and then we make judgments based on those unique characteristics. I will not go into it today, but there are major differences between what we have seen in Egypt compared to what we've seen in Ukraine, for example.
Senator Downe: I don't want to belabour the point, I know you have other witnesses, but it seems to me the way the events turned out in Egypt would be in the best interests of Canada because the government currently there is more supportive of the policies we have in the Middle East. While there was no direct interference, I'm just surprised at the position Canada took when a legitimate government was basically overthrown by the military, but there has been a new election since then.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Mr. Gwozdecky, early in your presentation, you painted a sober picture of what is occurring in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. You referred to unemployment being even higher among youth, of under-active sectors of the economy, a weak economy, shortage of food, et cetera.
I raise this point because I was dismayed. This is the first time that a witness has painted such a sombre picture of a situation.
Canada only just advised Canadians to leave Libya. I am sure that you are aware of this. The level of insecurity in Libya is terribly worrying. You made mention of this. You also mentioned that Canada gave 30 million dollars to Libya.
Is Canada cooperating with the Libyan authorities to facilitate the transition towards democracy?
[English]
Mr. Gwozdecky: I'll speak in English because I want to be as precise as I can be in answer to your question.
We are engaging with the Libyan government. There are challenges when one tries to engage in a place where state authority has been eroded to the extent that it has. We've had three different prime ministers in the last several months. We've had a new one take over in the last couple of days with the help of military support, and there is an ongoing dispute between two prime ministers, an interim one and an acting one, currently playing itself out. The Supreme Court is about to rule in a matter of days as to which is the legitimate one. At the level of the political, it's very difficult to engage because there is this ongoing dispute as to who is the legitimate power at the moment.
However, we do indeed engage because institutions exist in Libya. There are ministries that our embassy talks to regularly. We have a Libyan embassy here in Ottawa that we engage with very regularly. Their ability sometimes is limited in terms of the influence they have over events because, as I tried to describe earlier, Libya is going through a period of some turmoil. Depending on where you go in the country, you have different forces that are in control and, in the capital itself, there is no clear central government authority.
I'm not sure if I've answered your question. You can ask it again, if you like.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: I think that answers my question. In other words, Canada is not getting very involved in the situation in Libya.
I would like to ask you a question about another country. You mentioned that there was hope for Tunisia because, of all countries, it is probably the country with the most promise when it comes to transitioning towards, and building, a democracy.
Last Saturday, the King of Morocco gave a remarkable speech before the National Constituent Assembly of Tunisia, where he reaffirmed the deep ties that unite Morocco and Tunisia. You mentioned earlier that there was hope if the surrounding countries do come to the party and provide assistance.
Can you say more about what connects these two countries? We have not addressed this, since nothing of note has occurred in Morocco, as it has in the Arab Spring. Do you think that Morocco can play a key role in the democratization of Tunisia?
[English]
Mr. Gwozdecky: I didn't come prepared to speak about Morocco, but I would say in general that all the Arab states, particularly the ones in North Africa, can play a vital role in the stabilization and progress in their neighbouring states.
There are huge movements of people and arms across borders. These things, if better controlled, can lead to stability. There are external governments that invest in various militias and political groups, sometimes with a destabilizing effect in countries of the region. The less meddling, I think, would contribute to more stability.
Every Arab state has a stake in their neighbours and can play a positive role if they choose to.
With Morocco and Tunisia, certainly Morocco can play a role, but I think Morocco and Tunisia are rather different in terms of their governance models. Morocco is a constitutional monarchy and Tunisia is not. They have these fundamental differences. That's not to say that they can't play a positive role in each other's forward movement.
I would agree in essence that every Arab state has a stake and can play a positive role in the development of its friends and neighbours.
[Translation]
Senator Verner: You have responded to some of my questions. I wanted to explore the issue of women's and girls' rights in the three countries in question since the advent of the Arab Spring. As you stated, women and girls were extremely well represented at the demonstrations. Later, there were reports of concerns regarding respect for their rights.
In November 2013, the Thomas Reuters Foundation published a survey of 330 experts calling on them to rank 22 Arab countries according to respect for, and the promotion of, the rights of women and girls.
At that time, Tunisia and Libya were ranked, respectively, six and ninth, and Egypt lagged far behind — even behind, I should point out — Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria. One month later, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems published a report on the issue. Despite progress in Tunisia, Egypt was very much a laggard in this area.
I read — and I heard you say — that Tunisia had adopted a constitution in which provisions regarding freedom of religion can be found alongside women's rights. Let us hope that this optimism might extend beyond a written constitution, and that there will be concrete measures taken following the adoption of the constitution.
That brings me to the following question: what level of optimism is there that women's rights in Libya and Egypt might one day be respected? You spoke of a roadmap for Egypt; does it contain provisions to promote women's and girls' rights?
I know that the Minister of State, Lynne Yelich, issued a number of statements on this matter in March, and that Minister Baird went to Egypt, in April, only a month ago.
Is there hope that, as in Tunisia, official steps might be taken in these two countries to uphold women's rights?
[English]
Mr. Gwozdecky: Thank you. That's a big question and a very important one. I think there have been some setbacks when it comes to women's rights, but I think it's probably too early to be able to measure what's taken place in Egypt over the last 10 months of an interim government. During that time frame there were huge security challenges that the government was trying to face and violent extremism on many fronts.
What I would say is, in general across the Arab world, there is a struggle between political Islam and secularists. I'm generalizing very much here, but in general terms secular governments have been, and are likely to be, more women- friendly. We've seen, for example, in Egypt a constitution brought into existence recently that had some significant improvements over the previous one that came in under the Morsi government. I think the one in Tunisia has been applauded as being one of the most, if not the most, progressive in the Arab world.
As you say, we need to see these constitutional clauses implemented on the ground for real people.
What we find in places where you have political turmoil is there is huge personal insecurity that affects everyone, and it affects vulnerable people more so. It's not to say that males are not dying in Egypt; they are. But women and children are more vulnerable and so they are affected by these times of insecurity at a higher rate than others.
I think, as I said, there is an opportunity here in all of these states and that's why we routinely and systematically engage with governments in all of the Arab states, encouraging them and advocating them to take the most progressive steps when it comes to women as possible. We never let up in terms of pushing for these kinds of things.
[Translation]
Senator Verner: I know that Canada closed its embassies in this region over recent years. Do we still have an embassy in Tunisia, and in the other countries in question?
[English]
Mr. Gwozdecky: Yes. We have not had embassy closures in any of the states that we've talked about this evening. We have a full embassy, in fact a new embassy in Tunisia, and a very significant footprint as well in Libya, notwithstanding the deep insecurity that exists there.
The Chair: We have virtually run out of time. I will ask Senator Oh and Senator Housakos to place their questions, and then I will ask you to respond to them, if we could restrict ourselves to a question.
Senator Oh: My question is in the bigger picture. I have communicated with lots of friends coming back and forth from the Middle East on the business community side. They tell me that since the Arab Spring movement began in 2010, six countries have been affected at a minimum, and this has actually crippled the whole Middle East. Economic growth has been set back; human rights are badly affected; and there is social unrest.
They were telling me that it is going to be set back for at least 20 to 30 years in economic growth. It must be very difficult for us, for Canadians, to set a policy. How do we deal with this? It is so turbulent. Who is on the lead in any of these countries?
They were thinking that the switchover from dictatorship to the Arab Spring movement is way too fast. Can you comment?
Senator Housakos: I would like our witness, if it's possible, to give us some oversight on whether all the countries and states in question tonight that we have been discussing receive foreign aid from Canada. I suspect that it's true, and if it isn't you can correct me, but in some cases where we give foreign aid to a state, do we attach any conditions to it in regard to human rights, governance, et cetera?
Mr. Gwozdecky: Let me talk about the last question first, because this is not my area of expertise. I would be very happy to give you details on this. I can tell you that the answer is yes, but I can't give you the specifics in terms of conditionality. We have development programs in the Arab world in Morocco, in Egypt, in the West Bank and in Jordan, and we have other programming that affects and supports almost every Arab state, but I could give you more detail at a latter point if I consult my colleague.
The Chair: Perhaps for time, I think it was the three countries you were interested in, Senator Housakos. Perhaps you could give us a written response to that when you have a chance.
Mr. Gwozdecky: Okay.
In terms of the economic downturn, you're absolutely right. When political turmoil arrives, the economy is affected. The two are intertwined. You cannot have economic stability without political stability, so we advocate for both. We know that without a stable political climate and good governance, it's almost impossible to attract investors to your country. They want a predictable environment; they want to see transparent decision-making; they want to see rule of law in order to support their decision to invest their money.
We've seen serious downturns in investment and economic activity in the Middle East as a result of the Arab Spring and that's why it's so important that political stability in some way starts to retrench itself in the region, because the fundamental — and I mentioned this in my statement — reason, the cause, the trigger of the Arab Spring was economic. It was the food vendor who couldn't make ends meet.
Right across the Arab world, people want the same things: They want a decent job; they want to be able to feed their families; they want to be able to have families. Without economic activity, that's not going to take place.
The Chair: I think one of the other lessons we have learned is that there was no such thing as an Arab Spring. There were different springs in different countries. We are not sure if it's a spring or an autumn. Tunisia seems to be moving forward; Libya seems to either move backwards or at least is stalemated; and the verdict is out on Egypt.
You have brought us up to date and given us a lot of information. It is an area we will continue to study and we appreciate your coming this evening and providing us with your update. It's very important in our foreign affairs study. We hope that we can monitor further developments, and you'll provide us some comments on the development aid. I know it's not just development aid; technical assistance is being provided and other support systems. I think someone in the department can get their hands on that information and give it to us in due course.
Thank you for coming.
(The committee adjourned.)