Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 5 - Evidence - Meeting of April 7, 2014
OTTAWA, Monday, April 7, 2014
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 1:32 p.m. to study the policies, practices and collaborative efforts of Canada Border Services Agency in determining admissibility to Canada and removal of inadmissible individuals; and the status of Canada's international security and defence relations including, but not limited to, relations with the United States, NATO and NORAD (topic: ballistic missile defence).
Senator Daniel Lang (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Colleagues, welcome to the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence. Before we welcome our witnesses, I would like to begin by introducing the people around the table. My name is Dan Lang, senator for Yukon. Josée Thérien is the clerk of the committee, and our Library of Parliament analysts are Holly Porteous and Wolfgang Koerner. Now I would like to go around the table and invite the senators to introduce themselves and state the region they represent, starting with Senator Mitchell.
Senator Mitchell: Grant Mitchell, Alberta.
Senator Campbell: Larry Campbell, British Columbia.
Senator Day: Joseph Day, Saint John-Kennebecasis, New Brunswick.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Jean-Guy Dagenais from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Beyak: Lynn Beyak, Ontario.
Senator Wells: David Wells, Newfoundland and Labrador.
The Chair: Thank you. This afternoon, we have two panels. The first is on our study of Canada Border Services Agency, and the second is on ballistic missile defence.
Colleagues, on December 12, 2013, the Senate adopted the following study reference:
That the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the policies, practices, and collaborative efforts of Canada Border Services Agency in determining admissibility to Canada and removal of inadmissible individuals; and
That the Committee report to the Senate no later than December 31, 2014, and that it retain all powers necessary to publicize its findings until 90 days after the tabling of the final report.
As we continue to look at the role played by CBSA in determining admissibility and its role in the removal of individuals, it is very fitting to hear from those on the front line who deal with thousands of non-Canadians who interact with the agency. Last week we had the pleasure of hearing from immigration practitioners and policy advocates. This week we're very pleased to welcome Ms. Janet Dench, Executive Director of the Canadian Council for Refugees; and Mr. Richard Goldman, Refugee Protection Coordinator, Table de concertation des organismes au service des personnes réfugiées et immigrantes.
The work you do, Ms. Dench and Mr. Goldman, is often not recognized. I want to let you know that Canada is a compassionate country, and we in the Senate are pleased to hear about the important work you do. Although this committee is not focused on immigration matters, we are interested in what you have to say about the CBSA and its various roles from a security, transparency and accountability perspective.
With that, I welcome you both to the committee. I understand that you each have an opening statement. We have one hour for this panel.
[Translation]
Janet Dench, Executive Director, Canadian Council for Refugees: Thank you for the invitation extended to the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR) to appear before the committee in the context of your study on the policies, practices and collaborative efforts of the Canada Border Services Agency. The CCR's more than 170 member organization inform us about the experiences of refugees and immigrants, and it is on their behalf that we defend the rights of refugees and other vulnerable migrants; and we have been doing so for 35 years.
The CCR recognizes that the Canada Border Services Agency is responsible for enforcing the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Some aspects of that legislation are of serious concern to the CCR; we appreciate, however, that the legislation itself is not the focus of this study, but rather the enforcement of the act.
We wish to point to the wide-ranging nature of the admissibility categories under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Who is targeted when the act refers to inadmissible persons? An inadmissible person might be a person convicted of a serious crime of violence, but might also be a person who was brought into Canada for exploitation by a trafficker, a refused refugee claimant who nevertheless has compelling reasons for fearing removal, or a person who has been a peaceful and productive permanent resident for a decade, but who has been found to no longer need Canada's protection as a refugee according to the convention.
Our comments will address some of the ways in which CBSA actions can and do hurt people, including some of the most vulnerable, such as refugees and children. The recent agency budget increases have only extended the actions that are of concern to us. The CCR believes that several measures must be taken to ensure that CBSA enforces the law in a way that fully respects human rights and the dignity of the person. The agency must be submitted to an independent complaints and oversight mechanism.
[English]
We have submitted some written comments. I will briefly highlight three of the areas of concern presented in those comments. The first is security inadmissibility. Defined at section 34 of the act, security inadmissibility is a good example of how the law casts a very broad net. It includes people who are or were members of an organization that is deemed to have committed terrorist acts, even if they weren't involved in those acts, were unaware of those acts or were not a member at the time the acts were committed.
Among those caught up in this provision are Eritreans who participated in the Eritrean liberation movement in completely non-violent and often very minor ways. Another example is Oscar Vigil, a Salvadoran who is currently facing deportation from Canada after 13 years of living here and despite the fact that his wife and children are Canadian citizens. He has been found inadmissible to Canada because of his involvement in the FMLN, which was recently reelected as the government of El Salvador.
According to the act, people who represent no kind of security threat can be exempted from inadmissibility through what is called ministerial relief, granted by the Minister of Public Safety. The ministerial relief rules have recently been narrowed by Bill C-43, the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act, passed last year. Bill C-43 also denies people who are inadmissible on security grounds access to humanitarian and compassionate consideration.
Our concern is that ministerial relief is being applied inconsistently at best in policy and in practice. The policy guidelines do not say that ministerial relief must be offered when refusing it would result in a violation of Charter rights, in line with a Supreme Court decision. In practice, decisions take years. CBSA recommendations to the minister often simply repeat the facts leading to the finding of inadmissibility. In short, the exemption provision has proven a meaningless, illusory remedy.
Second is removal to dangerous places. The CCR is concerned about removals of individuals to countries where there is generalized violence. Under the regulations, the Minister of Public Safety can declare a temporary suspension of removals to countries of generalized risk, but there have been no such suspensions in the last 10 years.
The CCR has called unsuccessfully for a suspension of removals to Somalia and Eritrea, two countries where there is generalized risk. Finally, in 2011, CBSA declared an administrative deferral of removals for some regions of Somalia, but this is an internal measure only, which is not publicly announced.
Even where there is a temporary suspension of removals, it does not apply to people who have committed even a minor crime. The CCR is concerned about the risks for vulnerable people if removed to dangerous countries. These include youth who have grown up in Canada. They may have no family or connections in the country of origin, and may not even speak the language. In Somalia, for example, such youth are particularly at risk as they lack the knowledge or networks to protect themselves. Individuals suffering from mental health problems are also highly vulnerable because they need adequate health care, and people with mental health issues are more likely to be targets for violence.
These concerns are greater since Bill C-43 was passed. It denies permanent residents the right of appeal if they are sentenced to imprisonment for six months or more, which was previously two years. This means that more permanent residents will be removed without an independent decision maker considering all the relevant circumstances of the case.
Third is investigation techniques that endanger refugees. CBSA has broad powers under the legislation to interrogate refugee claimants. CCR members have seen claimants called in repeatedly for interviews, often carried out without the presence of a lawyer. Those in detention tend to be particularly targeted. This is an area where increased resources can lead to excessive and unnecessary interventions.
We understand that it is CBSA's responsibility to investigate potential inadmissibility. However, investigations need to be done in a way that respects the dignity of the person and takes into consideration the particular situation of refugees.
A particular concern relates to investigations involving contact with the country of feared persecution. This is completely improper in the case of a refugee claimant. Nevertheless, there are frequent reports that claimants' privacy is breached. CBSA officers are known to call numbers that they find on claimants' cell phones without regard to the safety of the claimant or family in the country of origin.
In response to a complaint, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada recently confirmed that on the instigation of CBSA, Canadian government representatives had disclosed a refugee claimant's personal information to government authorities of the home country. This highlights the need for a policy to prevent disclosure of claimants' personal information to the authorities of the country where they fear persecution.
The Chair: I know you made every effort to summarize the brief that you had and you did that very well, but the brief itself has a lot more information, and it stands you well in respect to the work that you have done and what you provided for us.
I would like to move on now to Mr. Goldman.
Richard Goldman, Refugee Protection Coordinator, Table de concertation des organismes au service des personnes réfugiées et immigrantes: I'm here on behalf of the Table de concertation des organismes au service des personnes réfugiées et immigrantes, TCRI. This is an umbrella group of 142 community organizations assisting refugees and immigrants across Quebec. The group was founded in 1979 with the mission of defending the rights of newly arrived persons and families regardless of their immigration status.
On behalf of the TCRI, I wish to thank you for this opportunity to present our views on this important topic to your committee for the present study. The TCRI is a proud member of the Canadian Council for Refugees, from whom you have just heard. We endorse the CCR's comments for the present Senate study. We do wish to elaborate on three points of particular concern.
Our first point is on interviews conducted by CBSA officers.
First, the TCRI shares the concern of the CCR with regard to interviews of refugee claimants at ports of entry, known as POE or port-of-entry interviews. These concerns were raised and filed with your committee and the CCR's report Welcome to Canada: The Experience of Refugee Claimants at Port-of-Entry Interviews. The audiotaping of all interviews between CBSA officers and refugee claimants at ports of entry would be an extremely positive step, in our view.
I will give one example of where audiotaping can be of extreme importance. This is a case of which we have direct knowledge. It involves a refugee claimant who came to the Canada-U.S. border and asked for asylum here. His reason for asking for asylum in Canada is that he's francophone and has a relative in Canada. Now, under the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement, refugee claimants who are in the United States must normally make their claim within the United States unless they meet one of a number of limited exceptions, one of which is having a family member in Canada.
This particular fellow was turned back to the United States where he was to make his claim, even though he doesn't have any relatives there and doesn't speak the language.
CBSA's position was that he did not mention the family member in the port-of-entry interview. He challenged this decision on judicial review and provided affidavit evidence as to what he said at the port-of-entry interview. However, with no recording available, it was his word against that of the CBSA officer, and his judicial review application was dismissed by the Federal Court. It is an example of where it can be of great importance at ports of entry to have a transcript of what happened.
The second point with regard to audiotaping of interviews pertains to inland interviews. In addition to port-of-entry interviews, it is our experience that refugee claimants who are already in Canada, particularly those who are detained by CBSA, may be subjected to repeated interviews about all aspects of their claim. The CBSA officer's notes can then be used — and typically are used by a different CBSA officer — at hearings before the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, which may relate to detention and inadmissibility, or the Refugee Protection Division of the IRB, which may relate to issues of exclusion from refugee protection, also resulting in inadmissibility.
We believe it is unacceptable that CBSA officers may use notes often taken by another officer at hearings that have potentially life and death consequences for a claimant, with no recording available of what was said at the interviews in question. Audiotaping is an inexpensive and simple technology, and we believe there's no justification for refusing to use it at all such interviews.
We arrive at our first recommendation that all interviews conducted by CBSA officers, whether occurring at port of entries or inland, be audiotaped.
Our second main point of concern is cessation applications. Over the past year, our member groups have had to confront the new phenomenon of increasing numbers of cessation requests. As noted in the CCR's written comments on the present study, changes in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act introduced in 2012 mean that if a cessation application is granted by the IRB, the person now loses all status in Canada, becomes inadmissible and faces deportation.
We know of cases in which the sole ground for a cessation application was the claimant's application for a passport from their country of origin. This is despite the fact that Citizenship and Immigration Canada, CIC, sends claimants letters that, in our view, any reasonable person would view as an order to get a passport, and we provide verbatim an excerpt from such a letter:
All persons seeking permanent resident status in Canada must provide a valid passport or travel document issued by the Country of Citizenship in order to become a permanent resident. Please send a photocopy of your passport or travel document to this office as soon as possible. If you are unable to provide a passport or travel document, you may provide other documents.
I recently observed a cessation hearing at the Montreal IRB in which the CBSA officer argued that the above wording should not be taken as an order to produce a passport but rather as a suggestion that the passport is just one of a number of acceptable documents that may be provided.
This took up nearly an entire morning of the CBSA officer's time as well as the IRB member, the claimant and his legal counsel. We find this to be a shocking waste of resources and a particularly perverse one, given that if successful, it will result in the cancellation of status and removal of someone who everyone agrees was found in good faith to meet the definition of convention refugee.
We fear that CBSA's target of 875 cessation and vacation applications for the year 2013-14 is causing officers to arbitrarily pursue cases that should never have been brought forward.
Our second recommendation is that CBSA issue guidelines to officers directing them to pursue only cases in which the person has demonstrated a clear and genuine intention to re-avail himself or herself of the protection of the country of citizenship and has effectively received that protection, which is consistent with the UNHCR's guidelines on this topic.
Still with regard to cessation, we have a second point, which is failure to consider humanitarian and compassionate factors.
Our member groups have seen cases presenting very compelling humanitarian factors, such as long-term residency in Canada, marriage to a Canadian spouse, the presence of Canadian children and so on that have been the object of cessation applications. We have also seen a letter from CBSA stating that such factors cannot be taken into account in the decision of whether or not to institute a cessation request and can only be considered afterwards under section 25, the general humanitarian and compassionate, or H&C, provision of the IRPA.
We believe this is deeply problematic since, as was already noted, a cessation decision renders a person inadmissible. An H&C application would not suspend their removal from Canada. Nor do they have access to an appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division of the IRB on H&C grounds.
Our third recommendation is that CBSA officers be obliged to offer the opportunity to submit observations, including on humanitarian factors, prior to the decision on whether to institute an application for cessation.
Finally, our third point is about the lack of an independent oversight mechanism. Here we join the CCR and other partners such as the BC Civil Liberties Association in calling for an independent oversight mechanism for CBSA. As the BCCLA has already pointed out as part of your study, CBSA officers have an even wider range of powers than police. For example, they can stop travellers for questioning, take breath and blood samples, and search and detain and arrest non-citizens without a warrant. Yet, despite the sweeping police powers, there's no independent oversight body to review CBSA actions and to ensure respect for the human rights of refugees, migrants and Canadians who deal with the agency.
CBSA stands very much alone here, as every major police agency in Canada from the national to the municipal level has some sort of oversight body. And as the CCR has noted, in the case of CBSA, the risk is arguably even higher than with police forces, as they are dealing with non-citizens whose status in Canada is precarious. Refugee claimants and other migrants are amongst the most vulnerable people in Canadian society.
We conclude with our fourth recommendation, which is that an independent oversight mechanism be created for CBSA, capable of the following: receiving and dealing with public complaints about CBSA's conduct, including third- party complaints from public interest organizations; initiating its own reviews and investigations of CBSA conduct, even where there is no complaint, given the vulnerable people with whom CBSA interacts, many of whom have no idea about their rights or may be deported from Canada before they can even exercise them; and, finally, conducting independent civilian investigations of critical incidents involving CBSA officers and individuals in CBSA custody.
On behalf of the TCRI, I thank you for considering these comments, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
The Chair: Thank you very much for both your presentations, and I would like to begin with one question, if I could.
A number of recommendations have been put forward by both presentations, and I would like you to prioritize the two most important recommendations that you put forward, not that the others are not important, but knowing how government works and how fast government works, I would like to know exactly where the major problems are so that we can confront them as a priority.
Ms. Dench, perhaps you can comment and maybe Mr. Goldman can comment afterwards.
Ms. Dench: It is challenging to pick only two. I would second the point raised by Rick about the complaints mechanism. That is a very serious lack, and if we had a complaints mechanism that was effective and independent, it is possible that it could be used to address many other underlying problems.
I would also choose the problem of security inadmissibility that I highlighted just now. This is having tremendous impacts. I think it is having impacts on people that it was never the intention for the law to exclude, and yet the way it is being applied, people are being caught up in the security inadmissibility.
I would recommend that for your attention, too.
The Chair: Mr. Goldman, do you have any comments?
Mr. Goldman: Well, it is sort of like asking somebody to choose their favourites among their children. Fortunately, I only have two children, so it is a little easier for me. I would agree with Ms. Dench on both of those points. If we do have to choose, those would be the most fundamental, particularly the oversight mechanism, which might lead to the solution of some of the other issues we raised before you today.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Goldman. I wasn't asking you to choose between your children, but I did want to get a sense of what the priorities are as far as policy changes that could be effected.
I would like to start questions with Senator Mitchell.
Senator Mitchell: Thanks to both of you for your very powerful and explicit presentations. It is excellent to get recommendations in the way that you have laid them out.
I want to clarify one irony or contradiction in concept. It seemed to me, Ms. Dench, that you were mentioning the case of a refugee claimant who was rejected because he had demonstrated against a government in another country, if I'm not mistaken. Or let's say somebody does demonstrate against the government in another country, for which they are in trouble, and, in fact, they're actually exercising the kind of democratic values that we would want, that we say we promote all over the world and that we send our forces to fight and die for. Is it true that people in those circumstances sometimes are actually rejected because they appear to have been disreputable in their own country for that kind of activity?
Ms. Dench: You're right about the irony, and we are often struck by that kind of contradiction. An example that was the subject of an important legal case was a Libyan who was opposed to the Gadhafi regime, and, on the basis of his opposition to the Gadhafi regime, he was found to be inadmissible. Yet the Canadian government was collaborating with forces to try to dislodge Gadhafi, so it seems contradictory on one hand for an individual Libyan that that is given as a reason to exclude the person on admissibility grounds, whereas from the Canadian government point of view, it is the right policy.
As I said, it has to do with the definition of ``security inadmissibility,'' which is very broad, and when we were discussing the legislation with representatives of the government more than 10 years ago, we were told, well, it is better to cast a very broad net so that we kind of include anyone that we might want to make inadmissible, but then there is always ministerial relief so we can exempt the people who shouldn't be excluded.
That applies also to, for example, section 35 of the act, which excludes senior officials of governments. You have a very nasty government; you obviously don't want to be putting out the welcome mat to leaders in that government. But the definition of ``senior official'' is so broad that it could include, for example, judges who had actually been taking very brave judicial decisions that were standing in the way of the government that was committing atrocities. Yet, those same people would just be swept up in the same net of inadmissibility.
So if you participate in an organization that is opposed to the government, and one arm of that organization, perhaps, has taken some armed action, and that armed action is deemed to be terrorist by the Canadian government, even though you had nothing to do with that action, you are still considered inadmissible.
That's the case of the FMLN, for example, which is current government in El Salvador. It is also the case of the ANC. Obviously, Nelson Mandela was, according to our laws, inadmissible to Canada unless he had benefit of ministerial relief.
Senator Mitchell: Essentially what you're saying is Nelson Mandela wouldn't have qualified as a refugee in Canada under these terms. Amazing.
Mr. Goldman, with respect to your recommendations, many powerful ones, I'm interested in the review mechanism. There is a distinction between oversight and review. You emphasize review, and I think, Ms. Dench, you also kind of jumped on that side of it.
There is an argument for oversight, which is policy-oriented and trying to prevent the problems before they need to be reviewed. Have you given some consideration to a broader role for an oversight review mechanism, much the same as most major Canadian police forces — except the RCMP — have in this country today?
Mr. Goldman: I'm not sure that I understand the question.
Senator Mitchell: Sorry. There's a distinction that came out in earlier testimony. One was a public board that would provide oversight, and the board, as you defined it, you used the term ``oversight'' but really it's a review, so it would be a complaints mechanism. But there's also this role of oversight, where you would actually have not just an after-the- fact review role in a public board but a policy, managerial and supervisory role so that problems could be prevented rather than simply reviewed after the fact.
Mr. Goldman: I have to confess, that was a distinction that hadn't occurred to me until this moment, the one between oversight and review. Absolutely, if you can nip problems in the bud, if you can prevent them through oversight, I'm not sure how the mechanism would work, but it sounds like a wonderful idea. However, I won't be able to enlighten your committee on it because this distinction had not occurred to me until now.
Senator Mitchell: It might be worth looking into because it is used in police forces elsewhere.
Mr. Goldman: I'm not sure.
Senator Wells: Ms. Dench, thank you for your presentation, as well as yours, Mr. Goldman.
Ms. Dench, I have a question for you. I want to get an idea of the magnitude of the issue. When the Canadian Council for Refugees, as an advocacy group, chooses to take on a case, what criteria do you use to make a decision as to whether to take a case on?
Ms. Dench: We don't normally take on individual cases. We deal with policy issues generally. When you say ``taking on a case,'' I'm not quite sure what you're referring to.
Senator Wells: In the briefs I have with Canadian Council for Refugees on the header, a number of individual cases are mentioned.
Ms. Dench: We often use examples to illustrate the impact and to show what it means. I think for all of us, it's easier to understand what we're talking about when you see individual examples. We use that in our publications.
We did a study of the Eritreans who were found to be inadmissible on the basis of security grounds, so we asked our members for examples, and we looked for examples in other ways that would show how things were working in the process.
They're just illustrative, and we don't investigate in-depth. It is possible sometimes, in an example we had given, if you knew other facts, it would give you a different light on it. We're not intending to use it to clinch the argument; it's meant to illustrate the effects of policies.
Senator Wells: Thank you. Just so I can get to the magnitude of the issue, of the hundreds of thousands of people per year who are assessed by CBSA, how many are turned away? Of those who are turned away or declined, how many would you see as being poorly treated or would fit among the category for the policy you'd like to see changed?
Ms. Dench: I guess we're talking about various different areas of policy, so it would depend on what kind of areas. Certainly in terms of security and admissibility, we're talking about a small minority. The same would be true for cessation. In terms of the overall number of refugees, we're talking about a small number.
I'm glad to have the opportunity to emphasize how appreciative we are of the many cases of people treated well by the CBSA. We recently put out a research report that looked at refugee claimants in the claim process, and we heard from some of those who were interviewed who wanted to emphasize how grateful they were for the welcome and good treatment they received from CBSA.
It's the nature of our organization that we're going to be concentrating on the minority of people who are getting the short end of the straw or who we feel may have been mistreated or who the application of the law causes grief to.
Senator Campbell: I was just wondering, in your experience, how difficult is it for a person to move from an organization that was considered terrorist — and I would use the FMLN as an example from El Salvador because I have some familiarity with that.
The Chair: Colleagues, we have lost our other witness, but I would recommend that we proceed, and we'll try to get him back on the line. I'm sorry to interrupt, Senator Campbell.
Senator Campbell: Not a problem, chair.
How difficult is it to become a refugee not on the basis that you were a member of FMLN, whatever the basis, but that you were a past member? Does that keep you from getting into Canada?
Ms. Dench: One of the problems with the application of the law is that it's very inconsistent. You will find that there are many people in Canada who were members of the FMLN and who have been allowed to have their permanent resident status and this issue has never been raised with them. It frustrates people that the law is not applied in an even- handed way.
Of course, I don't want to say that everybody who was a member of the FMLN should be excluded, but people who are members are aware of this inconsistency, yet they're anxious. They don't necessarily want to raise their hands and say, ``I was a member'' because then they're thinking, ``What's going to happen to me? Will I be the next to get kicked out?''
Senator Campbell: Would this be a reason to get kicked out? Let's say I come from El Salvador; the gang has said they want me dead for whatever reason. I haven't done anything, but I arrive here in Canada, I ask for refugee status because of the dangers to my life, and I admit that I was a member of the FMLN. Would that affect the decision on the part of the board to allow me into Canada? Seeing this is now the government of El Salvador and has been for the last two elections, but the election before that, it was the right side that was governing. It's a democratic country.
Ms. Dench: Let me clarify the process. There are two opportunities where it might be brought up. When you make a refugee claim in Canada, CBSA does the investigation. We talked about that in our concerns. They can apply to suspend the refugee hearing while the admissibility issue is raised. If they see on your application form that you said you were a member of the FMLN, they could stop the refugee process.
It's rather rare that that happens, so many people go on to the Immigration and Refugee Board, which makes the refugee determination. They don't apply this security and inadmissibility thing, so that's not an issue for them. What happens in many cases is that the person is found to be a refugee and then they apply for permanent residence. At that point, it might be that the application goes on hold, and CBSA raises the issue: ``Well, we think you're a member of this organization, and for that reason, we're not going to give you permanent residence.''
It's done on a case-by-case basis. There's no general rule saying that all members of the FMLN will be excluded, which I think is partly why some people, even though they had identified themselves as members, still go on to become permanent residents.
The other issue is that membership itself is undefined and unclear. There will be people who say, ``No, I wasn't a member,'' but the CBSA might say, ``Well, maybe you didn't have a membership card, but you were sort of associating with people.'' In our brief, we give an example of someone who was taken to be a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, even though she wasn't a member; it was just because of her associations through her husband.
That's the other area where the net gets cast quite wide.
Senator White: Thank you very much. Sorry that the other gentleman is not on, actually.
My question surrounds oversight. I know you're familiar with the public complaints process within the RCMP and the role that the CPC has with the RCMP and the 800 communities they police.
Do you not see that as a potential replacement for another oversight body? I'm not a fan of building more agencies and oversight bodies if we have one that has changed, adjusted and certainly shifted over the past decade and, I think, has a better handle on the RCMP role. Do you not see that as an opportunity for taking on the role of oversight body for CBSA as well?
Ms. Dench: We have not been promoting a particular answer to the problem. We were very pleased when Justice O'Connor, in the Arar commission report, recommended an oversight body which was going to be an integrated one, and we were following up with Public Safety and with CBSA to say how much we hoped to be able to address some of our issues within that framework, and then we were told that that proposal would be looking only at security-related issues, and obviously there are particular complexities when you're looking into things that CBSA gets involved in that are particularly security-related.
A lot of our complaints or things that are of concern for us are not security-related. There may be issues of how CBSA officers treat an individual at the airport or so on. We want to be able to cover those issues as well.
An important point for us is to be able to have proactive investigations, because as Mr. Goldman pointed out, there's a great degree of vulnerability. In many cases, refugee claimants may never have a chance to make a complaint if they're removed from Canada, but they're also often anxious about making a complaint because of their insecure status.
We, an organization like ours, would like to be able to raise an issue, for example, to say, ``We're concerned about this happening,'' If the complaints mechanism or oversight mechanism could then say, ``We will send in some people to investigate. We'll take a look at the records,'' and so on, that would be facilitated also, obviously, with the recommendation of the TCRI, which we also recommend, for audiotaping interviews. Then you could go back and listen to those interviews on tape and see if maybe there's some adjustment that might be needed by the CBSA officers.
While we don't necessarily have a particular recommendation about where it sits, we would be looking for some mechanism that takes into consideration the particular issues that we deal with in the immigration area.
Senator White: I understand that, and I'm not trying to put you on the spot, but I will.
We've seen how CBSA has moved much more closely aligned to a police agency in this country over the last seven years than they certainly were in the previous 25 years. We've heard from some people at CBSA, in particular from the union, talking about the fact that they actually want the same abilities to perform in the same way police agencies do. In fact, that was his complaint, that they don't have the ability to engage in a pursuit, for example.
I look at a national organization. We have a national police service already. I might even suggest we should have them combined, to be fair. It would make it even easier.
But you wouldn't have an issue with this body supporting such an agency taking on that role for CBSA at this point? Is there something about the Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP that you would have a concern about them handling such a role?
Ms. Dench: I know there are limitations for that mechanism, but more generally, I would say that we understand that CBSA has many powers that are similar to police powers, particularly arrest and detention, and carrying weapons and so on. Those are all issues that need to be overseen in a similar sort of way to the police. On the other hand, it's important to recognize that CBSA also performs many functions that are quite different from police functions.
We're not keen to have CBSA turned into or be considered entirely as a police force. One of the concerns we had when the arming of CBSA came forth was the impact that has on both the CBSA officers and how they see their role, but also the impact on refugee claimants, because one of their roles is to interview a claimant. This is somebody who has fled persecution, perhaps a survivor of torture, who comes here hoping Canada will offer protection and safety. To be interviewed by somebody who sees themselves as a police officer, is wearing a gun, has the uniform and so on, that can be very distressing and intimidating.
Senator White: But if I may, that's exactly what they see. They see a guy in a uniform, with a bullet-proof guest, capsicum spray, a baton and gun on their hip. That's the reality. If that's the reality, why wouldn't we treat it as such?
From my perspective, they're a police agency. I see what they do today compared to 20 years ago. They're not collecting revenue at the border anymore.
The Chair: Can we get to the question, senator, or are you satisfied?
Senator White: I'm okay.
The Chair: Mr. Goldman, can you hear us?
Mr. Goldman: I was blacked out for a while, but I'm back.
The Chair: We're pleased to have you back. It's amazing how we become so used to technology and then we're so surprised when it doesn't work.
Senator Day: It didn't surprise me at all that you disappeared for a while as we talked about the powers of the CBSA. It's nice to have you back. We're not paranoid.
Senator Mitchell: We're not remotely paranoid.
Senator Day: Ms. Dench, I'd like you to explain the process for me. I hope in the short time that you and I have to talk to one another here, we'll come to an understanding about the youth who came to Canada, grew up in Canada and is now being sent back to Somalia.
Let's assume that the youth's parents, or father or mother had applied for landed immigrant status and were going through that process. There is a parallel process, as I understand it, with respect to a threat to security and inadmissibility that might be going on at the same time.
Can you explain these processes and how it would come about that a youth who had grown up here in Canada would be sent back to Somalia?
Ms. Dench: Yes. The family immigrates to Canada, maybe as refugees, family class — it doesn't really matter — and they're permanent residents. By the time the youth is 18, they haven't become citizens, or maybe the parents became citizens, but they didn't look after citizenship for their child. The child gets involved with the wrong crowd of people and is convicted of a fairly minor crime. At that point, depending on the particular crime, he or she may lose their permanent residence and face deportation from Canada.
There's more room for these deportations without any kind of appeal after Bill C-43 was passed, because now it only takes a six-month sentence for you to lose the right to be heard by the Immigration and Refugee Board, which would be the opportunity at appeal to make the case to say, ``I arrived at the age of 2. Canada is the only country I know. Yes, I committed this crime, but I've shaped up now, and I'm rehabilitated. I'm going to be going to university and putting myself on the right footing.''
Senator Day: Just to clarify that point, does there have to be some tie-in between the crime that was committed and national security?
Ms. Dench: No.
Senator Day: Is it just any crime?
Ms. Dench: It's any crime.
The Chair: Perhaps we can have a correction for the record. Isn't it six months or more in respect to the sentence?
Ms. Dench: Six months is the minimum. Before Bill C-43, if you had a sentence of two years or more, then you would not get access to the Immigration Appeal Division. Now if it's a sentence of six months or more, you don't get access to the Appeal Division.
Senator Day: I'd like to tie in Mr. Goldman here. Mr. Goldman, were your recommendations in any way tied into the experience that we've had in the last year with the passage of the amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Bill C-43? Are you looking at experiences that we've had in relation to those amendments, or is it too soon?
Mr. Goldman: No. I echo Janet's point about Bill C-43 and the fact that now there's a much lower threshold at which a person is cut off from access to an appeal on humanitarian grounds. A sentence of six months will now cut them off. The type of situation for the Somali community is a poignant one. We do see children who have grown up here, who have arrived at a young age and could be facing removal to a country with which they have no familiarity. We believe that there should be more scope for humanitarian factors but, unfortunately, Bill C-43 and before that Bill C-31 limited more and more the scope for humanitarian consideration of cases.
Senator Dagenais: I have two questions for Ms. Dench and Mr. Goldman. Some propose that the Canada Border Services Agency would be enhanced with increased information sharing among government security and intelligence agencies. What is your perspective on this issue, and what steps would you propose to mitigate those concerns?
[Translation]
Ms. Dench: I am not sure I understood you correctly. Which consultations?
Senator Dagenais: What do you think will happen thanks to that amendment to the act? And what changes do you propose with regard to your organization?
[English]
Ms. Dench: I don't know whether Rick understands better the question.
Mr. Goldman: Yes. I'm not that familiar with the information-sharing agreements. My understanding is that one of the big problems is having access to whatever record the U.S. has on somebody. Very often, immigration practitioners, groups here in Canada, when they're trying to assist somebody, can do an access-to-information request here in Canada and find out what's on record and assist the people. We don't want to hide things. We want to deal with things that are on record. I'm certainly not an expert on U.S. access to information, but I understand that there isn't a mechanism for us in Canada to get that type of access, even though the government may have it. If a government official explains the mechanism and it exists, I apologize, as I'm not an expert, but that is the difficulty that I have heard of as a practical reality.
Senator Dagenais: What are your views on Citizenship and Immigration Canada's sharing of biometric data from temporary visa applications with its Five Eyes partners?
Mr. Goldman: Biometric information sharing for temporary residents, people coming as tourists, students, I must say is not a top concern, at least for our coalition, which is serving people who are seeking refugee status, seeking to immigrate on humanitarian grounds, seeking to stay here permanently. I really don't have a strong opinion about biometric information sharing for temporary visitors, tourists, students, et cetera. I don't know if Janet would have something to add on that.
Ms. Dench: I would just emphasize the burden of cost that is put onto visitors to Canada. The biometrics, if I understand rightly, is at their own expense, and they have to go to an approved centre. Depending on where you are, you may have to travel long distances. It seems unwelcoming, from our perspective, if we are wanting to encourage people to come to visit Canada, to make them pay money and go to considerable inconvenience and then potentially to feel like they're being treated as suspicious, because submitting yourself to biometrics is not necessarily a pleasant sort of thing to be doing when all you wanted to do was come and visit Canada. That might be our reflections.
Senator Beyak: Thank you both for excellent presentations. Further to Senator Wells' observations, which I thought were great, and thank you for validating them, Ms. Dench, most of the people we process are very well treated. I wonder, Mr. Goldman, how you see the audio and video interview process working. Would it be random? What police services currently use it? Is it every interview that's done, or is it a selection type of process? Could you elaborate a little bit on that for me?
Mr. Goldman: Definitely. Thank you for the opportunity. I can elaborate on our suggestion, which is extremely simple. It is that any time a CBSA officer is interviewing a refugee claimant, whether at a port of entry or inland at an office, like we have here, 1010 St. Antoine in Montreal, or at the immigration detention centre in Laval, it should be audiotaped. We're not asking for video. That's probably expensive. It's as simple as being able to have a transcript. If you're being accused of saying something in a hearing and somebody has some notes, saying, ``You said this a week ago in an interview,'' and you feel this is not the case, then you'd be able to point to a recording or a transcript and say, ``No, I didn't actually say that.''
My understanding is that this is the general practice, even video recordings, of suspects by police officers. I'm not an expert on this. Most of my knowledge comes from the news, where I see these sensational cases of people being interrogated. That is Canadian news. Americans probably do the same or more. People being interrogated are on videotape, and finally they confess. It seems to me this is in everybody's interest to have on tape. Here we're just suggesting a very inexpensive, simple technology, which is audiotaping: Again, any time there's an interview that could potentially be used in a hearing, somebody flip on the tape recorder or CD recorder and make a recording.
Senator Beyak: Ms. Dench, did you have any comments on that?
Ms. Dench: In case there's any misunderstanding, we're not talking about when you arrive off the airplane and meet with a CBSA officer and recording all those. We're talking about the interviews where you're put in for a secondary examination and they start going through all the things in order to write a removal order, for example.
Senator Mitchell: The Mexican visa circumstance has been construed as a way of reducing refugee claimants. Would you share that assessment? Do you think the level of risk from that country of refugees is worth in any way, shape or form the commercial inhibition that it creates?
Ms. Dench: We are completely opposed to the imposition of a visa on Mexicans, because we know many Mexicans need protection and are at risk. Their lives are at risk in Mexico. I think that we as Canadians should be proud of the Mexicans who have been able to come to Canada and find protection here. Many hundreds have been accepted by the Immigration and Refugee Board. Since the visa was imposed on Mexico, that has really shut the door on many people for whom it would have been an opportunity to come to protection, to save their lives. We have to ask ourselves how many people have died as a result of that visa being imposed on Mexico.
Senator Wells: Ms. Dench, you spoke earlier about identification and documentation. What happens if a claimant comes and doesn't have suitable documentation? The question I'm trying to get at, of course, is that entry into Canada is a privilege, not a right. Do you accept that Canada could or should have concerns about not-well-documented people coming into Canada seeking refugee status?
Ms. Dench: If somebody arrives at the border and they don't have identity documents, that is not unusual for refugee claimants because, in fleeing, you often have to leave secretly without advertising your presence. It is quite frequent that they arrive without papers. They may be put into detention while their identity is verified. It is internationally recognized that states may need to do that. That is in conformity with the UN's guidelines. However, I think Canada in some cases goes too far in keeping them in detention for too long. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees recommends it should be for a very short amount of time.
I would also point out that there can be an overemphasis on identity documents as being the best way to satisfy identity in the sense that somebody can have good-looking identity documents and not be the person, or be that person but be of concern to us on security grounds. Conversely, there are often people who don't have identity documents but do not represent any kind of concern. I'm thinking of minors that we have seen being detained at great trauma to themselves. What sort of risk does a 16-year-old likely represent for us?
There can be a better assessment of the risks that don't put overemphasis on the issue of identity documents.
The Chair: Could I follow that up? You will have to be brief with your response.
During the course of our hearings, we have been informed there's up to at least 40,000 or 50,000 individuals who are somewhere in this country or alleged to be in this country who have been classified as inadmissible. The reality is that they went through the border, went through a process, and then basically didn't return when they were supposed to return. Subsequently, we are assuming they are in the country.
What concerns do you have about that as an organization in view of the fact that you have refugees who are being asked to go through a legitimate process, yet we have this other situation where individuals are coming to the country under certain circumstances and then just coming into the country without going through the necessary security or other pre-screening?
Ms. Dench: As I said in my opening, ``inadmissible persons'' is a very broad category, and most of the people who are inadmissible do not represent any kind of threat to the security of Canada; they're inadmissible for technical reasons, but they don't meet in any way a security inadmissibility definition.
As a general observation, what I think we see happening is that as the laws in Canada become stricter and stricter, we are probably moving towards more of a situation similar to that in the United States, where you have a lot of people who are undocumented. Previously in Canada, most people were in the legal system because there were advantages to being in the system. Now the laws have been changed such that being in the system squeezes so many people out such that what we likely see is more and more people outside the system. If you are concerned about security, that should be a concern for you.
The Chair: I notice our time has passed us by. I would like to thank Ms. Dench and Mr. Goldman for taking the time to appear before us. We appreciate the briefs that you presented. It is a lot of information, and it certainly will be taken into consideration. Thank you for coming.
I will ask that if there are questions going on, we will ask for an additional five minutes if that's okay for you, major- general.
Welcome to the second panel of the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence. We will continue our examination of ballistic missile defence and questions of NORAD, and NORTHCOM if appropriate.
On December 12, 2013, the Senate adopted the following reference:
That the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the status of Canada's international security and defence relations, including but not limited to, relations with the United States, NATO, and NORAD; and
That the Committee report to the Senate no later than December 31, 2014, and that it retain all powers necessary to publicize its findings until 90 days after the tabling of the final report.
As part of the study, the committee visited NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs a few weeks ago as part of a fact-finding mission. We held two days of intensive briefings. On behalf of the members of the committee and those who participated, I can say that we left with a clearer understanding and appreciation of the growing threats we face in North America as well as a renewed pride and confidence in the women and men who do so much at NORAD to keep us safe.
We are pleased to have with us today Major-General J.P.J. St-Amand, Commander, 1st Canadian Air Division, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. He graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada and joined the Canadian Forces in 1981. How time passes us by. He served as an operational fighter pilot with 433 Tactical Fighter Squadron, 3 Wing, Bagotville, Quebec, from 1989 to 1992. He rose through the ranks to his current position, where he serves as Commander, 1st Canadian Air Division, Canadian NORAD Region in Winnipeg, Manitoba.
He has a master's degree in Strategic Studies and a certificate of Practitioner of Joint Warfare from the USAF Air University.
Commander, welcome. We are pleased to have you here today. We understand you have an opening statement. We have one hour for the panel.
Major-General J.P.J. St-Amand, Commander, 1st Canadian Air Division, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Mr. Chair and senators, thank you for inviting me to appear today. It is my distinct pleasure to discuss the role of 1st Canadian Air Division and the Canadian NORAD Region.
Our forces within the Canadian NORAD Region maintain the highest readiness levels of any commands in the Canadian Armed Forces. At present, some 430 servicemen and women from the Canadian Armed Forces and U.S. Air Force monitor the aerospace approaches to Canadian territory, identify all tracks within Canadian airspace and stand ready to intercept and control tracks that may be a concern to Canada's security.
Our posture is scalable, depending on threat levels. In peacetime, most of our people are located in Winnipeg, where my headquarters is situated at 22 Wing North Bay, where the Canadian Air Defence Sector headquarters is located, and two fighter force wings in Bagotville, Quebec, and Cold Lake, Alberta.
Because of our country's vastness, these fighter wings must rely on a network of deployed operating bases and forward operating locations scattered across the country, including the North. That is a unique characteristic of the Canadian region of NORAD.
These auxiliary locations extend the reach of our fighters by providing forward areas for basing, refueling and maintenance. To ensure our forward operating locations are capable and ready, we routinely conduct exercises and operate from our forward operating locations. Even as we speak, we are conducting a major exercise called Operation Spring Forward at four of our forward operating locations.
NORAD is not simply a close working relationship between the United States and Canada; it is a full-fledged binational command and arguably the world's most integrated military arrangements between two allies. It is actively nurtured by professionals from the Canadian and U.S. militaries, working in lockstep at our respective headquarters 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to help keep our two countries safe from potential aerospace and maritime threats.
As I mentioned, United States Air Force servicemen serve within Canada under my command. This is not widely known. If you have ever been to my headquarters in Winnipeg, you will know that my office is right beside the office of a U.S. Air Force general, who serves as my deputy commander for operations. By virtue of the NORAD agreement, Brigadier General Hyde in this case is an integral part of RCAF force employment planning and execution in much the same way our Canadian general, Lieutenant-General Parent, serves as the deputy commander of the NORAD headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs. Other senior Canadian officers also serve similarly in the two other NORAD regions.
[Translation]
As part of our interoperability with the U.S., our two countries periodically share the burden of responding to an emerging airborne threat, depending on the availability of resources on both sides of the border. Our force posture must have capability to engage a variety of threats in the following categories: symmetric and asymmetric.
[English]
First, for the symmetric or state-sponsored threats that are considered the most dangerous, in terms of the aerospace warning and aerospace control missions, the threat is known to come from foreign long-range aviation and/or bomber fleets. Given the current geopolitical climate, the probability of a military attack is low, but not unthinkable. However, the consequences would be grave.
In other words, capabilities exist to cause us harm, but the intent does not currently exist. Were we to face a situation where intent is shown to become increasingly hostile, this would constitute a threat where strategic warning is measured in minutes to hours, and our ability to react is limited to what we have at hand. This explains the requirement to maintain very high readiness levels, even in peacetime.
Therefore, NORAD continuously tracks and responds to numerous aircraft of interest close to the airspaces of Canada and the United States under a symmetric threat scenario.
Second, asymmetric threats in the context of the Canadian NORAD Region relate to terrorist organizations using an aircraft as a weapon. The September 11 attack is, of course, the most tragic example of this, and these threats remain a valid concern with serious security consequences. As a result, we must be ready for scenarios involving aircraft being used to bring harm to populated areas or Canadian vital points.
That's why regular operations, such as Operation Noble Eagle and ongoing exercises, ensure we remain trained and capable to accomplish our mission. Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, our nations have placed a greater emphasis on surveillance and control over Canada and the United States. Since then, NORAD has responded to more than 3,500 possible air threats and intercepted more than 1,400 aircraft in Canada and the U.S.
[Translation]
NORAD's legacy for the past 56 years has been underpinned by the unwavering dedication and determination of our professionals. You can expect nothing less from our men and women in the years ahead. With our collective vigilance, we can ensure the skies above every community across our vast nation remain secure. I look forward to responding to your questions.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, commander. As I mentioned at the outset, one of the areas we are doing an overview study on is the question of ballistic missile defence, and Canada's position as far as that particular area of defence is concerned.
Presently we're not involved, but I'm wondering if you could give us some further information with respect to how it works and exactly what is or isn't in place. I have a specific question for you on that. Are there any agreements, obligations or commitments with the United States that they will protect Canadian cities — such as Senator Mitchell's part of the world, Edmonton or Winnipeg — in the event of a ballistic missile defence, or is it silent?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: I will start with how it works and the role that the Canadian region of NORAD plays within NORAD. With respect to ballistic missile defence, we have no connection whatsoever. My headquarters and my staff have no role to play in the execution of the mission itself, nor do we participate in any dialogue or provide any advice whatsoever. We are completely separated from what happens in Colorado Springs in terms of ballistic missile defence.
In that sense, I would not be able to confirm whether the U.S. is in agreement to protect any cities or population areas within Canada.
The Chair: If I can just follow up a little bit further, this is more of a technical question as we have witnesses come forward specifically with respect to the ballistic missile defence, trying to find out just exactly what protections are going to be provided through a ballistic missile defence system if Canada were to become involved. Can you tell us how many Canadian cities would be protected by a U.S. strategic response to incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles and perhaps how the Americans would prioritize their response if that was to occur?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: Unfortunately, because I have absolutely zero visibility, by function and by responsibility, into how ballistic missile defence works within NORAD, I cannot answer that question. I don't have that information.
Senator Mitchell: I would like to follow up on your question because it is a real heartland question for us.
Under NORAD, which is Canada-U.S. collaboration — and we were there in Colorado Springs, just amazing collaboration, tremendous respect from the Americans for us and vice versa — if a nuclear warhead is delivered by an airplane, NORAD applies to take it down and the Canadians are involved in that process. If a nuclear warhead is delivered by cruise missile, it is same thing; Canada is directly involved, Canadian Forces are involved and NORAD is obliged to take it down no matter if it's going to hit Edmonton or Washington.
If the nuclear warhead is delivered by ballistic missile, the difference being the first two are fueled and the last one is fueled only part way, then we're excluded from that process, and to emphasize the chair's point, there is no obligation for the U.S. to include Canada, worse yet even to take that down, if it's hitting a target that is not as relevant to them.
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: With respect to the obligation, senator, I cannot comment. I do not know. You have it exactly right with respect to our responsibility to intercept and control air-breathing vehicles, and that is absolutely correct. That is a part of the Canadian regions, in my remit as a commander, to ensure that this is a part of our remit for warning and control of the airspace within my area of responsibility.
There is a distinct separation between the two missions. I am fully responsible for and accountable for one, and we have the means and resources to deliver. The other one, I have zero visibility on.
Senator Mitchell: Part of the concern in 2004 when the decision was made not to participate in that feature of the NORAD joint defence of North America, Canada in particular, was this idea of Star Wars. The implication of that was that there would be satellites in space, and they would shoot rockets and take down ballistic missiles. It was the weaponization of space that was a concern to people.
That isn't the case now. That's not what's contemplated now. The technology would be impossibly expensive to do. Nobody is thinking about it. Is it not the case that now the technology is, in fact, just trying to shoot them out of the air from the ground like we would with a plane or cruise missile?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: I'm afraid that I can't help. I wish I could. Where I sit in Winnipeg, I'm not even a consumer of information that would help or support the execution of a ballistic missile defence, nor do I have visibility in the technology that's being worked on at this point. Unfortunately, I can't answer, senator.
Senator Mitchell: That's fine. I made my point, so thanks.
Senator Wells: Thank you, major-general. I recognize you absolutely were clear in saying you would have no role, but let's assume that a ballistic missile was coming and that an aggressor was using that as one of a suite of weapons. Obviously your team wouldn't stand with your hands in your pockets saying, ``Well, we don't do ballistic missiles.'' I can't imagine there's not some sort of agreement where defence of North America under NORAD would not be part of some cooperative effort. Could you comment on that? We saw in USNORTHCOM and NORAD in Colorado Springs that even though it is two commands, it truly did appear to, and we were told it did, work under one person.
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: And it works well, senator, in a sense. From my perspective, sitting in Winnipeg, at the command centre of the Canadian NORAD Region, I see ballistic missile defence as being executed and conducted totally out of Colorado Springs. It is very strategic. My headquarters is an operational level headquarters. Were we to see a scenario like this, of course we would want to do as much as we could, but I presently have no role to play. All of the execution and the means are located, in my understanding, at least, in Colorado Springs. We have no means in Canada. I have no levers of control to do anything about missile defence.
Senator Wells: Thank you. In your opinion, major-general, what's the greatest threat to Canada from an aggressive military point of view?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: In between? What's the greatest threat? See, if we venture into the ballistic missile defence definition of a threat, I'm quite aware, without being an expert, that it is very strategic in nature. I don't feel that I have the qualifications or the expertise to give an educated opinion, because it is far beyond just a military threat. It is very strategic. My headquarters is one level below. From that perspective, it is difficult for me to give you a clear answer whether one or the other is more of a threat.
I believe that you got a good definition of threats and the appreciation of threats from CDI. This is also what I read. I'm a consumer of those analyses, and I act with the resources that I'm given, but I do not have a part to play in that mission.
Senator Day: General, welcome. My first question goes to the command structure, just so that we have a clear understanding. You may have two or three hats here and, if so, could you explain this. As an operations commander, do you report through the Canadian Joint Operations Command and General Beare on up to the chief, or do you still report through the chief or the head of the air force?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: The number of hats will sound way more complicated than what it is when you live it on a day-to-day basis. I have four hats.
The first one is Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division. That is a role that I play for my boss, who is Lieutenant- General Yvan Blondin, Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force. My role there is that I am the operational arm, if you want. I'm responsible for executing air operations on his behalf and ensuring that his forces are ready. I'm responsible for the readiness of the RCAF forces. That is one hat.
The second hat I have is that I am the Canadian Armed Forces JFACC, Joint Force Air Component Commander, for which I do report through General Beare through CJOC, so General Beare and CDS. I am responsible to him for air operations, so I am his air component commander for whatever operations CJOC will conduct, either domestically or in the international domain.
The third job, also under the CJOC commander, is I am the commander of the central region for search and rescue. That is the region that goes essentially from the eastern border of British Columbia to somewhere in Newfoundland up to the Arctic. That mission I deliver on behalf of the commander of CJOC.
The fourth one, the reason I'm here, is I am Commander of the Canadian NORAD Region, where I report directly to General Jacoby, who in turn reports to the CDS.
It is a very distinctive chain of command with respect to the four hats. It sounds way more complicated than it is, but my headquarters has 600 or so personnel, and each of them also wear the four hats by extension. It is rather easy for us, through practice and through training, to switch our hats, to use the same assets in any of the formations as we go on a day-to-day basis. For that matter, within minutes, we could go from a NORAD mission into a SAR, search and rescue, mission into an air component command mission, for example, as proof, during the support to flood in Alberta in the spring of last year.
Senator Day: Thank you for that explanation. It is the fourth category that I would like you to discuss a little bit with us now. We met General Jacoby when we were down in Colorado Springs. I hope you will pass on our regards. We look forward to seeing him again. He was a wonderful host for us when we were there.
You report through General Jacoby up to General Lawson in that regard. There must be some discussions that you are part of, then, regarding this term we heard quite often from briefers when we were down there, ``NORAD Next,'' and the challenges for the future for NORAD and what those challenges are and what you are planning for. Could you talk to us about that term?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: NORAD Next is a very interesting activity that is ongoing. I am privy to some discussions. My staff participates mainly in the elaborations of plans, for example, and what NORAD might look like in the future. There's no substance to it at this time because this is an ongoing project that is relatively new. Yes, we meet as commanders, and there are two other regions in NORAD. One is continental U.S. and the other is Alaska. My counterparts, commanders in those regions, also once in a while will meet, and we will get briefed on the activities or the focus that NORAD Next may bring. My understanding is that it is very early in the discussions. I'm not exactly sure where it is going.
Senator Day: We know that aerospace was expanded in NORAD to include maritime. Is NORAD Next looking at an expansion of mandate for North America to include land forces?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: I do not know that it is a specific goal or focus, and I don't know if it's excluded either. I could not answer that question.
Senator Dagenais: NORAD Next has been described as a series of discussions aimed at determining the capabilities NORAD will need to confront emerging challenges in the 2025-30 time frame. Could you bring the committee up to date on the current status of this discussion?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: Yes, senator, of course. The exposure that I have had to those activities thus far reveals that we are just starting. Early meetings have occurred. I would say without much doubt that we're probably at the problem definition stage at this point. I have not seen much substance out of it yet.
Senator Dagenais: Is there a formal mechanism through which discussions are being held?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: There are agendas. Meetings are scheduled, but I am not sure how often those meetings are being held. I am not exactly sure on the participation, but that is something we're interested in, of course.
But because we are at the operational level, the reason I am not fully aware of the whole substance of these discussions is that it is very high at the strategic level.
We have exposure and some feasibility, but at this point I can't comment more on this.
Senator Dagenais: What are some of the future challenges that NORAD Next expects to deal with?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: I'll talk to you from the perspective of a Canadian commander within NORAD. The future challenges are not unlike the current challenges, in that Canada is a huge country. We have a problem of space and time, especially with respect to the threats that may occur in the North. So we depend heavily on partnership and on intelligence, communications and how we deliver command and control.
With respect to the aerospace warning control mission, these have to be talked about in the future and how we're going to deliver that. I'm talking about the means and resources attached to that. Not that we are involved in this, but the current situation is that we rely heavily on mitigation measures that allow us to do our mission effectively. I would think that when we talk about NORAD Next, we would have to talk about that.
Senator Beyak: Thank you, commander. We were privileged to go to Colorado Springs. The professionalism, commitment and precision were impressive.
Ten years ago, as Senator Mitchell said, Star Wars — the terms alone frightened most people; it sounded beyond our reach. It seems to me like it's almost natural now, in light of what you're doing and what you've told us. Would it not make your job even more effective in defending Canada if we went that extra step — for our committee and our recommendations? Do you have any thoughts on that?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: For missile defence? I am quite aware of the current policy and the fact that the mission I'm responsible for is totally detached. All I can tell you is that we have the means and resources to do what I'm asked to do now. I can't comment any more on that. My apologies.
The Chair: Colleagues, I'd like to pursue the further question about all aspects of North American defence; it's not just ballistic missile defence. It is interesting to note that I believe the United States is going ahead in the next year with another allocation of well over a billion dollars in adding to the ballistic missile defence for the United States and other parts of North America.
Within your responsibility and within the military infrastructure that you have in place with respect to being able to deal with something like an attack by a cruise missile, could you elaborate? As I understand, there are various missiles that could come to North America, and one is a cruise missile versus a ballistic missile. Could you comment on that? Also, could you comment with respect to the ratio of the aircraft that are located in the United States versus in Winnipeg, under NORAD?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: Cruise missiles are typically air launched or launched from a naval asset. Within Canada, our means of defending against those are mainly fighter aircraft at low threat levels. As the threat levels go higher, we have means through the partnership to bring other assets to bear.
With respect to the ratio of aircraft that we have versus what is resident within the United States, again, given the mission and the plans we have to execute, depending on different threat levels, we have sufficient assets. I would not be able to give you specifically a ratio. It is massive to the south with respect to modest means in Canada, but we have sufficient means to deliver what is required of us within the Canadian area of responsibility.
Senator White: I hadn't planned to ask a question, but based on your last response and the fact that you have wings on your chest, I would suggest you will understand my question. Do you see the F-35 as the best tool when it comes to dealing with that issue, or are there other assets that could as well deal with such a call for service? If you don't wish to answer, I won't be happy, but I'll understand.
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: I'll provide some information as to how my headquarters participates in the options analysis and operational requirements. I'll take advantage of your question, senator, to state that I have not been involved personally in the requirements and operational analysis, but experts from my headquarters have been dispatched to Ottawa to participate in the ongoing work. With respect to which choice will come out of it, it is incredibly complex, and I obviously cannot comment on that. I really don't have the visibility that would be required to make such a statement.
Senator White: I'm not looking for you to pick one over others. I'm probably as much a novice as anyone in understanding what that asset brings to bear. But based on what you know of the F-35, would it be able to manage some of the calls for service that you referred to? In the case where you talk about scrambling aircraft, would it be able to manage that same call?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: Apart from the fact it would be unfair for me to comment on that, given the option analysis, I'm not sure. I don't know all the detailed operational requirements that are in existence, so I can't answer.
Senator Mitchell: I have a question about the North Warning System. I wonder whether you could, generally, indicate exactly what it does — well, you probably can't indicate exactly — but is it a network? Is it somewhat like the DEW Line? Where is it situated? Given that it does play a role in cruise missile and aircraft defence in NORAD, it could play a role in ballistic missile defence, I would assume. What's its lifespan? When will it be obsolete, do you think?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: My understanding of the North Warning System was that it was implemented in the 1980s sometime. I'm not sure exactly when. Its estimated life expectancy is 2025 or thereabouts.
It is a system of 11 normal-range radars and 36 shorter-range radars that are commonly referred to as ``gap fillers.'' They are to the north of the Canadian territory, essentially. Those are networked. The inputs of these radars are received at the Canadian Air Defence Sector in North Bay, and this is what they use to look at the traffic coming in. This is perimeter warning — a perimeter radar system, if you want — whose sole responsibility is to look out. They use those radars to monitor traffic that would be approaching Canadian airspace from the outside.
Senator Mitchell: Again, maybe you can't answer this, but given that we're not involved in the ballistic missile defence side of NORAD, could this network be helpful in that kind of defence, or is it just off limits?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: They are not designed for that. That's my appreciation now. I'm not sure. In 2025, depending on what the country decides to do, I have absolutely no idea what the future form of a northern warning system would take.
Senator Mitchell: Again, I don't want this to be a leading question, but given that we're involved in this process now as part of our responsibility in Canadian defence and NORAD defence, one could see where we could more morph the new version of that, because it will be obsolete in 10 years, into something that meets threats that the current one isn't designed yet to meet. So there's a process of renewal, upgrading and replacement of what's becoming an obsolete defence system.
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: I wish I could give you a clear answer. I am not a part of that procurement or replacement project. That would all take place here in Ottawa. Unfortunately, I can't answer.
Senator Wells: Major-General St-Amand, you said earlier that you have the means and resources to carry out your mandate. That's obviously good to hear. We know that your needs list is taken care of. What would be on your wish list, if you had to bolster something, recognizing that you have what you need to carry out your mandate already?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: The reason I'm smiling is that because of the size of our country, it is a constant challenge for us to manage resources we are given and the many that we have. I don't think we'll ever have enough. Even if we had a budget a hundred times the size of the one we have now, it would be extremely difficult to have perfection. We're well trained in managing what we have and delivering the maximum effect we can with what we have. As far as my wish list is concerned, there's not much else I could table here that would be useful, other than to say that it is a constant problem.
Senator Wells: Thanks for your answer.
Senator Day: Refresh our memories, would you please, as to when the NORAD agreement is up for renewal and signing.
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: I'm trying to remember.
Senator Day: Me too. I couldn't come up with the time. It wasn't that long ago that we agreed to renew NORAD. Presumably, the discussion Senator Dagenais and I have had with you in regard to NORAD Next would be discussions leading up to the next signing of this bilateral agreement.
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: Senator, I can't remember when the next one is.
Senator Day: It will be a matter of public record.
The Chair: Senator, I do believe we were informed that we have gone into a new agreement, which requires it to be reviewed every five years, not to be renewed. This has allowed for the planning for the principal of NORAD Next. So there's no possibility that there will be a stop or that the agreement would come to an end. Therefore, it's an ongoing agreement between the two countries.
Senator Day: That's very helpful.
The Chair: We'll check the record later to make sure I'm correct, but I believe that's the way I understood; it was explained to us when we were in Colorado Springs.
Senator Day: I don't recall that.
The Chair: It was an intensive briefing. I'm sure we all missed something along the line.
Senator Day: I noticed that you spent some time at SHAPE in Europe. You're aware that Canada is a founding member of NATO, 27 nations, and is going into a missile defence program, of which Canada is not excluding itself. It makes sense, therefore, for us to look into missile defence with that knowledge going on as well. I wondered if you had any comment that you wanted to make. I wanted to put on the record that we are participating in missile defence in Europe. If you had any comment you wanted to make, given your experience over there, that would be helpful.
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: Senator, I can only confirm that you're right. My understanding is that Canada is participating in that mission within NATO. I also understand that it is specifically for that theatre, and Canada is not included within that arrangement.
Senator Day: We wouldn't call that theatre defence, I believe. There's theatre missile defence and then there's continental missile defence, as I understand it.
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: I agree with you.
Senator Day: This is not just theatre area of operations defence. It's larger.
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: Forgive me. I used ``theatre'' just to locate the area that Canada would agree to for that mission to occur.
The Chair: If I could, colleagues, I want to follow up on the question of the air defence zone in the Arctic. My understanding is that because of the present radar system and the age, we fall about 200 nautical miles less than what the Americans' system is. Is that correct?
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: I cannot comment. I sincerely don't know, senator. You're talking about the capacity of the radar in the North?
The Chair: The coverage.
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: You may be talking about different radar systems. I know the radar systems we have that populate the North Warning System have a certain range, which you'll understand I cannot talk about, that bring us the visibility we need to do our mission. Other than that, we have no other radars to compare with that are resident in the North at this time.
The Chair: I'd like to move to one other question, if I could. We have a few more minutes here. It's the question of satellites. There was an announcement not too long ago that further steps are being taken to look at the prospects of PolarSat's being put into effect for the Arctic, which will bring in communications and, as is my understanding, weather reporting that we now don't have. Perhaps you could comment on that, and make an observation in respect to the role the military would play in such a satellite. Quite frankly, I'm happy to see that is starting to look like it will proceed.
Maj.-Gen. St-Amand: Like you, senators, my role is that I read the report and observe. Any procurement activity is resident within the National Defence Headquarters. I really don't have a role to play, nor do I have visibility on that. I can say that if this is true, in fact, I would be interested to know the capability and how that could support our mission, certainly. But I have nothing else to contribute.
Senator Day: I have a concluding remark, Mr. Chairman. This committee visited 1 Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg a number of years ago. Maybe the time has come to revisit and let the general know we might be interested in that.
The Chair: It's something we can definitely pursue. Colleagues, I have to say that our visit to Colorado Springs was certainly a worthwhile fact-finding visit. Although I said it was intensive, I know that we all came away much more in touch with what was going on as opposed to where we were before.
I'm going to thank our witness for appearing before us. We certainly appreciate what the men and women under your command do on our behalf. I would like to say you're excused now, and the committee is adjourned.
(The committee adjourned.)