Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue No. 7, Evidence - Meeting of September 20, 2016
OTTAWA, Tuesday, September 20, 2016
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 10 a.m. to study on issues related to the Defence Policy Review presently being undertaken by the government.
Senator Daniel Lang (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Welcome to the meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence for Tuesday, September 20, 2016. Before we begin, I would like to introduce the people around the table. My name is Dan Lang, senator for Yukon. On my immediate left is the clerk of the committee, Adam Thompson. I would invite each senator to introduce themselves and state the region they represent, starting with the deputy chair.
Senator Jaffer: Mobina Jaffer, British Columbia.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: I am Jean-Guy Dagenais from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Meredith: Don Meredith, Ontario.
Senator Day: Joseph Day, New Brunswick.
Senator Beyak: Lynn Beyak, Ontario. Welcome.
The Chair: Thank you, colleagues. Today we will be meeting for six hours to consider issues related to the defence policy review which has been initiated by the government. On April 21, 2016, the Senate authorized our committee to examine and report on issues related to the defence policy review presently being undertaken by the government. We are considering issues around Canada's possible participation in future UN peace support operations as well as other issues related to the review.
Joining us on our first panel are officials who have independently scrutinized the Canadian Armed Forces, specifically Mr. Michael Ferguson, Auditor General of Canada, and Mr. Gordon Stock, principal responsible for defence issues in the Office of the Auditor General of Canada. They are joined today by the Ombudsman for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Mr. Gary Walbourne.
Before inviting the Auditor General to begin his remarks and for the benefit of those watching at home, I'd like to read from the May 3, 2016, report on the Canadian Army Reserves. The Auditor General states:
5.120 We concluded that although Army Reserve units received clear guidance for domestic missions, the Canadian Army did not require Army Reserve groups to formally confirm that they were prepared to deploy on domestic missions. Army Reserve units and groups did not always have access to key equipment. At the same time, Army Reserve units lacked clear guidance on preparing for international missions, had lower levels of training as cohesive teams and had not fully integrated this with that of the Regular Army.
5.121 We concluded that the Army Reserve did not have the number of soldiers it needed and lacked information on whether soldiers were prepared to deploy when required. The number of Army Reserve soldiers has been steadily declining because the Army Reserve has been unable to recruit and retain the soldiers it needs. Furthermore, funding was not designed to fully support unit training and other activities.
5.122 We concluded that Army Reserve soldiers received lower levels of physical fitness training and were not trained in the same number of skills as Regular Army soldiers. We found that some Army Reserve soldiers had not acquired the remainder of these skills before they were deployed.
Colleagues, these are serious issues and we're looking forward to learning if they have been addressed.
Gentlemen, welcome to the committee. We know that you both have been working diligently to help identify and resolve serious issues within the Department of National Defence that impact our soldiers on a day-to-day basis. We're looking forward to your presentation.
I'd like to invite Mr. Walbourne to begin, followed by Mr. Ferguson.
Gary Walbourne, Ombudsman, Office of the Ombudsman for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good morning to all.
As most of you know, my mandate as the Canadian Armed Forces and Department of National Defence ombudsman is to investigate complaints and serve as a neutral third party on matters related to the department and the Canadian Armed Forces. My mandate is to act independently of the chain of command, both military and civilian, reporting directly to the Minister of National Defence.
It is my understanding that this committee has dealt with a broad range of subjects, from operations to strategic policy and beyond. But I am not here to focus on the weapons of war or where operations occur. What I am here to discuss are the people we send on those missions — our most valuable resource.
Our military personnel from across the country have voiced concerns over a number of critical issues related to their service, from recruitment to retirement. Additionally, we have heard particular issues pertaining to cadets, Canadian rangers, reservists, civilians and families. From these engagements we produce reports that contain evidence-based recommendations — not suggestions — aimed at solving some of the longstanding systemic issues facing CAF members. Our reports recommend action, and their implementation would mean real change for our members in uniform.
Since the creation of the office in 1998, we have built a compendium of evidence-based work that has and can still serve as guide posts for successive governments to implement real change.
I believe that the government has the opportunity to fix the system that too often allows vulnerable people to fall through the cracks. Between our reports and those produced within the CAF, successive ministers have had plenty of evidence supporting the need for real change in key areas. We have an ocean full of studies, and I am just waiting for somebody to wade into the waters and start making decisions. The concept of commissioning a study to study the results of a previous study will no longer pass the public sniff test. Some of these decisions may not be popular, some may not be as politically palatable as one might desire, but they are the right ones for the men and women who serve or have served this country. Too many of their complaints are avoidable.
Let me give you some examples.
The tragic events of October 20 and October 22, 2014, at Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and the National War Memorial that resulted in the tragic deaths of Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent and Corporal Nathan Cirillo gave rise to important questions about the entitlements provided to families of our fallen members. Shortly after Reservist Corporal Cirillo was shot to death at the National War Memorial, it emerged that his family would be entitled to significantly less in the way of ongoing death benefits than a regular force member who would meet a similar tragic fate. Given that Regular Force Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent was killed only two days before, the contrasts were made in stark public fashion. Given the significant media and broader public attention, the government swayed and provided benefit parity for this incident only.
But what about those Reserve Force members who are injured or who pass away in service to Canada, such as those who are on training? So far, and despite my office's best efforts to provide an evidentiary basis to make meaningful changes surrounding benefit parity, little has been done. My position has always been that a soldier is a soldier, an aviator is an aviator, and a sailor is a sailor. Once you put a uniform on, you are in service to Canada. If you get hurt while wearing that uniform — serving Canada — you should be treated equally.
Yesterday, we published the first visual process map of the medical release for Regular and Reserve Force members. These maps were developed in collaboration with the Office of the Veterans Ombudsman. Not only do these maps demonstrate the complexity of the process, but also that there are different steps to be followed by Regular and Reserve Force members. It is evident that a streamlined process is required. The transition must be made seamless.
Regarding transition, I believe that there is a fundamental disconnect between the Canadian Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Canada wherein a member must navigate exit from one prior to entrance into the other. Most of this has to do with the determination of attribution of service and the current service delivery model.
Last week, I released a report that I had delivered to the Minister of National Defence in June. I recommended that the Canadian Armed Forces determine whether an illness or injury is caused or aggravated by that member's military service and that that determination be presumed by Veterans Affairs Canada to be sufficient evidence to support an application for benefits.
In conducting their adjudications under the New Veterans Charter, Veterans Affairs Canada, as the administrator, considers mostly documentary evidence generated by the Canadian Armed Forces. The evidence consists largely of the applicant's medical records and possibly other career-related records.
This begs the question of why a protracted bureaucratic process is required for VAC to review records prepared by the Canadian Armed Forces when it is possible for the CAF to determine whether a "medically releasing'' member's condition is related to or aggravated by military service. Given that the CAF has control of the member's career and has responsibility for the member's medical health throughout that career, such a determination can and should be presumed to be evidence in support of a member's application for VAC benefits.
I believe that my recommendation of having the CAF determine service attribution in conjunction with a change in the service delivery model would cut wait times by 50 percent or more, greatly reducing the current 16-week service standard at VAC — which, by the way, does not include the 3 weeks it takes for VAC to get medical files from the CAF or the time it takes a member to get and submit relevant documents.
You may also think that the development of a new service delivery model would require intensive study that will take months or even years to complete. Next week I will be releasing a report that I submitted to the Minister of National Defence in August containing a potential new service delivery model. What I have proposed to the minister in this report — predicated on the fact that no new legislation is required and the Canadian Armed Forces will determine whether an illness or injury is caused or aggravated by military service — is fairly simple: The CAF would retain medically releasing members until all benefits from all sources have been finalized and put into place; establish one point of contact for all medically releasing members to assist in their transition; and, finally, develop a tool that is capable of providing members with information so they can understand their potential benefit suite.
These will all be detailed in the report to be released next week, and I will make sure this committee receives copies.
These are three strong, evidence-based, member-centric recommendations, ladies and gentlemen, that I believe are game changers.
Senators, my big biggest fear is that these recommendations will be set aside for the wrong reasons. Those in senior leadership positions may tell decision makers and lawmakers, such as yourselves, that it cannot be done — that it requires too many new employees, legislative changes or infusions of millions of dollars into the system. I can assure you that this is not the case. In fact, my office has found that these changes would come at very little financial cost and would start benefiting members and their families in the immediate near future. If there is too much complexity it is because we have created it and it can be undone. All that is needed is the will to do so.
And as we all know from their mandate letters made public, the Prime Minister has asked the Minister of Veterans Affairs and the Minister of National Defence to reduce complexity, overhaul service delivery and strengthen the partnership between the two.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: Mr. Chair, the witness is speaking extremely quickly in English. I feel for our poor interpreter. It is like listening to a tape recording on high speed. It is completely incomprehensible.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Walbourne, could you slow down a little bit? I recognize you're trying to do this in the allotted time, so please proceed.
Mr. Walbourne: Will do. My apologies.
Both ministers and the Chief of Defence Staff have publicly acknowledged that the system needs fixing. The time is no longer to study but to fix.
As I have previously stated, there has been a glut of reports and studies from parliamentary committees, my office and the Office of the Veterans Ombudsman, as well as internal ones commissioned by the VAC and the CAF, that contain strong recommendations to help fix the system. Many of these recommendations have been accepted by those in positions of authority to make change. But as we've learned, acceptance does not always translate into implementation.
As part of the defence policy review, I submitted a comprehensive, evidence-based position paper to the Minister of National Defence outlining many of the issues facing the defence community across the country. All of the issues raised in the document have to do with the people side of Defence and only the people side of Defence. Each issue translates to the quality of life for our Defence community. I sincerely hope that this evidence is given serious consideration when decisions are made.
In my submission to the minister, I deliberately avoided recommending studies or reviews. As I have previously stated, we do not need them. They are complete. What we need now is leadership and the will to build a system that is indeed member-centric and fair to all. No matter what position or stance we take at home or abroad, a well-supported military force, including their families and our next generation of leaders, will be a factor in determining success. Our people should be our top priority, our true "no fail'' mission.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I stand ready for questions.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Walbourne.
Mr. Ferguson, please proceed.
[Translation]
Michael Ferguson, Auditor General of Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada: Mr. Chair, thank you for this opportunity to discuss our 2016 spring report on the Canadian Army Reserve. Joining me is Gordon Stock, the principal responsible for the audit.
In our audit, we examined whether the Army Reserve was prepared to deploy on domestic and international missions. We concluded that the Army Reserve had been shrinking, and that gaps in training meant that Reserve soldiers were not fully prepared to deploy on all missions.
The Canadian Army needs the Army Reserve to carry out assigned missions. The Army Reserve provides almost half of the Canadian Army's 40,000 soldiers. On major international missions, the Canadian Army expects Army Reserve units to provide up to 20 per cent of the deployed soldiers.
[English]
However, we found that the training of the Army Reserve was not fully integrated with that of the regular army units. Although the Army Reserve was given clear guidance on preparing for domestic missions, units did not receive the same level of guidance or how to train their soldiers for international missions. We also observed that the Army Reserve didn't always have access to the equipment it needed for training and deployments.
Army Reserve units are responsible for training their own soldiers. However, we found that many Army Reserve units didn't have the number of soldiers they needed. For example, 12 of the 123 Army Reserve units were smaller than half of their ideal size.
Although the Canadian Army provided funding for 21,000 Army Reserve soldiers, only about 14,000 were active and trained. In 2015, when Army Reserve units met for their annual, large-scale collective training events across Canada, only about 3,600 Army Reserve soldiers attended.
National Defence knows that the current reserve recruiting system doesn't work and that it needs to take steps to improve retention. It has set a goal to increase the Army Reserve by 950 soldiers by 2019, but in our opinion this goal will be difficult to achieve, given that the number of Army Reserve soldiers declined by about 1,000 soldiers a year for the three years we audited.
Earlier this year, National Defence confirmed that this trend has continued. As of May 15, 2016, the number of active and trained Army Reserve soldiers has declined by a further 1,000 soldiers, to 13,181.
[Translation]
It is critical that National Defence has information on whether soldiers are qualified and ready for deployment. However, the system that records this information indicated that a high percentage of Army Reserve soldiers did not hold the required qualifications. National Defence told us that the information from this system could be relied on.
The National Defence Act has established that Reserve Force members are to serve primarily on a part-time basis when not deployed. However, National Defence has in effect created a class of Army Reserve soldiers who are employed on a continuing full-time basis.
In the 2014-15 fiscal year, the Canadian Army spent about 20 per cent of its overall budget for Army Reserve pay and operating expenses on these full-time contracts, leaving less available for other Army Reserve activities.
The Canadian Army allocates funds for Army Reserve unit activities, including training. But the funding model is not consistent with the expected results. In the 2014-15 fiscal year, National Defence reallocated funds from the Army Reserve budget to uses other than those of the Army Reserve.
[English]
In our audit we found that although individual skills training was designed to train the Army Reserve and regular army soldiers to the same standard for a particular individual skill, Army Reserve courses were designed to teach significantly fewer skills than were taught in regular army courses. We found that this skill gap was not always addressed during the pre-deployment training of Army Reserve soldiers. For example, when Canadian Army soldiers began to deploy as part of NATO's collective defence in Eastern Europe, a gap remained in weapons training between Army Reserve and regular army soldiers.
We made 13 recommendations in our audit report. National Defence has responded that it will address each recommendation, and it has recently provided a detailed action plan on how it intends to address them.
Mr. Chair, this concludes my opening remarks. We would be pleased to answer any questions the committee may have.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I want to acknowledge the work each one of you have done in coming forward with your presentations.
I'd like to start with Senator Dagenais, followed by Senator Jaffer.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I would like to thank the three witnesses for joining us today.
My first question is for Mr. Ferguson. We know the Army is called upon to serve in various theatres of operations. In the next 10 years, what kind of budget do you expect will have to be allocated to the Army in order for it to carry out its operations?
Mr. Ferguson: The audit pertains to the activities of the Canadian Army Reserve. We did of course identify problems in the way the department allocates funding to the reserve. We cannot really say how the department should allocate its budget though; you will have to ask the department that question.
We have identified some problems and made a recommendation to the department explaining the importance of allocating the budget to the reserve.
Senator Dagenais: Correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Ferguson, but I think right now the political arm is making commitments for which there is insufficient or no funding at all. In the long term, do you not anticipate a funding deficit and, if so, what would be the consequences for the army?
[English]
Mr. Ferguson: Mr. Chair, in terms of the Army Reserve, which was specifically what we looked at, there was a budget allocated to the reserve. Some of that budget, though, then went back to the regular Canadian Forces. I think it was $166 million, which was taken back, essentially, from the reserve to pay for their share of infrastructure of the Canadian Forces. But it was just based on the number of members; it wasn't based on how much the reserves use the facilities versus how much the regular forces use them.
Certainly, we identified that a number of reserve soldiers weren't receiving the number of days of training that was predicted for them. So I think that there are indications that the way that the money was being allocated was meaning that the reserves probably didn't have sufficient funds to be able to carry out all of the training that they needed and everything that was expected of them.
But I can't really say what the direct impact is or how much there is a deficit or anything like that. Certainly, it's very important that the Canadian Forces determine what they expect from the Canadian reserves, that they make sure that the reserves have the equipment that they need to do what they're supposed to do and that they have enough money to be able to carry out what they're supposed to do. You can't give an organization a mandate and expect them to carry something out without then also giving them sufficient money to carry that out.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: If I may, Mr. Chair, I have a question for Mr. Walbourne.
In your opinion, Mr. Walbourne, in which three sectors would you recommend prompt action in order to improve support for the military and enhance their effectiveness in their assigned missions at this time?
[English]
Mr. Walbourne: I don't know if I could pick three specific ones, but if you want to continue talking about the reserves for a moment, I believe there's an opportunity. We released a report in 2014 that we did in conjunction with the Surgeon General's office to talk about periodic health assessments for the reserves. We know that about a third of our reserves currently do not have a periodic health assessment on file. This goes back to the basics of, "Are they prepared and are they ready?'' as Mr. Ferguson was just mentioning. But I do believe, if I were going to fix things, we're talking about increasing the reserves. My question is: How are we going to increase the reserves and provide the type of care and benefits that the members need at the same time? That's an area of concern for me.
We started doing a systemic review on personnel awaiting training back while we were still engaged in Afghanistan, and we stood down on that report because of the operational tempo of the department. But it's coming back on our radar for review. Those are a couple of areas I would look at, very quickly.
The other place where I think we need to have some conversation is around — we hear so much about it in the news — transitioning members and how we move them forward. I think more needs to be done there. I think we have to show that we are taking care of our own.
The Chair: Colleagues, I just want to follow up on the financing question that was put to the Auditor General. I know that the focus of your last report was on the reservists, but you've also looked at other aspects of the military, whether it be the F-35s or other aspects in past years. So you have some understanding, and I'm sure Mr. Stock has more than others.
A concern that we have on the committee is that we want to know whether the overall financing for the military is adequate to meet the objectives that we're asking them to meet. I'll focus in on your report on the reserves.
We talk about having 21,000 reservists on standby at any given time with the military, with the necessary pay to go along with that and all other costs. Your report indicated that only 14,000 were on standby and being provided for. However, at the same time we're not even, within those 14,000, providing them with the necessary additional things, whether it be their equipment or otherwise, to be able to do the job that we're asking them for, for example, training.
So my question to the Auditor General is this: If we do have a full complement of 21,000 reservists, is there the necessary financing to meet the objectives that we're asking them to meet? If there isn't, what should the government be doing about that?
Mr. Ferguson: I think that you've described it very well, given that the current complement is significantly below 21,000. I think, as we say in the report, that they established the budget of 21,000 based on about 37 days of training for each reserve member. But what's actually happening is that the reserve members that are following the full suite of training are probably getting trained, I think, more like 47 days or something like that, about 10 more than the budget.
What's happening is that a significant percentage of reservists are not completing all of the training. They're completing half of the training or something like that. That means that the ones that are getting trained, as long as they have access to the equipment, are getting reasonably well trained. Although, even then, once they go to deployment and get integrated into a unit, the regular army has to augment the training that they have already received.
So I think it's very clear that if the Canadian Forces were trying to and had 21,000 people in the reserves to fully train, I think that would put a significant strain on the resources they have already allocated.
We indicated in the report, for example, I think in paragraph 12, that in 2014 the commander of the Canadian Army set out what the Canadian Army must do to build an integrated Army Reserve. It included the things that we looked at: ensure that the Army Reserve is prepared for domestic and international missions; provide Army Reserve soldiers and units with access to the equipment that they need to train themselves; recruit and retain Army Reserve soldiers to accomplish their missions; fully fund all activities, including training that Army Reserve units must undertake; and then a couple more items.
The army itself has laid out very nicely what it is that it needs to do to make sure the reserves can accomplish what they're being asked to accomplish. But if you go through our report, you can line our report up against each one of these bullets of what the commander of the Canadian Army set out in 2014, and you can see that they're not doing it. If they had all the numbers that they need and had all of the equipment that they need and were doing all of the training that they need, I think it's fair to say that there would probably end up being a severe strain on the existing funds they have. Twenty-seven per cent of the reserves' existing budget is being spent on full-time reservists, even though the act contemplates that the reserve is mostly part time; $166 million out of $706 million of their total budget is being allocated back to National Defence to pay for infrastructure.
I think you can see that there very much is a strain in terms of how much budget they have currently been allocated compared to what they have been asked to do.
The Chair: I want to get clear for the record so that the truck driver understands, if he's listening to these proceedings, what we're saying here. At the present stage, if we go to 21,000 reservists, the present budget does not provide adequate funding for what we're expecting them to do.
Mr. Ferguson: Mr. Chair, obviously I'm trying not to go quite that far.
The Chair: That's what I'm trying to get clear.
Mr. Ferguson: Right. I think National Defence has to be able to demonstrate to you whether they would be able to do all of these things. If they reorganize some things, or whatever, would they be able to do all of these things within the existing budget?
What I'm saying is based on everything that we've looked at — it's hard for me to sit here and see how they would be able to fund everything that they're supposed to do within the budget that they currently have, but I can't say definitively, because that wasn't part of the audit that we looked at. But certainly it looks to me like it would be a significant challenge for them.
Senator Jaffer: I have two questions. I'll start with you, Mr. Walbourne. I appreciated your focusing on the health of the reservists and the health generally. You clearly set out for us that two brave men were killed, and it would have been a real tragedy if one was treated differently than the other. But many are being treated that way and we just don't know about it.
My specific question to you is about women's health because, as we all know, we have additional challenges. I wanted you to see if there are additional services for women's health, because there is a lack of transparency as to how they gain the services. There is a real risk that women are not receiving the services that they should. I would like you to clarify that.
Mr. Walbourne: As we may all know, gender-based analysis has been around for a few years. It's starting to entrench itself into the organization.
This organization is at a point of maturity where we now have the ability to segregate and call our data differently. As part of all our systemic reviews going forward, gender-based analysis has to be there. Instead of being included before, it will now be held as a separate piece. That's important.
However, we know there will be different nuances of requirement between the sexes, and we'll make sure that, as we do our investigation, we'll highlight those issues and bring them forward.
Senator Jaffer: I would appreciate it if you would and if you would also provide something for us now — not this minute — as to what exactly, because from what I have heard from women in the forces, additional services are needed and those are not in place. So I ask if you could provide us some more information.
I'll go to the Auditor General. You clearly set out the challenges. When I was preparing to ask you questions, it was obvious that the reservists have different training from full-time army people. The biggest thing on the ground that turns is that you're putting both, the reservists and the others, in a dangerous situation when the training is not the same.
We heard from Dr. Dorn and Senator Dallaire. Senator Dallaire spoke yesterday about giving a wider mandate and tools to accomplish this for the reservists.
From your 13 recommendations, they have an action plan, but are you satisfied that that action plan can be implemented with the budget they have now?
Gordon Stock, Principal, Office of the Auditor General of Canada: The action plan, senator, was provided back in May in response to our report. It's not a question as to whether there is sufficient budget within National Defence as a whole; it's a question as to the priorities that the reserves are given versus the other priorities that National Defence faces.
In this case, I think the action plan is possible to implement. We have reviewed the action plan and found that it was a reasonable action plan, given where they are. Some of the timelines were somewhat optimistic, but we think that the action plan is a positive step.
Mr. Ferguson: That action plan was provided to the Public Accounts Committee. We had a hearing on this report with the Public Accounts Committee, so the Public Accounts Committee has that and they can also play a role in making sure that National Defence is living up to what they said they are going to do.
Senator Jaffer: Can I ask you this question, because you've studied this so carefully: Are you satisfied that, with this action plan, the reservists will have not the exact but the same calibre of training as the others?
Mr. Ferguson: I will refer to something Mr. Walbourne said during his opening remarks about plans and more plans, and studies and more studies. If you look at what I said that the commander of the Canadian Army set out for the Canadian reserves back in 2014, listed in paragraph 12 of our report, if you lay out all of those things, you would have said yes, those are the things that need to be done.
There have been lots of different things, and this action plan would be another one, of saying: Okay, do they know what needs to be done? I think it's very clear they know what needs to be done. That's not really the issue. The issue is their actually being able to do it and implement it, which obviously we wouldn't be able to make a comment on yet.
Senator Beyak: Thank you, gentlemen. Given the presentations you just gave us, the gaps you have clearly identified and the challenges you have raised, do you think our reserves — you said 20 per cent of them are now required land force personnel. Do you think that the Canadian Army reserves receive the necessary training and the support to allow them to deploy to Africa if that is the government's decision? It doesn't sound like it to me.
Mr. Ferguson: Remember that when we do an audit, it's for a particular period of time, and this audit would have gone into 2015. There has probably been a year, or a bit more than a year, so things could change in the meantime, but assuming that everything is still the same way that it was when we did the audit.
The first thing we found out was that the reserve units weren't actually given clear instructions on what they were supposed to be training for. Many of the units didn't have the number of members, so a unit couldn't really train as a unit; they were training more as individuals. They didn't have the equipment that they needed to do all of the training. They didn't have all the instructors that they needed to do all the training.
So when a Reserve Force member came out of reserve training, obviously they needed to get more training before they were actually able to be part of a significant international mission, for example, and it then became the role of the Canadian Forces to augment that training.
Even after that, though, we found that there were still some instances where perhaps the Reserve Force members didn't get training on the full range of skill sets, the full range of weapons perhaps, that type of thing. Remember that once somebody is in a dangerous situation, that situation can change and they have to react to the changing situation.
Personally, I think it's important that the Canadian Armed Forces recognizes what would be the minimum level of training for any soldier, whether a reservist or a regular soldier, before they would be allowed to go into that sort of dangerous theatre, always recognizing that a full-time soldier is going to end up with more experience than a reservist just because of the difference between full time and part time. But there should still be a minimum level of skill competence and a minimum number of hours of training in certain types of situations before a person is sent into theatre.
Certainly the Canadian Armed Forces tries to do that, but we still identified that there were perhaps some situations where, even after the reservist has gone through all the training at the reserve and they've gone through the training with the regular unit, they don't always end up with the same level of training that would be required of a regular member.
Senator Beyak: You said that the funding model is not consistent with the expected results, but you haven't audited to a further extent. Are you able to see where the buck stops, who is mismanaging or not accurately planning? I hate to use words like that, but what is the problem, in your estimation? Would you have to do another audit to find it?
Mr. Ferguson: I think National Defence should be able to provide that level of detail. We've pointed out a number of the issues, and they've done some of their own reports on it. For example, their funding was 37 days per member and then another, I think, 5 days or something in unit training. But when they did their own study looking at how much training a reserve force member needs, it was five to ten days higher than that.
I'll go back to what the commander of the army said in 2014, which was "fully fund all activities, including training that Army Reserve units must undertake;'' and "provide Army Reserve soldiers and units with access to the equipment that they need to train themselves.''
There is a straight logic model: How many soldiers do you need, what type of training do they need, what type of equipment do they need for training, how much does all of that cost, and does that equal the amount of budget that you have or not? I think that's something National Defence should be able to explain, rather than saying, "We have this much budget and we'll try to provide them with training, but if we end up with some people doing only 50 per cent of the training then at least we'll have 14,000 trained.'' But that's below the 21,000 they're looking for.
It seems like they've been trying to work within two things that don't actually come together; they don't match. I think National Defence should provide the information about how they will bring those two things into alignment.
Senator Meredith: Thank you, gentlemen, for your presentations today.
You talk about training and deployment. One of the things I'm always concerned about, as I think are all senators around this table and all Canadians, is the well-being of the men and women who serve this country. Is it generally accepted that there is a higher level of PTSD from a UN mission compared to a NATO alliance-led mission? Have either of you looked at the support available for returning police or Canadian Armed Forces members to ensure their well-being is intact when they return to Canada? I would love for you to explore that.
Mr. Ferguson: Actually, I think Mr. Walbourne would be better served to talk about that.
In our report, we identified also the issue about the health benefits available to reservists not being the same as the health benefits to regular army members, but I think Mr. Walbourne has done more work on that. Maybe he should answer the question.
Mr. Walbourne: One of the things we are always concerned about when people return from a theatre of operation is what type of support mechanisms will be in place to help them. We have been talking about transition and end-of-career issues for several years, and I have the same concerns today as I have had for that period of time. Are we prepared to accept these people back? Do we have the mechanisms in place? Are we going to try to build a system that helps the member easily get to where they need to be?
Reservists are an anomaly when we come back to Canada. Once they do their "out-clearance,'' they return to their hometowns or villages where they may not have connection to a regular unit. That's a concern for me.
Are we taking care of our soldiers? I think we are doing a fairly good job. Can we do more? Most definitely.
We were talking about deploying reserve soldiers. No reserve soldier gets deployed until they have been fully trained and kitted by the Canadian Armed Forces. I am not worried about that so much, but I am worried about the things that are happening when they return. Are we going to have a transition process that gets them to where they need to be in the right time?
Senator Meredith: I have had to personally intervene with respect to a particular case, which I will not go into, of someone who had been diagnosed with PTSD and the treatment they received from their superior officers.
As an ombudsman, what have you identified with respect to how individuals are treated when they are identified, and the treatment they are given in terms of access to promotions within the Canadian Forces? Can you comment on that? You may have entertained particular complaints that may have come to your office.
Mr. Walbourne: We deal with a lot of clients who present with this type of a malady. What I must say, and it needs to be clearly said, is I think we have come light years dealing with mental health and operational stress injuries from where we were as little as three to five years ago. I think there is a flavour or a message coming from the senior command that it's okay to come forward. I think because of that drum pounding people have been stepping forward.
I think the system that's in place is currently under review. The Joint Personnel Support Units are being reviewed by the Chief of Defence Staff. I know they have assigned Brigadier-General Corbould to be the head of that organization.
I am pleased with the activity I am seeing. I think there is always more we can do, but, as we mentioned previously, there are some who slip through the cracks. I believe that's just the way the system is built. It makes it difficult for people to come forward in certain circumstances.
I believe we've come light years talking about mental health and PTSD and operational stress injuries. As I'm sure the Chief of Defence Staff will tell you, this is the first step. It's not the end. We have not arrived. I think it's going to be an ongoing evolution.
We're optimistically waiting to see what the construct of the JP issues will be in the near future. I think we're doing an adequate job. Could we do more? For sure.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: My question is for Mr. Ferguson. Could you be more explicit in your comments and give us two or three specific examples of the insufficient training of reservists that could have a practical impact in the field?
[English]
Mr. Ferguson: Again, what we were looking at was what was going on in general.
[Translation]
A specific example is the state of equipment. In certain situations, reservists have observed, after completing an exercise, that there was not enough equipment. Without equipment, it is difficult for them to reach the competency levels required for training exercises.
[English]
I think, maybe, we've put in some of these examples where they did a lessons-learned exercise after an exercise and said, okay, there was a lack of equipment. For example, the Arctic unit identified that, yes, they had equipment provided to them but they didn't have some of the heavier equipment they would have needed to operate. They had light snowmobiles but didn't have some of the stronger pieces of equipment that they might have had to use.
The fact that some of the units are below 50 per cent of their ideal unit size — I think it was about 10 per cent of the units are below their ideal unit size — means they cannot train as a cohesive unit.
Before they actually get deployed, the Canadian Army itself has to make up that gap to ensure that those reservists are prepared to go out into the dangerous theatre.
The way that the whole program is designed is for the reservists to receive a certain level of training at the reserve units. We're fundamentally finding that they're not doing that, either because there was a lack of equipment, a lack of instructors or a lack of number of members in the units, so therefore they can't do all the training as units that would be expected of them to prepare them. That needs to be augmented once they get to the regular unit level.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: What are the risks of this lack of equipment for training? In a peacekeeping mission, for example, does this lack of training or equipment jeopardize the health or safety of a Reserve member or that of another team member?
Mr. Ferguson: Certainly, we have identified that type of risk.
[English]
One of the things that we identified was that the reserve units should specifically say whether they have been trained and whether they are ready to go.
Right now, the way that risk is mitigated is through the regular army unit providing more training to the reservists before they actually join the unit. But we identified that there can still be situations where that reservist didn't get the same level of training. It might have been physical fitness or training on individual weapons. So that can create a risk, and that risk is a risk to the safety of the individual and in fact could be a risk to the safety of the whole unit. That needs to be very well managed, and it's why we said it's important that each of the reserve units be able to say whether their members are ready to deploy or not.
In the course of the audit, we went to the National Defence system that identifies the training and preparedness of their soldiers. According to the system, 7 per cent of them were up to date on handling their own personal weapon; 55 per cent of them were up to date on their physical fitness. When we saw that, we asked the question that this doesn't look like the reserve soldiers are coming out of their training prepared to the level they should be, and the response we got from National Defence was the information in that system isn't reliable.
It essentially means that they're relying on individual unit commanders to say whether their members are prepared or not and are not tracking in enough detail all of the information about whether those reserve soldiers are actually ready to be deployed.
So there is very much a risk. They are trying to mitigate it by ensuring that the reserve soldiers are getting the training before they are deployed and getting that training at the regular unit level, but there still are gaps that could put the individuals at risk, and they need to do a better job of knowing what level of preparedness each soldier has.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: There is a risk in relying on the unit leader when he says his team is ready if there is no independent party assessing that capacity. As we know, soldiers all want to be deployed and all feel ready. That is not necessarily the case though. Relying on reports from the unit also increases the risk of error.
[English]
Mr. Ferguson: Obviously at the end of the day you have to trust the unit and the unit leaders, but I think they need to make sure that they're collecting the right evidence to say, "We know who has done what training and we know what training the unit has done and who has participated and, yes, we're ready to go,'' and make it more of a formal sign-off that this unit has been trained and received that training. That happens in some cases. Some of them do that type of formal sign-off.
But when we looked at the system and saw the numbers, it was hard to understand on what basis they were saying they were ready to go.
The folks in charge of the units know what's going on, but in a lot of cases it was perhaps not a rigorous system that identified who was ready to go, whether the unit was ready to go.
Again, the mitigation is once those soldiers get to the regular unit they go through more training and assessment to get them prepared, but that speaks to the system being perhaps inefficient; and at the end of the day, like I said, there's still a risk and there still are situations where perhaps some soldiers haven't received all the training that you would have expected them to receive before they go into some of those situations.
Mr. Walbourne: If I could add a couple of comments, national operations deployments do not concern me as much because there is a process that any reserve member must go through in order to be deployed.
We have reservists being deployed on national operations fighting fires, floods and so forth, with no periodic health assessment on file. So if they get hurt and do not have any evidence it was a precondition or caused because of service, they will be out of luck.
I'm more worried about how we utilize the reservists at home as opposed to the ones who are actually deployed. The Canadian Armed Forces do a tremendous job getting their people prepared for a theatre of operation.
Senator Day: I wanted to confirm what Mr. Walbourne has just indicated, that the preparation for deployment that was in place for Afghanistan, for example, was upwards of a year. Once a reservist signed up to go, there was upwards of a year of training with a regular force member before they sent them out. But there may be other situations as things change. We're no longer in Afghanistan.
Mr. Stock, your report is dated 2016. What time frame did you look at? Was it the state of affairs after Afghanistan?
Mr. Stock: Yes, that is correct, after Afghanistan up until the end of January 2016, as far as whatever information we had up until that point in time. There are particular functions that reservists play a role in, whether it's influence activities, convoy escorts, things like that, that we have mentioned in the report where we would expect that they would have training while they are in the reserves if the Canadian Army knows that's a function they will play in the future. We didn't see that there was a specialized training and funding for those particular items in the reserves.
I respect what Mr. Walbourne has said. I believe there are particular areas where the Canadian Army can do better in terms of making sure the troops are ready when they are called upon.
They are indoctrinated in terms of the amount of training with the units before they deploy, but in certain cases they are put into roles and have to quickly respond to changing circumstances where they may not have had as much experience as they could have had, so I think there are improvements that could be made regardless of how much training they have had in the past.
Senator Day: There are two areas I wanted to get you to reflect on. One is recruiting and the other is budget.
From a budget point of view, I would confirm that you looked at army reservists, the militia, and not Air Reserve and not Naval Reserve.
Mr. Ferguson: That's right. It was the Army Reserve.
Senator Day: Would you agree that there are or may be differences in the manner in which a budget for the reserve element of those other aspects of the Armed Forces is dealt with?
Mr. Stock: We didn't examine those other areas. One reason is because the Reserve Forces for those other branches of the military are so different.
The Army Reserve is definitely the bulk of the reserves, and that's why we focused there.
Senator Day: Just in passing, our understanding is that the once the estimate is done for what is expected is of the Naval Reserve for the coming year, the amount is allocated and then they readjust what they can achieve based on how much money there is. That money is left to be administered by the Naval Reserve throughout the year and is not available to be clawed back by the regular force, unlike what you have described in some situations with respect to the army. I wanted to make that point. It may be worthwhile doing a comparison and looking for best practices.
From the point of view of retention and recruiting, 12 of the 123 Army Reserve units were smaller than half. That's smaller than 50 per cent of their ideal size. That's not undersized by a small amount; that's 55, 60 per cent below what is deemed necessary. That is a very significant finding we'll have to look into.
We learned in the past that lot of the army reservists are university students, and they find that because the number of training days has been reduced to fit the budget, they're not getting enough days in to pay their tuition, so they're looking for other jobs.
Have you had a chance to determine whether recruiting and retention had anything to do with the amount of training days and the amount of money available, or is something else causing this problem?
Mr. Ferguson: We didn't look at that particularly. I'm not sure what your time frame is on that study, but we do have an audit coming out at the end of November on recruitment and retention in the Armed Forces.
I think in here you sort of see a disconnect between, on the one hand, them saying, "We want to add 950 members,'' but on the other hand, it's going down more like 800 to 1,000 members every year. We didn't specifically look at that question and even the other audit didn't specifically look at the question of whether the number of training days is driving a decision on the part of university students.
In here, we indicate that the recruitment process isn't able to provide them with the number of soldiers they need. I think you'll find that in the audit we issue in November we will be able to provide a little bit more light on some of the issues that are going on in that recruitment and retention issue.
The Chair: I know we're coming to an end here. Perhaps if we could follow a bit further on the question of recruitment and knowing what you know now that, obviously, we haven't been privy to at this time.
Is there a general statement you can make at this time that there is difficulty in meeting the numbers that are being asked of the military, yet the recruitment isn't being successful? There isn't interest from those who might participate?
Mr. Ferguson: I'm not quite sure exactly where we say it, but even in this report we specifically identify that the recruitment process in the Canadian Forces isn't designed in a way that is bringing in the numbers that they need, and they need to look at that recruitment. I think what the other audit will do is simply expand on that same idea. The fundamental point is the same. Paragraph 5.51 states:
. . . the recruiting system did not recruit the number of soldiers needed by the Army Reserve . . . .
They had difficulty.
National Defence officials stated that the current Reserve recruiting system does not work—it is too slow and does not recruit the number of Army Reserve soldiers it needs given the present rate of attrition.
That's probably a good summary, even in their own words, of the problem that's happening on the recruiting end.
The Chair: I want to conclude this, if I could. I want to go back to Senator Day's question, and that is the question of the requirement that a reservist have a year's training prior to being international deployment. Does that policy still apply?
Mr. Ferguson: I don't know whether it was a policy, whether that policy still applies.
I do want to, though, reiterate that part of what I was trying to communicate was that, yes, the Canadian Forces, before they send somebody out into an international mission, the regular forces have to do the training for those reserve members to try to get them prepared. They're successful most of the time, but there are still some cases where people end up deployed and don't have the full range of training. For the most part, they are trying to mitigate that.
I think what Mr. Walbourne said about domestic missions is equally important. In our report, we identified a case of reserve members being assigned to fight forest fires in Saskatchewan. They weren't all up to date on, for example, their physical fitness, but the commander of the mission just waived the necessity to meet that physical fitness requirement so that those people could go on that mission.
I think there are indications, whether it's on domestic or international missions, that there are some situations where risks are being taken with the health and safety of some of the Reserve Force members.
The Chair: Colleagues, I think we'll leave it at that. We're a little past time.
I want to thank our witnesses for appearing. We appreciate your taking the time to come before us.
Joining us on panel two today is Kwezi Mngqibisa, Coordinator and Consultant, Somalia Initiative, The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, commonly known as ACCORD. He's here by video conference.
ACCORD is a South African non-governmental organization founded in 1992. It's dedicated to the promotion of dialogue and institutional development across the African continent. It specializes in various forms of conflict prevention, management and resolution. The organization intervenes in the field through mediation, training and research.
ACCORD is comprised of four main units: peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-building and knowledge production. It is also active on gender-related issues in South Africa.
Peace initiatives in 31 countries have benefited from ACCORD's support, and over 20,000 individuals have been trained in conflict resolution through its programming. The United Nations has officially recognized ACCORD as a viable operator for conflict resolution in Africa. The organization has active programs in three countries: Burundi, Somalia and South Sudan.
ACCORD is currently operating under a five-year plan that seeks to develop mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution in a globalized context.
Sir, welcome to the committee. We understand you have an opening statement. We have one hour for this panel. Please begin.
Kwezi Mngqibisa, Coordinator and Consultant, Somalia Initiative, The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD): Good afternoon from South Africa, and good morning where you are. Thank you very much for this opportunity. We truly appreciate the privilege to share with you some perspectives that we have drawn from our 25 years of existence in dealing with peace and security issues.
Our opening statement, as could be expected, would actually focus upon the aspects of the defence policy relating to contributing to global peace and security. We are of the opinion that the chapter is actually an excellent internationalist and inclusive statement of intent, and we are specifically encouraged by the commitment expressed where it reads: "We are also keenly aware that our national security is closely connected to international security.'' We are of the opinion that this is a very good starting point for the evolution of how Canada would enter once more into its contributions to global peace and security.
As an opening statement, we have four points which we think are of relevance. First, based on the fact that we are experts and operators in the African peace and security arena, we are of the opinion that this area, although covered a lot by the media, little substantive research has been done in order to, one, understand context; two, prioritize issues; and, three, understand and anticipate the actions of protagonists. We are of the opinion that this defence review process, when looking at how Canada could find the road for itself in the maintenance of global peace and security, would benefit from much investment in the area of research of the three areas I've identified.
Second, we are of the opinion that the African peace and security arena is very much full of policy alternatives and policy opinions, both by Africans and other respondents to the peace and security threats and vulnerabilities that emanate from the continent. Our opening statement for the second time will be looking at the understanding of the policy frameworks of these respondents. If Canada is to make an important contribution in maintenance of global peace and security, specifically in contributing to African peace and security, an understanding of the consistencies, aspirations and capacities of the policy frameworks operating on the continent would be relevant.
Third, I think it is important to highlight the fact that the commitment communicated in the draft document that has been produced, which is the reason we're here today, speaks of the need to maintain and advocate some of Canada's core principles of promoting the values of democracy, respect for human rights and diversity, as well as the rule of law as a way toward enhancing global security. We have think there is a lot that Canada can do in its contribution toward global peace and security vis-à-vis the continent if it can thoroughly advocate for these values to be the cornerstone of some of the work that is being done, whether it is in peacekeeping or combat prevention or the central role of peace operations on the continent.
Fourth and last, we note with great interest the emphasis the document has actually made on capacity-building. This is very relevant. As I have said and as previous panels have discussed at great length the very important details around the recruitment, sustainability and deployment of troops, we think that capacity-building is an important element when one considers the very volatile nature and context of conflicts we find on the African continent. When we talk about capacity-building, we take into consideration the fact that, more than anything else, it is not just simple good, professional military preparation that is needed. There has to be much emphasis upon preparation and the capacity of those who will be deployed in terms of discharging the particularities of the roles that will be called upon as a way of Canada's contribution to the maintenance of peace and security when looking at Africa.
This speaks to the fact that a variety of roles need specific types of capacity-building. If we look into some of the recent developments around peacekeeping or peace operations on the continent, so-called "soft issues'' such as protection of civilians, and important seminal issues such as the conduct and discipline of said troops, have not necessarily shown peacekeeping in Africa to be easy but that it is very much a difficult place when it comes to ensuring that those sent to actually provide the kinds of assistance that would lead to the maintenance of peace and security conduct themselves in a manner befitting of their assistance. This will be very important, not just for Canada to look at building its own capacity but for Canada to consider making sure that some of these important elements are shared and capacities are built with some of the troop-contributing countries that will be deploying alongside Canada. If one were to look at where the continent is at, one would come to understand that we have a relatively well-developed — in the last 10 years or so — peace and security architecture.
I'd like to share with your committee, from our analytical point of view, that that particular architecture, as well developed as it has been, is not at this point in time responsive enough to some of the challenges that we face.
I would like speak to some of the most pressing peace and security situations on the African continent right now: one, Somalia; two, the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo; three, the scourge of Boko Haram in west Central Africa. These three situations, if considered as representative of an array of peace and security challenges, have not been responded to fully by this peace and security architecture. If you look at Somalia, it is the coming together of the nations of Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti and others that have directly confronted the scourge of al Shabaab. Indeed, the African Union has been providing the legal framework for that deployment. The international community has been supportive through United Nations' missions that are supporting the African Union in that country.
There is the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. We have got the republics of South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania directly confronting the scourge as part of an international effort supported by the United Nations' mission deployed in that particular country.
Once more, the question will be asked: If our peace and security architecture in Africa is so developed, why are we continuously finding other mechanisms in order to respond to these conflicts?
Last, I think pretty much everyone is aware of the work that has been done by the republics of Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon as part of the Lake Chad Basin intervention to respond to Boko Haram. Once more, it exposes the fact that despite progress that has been made in developing a policy framework to decide on a peace mission and the capacity to mount technical interventions on the ground. Our continental frameworks continue to be challenged by the specifics of dynamics that we find in our conflict situations.
I would like to summarize my opening statement to say that it will be important to get, first, ongoing research regarding these particularities of the continent; second, to pursue an agenda for policy harmonization between the interventions Canada would seek to make either on a bilateral basis or through multilateral structures; third, for Canada to be steadfast in advocating for its values that it holds when it actually goes out to contribute to peace and security globally, as it pertains to Africa; and, lastly, to be at the front edge of partnering for the purposes of building the capacity for the type of missions or deployments that will be far more responsive to the challenges that the continent faces.
The Chair: Thank you, sir.
We will start with Senator Jaffer and then go to Senator Dagenais.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you very much for making yourself available. Your work is well known to us. The work you do is at the forefront.
One of the things you spoke about is how Canada could work with you. I know you have a partnership with Norway. We do a lot of work with Norway as well, so they're our natural partner when we work on these issues.
With the work that Norway does with you, would you like that we work side by side with Norway or do different work when you say that Canada could work with you?
Mr. Mngqibisa: I'm glad to share with the committee the fact that the Norwegian partnership, in the form of the training for a peace project, is possibly one of the longest running capacity-building projects in the world for the African continent. The work is focused on building the capacity on civilian peacekeeping. It has focused, in the last couple of years, on the development of doctrinal or policy frameworks that would make sure that African regional economic communities as well as the African Union do not give lip service to the multi-dimensional nature of peace operations, but actually prepares its staff officers to be in a position to recruit and direct missions on the ground. It is not only military actions that make a difference.
The example of Norway would actually be self-congratulations on our part. That particular project, which I want to emphasize has been running for over 20 years, has been at the forefront of shaping thinking within the African Union. The challenge that we have on the continent is that many outside interveners like to think of regional economic communities as appendages of the African Union. They are not. They are economic entities that have been formed through the Economic Commission for Africa.
When you come in to provide assistance for peacekeeping deployments, the whole idea that there is a smooth relationship between the African Union and regional economic communities is not entirely true. What we have seen and been agitating for, through the Norwegian-funded Training for Peace project, has been the harmonization of the processes of recruitment of civilians and of ensuring the proper training of civilians, but out of appreciation and acknowledgment that it's not civilians alone who will do the job. We have been at the forefront of the development of civil-military coordination policies and standards.
The work we have done through this particular project has seen the production and manufacturing of publications that are being used right now in pretty much all of the missions on the continent.
It's important to share with the committee a humbling point for us. Because we're based in Africa as a civil society organization, it's not as if we know everything that is going on on the continent. What the Norwegian-funded project has been able to do for us is to create the necessary space for partnerships, first, with other parts of the world that have gone through similar institutional development processes. Second, it has helped us be in a position to create spaces for joint learning when it comes to the evolving peace and security architecture and cooperation between the regional economic communities and the African Union. Third, what has been largely misunderstood and neglected has been the emphasis that none of these peacekeepers come from the African Union. They come from member states.
The question we have for the committee to reflect on is the reality that some of these defence forces do not have proper military management structures. They do not enjoy proper structures of civil-military relations. They do not have properly articulated processes of capacity building and debriefing, all of the things we would expect a properly functioning military to do. Look into the profile of the peace support operations of contributing countries. So when we are looking at areas of partnership, it is a very wide agenda.
I will conclude by saying that it is not just about replicating what the Norwegian-funded project has been able to do. Definitely the continent is changing, the types of conflicts are changing, but perhaps more important the need for new responses are in the offing. Any areas of future engagement would not only be about what a court thinks or what the Norwegian project has actually achieved, but about looking at where the continent is going; hence, the suggestion in my opening statement that ongoing research would serve Canada very well in terms of understanding strategic inputs with greater impacts.
Senator Jaffer: One of the reasons I was very anxious to have you as a witness is because of the work you've done on sexual assault and peace operations. In the report Uniting Our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnership and People, the UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations identifies a trend that sexual assault is committed by UN peacekeepers. If Canada does look at sending peacekeepers, I hope it will also influence the issue of impunity.
I've just come back from East Africa, and one of the things I heard from numerous people is about UN peace operations where UN soldiers or peacekeepers have impunity. I would like you to address this issue of how we deal with UN peacekeepers who commit sexual assault on the grounds that they have impunity? I don't think that is acceptable. I'd like your opinion on it.
Mr. Mngqibisa: I fully concur. I'm South African. My citizenry is that of South Africa, and our own forces have had challenges in this regard.
I work across the continent, including in conflict situations such as CAR, Mali, Burundi, DRC and others and this is a real problem. No one could ever deny it.
The challenge is always active, and in many instances we have seen that action is withheld because those in decision-making capacities say there is not enough evidence or data. I think the most important investment we could make is to acknowledge the policies and directives of multilateral and regional organizations to actually invest in ensuring that information and data is immediately collected on these incidents.
In Africa, for example, we have had a very interesting addition to some of our layers of response to this matter by actually making sure that we have gender advisers in some of the missions that the African Union deploys. The main role is not simply to advance the mainstreaming of gender and what it does, but it is also to ensure that these individuals agitate for ensuring that the broader realm of protection of civilians, the manifestation of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers and beyond the mission are given the necessary due attention.
I think the point to be made is that these issues can no longer just be comfortably dealt with, as horrible as they may be, in the comfortable spaces that you and I share at this point in time. They need to find expression in the mission management teams on the ground, because it is those individuals who collect the data who can identify the culprits and be in a position to serve a very definitive link for action — not just simply by the UN or the African Union, but by the member states because ultimately it is they who have to act on these matters.
What we have seen on the continent has been exactly the breaking of that particular loop whereby people on the ground identify exploitative tendencies and provide information to investigations. But the troop-contributing member countries appear, somewhat, to have a stranglehold on the ability of the deploying authority — the EU or the UN — to say that we shall take no more of your troops until the instances of sexual exploitation and abuses carry the necessary punishment.
We have had, though, some excellent examples. I think it was the Central African Republic where the United Nations actually took a firm stance in the form of the Secretary-General saying that troops from the DRC would no longer be accepted because the government of that country was not taking the necessary firm hand in arresting this particular scourge.
I think that Canada can start investing in, perhaps, some sort of dialogue and awareness-raising on the responsibilities of the troop-contributing countries.
I have to be frank in concluding that we have had enough of discussing this matter at the UN, the EU or at the REX. We now need to make sure that the investment is made in ensuring action where it matters most — in the field — and consequently in the troop-contributing countries.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: For my first question, I would like to know what role your organization could play in anticipation of the arrival of Canadian soldiers in Africa.
[English]
Mr. Mngqibisa: Thank you very much. I take it that I will be in a position to take this.
For the last twenty years, ACCORD has been playing a role in the peacekeeping capacity building space with pretty much all the regional centres of excellence, and by this I refer specifically to the International Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya, which has been directly turning out those trained and deployed troops who come from well-known troop-contributing countries, like Kenya itself, Ethiopia, Uganda and other East African nations.
This relationship has not been confined just to Kenya or the East African region. We have a running relationship with the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana, which is basically the hotbed of peacekeeping training for ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States.
Closer to home, in Southern Africa, we have a working relationship with the Southern African Development Community's Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, which based in Harare, Zimbabwe.
Our work is seen as making contributions to preparing peacekeepers in the form of groupings of peacekeeping roles, military observers, staff officers, civilian police, logisticians, those charged with contributions with the rule of law and those charged with conduct and discipline.
And in this instance, ACCORD, since its foray into this area of peacekeeping, has participated in all of the field and command post exercises that have been undertaken in Southern Africa and East Africa. And this is not just at the brigade level, but also at the battalion level, which means that our range of professional education of veterans of capacity building would see us working in a multi-national, multi-cultural and multi-dimensional nature.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My second question pertains to the main conflicts you are involved in at this time. Do you have the ear and support of the UN in order to continue your missions?
[English]
Mr. Mngqibisa: Thank you very much, senator, for that question.
Our work in Somalia is very much supported by the United Nations in the form of the United Nations' support to the African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM. It's important to shed some light on the context that we find ourselves working in.
We are talking here of a peace support operation that at the same time has been defined by others as having elements akin to a counter-insurgency strategy. We're talking here of a country with a transitional government, but which has the support and recognition of the continental and global parts of the African Union and the United Nations. But at the same time, it is confronted by the scourge of al Shabaab, which of course has meant that those that have been deployed are continuously fighting to wrest territory away from al Shabaab elements, and they are fighting the radicalization and violent extremism that these particular groups espouse.
Our work as ACCORD in this context is actually looking at two things. It is building support for the institutionalization of reconciliation, because our assessment and that of our Somali interlocutors points to the fact that all of the easier culprits to identify as being the problem for Somalia are not the major problem. Al Shabaab, as a problem, is not necessary very difficult to understand, but the challenge is to help the emerging governance system in Somalia to bring about a Somalia that has social cohesion. That is the first thing that we are doing.
Secondly, it is about supporting the re-establishment of governance. In normal parlance, we call this stabilization. Basically, it involves looking at how to ensure that when a territory is taken away from al Shabaab, civilian authority is re-established. But again, that is not a very difficult thing to do because it is directly linked to military action towards government.
The biggest challenge, which is what our interlocutors have been sharing with us, is about creating a sense of legitimacy and linkage of these small civil authorities with the federal government in Mogadishu. Because this speaks to what many people out there would define as a clan dynamic. So the work that we do is not necessarily work that can be carried simply by sheer bravery or commitment on our part, but it is one that is informed by some of the leading interlocutors in the government of Somalia, who work with civil society. But none of that work would ever succeed without the necessary security environment which has been given by the African Union.
But even that is not enough, which leads us to the United Nations, which is the organization that is now providing the capacity and support towards the establishment of governance infrastructure, including parliament, regional administration and a whole lot of other things.
That would be just one example that I would like to share to showcase the fact that the work we do is very much interlinked to the work that other actors are doing on the ground and it is the kind of relationship that we would be in a position to avail ourselves if invited, for example, by Canada. We are doing something similar with, as you can imagine, being paid from South Africa, with the South African government. We are doing something similar with an array of other governments and for that matter with other military institutions as we understand that the AU, the UN, SADC. Other regional economic communities do not have troops, but it is member countries. So our relationships are with the defence colleges that actually produce the military leaders that are doing the work on the field. Our partnerships and our training provisions, as it were, are the ones that are done with the army schools of some of the leading contributing countries.
Senator Beyak: Thank you very much for so clearly articulating your record of achievement and the challenges you are still facing.
You've answered most of my questions in your responses to the other senators but I wonder, given Canada's recent commitment to Africa and the African Union's resolutions on the continent, what specific achievements have you seen from the UN peacekeeping forces in the past five years?
Mr. Mngqibisa: Thank you very much for that question.
Let me start by saying the following: If today there was no UN peacekeeping in Africa or, for that matter, African Union peace support operations, we would be in immediate need of them.
To start off, the record has not been up to all of our expectations. There have been major challenges; one of capacity, one of meeting some of the stated objectives, one of even deviation of those that have been deployed from conducting themselves in a manner befitting of the objective and cause that they actually signed up for.
But let us look at this in perspective. In 2003, when I first went to Somalia to work, the country was run over by warlords. The international community, through the United Nations, put together a political office to mediate and tried to put together some form of government. This government started to be operational in 2005, about 11 years ago, and 80 per cent to 85 per cent of those that formed that government, which is those days in the national community, were all warlords.
In 2012, when we had a transition from the transitional federal government of Somalia to the federal government of Somalia, this grouping was significantly reduced primarily because of the international community led by the United Nations to actually make sure that we identified individuals and community leaders that have the genuine interest of putting Somalia on a different path from that of the warlords.
Right now, I could count the warlords in a parliament of hundreds. They would not go beyond my two hands. And this for me is a reflection that we are not looking at the international community as the bringer of solutions. We are looking at the international community through peacekeeping as putting into place an environment where the locals would be in a position to make some mistakes and to find their own solutions.
So for me I don't think that the failures in Africa, or even the successes in Africa, particularly belong to the United Nations. I think that the international community, through the United Nations, gives expression to solidarity in local ownership.
Yes, we have been disappointed by South Sudan and developments in their assembly. There is no failure that could only be placed on the door of the United Nations or even the African Union. This is a reflection of the failure of the protagonists in some of these conflicts. But where we need to be emphatic and where Canada could continue to play a leading role is to make sure that the necessary kind of approach and attitudes and sense of urgency in responding to some of these breakdowns of peace processes or even peacekeeping initiatives is actually lent to the institutional framework of the United Nations.
The last couple of years have been a mixed bag of results, and I do not think that the fault lies squarely on the door of the United Nations, or the African Union for that matter, or even the international community. All of us have a role to play, but we just need to make sure that we pull together in order to emphasize where we need to alleviate situations where we can together.
Senator Meredith: Thank you so much for your presentation. You have answered some of the questions with respect to failures by the United Nations and lessons Canada could learn prior to deploying.
Going forward, what is it that Canada needs to do in terms of deploying our troops in peacemaking, peacekeeping and also economic building? We see what's happening within South Sudan currently and the work that has been done in Congo and so forth. Identify some of the things going forward that Canada can clearly do?
I was in Ethiopia just last year and visited the AU, so I understand there are certain challenges facing the continent. We are concerned as Canadians about the terrorist threats coming to our shores and if we can prevent that by ensuring that we have the right mechanisms in place. You speak about architecture, so identify for me clearly some of the things we can put into our report that Canada can clearly do before our troops deploy.
Mr. Mngqibisa: Thank you very much for your question, senator.
Today, if any part of my testimony comes out strongly, it has to be this point: I appreciate the fact that you are looking at Canada's potential contribution as wider than simply putting boots on the ground. For me, it's a very enlightened posture as well as a very necessary and urgently needed one in Africa. Why is this the case? Because as you've said, the African Union peace and security architecture covers all of these various requirements.
If we look into the architecture, it has got early warning; it has got the Panel of the Wise; it has got an African Standby Force and, of course, for decision making it relies on the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. But very few of us ever mention African governance architecture, which is looking at how to develop the capacity of the continent to put pressure on each other.
Senator, let me share with you a very sore point in my heart whenever we talk about the African Union. The progressive institution development initiatives that come from our architecture are not necessarily shared by the member countries. If you think about it, we are talking here about an organization, that African Union, that has protocols on any and everything else that needs to be done in Africa, but because the African Union has no capacity to implement these things, the onus lies with member countries who themselves do not have the domestication capability of making sure that we will talk about human rights and speak and live human rights in our countries. When we speak about agenda mainstreaming, we do those things for ourselves.
When you ask going forward what would be the specific things in which Canada could play a role in terms of making sure that strategic inputs can be made, I have to be honest: It is about providing support or consideration for support towards the drivers or the triggers of some of these situations.
I'm talking here about migration. I'm talking here about the impact of climate or at least engaging African governments or African organizations to respond to the impact of climate change. I'm talking here about what we all know and are experiencing during this month: elections and the conflicts that come from elections. If we do not respond to the impact of elections, the polarization that comes out of the contestation will lead to countries like Gabon and the DRC going back to conflict situations.
Since you've come back from Ethiopia, you will be familiar with developments around the Great Lakes region, where some would call it a constitutionalism crisis, whereby heads of states want to change their constitutions in order to allow themselves to legally continue being in power. These are not necessarily things that lead to conflicts today, but there are fault lines. If Canada were to invest in the ability to respond to these issues, we would be in a position to mitigate some of these situations before they become horrible situations, such as the 1994 genocide and other horrible things that we haven't talked about and, of course, violent extremism.
When we talk about radicalization, it's a very important element. It might not appear to be very popular to talk about terrorism or whatever you want to call it, but the reality of the matter is that if we look into the statistics where young people are actually found, there is radicalization taking place. It's not a question of making it sound sweeter or politically correct. The reality of the matter is that we do need a response before we actually get to the terrorist acts, as it were.
What would then be the things that that would require, considering that the hearing is on the defence review process? I've actually put down a few notes that I thought might be of great interest, especially under the theme of defence diplomacy, on page 17 of the document. I think there are specific things that can be done or considered by Canada. This falls under the broad umbrella of security sector reform. I'm talking about defence management.
These troop-contributing countries from my continent still require reform themselves. We need to have processes such as this one — transparent, consultative, regular processes of review. It cannot be that many of our troop-contributing countries on the continent do not do reviews. It is part of proper governance to inform them about where they get deployed and the conditions that should be met.
For me, this is a very important element because we can build the beautiful, responsive structures of the AU or even the original economic communities, but those will have to be staffed by troop-contributing countries. Some of them do not have proper military leadership structures. Some of them do not have proper civil/military relations back in their home countries. Some of them do take proper care of their personnel. Some of them do not have proper resources to actually give expression to some of the planning and some of the missions they want to undertake.
If Canada says that it wants to contribute to global peace and security, it means that Canada must accept that it will not be able to deploy everywhere in Africa or anywhere in the world, but it will have to find entry points of strategic engagement with the defence management, in this case, in Africa, so that these troop-contributing countries can build this capacity to be in a position to be far more effective, if not responsive, to the challenges the continent faces.
The Chair: We're coming to a conclusion here, and we certainly appreciate the time you've spent with us.
I've been listening very closely to what's being said here, and there are two aspects to it. One is the deployment of troops for the purpose of maintaining peace on a day-to-day basis. The other aspect is the question of whether or not resources can be made available from a country such as Canada for the purpose of helping to train and educate those leaders and the general populace, where possible, to take care of their own civil institutions, as well as to create their own civil institutions.
Our resources are limited as well. We have certain obligations that we've taken on in the Middle East, as well as in NATO, and they're substantial. So the question I have is: In view of the fact that we are limited to some degree, would it not be better for Canada to take a clear objective of getting involved in creating and working with organizations such as yours and expanding upon the purposes of education and other aspects that could be brought forward to the local populace so that we can help set that foundation, so that people can take care of themselves as opposed to having boots on the ground where we're strictly there day-to-day and, in some ways, putting our Canadian men and women in harm's way in an area that they know nothing about. Maybe you could comment on that if that decision had to be made.
Mr. Mngqibisa: I'm not a diplomat, Mr. Chair, so I will just come out and say that that would the main thrust of our input in the sense that boots on the ground, after all, are nothing else other than a fire brigade that responds once the fire has broken out. The reality of the matter is that, if we look back into the history of peacekeeping — it has been important, I agree — whether it's the various permanent member states of the United Nations or whether it has been the collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union, the reality is that all reviews point back to the need for better prevention. Prevention is not going to done by Canada in Canada to help the continent, but prevention will be done in Africa by Africans that have the capacity to do the proper analysis, to do the proper mobilization of resources.
If you think about it, Mr. Chair, in many of the conflicts to which our countries are deploying, they are using their own national resources to go to war when their national interests are actually threatened or they want to expand their sphere of influence, but they never have resources for peacekeeping. So the reality of the matter is that our investment has to now start shifting towards building the kind of military leadership, the kind of civil-military relations that will ensure that resources within countries, issues within countries, are dealt with through the realm of governance, and proper governance at that.
The Chair: Thank you very much for your time. We certainly much appreciate it. We've come to the end of our time, and we will take into serious consideration what you have presented here this morning for us.
I would like to first introduce our next guest and witness, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, who retired from the Canadian Army in 1993 after 33 years of service. During his time he served with NATO forces in West Germany and with UN peacekeeping forces in the Gaza Strip, Cyprus, Vietnam, Egypt, Central America and the former Yugoslavia. In 1985 he was appointed Director of Combat-Related Employment for Women, and in 1991 he was appointed Deputy Commander of the Canadian Army Land Forces Central Area.
Major-General Lewis MacKenzie was named chief of staff of the United Nations peacekeeping force in former Yugoslavia in February 1992. Although the purpose of the mission was to ensure a ceasefire in newly independent Croatia, the UN headquarters were located in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo.
Soon after, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was created. MacKenzie found himself in the midst of warring ethnic factions. In May 1992, he created Sector Sarajevo and, with his UN force, set about opening the Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Major-General MacKenzie became an international celebrity by using the only weapon at his disposal — the media — to try to help restore peace.
After his return from the Balkans in October 1992, Major-General MacKenzie was appointed commander of the army in Ontario. After criticizing the United Nations' inability to command, control and support its peacekeeping forces, Major-General MacKenzie retired from the military in 1993. That year, he published an account of his career — Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo — in which he recounted his harrowing experiences.
In 1993, the Conference of Defence Associations Institute presented Major-General MacKenzie with its Vimy Award, and in 2006 he was awarded the Order of Canada.
Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, it is an honour to have you here before our committee. Welcome. I understand that you have an opening statement and I would invite you to begin.
Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie, as an individual: Senators, thank you very much.
Senators, I think you are probably sick and tired of hearing people come by and tell you what the difference was in peacekeeping before and after the wall came down in Berlin and the end of the Cold War. It has been well explained, but I think I'm uniquely qualified to bring in another aspect of the difference, that being I'm told I'm the only person that has commanded a UN operation before the end of the Cold War and after, because you are only supposed to command one UN operation in your career.
The problem was that when the war was breaking out in the Balkans, they asked for someone with UN experience, and with my nine UN missions, I was selected.
The mission, though, in Central America just before the wall came down — ONUCA, which is a Spanish acronym for United Nations Observer Group in Central America — was unique in that as the commander I had no SRSG, no Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who is the person in charge of the mission, as was the case in Rwanda, where Roméo Dallaire was cursed with an incompetent diplomat who was more of a hindrance to him than any help.
You wouldn't think I was commanding the mission in Sarajevo, except that for the first time in military history, the troops up front were feeling sorry for their headquarters in Sarajevo — the troops up front in Croatia 300 kilometres away — and so I was ordered to report directly to New York, without an SRSG.
So two command positions. Well, what's the difference? In Central America, where we were responsible for observing and reporting on the Esquipulas II Agreement, which was merely, in the five Central American countries, thou shalt not harbour people in your country that are crossing the border to attack in a neighbouring country. It really dealt with the Americans that were living in Honduras and were involved with the Contra operations against them in Nicaragua.
So when I had a problem, I had five Central American countries where the door was open to every president of those five countries, one door open a lot wider than any other door because Violeta Chamorro was a graduate of McGill University, and so were five of her cabinet ministers, average age 27.
If I couldn't get resolution of the situation from the presidents or the commanders of their militaries, I could then go to New York where those countries had a delegation, a flag flying in front of the building, and that delegation could then be dealt with by the Secretary-General. There was a clear chain of command for the UN commander to resolve issues.
Ha. Witness with an ear in Sarajevo where on April 6, 1992, the war started, and all of a sudden you had a country that was only a few weeks old as a member of the United Nations, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Bosnia/Muslim side, predominantly Muslim, and two factions: the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats. You could, as I did some 20 times, sit down with them, and come to an agreement that would be broken within 24 hours, and then I couldn't even find them to protest.
Two of them had no delegation in New York, no flag flying in front of the UN. They were irregulars; they were a faction. They could do what they bloody well wanted to do, and in a city of 300,000 with less than 500 troops — the initial month borrowed from Canada — there wasn't a hell of a lot you could do other than protect humanitarian convoys, with the agreement of those three sides.
The same thing happened in Rwanda; the same thing happened in Somalia. The UN in Somalia initially went in. The Pakistani battalion was trapped and held by Farrah Aidid and his irregulars. The U.S., on behalf of the UN, occupied, arrived on the beaches of Mogadishu, and the media was there to meet them, which is exactly the way it should happen. You should go to a knife fight with a gun, and those two organizations that were causing all the trouble in Mogadishu buggered off. For months, including the Canadian contribution, the mission was the most successful mission in UN history in delivering humanitarian aid and saving hundreds of thousands of lives.
It became a presidential debate issue. Clinton promised if he was elected he would pull the troops out of Somalia. He did that. They left about 800 behind as a reserve, which only the Americans could use, not the Turkish three-star commander of the UN force, and it became a disaster, and the UN left with its tail between its legs.
As soon as that was seen by the historic contributors of peacekeeping — Norway, Sweden, Finland, Fiji, Canada, New Zealand, Australia — they said, "Bugger this, we're not going to contribute troops anymore.'' And that entire record of contributing troops from 1956 ended.
Third World countries took up the slack and came in in large numbers, today about 80,000.
Now, I have commanded troops from some of those countries, and some of them are very good. However, they are grossly underpaid. The US$1,323, I believe it is, that is paid to a country for every one of its soldiers every month on UN duty does not go to those soldiers. Every penny goes to the contributing nation's government, and as a result, it is fairly lucrative.
But when you plunk soldiers down that are not being paid a decent wage — in fact way back in 1992, my Russians and Ukrainians were not being paid at all — they will find other ways to make money, and they could well get involved with human trafficking, prostitution rings, black marketing or whatever, which is a current stain on UN operations, particularly in Africa.
So what I think we have to be ready for, and I would ask you to consider, is no matter what the UN asks for now, today, particularly in Africa, we do not let them tell us what we need to send. We cannot count on our small penny packet groups, which I hear being discussed, whether it is helicopters or intelligence or command and control or a medical unit. Their security should not be put in the hands of a foreign military force participating in the mission. We have to send our folks on the mission, capable of protecting ourselves. By that I mean if you're going to have penny packet organizations, they should be there within the organization of a battle group — call it what you want — an organization capable of ensuring the personal security of these people that we are contributing to the force. Just don't let them go off around some very, very large countries, spread out without proper security.
I conclude by saying these are not peace ops. I'm delighted that the word "peacekeeping'' has been removed from the vocabulary and it is now peace operations. They are not. They are protection missions. They will do nothing to create an atmosphere for peace talks to continue or whatever. Creating the conditions for peace? Baloney. They are going there and should go there to help in the protection of the innocent. They can't protect all that many, but at least that will be their role. They will be a protection force.
Finally, I know from reading the open media that we're looking for brownie points. Brownie points for what? Maybe to make a run at a Security Council non-voting seat. You don't get brownie points for penny packeting people around a mission area. You get brownie points from being robust, protecting people and looking after your own and helping the rest.
Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you very much, General MacKenzie.
We will start with Senator Jaffer and then go to Senator White.
Senator Jaffer: General, thank you very much for your service to Canada. It is no news to you that we all look up to you, and what you had to say to us today was very important. You already know that we have heard from many people.
I have two ideas I would like to test with you or to ask you about. One is we don't have the ability as yet, from what I have heard — and will you know better — to have a robust, large peacekeeping mission. We don't have the men and women to do this. What would you have to say if we provided strategic guidance, leadership guidance and training guidance? So it wouldn't be 600 or 700 men; it would be, say, 100, or 50.
Let me tell you where I am coming from. I was the envoy to Sudan, and I used to go with our men and women, a small number of 50 to 100, to South Sudan, to Darfur. They wanted boots on the ground, but they were giving strategic advice, training.
Do you think that is our role at this time? Is that our role, giving strategic guidance? Because we don't have the men and women the way you were saying. What do you think of that?
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: Senator, I would say we do have the capability to do that. The NATO mission is a rotational mission, very, very low stress, and they are there as a deterrent, as ridiculous as that might seem to some people, having a modest force like that. But it is a tripwire. They used to say all the Americans needed in Germany and West Germany was one soldier to make sure that he was killed first when the Russians or Soviets came across the border. It was a tripwire.
We will get into this, I'm sure. The planning process is on its head. It is ludicrous to put out a number and then try to find something to fill the number. That's ridiculous, but I accept it is politics.
I'm biased in your favour, because I was on the board of the Pearson peacekeeping centre. Our most valuable contribution in my last year on the board was watching how the centre was training female police officers in Africa to go back home and train female police officers. It was unbelievably successful and deserved much more attention profile than it was getting.
Certainly I agree with you, but I don't agree that you should be forced to look within the 600 to find them. My God, that is just so ludicrous. If there's a good role for them, then those people could be made available outside the magic 600. I'm getting tired of that number.
But you are absolutely right: If that's considered to be the strategic level, yes. Long-term thinking, absolutely. Great value for it.
Senator Jaffer: I have just come back from a conflict zone, and especially with women who have been sexually assaulted and also the situation of cholera in Haiti, there is often an anxiety or anger about the impunity of peacekeepers. I don't need to convince you. You know what I am talking about. Do you think Canada can play a role in changing that?
I believe Canada should play a leadership role in stopping this impunity. As you know, the UN is supposed to look after this internally, but we know what is happening. It is not as adequate as people would like it to be.
I would like your opinion. How do you feel about this issue of the impunity of peacekeepers?
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: I certainly agree that we could provide an example. What is so frustrating to me is we had one individual in Haiti, for example, that was having a bit of an affair with a civilian fellow UN employee. This is not high on my list of scandal, but you would think it would be from the cover or the front page of The Globe and Mail, as if that disqualifies us from addressing the issue you are talking about.
The short answer to your question is absolutely it can be. We were very early on in introducing women into the combat trades of the Canadian Forces. We took the lead there. There was much objection. Certainly we have the expertise and a national record and reputation for dealing with it. Quite frankly, it would fall within the same category as what the Pearson peacekeeping centre was doing by way of training female police officers in Africa.
Senator Jaffer: I took police officers to Darfur to teach rape investigation, and they still use that training and just rave about our police. Of course we do, too. For me, if we're going to do a peace operation, the police have to be part of it. I would like your opinion on that.
Maj. MacKenzie: Yes, and we have been doing that. My first mission was in 1962 in the Gaza Strip, and we had what was called UNCP then, the United Nations Civilian Police. We have been working with them on every mission since.
There was a small error in my introduction. Vietnam was an international commission of control and supervision. It wasn't a UN mission.
But in all UN missions there are civilian police, and more and more these days, as I'm sure the senator would reinforce, from the municipal, provincial and federal levels. In most missions where Canadians are now, the police outnumber the soldiers, so absolutely essential.
Once again, I had a couple of hundred police with me in the Balkans and I had to fire over 30 per cent of them. Why? Because requests would go out to countries to provide police at the constable level, on the street level, and when those countries saw the per diem that was being paid by the UN, some of them, even the head of the police force, would say, "Hey, this looks like a pretty good deal; I'm going.'' So all of a sudden I had all these police officers who weren't prepared to do constable duties because they were inspectors or superintendents or whatever.
The UN wouldn't let me fire them. The UN said, "No, send them back to New York and we will put them with their permanent delegation.'' They were getting even more per diem in New York than they were in the field. All of a sudden, a significant number of my police became incompetent overnight because they wanted to be sent to New York and work there.
You will run yourself into problems when you are dealing with each country providing X number of police or military or whatever.
Senator White: Thank you very much, general. Great to see a St. Francis Xavier University graduate in the room.
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: And Cape Breton U.
Senator White: I'm sure that wasn't the first time the United Nations saw incompetence, by the way.
My question is going to focus on the policing dialogue. You and I have had this discussion at least a couple times about the challenges that go with that.
Certainly one of the challenges police officers who arrive in theatre face is a lack of police basic training, sometimes even education levels where they can't learn basic training. I asked you the question whether you think we should be focusing some energy on raising their basic level by removing people from theatre — in other words, police officers from Afghanistan, as an example — to give them an education level in another venue. We did it in Jordan in the past. We do it sporadically there, certainly not in-depth. I know Australia has been bringing in police officers from Afghanistan now for seven or eight years and giving them an education level so that when the police officers from Australia arrive on the ground, they are not teaching basic language skills.
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: Absolutely.
Senator White: Do you see an opportunity for Canada in the future of peace operations to be more engaged at that level rather than just trying to teach some pretty basic things while keeping people alive on the ground?
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: I know I'm dated in my experience, but I couldn't agree with you more, that there's an opportunity there. I say that because, particularly with the police that were assigned to UNPROFOR in the Balkans, they were ordered to be under the administrative side of the mission. They were not under my command. They were with the chief administrative officer, et cetera, and they had a delegation come and see me about a week later: "Sir, can't you just arrange for us to work with the military?'' When that happened, I had to remove one Scandinavian gentleman who was in charge of the police and put in two officers, one from Senegal and one from Canada, who sorted it out because they were experienced.
But the very basic policing skills, while it is a prerequisite for being sent on a mission by the UN, are not being met I would say even today by the majority of the countries that contribute police officers. It is a really good gig. It is a really well-paying job.
Senator White: I have been to the international police academy, and the topic of inspectors buying their seat in an international mission was pretty well discussed there. It was around high-level officers who were paying thousands of Canadian dollars to serve six months in a theatre so they could make $100 a day in per diems. It is well known.
Could you walk us through where you see the capability capacity gaps today in the military for what the mission tomorrow is going to be?
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: Yes, I can. It is not a flip answer. I can't do that until the Government of Canada tells the military what they want it to be capable of doing. If they say, "You have to be able to deploy an army brigade of 4,000 and maintain it indefinitely, a flotilla of four ships with a command and control capability, a number of six-packs of air to maintain,'' in those cases I could tell you we don't have that capability. So then you dumb it down to fewer in all three services.
The capabilities are only known when you know what you are responsible for doing, and it is almost like what is going on right now with the magic 600. It is a reverse planning process. Some of the capability gaps are blatantly obvious perhaps, but most of them are only defined as gaps when you know what your task is, beyond the defence of Canada, which is very modest.
As far as identifying tanks, trucks and artillery, the capability gap when we went to Afghanistan was identified almost immediately: We need tanks and we need artillery. Magically they were available within a couple of months. It was fantastic. That was only recognized when the military was sent to do a particular job.
Senator White: What do you see our capability at now?
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: To do what?
Senator White: Right now if they asked, "What do you have to do something with?'' Two ships?
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: With the promises now being made with people in the Ukraine and Poland and going to Latvia, the numbers are modest. We would be hard-pressed, but it is not impossible to maintain what I refer to as a battle group, 1,200 to 1,400 folks in a mission in Africa. Not indefinitely, particularly when you put a language requirement on top of them, where you are going to be working the asses off the Van Doos and our French Canadian soldiers, one third of our force. They'd be punchy within a couple of years, but it would be possible. And as usual the military would say, "Can do.''
The Chair: I would like to follow up on the question of the identification of the linguistic requirement of "en français,'' which obviously, for the most part, identifies those within the military from Quebec.
What effect is that going to have on those regiments that will be taking on, basically, the workload, if a decision is taken, in contrast to the rest of the military? Has there ever been a deployment of soldiers in any numbers because of language requirements?
Next, what are the ramifications morale-wise within the military when you're actually deployed and this is a long-term commitment? Canadians should be aware this is not for six months. This is going to be for years if these decisions are taken. You might want to comment on that. That's not an issue that has really been discussed.
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: In fact, the military is very aware of that. I do happen to know, and it's public knowledge, that the western brigade is coming on standby for deployment, for example, if it was to Africa, and there would be plans for bilingual liaison officers with them. So there's not an intention to pick on the 5th brigade in Quebec, to take on all the roles. You can bet your life they will provide some of the liaison for the western brigade because it would have a very negative impact if you just sourced the deployments from the Quebec regiments.
The Chair: That was the question: Were they basically going to take the lead role and the vast amount of the responsibility?
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: If I'm current, they just gave up the standby role in Quebec. It's been passed off to the west.
If you try to adjust that, the ripple effects — and I'm out of date, I know — are horrendous. All the training regime, getting ready, change of command, individual moves and everything would be disrupted. So they will proceed by employing or deploying those individuals from the readiness brigade, as I would call them.
Senator Meredith: Thank you very much, General MacKenzie; it's good to see you again.
Sir, I rely upon your expertise, just like the committee members around this table, with respect to this report that we're trying to put together, to gather factual information. I'm always concerned about the conditions of our deploying and our readiness. We heard from a previous witness about our inadequacies in terms of being able to be totally ready.
Talk to us about the conditions for deployment, especially in Africa. My colleague Senator Jaffer spoke of South Sudan and other areas, for example, Congo, where Canada has been participatory, too. Talk to us about those conditions.
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: I admit up front that I'm not current. I maintain contact, but I'm not current. But I'm current enough to know that the preparations are so much superior to those during my day. That's not the fault of the leadership while I was growing up for the system — I started as corporal in the reserves — from a lieutenant to a colonel because the missions were predictable. You knew two and a half years before you went to Cyprus, for example, that you were going there. They were so predictable that you didn't even spend a lot of time with the people that were coming home before you went and replaced them. Four or five days were enough because it was routine.
The same thing in Germany with a much more intense, high-intensity role; you went there for three years. You learnt the ropes in year one. Year two, you became very good in the exercise, and in year three you won the track and field meet. That's the sequence you went through serving in NATO in the Canadian brigade.
They're much better prepared now. The commanders are much more conscious. We used to say, when I joined in 1960, "Gee, we could be going to war any day now.'' We never did. The Cold War was on. But now it's pretty serious stuff. They know they could well be deploying to Mali or South Sudan in two weeks, a month or whatever.
I would say I'm confident that the conditions for deployment are safe and ready, in the absence of no really ridiculous restrictions being put on them by the United Nations, and they should never — and I don't think will — accept those restrictions.
There are no more 30 rounds per magazine; there's no more pistol for some or rifle for the other. No, it's essential that they go with what our people think they need for the worst-case scenario.
Senator Meredith: We just heard from a previous witness from ACCORD who has been sanctioned by the UN or validated by the UN. I know that you are a big fan of the UN. I wanted to know your ideas about our deploying and our relationship with the African Union and what their responsibilities are in terms of the missions that we deploy to. Especially Africa, in terms of the continent and our partners there, what do we need to make sure that they have in place as we go there? They're on the ground. They have boots on the ground. We're putting fewer of our men and women in harm's way when we have trained capacity built with our partners on the ground. Elaborate for me.
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: It's a great question, senator, because in Mali there are four missions: AFRICOM; the United States mission; the United Nations mission; and the African Union mission. So you can imagine the liaison that's required.
I don't know whether I've mentioned it yet — the senator and I discussed it — I don't know what the numbers are in Mali, but it's up well over double digits of the participating nations of a meaningful size making up to 14,000. Every one of their national mandates trumps the UN's. They have their own national mandates that will mean commanders calling home to ask permission if they can do X, Y and Z that the UN commander is asking them to do. Therefore, you have a real dog's breakfast at a conference in a room like this, where everybody has a different freedom of action based on their national mandate.
So you're absolutely right. I discovered the hard way, over years and years, that the very best way to establish the relationships was not through a mandate or some written contract but personal relationships, and not always with the commanders, particularly when we were dealing with ex-Soviet bloc countries — Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians. There was always the political officer still there, and you really had to get by him and get to the military commander.
Personal relationships, as simple as it sounds, actually work. A good example is the Dutch commander in my signals organization in Sarajevo. I told him, "I need a signals cell here with me. I got to take it to Sarajevo from Belgrade.'' He said, "Sir, I do not have that authority. Please give me two hours.'' He phoned home, came back in and said, "You got it.'' It wouldn't have happened if he and I had some sort of adversarial relationship and I ordered him to do it whether he wanted to or not.
So it is different command and control, but it can work in most locations.
Senator Meredith: Thank you.
Senator Beyak: Thank you very much. It's very good to see you again.
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: Likewise.
Senator Beyak: I appreciate very much your expertise. Could you tell me what you are hearing out there on the ground from the past members of the Canadian Forces about Mali, about their experiences in the past and what kind of concerns they have? And do you think there should be a vote in Parliament on a mission like this?
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: What do I hear? I hear probably 1 per cent of the force talking or people talking to friends. Everybody, from Corporal Smith to four-star General Jones, is absolutely shocked and embarrassed at the reverse planning process, where somebody has picked a number out of air — 600 — and said, "This is what we're contributing; now let's go and find a role for them.''
I know from friends in low places who were familiar with the reconnaissance done by Justice Arbour and General Dallaire that nobody during that recce asked for boots on the ground. So the temptation will be to send penny packets of a medical unit, intelligence, helicopters or whatever, and that's what I would strongly recommend against, because now you're playing to the best-case scenario.
It's so obvious to people with a little bit of military training that this is ass-backward, and this committee is an example — I'm not picking on you. But without concurrent input from foreign affairs, development and diplomacy all working together — which is the way it didn't start at the beginning of the Afghan campaign but then came together within a few years and worked a little bit better — that's what we all recognize as a flaw in the system. It is not unique for this current situation; it's been happening during my entire career and 20 years after it.
As far as the vote goes, debating in the House of Commons gives debating a really bad name. No doubt about it. I was furious. Do you remember in the mid-1970s it was decided whether we would — it had to be debated in Parliament, but it was a debate for the record, which I understand is different from the regular debate. Anyway, they had to decide whether we would move from the UN mission, UNPROFOR, to the NATO mission. NATO was taking over. Ironically, now that we had peace, they sent in planes, tanks and everything else like that.
Every party had two to three members present in the house, and two of the parties, who shall remain unnamed, stood up and had it backwards. They thought it was going from NATO to the UN. We'd been there for three years and lost about 22 or 23 people, and they didn't even have the prepared remarks that indicated they knew what the hell the decision was.
So when you ask me if there should be a debate, absolutely, if for nothing else than to reveal the ignorance of some people not even familiar with the subject.
The Chair: I will follow up on the question of debate. There's one debate that takes place to discuss the merits of whether we deploy in some part of the world, and we actually become a participant and to what degree we become a participant.
But what would your thoughts be about a requirement that every two years, say, that there be a public debate to review the consequences of a decision taken two years previously so that the public would be better informed, or at least informed in part, to exactly the results of the actions that our Canadians did in certain parts of the world? It would also be to report back to Parliament.
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: Senator, I think that could be included in the renewal of what I call a mandate — the extension; whether it's going to be extended, depending on whether it's a one-year deployment or two or three. It couldn't be included there.
But having spent — oh, my God — almost two months when I came back from the Balkans dealing with U.S. congressional hearings and seeing the depth of knowledge of what we Canadians were doing in the Balkans, in Croatia and in Bosnia, and seeing the research that was being done, anything that would force our Parliamentarians — and not just a select few on a committee — to actually become familiar with the goings on overseas would be welcome.
I had to fill in for Dini Petty on a one-hour talk show every day of the week; she was going on holiday, and I was asked to fill in for seven days. I was given six subjects, but I had one day where I could choose a subject — one program. I choose the need for a national military cemetery, just to show parliamentarians the cost of their decisions. It was the most unsuccessful talk show in the history of CBC, I'm sure, because not one person disagreed. Not one Canadian disagreed. It wasn't compulsory — "You will be buried here.'' You have a choice, and now about 50 per cent of our fallen are buried here in Ottawa. It's not a big deal to parliamentarians. We have such a small military and modest footprint overseas that it just doesn't seem to capture the imagination as a popular subject to stay current with.
So anything that would cause someone or some committee to report back to Parliament and say, "This is what we've achieved'' — it can be a little embarrassing. I was very much against the bombing of Serbia and Kosovo. I was very much against bombing Libya. It doesn't do any good to say, "I told you so,'' because a lot of other people were against it, too, but nobody said that in Parliament. We had a bloody parade and a flyover.
You've got to be a little careful where you make your commitments such that you can live with the consequences.
The Chair: That's the point of my question: It's one thing to make the decision; it's another to learn the consequences two years hence, and then the ramifications to the country and to the men and women involved.
Senator Meredith: On that same point, you talk about those who sacrifice and give their lives for this country. We've lost about 122 peacekeepers. How do we minimize that risk when we actually deploy our men and women to Africa and other parts of the world for peacekeeping? How do we minimize that?
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: I'm going to put words in soldiers' mouths: They would be the last to ask you to arrange the mission so that it's safe. If it's worth doing, they're more than prepared to go there and do it, as are the police and our diplomats. And if we're going to get into the protection game — which we are if we're going to go to Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Mali — there will be risk.
Training mitigates the risk. Equipment mitigates the risk. Good communication mitigates the risk, so you can react quickly. There are ways that the military is eminently qualified to deploy that will mitigate risk.
But I remember writing a letter to the Calgary Herald when they said we shouldn't be sending observers to the International Commission of Control and Supervision in Vietnam after the Paris Peace Accords because some of them might get hurt. And it just seemed to me — I was a major at the time — that it's ludicrous that we're going to have a force we can't deploy because somebody might get hurt.
The soldiers would be the last ones to disagree with me on that, I believe. If they do, they shouldn't be soldiers.
The Chair: I'd like to go back to a couple of things. There seems to be a thread of information being provided to us, and there are two elements of whatever decisions are going to be taken. One is the question of whether there are going to be boots on the ground, men and women, used for the purpose of, as you said, protection, peacekeeping and peacemaking operations on a day-to-day basis. Then the other cry that we've heard from numerous witnesses is the question of capacity-building and the fact that you're going into war-torn countries that have had infrastructure destroyed. Also, there are basically no institutions in place and, therefore, no civil order.
The other side of that is this: Can Canada and the Pearson peacekeeping centre play that role, as opposed to assuming that we're going to go in as a deployment, to expand and become very good at what we do in respect to training those individuals who have been identified from a country such as Mali? You wouldn't have to necessarily keep it for one country. You would identify three or four countries where you would, over a period of time, here and there perhaps, bring forward the educational tools needed to bring these people into a situation where they can take care of their own country. That is as opposed to going in on a day-to-day basis and spending $450 million just strictly keeping the peace, which is already being kept, in part, by people who have already been sent there by the United Nations. In other words, we could make a difference over a longer period of time. What would be your comments on that?
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: I have a few comments on that, senator.
I would say that, yes, it's a good idea for a government to accept its low profile. I keep reading into my thought process that they want high profile, low risk and cheap, but I'm sorry, they don't go together. But, yes, absolutely, both can be done.
As far as capacity-building goes, you're primarily using civilian resources that will go in and, once again, I would say, with Canadian security because some of those areas are very dangerous. But if it's another situation where the capital is secure and there's a limited amount of peace, then sure, they can go in there, as they do in a development role. I've seen aid workers in some really dangerous situations witness what's going on in Syria right now. There are no shortage of volunteers, God bless them. So, yes, that could certainly be done concurrently.
If it's being done by itself, then you have a public relations challenge that has to be met if the government wants a profile, because as soon as they deploy, it's a story, and that's the last you'll hear of it, unless somebody is killed. It's very low profile.
Whereas if you put boots on the ground — and I'm not advocating that; I'm just saying that if you send people in, I want them protected, and that means boots on the ground around them — then journalists will start visiting, because if it bleeds, it leads. If somebody is killed, then there will be more coverage. That's just the real world. That's the way it works.
But certainly that's good work and needs to be done. Guys like Lloyd Axworthy will be here pounding on the table telling you to do it.
The Chair: Isn't there another issue or question here, as well? Doesn't any decision taken by our government have to look at whether it is in the interests of Canada as well as the country that we're going to go into to aid and assist? I ask this question because every day we see the carnage in Syria on a day-to-day basis. It is not too far off when there will have to be a major reconstruction of that country if we're going to be able to meet any of the social and humanitarian issues that are out there. There are millions of people, and we cannot believe what's taking place there.
So if the decision is taken to make this commitment to go to Africa in significant numbers — and you forgot to outline our commitments we have already made to Kurdistan, Latvia and other countries — are we, in the short term, causing ourselves the inability to really assist a country that actually is affecting our public security here in Canada?
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: I would refer to comments I made to the media a couple of days ago and that I'll repeat this afternoon on CPAC. If you took the money that we're going to spend seeking a seat on the Security Council — a non-voting seat for two years, commencing in 2021 — there are so many better places within the UN to spend it.
Ironically, the UN was created in 1945 to assist in maintaining international peace and security. I was giving a presentation in Minneapolis when an individual came up to me afterwards who just happened to be the last living signatory of the UN Charter in 1945, and they said, "You know General MacKenzie, you're right, except that we didn't have World War III.'' And that's why the Security Council was created and why the Permanent Five were given the veto.
By the way, the fine print says that the makeup and procedures within the Security Council are open to veto too, which means there will never be a change in my lifetime. They will always be the Permanent Five. The rest are there after a very expensive campaign to get there and then to maintain it.
Bob Fowler was on TV the other night, and for the four years he was there, he was doing an average of 22 to 23 functions every night for four years. He said it costs something; it costs a lot of money.
You give that money to UNICEF. I've had UNICEF and UNHCR working out of my headquarters. There is where the growth industry is, unfortunately; the clientele is growing dramatically every day and some real good is being done there, no doubt about it.
I know it's not a zero sum game; it's not one or the other. But I just see where the money is being spent and where it could be spent much more wisely with more impact.
Senator Jaffer: I have a question for you based on everything that we've been hearing. I hope I can say this correctly. One of the witnesses said that DPKO sends out notes that they need men on the ground. Different countries say they will send this many, and then DPKO will send them out.
I may have misunderstood, but my understanding is there's not the strategic planning that needs to happen with all those people going out. That is an exaggeration, because I'm sure there is some. I don't even know if this has ever been done, but do you think that there is a place for Canada to work with DPKO to do strategic planning before people go? Could that be one of our roles?
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: Senator, way back, when I was a critic of the UN, it was a very tiny staff and they realized that they had to be 24 and 7. So they started bringing in people, and a lot of countries, including Canada, volunteered to provide their officers' expertise to the UN at no cost. Canada would cover that cost.
I still remember going down to visit this new situation room. It was not an operations centre. There was no authority and I loved it because there was a cardboard sign on the front that said "General Lewis MacKenzie Situation Room. We work 24 and 7.'' That was nice; I liked that.
My point is that Third World countries protested immediately because those of us who could afford to maintain our people in New York were sending officers into the headquarters where they weren't accepting the US$150 per diem and salary while they were in New York for accommodations, et cetera. Within about two months, the plan was quashed. They no longer were providing those free resources to the UN.
So there is that type of planning going on now. I'm not an expert, but I know there has been a 20-fold increase in the staff there. So they have the people to do the job and within that staff I'm sure there are some.
But it becomes difficult to fine-tune the force by way of balance. You're absolutely right: What happens is that those requests come to a country — unless it has changed from my day — and ask, "In the event that we have a mission in such and such, what are you prepared to contribute?'' And if you go back and say "Nothing,'' then you're not asked. You have to go back and say, "We're prepared to volunteer this and that,'' and then you're officially asked, through the front door, to do just that.
You can imagine how time consuming that is. Some of those missions have 30 or 35 nations represented, some with only a couple of people, other ones with thousands. But it's a very difficult process for the UN to create the force that they want in the time in which they want it.
The Chair: Colleagues, we're coming to an end here. I would like to ask one question to the general about the overall defence policy review that's underway.
Do you have any comments that you would like to make on any area of the military that you think should be changed, altered or otherwise? You may want to comment on the reserves, procurement or ballistic missile defence, and then we'll conclude our meeting.
Do you have any comments?
Maj.-Gen. MacKenzie: As far as resources go, it's a hot subject. Ask any expert in the military today; there are disclosures that should take place. Then, in order to save resources and money, people will throw up their hands from that area and say, "My God you can't do that,'' like in Summerside. They will get on a bus and drive up here to protest in front of Parliament.
Every one of those locations the military leaves, booms. Why? Because we don't produce anything in the military. It's deterrence, and they maybe spend 50 per cent of the salaries in the local area. Most of them become industrial parks: witness Calgary, Summerside and locations like that. We are maintaining infrastructure way beyond our requirements.
The reserves have been beaten on ever since I can remember, even when I was one myself, but the fact is they provided an essential resource during the Afghan War of 20 per cent, 25 per cent, and did an outstanding job. When I visited Afghanistan, I couldn't tell the difference because there was none. They were doing that specific job extremely well. But every time it comes to save money, naturally they get picked on. And they're a very mobile workforce. A lot of students join the reserves. They stay for a couple years and then they go off and get a job on graduation and whatever.
Procurement: I thought I set a Guinness book world record. I only served one year here in Ottawa in 33 years. I discovered a friend of mine never came here — General Goudreau, a wise individual. We called it capital punishment. But I just don't understand the complication of purchasing equipment when it was demonstrated in the Afghan conflict how quickly you could get aircraft, tanks and artillery because lives were being lost.
It takes years and years of Public Works and DND working together. If you wanted to buy a tank 30 years ago you needed a colonel, a sergeant major and a corporal in the office. Now you fill a theatre with the number of project managers you need in order to buy something.
I wish I had an answer. All I know is it seems to be an insurmountable problem. I don't know why, but the fact is that it is. Procurement is so frustrating to get the right equipment into the right hands.
The Chair: General, thank you very much for coming before us. It has been a very informative presentation, and I want to say that we very much appreciate you taking time out of your schedule to be here. On behalf of the committee and the Senate, I would like to thank you for your outstanding service to our country and to our women and men in uniform.
Joining us for our fourth panel of the day are representatives of the Royal Canadian Legion: Major General (Retired) Richard Blanchette, Chairman, Defence and Security Committee; and Charls Gendron, Secretary, Defence and Security Committee. From the Canadian Association of Veterans in United Nations Peacekeeping, we have Major (Retired) Wayne Mac Culloch, National President. And from the Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans Association, we have Lieutenant General (Retired) Louis Cuppens, Special Advisor.
Gentleman, welcome to the committee. I understand that each association has an opening statement. We will start with the Royal Canadian Legion, followed by the Canadian Association of Veterans in United Nations Peacekeeping and then the Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans Association.
Major-General (Ret'd) Richard Blanchette, Chairman, Defence and Security Committee, Royal Canadian Legion: It's a great pleasure to appear in front of your committee. I am pleased to be able to speak to you this afternoon on behalf of our Dominion President, Comrade Dave Flannigan, and nearly 300,000 members. I am accompanied by Comrade Charles Gendron, who is the Secretary of the Defence and Security Committee of the Royal Canadian Legion. The Legion's mission is to serve veterans, which include active military and RCMP members, and their families, to promote remembrance and to serve our communities and our country.
[Translation]
I succeeded the late General Bill Leach as Chairperson of the Royal Canadian Legion's Defence and Security Committee. He described the position as the point of entry or contact with various departments whose decisions affect veterans and active members of the Canadian Armed Forces, as well as retired police officers and active members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
Issues of equipment, training, pay and morale are all components of this committee's mandate, which I have the honour of chairing.
[English]
When you consider these responsibilities, rest assured that the Legion did not commit mission creep, as we used to say at staff college. Our organization, your Legion, was created by an act of Parliament in 1926, and to this day we have been assisting veterans through our legislative mandate in both the Pension Act and the New Veterans Charter. The Legion is the only veteran service organization that assists veterans and their families with representation to Veterans Affairs Canada and the Veterans Review and Appeal Board. Our 22 professional service officers, not to mention all those who are not professional helpers but who are volunteers, are located across the country and provide free assistance to veterans and their families with obtaining benefits and services from Veterans Affairs Canada, and one does not have to be a Legion member to avail himself or herself of our services.
[Translation]
Accordingly, the Legion feels the new defence policy should hinge on the people who will make this defence policy work. I have had an opportunity to brief two members of the Minister's Advisory Panel, namely General Henault and Margaret Purdy, on this very subject here in Ottawa.
In June, I had a similar opportunity when I was in Halifax, when I participated in a round table discussion chaired by the Parliamentary Secretary for National Defence, John McKay. On both of these occasions, I presented eight recommendations, which were related to personnel issues affecting both serving and retired members of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. I will not repeat those eight recommendations in these opening comments, hoping that they have already made their way to whoever needs to hear them for a defence policy review more focused on personnel issues.
[English]
Today, you rather want to hear us on issues concerning peace support operations. I will limit myself therefore to four recommendations related to this matter.
Our first recommendation will not sound new to your ears but does need to be repeated. A DPR, a defence policy review, is a challenging mental and practical exercise that needs to be based on a wider national security strategy. Such a national security strategy has to take into account all the assets, military, police and civilian, that Canada has at its disposal. Our American, British, Australian and French allies have all followed this much more logical approach. It is now clear that our new government has elected to put the cart before the horse.
Of course, we will hear that there was, there is and there will be a lot of consultation with other departments and organizations to produce the new defence policy. But, like many analysts have said before me, we are missing a great opportunity to take a global look at how Canada can contribute to the security of the world we live in. My recommendation has to be pragmatic, though. The train has already left the station. The announcements made on August 26 by Ministers Dion, Sajjan, Goodale and Bibeau on peace operations confirmed it. There will not be a national security strategy that will guide the preparation of the DPR, the defence policy review. In its stead, our recommendation is that staff officers and public servants developing the defence policy come up with a solid set of assumptions that will go further than the set of mandate letters to ministers. Of course, we are very happy to see these mandate letters, but we need more. These assumptions would never replace a national security strategy, but they would greatly facilitate the drafting of the new defence policy and its comprehension once promulgated.
[Translation]
Our second recommendation is that the defence policy review does not lead to the development of capabilities so specialized that their cost prohibits a multipurpose combat force in both offensive and defence operations. The balance between specialization and versatility must be maintained in all five elements, as we must now include space and cyberspace.
[English]
Our third recommendation is that if the Canadian Armed Forces deploy more personnel and more often, the Government of Canada has to build into the planning process an evaluation of long-term costs associated with supporting the families at home and the veterans themselves, even after they will have retired from active service. This implies a much closer cooperation between RCMP, Veterans Affairs, DND and Public Safety Canada through Minister Ralph Goodale, over and above the very constructive idea of double heading Minister Hehr as Associate Minister of National Defence.
[Translation]
Our fourth recommendation is that, should there be an increased participation in peace operations, the Government of Canada takes the necessary steps to improve the interdepartmental cooperation that is essential to operational planning and that includes allocating and distributing equipment, cultural briefings and specialized training. The 3D — Defence, Diplomacy and Development — or whole-of-government approach learned with difficulty from the Provincial Reconstruction Teams — the well-known PRT and Kandahar PRT — must be examined and improved according to future operational theatres.
[English]
In conclusion, the Royal Canadian Legion, with its nearly 300,000 members, is following the DPR very closely. We are grateful that your committee allowed us to contribute to your study with these four recommendations. Please do not forget to take into account also our eight recommendations on personnel.
Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Louis Cuppens, Special Advisor, Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans Association: The Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans Association forwarded to you, quite some time ago, a covering letter and a paper that I wrote to highlight just what was mentioned by our Legion representatives, the need for a broad consultation in developing this paper.
It is our position that a new defence policy review cannot occur in isolation. There are so many other government agencies that must be involved. Otherwise, we will end up with this, the 1987 white paper on defence, never funded, never even implemented, because it was done internal to the department. I brought it along just in case someone wants to borrow it.
You can see by the note that I sent that I have an extensive background in 38 years of military service, including my service in Colorado Springs as the deputy commander in chief of NORAD. I certainly can answer any questions on ballistic missile defence that you may have. I also directed the peacekeeping operations in National Defence headquarters, and I participated in a number of them, including Lewis MacKenzie's two missions. I would be glad to answer any questions that come up rather than reading my lengthy paper, which is nine pages long; I will leave that to your devices.
I'm prepared to answer any questions you may have. It is a pleasure to be here among you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, general. Do we have one other presentation?
Major (Ret'd) Wayne Mac Culloch, National President, Canadian Association of Veterans in United Nations Peacekeeping: Mr. Chair and honourable senators, I'm delighted to appear before you today to share the thoughts of the members of the Canadian Association of Veterans in United Nations Peacekeeping on the topic of our future participation in UN peace support operations and missions.
As you have previously mentioned, the mandate of this committee is to examine missions under the United Nations banner. I believe this definition should also include missions authorized by UN Security Council resolutions carried out by other agencies such as NATO or the African Union. In addition, peace support missions are not a clearly identifiable niche in the spectrum of conflict but constitute a continuum from peace building, to forestalling a conflict, to peacemaking, where the robust use of force is required to create a cessation of hostilities.
Peace support missions must have a clear and achievable Canadian objective. This should be distinctly measurable and have milestones for intermediate progress toward the ultimate objective.
The mandate provided to a Canadian contingent must closely align with the objective. Great care should be exercised to ensure that it is both clear and comprehensive of Canadian mission objectives. This document needs to also mirror the UN-based mission mandate, whether it be Chapter V or Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Discrepancies of this sort in the past between the UN and Canada have led to confusion on the ground — a situation which needlessly exposes our troops to danger and our nation to embarrassment.
Peace support missions are generally not low-risk for the individuals involved and are frequently life-changing events. By their very nature, such missions involve inserting Canadians into unstable, or verging on unstable, situations, frequently when law and order has broken down. While it is preferable to insert peace support personnel before situations become unstable, it is highly unlikely that a nation would request and accept a UN peace support mission before it was either at or past the tipping point for trouble.
Any Canadian contingent must have clear rules of engagement which are set by Parliament. This should include self-defence both for individuals and collectively. There should also be provision for the use of force in other events, from stopping firefights to the defence of helpless civilians, to prevent any Srebrenica-like incidents such as happened to our Dutch allies in Bosnia in 1995. Surely we have learned by now that Canadian soldiers must never again be ordered to stand by while the most vile acts are committed before their very eyes.
Examples of successful missions in this area include UNDOF in the Golan Heights, the one-year mission to Namibia, and UNTSO in the Middle East. Angola and Rwanda were notable failures from which we must wring applicable lessons.
In terms of support, Canadian amenities should be provided to all Canadian participants on peace support missions. Special attention must be given to individual augmentees who are often overlooked in the provision of such support and are left to fend for themselves.
On a related topic, despite reach-back and other modern technologies which can remove humans from the mission theatre, there will always be a requirement for some support in close proximity to the boots on the ground. The temptation to reduce this essential support in order to reduce numbers of personnel in theatre must be avoided. The provision of an adequate support echelon in theatre is essential, not only for the maintenance of high morale but also because such intimate support is vital to mission success.
As I mentioned earlier, service on peace support missions is frequently a life-changing event, and all members of the peace support missions should be covered by government assistance during the mission and through Veterans Affairs Canada after their return from overseas. The current gap is most severely felt by provincial and municipal police forces which are deployed on such missions, but gaps also exist with members of the RCMP who deploy also. They should receive the same levels of support and coverage as the Canadian Armed Forces members.
Families of the deployed members on missions also require significant support. In this case, this needs to start before deployment commences, and family members need to understand what the UN mission involves and Canada's part in it. Further preparatory education should be provided to the family on its safety net, and what to do when the unexpected happens. The Canadian Armed Forces continues to develop a suitable model in this area, which should be migrated to the RCMP and police services. At the conclusion of the tour, reintegration education is required for both the deployed individual and the family members.
In summary, for Canada to continue with its rich history of engagement in peace support operations around the globe, some shortfalls will need to be addressed before government embarks on a resurgence in this area. Direction must be clear and sensible and provide for the protection of Canadian personnel and the helpless. Adequate support from start to finish is the responsibility of the government that deployed them and must recognize the impacts on individuals and families of all deployed personnel.
Thank you very much. I'm very prepared to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you very much for your presentations, and I know I speak for all of us: Thank you for your service to the country to keep our country safe.
I would like to start with you, General Cuppens, from the Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans Association, on the Pearson Centre. I've read your presentation. You've said we must create an establishment to replace the now shut down Pearson Centre. Can you comment on that and why you think that, please?
Lt.-Gen. Cuppens: I know which paper you are referring to. My colleague that couldn't be here today, General Mitchell, is a strong advocate of that centre. The centre was in existence for a long period of time, and it supports the notion that for attending a peace support operation or taking part in joint operations where we're trying to restore peace in an area that has none, special training is needed.
This training was given to diplomats, to health and aid agencies, as well as to military people who would be in charge, primarily oriented towards understanding the modalities of the missions and understanding what government involvement is, very much like General MacKenzie mentioned: What do you do in the ninth hour when everything turns horrible? Who do you contact?
There was an extensive training process. It is unfortunate that the centre closed down, and so there's strong advocacy on the part of our organization to recreate that.
Senator Jaffer: One of the witnesses, I think it was yesterday, spoke about building the intellectual — I don't mean to say people aren't intelligent; don't take it that way — intellectual ability of mid-management, people in the army and navy and air force, and to create a more strategic base, a more strategic army in Canada.
Do any of you want to comment on that? How would we go about strengthening the mid-management, not the top management, in all three forces?
Lt.-Gen. Cuppens: I will give it a shot first, and my colleagues may wish to pipe in.
During my time at National Defence headquarters in 1987, we created the directorate of peacekeeping operations. It was well before General Hillier came in and restructured the headquarters components. I can recall, as we got involved in what General MacKenzie described so well, that if your country was asked to provide a logistics battalion, what would your answer be, and then the follow-on to that.
Usually around the table, working to provide the best possible advice to government, we had people from CIDA, Foreign Affairs, RCMP, CSIS, people internal to National Defence as well, whether logisticians, finance or legal people. I led this team around several times — it was about a 20-person team — to make sure that we had captured a total-government solution, and that's common knowledge among people who are in the Defence Department in uniform. I'm not so sure it is common knowledge in the other departments of government.
Maj.-Gen. Blanchette: Your question is very important. My feeling is that mid-level management in the Canadian Forces equates roughly to major to full colonel rank. I would say that the system that we have in place in the Canadian Forces right now is an excellent one. It doesn't need all that much tweaking to be nearly perfect. I'm serious about it. I have been giving classes to various organizations. I've followed it very closely, and it is very, very efficient.
What is not so efficient is how we are training our civilian partners. Our colleagues from Foreign Affairs or Global Affairs, from development, even from the police or military side, need to know how the operational planning process unfolds in the Canadian Forces, and I would say in the world at large because we are taking the Americans' advice as to how to do this. Our system is very close to theirs.
We want to have good teams. I was director of peacekeeping policy when I was a colonel, and when we worked with the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre to work on the ancestor of the PRT, when we were calling it 3D operations, it was quite striking that it was difficult to talk with our colleagues because they were not at the same speed. They found it difficult to hop on the bandwagon that was moving really quickly as we were getting ready to go for mission X.
It's quite surprising that our public servant development system is not thinking of having a better cooperation between civilian and military in that field.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Before asking my questions, I would like to make a comment on Mr. Mac Culloch's statement. You said that municipal and provincial police often need support after participating in an operation. As the former president of the Quebec Provincial Police Association, I can tell you that you are entirely correct. Many people who came back from missions to Rwanda and Haiti needed support.
My question is for Major-General Blanchette. In your presentation, you talked about a more logical approach adopted by other allied countries and said that Canada refuses to adopt it, in spite of your suggestions that we do so. Why does Canada not want to follow the example of the allied countries?
Maj.-Gen. Blanchette: Unfortunately, I think our government should answer the question. We are currently in a situation where we have simply put the cart before the horse. We have to get started, but let us be realistic: it is too late. Revising a national security strategy takes a lot of time. If it is the first time we are trying to do it, we have acquire intellectual capacity that involves nearly all aspects of civil society and everything relating to Canada's military power, and all the elements we are capable of deploying as a G8 country if we are to influence the international situation, or, more simply, focus on the ways we can deploy our elements here in Canada.
I mentioned four countries that have responded by carrying out this process. Once there is a solid foundation, there is no need to revisit the national strategy and constantly change it. We are talking about having policies that will be braced on that national security strategy and that must be developed methodically, as I said earlier.
Senator Dagenais: I have a question for Mr. Cuppens. Unfortunately, UN peace missions in the past have resulted in the deaths of 22 Canadian Blue Helmets. Each case is different, certainly, but surely there are lessons we can learn from this loss of life, to do better at keeping our soldiers safe. Would you have any suggestions as to new ways of doing things, at least in order to reduce the loss of life?
[English]
Lt.-Gen. Cuppens: The question you asked is quite complicated, and I was able to sit in when General MacKenzie was answering a similar question. First of all, as you know, when the military is committed to a peace support operation or a peace restoration operation or whatever, the soldiers are well trained and well briefed, and they understand the nature of security.
But long before that an assessment is required of a potential mission. I think this is what you're getting at. The mission needs a reconnaissance in detail. When it's finally done, as I mentioned in my report, you need to know logistics support, communications, medical support, who you're working with, rules of engagement, casualty estimates.
How can you give the government a signal saying it's okay to do this mission in Africa when you haven't assessed any of those factors and many, many more? The military folks who do that type of work are well trained to do it. As my colleague here has mentioned, unfortunately on the DFAIT side, and perhaps sometimes on the CIDA side, there is a quest to try to do nation rebuilding at the same time, and not enough attention is paid to the security elements and risks involved.
I can cite examples of when we were sent in 1987-88 to deploy a communications entity between Iran and Iraq, to separate those entities who had agreed to come to a ceasefire. It took a lot of reconnaissance, exploitation of interest, intelligence, just to make sure that we were in fact committing the Government of Canada and its young people to do this mission.
Other missions were done in haste. I can point to a number of them where we did have casualties and they should not have occurred had the assessment been done correctly.
I hope I've answered your question, senator.
[Translation]
Maj.-Gen. Blanchette: To follow up on your question, I would like to add that I have had the privilege of commanding troops in three UN missions. I started in Cyprus, and then I commanded my battalion in Haiti and in Rwanda, where, for a year, I was in very difficult situations where the lives of many people under my command were at stake.
What you are talking about corresponds to what we call, in terms of operational planning, "the zero loss factor''. What is the possibility of suffering no losses?
[English]
Zero casualties. This is a very important factor to consider when you're doing your assessment on how you are deploying your troops, but the very basic factor to consider will always be the leadership on the ground. The leadership on the ground has the responsibility to make the call, by looking one person in the eye, determining if the risk is too high to go to this mission. The military is the only organization where you can give a legitimate order and you know that this person will be killed. This is very tough.
I must admit that many, many Canadians do not realize that difference, and I have a lot of respect for my police officer friends and firefighters and all of this, but these trades are protected in one way or another. If they want to refuse, they have the legitimate right of refusal. You don't in the military, and that is very important to understand.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: My question is for Lieutenant-General Cuppens. There is often discussion of problems relating to funding military activities, the envelope for which should amount to 2 per cent of GDP. We are far from that, since our investments come to less than 1 per cent of GDP. This is a recurring situation that has an impact on equipment, training, strengths, and so on.
You say in your presentation that without a substantial budget increase, we will once again be freeloaders, at least for the next year, meaning that we will have to draw on other budgets to fill our gaps. Can you give us some practical examples of situations on a deployment or mission where we have had to make up for a shortage of equipment or preparation by drawing on the resources of another country?
[English]
Lt.-Gen. Cuppens: Another very complicated question that you ask, but I'll attempt to provide some examples and also highlight the issue.
Yes, in my paper I commented that Canada has not met the NATO obligation that it signed up to. We are part of NATO. We agreed at a meeting to 2 per cent growth. We haven't done that yet. In fact, we have frozen the Defence budget in the last cycle. We're probably sitting just short of 1 per cent. We're fifteenth among all the other nations.
This is not new. We have been defence freeloaders for a very long time. I had the pleasure of serving in the United States for five years. I was reminded constantly, both by their Secretary of Defense and their various heads of the joint chiefs, of Canada's shortfalls. We need to correct that. We're part of NATO. When they all take a vote and put their hands up, Canada says, "2 per cent.'' We haven't done that.
With regard to your specific question about mission and mission support, in 1957, I believe it was, 1956-57, we sent a recce squadron from Canada over to patrol the area between Israel and Egypt. We sent them over there inadequately equipped, clothed incorrectly for a hot climate and with no food, but we had to get there quickly. Over time that was addressed. That was in 1957.
I participated in missions where we had no logistic support planned. We had taken our troops out of Europe. During this last mission in Afghanistan, we had to create Camp Mirage in another country, and we couldn't give the name out to the media so that we could actually logistically support the troops in our area. We had to create a hospital to look after the medically wounded people. Still we had to backload them to Landstuhl, Germany, because we didn't have a plan for long-term medical evacuation.
We sent people to various theatres again with weapons that didn't work or not enough weapons. Look at the mission in Afghanistan, the need for tanks, the need for heavy-lift helicopters. We have done all of this. Surely over in that Defence Department there must be a book about that thick called "Lessons Learned.'' I've been out 18 years, but I'm still reading about some of this stuff.
To try to answer your question, we have sent people into harm's way not equipped with the very best of equipment, whatever we can possibly get done. I could mention types of equipment if you want, Iltis Jeep being one of them, but there are many. I hope I've answered your question.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: Listening to your presentations, I note that when it comes to the army, when Canada leaves on a mission, you feel that we are not sufficiently prepared, trained or equipped to deal with the threats and situations that may arise, and that this can jeopardize the lives and security of members of the forces.
This morning, the Auditor General spoke to us about the condition of the reserve. He has also submitted a report on that subject. He told us that reserve members are less well-trained than regular forces personnel. The reserve is also less well-funded than the regular forces. He also said that reserve members are physically less prepared and less equipped than regular forces personnel. However, we are told that in a deployment situation, they will undergo additional training that is close to what regular forces personnel receive.
I now hear, this afternoon, that the resources available to the forces in this regard are not sufficient. I am concerned about the risks associated with a mission for which we are ill-prepared. Is that fear subjective or objective? Is it right to be afraid that if Canada gets involved in a mission, the army and the reserve are not sufficiently prepared and there is a significant risk of loss of life?
[English]
Lt.-Gen. Cuppens: Your question is a matter of currency in the sense that I've been retired for 18 years, almost 19. What I recount to you in my paper is that there are deficiencies. I cannot comment on the degree of training in Canada's military reserve. It's my understanding — and you should ask that question to the commander of the army — that when a reservist is called up to active service, he has the same qualification as the man standing next to him. He has the same skill set as the men in the infantry battalion, the artillery unit or whatever unit he is with.
So your premise about them not being as skilled is foreign to me. We don't put a reservist into a situation that he has not been trained for. He cannot apply, nor can the unit send him, if he's not qualified. This gentleman may be more current, but that's my answer.
[Translation]
Maj.-Gen. Blanchette: I retired four years ago, so my experience is a little more recent.
I would like to continue in the same vein, starting with the question of the 2 per cent defence effort and what goes on at NATO. For three years, I had the privilege of sitting at the right hand of General Henault, who was the chair of the military committee. At the time, there were 26 nations around the table. The challenge of reaching consensus was as difficult then as when the alliance first began, when we made the decision about the 2 per cent. Trying to find a consensus is always a real challenge when there are 26 organizations or nations that have to agree. The situation is more or less the same today with the 28 member nations of NATO.
The decision concerning the 2 per cent target was based on the assurance that all of the countries would be able to achieve it, of course. However, we knew for a fact that some nations would be able to do certain things with 2 per cent, and other nations would be able to do other things. So there was a very subjective aspect, from that perspective.
I will now talk about the question of training for reservists. I served as director of reserves management for two years, at the rank of colonel, during the last decade. At that time, we had a process we called the Army Reserve restructure — it related to the army and not the navy or air force. It should be noted that the navy and air force use their reservists very differently from the army. The reason why reservists were also useful during the recent deployments, in the former Yugoslavia and even in Afghanistan, is that they were there as individual replacements. Those replacements proved to be extremely useful in infantry battalions, a majority of which served as a base for the forces on the ground.
These units receive budgets to provide a certain amount of group training. However, the frustration you may have perceived behind the figures provided by the commanders of Reserve regiments relates to the fact that with the money available to them, they are not able to bring the group training up to a level that would enable them to put even a platoon, 30 men and women, on the ground. This has been the situation for a very long time. The fact that we are capable of providing reservists — who come fairly quickly with what is called the build-up of a unit — with the opportunity to achieve the same standards as soldiers in the regular army must be seen as a victory. Ultimately, I come back to the idea of leadership. It is the unit commander who will assess their troops and say to their boss: "I am ready to go'' or "I am not ready to go.'' That responsibility will always rest with the commander appointed to go on a mission.
Senator Carignan: In the army itself, is there a sufficiently high level of preparation to perform the mission?
Maj.-Gen. Blanchette: Each case is different. When I was preparing my battalion to leave for Haiti, I recall very well that we had certain targets to achieve. I had spoken with my chain of command, that is, the people who worked for me, and with my brigade commander, to determine what we wanted to accomplish during the three months we had, from the time we received our warning order. With all the additional duties assigned to me, such as cultural training — managing to speak Creole at a certain level, for example — I came down to the wire. There was a series of factors that had hit me in the beginning. In the final weeks, we had to compress leave time, cut leave time. But when we left, I saluted my boss and told him: "We are ready to go.'' That is how it works.
[English]
The Chair: Colleagues, time is moving on for us. We have 10 minutes left. We have three senators who have questions.
Would you please keep your preambles fairly concise, and could we ask that the responses be fairly concise.
Senator Beyak: I'd like to echo Senator Jaffer's thanks to all of you for your defence of our nation. It's an honour to have you here with us.
You'll be happy to note, General Cuppens, that yesterday that same report was brought forth, and they told us that they hoped that our report would include some lessons learned.
I wonder if each of you could give me your thoughts. You already did your opening remarks, General Cuppens, on our need to have a foreign policy review in conjunction with a national defence review. We've heard several witnesses tell us that it's incumbent or that the national defence review is just another document, as you said.
Lt.-Gen. Cuppens: I raised it in my paper. In fact, when I saw the mandate letters for each of the ministers assigned to the cabinet, I right away wrote an editorial saying you cannot do a defence review in isolation. You need to have your colleagues in foreign affairs, CIDA, security and public safety. All of us have a role to play in national security, and some aspects of national security will require military force, and some aspects will require political imposition of will, security forces, natural resources or industry preparedness.
You just can't pull down and say this is the national security policy of Canada without collectively getting those ministers around the table with their best possible advice and signing up: "Yes, this is what we want the military to be capable of; this is what we want our foreign affairs operators and diplomats to do; this is what we want the public media to do; this is what we want our police to do.''
I'm very pro a collective review, not an independent review, as I waved this document to you, unfunded. It collapsed.
We've had several others call the Canada First Defence Strategy also unfunded. So, until this gets right among the politicians, we're kind of doomed failure.
Maj. Mac Culloch: I believe they go hand in glove. To do one without the other is a job half finished.
Senator Meredith: We talk about training for our Canadian Forces and pre-deployment and our reservists and so forth.
On the flip side, for our partners whose countries we're going into, what is the responsibility of Canada to ensure that they're fully equipped, capacity-built to minimize risk as well as minimize the loss of lives when we do deploy our troops there?
The second question, Major-General Blanchette, is with respect to the Auditor General with respect to PTSD and the well-being of our veterans, which is, again, very topical and how we need to ensure that we have the mechanisms in place to support them.
I would like your comments on that quickly. Maybe Major Mac Culloch, you could speak first, sir, and then the other gentlemen can pipe in.
Maj. Mac Culloch: I think I'll take a pass on that one. The network is more than just PTSD that is required, and it's acutely felt most by the people with the least amount of support net. Unfortunately, those are just a little beyond the reach of the federal government in the provincial and municipal police forces.
I think that in terms of the training that we do to get out the door, it's as good as we can make it, and it's difficult to influence that of other partners because they are, after all, sovereign nations.
Lt.-Gen. Cuppens: With regard to the first part of your question on preparations, if we're going to enter an operation of whatever type with an ally, we have to clearly understand what their rules of engagement are. We had quite an experience in Bosnia and the Balkans. For example, the U.S. military have an ability in their law to defend property. You can defend your home with lethal force. It's not so in Canada.
So when you enter a theatre where you're holding ground, you have to have very clear rules of engagement amongst all of those who are participating; otherwise, someone is pulling back and others are left to stand.
That's one of the major factors to be discussed, but I rattled off a litany of them earlier, so I won't bore with you that. There are a lot of preparations there.
For the most part, Western-leaning countries have trained together. We've been together before, so it's not difficult. It's when you get into training other nations who have not been with us.
On the second part, I've testified in front of the Commons Committee on Veterans Affairs several times about the need for closer cooperation between Defence and Veteran Affairs Canada. There should be a seamless transition. There shouldn't be a release of an individual who, three weeks later, commits suicide.
There are a lot of things wrong. Veterans Affairs and the House of Commons are trying very hard to address it and fix it. It's not working to 100 per cent yet, but I would dare say that we're at the 80 percentile level.
PTSD is a major issue for many of the soldiers who have come back from beyond, especially Afghanistan. In fact, I'm told that more soldiers have died of suicide since Afghanistan than the numbers that died while they were in theatre.
Maj.-Gen. Blanchette: Perhaps to start with the question I missed, Senator Beyak, that in my speech I did cover for two minutes the need for a national security strategy.
On the two points that you had, senator, I would like to say that capacity building is a wonderful domain where we Canadians are good at passing on our savoir faire. The best example of it is, of course, quite recent with what we did in Afghanistan, and for the year that I served there, I visited the Afghan security forces on a very regular basis to witness that very positive interaction that was happening, and, unfortunately, it's not all the countries that are able to do this. We never had anybody — and I stand to be corrected — killed by an Afghan who turned against a Canadian. So I think that speaks volumes for how good our folks are as trainers.
On the well-being of our forces, I think I speak on behalf of both serving members and veterans here that we expect the Government of Canada to take care of us when we have difficulties, whether they are physical or mental, when they are due to our previous services.
You will hear a lot of complaints, of course, but it is a huge field where so many resources are required to make a dent in what needs to be done, and Veterans Affairs, from what we've understood from the mandate letters, has a very tall order. And in the Legion, we're basically keeping the government's feet to the fire, and we want to make sure that they continue filling up these things. We are identifying them in a numerical way: You have 14 left; okay, you are down to 12; keep on going, minister. This is the kind of request that we are making.
But even with the members who are serving, we have situations where we have real hopes. For example, my brother served in the military for 28 years. He died last year. His widow came to me and said, "These mandate letters — I've read them. I saw that I might get 70 per cent of your brother's income or pension; is it coming?'' We are waiting for it. It is 50 per cent. She might get 70 per cent.
We're going to be careful when we're creating hopes with these letters, and we want to make sure that there's a follow-up to them and that the promises will be fulfilled.
Senator Day: My first question will follow my colleague's question — I think she read my notes here — in terms of just what we need to study in conjunction with the defence policy review. I have General Blanchette's comments in front of me. I wanted to ask you about the national security strategy, because that's a different term from a policy review.
I'm also well aware — because we were wondering where we stood when the minister started making these statements about Africa, and we're engaging in all of this, while at the same time, they asked us to do a study with respect to national defence policy. So it seems there's already a decision there, and we're really now just looking at one aspect of it.
I'm also mindful of the statement by several people who say that life is what's happening while you're making plans. Where do we start, and how do we get on with it? What did you envisage with the strategy?
Maj.-Gen. Blanchette: Unfortunately, I probably don't have time to fully answer your question. I can tell you that if the national security strategy were pie, you have a cookbook here how to cook a pie. That's from CDA — The Strategic Outlook for Canada. In there, year after year, every time you have a new document, the Legion is a member of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute. In there, you have the recipe for how to prepare a national security strategy before you determine where and how you're going to use resources for defence and security, and all the other aspects.
How can you proceed and determine how you will be training your forces when you don't know how your forces will likely be used? Are we likely to go against Russia in the next couple of years? Is that something that could be on the books for us? It depends how we define our relationship to Russia. How do we define our relationship to China? That's a very general question, but that needs to be answered to a certain point so that the military officers have a better understanding of how the Government of Canada wants to use its forces.
I'm not talking about having another Cold War here, but we need to have those big questions asked, and if you want a detailed list of it, this document covers exactly how this should be unfolding.
Senator Day: My question is short and is for General Cuppens. We have the advantage of having someone who served with NORAD as deputy commander for a good number of years. This committee is on record as saying that we should be participating in missile defence. To the extent that you can, could you discuss with us your reaction to the many-years-ago decision not to participate and your view now?
Lt.-Gen. Cuppens: I maintain the same view I had when I was in Colorado Springs, namely, that we should be a participant. We are in NATO already. NATO has a missile defence system. We're a part of NATO. When I was describing this, I couldn't get the logic through to a mixed group of senators and MPs. The honourable senator down there was at one of my briefings about ballistic missile defence.
I saw it as an opportunity lost — the tremendous experience that Canadian young people would have had in developing such a system. I had gone so far as to place officers within the development modules in Washington and elsewhere. Once our country decided we're not participating, they were all withdrawn.
To me, we are inching ever closer to the point when undeterred actors will threaten this nation and our neighbours to the south — without having a fully deployed system, which is quite different than the one that exists right now, which is very small.
Canada has a lot to offer. We could, for instance, participate in the detection mode. We could participate in the guidance mode or the research and development mode. But once we declared we are not participating, all those opportunities went away.
So I'm very much a proponent and remain a proponent of missile defence. I did my best when I was wearing a uniform to convince government people we should be involved, and they decided no. I saluted and walked away.
The Chair: I want to thank our witnesses. General Cuppens, we had a unanimous report supporting Canada's participation in ballistic missile defence, and I think it was a very serious moment lost for our country. It has put us to some degree in jeopardy if events go the way some people think they might. And at any rate, maybe the Government of Canada is listening and might take the opportunity as a new government to see what they can do to convince the United States we should be part of that.
Thank you all for coming today, and for the time and effort you put into your presentations. They will be considered seriously.
Joining us on panel five today, as we consider issues related to the defence policy review and Canada's re-engagement with peacekeeping operations, is Her Excellency Ambassador Anne Kari Hansen Ovind of the Kingdom of Norway.
Prior to becoming Norway's ambassador to Canada in January 2016, she led the Section for the High North, Polar Affairs and Marine Resources in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the previous six years. Ambassador Ovind has extensive experience in NATO affairs and was the first secretary at Norway's delegation to NATO in Brussels from 2003 to 2006. She also worked on matters of nuclear safety and bilateral cooperation with Russia in the North.
[Translation]
Her Excellency Anne Kari Hansen Ovind, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Norway, Royal Norwegian Embassy in Ottawa: Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. It is a great honour for me to appear before you today. Thank you very much for inviting me.
I will take this opportunity to share with you the Norwegian experience with peacekeeping, particularly in UN operations and other related operations.
[English]
The United Nations has held a dear position in Norway, and in the hearts and minds of many Norwegians, from the first operation in the Middle East in 1948, through operations in Lebanon and the Balkans, to current operations in Mali, to mention some. More than 60,000 Norwegian men and women have proudly worn the blue beret of peace and hope. Others have held key positions, adding to our long-standing contributions. Norway stands fully committed to doing our part in the international efforts to adapt UN peace operations to a new era.
We welcome the commitment of the Canadian government to re-engage with the UN.
The UN is under considerable strain to deliver on increasingly demanding mandates in increasingly demanding operational environments. UN personnel are directly targeted in the field and often find themselves, with limited training and equipment, trying to keep peace when there is no peace to keep.
Today, nine out of 10 UN peacekeeping personnel are from the global South. Norway believes that it is of paramount importance to increase Western participation. Canada's reengagement in UN peace operations will help in this regard.
There are three reasons we believe this to be important. First and foremost, we believe that increased Western contributions will boost the legitimacy of UN operations. We share a common responsibility for international peace and security.
Secondly, we possess many of the advanced capacities and skills needed to succeed in a complex security landscape.
Thirdly, the conflicts where UN peacekeeping is engaged are increasingly related to our own security, directly or indirectly. Geographical distance no longer provides protection against problems elsewhere in the world. Take Mali, for example. Geographically located as a gateway to the Euro-Atlantic area, Mali is a hub for international terrorism, gun smuggling and human trafficking. It is a transit country for migration. Locally, the UN plays a vital role in contributing to stability and sustainable peace. At the same time, the mission is an important part of the fight against violent extremism internationally.
Honourable members of the committee, while recognizing the crucial role peace operations can play, we must also realize that our demands and expectations are exceeding what peacekeeping can deliver today. We must acknowledge that quantity is not enough. We need to improve the quality of what the UN does, from the situational understanding on the ground to the training and standard of UN personnel, as well as the state of the equipment. UN peacekeeping efforts cannot be based on which capacities we can offer, but what the conflict requires and the UN's ability to deliver just that.
To do so, more resources must be accompanied by significant reforms. Norway believes that the work of the high-level independent panel — the so-called HIPPO report that was presented in June last year — has given us the reforms we need in both the short-and the long-term perspective. The member states and the UN must work together to make these reforms a reality. We must do so rapidly and decisively and with an open mind. Norway has been a firm supporter of these reform efforts.
There will always be limited resources. That is as true for the member states as it is for the UN as a whole, and that is why we need to think smart, make use of each other's natural advantages and look for force multipliers.
A country of five million people, Norway has a modest defence budget. We are dependent on finding those smart solutions in partnership with each other. Norway may be small, but we pack considerable punch within certain niche capacities that, together with another country's contributions, could turn out to be exactly what will make a big difference on the ground in a certain operation. I believe this is true for all member states.
The most important thing we and other countries can do to support UN peace operations and the ongoing reform process is to deploy troops and capacities that actually back those efforts.
Currently, Norway contributes with 100 military personnel serving in four UN operations, with Mali, South Sudan and the Middle East as the most important theatres. In addition, Norway makes important contributions to NATO's Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan and to the coalition against ISIL in Iraq; and we will deploy to Jordan to assist in the training of local Syrian groups that are fighting against ISIL. We also have 37 police advisers engaged in Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan.
Honourable members of the committee, I will come back to concrete Norwegian contributions during the question and answer session. I would just like to emphasize the importance of Canadian police taking part in UN peace operations. Police have a key role in UN missions, and there's a great demand for French-speaking police. Canada's recent announcement of increasing the number of police contributions to UN missions is highly appreciated.
Right now there is a better positive momentum for more effective, efficient and responsive UN peace operations. That momentum was created by the reform process and further sustained by last year's summit in New York on UN peacekeeping operations and followed up at the recent meeting of ministers of defence in London, recently.
[Translation]
The renewal of Canada's commitment will be welcomed in the contribution to maintaining this momentum. Canada's support is also important to enable the next Secretary General of the UN to continue the crucial reform initiated by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. Thank you for your attention.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Jaffer: Ambassador, thank you very much for being here. I want to start off by saying to you that I know that each member of our committee would like to thank Norway for Norway's contribution, especially when it comes to peace operations.
I have worked with your foreign minister for at least two years, and I want to ask about Norway's gendered foreign policy. I would appreciate it if you would explain to the members and to Canadians what that means. Why does Norway think that is important, and what is it?
Ms. Ovind: Thank you for that question, senator.
Including women in peace operations, foreign policies and the 1325 agenda is not primarily about gender equality; it is really about improving outcomes. We are talking about improving the possibility of sustainability, sustainable peace, sustainable economic growth and welfare; and in relation to operations, we are talking about improving capacity, operational effectiveness and mission success.
I want to refer to Norway's Minister of Defence, at the summit in London recently, saying that recruiting more women is not only the right thing to do, it's the smart thing to do. It improves armed forces and provides the UN with better peacekeepers.
I can share with you a few examples of how Norway has been working on the issue of increasing the recruitment to the military and also to UN operations. Let me just mention that it was a milestone reach for Norway when we, as a first NATO country, implemented gender neutral conscription to our Armed Forces. This year almost one out of five of our 8,000 new conscripts are women. Next year we expect that that number will be one out of four. Of course, if they choose a military career that will be a good basis for recruiting women to our national defence, but also to international operations.
Another important milestone from our perspective was also when Major General Kristin Lund, who was the first female force commander in a UN peace operation, was appointed by the Secretary-General in 2013, and her role was actually prolonged until recently. I think that demonstrates that within the UN it is possible for women to really go for top positions, even as a force commander, and is certainly a good role model for women to follow.
I will stop there. I wanted to mention also that in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs we have a guide on how we actually include and work actively on the gender issue in foreign affairs and also development aid, but I wanted to share these examples with you from the topic that we are discussing today.
Senator Jaffer: For quite a while, Canada was the leader when it came to Resolution 1325 and to including women in decision making and other places, especially when it came to foreign affairs and internationally. Norway is now the leader on Resolution 1325 here, especially when it comes to having more women in decision-making places.
I would appreciate it if you could expand on how Norway is using Resolution 1325 to include women in its mission work.
Ms. Ovind: Let me give you one example from our engagement when it comes to facilitating, as a third country, peace processes. For instance, very recently, a peace agreement was reached between the Colombian government and the FARC, and I think the importance of including women in that process is a good example of how actually, as a facilitator, we were able to promote the inclusion of women in that process.
It established a subcommittee working on how women's perspectives could be included in different questions, and also, for the first time, there were women participating in both delegations. That is one example of how this is implemented.
Senator Jaffer: This morning we heard from a gentleman from South Africa who spoke about the work of ACCORD and also stated that Norway was a partner with ACCORD helping with training programs and sexual assault programs. He encouraged us to also play some kind of role with ACCORD. It would be interesting to hear your take on the partnership of Norway with ACCORD.
Ambassador, you cannot possibly be aware of everything Norway does. If you are not, please don't worry. You can send us an answer later on.
Ms. Ovind: Thank you for that, senator.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Thank you very much for your presentation, Ambassador. I would like to hear your thoughts on your experience with missions conducted with NATO, as compared to UN missions. Is the degree of risk the same between the different organizations?
[English]
Ms. Ovind: Thank you for the question, senator.
What is important to Norway is to contribute through UN, NATO and the international coalition against ISIL, and the participation really depends on how we can contribute the best that serves the operation the best, what kind of capacities we have that can serve the different operations, and what are the specific advantages and needs related to the different operations. Norwegian military participation is really to help promote peace and security in Norway and internationally and have international law as its basis. As I mentioned to you in my introductory remarks, we are contributing to four different UN missions at the moment and also to NATO missions, and we are contributing to the international coalition against ISIL, and that reflects Norway's priority.
I would be happy to share more details about the operations in priority.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: When you work with the UN or with NATO, do you have some difficulty knowing what guidelines are involved in the various missions you have to take on?
These are imposing organizations that have a lot of people working for them. Is it difficult to communicate with those organizations or are the mission guidelines still fairly clear, plain and precise?
[English]
Ms. Ovind: I can just answer in more general terms. It is important, of course, to have, before making a decision, consultations and involvement, engagement in advance, with the country or the head of the operation. That is important, but it is equally important to have close contact with the UN itself and the UN Secretariat and to have a good and close dialogue. I think that is the most important in preparing a decision and also during the operations.
Senator Beyak: Thank you, ambassador. In your opening remarks you mentioned your police officers and military personal in South Sudan. I wondered if you could give us a little bit more detail on the challenges they face and how they report back to you?
Ms. Ovind: South Sudan is, of course, a very important location where we have Norwegian engagement. We currently have 15 military officers in that mission. That includes staff officers and military observers. Norway also holds the military chief of staff position on an annual, rotational basis with the U.K., and currently it is the U.K. that holds this position.
When it comes to our police contribution, there are some more general challenges I can share, of course. The language skills are really important for all UN personnel, maybe especially in the police. I think here the Canadians have a great advantage as you are both English-and French-speaking. We welcome Canada's contribution in that respect.
Of course, the safety and security of UN peacekeepers is a key concern to Norway, as it is to other member states, so what we can do to improve training and improve equipment and medical capacities is important, and we also see that training is tremendously important. That was what I could share with you on South Sudan because you were particularly interested in that.
Maybe just a little bit more on the capacity building because we have seen that Norwegian police advisers in the country have been earmarked for the training of the so-called Joint Integrated Police, which consists of members from the two conflict partners. Training in that situation has of course been hampered as a result of the strained relations between the parties in South Sudan and following the renewed fighting that took place in Juba this summer. Maybe that responds a little bit to your question.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: Thank you, Your Excellency. I am pleased to hear you speak French. Your French is excellent. Congratulations!
My question relates to the percentage of military spending. If the figures I have are accurate, I see that Norway currently devotes about 1.5 per cent of its GDP to military spending. I also see in my research that in 2015, the prime minister criticized the 2 per cent target. In some interviews, she said the 2 per cent target was absurd. However, if my dates are accurate, on June 17, 2016, the government introduced a law on military programming to ensure that military spending could rise to a certain threshold, and the target seems to be the 2 per cent.
Can you tell us about the background to that law, what its goal is, and what the importance is for Norway of getting closer to 2 per cent? I note that Canada is at about 1 per cent. However, we have two and a half times the borders or coastlines that Norway has. Can you say a little about this aspect of what the government of Norway wants to do?
[English]
Ms. Ovind: Thank you for that question. There is a target in NATO of reaching 2 per cent of the budget spending. In Norway, at a moment, the budget for 2016 amounts to approximately CA$7.8 billion, and what I think is important in that perspective is also what we plan to spend on investments. Some 24 per cent of that is planned for investments.
Over the past few years, the security situation in Europe has deteriorated, reminding us that we cannot really take our sovereignty over our rights and freedoms for granted. Rapid change has also reminded us of the fact that we need to prepare to be able to respond in a crisis and take decisions now and not when the crisis occurs.
So we need to make the right decisions on investments today. Therefore, the Norwegian government recently presented a white paper to parliament, describing the long-term plan for the Norwegian Armed Forces for the years 2017 to 2020. In that white paper, the government recommended a gradual increase in the defence budgets over the course of the coming four years.
For the first time, the long-term plan also incorporates the growth cost of military equipment above and beyond regular inflation as an integral part of its financial planning. That is, the priorities in the defence long-term plan are to strengthen our national defence, to strengthen NATO's ability for collective defence and also to contribute to international crisis management.
This long-term plan, this white paper, has been presented to the parliament and is now being considered.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: I understand that the law introduced on June 17, 2016, is being examined and has not yet been enacted. However, there is a desire to ensure that there will be investment. Can you talk to us about the targets or parameters in the white paper, or the bill, that aims to ensure that, notwithstanding changes of government, those investments can continue over time? One of the problems we have here is that, with changes of government and different visions, the military budget has ups and downs, and that creates inconsistency in our investments.
[English]
Ms. Ovind: This long-term plan, once it is approved, will help to steer the direction of investments for this period. Of course, I cannot comment on how the deliberations are going at the moment, but upon approval, that will be the basis for long-term budget decisions.
Senator Meredith: Thank you so much, Your Excellency. I heard part of your presentation as I was out of the room, and you talk about peace and capacity building and mission success. I'm talking about Africa and your commitment to Africa. You have currently got 127 peacekeepers deployed in UN missions. As well, we heard earlier from a court in South Africa that has been singing the praises of Norway with respect to your support and the fact that they rely upon the expertise of Norway and Canada in terms of success in the continent.
In the future or in terms of the deployment currently, will there be more troops from Norway in the continent with respect to the hot zones and the crises that are currently going on? And how can Norway, with Canada, collaborate more with respect to these deployments, with respect to UN missions?
Ms. Ovind: Thank you for that question, senator. It might not come as a surprise that there is considerable concurrence in the Norwegian and Canadian approaches and participation in the UN peace operations, as it really reflects overall foreign and security policy priorities. For Norway, it is important that our peace operations participation should be part of a broader engagement with the country in question. I think a comprehensive approach is key.
Geographically, our main focus since the mid-1990s has been Africa, and that is likely to remain so. Africa is still a continent with the largest number of both conflicts and peacekeepers. As I mentioned in my introductory remarks, we currently have about 100 military personnel serving in four UN operations, with Mali, South Sudan and the Middle East as the key theatre of operations.
If I may add a few words about our operation in Mali, because I think it relates to your question, senator. Norway has identified MINUSMA in Mali as a strategic priority, as stability in Mali and the region affects European security. We see our participation in MINUSMA as a part of our effort to counter violent extremism. We have currently 73 military personnel in Mali.
We are also concentrating on offering technology and niche capacities that, together with other countries' contributions, can make a real effect on the ground. Maybe I can offer three examples of how we do that currently.
The first example I wanted to mention is the intelligence unit. In Mali, Norwegian analysts have taken part in establishing the first modern intelligence unit in UN peacekeeping, the so-called All Sources Information Fusion Unit, and we believe that intelligence capabilities are key to preventing deadly attacks on both peacekeepers and civilians, as well as strengthening any mission's ability to do the job more safely and effectively. That headquarters is located at the camp next to Bamako airport, the camp that was provided and set up by Norway. This is an example of how we can contribute in a way that could lead to a force multiplier as we offer some modern technology to UN operations.
Another example is the use of C-130 Hercules. This year, we are participating with a C-130 Hercules in the UN mission in Mali for 10 months, and this is making the mission less dependent on the risk-prone convoys travelling through the vast deserts of Northern Mali. The transport aircraft that we are offering and currently deploy in Mali actually constitutes 25 per cent of our total number of C-130 aircraft.
The third example I wanted to mention in order to have an amplifying contribution is the Norwegian-led rotational system based in Camp Bifrost in Bamako, and that is really cooperating with Denmark, Sweden, Portugal and Belgium, and have a rotation system so that airlift capacity is offered until the end of 2018. I think that is an example of how countries can work together to offer capacities that are needed and that could be provided to the UN on a more sustainable basis.
I think those were my examples from those operations.
Senator Meredith: We're concerned about radicalization and youth radicalization. What best practices has Norway developed as you interact with these countries? We see what's happened with ISIS and with al Shabaab and with Boko Haram.
We are concerned here in Canada with what transpired, the attack that took place on our Parliament. We're concerned about that.
What best practices can you share with us with respect to exchanges with Canada as we put this report together? As we look at national security and the global security aspect of things, what happens in another country affects us here, and how we prevent those things. Can you share with us what sort of collaboration you are doing to diminish radicalization within your country and how you share those best practices with other countries that you deploy to?
Ms. Ovind: Dealing with radicalization is really a big problem. We all are looking for ways to best push back radicalization.
We are talking about security here. I think security and prosperity are interdependent. The key word here is also a "comprehensive'' approach. We share that comprehensive approach very much with Canada.
Let me explain. The root causes of radicalization are also found in poverty and in lack of hope for the future. That is the reason why Norway has increased our humanitarian aid this year and also stepped up our long-term aid development assistance to the regions of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq.
I believe we have to have a broad approach to stimulate prosperity in different ways, but in that process, education is really key, education and better health care systems. In our aid development policy, Norway has made education a priority. We are now increasing our efforts in education and development aid. We are stepping up our efforts a lot. We have to take that comprehensive approach: fighting back, when necessary, with means, but also supporting humanitarian aid and development aid in the long run.
I haven't got a very clear answer on that. We just have to work with partners like Canada and others, and have a long-term perspective to realize, I would say, the sustainable development goals. The sustainable development goals are really to increase development and sustainable welfare for all people, and we need to work together to realize that.
The Chair: Colleagues, I'd like to ask two questions, if I could.
First of all, I understand that Norway has been in Mali since 2011, in their capacity with the United Nations. I'm wondering if you could outline for us the successes that have happened over that period of time, because when it comes to Mali, we hear about all the terrorism that is going on and the other aspects of how difficult it is for the country and the fact that it is in disarray.
If you've been there that length of time, along with your and other countries, what successes have we had over and above trying to keep the peace?
Ms. Ovind: I'm sorry, senator, could you please repeat some of that question?
The Chair: Could you inform the committee of the successes that your country has experienced in Mali conjunction with others, over and above keeping the peace. The reality of it is that you've been there five years. We'd like to hear just exactly where you started in 2011, to where we are in 2016.
Ms. Ovind: I think I have to come back to that, senator, according to concrete examples. I just wanted to share with you what we are doing at the moment in Mali to further add value to our contribution, these three examples I mentioned, and in particular how we are cooperating with our Nordic counterparts and other European countries to make sure that we have a sustainable rotation system for aircraft capacity and airlift capacity.
I think that is a good example of how countries can work together and make sure that the UN and this operation have the necessary capacity to better protect personnel and also become more effective in theatre.
The Chair: Could you come back to us in writing to perhaps outline the successes, because that's one of the concerns that we have as a committee. If the decision is made by government to deploy, where are we starting from and where are we going, looking forward, in respect to working towards the foundations being put in place for a civil society? In the last five years — and perhaps you can take this down, and we can give you a copy of the Hansard — what has been accomplished in those areas where you have managed to keep the peace and you've managed, along with others, to be able to help, the constructive type of approach to a country that is obviously in disarray?
I'd like to move to one other question, if I could, because we're moving on in time. In your opening remarks you specifically refer to the question of the United Nations and the reforms. I'll read back what was said, for the record:
To do so, more resources must be accompanied by significant reforms. Norway believes that the work of the high-level independent panel — the so-called HIPPO report that was presented in June last year — has given us the reforms we need in both the short-and the long-term perspective.
Could you perhaps give us more information on exactly what you're talking about when you refer to reforms? The reason I ask this is that we have had a number of witnesses before our committee, both last spring and in the last number of days, referring to the United Nations and the very deep troubles that they have in respect to the question of their ability to not only commit to what they're doing but also to ensure that it's done properly. I guess that's a concern we would have as well, if we're going to make a further commitment to the United Nations: What reforms are going to be done so that we ensure that what's being asked of us is being done properly?
Ms. Ovind: Thank you for that question. As I mentioned, it is an important momentum for pushing reforms of peace operations, and it will also be an important issue for the next Secretary-General.
I wanted to say that the HIPPO recommendation is very much in line with Norwegian priorities, and we will, through that process, work towards enhancing and highlighting the need for a political strategy in all operations, with more focus on preventing conflicts and mediating peace, and also responsive and more tailored operations. Also, a stronger partnership with regional organizations is key. More field-focused and people-centred operations are what we think are highlighted in this report and are important to work on in this reform process.
I also want to underscore the need to continuously work toward including and engaging with women. That is also key for UN success.
Senator Jaffer: Ambassador, some of these answers I know, but just for the record — and we do have Canadians watching this program as well — how large is your defence force?
Ms. Ovind: At the moment there are 8,000 conscripts.
Senator Jaffer: How many are in Mali?
Ms. Ovind: In Mali we have at the moment 73.
Senator Jaffer: Seventy-three men and women?
Ms. Ovind: I do not know exactly the number of women. I know that for our police advisers' contribution, some 30 per cent are women. I also underscore the importance of including women in our peace operations, on the police side.
Senator Jaffer: You have 73, and mainly what kind of work are they doing? Are they doing training, strategic planning? Where are they? Are they in Bamako?
Ms. Ovind: I'm sorry; I don't know all the details pertaining to the deployment.
Senator Jaffer: I would appreciate it if you would be so kind as to give those details to us. Earlier on, ambassador, you were asked how many people you've had throughout and exactly what have they been carrying out; you've been there since 2011. If you could provide that at the same time, that would be helpful.
Ambassador, the reason I ask the question is that the boots on the ground is a large number in Mali. Some witnesses who have come before us have asked how many can Canada provide. Six hundred? What can 600 do when there are already so many in Mali? It's interesting that you are doing such good work with 73 people.
That is why it's important for us to understand exactly what Norway is doing and how constructive a role Norway is playing with so few people. That would be helpful for our deliberations.
The last question I have for you, ambassador, is that I know, because I was involved with your mission in South Sudan for four years, and I was an envoy as well, I know the tremendous work Norway did with mediation, negotiations and working with John Garang. Do you have the same kind of role in Mali as well? I'm not talking about the defence force, but other people. Are they helping with peacekeeping? Are they trying to negotiate with the different rebel groups, as you did in Sudan?
Ms. Ovind: I haven't answered all your questions, senator; I'm sorry for that. I wanted to add that regarding numbers, the key is competence, capacity and the ability to actually effectively implement the mandate of the operation, not merely the number.
I will look into the details regarding the number of women and come back to you.
Senator Jaffer: Ambassador, I want to make clear that we didn't expect you to answer all the questions. You are the ambassador to Canada and not on the defence force. So we were not expecting that; but we are hoping that through you we can get this information. So please don't feel that you need to answer all the questions.
I would like to end by saying that Canada works very closely with Norway, and we are very much fans of the work Norway does. Thank you very much for being here today.
Senator Meredith: Your Excellency, thank you again for being here.
We've heard previously from other witnesses — and the retired generals were here — about the challenges facing the United Nations. Your country has been able to work through those challenges. Can you elaborate on the lack of resources and so forth when your troops are deployed on these missions, and how you overcome those challenges? What can Canada learn as we deploy our troops, especially to South Sudan? And we've been in Congo and Mali. Can you elaborate as to how you've been able to overcome some of those challenges with respect to lack of resources, especially with the UN?
Ms. Ovind: What has been important to Norway is to look into what kind of general, comprehensive interest is there, and also what kind of need is there for capacity. As well, what can Norway possibly contribute? That has been important.
The safety aspect is important in considering contributions. There are a number of issues that are important and need to be evaluated and looked into thoroughly in consultation with a number of actors before decisions are made.
It is very well reflected where we are contributing to these operations that I have mentioned, and in addition also to NATO missions and the coalition of fighting ISIL.
The Chair: Thank you, colleagues. We're coming to the end of our time. I want to thank you very much, Ambassador Ovind, for taking time out of your busy schedule and for your presentation. It was very informative, especially knowing how involved Norway is in the countries that we're referring to. Thank you again.
We are now on to the final panel of the day considering the issues related to the defence policy review and Canada's re-engagement in UN peace support operations. Joining us now is Ms. Carolyn McAskie, Senior Fellow Graduate, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa.
Ms. McAskie has extensive experience in the fields of peacekeeping and international aid and development. From June 2004 to April 2006 she served as a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN peacekeeping operation in Burundi, one of a handful of women to lead a UN mission. From May 2006 until August 2008 she was Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding, serving as the most senior official responsible for the newly created Peacebuilding Commission of the United Nations. From 1999 to 2004, she was the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordination at the UN.
Prior to her UN career, Ms. McAskie worked for the Canadian government in the Canadian International Development Agency, holding the rank of assistant deputy minister from 1993 to 1999.
Ms. McAskie is an officer of the Order of Canada and was also a director at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and served on the board of CANADEM. She is currently a senior fellow with the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs with the University of Ottawa.
Ms. McAskie. I understand you have an opening statement.
Carolyn McAskie, Former Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and Head of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Burundi (ONUB), as an individual: Thank you very much. I am very pleased that the translators wanted some opening remarks in advance because it set me to thinking ahead of time and ordering my intervention. If you will permit me, I will start right in.
Let me start by saying that I am very pleased to come before you and offer some insights into United Nations peacekeeping. You mentioned that I had been SRSG and head of mission for the UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi. I would like to say also that I am in fact the only Canadian to have served in this kind of capacity in a modern, comprehensive UN mission in Burundi made up of 5,600 troops, 120 police and 1,000 civilians.
Other distinguished Canadians who have led UN forces in the field did so in the days before the comprehensive missions when they were leading the military effort, which was not part of a modern comprehensive mission under civilian control, backed up by political, human rights, rule of law and development resources. In fact, that's one of the reasons why there were so many problems in those days, and many of our distinguished generals suffered from that.
I strongly welcome the current government's plans to return to peacekeeping after so many years. Canada's absence, and we should say over two successive governments, has been unfortunate and has lasted too long to the detriment of our reputation and to peacekeeping as a whole. Peacekeeping needs Canada, but it needs more NATO members also. Most of Canada's peacekeeping experience predates the reforms which have characterized the last 15 years. It will be critical for Canada to come to terms with modern integrated peace operations to ensure our success.
In the year 2000, UN peace operations changed dramatically with what is now referred to as the Brahimi report, which gave rise to these comprehensive integrated missions under civilian control. The UN and its international and local partners under this model would plan and implement support to post-conflict countries to ensure that political, military, development, humanitarian and human rights support could be added in a comprehensive way.
A much stronger relationship was forged among the mission, the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council to ensure there would never be another fiasco such as Rwanda, where General Dallaire was left high and dry after the U.S. refused to allow the Security Council to characterize the crisis as genocide.
Peace operations have been the object of a series of other significant reforms, with the publication last year of the report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. The reforms have continued. I have a copy of the report here, and I would be happy to address that also in questions.
I would like to make a number of quick, sharp points.
Number one, when you talk about the UN — and this is a big mistake a lot of people make, especially in peacekeeping but in other fields — you are more often than not talking about member states. "The UN did this; the UN did that; the UN failed here; the UN was not able to do that; the UN could not come to an agreement.'' There is no such thing as an individual entity with its own power and resources. It is wholly a member state institution. If there are problems — and of course there are, such as inadequate HQ response, poorly equipped or trained troops, badly designed or unrealistic mandates — it is member states that have designed the mandates and supplied the poorly equipped troops. The tragedy of Canada's long absence under the last two governments is that we never saw ourselves as a member state obligated to fix the very problems we were quick to criticize.
My second point is this: Do not think of this as a military operation. Now, I know this is the Senate Committee on National Defence, but it is a political operation that requires military assets, so you have to keep the overarching political agenda in mind. The 2015 high-level panel called for a return to the search for peaceful political settlements, backed, where necessary, by the use of force. This means we should not just be providing troops. Missions are desperate for good political officers, human rights personnel and development budgets. Headquarters is desperate for personnel in support capacities.
I'm not entirely sure of my ratio here, but I'm going to give you a rough figure to give you an idea. The U.S. Army operates on the basis of one person in headquarters for every two in the field. That's the ratio of support from HQ.
In the UN, it is more than 1 to 100 or 1 to 200. Member states have not given the UNHQ military HQ capability necessary to run 100,000 troops in the field, yet we're quick to criticize. This was a major characteristic of the Canadian military's reaction in the 1990s, that they had no faith in the UN headquarters.
First, it is brilliant now compared to what it was then. It has improved enormously, but it is still understaffed by the standards of NATO in terms of the HQ support to the field. And don't forget that most of the UN military come from countries that are unable to fully equip and train their personnel.
Number three, there's a lot of talk in the papers about how it is not traditional peacekeeping anymore. My advice to you is don't get hung up on traditional peacekeeping. There has been no such thing since the Cold War. The one main exception, interestingly enough, was UNMEE, the UN mission patrolling the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2002, which ironically was the only one to attract two Western powers, Canada and the Netherlands.
Early post-Cold War missions in Africa and Central America long before the integrated mission concept of the Brahimi report in the year 2000 already included elections, disarmament and human rights, although that integrated approach under civilian command was still missing.
My fourth point is that you read a lot about Canada's whole-of-government approach, with cooperation among defence, development and diplomacy. It was a useful exercise. It had a lot of serious critics in Afghanistan in terms of trying to get different departments to talk to each other. But by and large — and I say this as someone with a CIDA background — the military ran the show. Our fabled development program, which at one point was the largest Canadian development program on our books, shrank when the military pulled out. Afghanistan was mainly a military exercise for Canada.
Comprehensive UN missions are quite different. They are under the civilian control of an SRSG, a special representative, with a force commander, the political deputy SRSG and the development deputy SRSG reporting as three equals to the SRSG head of mission. They operate together under a strategic vision and plan for the mission as a whole, closely allied with the host government, military and civilian authorities, as well as a broad range of international partners.
In Burundi, I regularly convened a round table that included the World Bank, the donors represented on the ground, the European Union and various NGO organizations. It is all done on the ground in partnership.
Number five, if you will use this expression, ignore the nervous Nellies who say, "Oh, but we might have casualties.'' Excuse me? You are going into war zones. Of course it's dangerous. It's a war zone. That's why we're helping, and that's why we have troops, to go into war zones. Of course armies take precautions, and I know it doesn't read well at home when there are casualties. I totally understand that aspect, but if we want a casualty-free war, stay home and keep your troops on parade. That's my reaction to that.
And remember, Canadian civilians with no support from their government are on the front lines all the time as aid workers, humanitarians, political officers, gender and human rights staff in missions and in active and advocacy NGO work all over the world.
I would like to tell you a personal story. Do you remember those banners at the Ottawa airport that read "Support our Troops''? The first time I saw those, I was working for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and I was coming back from missions where we had buried our humanitarian workers. The first time I saw the big banners "Support our Troops,'' I almost cried. Where was the support for our humanitarians dying — yes, dying — on the front lines?
After the tragedy of Rwanda, what did the Western world do? It retreated. One massive failure, a failure of member states that refused to respond in the Security Council, and it was game over. Five years later, more humanitarian workers were being killed in war zones than peacekeepers. This is a matter of record.
That is what inspired me to join the UN in 1999 as Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
In addition, in Burundi, because Canadians are bilingual and they're highly sought after in the UN, the largest number of civilians on my mission staff were Senegalese, the second-largest number were Canadians. The Canadians were serving in Burundi, even though I came to Ottawa and asked Defence, Foreign Affairs and CIDA for support to the one Canadian running an integrated peacekeeping mission, and I got zero, zero and zero. But I had my Canadians. They were all Canadians hired by the UN who came to a war zone because that's what they do, and that's what they feel is needed.
Let me turn to another question. This is my point number six. I was reading an article in the Globe or the Citizen about how we need to define whether some of these missions are in our national interest. Is Mali in our national interest? Is Colombia in our national interest?
I would like to take you through an argument to look at what is the full meaning of our national interest. In this day of cross-border terrorism, environmental, health and migrant issues, our national interest is a global one. Canada's peace, security, and prosperity depend on a stable and secure world. Global poverty and underdevelopment and their link to environmental degradation, political unrest and bad governance have long been understood.
A return to peacekeeping requires a better understanding of the causes of conflict, along with a commitment to engage in prevention. It costs the world four times as much to address conflicts than it would to prevent them through up-front investment.
A Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, said almost 200 years ago that our self-interest properly understood goes far beyond our political and geographic borders. The self-interest of others, the common welfare is, in fact, a precondition for one's own ultimate well-being. Global security and prosperity are in everybody's interests, which is why we have a United Nations in the first place. That's why I'm very pleased to see that the current government is moving into these areas of supporting broad global issues, because they are in our interest.
Point number 7: Invest in training, not just for Canadians, but for third-world partners. Canada lost a precious and globally recognized tool when the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre was allowed to die on the books. Established in 1994 as the first of its kind, it inspired a global network of peacekeeping institutions around the world, the International Association of Peace Centres. This community was dumbstruck that the Canadian government would pull the plug on the Pearson Centre, a leader in its class.
Serious consideration should be given to reviving it, either outside government or within government, such as the Swedish model, the Folke Bernadotte Academy named after a famous Swedish diplomat.
Number 8: Let me touch on the whole issue of sexual exploitation in UN missions very briefly. I would challenge you to understand better what the real issues are in sexual exploitation and UN missions. There has been a lot of gnashing of teeth and wringing of hands over this. It is a critical and appalling testament to the behaviour of men in uniform. But to say it is a UN problem alone when we now know that many military and police organizations have had their own problems means we are missing the point.
First of all, it is extremely difficult for the UN hierarchy to deal with this when member states refuse to either recall or punish perpetrators. Troops on the ground still belong to their governments, not to something called "the UN.'' And the UN Secretary-General does not have the authority to send these people home.
It is not a third-world problem. We keep thinking, "Oh, well, these poor countries, they're undisciplined.'' A recent major scandal involves French troops in the Central African Republic who have been sent home for running a child prostitution ring, and their government has so far not sanctioned them. Canada, unfortunately, as we now know — luckily it is few incidents; I don't want to exaggerate — is not immune.
Sexual exploitation is a military issue, and it is a male-violence issue which happens to occur in the UN. It is also a women's rights issue. Societies which involve women more broadly in all spheres are more successful, more peaceful and better able to solve and prevent conflicts and maintain peace agreements. This also, ladies and gentlemen, is a matter of public record.
Finally, you have all heard the expression "go big or go home.'' I would add "go strategically.'' Six hundred is better than 19, which is our current total number of soldiers. But it still leaves us in thirty-eighth slot behind Fiji. I heard you questioning the previous witness, the Norwegian ambassador, about how well they're doing with 73. Well, Norway has a population of 3 million. We have a population of 35 million, a much bigger force, and we play a bigger game. Six hundred leaves us in thirty-eighth place, as I said, behind Fiji. As a starting point, it is extremely welcome. I do not want to denigrate the effort, as long as the numbers are not spread too thinly over multiple missions — a few here, a few there. There's room for that, some strategic interventions in headquarters or in particular missions, but try to have a critical mass. Six hundred is almost a battalion, so try to keep that.
I would recommend there should also be a growth plan, but also a longer-term strategy, particularly for Africa, where almost two thirds of UN missions are concentrated. Such a strategy should take account of other players. This is not something we can design at home. Think of the French role in western central Africa. We need to be talking to all the partners who are involved, and it must include an understanding of the causes of individual conflicts and be matched with an appropriate investment in peace building and development. A military investment alone is not enough.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you very much for your presentation today. I also want to congratulate you and thank you for the role you have played in the UN. As you said, there have been no Canadians that have played the role that you have played, and I'm sure at the moment, with what is happening in Burundi, you must have many sleepless nights.
You are a leader in these issues, so I have many questions of you. We have been having these hearings for a few weeks or months, and one question that keeps coming up is whether we should be aligned to NATO or to the United Nations.
Ms. McAskie: Exactly.
Senator Jaffer: When that question comes, it grates me because they're two different things, and we need to be at both places. I would like to hear from you what you think.
Ms. McAskie: Right. Well, I realize it is a numbers game as much as anything else because the easy answer is that it should both. Canada is an important member of NATO. We should not be giving that up. You may have noticed that in my remarks I said that this is an opportunity for Canada to try to engage more NATO members to support the UN.
The UN can do things and go places that NATO can't, or won't, because of its decision-making structure. NATO is a more cumbersome and heavier tool, and if I listen to my general friends, it wasn't easy operating within a NATO structure in Afghanistan. It is not that NATO works, the UN doesn't. We have got to get away from that.
The issue here is that the UN is a political, development and humanitarian organization, which, through the Security Council, is able to draw on a military capacity. It is a very different kind. How many exercises does NATO have? I couldn't tell you right now, actually, whereas the UN is very transparent. The UN has 16 full-fledged peacekeeping missions around the world, and it has political negotiators attached through what is called the good offices of the Secretary-General to every single political negotiation in the world.
The UN has its finger on a whole lot of other pulses that NATO doesn't. NATO can gather up the sum total of the expertise of its individual members, but because of the structure of the UN Secretariat, too, they have a tremendous capability for analyzing the information.
Given the high profile right now of a whole lot of UN missions, I would say that after our experiences with NATO, it is time for us to put the emphasis on the UN through the Security Council. The UN has 100,000 troops on the ground right now. That represents the largest army in the world, but when you divide it up among the various missions, you realize that each mission is not very big.
I remember being — I suppose "annoyed'' is the word — frustrated, I guess — at criticisms of the UN operation in the Congo. The whole UN operation in the Congo in terms of troops was the size of what was called the "Obama surge'' in Afghanistan. Afghanistan had 150,000 troops, and Obama put another 15,000 or 20,000 troops in to reinforce the effort. The Congo had been running for 10 or 12 years on anything from 15,000 to 18,000 to 19,000 troops. Those of you who understand how the military operates — and I'm sure that's all of you on the committee — if you have 18,000 troops, you only have 6,000 active because six are down and six are supporting, because that includes your supply chains, hospitals, transport, and it includes your admin and running your bases.
That means that 18,000 troops for a place the size of the Congo and the tremendous problems in Eastern Congo. It is not a lot. Yet that was one of the biggest.
Senator Jaffer: I'm a dreamer, so if NATO's capacity, ability and competence — and as you said, if some of the members, with Canada, strengthened the UN capacity, we would have a different kind of UN peace operation; isn't that correct?
Ms. McAskie: I totally agree. In fact, I have said that to NATO ambassadors. I met with NATO ambassadors when I was on the UN Peacebuilding Commission, and they said to me, "Why does New York not love us?'' And I said, "Well, first, you criticize them, and, second, you won't join their missions. What's to love, you know?''
I don't see why you couldn't put a NATO unit into a UN mission, but you would still need to work out the whole question of who is in command — "Who's on first?''
Senator Jaffer: This might be a biased question, because I am a senator who is originally from Africa, but I get this feeling in this committee from some of the questions that are asked that people are nervous when it comes to Africa. You have served in Africa. Recently when I travelled, I saw many Canadian humanitarian workers running camps and doing all kinds of work.
Ms. McAskie: Yes.
Senator Jaffer: Should we be frightened about going to Africa?
Ms. McAskie: If we are frightened about going to Africa, we shouldn't call ourselves Canadians. To be frightened for our army to go to Africa is degrading, embarrassing.
What's to be frightened of? I lived in Burundi for two years. I lived in Kenya in my twenties, doing aid work. I have travelled in almost every country south of the Sahara. I have met with rebel groups in Sierra Leone and with rebels in the Eastern Congo. I have never once been afraid.
Now, we have had incidents where humanitarian workers have been killed by rebel groups. It happens. But we have to ask ourselves the question: Do we want to solve these problems? You can't do it if you don't go. It doesn't work if you don't go. We can't stand back; we have to be part of it. We have to be on the ground.
Frankly, the more Western countries that are prepared to put their money where their mouth is and get on the ground in Africa, the better. Africa is an amazing place — an amazingly complex place and an amazingly varied place. I go to Tanzania often. It is a beautiful country. It is the most peaceful country imaginable. Ghana is successful economically. Senegal is doing really well. We don't hear those stories.
The whole issue of Mali is very complex. It is a long-term failure of environmental degradation and poor governance.
Then, of course, there was the spillover of arms from the Libya exercise. Libya was such a tragedy that the UN officials who were designing follow-up missions were left high and dry. The Western world — in Canada, we even had our fly-by on Parliament Hill: "We have done the job.'' No, all we did — like the marines — was to kick open the door. Then you have to get in there and do the job.
We did not do the job in Libya. As a result, those arms are all over the place, and they're fuelling al Qaeda, the Magreb, Boko Haram and all these others.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Thank you, Ms. McAskie.
I was pleased to hear you say in your presentation that the operations are more political than military. The committee has heard several military witnesses, and some of them cast doubt on Canada's preparedness for peacekeeping missions in Africa and our capacity to ensure the security of our soldiers and our troops.
What do you think would be the chances of success for a peacekeeping mission in Africa, given that some of the witnesses we have heard talked about gaps in the preparation of our soldiers?
Ms. McAskie: You mean gaps on the part of Canadian soldiers or in general?
Senator Dagenais: In general, when it comes to the actual preparation, some witnesses identified gaps in the preparation of reservists, among other things.
Ms. McAskie: Given the fact that we have been away from it for nearly two and a half decades, we do not have a lot of soldiers who have experience. But we have to start somewhere. I can never be persuaded that this is a good reason not to do it. On the contrary, it is a good reason to start doing it.
We should point out that a group of Canadian soldiers would be on the ground with other soldiers who have a lot of experience. Even though few Western countries have troops on the ground, in Africa or elsewhere, a lot of countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Ghana or Kenya have troops who are very well trained, who know their work and who work together a lot. I know, from the Peacekeeping Centre, that Canada was very committed to supporting those troops in their training.
I believe that nothing can replace on-site training. We have to start somewhere. That is what I would encourage. Does that answer your question?
Senator Dagenais: Yes, thank you.
We are not very familiar with the tangible objectives to be achieved in Africa, and I note that you have a great deal of experience. With respect to the length of the mission for which the government would be prepared to commit troops, would it not be good to set a deadline even before deploying the troops? We could say that we are sending troops, but that after one year or two years, they would be withdrawn.
Ms. McAskie: The policy, from the Security Council's perspective, is that all missions are approved six months at a time. There is therefore always an exit door if the need is felt. The practice is to rotate troops. There is never one unit that is on site for more than six months at a time. It can be replaced by other troops. That means that if Canada commits to participating in a mission in Mali, Congo or elsewhere, it is more or less understood that it would be for a period of time. It would not be a good idea to start by setting a deadline of two or three years, or six months. That would give a bad impression.
Senator Dagenais: Right.
Ms. McAskie: It also gives the impression to personnel, whether military, political or otherwise, that they are there only for a certain period. That also inhibits any real personal investment in the work, in the preparation and in the long-term vision. It is really a matter of working well with the others, because Canada is not working alone, obviously. There are other soldiers.
Before coming here, I read the mission mandate for Mali. I have forgotten how many people are part of it, but it is certainly thousands of people, 600 of whom come from Canada, which is not a huge group.
Senator Dagenais: Thank you, Ms. McAskie.
Ms. McAskie: It is my pleasure.
[English]
Senator Meredith: Thank you so much for your presentation. Again, I echo the words of my colleague, Senator Jaffer, with respect to your service to Canada and the world and what you have aspired to. You are obviously an inspiration to others.
Ms. McAskie: I always enjoyed it and always had a good time.
Senator Meredith: You're fearless as well, so that's awesome.
One of your comments was that about two thirds of the missions are in Africa. I have sat here and listened to the witnesses, and my question is with respect to how we engage with the partners on the ground to minimize the risk to our Canadians. You talked briefly about the pursuit of our seat on the Security Council. Previous witnesses talked about how it would be unwise to spend the money to pursue that seat, and how we could further invest, instead, with respect to saving lives and capacity building within these countries that we're deploying to.
Please elaborate for me on that. I have a couple of follow up questions, if the chair would permit.
Ms. McAskie: Are you asking about the value of being on the Security Council?
Senator Meredith: No, we're pursuing that. I am asking two or three questions together here. It's about how we engage partners on the ground, and the investment that we're pursuing to get the Security Council seat. Would that money not be better spent engaging in capacity building with these countries?
Ms. McAskie: I think engaging in capacity building with these countries is tremendously important. I think that need will always be there, whether we participate in peacekeeping or not.
I would hope that with increases to the development budget, with a more proactive diplomatic profile and with an interest in peacekeeping that, while it's not possible for us to do everything, we can spread ourselves around a bit. I don't think it has to be either-or at this stage.
Whether it's good for us in terms of whether this will help our Security Council vote or not, I think that Canada needs to be back in peacekeeping.
My sense is, from everything I read, that three quarters of Canadians support it, that it's an issue for Canadians, and the fact that we haven't been there has been a negative issue in the minds of Canadians. It's a very important signal of our return to the world stage, but it's not just a symbolic signal; it is in fact a very real need.
I spent almost 10 years in the UN on the humanitarian peacekeeping and peace building side, and I saw how extraordinarily difficult it was for my colleagues who were trying to put peacekeeping missions together to go around the world constantly to beg and to borrow — maybe not to steal — assets here and there. If they had that option, they might have tried it.
I remember the Darfur exercise and how horrified we all were by that. We were able to get troops, but they were mostly Africans from neighbouring countries, and these were countries that didn't have the kind of equipment the mission needed, for example, like attack helicopters. It was impossible to get that kind of equipment from Western countries.
There are different ways of doing it. If Canada decided they wanted a casualty-free war, we could send planes and attack helicopters, and we could send support. But if we don't commit our own troops, then we have to ask ourselves why we have an army, if we don't want casualties. Now, I'm not taking casualties lightly. This is a tough thing to say because it sounds as if, oh, I don't care if a few boys get killed. Absolutely not. This is horrendous and it's a terrible strain on the families, but if people join the army they have to expect that at some point they will be put in harm's way.
I really feel that our number one priority should be to do that. But we still have the capability, even if we do that, to do capacity training.
There are a lot of exercises out there on capacity building in Africa involving Canadians, Americans, the EU and Brits, and as I said, the Pearson Centre was engaged in a lot of them. There is a lot that we could do very easily.
Senator Meredith: As a follow-up to that, you said that we are always blaming the UN. It's the member states, and we thank you for your further clarification on that.
One of the things that a country always faces as a member of NATO and the UN is with respect to requests that come to Canada and the deployment of our troops. Is it, in your opinion, that there should be a parliamentary vote prior to deployment when a request comes in? As well, after what period of time should there be a review of our deployment? Should it be two years or three years, in your opinion? Can you elaborate for the committee?
Ms. McAskie: Once you have troops on the ground in a UN commission, you should be reviewing it constantly. How is it working? Are you wasting your time twiddling your thumbs? Or are you in over your heads? Should the mission be reinforced?
But the thing is that the contingent commanders on the ground have a lot to say in what the strategy is on the ground all the time. The review is happening. When I was in Burundi, I was on the phone all the time with senior people in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. My force commander, who was a brilliant South African, was constantly in touch with the military advisors in New York about what was feasible and what could be done.
What's interesting is that I had a number of troops, some of whom would have been in touch with their own HQs, like the Pakistanis, but it was less so with others, like the Ethiopians and the Mozambicans.
It's going to be an interesting exercise for Canada to see where we sit in the hierarchy, because one of the things I haven't heard mentioned, just because I haven't been that involved, is whether we are looking to take on the job of force commander. If we put in 600 troops, do we want to have the post? Is that going to be the quid pro quo, that we have the force commander position?
What if the Dutch or the French have 1,000 or 2,000 troops? Canada's not going to be the force commander.
Now, the way it works is you have a force commander, and then you have country contingent commanders, and the contingent commanders, ultimately, have to agree before their contingent is involved in an actual exercise.
There is a whole range of exercises for troops on the ground. They're not going to be on the front line waging war very often. Mali, in particular, is becoming a very dangerous place because of the terrorist groups.
Senator Meredith: Let me interject quickly. What should Parliament's role be with respect to whether to deploy, or to retract our troops that we do deploy, in your opinion?
Ms. McAskie: I don't know. I have no experience in that. I'm sorry, senator.
Senator Meredith: I thought I would gain your view.
Ms. McAskie: I realize it's a critical issue. Does Parliament vote if we go to war, for example? I don't know on that one, sorry.
The Chair: I should hope so. If they don't, we have a bit of a problem. That's why it's called a democracy.
Senator Jaffer: One of the things when you are in conflict zones, especially coming from women, is the issue of impunity, and UN forces have the privilege of impunity. I believe that if Canada becomes active again, one of the things that Canada needs to deal with is the issue of peacekeepers enjoying impunity, because that destroys all the good work that has been done. I would appreciate your view on that.
Ms. McAskie: There are rules of engagement in any mission, and the troops have to accept that. I was very fortunate in Burundi in that we did not have any serious incidents. I had one issue, which was characterized as sexual exploitation, but, frankly, it was two young soldiers who went out to a bar and they had a few drinks with a couple of girls who said they were 16 and they spent the night in the bar. Then we discovered the girls were 15, so it was underage sex and it was AWOL. These two boys were sent home.
Do you mean impunity mostly in terms of the sexual exploitation?
Senator Jaffer: One of the things that I have recently been working on is the issue of cholera in Haiti. I know that our immediate reaction is sexual assault, but many people contact me, and it can be anything, and the UN internal structures don't deal with that properly.
Ms. McAskie: Frankly, I'm appalled at how the cholera thing rolled out, I really am, because from what I know it was obvious at the beginning that there was an issue with infected Nepalese soldiers and it was getting into the water and then it infected the surrounding countryside.
I had a Pakistan unit who were absolute whizzes at building temporary bases upcountry in difficult places. If I had been in charge in Haiti and I'd had a unit like that, I would have sent them up there right away to clean it up and to get the Nepalese kids treated, quarantined, isolated. I don't know how it happened. I'm appalled that it got out of hand.
Second, I'm appalled — and I know the person involved — that a senior person in the UN refused for the UN to accept any accountability for it. Now, there's an issue here. Again, it goes to what the senator also mentioned and the responsibility of member states. The UN senior officials should have sat down with key member states right away and said, "Look, to start with, this is what happened, we should have fixed it, we are responsible, and this is what it's going to cost to clean it up. Can the member states add that to the Haiti budget to allow us to do it?'' Because there was no money in the Haiti budget to do it, and this was not even starting to talk about legal compensation to families who had lost family members to cholera.
That, to my mind, was a failure of UN personnel, but member states should have sat on them right at the beginning and said, "What's the problem? How do you fix it? What's it going to cost? How can we deal with it?'' But the UN should have admitted to that and taken responsibility right away. I couldn't agree more.
The Chair: Colleagues, I want to thank our witness for appearing. She obviously brings a lot of experience from the perspective of the issues that we're dealing with, and we very much appreciate the time and effort that you've put in.
I'd like to excuse the witness.
Ms. McAskie: Thank you for inviting me and bringing me out of retirement in beautiful Wakefield.
The Chair: Thank you for coming.
(The committee adjourned.)